Lt General (Retd) R K Sawhney,
Distinguished Fellow, VIF
Sushant Sareen,
Senior Fellow, VIF
First Impressions: Uncertainty, yes; but also Optimism about future
The creeping sense of despondency, even defeatism, over the future of
Afghanistan post 2014 that seems to have set in among a section of the
strategic community and top policy makers in New Delhi is not just ill
informed but also quite unnecessary. Regardless of the line being
plugged by some Western boy-scout journalists and analysts who tend to
view the world from a Political Science 101 perspective in which
everything is seen and evaluated from what is ideal rather than what is
real, Afghanistan is not lost. While it is true that the US-led
international forces haven’t really succeeded in pacifying the country
and eliminating the Islamist insurgency, the tendency to heap the blame
of their failures (which are really the result of closing their eyes to
Pakistani shenanigans and double-game in the War on Terror) on the Hamid
Karzai led dispensation is to say the least disingenuous.
Notwithstanding all the problems that the Afghan state faces –
fragile security situation, weak economic base, governance deficit,
fledgling institutions, pervasive corruption etc. – a Taliban takeover
that many in India and rest of the world fear is by no means inevitable.
If the international community continues to support the Afghan
government with monetary and military assistance for at least another
decade i.e. until 2025, then not only will the Taliban be defeated, but
Afghanistan will be able to realise its potential of emerging as a
fairly stable and relatively functional democratic state. Indeed, there
is a far greater chance of Afghanistan pulling through than there is of
its tormentor Pakistan getting out of the self created terrorist hole
that it finds itself in. The caveat is, of course, that the
international community doesn't abandon Afghanistan and undermine its
tremendous achievements of the last decade. Compared to Afghanistan,
pumping money into Pakistan to stabilise it is going to prove utterly
counter-productive. Counter intuitive though it may sound, the fact is
that pulling the plug on Pakistan rather than Afghanistan is what could
lead to better results in terms of reining in and ultimately eliminating
the jihadist terrorist networks in the AfPak region. This would force
Pakistan to change its strategic policy framework. Continued support to
Afghanistan is not throwing good money after bad; pumping money into
Pakistan is.
To be sure, Afghanistan faces monumental challenges. Interestingly,
even top Afghan officials don't try and gloss over the enormous problems
that confront their country. But unlike the outsiders who appear to be
all set to throw in the towel because they think these problems are
insurmountable, the Afghans are showing remarkable resoluteness in
improving their capacity and ability to grapple with the problems that
their country faces. There is undoubtedly a growing sense of uncertainty
that seems to gripping many Afghans. But this isn't so much because the
Afghans have given up but more because it is being fuelled by the
growing apprehension among the Afghans that the rest of the world is in
the process of giving up on them. There is palpable concern among
Afghans that the international community is getting ready to cut and run
and even turn its back on Afghanistan and write it off as a bad
nightmare. More than anything else, this faux conjecture that the Afghan
state will not be able to hold its own against the Taliban onslaught
after the withdrawal of the Western troops’ which is causing more damage
than anything that the Taliban and their patrons across the Durand Line
have thrown at the Afghan state. Senior Afghan officials and
politicians are mindful that they need to demolish this conjecture and
change the narrative in order to re-instil confidence among the public
within Afghanistan and without. If they manage this, worsting the
Taliban won’t be very difficult.
More difficult than getting rid of the Taliban, however, will be the
task of nation building, which is still pretty much a work in progress.
The institutions of state and society in Afghanistan –army, political
system, judiciary, civil service, civil society etc. – are still in
their infancy and therefore vulnerable. They need time to grow and
strike deep roots. Any premature or hasty and ill-thought out pulling
out of support, whether for reasons of political correctness, a Faustian
strategic bargain, simple exhaustion with involvement in Afghanistan or
even financial problems back home, will pretty much mean pushing back
Afghanistan into chaos. Apart from institutions, the Afghans need to
start thinking of putting their economy on more solid footing. This
means steadily lowering the dependence on foreign aid and assistance and
becoming self sufficient. Afghanistan has enough going for it to be
able to manage without external hand-outs. But again they need time and
political stability in order to develop their capacity to be able to
gain economically from their mineral wealth and their geographical
location at the cross-roads of Middle-East, Central Asia, South Asia and
China.
Herat Dialogue: a peek into what people, local and foreign, are thinking
The Second Herat Security Dialogue organised by the Afghan Institute
of Strategic Studies offered an excellent insight into not only how the
international community perceives the situation in Afghanistan but also
how Afghans – politicians, officials, academics and students – see their
country and its future. Even though the sense of uncertainty about the
future was pervasive among the participants, both locals and outsiders,
there was an underlying hope and even confidence that things would work
out. The tantalising prospect of Afghanistan emerging as not just a
bridge between different regions but also a regional trade and transit
hub for pipelines, power lines and highways clearly suggested that
Afghanistan need not be a basket case economy forever. Add to this the
potential for exploiting minerals – copper, gold, oil and rare metals –
and there was no reason why Afghanistan couldn’t emerge as a fairly
prosperous country. One session of the Herat Dialogue dealt with the
need to rediscover Afghanistan’s syncretic Sufi roots and traditions of
tolerance which could be a potent antidote to the poison of radicalism
being spread by Al Qaeda and Taliban. But quite understandably, these
positive factors seemed to be dominated by the concerns over how the
security and political situation would unfold in the coming months.
No one really subscribed to the possibility that the state would
collapse like a house of cards after the drawdown. A return to the
Taliban rule of the 1990s was also rejected, as was the probability of
another civil war breaking out. At the same time, it was openly and
readily acknowledged that while the situation was evenly balanced for
now, it could deteriorate very fast and spiral out of control if the
political setup started unravelling. In fact, how the politics plays out
in the coming months will be just as critical in deciding the future of
Afghanistan as the military and monetary support from the international
community. If both these things work out, then Afghanistan will remain
stable; but if even one of these two cornerstones collapses, then the
whole edifice could come crashing down.
The Presidential elections due in April next are being seen as a make
or break event. It is not just about who wins the election, but even
more importantly the credibility of the elections that will determine
the future course of events in Afghanistan. Ahmed Wali Masood, who is
the brother of Afghan hero Ahmed Shah Masood, pulled no punches in
declaring that if the elections fail because of widespread fraud, then
everything will collapse. At the same time, he was emphatic that a
credible election could prove transformational. This was the theme that
echoed throughout the conference. Western delegates were very clear that
the continued financial and other support would be contingent on
legitimacy of the process. Any repeat of the kind of fraud that marred
the last Presidential elections or any delay in the election – there are
apprehensions that President Hamid Karzai may manipulate the process to
protect his interests and remain relevant – will not be acceptable to
anyone anymore. While there is enough realism that the polls process
will not be ‘perfect’, what is important from both the Western as well
as Afghan perspective is that the process should be ‘good enough’ for
everyone to accept the outcome. As far as the international community is
concerned, any result that is accepted by the Afghan people will be
acceptable to it. The bar is being deliberately set pretty high so that
even if the halfway mark is reached, the elections will be a resounding
success.
Apart from the credibility of the election process, there are some
apprehensions about how the politics will play out the day after the
results are declared. In other words, the effect, impact and
repercussion of who wins and who loses is also something that is being
keenly discussed and debated. Will the non-Pashtuns (some of whom are
feeling sidelined by the Karzai administration) accept another Pashtun
President? Will the Pashtuns agree to embrace either a non-Pashtun or
even a half-Pashtun President who is closely identified with the
non-Pashtun ethnic groups and rides into power on the strength of a
united non-Pashtun vote and a divided Pashtun vote? Will pre-election
ethnic and political alliances become a fault line that tears the
country apart post elections or will the reality of results lead to a
readjustment and accommodation between the main political players and
ethnic groups? These are questions that to which there is no clear
answer as yet. For their part, the Afghans believe that if the poll
process is clean, then people will learn to live with whatever result
emerges from the election.
One of the factors that is seen to be a game-changer in Afghanistan
is what an Australian academic called ‘the democratic urgings of the new
generation’. Alongside, he pointed to the effect of globalisation on
Afghanistan which would make turning back the clock to the Taliban
medievalism extremely unlikely. While a former Taliban representative
who is currently a member of the High Peace Council made a strong pitch
for an accommodation with the Taliban – he claimed the Taliban were
neither radical nor revolutionary but simple traditional people! – and
warned against excluding or ignoring them, he was not only challenged by
the young Afghans but practically hooted out. Some Western delegates
spoke in favour of the ‘reconciliation’ process but not if it endangered
the progress made during the last decade in Afghanistan. Those in
favour of the ‘peace process’ wanted that the Taliban demonstrate on
ground the claims they made in international conferences about how much
the movement has changed over the years and how the mistakes they made
in the past would not be repeated. What was however not clear was how
the democratic system could co-exist with a movement that brooked no
dissent and whose leader claimed to be the Amir-ul-Momineen (Leader of
the Faithful).
Politics and the Presidential Elections
Sitting outside Afghanistan it is easy to dismiss the forthcoming
Presidential elections as something of an irrelevant and unnecessary
distraction from the looming security situation. But clearly this is a
line of thinking that is utterly misplaced. The Afghans have placed a
lot in the store of the elections. If well conducted, with minimum fraud
and maximum participation, the elections could prove to be a major
stabilising factor. On the other hand, if the polls are marred by
irregularities like the 2009 elections, then they could just as well
prove to be the nemesis of the Afghan state. That all shades of
political opinion (except for the Taliban) have a stake in the elections
is borne out by the sheer number of candidates – 27 – who have thrown
their hat in the ring. Of course, not all these candidates – in the
Afghan context, a more appropriate term is ‘ticket’ which includes not
just the presidential candidate but also his running mates – are serious
contenders.
It is generally agreed that the two front-runners are going to be the
former foreign minister and the runner-up in 2009, Dr Abdullah Abdullah
and President Karzai’s finance minister, Ashraf Ghani Ahmedzai. Dr
Abdullah has roped in a faction leader of the Hizb-e-Islami, Mohammed
Khan and the Hazara leader Ustad Mohammed Mohaqiq as his running mates.
Ashraf Ghani has the Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and a Hazara
leader Sarwar Danish on his ticket. Interestingly, Ashraf Ghani has not
taken any Tajik as one of his running mates, something that goes a
little against conventional wisdom wherein every ticket must have both a
Pashtun and a Tajik (the two largest ethnic groups) to stand a winning
chance. The other serious contenders are the former foreign minister Dr
Zalmai Rassoul (he has roped in one brother of Ahmed Shah Masood as his
running mate and a firebrand Hazara lady lawmaker as his 2nd
Vice President nominee), President Karzai’s brother Qayyum Karzai, the
Pashtun strongman from Kandahar Gul Agha Sherzai, the former mujahideen
commander Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf (with the Herat strongman and Tajik
leader Ismail Khan as his running mate), former Defence Minister Abdul
Rahim Wardak and finally Hashmat Ghani Ahmedzai, who is the brother of
Ashraf Ghani.
With such an array of tickets, it is expected that the polls will go
into the second round where Dr Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani will battle it
out. Supporters of Dr Abdullah are quite confident that he will be able
to win the elections in the second round. He has apparently been working
double time since his engineered defeat in the last Presidential
elections in 2009 to sew up his alliance. Equally importantly, he is
making a strong pitch to reclaim his Pashtun heritage (from his father’s
side) and thereby attract at least some Pashtun vote to his side. His
supporters claim that he is likely to win a fair amount of votes from
the South. They are also of the view that many Pashtuns have come to the
conclusion that they got a raw deal from a Pashtun President and a
non-Pashtun might be more compelled to cater to their needs than a
Pashtun. By managing to unite all the important leaders (except for
Dostum and Ahmed Zia Masood) of the erstwhile Northern Alliance behind
him, Dr Abdullah is reasonably confident of winning the overwhelming
majority of the non-Pashtun vote from the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks.
What is more, the choice of Dostum as running mate by Ashraf Ghani is
seen as a big positive for Dr Abdullah because many Pashtuns will not be
inclined to vote for a ticket with Dostum on it. Many of the candidates
in the first round, for instance Sayyaf-Ismail Khan, are likely to
endorse the Abdullah ticket in the second round.
Ashraf is quite popular among the intellectual crowd in Kabul but
whether he will be able to win mass support is somewhat uncertain. By
not including a Tajik on his ticket, Ashraf might have made a smart play
for the Pashtun vote which with the Uzbek and some Hazara votes, could
well turn out to be a winning combination. But many of his detractors
wonder if he will be even able to reach the second round, partly because
the plethora of Pashtun candidates is expected to badly split the
Pashtun vote bank which increase the possibility of another candidate
like Zalmai Rassoul sneaking in for the run-off election. Ashraf’s own
brother is also a candidate and could cut into his potential votes. The
other big problem for Ashraf and any other candidate who depends on the
Pashtun vote is that the climate of fear and insecurity that is hanging
over the elections could result in a low voter turnout in the Pashtun
belt, something that will work to the advantage of the non-Pashtun
candidates by neutralising the numbers edge of the Pashtuns. Conversely,
there is also a fear that the fragile security situation in the Pashtun
areas could be exploited to repeat the vote fraud and stuff ballot
boxes like last time. Some political observers claim that while the
Centre, West and North of the country will be where the voting will take
place, the South and East is where the fraud will be perpetrated. In
any case, according to them, the geography of voting has changed and
even in a free and fair election the South and East will account for
only around 40% of the votes.
There are also questions being asked on who President Karzai will
endorse. For quite some time he has been keeping his options open and
hasn’t quite let it be known who he is backing among Ashraf, Rassoul and
his brother Qayyum. Members of the opposition believe that Karzai’s
endorsement is more a liability than an asset for the candidates, but
there are apprehensions that he might once again misuse the state
machinery to give a leg up to his favourite candidate. At the same time,
by not coming out clearly in support of any candidate – he first
appeared to back Sayyaf, then indicated that Ashraf was his candidate,
later hinted at Rassoul and after his brother threw his hat in the ring
some thought he was backing Qayyum (though sceptics argue that in
Afghanistan, brothers are generally never favoured) – he has caused a
lot of heartburn among those who were looking for his endorsement. As a
result, he has lost the confidence of his friends. He has also riled his
non-Pashtun opponents by trying to divide their ranks by offering
bribes and blandishments. In the final analysis, Karzai will back the
candidate who he thinks will receive the support of the Pashtuns because
the only way he remains relevant in the future politics of Afghanistan
is by positioning himself as the leader of Pashtuns. There is also some
talk of Karzai wanting to replicate the ‘Putin option’ by manoeuvring a
light weight favourite into the Presidency and then becoming a candidate
in the next election.
While fraud is one of the uppermost concerns regarding the elections,
money is expected to play a major role in these elections. Fears are
also being expressed that the polls will sharpen the ethnic divide
because voting will primarily take place on ethnic lines. But these
fears are somewhat overstated because efforts are being made by almost
all the candidates to woo voters of other ethnic groups. There is also a
realisation among top candidates that winning the election is the easy
part, retaining power and running the country a much more difficult
task. No wonder then that some people close to Dr Abdullah are claim
that if he wins the election, he could very well appoint Ashraf Ghani as
his finance minister. Similar appointments could be made if Ashraf or
Rassoul win the elections. In a sense then, even though politics in
Afghanistan is crystallising along ethnic lines, it is also slowly
maturing to a level where after the heat and dust of elections is over,
the politicians make new alignments to run the government and the
country.
While the Afghans appear to ready to live and adjust to whatever
result is thrown up by a credible election, there is a lot of
apprehension about Pakistan playing the role of spoiler. Afghan
political analysts say that if Dr Abdullah wins, the Pakistanis will try
and provoke the Pashtuns and Taliban to not accept the result and
undermine the government. This is quite simply because the Pakistanis
cannot countenance a strong Tajik presence in the government in Kabul.
Even if Ashraf Ghani or Rassoul win, the Pakistanis will continue to
create instability in Afghanistan using the Taliban and Gulbadin
Hekmatyar. Interestingly, some top Afghan politicians believe that
Pakistan neither wants the Taliban to hold complete sway in Afghanistan
nor do they want any kind of negotiated settlement between the Taliban
and the Afghan government. The suspicion about Pakistani intentions is
so high that the Afghans are convinced that even if the Taliban were to
enter into a dialogue, the ISI will create a counter force to keep
Afghanistan destabilised. One possible reason for such a policy is that
the Pakistanis want to push the war that is being waged inside their
country into Afghanistan, even if this means reigniting the civil war in
Afghanistan. If this is indeed the Pakistani policy, then it is clearly
a very short-sighted and less than inelegant policy because instability
in Afghanistan will inevitably spill over into Pakistan and destabilise
an already tottering state.
The Security Matrix
Even though many analysts around the world have convinced themselves
that the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)
will crumble after the withdrawal of the ISAF in 2014, this doomsday
scenario is somewhat exaggerated. There is little doubt that the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) have serious problems of personnel,
training, equipment, logistics, and intelligence. But meeting the
Defence Minister, some of the top leadership of the ANA and also a few
of the young officers, is quite a revelation. There is absolutely no
panic among the top brass. On the contrary, it exudes a level of
self-assuredness and quiet confidence that immediately dispels all
doubts about the ability of the ANSF to hold their own against the
enemy.
Unlike the Pakistani generals who are so full of bluff and bluster
but who fizzle out the moment a fire-fight breaks out and the army
starts bleeding, the Afghan Army Chief is very matter of fact in its
appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of their army. There is a
disarming honesty in the way the Afghan Defence Minister and top brass
explain the security situation. No bombast, no spin and no brushing
under the carpet of inconvenient and troubling realities. And yet, a
level of confidence that can only come from faith in the fighting
capability of the troops that immediately reassures the interlocutor
that this army will not crumble if it continues to receive military,
financial and political support.
Ever since the ISAF has transferred the security responsibilities to
the Afghan Army, it has proved its mettle. Senior generals proudly claim
that even though the Pakistanis opened the floodgates for the Taliban
to launch fierce attacks since April this year, there is not a single
engagement in which the Afghan troops have shown their back to the enemy
or yielded territory to them. They have in fact opened up areas from
which the ISAF had withdrawn. For instance, in Nuristan, the ANA has
moved in and is in the process of opening the road for normal traffic.
No doubt, the ANA has been taking serious casualties – in the last six
months, around 800 dead and some 2000 injured. But morale remains fairly
high. What is more, the dictum that armies that bleed emerge as solid
fighting forces stands quite true for the ANA.
Senior officials say that they haven’t lost as many men in fighting
as they have lost in IED explosions and suicide blasts. In other words,
it is not so much the fighting prowess of the Taliban terrorists as it
is their classic terrorism tactics that is causing casualties. At one
level, this means that the ANA is more than a match for the Taliban; but
at another level, unless the ANA can find a way to counter the IEDs and
Suicide attacks, they will continue to suffer grievously.
Unfortunately, there is as yet no solution that has been found to this
problem. One of the reasons why the ANA officials are requesting the
international community to supply them with Tanks, Armoured Personnel
Carriers as well as reliable mine breeching equipment, is that it would
minimise the casualties caused by IEDs. But so far, their requests have
fallen on deaf ears.
The ANA brass, while quite confident of holding their own against the
Taliban, is seriously worried about being unprepared to handle any
external aggression by the Pakistan army on side of the Taliban. They
say that on their own the Taliban can only carry out acts of terrorism
but cannot over-run the country like last time unless they have the
support of the Pakistan army. This, more than anything else, is the real
worry for the Afghan security establishment, and it is precisely this
worry that no one – US, India, Europeans, or any other country – is
willing to address. The Afghans want tanks and artillery so that they
can take on a Taliban offensive supported by the Pakistan army. But even
fairly obsolete equipment is being denied to them. They complain that
the Americans promised them this equipment but have not only reneged on
these promises, but worse, have destroyed whatever Soviet era tanks and
artillery the Afghans possessed. As a result, the ANA has been reduced
to a glorified paramilitary force which is in no position to handle any
conventional threat from across the Durand Line.
Although Western writers have made a lot about the high attrition
rates in the ANA, this isn’t something that worries the Afghans very
much. They admit that there is a fair amount of attrition, but say that
the new recruits more than fill the gap. The attrition is not much
because of desertion as it is because of many soldiers not renewing
their three-year contracts – this rate has gone up to almost 50% in
recent years. But if service conditions improve, then the ANA will not
only be able to attract new recruits but also retain the trained
manpower. Training is yet another issue on which is occupying the
attention of the brass. Even though Afghans are natural fighters, modern
armies need an officer corps to lead the men into battle. While the ANA
has refurbished its own academy, a number of young officers are being
trained in India, and frankly they are turning out to be a real asset
for the ANA – smart, crisp, brimming with confidence that the Indian
Army instils in its officer corps. Although Pakistan has been offering
training in its own academies, there are not many takers for this offer.
One big reason is that young officers feel that if they train in
Pakistan their loyalty will forever be suspect and they will always be
treated as ISI agents, which will affect their careers, and worse, their
reputation and self-esteem.
Apart from the equipment that ground forces need, the ANA is also
feeling the pinch on managing its logistics. Until now, they have been
largely dependent on the Americans. But after the withdrawal, they will
be pretty much on their own. The US is in the process of supplying the
Afghans a few C130 transport aircraft. Arrangements are also being made
to provide choppers which can be used for medical evacuation and
supplies, in addition to playing a combat role. Some mortars and light
artillery is also in the pipeline. The Afghans are also toying with the
idea of converting some old passenger aircraft into transport aircraft
for the army. India too has promised to supply and refurbish some AN32
transport aircraft. Of course, like in everything else, the Indians have
been lagging behind in delivery, a point that was put forward by Afghan
officials in a very polite manner.
India’s Enigmatic Policy
In recent years, India’s approach and policy on Afghanistan is so
afflicted by self-doubt, strategic confusion and perhaps even an element
of towing the line that is set not in New Delhi but elsewhere that it
has all but lost the plot in a country which in many ways is critical
for India’s own security. So taken in is India with the inherent
limitations it faces in Afghanistan – geographical, financial,
diplomatic (the inability to use Iran as a conduit to Afghanistan) and
military – that it has neglected the advantages it enjoys, which to an
extent neutralise the limitations. No surprise then that even though
there is tremendous goodwill for India, the Indian officials are
virtually imprisoned in fortress-like compounds with their movement
restricted because of the real threat of terrorists targeting them.
There have been around three bomb attacks on the Indian mission in
Kabul, Indian consulate in Jalalabad has recently been targeted, the
consulates in other cities are also in the cross-hairs of terrorists
(believed to be working under instructions of the ISI), Indian Army
doctors have been killed and guest-houses where Indian officials stay
have been attacked. On the other hand Pakistan is, to put it mildly,
hated in Afghanistan and yet their officials strut about like they own
the place. Surely, something is seriously wrong with the way India
handles its affairs.
Threats aside, the Indian policy is also steadily making India
marginal in Afghanistan. What is really infuriating for the Afghans is
that India has not just adopted a defeatist approach and seemingly
reconciled to the possibility that the Afghan state will not survive
very long after the withdrawal of foreign troops, but worse, that India
is increasingly following a policy under which it is showing more
understanding for Pakistan’s concerns rather than for Afghanistan’s
needs. The way the Afghans see it, if even a strong country like India
is ready to kowtow to Pakistan’s aggressive, if also disastrous, policy
in Afghanistan, then perhaps the Afghans would be better off striking
their own Faustian pact with the proverbial devil. India’s pusillanimity
has touched such ridiculous levels that recently the Indian Foreign
Secretary was advised not to visit the Jalalabad consulate lest it send
out a very aggressive signal about India’s Afghan policy! That she
ignored this advise goes to her credit. Her visit boosted the morale of
the Indian officials who are working under enormous stress and in a very
difficult and dangerous environment in places like Herat, Kandahar and
Jalalabad, not to mention Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul.
Even more galling is the line that is being peddled in some quarters,
advocating that India, along with other countries, should create a sort
of funding agency and which then lets Pakistan implement the
development projects in Afghanistan! This, according to their thinking,
will go a long way in reassuring Pakistan that India’s only interest in
Afghanistan is to stabilise that country. Pakistan, they say, will very
graciously give credit to India for the funds it gives for a school, or
hospital or any other project. Their argument, which is not just
specious but also ridiculous, is that India’s strategic interest lies in
a peaceful Afghanistan and if this sort of policy helps to bring peace
and stability in Afghanistan then it achieves the purpose for which
India is assisting Afghanistan’s reconstruction.
It is precisely this sort of defeatism and dissembling policy
prescriptions that appear to be behind the refusal of India to supply
some of the defence equipment that the Afghans have requested.
Strangely, India has always insisted that unlike other countries which
always gave Afghanistan what they thought the Afghans needed and never
bothered to find out what they Afghans actually wanted, India always let
the Afghans give their wish list. However, when it comes to defence
cooperation, India seems to have adopted the approach of other countries
and rather than fulfilling the Afghan wish-list, India has taken it
upon itself to decide what the Afghans need. Much of the stuff that the
Afghans have requested for – old tanks, artillery pieces and some old
aircraft – is no longer used by the Indian Army and can be easily
refurbished and given to the ANA. But the great strategists sitting in
high offices are chary of fulfilling the Afghan request because they
think that if the Afghan government collapses then all this equipment
will fall in the hands of the Taliban.
Why this logic is faulty is because: one, this risks becoming a
self-fulfilling prophecy because by not helping the Afghan state India
would be creating conditions for the Taliban to capture power; second,
even if this stuff was to fall into Taliban hands, who would they use it
against? They aren’t going to lug it across Pakistan to target India
across the Radcliffe line. If anything, they might actually use it
against the patrons across the Durand Line. The real reason therefore
seems to be that India doesn’t want to provide any support to the Afghan
government that rubs Pakistan the wrong way and provokes it to
intensify the sponsorship of terrorism not just in Afghanistan but also
India. The flip side of this faulty reasoning is that even though India
has desisted from providing the Afghans with the weapons they need for
their protection, Pakistan has not stopped the export of terrorism. This
begs the question as to why India should be bothered about Pakistan's
concerns when the Pakistanis show no consideration whatsoever about
Indian concerns.
What India seems to have forgotten is that the Afghans are fighting
not just for saving their country but also the region from being
destabilised by the radical Islamist terror groups. While the Pakistanis
keep tom-toming how they are fighting for securing the world against
terrorism, the fact is that it is not the Pakistanis but the Afghans who
are fighting this fight. If countries like the US and India cannot
fight shoulder to shoulder with the Afghans, then the least they can do
is to give them the wherewithal to fight on their own. If truth be told,
the enemy of the Afghans is also the enemy of India. The war that the
Afghans are fighting is also India’s war. The choice before India is
simple: it can either fight this war on its borders or help the Afghans
fight this war inside Afghanistan. India would also do well to remember
the immutable principle of international politics: to inspire faith in
your friends and favour them; and instil fear in your adversaries. India
needs to apply this principle while forging its Afghan policy. This
means that it is no longer enough to rely upon just soft power and
developmental assistance to secure Afghanistan against the onslaught of
the barbaric and medieval Taliban. India must also use its hard power
(without putting boots on the ground because that would be
counter-productive) to assist Afghanistan.
