India-US Ties: Need to Take a Realistic View

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

India-US relations need to be put back on track. The relationship has lost steam in recent months with many contentious issues surfacing that remain unaddressed. We have now to see whether with the change of government in Delhi a new start can be made. The 5th India-US strategic dialogue on July 31 will provide an occasion to review the state of our bilateral ties. The composition of the US delegation indicates the subjects the US side intends emphasizing. Apart from the US Commerce Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, the Under Secretary for Homeland Security and the US Envoy for Climate Change will be accompanying Secretary of State John Kerry, who will be visiting Bengaluru, which has cast somewhat as a villain in the US for causing job losses there. It should be useful for Kerry to expose himself to the concerns of the Indian IT industry about immigration reform legislation under consideration in the US, H1B and L1 visas, the totalisation agreement etc.

The challenges ahead will not be easy to overcome. The irritants marking the relationship arose when a “pro-US” Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, was in power, with an economic team with a similar reputation. His government was grappling with development and growth issues and sought US participation in building a strong and modern Indian economy. Indeed, the strategic dialogue, with its five pillars- strategic cooperation, energy and climate change, education and development, economy, trade and agriculture, science and technology, health and innovation- was instituted in 2009, under his watch. Nevertheless, despite the intensification of India-US engagement and the large scope of the bilateral agenda, the feeling grew that the relationship had not lived up to its promise. If despite four previous rounds the relationship became somewhat morose, no breakthroughs can realistically be expected from the fifth one.

To begin with, the US must make an extra effort to establish a relationship of confidence with the new Prime Minister, whom the Americans have treated very shabbily with an obstinacy that makes little political sense. President Obama seemingly established a good personal chemistry with Manmohan Singh; it is unlikely that this will be easily repeated with Narendra Modi, although the US President has reached out to him immediately after his election and welcomed him to Washington, as did Secretary Kerry. Deputy Secretary Burns visited India very recently to personally deliver Obama’s invitation to the Prime Minister. Modi himself has been remarkably large-hearted towards the US, conveying through his decision to quickly visit Washington that he intends to overlook the visa denial insult and move forward to establish a mutually productive relationship in India’s national interest. It is indisputable that a perception of some malaise developing in the India-US relationship complicates some of our external relationships and the management of an overall balance in our foreign policy.

To the extent that these diplomatic signals are watched when a new government takes over in a country headed by a Prime Minister who has the reputation of being focused and decisive and capable of producing results, but whose thinking on foreign policy issues is not known, it would have been noted that the first foreign visit by Modi announced by the government was not to the US. As against this, Modi has reached out exceptionally towards China by allowing the Chinese to stage a diplomatic coup of sorts, especially vis a vis Japan, in having their foreign minister received as the first foreign envoy by him, holding an unusually long conversation over the telephone with his Chinese counterpart and following it with a “very fruitful” meeting with the Chinese President in Brazil who was invited to visit India in September, programming the Indian army chief’s visit to China and that of the Vice-President to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Panchsheel Agreement along with the Myanmarese President, which boosts China’s “peaceful” credentials, enables it to present itself as a benign neighbour to offset its image as a threatening power in the east, and also indirectly signals reduced concern about China’s thrust into Myanmar.

This has implications for our “strategic cooperation” with the US. The Modi government, by intensively engaging China and inviting it to invest in India, has emphatically distanced itself from the US “re-balance” towards Asia. While the trilateral US-Japan-India naval exercises in the Pacific have just been completed and the Indian Navy will no doubt continue to exercise frequently with the US navy in the Indian Ocean, the new government is clearly being responsive to a calculated Chinese charm offensive that, not surprisingly, excludes any softer nuance on its territorial claims on Indian territory. The strategic independence of our China policy is being affirmed.

The upcoming strategic dialogue will hardly bring about any greater congruence between our positions on developments in the troubled Islamic region to our west. The US continues to mishandle Pakistan at our cost. It US has brought about regime changes in various countries through military interventions; it has resorted to suffocating sanctions against Iran, for instance; it is threatening to isolate even a powerful nuclear armed country like Russia by targeting its vulnerabilities. Yet, it is accommodating towards Pakistan, although the latter has been responsible for indirectly inflicting the greatest number of casualties on the US by a friendly country- indeed, a non-NATO ally- because of the safe havens it has provided to the Taliban. The ambiguous way the US deals with Islamic movements, including its outreach to the Taliban and its unwillingness to scotch the dangerous idea of the Islamic Caliphate, is not consonant with our strategic interests. Its current geopolitical compression of Russia is reviving cold war type tensions in Europe that could spread elsewhere if the confrontation with Russia is pursued in a bid to divide Russia from Europe so that US hegemony over Europe through NATO is not diluted. This puts India at odds with the US strategically over Russia with which we have a “special and privileged strategic partnership”.

On the nuclear issue, the BJP, responsible for inserting those provisions in our Nuclear Liability Act that the Americans adamantly object to, will find it that much more difficult to find a legal solution. On defence sales, the new government wants to give priority to local manufacturing and technology transfer. On the latter, the US has the record of being the most restrictive. We cannot also move too much in the US direction as we have defence ties with other “strategic partners” too.

The several irritants on the economic side have contributed most to the perceived loss of élan in the bilateral relationship. Select US corporations have led a campaign, including in the US Congress, against India’s investment, trade and IPR policies, leading, inter alia, to a year-long investigation by the US International Trade Commission and India’s classification as a Priority Watch Country under Section 301 for IPR violations. On our pressing need to obtain massive foreign investments to upgrade our physical infrastructure, not much can be expected from the US. Another limitation is the unwillingness of US companies to work with the public sector. The US uses the strategic dialogue for policy changes in India that would create a business environment tailored to the need of their companies looking for opportunities in the financial, energy, agriculture and environment sectors, for instance. While being demanding on this score, the US is unwilling to address long standing Indian concerns on a number of trade and services issues. On top of this, detracting from their “strategic cooperation” on global issues, India and the US have serious differences within the framework of WTO and Climate Change negotiations, a situation unlikely to change soon given the entrenched US positions and India’s resolve to protect its legitimate interests.

An upset Kerry has already cautioned India that “it has a decision to make about where it fits in the trading system”, and that India’s willingness to support a rules based trading order and fulfill its obligations would help it to get US and global investments. He has called upon India to give greater space to private initiative, to be more open to capital flows, to limit subsidies that stifle competition and provide strong IPR protection for attracting more US companies to India. He has a vision of expanding India-US trade to US $ 500 billion a year.

Unrelated to the strategic dialogue but relevant to political atmosphere of our ties, the sanctimonious State Department has issued its 2013 report criticizing India’s “restrictive” religious laws. It is time the US ceased being the moral policeman of the world and showed restraint in criticizing countries like India who have a civilizational record of religious tolerance that the US itself lacks.

All in all, we have to take a realistic view of the scope of our “strategic partnership” with the US and not be beguiled by rhetoric, much as we must seek to build strong bridges with that country in pursuit of our larger national interest.

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Published Date: 29^th July 2014, Image source: http://www.indiawrites.org

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

China’s Assertiveness in South China Sea: Vietnam’s Response and Implications for India

Maj Gen (Retd.) P K Chakravorty

Brunei Darussalam recently hosted two summits from 08 October to 10 October 2013. The first was the ASEAN summit which was held on 08 and 09 October followed by the East Asian summit on 10 October 2013. The Chinese President Xi Jinping was the most prominent dignitary present in these meetings as neither the American or Russian Presidents were present. Naturally the issue regarding South China Sea (SCS) did not generate much heat and the Sultan of Brunei noted good momentum between ASEAN countries and China over the conflicting territorial claims in the SCS. The Chinese stated their request to countries not directly involved to stay out of the dispute. Further, they emphasised that freedom of navigation in the SCS has not and never will be an issue. This was the biggest concern to nations like Australia whose 60 percent trade passes through the region. China was able to steer these conferences without any difficulty and in the absence of a strong American presence was able to push its own agenda. However, the fact remains that the issues remain unresolved and Chinese forces are creeping into this region with skill and dexterity.

In July 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had called on the People’s Republic of China to resolve the SCS territorial dispute peacefully. China replied that the US should keep out of the issue. The US Department of Defence issued a statement on 18 August 2010 where it opposed the use of force to resolve disputes in the SCS and accused China of assertive behaviour. Issues kept simmering and in May 2011, Chinese naval ships attacked and cut the cable of a Vietnamese exploration ship. On 01July 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry asked all nations to resolve the disputes in the SCS amicably. This was accepted by all members and China has emphasised that bilateral solutions will be found. Thereafter, in the meetings held at Brunei in October, China has endeavoured to guide the discourse on SCS that is favourable to its line of thinking with the prospects of joint exploitation of hydro carbon resources of the disputed sea bed.

Vietnam’s Cooperation with India on oil exploration in the region

India’s Oil and Natural Gas Commission Videsh Limited (OVL) has been present in Vietnam for a reasonable period. The exploration license was acquired in 1988 and commercial production began in 2003. Later in 2006, OVL acquired two more blocks in the SCS for oil exploration. These were Blocks 127 and 128. Drilling in Block 127 did not reveal any hydro carbons and OVL decided to return both these locations back to Vietnam. However, Vietnam persuaded OVL to continue drilling in Block 128 despite opposition from the Chinese explicitly stating that the area of Block 128 was within Vietnamese waters. On the insistence of Vietnam, India concluded an agreement for cooperation in hydro carbons for a period of three years in 2011.

India’s position was clarified by its Defence Minister who stated that ships of the Indian Navy would continue to go to SCS for training and our merchant ships would undertake trade. Further, India clearly stated that she supported freedom of navigation in international waters including the SCS. The agreement signed between India and Vietnam was met with stiff opposition from China who claimed that no exploration could be undertaken in areas over which China has sovereign rights. The Government of India correctly responded by stating that while China had concerns, India was going by the agreement signed with Vietnam. The Chinese claim was rejected by both India and Vietnam. As per the UN, the area of exploration belongs to Vietnam. India has firmly stated that ONGC will continue to explore oil in the SCS. Further India has clarified that the entire Indian Ocean region stretching from East African coast to SCS remains crucial to its foreign trade, energy and national security.

Vietnam has remained steadfast on the issue and in July 2012 the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a law demarcating Vietnamese sea borders to include the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Resolution of the issues

All countries particularly US and ASEAN want the issues to be resolved peacefully. China has been dealing with the issue bilaterally without much success. Its occupation of territory by force is challenged particularly by Vietnam who has demonstrated their military capabilities and would counter use of force judiciously. The obvious question that arises is what the options for resolving the issue are. Broadly there are two options. The first is to resolve the problem through negotiations bilaterally or multilaterally. In the event of no success during negotiations, the parties could resort to other modalities of dispute settlement such as conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. This is a sovereignty dispute and it would be difficult to refer it to any form of third party without the consent of parties. Further China has exercised her right under Article 298 on UN Convention of Law of Seas to opt out of compulsory binding dispute settlement. Therefore, the case may not go before the International Tribunal for Law of Sea. The other option would be to set aside sovereignty issues and to undertake joint development of disputed areas. Joint development has produced tangible results between Malaysia and Thailand (1979-1990), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992) as also between Australia and Timor Leste (2002). This issue can be applied to Disputed Areas. However, China has yet to clarify its claims. Thereafter the aspect of Joint Development could be analysed.

Role of Vietnam

Vietnam is the only country which has physically fought the Chinese on these islands and would not bow to China over their claims. While China holds the key to resolution of problems in the South China Sea, it is pertinent to note that China resolves a border problem only after protracted negotiations so as to exploit time to its advantage. Paracel Islands was secured in 1974 by China without worthwhile opposition from Vietnam as they were involved in the war for unification. They would like to get a clearer perspective of hydrocarbon availability prior to clarifying their claims. Out of all the other claimants, Vietnam would fight for its rights and settle for a judicious resolution. The new Chinese leadership has been assertive on both the East Sea and SCS claims.

Vietnam and Japan have strongly opposed China’s aggressive behaviour on these disputes. Both these countries seek to involve the U.S. and other regional powers like India to counter China’s assertive posturing. India on her part has spoken of freedom of navigation in the high seas. Further, Vietnam has insisted that India continue offshore drilling in the blocks allotted despite Chinese opposition.

Six Wars visualised by Chinese analysts

A Hong Kong based daily Wen Wei Po published an article in June 2013 titled “Six Wars to be fought by China in the next Fifty years.” This is a Chinese Communist Party daily and the editor-in-chief is a member of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPCC). The article states that the First War would be fought for the unification of Taiwan between 2020 to 2025, the second would be re conquest of Spratly in the period 2025 to 2030, the third would be capture of Southern Tibet (Arunachal) likely to occur between 2035 to 2040, securing of Diaoyu islands between 2040 to 2045 would be the fourth war, the fifth war would be unification of Outer Mongolia between 2045 to 2050 and recapturing of lands lost to Russia would be the sixth war between 2055 and 2060. The second war would be primarily fought against Vietnam and the third war against India.

The Second War would be fought after the unification of Taiwan and it is possible that Vietnam and Philippines would put up a stiff resistance. The US is expected at best to provide outside support. In such an eventuality, the best option would be to attack the Vietnamese posted in these islands and capture them. As per the Chinese, this will compel other countries to hand over their islands to China. China possibly is underestimating the military prowess of Vietnam against whom a war was fought in 1979 to teach a lesson. Much to its anguish, China learnt a few lessons from Vietnam and over a period of time has forgotten them. The wars against Vietnam would not be a cake walk and despite the modernisation by the Chinese, the Vietnamese are focussing on Anti Access / Area Denial capability. Similarly, the capture of Arunachal would be a hard nut to crack. Both India and Vietnam are required to modernise their Armed Forces and enhance their capabilities.

The Chinese Prime Minister visited Vietnam on October 13 and agreed to mutually resolve the disputes in the SCS. China respects strength and Vietnam, despite being very cautious, would be willing to stand up to China’s military challenge. India too must remain firm and modernise its military in a fast track mode. Enhanced defence cooperation between Vietnam and India would be mutually beneficial.

Resolution of disputes in the SCS would depend largely on China’s keenness to clarify its claims and peacefully negotiate with other claimants. The new leadership is looking for a Chinese dream where the territorial claims are settled entirely to its advantage. In the SCS dispute, while Vietnam would do its best to avoid a military conflict with China, it would be unwilling to accept Chinese hegemony. India on its part has to very prudently discern the emerging strategic dynamics in the Asia Pacific region and craft its responses and policies in a manner that would suit its national interests and objectives.

(The author was India’s Defence Attache to Vietnam)

Israel Palestine Talks: Joining Pieces to Attempt Peace

Col Rajeev Agarwal

The recommencement of peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis on 29 July 2013 was long overdue and marked the culmination of six rounds of shuttle diplomacy in the region over the past six months by John Kerry, US Secretary of State holding multiple meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Kerry has given the current peace process a nine month period to find a final agreement to the longest festering dispute in the region. However, given the dismal record of past talks, it would be a miracle if there is any significant peace agreement at the end of these nine months.

As the peace talk’s process gets underway, there are a number of questions seeking answers which could project a clearer picture of the emerging situation. Some of the prominent questions are:-

• In the context of a history of failed attempts, what is so new and positive about this attempt that may raise expectations of a peace agreement?
• Within the complexities of the issues, how willing would be the two sides to compromise on their hard stand and attempt a peace resolution?
• How long is it possible for the current stalemate or status quo to be maintained?

In examining these issues, it is necessary to take a brief overview of the core issues of the conflict as also an insight into perspectives and positions of each of the major players in the dispute; Israel, Palestine and the US.

Contextualizing the Problem

Borne over six decades, the issues are complex; both sides have strong and opposing viewpoints backed by huge public support which often make the core issues unbridgeable. But, both the sides and even the US realize that time is fast running out on achieving the goal of two independent sovereign states existing side by side as Israel and Palestine. That is why perhaps, despite the existing stumbling blocks and the fact that there has been no forward movement since September 2010 talks, there is guarded optimism in the atmosphere. The last time peace talks generated optimism was the Camp David Summit in July 2000¹ hosted by US President Bill Clinton when he almost got Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to agree to a peace agreement. Unfortunately the talks failed resulting in a bloody backlash in the form of the Second Intifada killing thousands of Israelis and Palestinians. The bitter memories of the Second Intifada therefore put in a sense of caution and controlled optimism of what could happen should the present talks fail.

As the current process gets underway, a look into the core issues confronting the two sides could give an insight into the possibilities of any substantial peace agreement.

Jerusalem as the capital

Israel is unwilling to divide and share Jerusalem with Palestine and stands by the 1980 Israeli Basic Law that "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel²". The Palestinians want East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state, an area which was occupied by Jordan before being captured by Israel in 1967. It contains the al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest place in Islam. The US does not recognize the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and maintains its embassy still in Tel Aviv.

Borders and shape of Palestine State

Israel accepts that there should be a Palestinian state and that there will have to be an Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank (captured by Israel in 1967) to accommodate this. It, however, wants to keep major Jewish settlements that have grown up on the West Bank and Jerusalem. Palestinians want borders along 1967 lines but accept that some Israeli settlements will have to stay and insist that any land given to the Israelis would have to be compensated for by a balanced land swap. The US agrees that the starting point should be the 1967 lines and that a land swap will have to be the basis of any agreement.

Settlements

This has been the issue which has prevented resumption of talks for long. Despite being declared as illegal by the international community, Israel has continued to announce and build settlements in West Bank and Jerusalem. The Israeli government has insisted on keeping the major Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Palestinians want that all settlements be abandoned as they were in Gaza. However, they appear ready to accept that some will have to stay but argue for a minimum number and a land swap for any that are left. The US does not recognize the international legitimacy of the Israeli West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements and has repeatedly urged Israel to exercise restrain in announcing and building them.

Refugees

This is once again a very sticky issue. Israel rejects the idea that Palestinian refugees should be allowed any "right of return" to their former homes fearing that it could adversely affect the demography of Israel and the identity of Israel as a Jewish State. Palestinians, while maintaining the "right of return” could be willing to accept the return of a limited numbers with the balance being given adequate compensation by Israel. They however refuse to recognize the concept of Israel as a "Jewish state", saying that it ignores the Israeli-Arab citizens of Israel. The US understands the Israeli refusal to take back refugees and hopes that this can be resolved by compensation and development aid.

Security

Israel is concerned that Palestinian territory, if completely independent could be used to launch attacks on Israel. Therefore, it is insisting that the state of Palestine be largely demilitarized and that it keeps a large measure of security control, including in the Jordan Valley. Palestinians argue that viable security will come from a stable two-state solution not the other way round. They want as many attributes of a normal state as possible and clearly state that client-status would be untenable and unacceptable. US, while comprehending apprehensions of both parties, feels that this issue could be resolved even at the cost of deploying international peace mission along the two states.

Changing Geo-political Context in the Region and its Effect

While Israel and Palestine peace talks were stalemated after September 2010, significant developments in the region in the past three years have changed the geo-political dynamics in the region and therefore the context of the current initiative. A brief current overview of each player in Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) would give a better insight into respective compulsions as well as possibilities of any forward movement in the current process.

A critical appraisal of Israel’s standing in the immediate neighborhood and the region at large clearly indicates that the country stands more isolated and alienated than ever. Even countries and areas hitherto considered neutral or friendly have turned hostile, although all of this was not of Israel’s making. This is especially the case with the ‘Arab Spring’, which has brought about changes both within individual countries as well as in the region as a whole. Islamist parties are on the rise and economic concerns have risen to the fore. In Egypt, it lost Mubarak, its time tested ally, who had ensured peace between Egypt and Israel. The 1978 peace treaty hangs in the balance although Egypt has not yet indicated its intent to abandon the treaty. Sinai Peninsula, the buffer between Egypt and Israel, has erupted post ouster of Mubarak and caused concern in Israel³. When Egypt permitted two Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal in February 2011 (the first time such an event has happened since the 1979 Iranian Revolution), it naturally caused alarm in Israel⁴. Israel’s ties with other countries in the region have also become unsettled. It has fallen out with Turkey (yet another regional leader) post the Gaza Flotilla incident of May 2010 despite the patch up prompted by President Obama in March this year⁵. With civil war raging in Syria, Israel fears that Assad would finally be forced out, thus disturbing the fragile peace on Israel’s eastern borders. Jordan could go the way of Islamists any time, which would spell more trouble for Israel. The Palestinians have already been given the status of Non Member Observer in the United Nations in 2012⁶. On June 30, 2013, the European Union, coming down harshly on Israel’s continued push to build settlements, adopted new guidelines, stating that future agreements between the European Union and Israel must exclude settlements in the occupied West Bank. The directive covers all areas of cooperation between the European Union and Israel, including economics, science, culture, sports, and academia. Though the material effect may be insignificant, it is a serious blow to ties with European Union. Finally, Iran continues with its civil (?) nuclear programme and despite the alarms raised by Israel, there are hardly any takers for military action against Tehran.

Domestically, Prime Minister Netanyahu leads the right-wing Likud party, which on the whole opposes the creation of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu has already faced serious criticism for the July 28 cabinet approval for release of 104 Palestinian prisoners. In a statement, Prime Minister Netanyahu recognized how difficult this decision was for many Israelis to accept, but that this was a moment “in which tough decisions must be made for the good of the country⁷.”

Like Israel, Palestinians too are confronted with serious issues. Firstly, Mahmoud Abbas, despite being the leader of PLO does not represent all the Palestinians as Hamas controls the Gaza Strip and does not recognize Abbas as the sole leader of all Palestinians. There have been no elections after the January 25, 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council which Hamas won comfortably. The subsequent struggle for power resulted in split of 2007 resulting in Fatah ruling the West Bank and Hamas ruling the Gaza Strip. In such a situation, any agreement that Abbas may procure may not be truly representative of all Palestinians. Also, with Abbas aging and no successor nominated, there could be a serious leadership crisis after his death. There is also a fear that failure of current talks after nine months could diminish his political standing and boost that of the rival Hamas. With regards to the contours of Palestinian state, prominent Fatah leaders, concerned by increasing Israeli settlements, have said that the two-state solution is no longer viable and have begun speaking in favor of the creation of one democratic bi-national state for Arabs and Jews in all of Israel-Palestine, something which may not be acceptable at all to Israel. There is also the debate regarding the forthcoming UN General Assembly Session in September where the PLO could stake claim for upgraded status over the “non-member observer state” it got in 2012. However, US annoyance of their continued bid in 2012 despite US asking them to back down has cost them adversely in terms of withheld US aid. Perhaps, concerned with the enormity of all the above challenges, the Palestinian Authority says it has currently only agreed to “talks about talks.” Also, it agreed to the first step only after Israel announced the release of 104 prisoners and the Arab League backed the peace plan⁸. Mahmoud Abbas has also indicated that any peace deal would be first put to a referendum before all Palestinians before ratification, a measure that has been indicated even by Israel in its resolutions in Knesset.

Hamas, which has refused to recognize the current peace process, itself, is not on a very firm footing. The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt has temporarily weakened Hamas. Added to it is the severe crackdown by Egyptian Army in Sinai which has virtually blocked off all illegal supply routes into Gaza Strip. Its break up with Assad regime in Syria has negatively affected its relationship with its benefactor, Iran. Post the November 2012 conflict with Israel called “Pillar of Defense” by Israel; the Hamas military capabilities also have been severely reduced. Also, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians back non-violent resistance to the Israeli occupation and reject military operations⁹. In such a situation, if a peace deal is reached, it would be very difficult for Hamas to remain defiant in Gaza Strip.

US has enjoyed tremendous influence in the region for the past four decades. It has been the virtual security guarantor for the Gulf nations and security of Israel has been one of its national security objectives. However, post the onset of ‘Arab Spring’, US has experienced diminishing influence in the region. The ouster of the dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya has not brought in regimes exactly favorable to US interests. Rise of Islamists in political mainstream has added to its concern. Syrian crisis and US reluctance to get directly involved militarily has drawn the ire of the region. In the midst of all this, Iran nuclear issue continues to fester along.

In such a situation, MEPP is one issue that can get US dividends and restore some of its influence in the region. It has been one of the personal priorities of President Obama and is a conflict in which the US still has considerable leverage with both parties. Failure to reach a satisfactory resolution till now inhibits its ability to achieve its goals in the region. Former U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, Chief Gen. James Mattis described the impact the lack of a solution has had on his work and why it underscores the importance of Kerry’s efforts; “I paid a military security price every day as a commander of CENTCOM because the Americans were seen as biased in support of Israel. … Moderate Arabs who want to be with us can’t come out publicly in support of people who don’t want to show respect for the Arab Palestinians. So [Kerry] is right on target with what he’s doing¹⁰”.

There is also the issue of significant spin-offs from the resolution of this conflict. The most significant impact is likely to be felt on the Iran nuclear issue. If MEPP succeeds, there will be tremendous pressure on Iran to deliver. Also, Israel would be emboldened to further threaten Iran with military action. There is also the issue of US announcing its rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific in recent times. While it may not result in significant dilution of US focus and presence in West Asia, resolution of major issues like MEPP would certainly contribute towards its future course in Asia-Pacific.

US, shepherding the recommencement of peace talks, is banking upon two caveats for some success; first, that the nine month period for the talks is for all unresolved issues – there will be no interim agreement or confidence building effort that can be undermined by either side as was the case with Oslo. Second, by getting the Arab League to reaffirm its commitment to recognize Israel if a deal for Palestinian statehood is reached, it has given the Israel a major incentive to see the talks move ahead.

There is no Status Quo

MEPP has been stalemated since the breakdown of talks in September 2010. However, any talks of maintaining ‘status quo’ are misplaced as the status quo is changing by the day. As discussed above, there is constant evolution in the standing of each of the important players in this conflict. Also, with two critical factors; Israeli settlements and Palestinian population constantly increasing, status quo does not remain a feasible option. There are views which express concern that any continued stalemate might run the risk of completely jeopardizing a viable two state solution, perhaps by the end of this decade. There is also a realization that time is fast running out and if unduly delayed, there may not remain a viable scope for two independent states owing to expanding Israeli settlements and Palestinian populations. In a recent op-ed, Yuval Diskin, former head of Israel’s Shin Bet security service, wrote, “This is a matter that requires national responsibility of the highest order. It requires taking advantage of what may be the last opportunity to extricate ourselves from the deadly clutches of our conflict with the Palestinians, clutches which we have tethered to ourselves¹¹.” Thus, there is no question of a status quo in this conflict.

Conclusion

The gaps between the two sides are significant and issues are complex. Declaration by both Israel and Palestine that the peace agreements will be put through public referendums reflects the skepticism of the leaders on the future of peace talks and its acceptability with respective populations. However, the good news is that all sides have agreed for the resumption of process after a gap of three years. It would be however unreasonable to expect too much too soon. Many a times MEPP talks have come on the brink and failed. Major compromises, bold decisions and domestic public support would be needed if the talks have any chances of moving ahead.

(The author is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)

Endnotes

1. History of Mid-East peace talks, BBC News, 29 July 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11103745, accessed on 06 August 2013
2. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, The Knesset Website, available athttp://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm, accessed on 07 August 2013.
3. Rajeev Agarwal, “Sinai: The Middle East’ New Hot Spot,” IDSA Issue Brief, available at http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/SINAITheMiddleEastsNewHotSpot_ragarwal_301112, last accessed on 07 August 2013.
4. “Iranian warships sail through Suez Canal,” CNN News, 22 February 2011, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-22/world/egypt.iran.warships_1_suez-cana... , last accessed on 07 August 2013.
5. “Obama Brokers Apology From Netanyahu to Erdogan,” Al Monitor, 22 March 2013, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/netanyahu-apology-erdo....
6. Report available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm, last accessed on 07 August 2013.
7. Michael r. Gordon and Isabel Kershner, Israel and Palestinians Set to Resume Peace Talks, U.S. Announces, New York Times, 29 July 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/world/middleeast/israel-agrees-to-pris..., accessed on 07 August 2013.
8. Kerry wins Arab League support for efforts to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Haaretz News, 17 July 2013, available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.536305, accessed on 06 August 2013.
9. Poll: Hamas loses popularity among Palestinians , Jerusalm Post, 10n April 2013, available at http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Poll-Hamas-continues-to-lose-popularity..., accessed on 07 August 2013.
10. Matthew Duss, Creating an Environment Conducive to Progress in Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, Centre for American Progress, August 5, 2013, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2013/08/05/71422/..., accessed on 07 August 2013.
11. Yuval Diskin, Diskin: Israel nears point of no return on two-state solution, Jerusalem Post, 13 July 2013, available at http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Diskin-Israel-nears-point-of..., accessed on 06 August 2013. 

India-US Ties: Need for Clarity, Balance

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Doubts persist both in India and the United States on the substance of their strategic partnership. High-sounding declarations about the partnership being one of the defining ones of the 21st century, or one between “natural allies,” have not erased uncertainties in the two countries about the capacity and willingness of each side to meet the expectations of the other.

Growing India-U.S. convergence on several issues has not eliminated significant divergences emanating from huge disparity in power, different priorities, conflicting regional interests and differing views on structures of global governance. India has moved from distrust to positive engagement and greater acceptance of basic U.S. goodwill towards it. The U.S. is devoting higher attention to India than ever before in recognition of its growing international importance. But this improved atmosphere in bilateral relations is not sufficient for ironing out real differences.

Wide Gaps

While there is like-mindedness on issues of democracy, pluralism, human rights, economic liberalisation, terrorism, religious extremism, non-proliferation and the like, their treatment in concrete situations exposes wide gaps in the thinking of the two countries. India notes the selective manner in which “universal values” are promoted, sparing friends who spurn them and sanctioning adversaries for similar repudiation. Even in the case of terrorism, the conduct of some is condoned while that of others invokes steps to bring about regime change.

On Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Climate Change, the Doha Round, sovereignty issues, global governance, etc., India and the U.S. have different perspectives. While differences between the U.S. and some of its allies on important issues do not call into question the basic assumptions about their mutual relationship within an alliance system, in India’s case the “strategic relationship” gets stress-tested in public opinion each time the two countries are in discord.

Our strategic partnership with the U.S. cannot presume identity of views on contentious international issues or adjustment of Indian policies to suit American preferences alone. Yet, when India speaks of strategic autonomy, U.S. votaries and Indian champions of a strong India-U.S. friendship decry such thinking as mired in India’s defunct nonaligned credo. If the Indian Parliament passes a nuclear liability law imposing supplier liability on nuclear vendors, particularly after Fukushima, U.S. and Indian strategic affairs specialists become petulant. Similarly, if U.S. companies are excluded from defence contracts, there is interrogation about India’s commitment to a strategic partnership with the U.S. Elements in India characterise genuine policy differences as fence-sitting, reluctance to accept burden-sharing in upholding the international order and free-loading by India on the back of those powers who make hard choices, sometimes at the cost of their own immediate interest, to maintain peace and security.

Recurrent doubts in India about the quality of its U.S. relationship are fuelled by the inconsistency, lack of steadiness and even transparency of U.S. policies. The U.S. can change gears to suit its interests at a particular juncture, shaped by electoral considerations or lobbying. It is adept at giving varying spins to its policies as circumstances demand. The U.S. policy towards Pakistan, despite its terrorist affiliations and disruptive role in Afghanistan, exemplifies this. Washington’s military and economic aid to Islamabad continues despite Pakistan’s complicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s abetment of terrorism in India and the strategic headaches it causes to the U.S., the American tendency to equate India and Pakistan resurfaces from time to time.

On Afghanistan, the U.S. first questioned India’s role there, then supported it and is now disregarding India’s fundamental strategic doubts about politically rehabilitating the Taliban by dialoguing with it. The U.S. now seems open even to the Haqqani network’s participation in the political end-game in Afghanistan. On China, the signals waver, with the declaration of a pivot towards Asia with China’s rise in mind, which is then diluted to “re-balancing” detached from China-related fears and, finally, the wisdom of any beefed-up Asia-Pacific policy is questioned by the would-be U.S. Secretary of State.

US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit in June for the fourth round of the strategic dialogue illustrated these cross-currents moulding the India-U.S. strategic partnership. The joint statement issued on the occasion omits any mention of Pakistan, even in the context of the Mumbai attack. The references to terrorism and “violent extremism” and to dismantling of terrorist safe havens in the region are worded to avoid finger-pointing at Pakistan. There being no risk of any other political force being excluded by design or choice, the reference to “inclusive” Presidential and Provincial elections in Afghanistan in 2014 is puzzling, as it suggests that India too is advocating the “inclusion” of Taliban in these elections. The rhetoric about the reconciliation process being Afghan-led and Afghan-owned sounds hollower with the U.S. decision to talk directly to the Taliban at Doha, as Kabul will not dictate the negotiating script to Washington. The red lines drawn by the international community for any deal with the Taliban have been blurred in the joint statement which speaks in general terms about preserving “the historic political, economic and social progress made over the last decade,” though in Kerry’s speech at the Habitat Centre these red lines are reiterated. It is not clear how India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid could say in his joint press conference with Kerry that the U.S. “will ensure that none of the concerns of India is overlooked or undermined,” when the very act of talking to the Taliban under Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s benign oversight subverts India’s interests.

The joint statement omits any mention of China, the South China Sea or U.S. “re-balancing” towards Asia, though Kerry affirmed in his press statement that the U.S. leadership considered India a key part of such a re-balance. There is only a general reference — in the paragraph dealing with the Indian Ocean and the Arctic Council — to maritime security, unimpeded commerce and freedom of navigation! Iran and Syria are absent from the statement. The India-U.S. strategic dialogue thus ignores or obfuscates key strategic issues.

Arm-Twisting

Kerry pushed India unreasonably on the civilian nuclear front by unilaterally affirming in the joint press conference with Khurshid — beyond the joint statement’s non-committal language — that the two sides had agreed that a commercial agreement between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India should be reached by September this year. This is hardly possible when highly complex issues such as capital investment, financial mechanisms and the per-unit tariff rate have to be finalised, besides meeting other regulatory requirements. Is Kerry suggesting that the “full and timely implementation of the civil nuclear deal” requires India to hasten the finalisation of nuclear contracts with U.S. firms, irrespective of any consideration? Perhaps this arm-twisting is related to the Prime Minister’s expected visit to Washington in September.

The extraordinary emphasis on climate change issues by Kerry during his visit unnecessarily risks converting a complex global issue into a contentious bilateral one. Kerry waxed eloquent on the new energy market being the “biggest market ever seen on earth ... a $6 trillion market with 4 billion users,” suggesting powerful commercial considerations behind his push. The wisdom of creating a working group headed by Kerry and Khurshid to intensify bilateral efforts to address “forcefully” this “urgent” issue — which means increasing the weight of non-technical foreign policy considerations into bilateral discussions — is questionable.

Positive features were, of course, not missing from Kerry’s visit, given the much improved tenor of India-U.S. ties and the extraordinarily rich agenda of bilateral cooperation which in many unspectacular ways can be productive for India. The short point is that the cogs of the strategic partnership still grate with each other and the machine is not adequately lubricated yet by the diplomatic grease of coherence, clarity, balance of interests and a sense of true partnership.

Morsi’s Ouster: Failure of Political Islam

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

If the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak by the mass of protestors in Tahrir Square in 2011 was a surprise, the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi by even larger protests in Tahrir Square and across Egypt in recent days is equally dramatic.

Mubarak was in power for 30 years. The people, tired of his repressive and corrupt rule, wanted change. Morsi, in power for only a year, has alienated the people extraordinarily quickly, forcing a regime change.

Morsi, elected as President through a tortuous but reasonably credible democratic process, differed from the manner in which Mubarak assumed and retained power. Those young, social media activists who sought regime change in 2011 may not have intended power to be transferred to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with the Salafists in tow. But the MB being far more organized and embedded at the grass root level than the more liberal and secular forces responsible for expelling the Mubarak regime, won the election and acquired political legitimacy. Now they have been ousted by what is effectively a military coup.

Brotherhood

This unforeseen development in a country that is the political and cultural heartland of the Arab world cautions against interpreting the nature of forces at play in the Arab world from narrow, self-serving political perspectives.

When political change occurred in Tunisia and Egypt through street protests against dictatorial regimes, it was pre-maturely hailed as the Arab Spring by the West. The Arab world, it was claimed, was moving towards democracy, refuting a widely-held view that Islam and democracy cannot cohabit.

The entry of MB into electoral politics was welcomed as a sign of maturing democratic impulses sweeping the Arab populace. Fine tuned analysis to disarm fears about the implications of this long-banned organization joining politics and aspiring for state power were offered. The MB comprised of various political currents, it was said, with moderates in the ascendant. “Political Islam”, which the MB represented, was seen as the only way that democracy could be ushered into the Arab world. Seen as a hostile force after the Iranian revolution, “political Islam” became a viable and acceptable instrument to promote America’s vocational attachment to the international spread of western style democracy.

Reservations about Morsi were held in abeyance, believing that he could successfully make the transition from military rule to democracy in Egypt. Morsi, in fact, made a fairly positive impression after assuming power, at least externally. He seemed intent on restoring Egypt’s political role in the region, reaching out to Iran, reducing the heavy weight of America on Egypt’s foreign policy, courting China, renewing relations with nonaligned friends of the past like India.

India received him in March this year, signalling our positive view of the political change in Egypt and acceptance of the moderate credentials of the MB. Surprisingly, we found common language on Syria as well as on terrorism in our joint declaration with him.

Revolt

However, perceived inadequately in their acuteness by the outside world because of tailored international media coverage, serious tensions have apparently been brewing in Egypt because of Morsi government’s policies to islamicize Egyptian institutions and society through appointments and educational and cultural initiatives. With the failure to improve economic conditions, with poverty and unemployment rampant and sectarian strife targeting the Coptic community, public grievance against the Morsi government has been escalating.

It did not seem, however, that matters had reached such a dangerous tipping point. Could such truly massive demonstrations that require huge resources, remarkable coordination skills and identifiable leadership occur spontaneously or erupt primarily through the use of social media, especially in an inadequately wired society? Individuals like El Baradei and Amr Moussa, with limited public following, have emerged as the political face of the popular revolt, which leaves many questions unanswered.

Coup

The US seems to have been egging Morsi to bridge growing domestic political differences, with its Secretary of State John Kerry, during his March visit to Cairo, while pledging additional aid, calling for restoration of “unity, political stability and economic health to Egypt”. Kerry spoke about the “deep concern about the political course of their country, the need to strengthen human rights protections, justice and the rule of law, and their fundamental anxiety about the economic future of Egypt" that political and business leaders conveyed to him. The US Congress reacted sharply in June to the repression of NGO workers- Egyptian and American- assisting Egypt “as it moves down the path towards democracy, democratic training, the building of civil society, and the establishment of the rule of law”.

The Arab Spring has withered at its roots. The political judgment that MB had evolved into a moderate force has proved faulty. That “political Islam” could usher in democracy in the Islamic world has proved to be wrong. Ironically, opening the doors for more democracy in Egypt allowed conservative Islam to walk in and thwart the wishes of a large section of the population.

If the revolt against MB rule in Egypt will reverse the rising tide of conservative Islam in the Arab world on the strength of Gulf wealth and Turkish ambiguities, it would be a welcome development. The immediate prospects in Egypt are, however, bleak as a legitimately elected government has been ousted by the military and the erstwhile President confined. The West is refraining from describing this as a coup, which it is as the Constitution does not empower the Egyptian armed forces to be political arbiters in a crisis, howsoever serious.

The Egyptian military, supposedly trusted by society, is now being castigated by MB activists, as is the US. So much for the Arab Spring and Egypt’s much-lauded experiment with democracy with Islamists in charge. The last word to be said may well be a bloody one!

Indo-US Relations: Time to Impart Momentum

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF 

The fourth India US strategic dialogue that was held in New Delhi in the last week of June was aimed at reviewing progress in bilateral relations and outlining the trajectory ahead. Given the nature of evolving Indo-US relationship, no major breakthrough was expected. However, the dialogue also brought on the same table all important government stakeholders involved in the Indo-US strategic engagement thereby providing a common platform for discussion besides ensuring a holistic understanding of the nuances and reducing the dissonance. 

In line with what US interlocutors have been saying about India figuring as an important country in its design of Asia Pacific strategy, US Secretary of State John Kerry described India as a key partner of the US rebalance in Asia. He reaffirmed US commitment to pivot to Asia and stated that Washington valued India’s role in ensuring a stable Asia. India, on its part, has also been engaging South East and East Asian countries since early nineties since it unveiled its ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP) that has political, economic and security components. Though India’s LEP pre dates the American rebalance to Asia, both share similarity of interests and objectives in many ways. Both India and the US support freedom of navigation and trade through seas particularly in South China Sea which has been the scene of assertive policies of China.

However, it is unlikely that India can become a partner of the US in the mould of Japan, South Korea or Australia to advance the objectives of America’s Asia Pacific strategy. India is also critically looking at the US sponsored economic initiative of Trans Pacific Partnership which is the economic component of its Asia Pacific strategy. The alternative is ASEAN sponsored Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which has the potential of being dominated by China.

But what is of abiding concern to India has been the evolving situation in Afghanistan where Pakistan and Taliban have been given the central role in the unfolding end game. Despite Kerry’s assurance that talks with Taliban will only take place if they adhere to the three red lines of renouncing violence, accepting Afghan Constitution and severing links with Al Qaeda, there is a degree of skepticism in India about his assertions. During his visit, Kerry also talked of improving India Pakistan relations that would have positive impact on the situation in Afghanistan. Now, this is a formulation which has been advanced many times by American interlocutors like late Richard Holbrooke and others and vehemently rejected by India. Even James Dobbins, the current US Special Representative for Af-Pak, who arrived in New Delhi in the wake of Kerry’s visit, talked about this formulation but in different words.

Further, Kerry very well knows that in Pakistan, the locus of power lies with the Army and professions of peace with India by the newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif are of no consequence as Pakistan’s Afghan and Indian policies will be shaped by the military. Kerry himself has met Pakistani Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in Brussels and Jordan in connection with solving the Af-Pak puzzle. His proclivities towards Kayani and Pakistan military are well known as he was the author of Kerry-Lugar bill which enabled provision of military aid to Pakistan despite Islamabad providing sanctuaries to Taliban who have killed many American and ISAF soldiers. 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions is another area where India has divergence of approach with the US. The US has granted exemptions of sanctions to India for off take of oil, albeit reduced, for another six months effective from June 5, 2013. The Americans are hopeful of Indian influence on the new as well as old Iranian leadership to comply with nuclear non proliferation requirements and engage positively in the P 5 + 1 talks that are likely to resume in August. India, however, did not seem confident enough knowing the complexity of the issue and deeply nuanced differences between Iran and the United States. 

There is much concern in the United States that adequate benefit has not been derived from the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal. The main bone of contention is the nuclear liability law. India is firm on non dilution of the nuclear liability law as it is also politically unsustainable for the present government facing a difficult election year. It also needs to be remembered that Russia also had misgivings about India’s nuclear liability law; however, they were satisfied after they were allowed to raise the costs of setting up their nuclear plants in India. India has reportedly expressed willingness to engage in explaining the law. Thus, there is hope that ongoing commercial discussions between NPCIL and Westinghouse towards setting up a nuclear power plant at Mithivirdi in Gujarat and between General Electric-Hitachi and NPCIL on setting up a nuclear power plant in Andhra Pradesh may bear some results by September. This is the time when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would be visiting the US. Prior to the summit level meeting, US Vice President Joe Biden would be visiting India in end July to impart some momentum to Indo-US relationship. 

While there are multiple tracks of defence engagement, the main focus for the US has been defence sales. Indo-US defense trade has reached nearly $9 billion. Induction of C-130J and C-17 aircraft into the Indian Air Force and of the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft into the Indian Navy have been the main achievements of the past year. India is planning to order six more C-130 J special operations aircraft and 145 M777 ultra-light howitzers. Commercial negotiations are on for 22 Boeing Apache Longbow strike helicopters ($1.2 billion) and 15 heavy-lift Boeing CH Chinook helicopters ($1.4 billion) for the Indian Air Force. Meanwhile, delivery of 10 - C 17 Globemaster III is likely to be completed by June 2015 and the buzz is that 10 more may be on order. The main focus from the Indian side is on developing a model of co-development, co-manufacture and co-purchase. However, there has not been any progress on these aspects. 

During the Kerry visit, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, Commander, US Pacific Command called on Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff. Regional security and South China Sea were reportedly the main issues discussed. Both India and US support freedom of navigation through the seas and have participated in counter piracy exercises as part of maritime cooperation. On the issue of counter terrorism, the working of annual Counterterrorism Joint Working Group meetings and the Homeland Security Dialogue, which met in May 2013, was reviewed. While cooperation in investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks was discussed, India has not been able to gain from the interrogation of David Headley, a key conspirator in the attacks.

Given information of Chinese forays in offensive cyber actions and India’s particular vulnerability in this area, cyber security consultations chaired by respective national security councils to coordinate positions on cross-cutting cyber-security issues are expected to provide India substantial benefit as it is due to expand cyber security organizations and mechanisms in the country. Operational cooperation between India’s Computer Emergency Response Team and the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team also assumes importance and is expected to increase in the coming days.

A contentious issue was revelations by American whistle blower, Edward Snowden, on worldwide electronic surveillance by the United States. India was said to be the fifth most snooped on country in the world at one point despite claims of extensive security cooperation between New Delhi and Washington which has irked South Block and the issue was flagged for discussion during Kerry's visit. However, the US Secretary of State explained that the US was not carrying out any specific search of individuals that violated privacy but was engaged in general monitoring of communications of terrorist suspects based on orders of relevant US courts.

The US has welcomed the new regulations regarding foreign investment ceilings in the Indian economy, and creation of new Cabinet-level mechanisms to expedite investment in India’s infrastructure. The two sides are expected to resume negotiations to conclude a Bilateral Investment Treaty/Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement as soon as India’s revised model BIPPA text is ready in the coming year. 

The main achievement of the fourth round of India US Strategic dialogue seems to be to highlight intensity of engagement established between the two countries and personal rapport between the Secretary of State John Kerry and Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid in their first meeting. Though this may not last beyond the year at best, this will enable both the ministers to drive the present engagement to a new level, particularly to achieve a breakthrough during the forthcoming high level visits of Vice-President Joe Biden in late July and that of Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh to Washington in September.

It is also obvious that though the Strategic Dialogue is only in its fourth round, it has assumed an all-of-government character and has multiple points of engagement ranging from security to space and education, each having a momentum and intensity of its own. While India does have such multi-track annual dialogue with countries such as Russia, the engagement with the United States now surpasses the one with Moscow. Thus, it is apparent that India-US strategic partnership is now the most significant bilateral engagement for New Delhi.

There are many positives in the evolving Indo-US relationship. Both are engaged in strengthening their relationship in a variety of sectors ranging from consultations on global and regional issues to finding ways to enhance cooperation in economic, defence, counter-terrorism, cyber-security, energy, space and high-end technology areas. Indo-US trade has crossed 100 billion dollars which is more than Sino-Indian trade. India has held largest number of joint military exercises with the US. Though, the general purpose of such military exercises is counter-terrorism, they have a strategic idiom of their own besides promoting interoperability. 

Thus, it can be said that the recent Indo-US Strategic Dialogue provided a useful framework for imparting meaningful substance to the strategic partnership.

Afghan Reconciliation: At Brussels, Kerry Sprouts Consensus

Monish Gulati

Introduction

In a bid to progress the Afghan reconciliation process, which has degenerated into a slanging match between Pakistan and Afghanistan, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani Army Chief General Kayani in Brussels on 24 April 2013. The difficult relationship between Karzai and Kayani amongst other issues has been dragging down efforts to bring stability and peace in Afghanistan before the forthcoming elections. The three-way talks were held the day after NATO foreign ministers arrived to discuss, besides other issues the NATO/ISAF’s role in Afghanistan post-2014. The Kerry-Karzai-Kayani meeting was part of a series of ongoing discussions between the representatives of the three countries, which picked up pace after the confirmation proceedings of President Obama’s new team were completed.

Background

The US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel launched concerted efforts to address the Af-Pak issues by making Kabul their first stop. Chuck Hagel's two-day (09-10 March) visit to Afghanistan was his first overseas trip as the Defense Secretary and there were expectations that the visit would shore up the fragile relations with Afghanistan. Earlier in the week, on 04 March, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen had visited Kabul with the message, "Let there be no doubt: our commitment is certain, to the end of transition and beyond it, NATO will stand by you".

The Secretary of State Kerry met Gen Kayani in Amman on the night of 24 March and asked for his help with President Karzai to further the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Kerry had decided to skip Islamabad because of upcoming Pakistani elections and instead met Gen Kayani in the Jordanian capital. Then on 25 March, Kerry headed to Kabul on an unannounced trip with an agenda that included discussions on reconciliation and transition and presence of US troops in Afghanistan after 2014.¹ Kerry's visit to Kabul was his first as Secretary of State, and coincided with the handover of the U.S. detention facility at Bagram to Afghan control, resolving a major irritant in the relations between the two countries. The US also agreed to the withdrawal of its special-operations teams from Wardak province, another Karzai demand.²

ISAF’s commander in Afghanistan, General Joseph F Dunford met with Gen Kayani on 01 April 2013, as part of the continuing tri-partite commission efforts to strengthen military-to-military cooperation and regional stability. This was General Dunford’s first visit to Pakistan as ISAF Commander.³ Later in the month Dunford told members of the Senate’s Armed Services Committee that there was little evidence to suggest that Pakistan was intentionally sabotaging the Afghan peace process. He also told the US Senate that Karzai's accusations against Pakistan highlighted "the very deep mistrust that currently exists and has historically existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan." Afghanistan Defence Ministry spokesman Gen. Zahir Azimi on 18 April termed Gen. Dunford remarks as ‘wrong’.⁴

Despite the fact that US officials over a period of last couple of months had been interacting with Afghan and Pakistani leaders to iron out differences and take the reconciliation process forward, just days prior to the Brussels trilateral, bilateral discussions were held to lay more groundwork. On 21 April, senior civil and military officials from Pakistan and the US held talks in Islamabad to discuss measures to reach out to the Afghan Taliban. The talks were attended by acting US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, David Pearce and General Kayani.⁵ Pearce was assisted by Special Assistant to US President, Lt Gen (retd) Douglas Lute; Principal Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Dr Peter Lavoy and Ambassador Richard Olson.⁶ The issue of release of Taliban detainees and Qatar process was also discussed. The two countries agreed to stand by the outcome of the London Trilateral with regards to prior coordination before future release of Taliban detainees being currently held by Pakistan.

However, a day later on 22 April, as Karzai travelled to Brussels to attend the trilateral talks, his office issued a statement that Afghan patience was running out with Pakistan as it had not taken meaningful measures for addressing Afghan concerns. Afghanistan insisted Pakistan continues to support the insurgents to counter the Indian influence in the country. Pakistan strongly rejected the charge in a statement posted on its Brussels embassy website stating that it had "consistently endeavoured to facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process.⁷

NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen met the Afghan President in Brussels on 23 April, a day prior to the trilateral talks during the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting. He told the Afghan President that the Afghan government must follow up on a series of planned reforms to ensure that Western support continues beyond 2014. He added that “Their continued efforts to meet their commitments will pave the way for our continued support”. Rasmussen spelt out the commitments which included fighting corruption, holding credible elections next year and respecting Human Rights, including women's rights.

NATO Secretary-General later told reporters that “If we are to ensure long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan we also need a positive engagement of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan”. At the press meet the Afghan President thanked the NATO for training and equipping his forces, and expressed confidence that they will be ready to take full security responsibility when most of the foreign troops depart.

US Secretary of State John Kerry joined his NATO counterparts in Brussels on 23 April for discussions on joint operations in Afghanistan and drawdown plans by the end of 2014. He reaffirmed NATO’s commitment beyond 2014 to training and advisory mission whose parameters are being negotiated between the Afghan and U.S. governments. ⁸

Brussels Trilateral

On 24 April US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted talks between the Afghan President and senior Pakistani officials. The discussions were held at the official residence of the United States ambassador to NATO. Karzai was accompanied at the meeting by Afghanistan’s Minister of Defence and Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul. General Kayani was joined by Jalil Abbas Jilani, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary. Gen Joseph Dunford, also attended the talks along with Douglas Lute and David Pearce. ⁹

After about three and a half hours of talks in Brussels, Kerry said he had made progress with Karzai and Kayani. But all sides still had "some very specific homework to do". He declined to give specific details so as not "to raise expectations or make any kind of promises that cannot be delivered”. The three parties would "continue a very specific dialogue on both the political track as well as the security track.

Kerry indicated that any results of the Brussels talks would have to be more tangible measured not in rhetoric but in improving relations as NATO winds down its Afghanistan mission. Kerry said "We have all agreed that results are what will tell the story, not statements at a press conference." Significantly neither Karzai nor the Pakistan officials made any comment at the end of the meeting.

Assessment

Kerry, who has interacted with senior Afghan and Pakistani leaders for years as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, came with the hope that the trilateral talks would break the impasse. Addressing U.S. diplomats a day prior to the trilateral meet in Brussels, Kerry said his goal for the talks was to advance the peace process "in the simplest, most cooperative, most cogent way so that we wind up with both Pakistan's and Afghanistan's interests being satisfied but most importantly with a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, which is worth the expenditure and the treasure and effort of these last years."¹⁰

The first positive outcome of the trilateral appears that Kerry has prevailed on Karzai and Kayani to use the media in a constructive manner. The rhetoric from either side has not only impeded progress, it has eroded the confidence and optimism of the Afghans regarding the situation post 2014. It has made consensus building difficult and provided the Taliban with a psychological edge on the situation. Significantly neither Karzai nor Kayani spoke to the press in Brussels nor made any negative comments on return.

Besides some movement on the negotiations with Taliban in Qatar, it is likely that the reconciliation process may see the involvement of other Afghan political groups and in what Pakistan terms as Track-II dialogue. Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan Umer Daudzai had earlier this month opposed the Track-II dialogue stating that that peace should be between the state of Afghanistan and any faction involved in fighting, “We are opposed to any move degrading the state of Afghanistan”.¹¹

On the other hand it appears that Pakistan’s objective is to make the current Karzai regime just as another faction in the fight for power in Afghanistan rather than a fully legitimate government installed through a democratic process whatever may be the shortcomings of this nascent democracy. Pakistan has also been contacting the erstwhile Northern Alliance elements for achieving its strategic objectives.

However, there could be some constructive steps on the Afghan-Pak border issue which has lately restricted access to Afghans citing security preparations for the forthcoming elections in Pakistan and seen tensions rise due to construction of a gate by Pakistan. Rasmussen had remarked that the porous Afghan-Pakistan border hurts all the efforts to improve security in the region, and also hurts both countries' common interest in fighting extremists.¹²

Another possible outcome of the trilateral could be the early appointment of a new US Special Envoy for Af-Pak, to address some of these contentious issues in a sustained manner.¹³

What India would note, notwithstanding the general elections in Pakistan, is the fact that the Pakistani delegation was headed by Gen Kayani. It is an indication of the importance US attaches to the Pakistani military on security and policy matters especially when it comes to Afghanistan and reconciliation with the Taliban. It also indicates how US is running out of options (and time) in Afghanistan and is virtually dependent on Pakistan to ensure a safe pull out. India would also watch for progress on the Afghan-Pak SPA, a key Pakistani precondition, and the level of military cooperation it results in.

Further, all indications are that the reconciliation talks, far from being an Afghan owned and Afghan led process are increasingly becoming a Pakistan owned and Pakistan led process duly encouraged by the US. The unveiling of Afghan High Peace Council Peace Process Road Map to 2015 in November, 2012 followed by Chantilly talks in France and pro-Kayani proclivities of Kerry point towards the US making Pakistan and that too Pakistani military as main arbitrators in the unfolding drama in Afghanistan. Americans in their haste and desperation to leave Afghanistan are pandering to Pakistan’s strategic designs. It is also well known that the tactic of arrest and release of Taliban leaders detained in Pakistan is employed to suit Pakistani discourse on reconciliation and has been adopted several times earlier to gain concessions from the US and others.

Endnotes

1. Baqir Sajjad Syed. ‘Gen Kayani, Kerry discuss Afghan reconciliation’, Dawn, March 26, 2013.
   http://dawn.com/2013/03/26/gen-kayani-kerry-discuss-afghan-reconciliation/
2. Nathan Hodge and Jay Solomon. ‘Kerry Visits Kabul to Bolster Alliance’, WSJ , March 25, 2013.
   http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732478950457838208127904847...
3. ‘Isaf Commander meets Gen Kayani’, Dawn, April 01, 2013.
   http://dawn.com/2013/04/01/isaf-commander-gen-dunford-meets-with-kayani/
4. ‘Azimi disputes Gen. Dunford’s remarks on Pakistan’, Afghanistan Times, April 18, 2013.http://www.afghanistantimes.af/news_details.php?id=3113&&cid=1
5. Kamran Yousaf. ‘Afghan peace process: Pakistan, US in a bid to break the deadlock’, The Express Tribune,
   April 22, 2013.
6. Ibid.
7. ‘US-Afghan-Pakistan talks make progress, more work to do: Kerry’, The News, April 24, 2013
8. Karen DeYoung. ‘Kerry, in Brussels, reaffirms commitment to post-2014 training mission in Afghanistan’,
   The Washington Post, 24 April 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/russias-lavrov-says-west...
9. ‘No breakthrough in Pak-Afghan talks’ , The Nation, April 25, 2013
10. Elise Labott. ‘Kerry aims to soothe Afghan-Pakistan tensions’, CNN, April 24, 2013.http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/24/kerry-aims-to-soothe-afghan-pak...
11. Ser1.
12. Al Pessin. ‘NATO Tells Afghanistan to Meet its Commitments to Ensure Aid’, April 23, 2013
    http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2013/04/mil-130423-v...
13. Ser1.