India-US Ties: Need for Clarity, Balance

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Doubts persist both in India and the United States on the substance of their strategic partnership. High-sounding declarations about the partnership being one of the defining ones of the 21st century, or one between “natural allies,” have not erased uncertainties in the two countries about the capacity and willingness of each side to meet the expectations of the other.

Growing India-U.S. convergence on several issues has not eliminated significant divergences emanating from huge disparity in power, different priorities, conflicting regional interests and differing views on structures of global governance. India has moved from distrust to positive engagement and greater acceptance of basic U.S. goodwill towards it. The U.S. is devoting higher attention to India than ever before in recognition of its growing international importance. But this improved atmosphere in bilateral relations is not sufficient for ironing out real differences.

Wide Gaps

While there is like-mindedness on issues of democracy, pluralism, human rights, economic liberalisation, terrorism, religious extremism, non-proliferation and the like, their treatment in concrete situations exposes wide gaps in the thinking of the two countries. India notes the selective manner in which “universal values” are promoted, sparing friends who spurn them and sanctioning adversaries for similar repudiation. Even in the case of terrorism, the conduct of some is condoned while that of others invokes steps to bring about regime change.

On Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Climate Change, the Doha Round, sovereignty issues, global governance, etc., India and the U.S. have different perspectives. While differences between the U.S. and some of its allies on important issues do not call into question the basic assumptions about their mutual relationship within an alliance system, in India’s case the “strategic relationship” gets stress-tested in public opinion each time the two countries are in discord.

Our strategic partnership with the U.S. cannot presume identity of views on contentious international issues or adjustment of Indian policies to suit American preferences alone. Yet, when India speaks of strategic autonomy, U.S. votaries and Indian champions of a strong India-U.S. friendship decry such thinking as mired in India’s defunct nonaligned credo. If the Indian Parliament passes a nuclear liability law imposing supplier liability on nuclear vendors, particularly after Fukushima, U.S. and Indian strategic affairs specialists become petulant. Similarly, if U.S. companies are excluded from defence contracts, there is interrogation about India’s commitment to a strategic partnership with the U.S. Elements in India characterise genuine policy differences as fence-sitting, reluctance to accept burden-sharing in upholding the international order and free-loading by India on the back of those powers who make hard choices, sometimes at the cost of their own immediate interest, to maintain peace and security.

Recurrent doubts in India about the quality of its U.S. relationship are fuelled by the inconsistency, lack of steadiness and even transparency of U.S. policies. The U.S. can change gears to suit its interests at a particular juncture, shaped by electoral considerations or lobbying. It is adept at giving varying spins to its policies as circumstances demand. The U.S. policy towards Pakistan, despite its terrorist affiliations and disruptive role in Afghanistan, exemplifies this. Washington’s military and economic aid to Islamabad continues despite Pakistan’s complicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s abetment of terrorism in India and the strategic headaches it causes to the U.S., the American tendency to equate India and Pakistan resurfaces from time to time.

On Afghanistan, the U.S. first questioned India’s role there, then supported it and is now disregarding India’s fundamental strategic doubts about politically rehabilitating the Taliban by dialoguing with it. The U.S. now seems open even to the Haqqani network’s participation in the political end-game in Afghanistan. On China, the signals waver, with the declaration of a pivot towards Asia with China’s rise in mind, which is then diluted to “re-balancing” detached from China-related fears and, finally, the wisdom of any beefed-up Asia-Pacific policy is questioned by the would-be U.S. Secretary of State.

US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit in June for the fourth round of the strategic dialogue illustrated these cross-currents moulding the India-U.S. strategic partnership. The joint statement issued on the occasion omits any mention of Pakistan, even in the context of the Mumbai attack. The references to terrorism and “violent extremism” and to dismantling of terrorist safe havens in the region are worded to avoid finger-pointing at Pakistan. There being no risk of any other political force being excluded by design or choice, the reference to “inclusive” Presidential and Provincial elections in Afghanistan in 2014 is puzzling, as it suggests that India too is advocating the “inclusion” of Taliban in these elections. The rhetoric about the reconciliation process being Afghan-led and Afghan-owned sounds hollower with the U.S. decision to talk directly to the Taliban at Doha, as Kabul will not dictate the negotiating script to Washington. The red lines drawn by the international community for any deal with the Taliban have been blurred in the joint statement which speaks in general terms about preserving “the historic political, economic and social progress made over the last decade,” though in Kerry’s speech at the Habitat Centre these red lines are reiterated. It is not clear how India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid could say in his joint press conference with Kerry that the U.S. “will ensure that none of the concerns of India is overlooked or undermined,” when the very act of talking to the Taliban under Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s benign oversight subverts India’s interests.

The joint statement omits any mention of China, the South China Sea or U.S. “re-balancing” towards Asia, though Kerry affirmed in his press statement that the U.S. leadership considered India a key part of such a re-balance. There is only a general reference — in the paragraph dealing with the Indian Ocean and the Arctic Council — to maritime security, unimpeded commerce and freedom of navigation! Iran and Syria are absent from the statement. The India-U.S. strategic dialogue thus ignores or obfuscates key strategic issues.

Arm-Twisting

Kerry pushed India unreasonably on the civilian nuclear front by unilaterally affirming in the joint press conference with Khurshid — beyond the joint statement’s non-committal language — that the two sides had agreed that a commercial agreement between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India should be reached by September this year. This is hardly possible when highly complex issues such as capital investment, financial mechanisms and the per-unit tariff rate have to be finalised, besides meeting other regulatory requirements. Is Kerry suggesting that the “full and timely implementation of the civil nuclear deal” requires India to hasten the finalisation of nuclear contracts with U.S. firms, irrespective of any consideration? Perhaps this arm-twisting is related to the Prime Minister’s expected visit to Washington in September.

The extraordinary emphasis on climate change issues by Kerry during his visit unnecessarily risks converting a complex global issue into a contentious bilateral one. Kerry waxed eloquent on the new energy market being the “biggest market ever seen on earth ... a $6 trillion market with 4 billion users,” suggesting powerful commercial considerations behind his push. The wisdom of creating a working group headed by Kerry and Khurshid to intensify bilateral efforts to address “forcefully” this “urgent” issue — which means increasing the weight of non-technical foreign policy considerations into bilateral discussions — is questionable.

Positive features were, of course, not missing from Kerry’s visit, given the much improved tenor of India-U.S. ties and the extraordinarily rich agenda of bilateral cooperation which in many unspectacular ways can be productive for India. The short point is that the cogs of the strategic partnership still grate with each other and the machine is not adequately lubricated yet by the diplomatic grease of coherence, clarity, balance of interests and a sense of true partnership.

Time to end Unilateral Concessions

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board) 

Prime Minister Shri Manmohan Singh’s remark that there can be no business as usual with Pakistan after its troops mutilated the bodies of two Indian soldiers they killed, and that those responsible for this crime will have to be brought to book, is unexceptionable in so far as it goes. But to interpret this as indicating a radical reversal of our policy towards Pakistan would be a mistake. 

The prime minister has made tough sounding statements before on Pakistan’s linkage with terror threatening the peace process and the imperative need to bring to justice those responsible for the Mumbai carnage, without this affecting the fundamental decision to engage Pakistan despite provocations. The beheading incident is not more intolerable than the killing of a large number people in cold blood in the Mumbai attack, and yet after a pause we resumed the dialogue with Pakistan, the justification being that we have to live with it as a neighbour and closing the doors to a dialogue is not an option. We say that we need peace with Pakistan to realise our goals of high economic growth and poverty alleviation. The argument that as the bigger and stronger country we should be more generous with Pakistan entices us. The fluidity of our convictions and general reluctance to take hard decisions makes us choose soft options, which we wrap in the cloak of moral superiority, statesmanship and our vocation for peace.

If we could disregard the intense provocation of the macabre dance of death in the Mumbai attacks and engage in hope-filled diplomacy with Pakistan subsequently on the assumption that its propensity to bleed us through terrorism could be contained by goodwill gestures on our part and that relations with it could be normalized as between two civilized and rational countries, then to believe that all our earlier arguments in favour of a sustained dialogue have now lost all relevance would be wrong.

Defence minister Antony has called the recent events a “turning point”, which is strong phraseology but doesn’t necessarily mean a change of direction in our policy towards Pakistan. The Air and Army Chiefs have spoken of options India will use at the time of its own choosing, but these seem aimed more at boosting the morale of our forces rather than any concrete plan of action for the future. The Army Chief has in fact clarified intentions by speaking of tactical action, not any strategic change of course. The anxiety to salvage the dialogue even as accountability is demanded of Pakistan comes out in the External Affairs Minister’s statements. The seeming robustness of our statements sits ill with our proposal for a flag meeting with the Pakistani military, as if we are more nervous than Pakistan about escalation. This request appeared all the more anaemic as it was made despite the obnoxious Pakistani reaction to national outrage in India.

Pakistan is unbothered by the statements coming out from New Delhi. Its Foreign Minister , Hina Rabbani Khar, is conspicuously defiant in her tone, “appalled” as she is at the “absolutely unacceptable” Indian charges. She has added insult to injury by suggesting UN involvement, knowing our allergy to any such proposal. Assuming an ill-fitting mantle of peace, she has accused India of war-mongering. She has clearly signalled that Pakistan has no intention to “bring to book” those responsible for an incident which its own enquiry shows did not occur in the first place. Pakistan has not brought to book even after four years those responsible for the Mumbai attacks, whose occurrence at least Pakistan could not claim to be contrived by India. 

For the moment we have curtailed sporting and cultural exchanges with Pakistan. If, as the Prime Minister says, it can’t be business as usual with Pakistan after its outrageous conduct, we should act on the business front and postpone the visit of the Pakistani Commerce Minister due this month. The operationalizing of the visa agreement can be delayed too. In response to Pakistan seeking to involve the UN, we should state that the only issue for discussion is Pakistan’s withdrawal from the territory occupied by it illegally. We should bite the bullet on UNMOGIP and expel it from Indian territory as a signal to Pakistan and the separatists in Kashmir. We should avail of this incident and Pakistan’s truculence to cease equating ourselves with Pakistan as victims of terrorism and expressing our helplessness by affirming that we have no other option but to talk to it come what may.

The government’s decision to curtail sporting and cultural exchanges for the time being is appropriate, but it is being contested by some who want to sing and play with Pakistanis even as their army brutalizes inhumanly our soldiers defending our frontiers. It is true that invidual Pakistani artists and sportsmen are not involved in this barbarism, but their country is. Our people to people relations with Pakistan, good or bad, are mediated by the state and are not autonomously established at individual level. The army is defending our territory not because of a personal compact but because they discharge a function enjoined upon the state. If, as individuals, we must share the grief of the families of our soldiers mutilated on the Line of Control, indivdual Pakistanis must bear the burden of their army’s heinous conduct.

Unfortunately, it is Pakistan’s habit not to accept responsibility for violating agreements and codes of civilized conduct. In its eyes, the other party is always wrong or manipulative and Pakistan is the victim of the conspiracies of others. It is very difficult to deal with such a mind-set. We continue to nurture the false hope that Pakistan will see it in its own interest to behave differently, to discard its policies to promoting jihadi terrorism that is recoiling on the country itself, to accept that it has to live in peace with its larger and more powerful neighbour for the sake of the welfare of its own people and not cling to notions of parity and revenge fired by religious fervour. While we should not underestimate the difficulties of the government in dealing with such a recalcitrant country, we should not exaggerate the possibility of winning Pakistan’s trust by well-meaning unilateral concessions.

Granting PAK The Upper Hand

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF 

Another round of the India-Pakistan dialogue has been completed with External Affairs Minister Krishna’s visit to Islamabad on September 8. The agreement on relaxing the visa regime and holding the meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Commission after a gap of 5 years seems consistent with our policy of making progress step-by-step in normalising our relations with Pakistan.

Dialogue

Pressing Pakistan again at Islamabad to expeditiously bring to justice those responsible for the Mumbai massacre apparently conveys that we are not relenting on this key demand for determining the pace at which our relations will move forward.

In reality, rather than this implying that India has the upper hand in dealing with Pakistan, it is actually the reverse. Pakistan has put us on the defensive, certainly vis a vis its own public opinion, by claiming that it has taken several steps to reach out to India, that it has moved away from its traditional positions in significant ways, but that it is India that is not reciprocating. This explains Pakistani Foreign Minister’s spurious talk about “serious signals”, “breaking away from many positions we have held” and “big leaps forward” and the “need to change the mindset”. The sub-text of such pronouncements is that India has entrenched attitudes.

Such claims by Pakistan are without substance. With its parliamentary resolution in April this year, Pakistan has retreated to its old mantra that the Kashmir issue should be resolved on the basis of UN resolutions. Pakistan wants us to withdraw from Siachen, it will not agree to a rational compromise on Sir Creek and it will not end its decades old opposition to the Wullar Barrage. It covers up its uwillingness to act against the anti-India jihadi groups on its territory by the phony argument that it is itself a victim of terrorism. It will not put curbs on Hafiz Saeed as sufficient evidence to arraign him in a law court is supposedly lacking. Its record of legal inaction against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage is there to see.

The irony is that barring India’s demands on terrorism, the agenda of normalisation rests on India satisfying Pakistan’s demands. Pakistan wants us to demonstrate our commitment to peace by conceding what it wants, failing which the “naysayers” in Pakistan will presumably continue to consider India a threat. We should ask Pakistan to act on the basis of the glib statement by Foreign Minister Khar at Islamabad that “whatever has happened today is the past”. Pakistan should, accordingly, cease making untenable territorial claims on J&K and stop calling for- in the face of India’s known position- associating the “Kashmiri people” with the Indo-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir. One would hope that the next time she or the Pakistani Foreign Secretary comes to Delhi she will, abiding by her own sane advice, shed past habits of confabulating provocatively with Hurriyet leaders in Delhi.

The joint statement says, somewhat cryptically, that the two sides reaffirmed the importance of abiding by the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Pakistan would have wanted this inclusion, but India seems to have worked on the language to deflect any finger-pointing in its direction. Pakistan has created an impression amongst its public that India is depriving it of its due share of water, making the issue another focal point of hostility towards India. It is determined to prevent India from constructing run of the river projects on the Jhelum provided for by the IWT by seeking international arbitration on the Kishenganga project. Again, it is Pakistan that is objecting to what India is legally doing, not India raising contentious issues with Pakistan about its projects on the rivers allocated to it.

Terrorism

India is legitimately asking Pakistan to curb terrorism from its soil directed at India. It is right in asking Pakistan to prove the anti-terrorist credentials it claims for itself by not endlessly delaying the trial of those responsible for the Mumbai attack. It is truly astonishing that the pert Pakistani Foreign Minister should be “appalled” when told terrorism continues to be an issue, that this is “old time” stuff, that “terrorism was a mantra of the past”, not of the future and that India should view the Mumbai attack trial “realistically” and “not emotionally”. Equally extraordinarily, she spoke about terrorism as a dated issue on the day the US declared the Haqqani group sheltering in Pakistan and linked to the ISI as a terrorist outfit.

PM Visit

The disconnect at the political level in Pakistan between the reality of the country’s terrorist affiliation and any honest recognition of it is staggering. She, of course, failed to mention the word terrorism in her joint press conference with Minister Krishna, laying bare the scant regard Pakistan pays to our claim that we raise the issue at “every conceivable opportunity”.

Minister Khar’s position on terrorism hardly opens the door for PM’s visit to Pakistan, as he wants Pakistan to make credible progress on trying those guilty of Mumbai, besides some substantive results such as an agreement on Sir Creek. While the trade opening has occurred because of Pakistan’s dire economic situation and the visa regime relaxation benefits Pakistan much more, progress in both areas should be welcomed. Time is not, however, ripe for PM’s visit, as Pakistan wants to close the terrorism and Mumbai chapter without real delivery. Minister Khar’s egregious statements make this abundantly clear. Even with regard to PM’s visit, by pressing for it Pakistan has put us on the defensive. We are now squirming to explain why, despite his keenness to visit Pakistan; he cannot do so for the moment. We are both laying conditions for the visit and denying any are being laid.

Little Expected, Little Gained from Zardari Visit

Kanwal Sibal

It was a private visit, but it was unavoidably given an official colour as the Indian prime minister could not have ignored the Pakistani president's presence on Indian soil without creating a misunderstanding.

Observers would have conjectured that India considered the embattled Mr Zardari a spent force incapable of delivering on vital issues whatever his desire for improved relations with India.

The government would have been criticised for missing the opportunity to show India's backing for an elected civilian president at odds with the armed forces who, combined with the judiciary, wanted his ouster.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is, in any case, very keen to make a breakthrough with Pakistan and would have sought this unexpected opportunity to engage with Mr Zardari who was, therefore, invited to Delhi en route to Ajmer for a lunch and a private conversation.

Nothing much was expected from this meeting except a review of various issues and a general exchange of views on further steps needed to make progress.

This is so because India and Pakistan are already engaged in a structured bilateral dialogue covering the whole gamut of bilateral issues whose format and the agenda were agreed after tough negotiations.

One round of this dialogue has already been completed and the second has begun. During this period, the Indian prime minister has met Pakistan's leaders in India and in foreign capitals.

Unhappy History

What India expects from Pakistan is known to the latter; the answers Pakistan gives to India's demands are also known.

If progress in resolving outstanding issues is slow, it is because the issues are overlaid by unhappy history and deep mistrust.

Translating general expressions of friendship and goodwill into practical decisions is very difficult.

India wants satisfaction on the terrorism issue; Pakistan wants "justice" on the Kashmir issue and sees terrorism as a way to force India to yield ground.

This thinking has not been totally discarded even though Pakistan itself has become a prey to the very monster of terrorism it created.

The increasing radicalisation of Pakistan and the impunity with which Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, operates accounts for this.

Now Pakistan has raised the water issue in highly charged terms even though the only agreement that has worked between India and Pakistan is the Indus Waters Treaty.

In these circumstances, to have expected President Zardari's visit to have provided a breakthrough would have been unrealistic.

President Zardari at the Sufi shrine in Ajmer The visit did not live up to the media hype, says Kanwal Sibal

At about 40 minutes, the one-on-one meeting of the leaders was shorter than expected.

In this amount of time all outstanding bilateral as well as regional issues could not have been discussed in any detail.

Prime Minister Singh appears to have spoken, not for the first time to his Pakistani interlocutors, about the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice, prevent terror attacks against India from Pakistani soil and curb the activities of Hafiz Saeed.

Mr Zardari seems to have given a non-committal response.

Predictably, the president spoke of Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek - three areas where the two countries dispute control.

It was important for both leaders to assure their publics that "core" issues had been flagged. That both agreed to a step-by-step approach to resolve them only indicates the limited potential of this high-level conversation in Delhi to break new ground.

This step-by-step resolution of issues has lasted a few decades already and could well last a long time more now that there are question marks about Pakistan's future stability, the growing Islamisation of sections of its society and the uncertain consequences for itself and the region of its expected over-reach in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

Mr Singh expressed his appreciation of the steps taken by Pakistan on the trade front.

More could have been said about this positive development in bilateral ties in the statements by the two leaders and the later briefing on their talks by the Indian side.

Subdued Terms

Why this was not done is not clear. Perhaps Mr Zardari was reluctant because he does not want to be personally associated too much with this initiative which he undoubtedly favours, leaving its positive profiling to his government.

Somewhat surprisingly, the two leaders spoke after their meeting to the press in uncharacteristically subdued terms, with the Indian prime minister speaking laconically of finding practical and pragmatic solutions to the outstanding issues and the Pakistani president being even more bland.

Much has been made in the Indian media about the invitation to Mr Singh to visit Pakistan.

Pakistan is pressing for his visit as that would imply that it has delivered on the terror issue, including the trial of those responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack, and that relations between the two countries have been effectively normalised.

Mr Singh wants to go but he wants concrete results that would vindicate his policy of engaging Pakistan despite its recalcitrance on the issue of terrorism, an approach that has many critics in the country.

A premature visit by the prime minister could be highly counter-productive for him personally and for the country. Hence his caution.

In response to Mr Zardari's reiteration of an invitation to visit Pakistan "soon", Mr Singh has indicated his readiness to go on a "mutually convenient date", nuanced to an "appropriate time" in the briefing later by the Indian ministry of external affairs with the added caveat of "mutually acceptable dates" and "substantive preparations" beforehand.

All in all, the visit did not live up to the media hype, but it served its purpose of maintaining high-level engagement with Pakistan in the hope that incremental progress could be made in resolving the difficult issues that bedevil the bilateral relationship.

Author is Member Advisory Board in Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary