Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Friday, January 12, 2018

Commentary: North Korea Takes Advantage of Flags of Convenience Regime

12 Jan, 2018  | Dr Vijay Sakhuja
Amid high decibel ‘verbal exchanges’ between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un over latter’s nuclear ambition, the United Nations Security Council announced on 22 December 2017 new economic sanctions against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The current sanctions, the ninth in the series since 2006, were pursuant to the recent intercontinental ballistic missile tests conducted by Pyongyang. These include limiting DPRK access to energy resources with ‘ban on condensates and natural gas liquids, a cap of 2 million barrels a year on refined petroleum products and a cap on crude oil exports to North Korea at current levels’.
The international shipping has in the past scrupulously adhered to UN sanctions and refrained from transporting embargoed goods to DPRK, barring a few vessels that were suspected of defying the sanctions. The US had also sought blacklisting of at least 10 vessels that are involved in illegally transferring oil at sea to be delivered to North Korean. These suspected vessels are flagged in Panama, Hong Kong and other registries including DPRK’s own register. Russian oil tankers were also suspected of providing ‘lifeline to the regime’ by engaging in ship-to-ship transfer at sea. The US put out satellite images of a North Korean ship trying to conduct a ship-to-ship transfer in October 2017, and President Donald Trump accused China ‘being caught red-handed selling oil to North Korea’.
The Panama Maritime Authority announced cancellation of registration of ship Koti operating under its flag (detained at a port in South Korea), and suspected of breaching the UN sanctions against North Korea. Another vessel, the Hong Kong flagged Lighthouse Winmore, also suspected of transferring refined petroleum products to the North Korean ship, the Sam Jong-2 in October 2017, was seized and remains in South Korea. Meanwhile, Taiwanese authorities brought before court a man ‘prosecutors allege to have made false declarations in the case of a Hong Kong-flagged tanker suspected of transferring oil to North Korea in violation of international sanctions’, but was later released on bail.
In the past, a number of North Korean vessels have been detained for carrying embargoed cargo. In fact, the country has a rich history of transporting illegally a variety of commodities ranging from drugs, small arms and weapons, oil and gas, missiles and even weapons of mass destruction. For instance, in 1999 the Indian authorities detained in the port of Kandla MV Ku Wol San, a North Korean vessel carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) accessories bound for Pakistan/Libya. On August 6, 2009, the Indian Navy undertook VBSS (visit, board seize and search) operations in the Andaman Sea against a North Korean vessel in support of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1874 that ‘strengthens arms embargo, calls for inspection of cargo vessels if states have ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe contain prohibited items’.
The ongoing imbroglio over the ship-to-ship transfer at sea in breach of the UN sanctions against DPRK has brought to fore the weaknesses in the Flag of Convenience (FoC) regime, which has been under scrutiny by the law enforcement agencies and international community. Linking ‘a State’, ‘a ship’ and ‘a flag’ is an age old practice and documented in antiquity. It helps to determine who owns the vessel, or has jurisdiction over it, and therefore empowered to prosecute it in case it is engaged in any illegal activity, or defend its operations in case national interests are in jeopardy.
As with any commercial enterprise, international shipping is market driven and therefore competitive. The primary aim of any shipping company is to enhance fiscal advantage, maximise revenue, and minimise costs. Ship owners’ carefully choose register for their ships and hence fly that country’s flag. In essence, economics is the decisive factor that will determine the flag a ship flies. Likewise, it is a win-win situation for the FoC registries. This practice generates revenue for the flag state in the form of fees, transactions and services provided to the ships seeking registration. These funds are critical for the flag state and bring in significant income. This widespread phenomenon has resulted in larger percentage of the world fleet under the FoC when compared with the traditional maritime countries themselves.
Since the last century, the practice of ‘closed registers’ witnessed changes due to stringent domestic manning regulations, restrictive taxation regime, and other commercial considerations in home countries. Panama was the first to set up an ‘open register’ in 1916, and by 1950 there were more open registers and accounted for nearly 4 per cent of the world’s fleet. In the mid-1980s, the share of FoC in international shipping registration increased to over 30 per cent and by 2009, nearly 73 per cent of the global merchant fleet was under open registers. According to 2017 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, today more than 70 per cent of the commercial international fleet is flagged out and registered under a different flag from the country of ownership.
Interestingly, there are agencies which specialize in helping shipping companies to obtain FoC registries, For them it is a business model, and according to ‘ship solutions’, an agency which specializes in such a venture since 2010, they help shipping companies and owners to register or reflag ships. The agency enables ‘ship managers to streamline their operations during peak times and leave the registration of the vessels to us … to keep overheads to a minimum and thus … offer a very competitive price and can perform jobs of any size within a tight timescale’.
It is a fact that States operate FoC registry to ‘earn a great deal of money, usually from registration and maintenance fees and taxes, from the ships in its registries, but expend very little money to ensure that such ships meet international standards’. Further, FoC offers numerous opportunities to devious ship owners to “hide so long as they pay the requisite registration fees and tonnage taxes, leading to dangerous consequences, such as the funding of terrorist activities and lack of liability for substandard ships sailing the high seas”.
In the case of DPRK, it has skillfully used the FoC regime and engaged in maritime commerce violating various UN sanctions. Of particular interest is Ocean Maritime Management (OMM) Limited, a shipping company with operations in at least 10 countries, has a dubious record of engaging in illegal activities at sea. The company has taken advantage of the FoC regime and been renaming its vessels. For instance, it has not only renamed as many as 13 of its 14 vessel , but also transferred the ownership to shell companies. This is perhaps a clever way to, reflag the vessels and thus ‘effectively erase’ these vessels from the ‘blacklist’, ‘a strategy to evade assets freezes’ by the international community. For instance, the U.N. Security Council’s Panel of Experts on North Korea, that monitors implementation of sanctions on Pyongyang, blacklisted OMM for ‘arranging an illegal shipment on the Chong Chon Gang ship, which was seized in Panama and found to be carrying arms, including two MiG-21 jet fighters, hidden under thousands of tons of Cuban sugar’. However, the company was not deterred and OMM evaded ‘sanctions by changing the registration and ownership of vessels’ to a shell company.
Some DPRK flagged vessels have been intercepted while carrying military cargo bound other States. For instance, in December 2002, So San, a North Korean vessel carrying fifteen Scud missiles hidden under cement bags and bound was Yemen intercepted by a Spanish frigate and a support vessel Patino in the Indian Ocean. The vessel was allowed to proceed to its destination after the Yemen government announced that the consignment was bound for it and it has been argued that ‘there was no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea’. Similarly, in 2016, one of the OMM ships was apprehended for carrying imported weapons from Cuba, but authorities ‘in Havana admitted being behind the stash, saying they were Soviet-era arms from Cuba headed for repair in North Korea’.
Given the complexity of the political economy of merchant shipping and its close relationship with global economy, the FoC system has the potential of being a major challenge for the safety of ships, national security in general, and maritime security in particular. International law (1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, Articles 90, 91, 92, 94 and 110; United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships; Convention on the International Maritime Organization) and national legislations stipulate the mandatory requirement of a genuine link between ship and flag state. This is so due to the need for ‘an absolute minimum entity’ which can be made responsible for the ‘actions of the ship owner and on which penalties of adequate severity can be levied so as to discourage violations of applicable international minimum standards’ wherever they occur.
While that may be necessary, North Korea has blatantly yet cleverly, contravened international law and successfully defied UN sanctions. In the future too, it can continue to marshal its national shipping fleet as also other FoC vessels to conduct illegal commerce and clandestinely obtain embargoed goods from the international market. It is fair to state that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is not perturbed by UN sanctions and DPRK will continue flagrant violation of sanctions.
(Dr Vijay Sakhuja is former Director National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi)
(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

Friday, July 3, 2015

Thoughts on India’s Central Asia Strategy

Amb Rajiv Sikri, 
Distinguished Fellow, VIF

It is indeed encouraging that in a few days Prime Minister Modi will be visiting all the Central Asian countries simultaneously, something that no Indian Prime Minister has done so far. However, India seems to be grappling with the same issues and dilemmas in relation to Central Asia that were present in the nineties, notwithstanding periodic efforts to kick-start the relationship. Why is this so? There are both objective constraints, as well as some missed opportunities.

If it is to have an enduring impact, Prime Minister Modi’s visit will have to go beyond promoting goodwill and the usual bilateral agreements and discussions. He must go with a clear strategic perspective of India’s relations with the Central Asian countries; without that, it won’t be possible to develop a viable Central Asia policy. India’s relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) must take into account developments in the wider Eurasian space that includes the five CARs, Afghanistan, Pakistan west of the Indus, Iran, Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including those regions currently occupied by Pakistan and China.

Throughout history, Eurasia has been a strategic not a mere geographic space. As a geographical area on to which the back doors, so to speak, of major Asian powers open, Eurasia has always attracted, and will continue to attract, the attention of outside powers. It is a ‘negative security space’, an area where major powers cannot afford to let competing major powers or forces exercise a dominating influence because that would pose a threat to their own security. The Cold War and the impermeable political borders of Eurasia during this period dulled strategic perceptions about this region, but that was a geo-strategic aberration.

For the last quarter century, Eurasia has been once again at the centre of global geopolitics. In the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century, it was the setting for the ‘Great Game’ between imperial Britain and Tsarist Russia. A century later, the geostrategic imperatives remain unchanged, only the ‘game’ has become more complicated, with energy emerging as an additional factor in strategic calculations. Connectivity across Eurasia has dramatically improved. Roads, railway tracks as well as oil and gas pipelines and power transmission lines are criss-crossing the region. Of course, so are drug smugglers, terrorists and fundamentalists.

The CARs, both collectively and individually, are today much weaker than their geographically contiguous large neighbours like Russia and China. Between the two, Russia’s influence has declined while China’s has steadily increased in the CARs over the last quarter century. Since 9/11, the United States has also become an active player in the region. These three powers are the principal outside players. Other powers such as Europe, Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India still play only marginal roles.

Russia is taking purposeful steps to regain its preponderant influence in the CARs. It has enmeshed most of them in regional security and military arrangements like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well as through bilateral military agreements. A Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been set up; Tajikistan too may join it. Russia has many additional levers in Central Asia viz. a significant and influential Russian origin population; good networking; dependence of many CARs on remittances of migrants working in Russia; transit facilities for landlocked CARs; and considerable economic interdependence of CARs with Russia. While wanting to reduce the strong grip of Russia that held them for seven decades, the CARs realize that they can neither ignore nor do without Russia.

A rising China is systematically and relentlessly sucking the CARs into its economic whirlpool. Energy supplies for its fast-growing economy, a proximate market for its products, and a security buffer for Xinjiang – these are China’s main concerns vis-à-vis the CARs. Having taken over Xinjiang, it now seeks to dominate the CARs. This won’t be easy, since China faces many serious long-term challenges. Xinjiang, which has extensive ethnic, economic, social and other ties with the CARs could turn out to be China’s Achilles heel. Uighur nationalism remains strong. The fate of the Muslim Uighurs carries resonance among the Islamic ummah. Some Uighur elements appear to have developed linkages with the al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, more recently, the Islamic State too. Xinjiang’s security and stability could be compromised by turmoil or turbulence in the CARs. China realizes this – its latest Defence White Paper mentions the dangers from separatist forces fighting for “East Turkestan independence.” Moreover, despite benefiting from China’s economic growth the CARs remain wary of becoming economically too dependent on China, and worry about creeping Chinese demographic expansionism. Historically, China has been viewed by Central Asians as an expansionist and dominating power, and recent Chinese muscle flexing in Southeast Asia would have reinforced traditional suspicions about China’s attitude towards weak neighbours.

Capitalizing on the favourable climate after 9/11, the United States rushed to establish a number of bases in the region, which it has since had to vacate under the combined pressure of Russia and the CARs. While its other global preoccupations have reduced US interest in Central Asia under President Obama, US policy has always been to somehow detach the CARs from Russia’s sphere of influence and integrate them economically with Afghanistan and South Asia. The ongoing Russia-US standoff over Ukraine would have only reinforced US determination in this respect. Central Asians welcome the United States as a check on both China and Russia, but they realize the fickleness of US policies and level of interest, and remain wary of US proclivity to work for regime change and exert pressure on human rights issues.

Where does India fit into this picture? Over the centuries the most extensive connections of Central Asians with the outside world have been with India. Nor has India ever posed any ideological, demographic or territorial threat to Central Asia. Thus Central Asians have always had a romantic attraction towards India, reinforced by close and friendly relations during Soviet times. That is a good starting point, but nothing more. Today, at a general level, the CARs want a more active Indian presence to balance the other major players who carry considerable baggage. So far, however, the CARs and India haven’t been able to reconnect meaningfully principally because of the absence of easy and reliable connectivity. Since there does not appear to be any immediate solution to this problem, economic and people-to-people linkages between the CARs and India remain weak. Trade routes are long, cumbersome and uneconomical. The legal systems, regulatory and taxation provisions in the CARs leave much to be desired. There are other factors too why Indian private entrepreneurs find the CARs comparatively less attractive than many other places viz. poor air connectivity; difficulties in getting visas; unfamiliarity with local languages; and some bad experiences of Indian companies in the CARs in the early years after their independence. Perhaps economic relations will get a boost if India were to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. A study group has been recently set up to examine this proposal.

More than trade in goods, the two sides should focus on trade in services and use of the CARs as a transit point. Leveraging their location, the CARs could, however, become a passenger and cargo hub for air traffic from India to Siberia and the Russian Far East region in one direction, and to Europe in the other, in the way Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Singapore have positioned themselves. The CARs could also develop their potential as a tourism destination for Indians with competitive pricing, a more liberal visa regime and better air connectivity. There could even be joint marketing of Central Asia and north India to the rest of the world as a “Mughal Trail.

A blueprint for India-Central Asia cooperation was outlined in India’s ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ three years ago. This needs to be fleshed out and implemented earnestly. One of the first things that India should do is to change its image in the CARs. Instead of the traditional stereotype of Soviet times, India should be projected as a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced country with capabilities that are relevant for the development of the CARs. Some of the concrete initiatives that could be pushed are: encouragement to private Indian airlines and charter flights to operate between India and Central Asia; significant expansion of existing programmes of technical cooperation so that more young people visit India to develop skills that are needed in their home countries; larger loans on soft terms for infrastructure projects. In return, India would very much like to gain access to the rich natural resources of the CARs and some specialized defence technologies and production facilities.

It must be emphasized, however, that India’s interests in Eurasia are fundamentally strategic. The CARs are superficially stable but inherently fragile states, with incomplete nation building, underdeveloped political institutions and traditions, no accepted mechanism for periodic transfer of political power, and economically still considerably tied to a beleaguered Russia. Weak and unstable states with centrifugal tendencies could become a haven for terrorists, separatists, drug dealers and fundamentalists, linked up with similar elements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and West Asia. India has a strong interest in seeing stable and secular CARs. This is a formidable challenge that will not be easily met without large-scale investments that promote economic development and reduce unemployment among the youth, thereby giving people long-term hope about a brighter future.

A stable Eurasia is in the interest of all countries of the region. However, the prospects of long-term stability and peace are bleak if the great powers indulge in a new zero-sum ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. Wisdom lies in all countries adopting a cooperative rather than a competitive approach. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is potentially a promising vehicle for such cooperation. India hopes to join it as a full member, but this is not a given since the attitude of China remains ambivalent. Unfortunately, the SCO is China-dominated and China-driven. While full membership will certainly raise India’s profile in Central Asia, it is unlikely to help India achieve its core interests in Central Asia. China and Pakistan, both individually and jointly, seem determined to unilaterally pursue their perceived strategic interests in the region.

Apart from the CARs, developments in Xinjiang, geographically contiguous to both the CARs and India, have direct and far-reaching implications for India’s security. India needs to carefully study and anticipate various scenarios in Xinjiang. China’s strong strategic partnership with Pakistan, and physical connectivity via Xinjiang, has been reinforced by the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. The success of China’s Silk Route Economic Belt initiative will enable China to dominate the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan (where it is making significant investments and is also trying to play a political role). If China were to emerge as the preponderant power in Eurasia, this would constitute a tectonic geopolitical shift that India, can countenance with equanimity, as this would significantly undermine India’s strategic interests and security.

Thus India’s approach to this region cannot be passive. India must strive to get a firm foothold in the Eurasian space, including Afghanistan, so that forces inimical or hostile to India’s interests like China and Pakistan do not dominate it, particularly if economic and other influence is backed by a military presence. In order to ensure its security, India has to exercise at least some degree of influence, if not control, over the trans-Himalayan strategic space in Eurasia. It must become relevant to the growth, development and prosperity of the CARs. For this to happen, it has to be involved in Eurasian energy politics. Small individual investments of the kind India has made in Kazakhstan are inadequate. What is needed is a big project that creates long-term mutually beneficial linkages of India and the CARs and, equally important, is in conformity with the strategic interest of the concerned parties.

In this context, Iran’s strategic relevance to India has gone up. Apart from other factors like Iran’s intrinsic importance as a major player in the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s rich oil and gas reserves, Iran is currently India’s only route to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. India and Iran will also need to cooperate to try to stabilize Afghanistan. Already a formidable regional power, Iran’s role will only increase after a nuclear deal is clinched with the P-5+1. After submitting to US pressure over Iran for a decade, India is now repairing its disrupted ties with Iran. The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding on the development of Chabahar port, not merely as an economic but more so as a strategic project, and the reactivation of the North-South Corridor are long overdue and important concrete steps in this direction. These need to be followed up urgently with high-level exchanges, including at the Prime Minister’s level.

Since Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Qatar have about two-thirds of the world’s exportable surplus of natural gas, Eurasia should be at the centre of India’s gas import strategy. For all these countries too, India is a proximate and attractive long-term market. Russia can no longer count on the long-term loyalty and dependence of its traditional European customers, the more so after the Ukraine crisis. India is an important alternative market. Turkmenistan is already pushing the TAPI pipeline project to export its gas to India and Pakistan. As for Iran, it will definitely want to tap large gas markets like India once sanctions are removed, hopefully quite soon. Qatar’s future as a major gas exporter is linked with Iran, with which it shares the same principal gas field (South Pars/ North Dome). India already has energy investments in Russia and Kazakhstan and there is an agreement in principle with both countries to explore the possibility of energy pipeline projects to India. If the Central Asian countries work with Russia and Iran, Eurasia can be hard-wired with India in a web of interdependence. This has to be conceived and executed as a strategic project, not merely as an economic or energy deal.

India must try to persuade Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to let India develop, or at least allocate to India, some large gas fields that can be a source of long-term gas supply to India. The greater challenge will lie in transporting Eurasian gas to India. The LNG route is too long and expensive, at least for now. Purely land routes from Eurasia to India pose many problems. Given the continuing lack of trust between India and Pakistan, and the uncertainties surrounding Afghanistan, it is doubtful if either the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) or the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline projects will actually fructify. Under these circumstances, the only feasible alternative is a land-cum-sea pipeline from Eurasia to India via the Iranian port of Chabahar.

One possible route is from western Siberia in Russia to Chabahar via west Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The advantage of this route is that it involves fewer countries and can also incorporate existing swap arrangements between Iran and Turkmenistan. Another route is from eastern Siberia in Russia to southeast Kazakhstan via the Altai region, on to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley, thence west to Khojent in Tajikistan at the mouth of the Ferghana Valley, and thereafter into Afghanistan, along the Mazar-e-sharif – Herat – Delaram - Zaranj route (which is outside the Taliban’s area of influence) before entering eastern Iran and down south to Chabahar. The advantage of this route is that it would also serve Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and western Afghanistan, and thereby help to stabilize these countries. On the flip side, it would definitely be a more complicated project. Perhaps it might be better to start with the first option and then consider the eastern route later.

From Chabahar, there would be an undersea pipeline via Oman to ports in Gujarat. Two gas hubs would come up. One would be in Chabahar, fed by Russian, Turkmen and possibly also Kazakh gas from the north, together with Iran’s own gas from South Pars. Another hub would be in Oman where the gas piped from Chabahar under the sea would meet up with Qatar gas piped across the UAE. An Indian company, South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE), has done a study on the commercial and technical viability of such undersea pipelines between Iran/Oman and India, and is actively working with the concerned governments to take it forward.

One hopes that as Prime Minister Modi prepares to visit Central Asia, his Government and his advisers are looking at conceptualizing a major strategic project of the kind suggested above. If such a project were to be endorsed by the CARs during his visit, that would be a significant breakthrough in India’s floundering Central Asia policy.

Published Date: 2nd July 2015, Image Source: http://www.presstv.ir
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Monday, October 8, 2012

Russia’s New Silk Road Strategy: Connecting to Pakistan


Vinod Anand
Senior Fellow, VIF

Even though much awaited President Putin’s visit to Pakistan in the first week of October has been shelved, causing disappointment among the Pakistani establishment, the doors for finding a new understanding between the two on Afghanistan and regional issues remain wide open. Putin was to pay a bilateral visit to Pakistan before the quadrilateral summit that was scheduled for 2-3 October in Islamabad. Pakistan had become part of the quadrilateral of Russia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan in July 2009 when the forum’s first summit was held in Dushanbe. The main goals of the quartet are to promote regional trade and undertake joint projects in energy, transport, communications, agriculture and infrastructure. Combating terrorism, extremism, illegal trafficking of drugs and trans-national organized crimes, supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan and in the region are the other major objectives. These are usually the objectives of any number of multi-lateral structures and organizations that exist in this troubled region, for instance the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Finding a regional solution to many of the problems being faced by the region especially that of instability, insecurity in Afghanistan and improving the socio-economic environment have driven the major players like the U.S., China and Russia to advance their own formulations and structures. However, the competing strategies of the main players in the arena have only added to the complexity of the regional issues.

At a time when Pakistan’s stock is running at all time low with the U.S. and its coalition partners in Afghanistan, Islamabad has been working to find a new strategic equation in the post-2014 Afghanistan scenario. Russians believe that Pakistan remains central to the Afghan imbroglio and has an important role to play in the unfolding scenario. Pakistan hopes to obtain a favourable outcome in the Afghan end game with Russia on its side. Moscow has also not been much enamoured by the so called ‘reset’ in its relations with the U.S., as promised by Obama administration. American policies on BMD, eastwards expansion of NATO and contesting Russia’s ‘privileged status’ in Central Asian region has soured the U.S-Russian relationship. Even though Russia is providing logistics routes through its territory for ISAF troops in Afghanistan it continues to oppose American bases and transit facilities being provided by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Further, in the long run both Russia and Pakistan would like to see the back of the American troops in Afghanistan. They are against the long term presence of the American bases in Afghanistan as these have adverse strategic connotations for both Russia and nuclear Pakistan.

There is also a wide-spread belief that in its approach to Afghanistan, China is becoming wary of putting all its eggs in the Pakistani basket and has embarked on establishing a direct relationship with the Kabul regime. On the sidelines of the SCO Summit in June this year, China and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement. At the summit, Afghanistan was admitted to SCO as on observer. Further in September Zhou Yongkang – member of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party - visited Afghanistan and signed a number of agreements on assisting Afghanistan in its security sector development programmes. He committed to training 300 Afghan national police officers which in effect could help the ISAF/NATO efforts of training the Afghan National Security Forces.
Thus, Pakistan has been aiming at finding new partners in the power play taking place in the region. As part of Pakistan’s desire to forge a cozy relationship with Russia Gen. Kayani has also traveled to Moscow in the first week of October. In fact, as a military head and one who is the final arbiter of Pakistan’s security and foreign policies, his visit would give an opportunity to Russian leaders to obtain insights into Pakistan’s fresh thinking, if any, on Afghanistan and regional security issues. While Kayani was in Moscow, the Russian Foreign Minister was in Islamabad for parleys with his Pakistani counterpart to explain the absence of Putin and identify with Pakistan’s role in the region. Sergei Lavrov supported Pakistan’s stance on the U.S. Drone strikes and denounced these attacks as violations of Pakistani sovereign territory.

Russia and Pakistan are looking for many benefits from mutual cooperation. The Russian gas company Gazprom has been looking forward to being awarded a contract for building the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline without many of the processes associated with the laid down procedures. Russia has agreed to modernise, reconstruct and expand the Pakistan Steel Mills that has been running far below its capacity. Russia would also be supporting Pakistan Railways by undertaking a joint venture for developing a carriages workshop and may even supply Russian rail carriages. The Russians are also converting two Pakistani thermal power plants from furnace oil to coal.

Gaining access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean has been a long cherished Russian desire since the days of Tsarist Russia and a route through Pakistan could be one useful option. Writing recently in Pravda, an analyst Lyuba Lulko suggests that “establishing close cooperation with Pakistan will give Russia a real chance to gain a foothold in Central and South Asia. In addition, Russia will be able to access the Indian Ocean, and make the U.S. troops in Afghanistan directly dependent on its logistics.”
The proposed multimodal transport links, another version of the old Silk Road are expected to provide benefits to all the four countries involved. Pakistan will gain access to Central Asian markets while Tajikistan and Russia would gain access to Pakistani ports. Commenting on last year’s Quadrilateral Summit at Sochi, Chairman of the Russian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev, observed that “Russia may become a donor of economic, social and military-political security for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.”

Russia has also offered to revive all the Soviet era industrial and infrastructure projects (numbering about 140) in Afghanistan. Russia is also willing to help Tajikistan in the hydro-power sector. The Central Asia South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) power transmission project of exporting electricity from hydro-power rich Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan is a much touted project. However, it is difficult to be realized because of objections to hydro-power projects by the down stream Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan. Another project is of building a road from Tajikistan across the Wakhan corridor to Pakistan in order to enhance regional connectivity. If Russia is able to support such projects and find the finances for the same then it would also gain a degree of control and enhance its influence in the region.

However, Pakistan and Russia would certainly have competing objectives in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Unlike Pakistan, Russia would be apprehensive of a radical Taliban regime in Kabul that may have the agenda of spreading its ideology to the Central Asian republics and beyond to Chechnya. Pakistan has not been able to control its own radical jihadis and it is unlikely that it would be able to have a degree of control over a resurgent Taliban regime in Kabul.

So far as India is concerned, the pipeline projects like Iran-Pakistan-India or TAPI gas pipeline project or for that any other multi-modal transport corridors can become economically viable only when India is included in them. A limited grouping like Russia-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Pakistan may only produce a limited benefit. Pakistan’s obtuse policies of denying overland transit to Indian goods to Afghanistan and beyond deprive Pakistan and other regional countries the benefits of revenue and beneficial economic engagement and trade. Equally, its sponsorship of terrorism, and proclivity to use transit for political purposes, as shown most recently by its shutting down the NATO supply lines to Afghanistan, ensure that India remains wary of any such projects.
Connecting South Asia to Central Asia, especially through Pakistan (the shortest overland route) could be a win-win situation for all countries in the region with Afghanistan emerging as an important hub of communications in all directions. This would have positive effect on security, stability and economy of Afghanistan. But Pakistan will have to undertake a root-and-branch transformation of its security outlook for that to happen.

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Delhi’s Craven Policy on Syria




Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF

The position India is taking on the unfolding Syrian crisis does not do honour to our diplomacy. We supported last week the western resolution providing for sanctions on Syria under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter unless its government effectively ended its military operations against the insurgents who are backed by the West, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

UN

Russia and China vetoed this one-sided resolution which imposed specific and verifiable obligations on the government such as ceasing, within ten days, troop movements towards population centres and all use of heavy weapons there, a complete pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres and withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from these centres to their barracks etc. No obligation was imposed on the armed opposition groups, apart from a general exhortation to “all parties, including the opposition (to) cease all armed violence in all its forms”. The resolution took no cognizance of the role of the external backers of the armed groups and sought no end to outside interference.

In these circumstances, the provision to extend Kofi Annan’s UN mission to Syria for another 45 days- something that Russia and China(and India) favoured- became a casualty. The West has, in reality, little attachment to Annan’s mission as it serves to delay what they want- President Assad’s quick ouster- while Russia and China (and India) support it in the forlorn hope that some negotiated way out of the crisis can be found.

Kofi Annan’s mission has been subsequently salvaged, with the Security Council unanimously approving( July 20) a compromise western resolution extending the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria for 30 days, with the possibility of extension should there be a cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction of violence by all parties in Syria. The “all parties” referred to will not abjure violence as religious ideology and larger geopolitical objectives are involved. The regime will combat the armed opposition groups to protect itself and the country’s multi-ethnic secular foundations. The latest resolution is therefore an exercise in cynicism by those who remain bent on regime change and those who are willing to clutch at such diplomatic straws to uphold their position that the Syrians themselves and not external powers should decide on political change in Damascus.

If India’s conduct in the UN Security Council is questionable, it is because India is buffeted by contradictory considerations of principle and pragmatism in adopting a position. Conscious of its transformed relationship with the US, India is reluctant to oppose the latter on issues like Syria in the UNSC where its conduct is under scrutiny in the context of its permanent membership aspirations. India is exhorted by the West to assume its “international responsibilities” as a would-be global power on humanitarian and democracy-related issues, which means endorsing the policy of imposing sanctions on delinquent states as identified by them. India’s foreign investment and growth needs dispose its policy makers to bridge political gaps with the US as much as possible. India’s vast energy, trade, manpower and remittance linkages with the Gulf countries contrast with limited economic ties with Syria, placing a premium on pragmatism in defining our position.

Pragmatism

On the other hand, strategic autonomy means taking positions in conformity with our fundamental thinking about the conduct of international relations, even if our western partners find them disagreeable. The abhorrence for externally enforced regime change seems to have got dissipated in our political thinking. Syria may be different from Iraq and Libya in method but not in objective. Western leaders are insisting on Assad’s departure and warning that his days are numbered. They are supporting the armed opposition groups; their media has launched an information war against Syria; for ostensible humanitarian reasons they are creating conditions for a large scale human disaster there. Why should we implicitly support regime change in Syria?

In our longer term interest we should not be complicit in the destruction of secular authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and their replacement by authoritarian Islamist ones. The veneer of democracy being given to these developments is false. The US, which has managed fundamentalism in the Gulf for decades and even promoted it in our region till recently for geopolitical ends, may believe it retains enough levers to manage the developing Islamist trends in the Arab world in which allies like Saudi Arabia and Qatar are playing a catalysing role. But India is getting exposed to a longer term threat by the lurch of the Islamic world towards Salafism.

Principle

India’s explanation India for voting for the western resolution on Syria is disingenuous, as it refers only to India’s desire to preserve Kofi Annan’s mission and ignores completely the sanctions provision that Russia and China were objecting to. Not taking into consideration Russia’s cogent arguments against the western resolution reflects a departure from our oft-stated positions, along with Russia, on respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of countries, opposition to regime change and support for multilateralism and multi-polarity.

Our compliant attitude at New York contrasts with the position taken by South Africa which abstained and criticized the western resolution as one-sided. Pakistan too abstained, and opened up space for itself, unlike us, to jointly work with Russia to draft a joint resolution on extending the Kofi Annan mission as an alternative to the UK draft. This reflects poorly on our diplomcy with Russia on Syria.

A compromise between principle and pragmatism dictated abstention by India on the vote on Syria. If we should not oppose the West when they are right because of old prejudices, we should not support them when they are wrong out of new fears.

Friday, June 1, 2012

President Putin Redux


PP Shukla,
Joint Director, VIF

Even with the North Atlantic orientation of today’s
European policy, we cannot forget that NATO and
Europe are not one and the same thing. And I’ve already
said that Russia is a country of European culture, not
NATO culture.

- Vladimir Putin, First Person

On 7 May, as has been happening every four years since 2000, a President was sworn into office on the Kremlin in Moscow. Vladimir Putin took the oath of office for the third time – actually for the fourth time, since he had been acting President since late 1999. It must have been quite a contrast for him. When he took office duly elected in May 2000, he told the Russian people that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had handed over power to him with one plea: “Save Russia”. And at that time, it was a big ask. Russia was going through fresh convulsions, economic and political, and the ailing Yeltsin was demonstrably unequal to the task.

It is to the credit of Putin that he did indeed save Russia. He did more: he restored it to the level of a great power. He brought stability, he ended the free-for-all that Russia, including even its capital city had been reduced to. And he oversaw a revival of the country’s economy as well. As a result, by the early 2000’s, Goldman Sachs had identified it as part of the BRIC economies whose future was to become one of the major economies in the world. True, not all of this was Putin’s doing, but in large measure it was, and he had created the stability that was so essential for the economy to take advantage of the commodity boom that was to follow. And a grateful populace indicated its recognition of his role by giving him a degree of support that - even after discounting for some exaggeration in the opinion polls – most democratic leaders can only dream of.

But time marches on, new events occur, the stability and other basics begin to be taken for granted. Memories fade, and new ideas emerge. Above all, a new President had to be elected as the Russian Constitution allows only two consecutive terms to an incumbent. Medvedev held the job for four years, starting in 2008, and in both tone and substance, his approach to governance was markedly different. Some degree of popular impatience with the “sovereign democracy” that was the flavour of the Putin-Medvedev era was clearly manifest, especially on the streets of Moscow and St Petersburg. The irony was that these were the cities that had gained the most from the policies of Putin, and he himself is a native of St Petersburg.

This would explain why the return of Putin as President has not been welcomed with the enthusiasm that he certainly feels entitled to. Public opinion has clearly shifted in the four years of the Medvedev Presidency, and this has targeted both the leaders, as well as their Party, the United Russia Party [URP]. This would also explain why there have been street demonstrations against both the Parliamentary elections that were held last December [won by URP of course, though with a diminished mandate], and the Presidential elections in March.

Anyway, Putin is in power now for six years – the term of the Presidency was increased to six years by Medvedev in one of his early acts as President, and it is important to try and understand his [Putin’s] persona and current strategic views. It would be important to recognise that the situation in Russia – indeed all of Europe – is fluid, and there are few certainties, including of politics in the continent.

A look at his views as they have been since his first term as President suggests that he sees Russian interests best served in a strong European tie-up. This is coupled with an understanding [right or wrong] that Europe and America are distinct cultures, as the quote given at the opening of this article indicates. This is coupled with a strong personal German exposure during his career in the KGB, with the result that he speaks fluent German, and is well acquainted with the culture. In his early book – a long interview actually – “First Person”, he describes with feeling how he was impressed by Helmut Kohl of Germany, and observes: “And it was especially gratifying to hear him [Kohl] say that he couldn’t imagine a Europe without Russia”. This view has been only reinforced over the years, and German Chancellors like Schroeder have been particularly close to Russia and to Putin. [It would be fair to say that Medvedev is more exposed, and sympathetic, to the Anglo-Saxon world and culture.]

Putin has revealed his attitude very early in his new stint as President. He blamed the street disturbances on the Americans even before he took office; and he has declined to attend the G8 Summit in America. The message clearly is that America is not to be his first visit outside the CIS. In fairness, President Obama also did not help matters by declaring that Putin had one leg in the Cold War era, and demonstrating a clear preference for dealing with Medvedev. Nonetheless, the fact that Putin has retained Medvedev as Prime Minister and sent him to the G8 Summit, suggests that he [Putin] is pragmatic enough to see that the American relationship is important enough not to be damaged just in order to make a point. Of course, this move to stay away may also play into the American Presidential elections, and Putin would not mind that either, for he is not one to forget a slight.

On present indications, the first country Putin is likely to visit outside the CIS will be China. It is reported that there is to be an SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] Summit, and he will be going for that. This makes it doubly significant, for he is also signalling the importance he attaches to SCO, in contrast to his attitude towards the G8. In turn, China has welcomed Putin’s return to the Presidency. An article in the People’s Daily, under the title “A stable prosperous Russia under Putin is good for China” hailed his electoral success, adding that he rode “a wave of popularity for his no-nonsense incorruptible image” – just the sort of message that would please him.

It is also instructive to examine Putin’s inaugural speech. It is a short speech, as all his inaugural speeches have been, but there is this significant passage: “We must all understand that the life of our future generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on us today and on our real achievements in building a new economy and developing modern living standards, on our efforts to look after our people and support our families, on our determination in developing our vast expanses from the Baltic to the Pacific,and on our ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia.” [Emphasis added].

This idea of Eurasia is very much part of Putin’s persona, and embraces both a strong tie-up with Europe and Germany as its anchor, and with China at the other end of the Eurasian land-mass. In the same speech, Putin also praised Medvedev for the work he did as President. The latter also spoke at the inaugural ceremony and hinted that the civil and social changes he introduced need to be preserved. This could contain the seeds of future trouble between the two men.

On the same day that he took office, Putin signed a number of Executive Orders, some five in number; of these, three are of immediate interest, as they also tell us something about the priorities that he will follow. They concern Demographics, the Economy, and Foreign Policy. Each of them is worth considering in some detail. The Russian population has been in steady decline for some decades now, particularly the Slavic part. Despite Governmental efforts, this trend has not been arrested. There is not only the question of maintaining the population growth at a level that would be enough to replenish the labour force, important though that is, there is also the problem of depopulation – over time – of the Siberian region. A very small part of the population lives in these regions, no more than 7 million in the Far East. Facing them across the border is a Chinese population that is some 120 million, if not more. At the moment, the problem has been contained, despite scare stories to the contrary in Russian lore, and the number of Chinese settlers, registered and unregistered, in the area are not more than half a million at the most. But the potential imbalance is too serious to be ignored. The Order issued by Putin calls for more incentives to all families that have three or more babies; nothing really new here. The important element is the suggestion that migration is to become a serious effort to address the labour shortage. Again, this is not entirely new, and there are migrants from the CIS in large numbers. But the intent here appears to be to cast a wider net, something that has been bubbling under the surface for some years now. The document is short on substance, but this is a thought that has found high-level expression, and will need to be followed carefully.

On the foreign policy side, there are a number of important indications of what we may expect. The order in which issues are taken up may be taken to reflect their importance. The list of tasks begins with international issues like terrorism, proliferation, drug-trafficking, etc. Then comes the regional prioritisation, and the first area listed is the CIS. Next comes the European Union, where the most important subject is Energy cooperation and the need to develop a common space in this sector. Asia-Pacific is the next and there is the following formulation used to define priority tasks: “deepening equal, trust-based partnership and strategic cooperation with China, strategic partnership with India and Vietnam, and developing mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and other key nations in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Until recently, India and China were mentioned on par with each other, but here the standing of China is clearly enhanced. There is a suggestion that the two countries are not only trusted partners, but that they also cooperate at the strategic level. This is a trend in Russian thinking and action that needs to be watched carefully. China is the only major power that has shown some understanding of Russian concerns over Western policies towards it, notably Ballistic Missile Defence deployments in East Europe, and NATO expansion, and this has been well-received in the Russian elite policy circles.

The US is the next to be mentioned, and has the distinction of being only one of four countries mentioned in a stand-alone formulation. There is nothing unexpected in the details of policy priorities but it is important to note that there is an explicit reference to the threat Russia perceives from the American plans for a global missile defence system. This is one of the major Russian concerns, as mentioned above, and will continue to bedevil relations. Obama was overheard asking Medvedev to ask Putin to give him some time to work through this issue after the election, but Russia will clearly not cut any slack on this one.

The other countries that get a stand-alone mention are Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea – all problem areas that concern Russia deeply. There is nothing remarkable in the formulations, though it is worth noting that on Afghanistan, the Order mentions the importance of SCO and of CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation – a grouping of some former Soviet states], and of the Russia-NATO Council. But there is no direct mention of NATO itself, which is odd considering that the Russians at various times have indicated their desire for ISAF not to pull out prematurely from the country.
The economic policy contains some of the expected targets, such as on ease of doing business. But the most significant hint is that concerning the main State monopolies on aircraft manufacturing and ship building. There is a hint that the monopolies hae not performed as expected, and they are to be audited for their performance. These were monopolies from the Soviet times, which were broken up in the 1990’s, then re-consolidated under Putin himself. They have clearly not performed up to the mark, and it is not surprising that their functioning is to be examined. But the approach is still decidedly statist, and it would be fair to say that this is not the thinking that guided Medvedev in his policies as President.

An important aspect that deserves close attention going forward is the nature of the Defence cooperation between Russia and China. After some serious problems in the mid-2000’s, things appear to have got better lately. A recent statement by one of China’s Deputy Ministers emphasised the importance of this in the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries. and the financial problems of the Russian Defence industry would make China an attractive partner. There are continuing problems over IPR issues, no doubt, but this is where the dynamic between the financial problems and the overall relationship on the one hand, and the IPR issue on the other will bear watching.

The early personnel changes have also been announced. There are some changes in the Government Ministers though the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence remain unchanged. The most intriguing aspect of the change is the dropping of the powerful Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, who controlled the Energy and Fuel complex. It has now been announced that he is to become CEO of the State oil company Rosneft – a clear demotion. There were suspected differences between him and President Medvedev, but this looks like a concerted move by both the leaders in the new tandem, Putin and Medvedev.

The removal of Sechin from the post of Deputy Prime Minister opens the way for a Medvedev protégé – Arkady Dvorkovich – to take his place as the overall in-charge of the Energy and Fuel Complex. The retention of Igor Shuvalov as First Deputy Prime Minister, and the only such [there were two First DPM’s in the outgoing arrangement] is another indicator of a willingness to reach out to the West for deeper economic engagement. It is also worth noting that Vladislav Surkov seems to have been forgiven for the disappointing performance of the United Russia Party at the Parliamentary elections and is now to be the Head of the Government Staff, a powerful post. None of the three has any exposure to India, and this would suggest that we would have to continue to work at the top leadership levels in order to keep the economic relationship healthy.

Many of the Ministers who were in charge of economic and social portfolios in the outgoing Government have been moved to the Kremlin as advisers to Putin. This suggests that he will run the Government with tight control over decision-making, and with the help of the team that he had with him as Prime Minister. But perhaps the most important move from the old Government team is the complete rehabilitation and return to power and trust of Sergei Ivanov, who was earlier the Deputy Prime Minister. He was a candidate for the Presidency and very close to Putin in 2008, but Putin chose Medvedev over him then. Ivanov was brought in as the Head of the Presidential Administration in December last year, while Medvedev was still President. However, it was clearly a preparation for the new President, namely, Putin. The position of Head of the Presidential Administration is effectively the most important position after that of the President himself in the Kremlin. Ivanov, who speaks fluent English, knows India well and will be an important channel for developing ties between the two countries.

For India, it is important to take note of the changing overall outlook in the Russian establishment. Nothing drastic is expected in our bilateral ties, and the relationship is strong and stable, as is shown by the quality of the Defence and Hi-tech cooperation between the two countries. The importance of India is also reflected in the positive reference in the foreign policy priorities, even though it comes below China and the description is of a lesser order.

However, of late, our high-level dialogue has been losing the quality it had during Soviet times, or even early in the 2000’s, and is becoming formal and transactional. There is also the changing Russian attitude towards Pakistan. It is not as yet a cause of concern, but the pace of development of the relationship will bear careful scrutiny in the coming months and years. This is almost a Russian reflex: whenever they fear that India is getting too close to America, they reach out to Pakistan. While it may have been a viable approach in the 1960’s and 1980’s, it would be serious mistake in the current context, and it is to be hoped that those in Moscow who understand South Asia well will see the pitfalls of this policy.

All in all, this adds up to a very ambitious approach to Russian policy and ambitions. The big question is whether this is feasible. The Russian system has atrophied quite a bit since the days of the USSR. The kind of capabilities it had in science and technology, in defence, in space – all this has suffered attrition. Above all, their long-standing weakness in economic thinking and management, especially in the context of a market economy, and a probable slowdown in the commodity boom, is going to prove to be a serious challenge. There is also going to be unprecedented resistance to Putin’s vision and programme – it does not take much to see that. The street demonstrations after the Parliamentary and Presidential elections were among the largest since the fall of the USSR. The public mood is changing, and the media are reflecting a desire for more changes – once again in a liberal direction, after the control they accepted in the early period of this century. If the leadership is up to the challenge of adapting to the new circumstances, economic and social, Russia can look forward to another period of stability and economic growth. As a major power on the global scene, Russia will be an important factor in the emerging shape of the world, one way or another.

Thursday, May 31, 2012

A Force Multiplier for The Indian Naval Capability

Radhakrishna Rao
Research Fellow, VIF

In a major technological breakthrough for the Defence Research and Development Organisation(DRDO) and a significant boost to the strike capability of the Indian Navy, the naval variant of India’s home grown fourth generation fighter aircraft Tejas LCA had its successful debut flight on April 27.

The 20-minute long maiden flight Tejas naval at Bangalore has been described as “outstanding success” by the DRDO chief V.K.Saraswat. As envisaged now, the two seater Tejas naval is expected to get Initial Operational Clearance(IOC) by the middle of this decade. According to DRDO, Tejas naval has catapulted India into the elite league of countries capable of design, development and production of four plus generation carrier borne fly by wire fighter. Indeed, the design and development of the Tejas naval involved many formidable technological challenges since it was required to operate under saline and humid environment with restricted availability of deck run for launch and recovery of high operating load conditions. Many new and novel technologies including Leading Edge Vortex Control(LEVCON) surface fitted at the front end of the aircraft wing operated by a concealed rotary actuator with aerodynamic profiling to ensure low landing speed, ground controllability and better vision for the pilot were developed for the first time in the country.

Moreover, Tejas naval has the distinction of being the only carrier borne fighter aircraft in the light category and the second STOBAR (Ski Take off but Arrested Recovery) carrier borne aircraft in the world. Not surprisingly then DRDO points out that Tejas naval fighter will provide a complete marine force multiplier that will help the Indian Navy to position itself as a blue water, maritime force. In yet another boost to the Indian Navy, Defence Minister A.K.Antony informed the Parliament that an exclusive naval satellite for dedicated communications will be launched during 2012-13. The GSAT-7 satellite which will be launched by means of the three stage Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle(GSLV) will help Indian Navy provide secure and reliable communications channel to link up its “resources and assets” for an integrated operational strategy.

On another front, the induction of the nuclear powered Nerpa class submarine Chakra that Indian Navy has taken on lease from Russia is also expected to enhance the fighting fitness of the Indian Navy. With INS Chakra in operational trim, India has become the sixth country in the world to operate a nuclear submarine. The submarine, considered one of the stealthiest and deadliest in the world, can carry four 533-mm torpedoes and four 650-mm torpedoes. Defence analysts say that with a diving speed of 30-35 knots, INS Chakra will be able to outrun any Chinese or Pakistani submarine.
In a related development, with Russia planning to hand over 45,000 tonne class augmented aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya with forty years of service life to the Indian navy by 2012 end, the sixty years old Indian navy, the youngest of the three services, can look forward to boost its strike capability . There is no denying the fact that aircraft carriers hold a key to expand the reach and boost the strike capability of a naval force. Indeed, early this year Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of the Indian Navy, had stressed on the importance of an aircraft carrier in augmenting the capability of the navy to take care of the Indian interests in the Indian ocean area and beyond.

“Carrier building is very expensive but it is certainly there in our long term plans,” observed Verma. Giving an inkling into the futuristic aircraft carrier that the Indian Navy is keen on operating, Verma pointed out that the navy was firming up the design of a future aircraft carrier by taking into account the emerging advances in the field of aviation and the potentials of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) in the scheme of the naval warfare. “There would be far more capable aircraft and far more expected of an aircraft carrier by the late 2020,” observed Verma. As envisaged now, Indian Navy is keen on operating three aircraft carriers by the end of this decade. The idea is that at any given time, two aircraft carriers should be in full operational trim.

As part of the growth strategy of Indian Navy, Verma has also hinted at deploying UAVs(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) on INS Vikramaditya sometime in the future. Currently, the INS Viraat, whose refurbishment has resulted in its life being extended upto 2015, is the only aircraft carrier in service with the Indian Navy. And India’s 40,000-tonne home-grown aircraft carrier being built by the Cochin shipyard at Kochi in South India is expected to join the Indian naval fleet by the middle of this decade. Indian navy has also a clear cut plan for a vastly improved second generation indigenous aircraft carrier for deployment by 2018.

Though youngest of the three services, the Indian Navy has been ahead of two other wings in getting its requirements met from the indigenous sources to the maximum extent possible . Indeed, Indian Navy continues to play a pro active role in encouraging the shipyards and industries in the country to take up the development of complex systems involving advanced technological elements. As it is, the allegation of kickbacks associated with German HDW submarine deal in early 1990s had seriously dented Navy’s modernisation plan with a large indigenous contribution. Like the spectre of Bofors which continues to haunt Indian army’s artillery modernization programme, the HDW scandal did seriously sap Indian navy’s combat readiness plan for many years. “After the lost decades, we are now able to place orders and acquisitions are happening; only that our ship yards are unable to deliver at globally competitive rates. But notwithstanding that in the next five years, we would be commissioning on an average five ships or submarines a year,” noted Verma. According to Verma, today Indian Navy is poised for a very good growth path.

In a development of significance to meeting the needs of the Indian Navy, private shipyards such as Pipavav, ABG and Larsen and Toubro(L&T) have invested heavily in technology up-gradation and are more than willing to take up the challenge of building advanced ships, submarines and other systems for the Indian navy. While L&T has made a significant contribution to the construction of India’s first home grown nuclear submarine INS Arihant, Pipavav shipyard, rated as the country’s best shipyard, is building six offshore patrol vessels for the Indian Navy. The state owned Garden Reach Ship Builders and Engineers(GRSE), which has on hand order for building six fast attack craft, has delivered first of the craft well before the deadline, thereby signalling the maturity of the Indian ship building industry. To meet the growing and diverse needs of the Indian Navy, the Ministry of Defence has cleared the participation of private shipyards in the bids along with the public sector shipyards. Mazagaon Dock which is now building three advanced Delhi class destroyers, three Shivalik class stealth frigates and six Scorpene submarines, is focussing on the modular ship design, which is one of the components of the programme for the up-gradation and modernization of shipyards in the country.

In another development of significance, the Ministry of Defence has taken over the Hindustan Shipyard from the Ministry of Shipping with a view to transform it into a hub of nuclear powered submarines. However, the lack of proper ground work and foresight resulted in Government being forced to withhold the joint venture plan between Mazagaon Dock and Pipavav shipyard. Certainly, this would have been a win-win combination, making for a formidable technological base to take up the challenging assignments from the Indian navy. Pipavav is considered one of the most sophisticated shipyards with the largest dry dock in the world and as such has a potential to contribute to self reliance in a big way.

Indian Navy is also working towards boosting its aviation assets aimed at positioning itself as a formidable maritime force. It has already ordered 49 deck based Mig-29K combat aircraft from Russia .Some of the aircraft that navy is planning to acquire in the near future will be designed to operate in the contemporary and futuristic electronic warfare environment with cutting edge technological features. Similarly, Indian Navy is looking at acquiring a range of state of the art helicopters to realize its long term strategic goals. Indeed the plan to acquire six P-81 Boeing long range maritime surveillance aircraft is quite relevant and timely to enhance Indian Navy’s situational awareness domain in the Indian ocean region where the menace of sea pirates has assumed a serious dimension. When Boeing hands over the first P-81 sometime next year, India will become the first non-US operator of this aircraft that will ultimately replace Soviet vintage Tupolev-142 M and Illyushin-38 long range patrol aircraft. Indian navy is also interested in acquiring four more of P-81.

In the ultimate analysis, the accretion plan of the Indian Navy, the forth largest maritime force in the world, looks at operating 150 plus warship of various categories and 500 aircraft including fighter jets, helicopters and maritime reconnaissance aircraft by 2027. Indian Navy’s strike capability will stands enhanced by a substantial extent when Long Range Surface to Air Missile(LRSAM), a guided weapon that the state owned Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is building in tie up with Israel Air Force Industries(IAI) gets ready for operational use. With a range of 70-km and weighing around 275-kg, the LRSAM with a high performance guidance system will be a force multiplier and game changer for the Indian navy. The trump card of the Indian Navy is the Indo-Russian supersonic cruise missile BrahMos which has already been inducted into some of its warships. The 290-km range BrahMos with a phenomenal destructive power has been described as the “most powerful and most formidable ”naval missile of its kind.

In a related development, Arihant is now poised for extensive sea trials as a prelude to make it fully operational by early 2013. Incidentally, over 6,000-tonne Arihant equipped with a dozen K-15 ballistic missiles will constitute the robust undersea leg of the Indian nuclear triad. As India has a policy of no “first use” of nuclear weapons, survivable retaliatory strike capability is dependent on the this nuclear powered submarine .

Chakra in tandem with Arihant will give Indian Navy a greater manoeuvrability to hoodwink the enemy’s surveillance system and strike hard as they can remain submerged indefinitely . Meanwhile Pakistan, which is, trying to match the Indian Naval capability has said it will build nuclear submarine to meet its defence requirements. “The nuclear submarine would be built in the country” said a government official and added “it would take 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would join the list of countries that have a nuclear submarine.”

With China rapidly expanding its naval capability to realize its long standing ambition of challenging the might of American naval fleets moving across the high seas of the world, Indian navy is not willing to be left behind in the race to take care of the Indian interests across the vital global sea lanes. For realizing this vision, Indian Navy would need to strengthen its submarine fleet by a substantial extent. However, right at the moment the submarine asset of the Indian navy, leaves much to be desired. According to India’s public audit watch dog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), navy’s submarine fleet is aging fast and by 2012, 63 percent of the vessels would have completed their operational life. The Navy which currently operates just 14 submarines has a submarine strength much below the envisaged force level. All the six Scorpene submarines being built with French assistance at the Mumbai based Mazagaon Dock under Project75 will be delivered between 2015 and 2018. The Scorpene production programme has been marred by delays and cost overruns. Indian Navy is also planning for a new production line of the next generation diesel electric submarine with Russian technology. This project has been cleared by the Defence Ministry.

The Indian Navy is fully well aware of the implications of the rights secured by China’s Ocean Mineral Research and Development Association(COMRA)from the International Seabed Authority for exploring poly-metallic nodules in the Indian ocean region. Indeed, this could serve as a cover to strengthen Chinese naval presence in this vital oceanic body. “The world has anxieties over the rise of China but the two countries that should watch out are India and Japan as China has the capacity to cast a shadow on them,” says Geir Lundestad of Norway’s Nobel Institute. For China, India’s joining hands with Vietnam for oil exploration in South China Sea, over which China claims total and absolute rights, has become a hard nut to crack.

However India’s endeavour to build Chabahar port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf in Iran close to Pakistan’s coastal stretch has entered a phase of stalemate presumably owing to international pressure in the wake of Iran’s vow to continue with its nuclear programme. “If India accelerates the work, the port of Chabahar will come up in record time because the Iranian side is fully equipped and willing to help India in completing the project,” says Mostafa Dolatyar of Teheran’s Institute for Political and International Studies, “For India, access to central Asian oil and gas is entirely dependent on its use of the Iranian ports and Chabahar will be a port dedicated to the Indian needs”.

On his part, Verma is clear in perception, “the Indian Navy’s current perspective level planning is driven by a conceptual shift from numbers of platforms—that is from the old bean counting philosophy to one that concentrates on capacity”.Giving details, Verma points out “In terms of force accretions in the immediate future, we are acquiring ships in accordance with Navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan. Our preferred choice of inducting ships and submarines has been through the indigenous route and of the 49 ships and submarines on order, 45 are from Indian shipyards.”

For with China enlarging its footprint all over the Indian Ocean region through what is being viewed as its aim of creating a “string of pearls” of listening posts around India, Indian navy cannot afford to remain idle. China has already constructed an ultra modern port in Hambantota in Sri Lanka in addition to a number of maritime projects in Myanmar. And to India’s discomfiture, China has also bagged a project to build a deep sea harbour at Sonadiya near Chittagong in Bangladesh. Of course, for geo-political and strategic reasons, China has not obliged Pakistan in so far building a naval base at Gwadar is concerned.

Against this backdrop Indian Navy’s strategy to transform itself into a satellite augmented, network centric three dimensional force, assumes significance. As it is, the Indian Navy has drawn up an ambitious plan to acquire a range of satellites for a variety of end uses in the years ahead. To begin with, it would get GSat-7, a multi band communications satellite built by the Indian Space Research organisation(ISRO). GSAT-7 will help the Indian Navy link up its long range missiles , radar and air defence networks to a central room through a dedicated satellite communications network. The most striking advantage of GSAT-7 is that it would provide secure, reliable and hassle free communications channel. GSAT-7 which will encase the rich and varied experience of ISRO in building INSAT series of communications spacecraft will help smoothen naval plan for a robust net centric war platform. This satellite with 600-100 nautical miles footprints over the Indian Ocean will enhance maritime domain awareness of the Navy over the Indian ocean region which India considers to be the primary area of responsibility in terms of maritime security.

Not even sky seems to be the limit for Indian navy’s ambitions to acquire space assets. Looking ahead, it is keen on acquiring dedicated satellites for applications such as navigation, ocean watch, reconnaissance and surveillance, electronics intelligence and weather prediction in addition to communications and data transfer . The ultimate objective of the Indian Navy is to create and sustain a three dimensional, technology enabled, satellite augmented network centric system to transform itself into a forward looking, formidable sea power. Indian Navy’s radical shift in its strategic outlook is clearly exemplified by the fact that it is aiming for a global reach from being a just regional sea power worried about the threats from China and Pakistan. That Navy is looking well beyond China and Pakistan to position itself as a maritime force capable of taking care of Indian interests across the high seas of the world augurs well for India’s long term strategic vision of attaining the status of a major military power.