Showing posts with label jihadi groups. Show all posts
Showing posts with label jihadi groups. Show all posts

Friday, October 4, 2013

Indo-US Ties: Slow Yet Steady Transformation

Kanwal Sibal, 
Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

The most important foreign policy development in the last decade has been the remarkable improvement in India’s relations with the United States. From mutual suspicion, lack of empathy and a policy of keeping the relationship at a low level to avoid giving the US too many leverages over India, we have moved to a relationship of mutual confidence, genuine engagement and belief that the two sides can develop convergent strategic interests.

The rhetoric accompanying this rapprochement is a little overblown on the US side, with President Barack Obama describing the India-US relationship as a defining one for the 21st century. What this might mean other than a strengthened relationship and greater convergence in the coming years is unclear. The vision of India becoming such a major pole in global affairs that the India-US tandem will determine the configuration of international relations, the principles governing them, the management of global commons and the consolidation of political and human values acceptable universally seems a little grandiloquent.

India, on the other hand, uses more subdued vocabulary to describe the improving ties, emphasizing their transformed nature, which is a more realistic description of where they stand today. The Indian government, conscious that it is already being perceived as being too pro-US and aligning itself unduly with American interests, presumably feels the need to keep its rhetoric low-key so as not to invite criticism domestically and raise doubts externally about the independence of its foreign policy decision making.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that for India, its relationship with the US has become the most important one. The range of engagement with the US, reflected in several dialogues in diverse areas that the two countries are holding- whether it is in the field of energy, education, agriculture, health, development, science and technology, environment, trade, defence, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, high technology and the like- far exceeds that with any other country. The objective is to build Indian capacities in a number of sectors with US technology and know-how, a process that would help India to develop and grow even as the US gets greater access to the expanding Indian economy.

India and the US have had to overcome a difficult legacy. It can be argued that, over decades, the US has done much damage to India’s strategic interests by hamstringing our efforts to develop nuclear and missile technologies, imposing sanctions on us in these areas, denying us high and dual use technologies, overlooking Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear and missile technologies from China, politically subverting Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir by interventions on Pakistan’s behalf, arming Pakistan against us, and unleashing Islamic extremism in the region by its decision to use jihadi groups to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Progress has been made, even though unevenly, in overcoming this unfortunate legacy.

The change in mutual perceptions began with the NDA government, with the then Indian leadership speaking of India and the US as “natural allies” and taking the initiative to engage the US on divisive strategic issues, especially nuclear and high technlogy ones. The slow progress being made was put into really high gear by President Bush, leading to the 2005 India-US civilian nuclear deal and the NSG exception for India, for which the US undoubtedly did the “heavy-lifting”. Howsoever controversial the deal became in India because of some crucial concessions extracted from us and the misleading hype about its energy potential created by its supporters, the fact is that non-proliferation issues blighting our bilateral relationship with the US and pitted us against the majority of the international community for decades have been removed from the agenda, which constitutes a solid political and diplomatic gain.

Flowing from this, India has been able to sign civilian co-operation agreements with several other countries, including Canada, with progress in negotiations with Australia and hopeful prospects of an agreement with Japan. India has been able to secure raw uranium for its reactors, overcoming an immediate problem that the Indian nuclear sector faced. As a result of the Indo-US nuclear deal, sanctions on almost all Indian entities have been lifted and high technology export controls for India have been eased to a degree. The US has committed itself to promoting India’s membership of the four technology denial regimes, namely, the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Agreement and the Australia Group, which when it happens will integrate India into the global non-proliferation regimes as a non-NPT member. India’s task will be to prod the US to implement this commitment at the earliest and not use it as a bargaining point to extract more concessions from India in non-proliferation related areas.

The US position on India’s permanent membership of the UN has evolved positively and has contributed to the sentiment in India that the US is now ready to open the strategic space that India claims for itself. Actual membership will be a prolonged process and will not depend on US alone, thought the US position on expansion will remain crucial.

The US attaches importance to the bilateral dialogue on global commons- air, space, sea and cyber. It is emphasizing partnership with India in defining the rules. The intention is to ensure that as India rises and seeks a change in the international rules so far defined by the West, it does so in close coordination with the US so that any disruptive initiatives get forestalled.

In addition, the US seeks burden-sharing in upholding the international system from which it feels others benefit without assuming responsibility. The dialogue on global commons is intended to steer India towards burden-sharing. In the maritime domain, freedom of navigation and securing the sea lanes of communication are areas where the US would have particular interest in partnering India, given India’s dominating position in the Indian Ocean and the steady expansion of its navy. In the new area of cyberspace, cyber security has become a matter of urgent international attention and India’s emergence as a major IT power, along with the vast expansion of its telecommunications network, makes India a partner of choice to establish new rules of the game.

The dramatic change in India’s defence ties with the US in the last decade signifies a notable reduction of the trust deficit between the two countries, given the history of US sanctions against us and its practice of imposing arms embargoes in situations of tension and conflict. In the last five years or so, the US has bagged orders worth about $9 billion, whether for C-130 and C-17 heavy lift aircraft, advanced maritime reconnaissance aircraft, attack helicopters and VIP helicopters etc. The US lost out in the competition for the 126 combat aircraft contract, a set-back that it did not easily absorb, as it expects a greater share of Indian defence procurements as a testimony of India’s seriousness in treating it as a long term strategic partner. India has balked at signing the interoperability agreement (CISMOA), the logistics agreement (LSA) and the agreement to have access to high defence technology (BECA).

India remains reticent about tying up too much with the US in the defence domain lest we are perceived as having moved too much into the US defence orbit and compromising the independence of its policies. The US is, wisely, no longer insisting on signing them, leaving India to decide as opportune. What balances this reticence is the numerous joint military exercises with the US involving the three arms. The naval exercises in the Indian Ocean area have been particularly elaborate, involving even aircraft carriers, submarines etc on both sides, which sends an important strategic message because these waters are crucial for the trade and energy flows for China and other East Asian countries. US, India and Japan have also held their first trilateral naval exercise off the coast of Japan in 2012, though India is inexplicably reticent about such trilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean.

The US move to establish a strategic partnership with India, symbolised by the nuclear deal, has the rise of China as an underlying motivation, though this is not acknowledged officially. Chinese commentators interpret this relationship as a move against China, though they find India’s attachment to independent decision making as a re-assuring element. The US has described India as a lynchpin of its pivot or rebalancing towards Asia. While caution is exercised in not making it appear that this initiative is directed at China, the reality is that the rise of China and its growing muscle-flexing, as is evident in its conduct in the South China sea, requires the US to signal its intention to maintain and reinforce its presence in Asia to give confidence to its allies who may otherwise seek accommodation with China at the expense of the US. In this, the US clearly sees India as a vital partner given India’s several attributes that makes it a credible power to rival China in the years ahead. India, however, is wary of this re-balancing strategy as it doubts the capacity and inclination of the US to contain China beyond a certain point because of the huge economic and financial interdependence between the two countries. India would like to avoid becoming collateral damage in an unclear US strategy towards China.

On the issues of terrorism and religious extremism, while bilateral cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism has progressed, US policies have an element of ambivalence that undermines Indian interests. The principal US focus is on Al Qaida and its affiliates but not on the Taliban whom the US seems ready to accommodate so long as it commits itself to cutting off its links with Al Qaida and not permit terrorism from areas under its control directed at the West. For this reason, India and the US have difficulty in remaining on the same page on the Afghanistan issue, as well as on some aspects of US policies towards Pakistan, whether it is the reluctance to apply the kind of pressure that Pakistan merits in view of its profound terrorist affiliations to force it to break these links, or contain the ambitions of the Pakistani military in Afghanistan. US arms aid to Pakistan remains an issue, even though India downplays it so as not to vitiate the atmosphere of the dialogue with Pakistan.

On Afghanistan, in the course of the decade, the US has moved from a seriously distorted analysis of the situation that looked for a solution through a resolution of the Kashmr issue to a more realistic position which took into account Pakistan’s double-faced Afghan policy. Initially, the US opposed any significant Indian presence in Afghanistan because of Pakistani sensitivities but moved towards welcoming our economic assistance effort there and even seeking to do cooperative projects with India. The US has discouraged India from defence cooperation with Afghanistan other than providing training to Afghan security forces within limits, though the Afghan government is pressing India to even supply combat equipment.

India has been able to establish its presence on the ground in Afghanistan because of the security cover provided by the US. With the impending US withdrawal, India will face new challenges from the Taliban forces. The US decision to open a dialogue with the Taliban disregards India’s strong objection to any political accommodation with it without insisting on the red lines laid down by the international community on the subject. The US decision to leave Afghanistan in 2014 in conditions permitting an orderly withdrawal with the help of the Pakistani military creates a potential security problem for India.

The US awareness of Pakistan’s double-dealing on terrorism, highlighted by the shelter given to Osama bin Laden on its soil and refusal to act against the Haqqani network, has not resulted in any clear US policy of dealing with the country on the basis of its duplicitous conduct. The US continues its failed policy of offering carrots to Pakistan, which include even military aid, in the hope of buying its cooperation. The result is that Pakistan is able to manipulate the US to serve its purpose in crucial areas despite under currents of tensions between the two countries. At one stage it appeared that the US had de-hyphenated India and Pakistan, especially in nuclear matters, but the element of hyphenation has not altogether disappeared, as the US does defer to Pakistani sensitivities towards India to some extent. On the whole, though, it can be said that India-US relations have in the last decade acquired a different trajectory than US-Pakistan relations.

The Iranian issue has created wrinkles in our bilateral relationship as US sanctions have interfered with India’s energy security, forcing India to reduce its oil intake from Iran quite drastically and impeding any Indian investment in attractive long-term projects in the oil and gas sector in Iran. The US linking of the nuclear deal with our policy towards Iran and India’s vote against Iran in the IAEA to satisfy US expectations have been factors in creating the perception that the US relationship carries costs in terms of independence of decision-making. The talk of strategic autonomy, which is a code word for not aligning ourselves with US/Western positions on international issues, unsurprisingly, finds disfavour in US circles, though for the first time an American leader, to wit US Vice-President Biden, during his recent visit to India declared that he saw no contradiction between strategic autonomy precious to India and our strategic partnership with the US.

The last decade has also seen a significant expansion of India-US economic ties, with trade in goods standing at $62 billion and the total exchanges, including investment, amounting to over $100 billion, making the US the largest economic partner of India. The India-US bilateral economic agenda is, as noted earlier, exceptionally wide-ranging. Progress has been slow in most areas, partly because the Indian reforms process has slowed down, the ceilings on FDI in sectors of the economy of interest to the US have not been raised and enabling legislation in areas like education has not been passed as yet. These are areas, however, where reforms will undoubtedly occur in time, with some movement to raise the ceilings in the financial sector.

The prospects of nuclear cooperation with the US have dimmed because of our Nuclear Liability Act, much to the disappointment of the US side which had counted on large opportunities for its companies in this sector. The US side is pressing for signing an “early works agreement” between Westinghouse and NPCIL to register some progress in the fulfilment of India’s commitment to the US to order 10,000 MWs of nuclear power from US reactors at two sites.

Other issues have contributed to a distinct lowering of enthusiam for the India relationship in the US, such as perceived Indian protectionism exemplified by our Preferential Market Access decision to force foreign companies to set up manufacturing facilities in the telecom sector in India, the Supreme Court judgment on the patents issue which has exacerbated concerns about IPRs and the retroactive application of our tax legislation as in the Vodafone case. The US corporate mood towards India has soured of late, and this needs to be reversed. The US is pushing for a Bilateral Investment Treaty. On climate change and WTO related issues, India and the US have unbridged differences.The general view is that the relationship is now suffering from the fatigue factor. The slowdown in India’s growth and other structural problems that have appeared in the Indian economy have taken the shine off the India story for the time being, but the medium and longer term prospects remain very positive for the India-US relationship.

On the Indian side, we have problems with the new Comprehensive Immigration Bill that will put more restrictions on movement of personnel from India to the US in the IT sector, the increased cost of H1B and L1 visas that will impose sizable costs on the Indian IT sector and the whole campaign against outsourcing led by the White House. India has its own concerns about US protectionism and market access for some of its products, which do not receive a sympathetic response.


All in all, however, ties with the US are decidedly better than they were a decade ago. Even if the relationship has “plateau-ed” as some say, the plateau is at a high elevation today.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Failing on Terror Yet Again


Kanwal Sibal 
(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

Hyderabad is bloodied again by terrorism, exposing once more our failure to marshal the political will, the legal instruments, the organizational structure and the required technical skills and manpower resources to combat this grave threat to the nation.
Admittedly, combating terrorism is extraordinarily difficult because a few individuals armed with rage, rudimentary bomb making techniques and the most ordinary means of “delivery” like tiffin boxes and bicycles can cause mayhem in crowded localities in our overpopulated and disorganized cities when they choose.
More importantly, terrorism has a vast international dimension outside not only India’s control but also of countries more powerful, resourceful and determined to fight terrorism than us. At its centre is the sense of grievance nourished in Islamic circles against the enemies of Islam and the moral legitimacy accorded by religious texts as interpreted by them to the act of killing innocent people haphazardly as redressal.

Contrast

While it would be unrealistic to expect the government to provide total protection to the public against any possible terrorist attack, the people can legitimately expect credible and comprehensive steps to secure their lives against such deadly violence, without being necessarily able to emulate the US success in this regard. The US is oceans away from the epicenter of terror; its neighbours cooperate fully to shield North America from terrorism; by drawing its frontline against terrorism thousands of miles away from its shores the US has given itself vast protective geographical depth.

India has no such cushions. Our neighbour has used terrorism as a weapon against us for almost 30 years now. Having long judged our weak response, Pakistan can fine tune the timing, periodicity and degree of its provocations to suit its political needs. It knows that deniability is important to create space for doubt about its culpability so that an immediate Indian riposte is deflected and the risk of being declared a terrorist state is avoided. For that it has raised jihadi groups to attack India, whose violence is then politically justified as being driven by the unresolved Kashmir question. As international scrutiny of its terrorist links grows, Pakistan has also outsourced terrorism to extremist groups in India by mobilizing them through pan-Islamist ideologies on the back of local grievances.

Pakistan also has a class of politicians, diplomats and members of civil society that come across as educated, modern, articulate and rational and they counter with finesse accusations that it is promoting terrorism. The rise of domestic terrorism, although an offshoot of the complicity of state organizations with jihadi groups, gives them an added argument to deny Pakistan’s terrorist affiliations.

Additionally, the rampant belief in conspiracy theories in Pakistan about the West, Israel and India conniving at slandering Islam creates a sense of victimhood, precluding self-introspection about its own failings as a society. In this narrative, Islam is the embodiment of peace and justice and terrorism is alien to it. If Islamic groups commit acts of terrorism, it is because of manipulation by hidden hands. The other defence is that either those guilty are not true Muslims, or that the entire community should not be tarnished because of the misdeeds of a few with no proper understanding of Islamic tenets. This explains the widespread belief that the 9/11 attacks against America was a Jewish conspiracy. The remarks in Delhi by Pakistan’s interior minister alleging an external hand behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks is part of this syndrome.

Pakistan

Iran and North Korea are castigated for terrorism, as was Libya earlier, even if what is attributed to them has no parallel in scale and scope to Pakistan’s involvement with such activity. Pakistan is spared the same ignominy because its relationship with the West is not one of unalloyed hostility. Its attitude to western demands, even on terrorism, is both compliant and defiant. In any case, a non-Nato US ally, receiving substantial American arms and economic assistance and geopolitically vital for extricating the US from Afghanistan, can hardly be declared a terrorist state. This western ambivalence towards Pakistan severely limits the extent to which India can bilaterally and multilaterally make Pakistan more accountable for its terrorist misdeeds. A nuclearized Pakistan makes the problem even more complex to handle.
India’s democratic system, its openness, its internal watchdogs such as the independent judiciary and the press, the accountability of the instruments of force in the hands of the executive in a constitutional system, do not allow India to use the instrument of terrorism against Pakistan as a deterrent.

Mistakes

While all these difficulties and handicaps are understandable, what is not is the absence of a coherent national strategy to combat terrorism despite repeated assaults. We have made matters worse for ourselves by diluting the centrality of terrorism in our dialogue with Pakistan; we have accorded Pakistan the status of a terrorism stricken state just like us; we have lowered the heat on Pakistan by conceding the amplitude of our problem of home grown terrorism; we have weakened our position by equating a few isolated terrorist attacks by Hindus with scores of such attacks over two decades by jihadi groups; further harm has been done by the Home Minister accusing the main opposition party of training Hindu terrorists; we have politicized the terrorism issue for electoral reasons so much that any corrective action will be interpreted with political bias; the disproportionate sympathy in sections of our intelligentsia for Afzal Guru shows the soft belly of any potential resolve to combat terrorism without quarter.

No wonder that all we can do when a terrorist attack occurs is to call it “dastardly” and vow that the “perpetrators” will not go unpunished, and repeat the same clichés when innocent Indian citizens are bloodied again by jihadi groups. 

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Granting PAK The Upper Hand


Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF 

Another round of the India-Pakistan dialogue has been completed with External Affairs Minister Krishna’s visit to Islamabad on September 8. The agreement on relaxing the visa regime and holding the meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Commission after a gap of 5 years seems consistent with our policy of making progress step-by-step in normalising our relations with Pakistan.

Dialogue

Pressing Pakistan again at Islamabad to expeditiously bring to justice those responsible for the Mumbai massacre apparently conveys that we are not relenting on this key demand for determining the pace at which our relations will move forward.

In reality, rather than this implying that India has the upper hand in dealing with Pakistan, it is actually the reverse. Pakistan has put us on the defensive, certainly vis a vis its own public opinion, by claiming that it has taken several steps to reach out to India, that it has moved away from its traditional positions in significant ways, but that it is India that is not reciprocating. This explains Pakistani Foreign Minister’s spurious talk about “serious signals”, “breaking away from many positions we have held” and “big leaps forward” and the “need to change the mindset”. The sub-text of such pronouncements is that India has entrenched attitudes.

Such claims by Pakistan are without substance. With its parliamentary resolution in April this year, Pakistan has retreated to its old mantra that the Kashmir issue should be resolved on the basis of UN resolutions. Pakistan wants us to withdraw from Siachen, it will not agree to a rational compromise on Sir Creek and it will not end its decades old opposition to the Wullar Barrage. It covers up its uwillingness to act against the anti-India jihadi groups on its territory by the phony argument that it is itself a victim of terrorism. It will not put curbs on Hafiz Saeed as sufficient evidence to arraign him in a law court is supposedly lacking. Its record of legal inaction against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage is there to see.

The irony is that barring India’s demands on terrorism, the agenda of normalisation rests on India satisfying Pakistan’s demands. Pakistan wants us to demonstrate our commitment to peace by conceding what it wants, failing which the “naysayers” in Pakistan will presumably continue to consider India a threat. We should ask Pakistan to act on the basis of the glib statement by Foreign Minister Khar at Islamabad that “whatever has happened today is the past”. Pakistan should, accordingly, cease making untenable territorial claims on J&K and stop calling for- in the face of India’s known position- associating the “Kashmiri people” with the Indo-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir. One would hope that the next time she or the Pakistani Foreign Secretary comes to Delhi she will, abiding by her own sane advice, shed past habits of confabulating provocatively with Hurriyet leaders in Delhi.

The joint statement says, somewhat cryptically, that the two sides reaffirmed the importance of abiding by the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Pakistan would have wanted this inclusion, but India seems to have worked on the language to deflect any finger-pointing in its direction. Pakistan has created an impression amongst its public that India is depriving it of its due share of water, making the issue another focal point of hostility towards India. It is determined to prevent India from constructing run of the river projects on the Jhelum provided for by the IWT by seeking international arbitration on the Kishenganga project. Again, it is Pakistan that is objecting to what India is legally doing, not India raising contentious issues with Pakistan about its projects on the rivers allocated to it.

Terrorism

India is legitimately asking Pakistan to curb terrorism from its soil directed at India. It is right in asking Pakistan to prove the anti-terrorist credentials it claims for itself by not endlessly delaying the trial of those responsible for the Mumbai attack. It is truly astonishing that the pert Pakistani Foreign Minister should be “appalled” when told terrorism continues to be an issue, that this is “old time” stuff, that “terrorism was a mantra of the past”, not of the future and that India should view the Mumbai attack trial “realistically” and “not emotionally”. Equally extraordinarily, she spoke about terrorism as a dated issue on the day the US declared the Haqqani group sheltering in Pakistan and linked to the ISI as a terrorist outfit.

PM Visit

The disconnect at the political level in Pakistan between the reality of the country’s terrorist affiliation and any honest recognition of it is staggering. She, of course, failed to mention the word terrorism in her joint press conference with Minister Krishna, laying bare the scant regard Pakistan pays to our claim that we raise the issue at “every conceivable opportunity”.

Minister Khar’s position on terrorism hardly opens the door for PM’s visit to Pakistan, as he wants Pakistan to make credible progress on trying those guilty of Mumbai, besides some substantive results such as an agreement on Sir Creek. While the trade opening has occurred because of Pakistan’s dire economic situation and the visa regime relaxation benefits Pakistan much more, progress in both areas should be welcomed. Time is not, however, ripe for PM’s visit, as Pakistan wants to close the terrorism and Mumbai chapter without real delivery. Minister Khar’s egregious statements make this abundantly clear. Even with regard to PM’s visit, by pressing for it Pakistan has put us on the defensive. We are now squirming to explain why, despite his keenness to visit Pakistan; he cannot do so for the moment. We are both laying conditions for the visit and denying any are being laid.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Yet Another Round of Platitudes


Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF


For those cynical about the dialogue process with Pakistan, the lack of substance in the joint statement issued after the latest round of Foreign Secretary level talks (July 4-5) confirms our neighbour’s unwillingness to fundamentally revise its thinking on core bilateral differences.

For those who remain hopeful about normalising relations with Pakistan despite decades of bitter experience, the platitudinous joint statement offers no peg on which to hang their optimism.
The talks were held in the same “frank and constructive atmosphere” prevailing in all past encounters, without, however, yielding much result. While we are committed to a “dialogue process”, the Pakistanis insist it should be “purposeful and result-oriented”- which, decoded, means India should make concessions. We accommodate Pakistan’s preferred but, in effect, harmless phraseology.

The issue of Peace and Security, including CBMs, has been discussed in the same “comprehensive manner” as before, but without comprehensive outcomes. Both sides have “emphasized the need to promote greater trust and mutual understanding through constructive dialogue”, repeating piously the hope expressed many times earlier. This trust and understanding refuses to materialize despite repeated “constructive” dialogues.

The issue of Nuclear and Conventional CBMs is complicated because India attaches importance to nuclear CBMs while Pakistan favours conventional CBMs. Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery capability with single-minded determination, even in a situation of mounting internal instability and financial stringency. It seeks to introduce tactical nuclear weapons as a counter to India’s “Cold Start” doctrine which it has studiously hyped.

Whether it talks of a conventional balance of forces or a strategic balance after both countries became nuclear, Pakistan omits from the equation India’s need to factor in the superior Chinese nuclear and conventional capability it must contend with. Pakistan, as China’s closest strategic partner, naturally refuses to take cognizance of this compulsion in India’s defence preparedness.

India’s interest in Nuclear CBMs is to make Pakistan accept a no-first-use agreement in order to raise Pakistan’s low threshold of nuclear weapon use. Pakistan, which has employed state terrorism against India under cover of its nuclear capability, is hardly likely to agree to a no-first use agreement until it decides to genuinely bury the hatchet with India. In that case India’s larger conventional strength, commensurate with its geographical size, large coast line and China’s menace, would pose no threat to it.

The source of conflict between India and Pakistan, it needs remembering, is its territorial claims on India and the use of jihadi terrorism to back them, and not any terror-backed Indian claims, territorial, water-related or religious on Pakistan.

On the issue of terrorism we have eschewed, to our credit, the absurd formulation conceded earlier that both countries are victims of terrorism, elevating Pakistan thus from a perpetrator of terrorism against us to a partner in arms against it.

Some equivalence has been conceded though in the formulation that both countries “affirmed the strong commitment...to fight and eliminate terrorism in an effective and comprehensive manner so as eliminate the scourge in all its forms and manifestations”, but having lost ground massively earlier it is not possible now to retrieve it diplomatically. Pakistan’s prevarications on the Mumbai terror attack, its give-me-more-and-more-evidence-which-I-will-ignore approach, its unwillingness to act against Hafiz Saeed and suppress the jihadi groups, and dismissal of Abu Jundal’s testimony as an “insinuation” hardly supports the above affirmation.

The formulation on Jammu and Kashmir is neutrally worded, with both sides prepared to “continue discussions in a purposeful and forward looking manner with the view to finding a peaceful solution by narrowing divergences and building convergences”. Given Pakistan’s claims about the centrality of the Kashmir issue and its reversion to its traditional position of resolving it on the basis of relevant UN resolutions, as confirmed in its parliamentary resolution earlier this year, this exercise of “narrowing differences and building convergences” is more an effort at verbal crafting than any serious political commitment.

Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani Prime Minster has, after the talks, promptly re-affirmed Pakistan’s full support for the Kashmiri cause till the UN resolutions are implemented.

The emphasis on cross LOC CBMs reflects our desire to win over public sentiment in the valley and Pakistan’s hope that these will eventually erode India’s sovereignty and give it a say in J&K affairs.
Pakistan, had in any case, made up for the tempered J&K formulation in the joint statement by its Foreign Secretary repeating the affront his Foreign Minister administered to us when he, like her, met the separatist Kashmiri leaders even before he held official discussions. Our displeasure conveyed to her then, which she dismissed with hauteur, has gone unheeded.

It is unacceptable that even Pakistani bureaucrats should be meeting Indian separatists in India’s capital, but we cannot now easily extricate ourselves from the web of our past mistakes. A right riposte would be to openly meet dissidents from J&K’s Northern Areas either in India or in third countries as Pakistan will not allow us to meet them in Islamabad.

The intention to promote more people to people, media and sports contacts, parliamentary exchanges etc is to be welcomed, even if the delay in signing the finalized revised bilateral Visa Agreement which would facilitate this remains unexplained.

The joint statement reflects the stalemate in ties- neither conspicuously improving nor notably deteriorating. Its ritual phraseology gives the text length but not any depth. Just as well, as we clutch at straws of peace with Pakistan as if we are drowning and end in making one-sided concessions to make the dialogue look meaningful. We should wait for drowning Pakistan to clutch at opportunities of peace with India.