National Interests should Guide India’s Afghan Policy

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

2014 will be a turning point in Afghanistan. Power will be handed over to a new President after elections. The US military will complete its withdrawal. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take over the security responsibility for the country.

The prospects for all these transitions do not look promising. The new President will have to be a Pashtun in order to ensure broad-based ethnic support. President Karzai was parachuted to the presidency without elections in post-war circumstances in which the US and the West could impose their will. His re-election was mired in controversy, created primarily by his western supporters. Despite many levers at their command, the US and the West have not been able to manage Karzai. This shows how difficult it has been for the US and others to oversee the political process in Afghanistan even under military occupation. With the impending withdrawal, their control over politics will become even less. The larger question is whether a new Pashtun leader can emerge who can assure cross ethnic support? Will he able to deliver political stability and a degree of economic development in the very difficult circumstances that his country will be facing?

The US has signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, but the follow-up agreement- the Bilateral Security Agreement- on the status of the residual US forces that will remain in military bases has not been finalized. The US has failed to secure a suitable agreement in Iraq. If it fails in Afghanistan, it is threatening a “zero option”. Whether this is pressure tactics or is a veritable option is not clear. In any case, the fact that this is being considered shows that the US has no clear answer for the future. “Zero option” has the air of a “zero answer”!

The ANSF may have numbers and reports that they are performing well does not guarantee they will be able to operate successfully in a post-US withdrawal environment, especially if the US leaves in a scenario that is politically unsatisfactory for all sides. The ANSF lacks heavy weaponry, air power and sophisticated intelligence capability. Will they be able to really cope as a cohesive force?

The economic prospects in Afghanistan are not very reassuring despite the pledges of assistance made at Tokyo and the announced longer-term commitments made by countries not to abandon Afghanistan. If the US exercises a zero military option, will that be compatible with a major economic commitment prolonged in time, especially in a tight economic situation in the US and the Eurozone? Plans by countries to invest in Afghanistan not only depend on internal stability but also will take some years to yield results, enough to make a difference on the ground.

Adding to the problem is the general instability around Afghanistan. The internal situation in Pakistan is fraught despite recent elections. Iran has a new President but the nuclear dossier remains problematic and sanctions on Iran have been further tightened. The Arab world is in turmoil, with the so-called Arab Spring having withered very rapidly. Religious extremism is spreading and this gives political oxygen to such forces battling in Afghanistan.

India has to cope with the situation as it develops. We have faced the worst when the Taliban took over Afghanistan in the mid-90s. We know of course what the dangers are ahead and have tried to play our limited role in preventing untoward conditions from developing through our political and economic engagement with Afghanistan.

India is pursuing a very responsible policy in Afghanistan. We want a sovereign, stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, one that is free from extremism and where human rights, especially those of women are respected. India is doing nothing contrary to the achievement of this objective in Afghanistan.

We are maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan based on equality and respect for sovereignty. We are not interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, arming any particular group or providing safe-havens for terrorists or anti-government political groups to carry on violent activities against the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

We have legitimate interests in Afghanistan as a neighbouring country and every right to be present there. The international community cannot accept the curtailment of Afghan sovereignty by endorsing the principle that the Afghan government should give precedence to the interests of any particular country over that of any other. It is for the Afghan government to take independent decisions in a responsible way. India has no intention to occupy the legitimate space that other neighbouring countries of Afghanistan seek there.

India has established a strategic relationship with Afghanistan. This is anchored in a longer-term bilateral and regional perspective. India has geo-political, strategic interests in this entire region that forms a part of our strategic neighbourhood. Afghanistan borders Central Asia and Iran, apart from China and Pakistan. India has had intimate age-old ties with Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran, with the history of our country linked to this region over centuries.

Central Asia is landlocked and so is Afghanistan. The development of this region faces a particularly difficult challenge because of this. This entire region needs the broadest possible choices for its development. It is natural for it to look for enhanced ties with India as the biggest economy in Southern Asia that can substantially contribute to this objective. We are wiling to respond.

Afghanistan has huge mineral resources that await exploitation. India is ready to invest large sums in this sector, beginning with iron ore extraction. Afghanistan is ready to offer to India a natural resources corridor for development. For realizing this objective, India needs better access to Afghanistan, as Pakistan is not as yet willing to provide transit facilities through its territory to Afghanistan.

India is looking at the Chabahar port in Iran as an access route to Afghanistan as well as Central Asia. We have recently committed $100 million to this project. US/EU sanctions on Iran are a complication for such efforts to give Afghanistan alternative options for its trade and facilitate foreign investment there. The US government should take a positive view of Indian investments in Iran that are specifically directed at easing Afghanistan’s difficult situation, which will be important for stimulating the Afghan economy, at present too dependent on foreign assistance and income derived from the presence of foreign troops on its soil.

In developing trade and energy ties between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, a project that the US favours as part of the New Silk Road project, Afghanistan is a critical hub. We support the TAPI pipeline project that will bring Turkmenistan gas to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. India can fruitfully participate in projects to increase electricity grids in the region to alleviate regional energy-related problems.

India is participating in several international efforts to contribute to development in Afghanistan, whether it is the Istanbul Process and the Heart of Asia conferences in Kabul in June 2012 and in Istanbul in April 2012, or the initiative we took ourselves to organize a Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan, also in June 2012, followed by the Tokyo Conference on aid to Afghanistan in July 2012.

India’s own bilateral aid to Afghanistan has reached $2 billion. Some see in this an effort by us to seek undue influence in Afghanistan. If India’s foreign assistance programme and the billions Indian companies are investing abroad are considered, this is not a very big sum. There is full participation of the Afghan authorities in selecting Indian assistance projects that are infrastructural as well as geared to meeting the basic requirements of people and localities spread over the country. A large number of our projects are in the Pashtun areas. India has earned great popularity because of the manner in which we have conducted ourselves.

Economic development in Afghanistan and the region is essential to check-mate the growth of extremist ideologies in the region and associated terrorist activity. These concerns are uppermost in India’s mind as we are most exposed as a country to terrorism and supporting ideologies. As a secular, multi-religious state, we are particularly sensitive to such threats. Any boost given to these extremist forces, even unwittingly, should be unacceptable as our security is threatened.

It is with concern therefore that we view the outreach by US, Britain and others to the Taliban. We are not against any genuine attempt at reconciliation if all sides want it on a basis that respects the red lines drawn by the international community for a dialogue with the Taliban. We find that these red lines are being blurred by NATO’s anxiety to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, whatever the ground situation.

Such a strategy gives the upper hand to the Taliban groups in Pakistan in negotiations as they know time is on their side.

The rhetoric remains that the reconciliation process should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, but the manner in which the dialogue is being structured does not suggest that it will be an independent intra- Afghan process. President Karzai has already distanced himself from the US initiative. We feel that nothing should be done behind the back of the Kabul government. Latest statements from persons close to President Karzai express the deep concern of the Kabul government about understandings that the US may have reached with Pakistan and the possibility of south and eastern Afghanistan being handed over to the Taliban, which could divide the country and trigger an all-out conflict.

The end-game in Afghanistan is being played out in an atmosphere of great suspicion and bickering amongst the principal parties involved. The manner in which the Doha office of the Taliban was opened has made matters worse. The conduct of the Taliban in declaring themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan made their own end-game clear.

The link between the Taliban and Pakistan is evident. One will have to wait and watch whether the declared US position that no single country will be allowed to dominate post-2014 Afghanistan can be sustained by it when its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan is so clear.

India has not been kept adequately in the picture about the dialogue with the Taliban, despite India’s vital concerns being involved. India suffered when the Taliban came to power in 1996. That was the only time India had no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and terrorists were being trained on its soil for attacks against India. If the Taliban were to be accommodated again, India has reason to be concerned.

We find that the policies of our western friends in Afghanistan are neither sufficiently steady nor transparent.

The argument that the Taliban has various currents in it and there are “moderate” Taliban has been exposed as hollow by what has transpired in Egypt where the same arguments distinguishing between various strands in the Muslim Brotherhood and welcoming their assumption of power have proved devoid of worth.

India does not want conditions of ethnic conflict to be created again in Afghanistan. The international community must safeguard against it. The post 2014 situation in Afghanistan remains very uncertain as the country will be faced with a political and military transition even when the external danger to the country has not been neutralized.

Establishing democracy in Afghanistan by integrating forces into the polity that are currently threatening the country will be a most difficult enterprise.

The root of the problem must be dealt with, which is external support for Afghan extremists and their instrumentalization for achieving the military ambitions of a third country. So long as there are safe havens for extremists outside Afghanistan, the problems will not go away. If the Taliban retain influence in eastern and southern Afghanistan, it is because their staging grounds are outside.

India’s traditional ties have been with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. A large number of our development projects are in Pashtun areas, which have been very well received by the local people. We support ethnic harmony in Afghanistan, with the Pashtuns adequately represented in governance, but this has to emerge through a democratic process, without the shadow of externally supported violence.

Our strategic partnership with Afghanistan is not directed against any third country. The primary element in this strategic relationship is not military. India is willing to contribute to the capacity building of the Afghan national security forces through training and supply of non-lethal equipment so that they can better provide security to the people after the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Our goals are primarily economically oriented. We do not want to supplant NATO.

In principle, however, India could provide a limited amount of combat equipment too, as sought by the Afghan government. The concerns of Pakistan should be irrelevant in this regard. Pakistan is having a military relationship with Sri Lanka unbothered by our sensitivities. China is arming Pakistan, providing it even strategic capabilities, without any one advising Pakistan to defer to Indian sensitivities about the security threat posed to us. The US is arming Pakistan too, disregarding our sensitivities.

For elements in the US to caution us against increasing our military engagement with Afghanistan because of Pakistani sensitivities is inconsistent with the policy choices they make in our region in their national interest. India could argue, as the US does, that our arms assistance to Afghanistan will not change the balance of power between it and Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear capable state with large and well-equipped armed forces, whereas Afghanistan has a fledgling, ill equipped force that is no match for the Pakistani military. Our decision on the question should be based on our judgment on how far we want to or can go in giving arms assistance to Afghanistan, not what Pakistan or the US thinks. In our own interest, we should be prudent.

It is a hugely perverse notion that the real problem in Afghanistan is India-Pakistan rivalry. Those who feel that their intervention in Afghanistan has not worked to stabilize the situation to the extent that they may have wanted and now want to cut costs at all costs, should not seek to transfer the responsibility for their failure on India’s shoulders.

India was not responsible for the rise of religious extremism in the region; it was not responsible for the civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure; it did not put the Taliban in power in Kabul; it had no hand in the presence of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan; it had no responsibility for US/NATO military intervention in Afghanistan; the Taliban groups or the Haqqani group are not in India; NATO soldiers have not been killed by groups operating from Indian soil. If the US has had to resort to drone attacks against terrorists in Pakistan, it is not because of India.

We seek a friendly relationship with Afghanistan. We seek no exclusive relationship. Afghanistan should have friendly relations with all its neighbours. We are willing to work with all of them. India and China are already talking to each other on Afghanistan. There should be no problem in discussing Afghanistan with Pakistan in a constructive way that opens up the doors for transit facilities eventually. The new government in Pakistan should think along those lines, rather than allowing Pakistan’s policies to be guided by the ambitions of its armed forces.

We have been very constructive in our dealings with the US on the Afghan issue. We have supported the international military intervention in Afghanistan and the ouster of the Taliban regime from power. We have been sensitive to US equities and concerns in Afghanistan despite serious provocations from Pakistan, including the terrorist attacks against the Indian Embassy in Kabul and India-related targets there. We continue to be willing to work with the US in a positive and mutually beneficial way in Afghanistan.

On June 27, US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Dobbins, sent to India to re-assure us about the US initiative to negotiate with the Taliban, did not convey the impression that the US was playing a sure hand, was confident about its strategy and had alternative options in view.

He said the US hoped for presidential candidates in Afghanistan that have cross-ethnic appeal. The US was not entering the dialogue with the Taliban with any certainty that it will start, how it will develop, whether progress will be made and whether it will result in diminished violence and peace. The Taliban had to say whether they will accept the conditions and meet the US and the Afghan High Peace Council. The issue of terrorism had to be directly addressed and that a pre-condition for starting talks was a statement that the Taliban will begin to distance themselves from the Al Qaida, but reaching an agreement will require concretely severing all ties. Ending violence was not a pre-condition for talks, but an agreement had to include cessation of hostilities and respect for the Afghan Constitution. He concluded by stating that it was not certain that negotiations will end the war but that it was worth trying.

Such a tentative and uncertain reading of the situation, without a clear and confident road map, justifies our concerns about the wisdom of taking a step to politically accommodate such a retrograde and obscurantist force as the Taliban with the assistance of the Pakistani military whose disruptive strategic ambitions in Afghanistan are in fact at the root of the problem.

(Based on a talk recently delivered on the Capitol Hill, Washington)

The Pakistan Factor in India’s Afghanistan Policy

Monish Gulati

During his last week’s visit to New Delhi, Afghan President Hamid Karzai sought a pro ‘active’ Indian involvement in Afghanistan’s security even as across the border, Chinese Premier Li Kequiang committed to improve the connectivity of the strategically located Gwadar port to realize the Pakistani dream of turning it into a regional trade hub for China, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs).

Also the first US convoy of 50 trucks and armoured vehicles reached Quetta from Kandahar on 21 May, carrying US equipment being withdrawn from Afghanistan through the Chaman crossing on the Pak-Afghan border to Port Qasim, Karachi. This came even as Pentagon put in a request for ‘reprogramming’ its budget for 2013 on account of additional expenditure of $ 1.8 billion it had incurred when Pakistan had closed NATO supply routes to Afghanistan from Karachi last year.

Contrasting events over the last week point to how Pakistan’s foreign policy trumps India’s foreign relations in the sub-continent. It also indicates how Pakistan with an economy propped up by aid handouts finds itself on the same table as US and China without declaring itself a regional superpower. India on the other hand appears to be blundering through its foreign policy options or operating with its hands tied. The question to be asked is whether India lacks the capability to articulate and realize its interests in Afghanistan or its foreign policy manoeuvers have been constrained by certain ‘red lines’ Pakistan has managed to frame through a dexterous manipulation of international interests and concerns.

Afghan-Pak Relationship

Despite a common and porous border, ethnic bonds and shared Pashtun culture, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have at best, been tenuous. After the dismal outcome of the recent Afghan-Pak-UK trilateral and the failure of Hagel and Kerry to achieve a significant breakthrough in Af-Pak, it is becoming increasingly difficult to predict what direction the relations between the two countries will take after the ongoing security transition in Afghanistan. Quite simply, as one analyst put it, "There are way too many things in play.” The failure of the two countries to come to an understanding on their relationship has bred an atmosphere of suspicion and frustration making third party intervention on behest of either side very difficult.

Other than the China and Iran, the two neighbours Pakistan shares with Afghanistan, Pakistan’s relations with US and India have been playing a crucial role in shaping its strategy in Afghanistan. Besides the Pakistani fears of encirclement by India and the perceived Indian interference in its internal security affairs particularly in Baluchistan, it is the blatant Pakistani demand at virtually all recent bilateral and multilateral forums that Afghanistan has no meaningful relationship with India and it has proved to be a major obstacle in ties between the two South Asian countries. This insistence has been shrill of late on Indo-Afghan bilateral security cooperation, which is largely confined to training of personnel as against any Indian military presence on Afghan soil. What is worse is the tacit support such demands have received from countries such as the UK.

However, it is the choppy dynamics of its relations with the US that has had overbearing influence on Pakistan’s strategic outlook and external policy. Post 2001, US has displaced India as Pakistan’s prime foreign policy concern which in turn strongly influences the country’s dealings with Afghanistan because it regards the US as one of the major causes of instability in Afghanistan and indeed, within Pakistan itself.

Like all regional stakeholders, Pakistan has also hedged its interests in Afghanistan, which unfortunately is premised on the outcome that in the end, US will not have its way in Afghanistan. It is this factor that makes Pakistan’s hedging strategy distinct from that of other regional actors, who too are safeguarding their interests, but against the uncertainty of the final outcome in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan will oppose directly or indirectly any move to prolong US presence across the border. Many analysts infer that it is this position which induces duplicity in Pakistan‘s approach towards US/NATO in Afghanistan.

Contrary to what many in India would like to believe, it is very likely that the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the consequent reduction of US influence in the region will take away even the economic cooperation plank from the Indo-Afghan relationship . Pakistan, on the other hand, has doubly hedged its bets against Indian role in Afghanistan by reinforcing the perception that its support for the Afghan Taliban is a reaction to Indian assertiveness in Afghanistan. This ensures that any Pakistani assistance in furthering Afghan reconciliation that involves Taliban’s cooperation comes with the underlying precondition of keep India out of the picture. A condition that remains valid even after the US drawdown and as long as Taliban remains a force to reckon with in Afghanistan. It also gives credence to this ungainly argument that a part of Afghanistan’s woes are due to India’s ‘hegemonistic’ aspirations in the region.

Thus, India finds itself in a position where Pakistan’s support to the insurgency in Kashmir is being viewed as legitimate assistance to a local independence struggle while any notion that India might harbor for a tit-for-tat in Baluchistan will be construed as interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs and in the eyes of the international community an ‘irresponsible’ act to destabilize the fragile situation in Afghanistan and regional peace. International sentiments remain equally ‘understanding’ of Pakistani fears on ‘encirclement’ by India, while it is India that is finding itself increasingly isolated by China in its own backyard.

In addition to managing its affairs with the US, Pakistan appears to utilise its ‘all-weather’ relationship with China as a counterbalance to both the US and India and at the same time partake economic benefits through development of bilateral trade . It also looks to increased transit revenue on account of trade traffic through its transportation routes and ports as a spin off from the Chinese economic activity in Afghanistan. The recent handover of commercial operations of Gwadar port to the Chinese is an indicator of this approach.

Pakistan is also trying to manage its disagreements with Iran over the strategic approach to Afghanistan and Central Asia. This would provide Pakistan access to Iran’s energy resources, prevent diversion of potential transit trade revenue from Gwadar and simultaneously deny India access to the CARs. The recent Iran Pakistan gas pipeline deal with Iran showcases this approach which Pakistan formalized against US opposition and the seemingly irreconcilable Sunni-Shia sectarian divide.

Internally the situation in Pakistan is equally confounding as the country which continues to face major concerns on economic stability, growth and security, professes lack of state control over militants on its territory and what it has got many to believe- its nuclear arsenal. Pakistani non-state actors who appear to be beyond Pakistani control (in the process absolve it of any responsibility for their actions) strangely, at times, find common ground with the Pakistani state in pursuit of their ‘criminal’ objectives. The recent decision of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to participate in Afghan Taliban's spring offensive in Afghanistan against Afghan and foreign forces is one such case. TTP also confirmed that its cadres were already active against Afghan and foreign forces, especially in the Logar province.

Red Lines

Through a deft management of international opinion and a subtle exploitation of their vulnerabilities and fears, Pakistan has managed draw certain ‘red lines’ for Indian foreign policy on Afghanistan. The first line ensures India deals with Pakistani support to foreign militants in Kashmir on its side of line of control only, as an internal security issue. Second, any support to militancy in Baluchistan, even financially, is an irresponsible act of interfering in the internal affairs of an economically and politically fragile nuclear weapon state. Third line restricts support to Afghanistan to non-military /security areas and no measure is taken to upstage Pakistan’s influence and leverage with the government of the day in Afghanistan. That comes with minor discomfort of issues such as no Most Favoured Nation status, no transit for Indian trade, TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gas line remains a pipe dream etc.

Conclusion

It is imperative for India, therefore, for to find its way out of the ‘foreign policy confines’ Pakistan has created for it with regards to its relations with Afghanistan. There is a need to replace the theory of Indian ‘irresponsibility’ in seeking a greater role in future of Afghanistan with Pakistani ‘responsibility’ to acknowledge the fact that that as an independent sovereign nation, Afghanistan has the right to manage its own relations with its neighbours driven by the interest of its own people.

Russia’s New Silk Road Strategy: Connecting to Pakistan

Vinod Anand
Senior Fellow, VIF

Even though much awaited President Putin’s visit to Pakistan in the first week of October has been shelved, causing disappointment among the Pakistani establishment, the doors for finding a new understanding between the two on Afghanistan and regional issues remain wide open. Putin was to pay a bilateral visit to Pakistan before the quadrilateral summit that was scheduled for 2-3 October in Islamabad. Pakistan had become part of the quadrilateral of Russia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan in July 2009 when the forum’s first summit was held in Dushanbe. The main goals of the quartet are to promote regional trade and undertake joint projects in energy, transport, communications, agriculture and infrastructure. Combating terrorism, extremism, illegal trafficking of drugs and trans-national organized crimes, supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan and in the region are the other major objectives. These are usually the objectives of any number of multi-lateral structures and organizations that exist in this troubled region, for instance the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Finding a regional solution to many of the problems being faced by the region especially that of instability, insecurity in Afghanistan and improving the socio-economic environment have driven the major players like the U.S., China and Russia to advance their own formulations and structures. However, the competing strategies of the main players in the arena have only added to the complexity of the regional issues.

At a time when Pakistan’s stock is running at all time low with the U.S. and its coalition partners in Afghanistan, Islamabad has been working to find a new strategic equation in the post-2014 Afghanistan scenario. Russians believe that Pakistan remains central to the Afghan imbroglio and has an important role to play in the unfolding scenario. Pakistan hopes to obtain a favourable outcome in the Afghan end game with Russia on its side. Moscow has also not been much enamoured by the so called ‘reset’ in its relations with the U.S., as promised by Obama administration. American policies on BMD, eastwards expansion of NATO and contesting Russia’s ‘privileged status’ in Central Asian region has soured the U.S-Russian relationship. Even though Russia is providing logistics routes through its territory for ISAF troops in Afghanistan it continues to oppose American bases and transit facilities being provided by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Further, in the long run both Russia and Pakistan would like to see the back of the American troops in Afghanistan. They are against the long term presence of the American bases in Afghanistan as these have adverse strategic connotations for both Russia and nuclear Pakistan.

There is also a wide-spread belief that in its approach to Afghanistan, China is becoming wary of putting all its eggs in the Pakistani basket and has embarked on establishing a direct relationship with the Kabul regime. On the sidelines of the SCO Summit in June this year, China and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement. At the summit, Afghanistan was admitted to SCO as on observer. Further in September Zhou Yongkang – member of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party - visited Afghanistan and signed a number of agreements on assisting Afghanistan in its security sector development programmes. He committed to training 300 Afghan national police officers which in effect could help the ISAF/NATO efforts of training the Afghan National Security Forces.

Thus, Pakistan has been aiming at finding new partners in the power play taking place in the region. As part of Pakistan’s desire to forge a cozy relationship with Russia Gen. Kayani has also traveled to Moscow in the first week of October. In fact, as a military head and one who is the final arbiter of Pakistan’s security and foreign policies, his visit would give an opportunity to Russian leaders to obtain insights into Pakistan’s fresh thinking, if any, on Afghanistan and regional security issues. While Kayani was in Moscow, the Russian Foreign Minister was in Islamabad for parleys with his Pakistani counterpart to explain the absence of Putin and identify with Pakistan’s role in the region. Sergei Lavrov supported Pakistan’s stance on the U.S. Drone strikes and denounced these attacks as violations of Pakistani sovereign territory.

Russia and Pakistan are looking for many benefits from mutual cooperation. The Russian gas company Gazprom has been looking forward to being awarded a contract for building the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline without many of the processes associated with the laid down procedures. Russia has agreed to modernise, reconstruct and expand the Pakistan Steel Mills that has been running far below its capacity. Russia would also be supporting Pakistan Railways by undertaking a joint venture for developing a carriages workshop and may even supply Russian rail carriages. The Russians are also converting two Pakistani thermal power plants from furnace oil to coal.

Gaining access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean has been a long cherished Russian desire since the days of Tsarist Russia and a route through Pakistan could be one useful option. Writing recently in Pravda, an analyst Lyuba Lulko suggests that “establishing close cooperation with Pakistan will give Russia a real chance to gain a foothold in Central and South Asia. In addition, Russia will be able to access the Indian Ocean, and make the U.S. troops in Afghanistan directly dependent on its logistics.”

The proposed multimodal transport links, another version of the old Silk Road are expected to provide benefits to all the four countries involved. Pakistan will gain access to Central Asian markets while Tajikistan and Russia would gain access to Pakistani ports. Commenting on last year’s Quadrilateral Summit at Sochi, Chairman of the Russian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev, observed that “Russia may become a donor of economic, social and military-political security for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.”

Russia has also offered to revive all the Soviet era industrial and infrastructure projects (numbering about 140) in Afghanistan. Russia is also willing to help Tajikistan in the hydro-power sector. The Central Asia South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) power transmission project of exporting electricity from hydro-power rich Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan is a much touted project. However, it is difficult to be realized because of objections to hydro-power projects by the down stream Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan. Another project is of building a road from Tajikistan across the Wakhan corridor to Pakistan in order to enhance regional connectivity. If Russia is able to support such projects and find the finances for the same then it would also gain a degree of control and enhance its influence in the region.

However, Pakistan and Russia would certainly have competing objectives in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Unlike Pakistan, Russia would be apprehensive of a radical Taliban regime in Kabul that may have the agenda of spreading its ideology to the Central Asian republics and beyond to Chechnya. Pakistan has not been able to control its own radical jihadis and it is unlikely that it would be able to have a degree of control over a resurgent Taliban regime in Kabul.

So far as India is concerned, the pipeline projects like Iran-Pakistan-India or TAPI gas pipeline project or for that any other multi-modal transport corridors can become economically viable only when India is included in them. A limited grouping like Russia-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Pakistan may only produce a limited benefit. Pakistan’s obtuse policies of denying overland transit to Indian goods to Afghanistan and beyond deprive Pakistan and other regional countries the benefits of revenue and beneficial economic engagement and trade. Equally, its sponsorship of terrorism, and proclivity to use transit for political purposes, as shown most recently by its shutting down the NATO supply lines to Afghanistan, ensure that India remains wary of any such projects.

Connecting South Asia to Central Asia, especially through Pakistan (the shortest overland route) could be a win-win situation for all countries in the region with Afghanistan emerging as an important hub of communications in all directions. This would have positive effect on security, stability and economy of Afghanistan. But Pakistan will have to undertake a root-and-branch transformation of its security outlook for that to happen.

Afghanistan and America’s New Silk Road Strategy

Vinod Anand
Senior Fellow, VIF

The security situation in Afghanistan continues to follow a declining curve. Not only the NATO supply routes through Pakistan have been attacked by the Taliban the logistics coming through Uzbekistan via the Northern Distribution Network have also come under Taliban attack. Relations between the US and Pakistan have not improved much; Pakistan’s stance on Haqqani group continues to sour US-Pakistan relationship with. The US Congress has voted for the Haqqani group to be designated as a terror group. It is well accepted that Pakistan continues to provide shelter to Quetta Shura and other assorted militant groups despite its avowals to the contrary. America has been advocating a regional solution to the Afghan puzzle and its ‘new Silk Road Strategy’ unveiled last year is claimed to be a part of the same. Though the strategy largely stresses on regional economic integration with Afghanistan yet it is not devoid of geo-strategic connotations. Finding a regional solution to the Afghan imbroglio has been one of the main planks of Obama’s Af-Pak strategy since 2009. However, so far, the US has largely been looking for a US led solution.

The question therefore arises is whether America’s new Silk Road strategy is really new or whether it is old wine in the new bottle? What are the objectives and significance of this strategy?

America’s Silk Road Strategy can be said to have gone through three iterations. The initial phase commenced with the demise of Soviet Union at the end of 1991. The US and the West were first off the block in making efforts to wean the nascent Central Asian nations away from the Russian influence. At that time Russia had also become weak and expected the West to help it out economically.

The Americans passed a Freedom Support Act of 1992 and a Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999. The main goals were to promote democracy and human rights, foster pro-West orientations in Central Asian nations, support economic growth, and development of transport and communications. Kazakhstan was seen as an ‘energy behemoth’ where American companies invested a great deal in its hydrocarbon sector. According to the thought process of the US administration the US efforts were seen as ‘strengthening independence of the Central Asian states and forestalling Russian, Chinese and Iranian efforts to subvert them’. The overall objective was to integrate theses countries into the European system.

When the US and its allies intervened in Afghanistan post September 2001 terrorist attacks to route out the Taliban the Russians, Chinese and the Central Asian states welcomed the Western powers’ intervention in Afghanistan because it suited their short term strategic interests of dealing with security threats arising from Afghanistan. The Central Asian nations states even offered bases to the US and western troops.

However, the next phase of America’s Silk Road Strategy can be said to have begun in 2005-2006 when the US started promoting a ‘Greater Central Asia Concept/ Strategy’. The term ‘greater Central Asia’ included many areas and countries surrounding the Central Asian nations. Ostensibly, the aim was to promote greater economic integration especially focused on connecting Central Asia and South Asia. The main goal of this phase of strategy was to weaken the Russian control over hydro carbon sector on Central Asian countries like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan by building pipelines that bypassed Russian territory. Therefore, not only Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project was a manifestation of this concept, even the Nabucco gas pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline projects (getting oil from Kazakhstan) also were part of this strategy. The argument offered was that the Central Asian nations need diversification of outlets for their natural resources and other products.

To give substance to the greater Central Asian concept the State Department in 2006 included Central Asia in a revamped Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. When Obama appeared on the scene he wanted to reset relations with Russia because of the complex geo-strategic situation prevailing in Afghanistan and Central Asian region which was again a sub-set of the overall global environment wherein the American power was considered to be on the decline. Though Russians and the Central Asian countries did help out the US and its allies by allowing transit of logistics through the Northern Distribution Network (the existing infrastructure and road/rail network of which could become a basis for another silk route) yet the ‘reset’ could not be realized.

The new Silk Road Strategy announced by Hillary Clinton last year (July 2011) is therefore not new; the basic premises of the American strategy in Central Asia have not undergone any change; if at all there is some change, it is in the priority of ends which it wants to achieve in the current milieu of Afghanistan. Top most priority for the US currently is how to get out of Afghanistan gracefully. Connecting Central with South Asia through a network of multimodal transport corridors and networks that include road and rail networks, pipelines, electricity grids and power transmission lines with Afghanistan as a hub are being seen as a panacea to cure at least the economic ills being faced by the region, especially that of Afghanistan leading to peace and stability there. Such a strategy is expected to provide enough revenues to the Afghan government to run its affairs without being dependent on foreign aid in the long run. But the multi-million dollar question remains, security first or the development first? Some American analysts propound the thesis that economic development and growth is possible even in unstable and insecure environment. However, without security all the talk of pipelines and investments in the mineral ores sector of Afghanistan by economic heavy weights like China, India and others would remain a chimera.

Hillary Clinton while explaining this U.S. policy towards Afghanistan had stated that in coming years it would focus on encouraging “stronger economic ties through South and Central Asia so that goods, capital, and people can flow more easily across borders.” She again articulated this new Silk Road concept at a meeting of regional ministers and others in September 2011, stating that “as we look to the future of this region, let us take this precedent (of a past Silk Road) as inspiration for a long-term vision for Afghanistan and its neighbors”. She envisioned a ‘web of economic and transit connections that will bind together a region too long torn apart by conflict and division’.

This kind of regional cooperation and economic integration was further mooted in Istanbul and Bonn Conferences of 2011 on Afghanistan. For instance, the Istanbul Conference had recognized Afghanistan’s role as the land bridge in the ‘Heart of Asia’, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia and the Middle East, and reaffirmed their support in the strongest possible terms to the secure, stable and peaceful future of Afghanistan. It also endorsed Afghanistan’s willingness and determination to use its regional and historical position to do its part to promote security and peaceful economic cooperation in the region. The Conference had also stressed the central role of the United Nations in the international affairs which was perhaps an oblique reference to the proclivity of the US to adopt unilateralist approach to international affairs or bypass the UN.

India, together with Russia and Iran has been working on another version of Silk Road. They are founder partners of the International North South Transport Corridor the main goal which was to link not only Central Asia and Russia but also Europe. However, due to many bottlenecks and poor infrastructure in Iran and many other geopolitical problems associated with Iran the full potential of this Corridor has not been realized. India also built a road from Iran border town Zaranj to Delaram in Afghanistan linking up with the Garland highway of Afghanistan. This is one of the most important road-links in land-locked Afghanistan. Zaranj is also linked by Iranian road network to Chabahar port. However, unstable conditions and the influence of the Taliban in the Southern areas of Afghanistan have prevented this route to be exploited fully. Therefore, attempts by India to establish its own versions of silk route have not been very successful.

Further, the Indian companies have decided to invest about US Dollars 10 billion in the iron and steel sector of Afghanistan to exploit the mineral resources of iron ore deposits of Hajigak in Afghanistan. The questions are being asked as to how the products will be evacuated. One project that may take off is construction of 900 KM railway line from Chabahar port to Bamiyan and Hagijak in Afghanistan which would be used for transportation of the products. But then any project by India in Iran upsets the Americans. The abandoning of Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline could have been due to the US pressure besides un-remunerative price quoted by the Iranians for the gas and heavy transit fee asked for by Pakistan (in addition to the security risks).

Broadly, India has been willing to work with any power or a group of countries which could help India gain access to Central Asia including Afghanistan.

The new Silk Road strategy also justifies the leadership role of the US on the premise that the US is the biggest investor in the region. Such an articulation would definitely be contested by China and Russia because of the geopolitical aspects of such a strategy. Though the American intelligentsia talks about the imperatives of involving Russia and China in the realization of this strategy, on the ground very little has been done so far except for utilizing the NDN that goes across Russia and the Central Asian states before connecting to Afghanistan. The SCO as a regional organization has not been given much recognition and credibility by the US and NATO. India would also be chary of any negative connotations associated with this concept that may impact its relations with countries like Russia or other powers in the region. Further, China in its own version of Silk Road strategy has announced its plans for construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China via Afghanistan and Tajikistan thus avoiding the turbulent Pashtun held areas. In addition China is also doubling up the capacity of the existing Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline to 61 billion cubic meters per year. Not only this China is also going to invest in the oil exploration in Afghanistan that is expected to generate US dollars 7 billion of revenues for Afghanistan. All this is likely to have a negative impact on the construction of TAPI.

On the other hand, if the US as part of its new Silk Road vision is able to influence Pakistan to grant overland transit rights to India then it would be a win-win situation for all involved with Pakistan being one of the biggest gainers as it will earn huge revenues. However, the current state of US-Pak relations leaves much to be desired. Though, Pakistan is part of the TAPI project for building the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to India it has so far refrained from seeing the wisdom of acceding to India’s proposal for granting access to Afghanistan in the reverse direction. Therefore, there are many impediments in the realization of the new Silk Road Strategy.

It also needs to be seen than India and the US have signed Strategic Partnership Agreements with Afghanistan, with the intention to intensify their consultation, coordination and cooperation to promote a stable, democratic, united, sovereign and prosperous Afghanistan. In the India-US Strategic Dialogue that took place in June in Washington, according to one analyst, India had refrained from openly endorsing the New Silk Road architecture proposed by the US, with the two sides discussing only the “vision” of enhanced regional connectivity. The two have “reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security require elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan”.

In the final analysis, the new Silk Road Strategy can be seen as a socio-economic approach combined with geo-political aspects to extricate the US and its coalition allies from an unwinnable situation in Afghanistan. Though regional cooperation has been mentioned as the panacea for the ills of this region the US continues to emphasize on its leadership role without purposefully working towards a regional approach to the Afghan imbroglio. There are many contradictions in the US approach to the region as its new concept excludes countries like Iran, Russia and regional grouping like SCO from its formulations. The above is also compounded by the fact that major players in Central Asia have their own versions of the silk road/routes. And India should be willing to cooperate with any grouping or nation that can help it getting connected to Central Asia and beyond.