Failing on Terror Yet Again

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

Hyderabad is bloodied again by terrorism, exposing once more our failure to marshal the political will, the legal instruments, the organizational structure and the required technical skills and manpower resources to combat this grave threat to the nation.

Admittedly, combating terrorism is extraordinarily difficult because a few individuals armed with rage, rudimentary bomb making techniques and the most ordinary means of “delivery” like tiffin boxes and bicycles can cause mayhem in crowded localities in our overpopulated and disorganized cities when they choose.

More importantly, terrorism has a vast international dimension outside not only India’s control but also of countries more powerful, resourceful and determined to fight terrorism than us. At its centre is the sense of grievance nourished in Islamic circles against the enemies of Islam and the moral legitimacy accorded by religious texts as interpreted by them to the act of killing innocent people haphazardly as redressal.

Contrast

While it would be unrealistic to expect the government to provide total protection to the public against any possible terrorist attack, the people can legitimately expect credible and comprehensive steps to secure their lives against such deadly violence, without being necessarily able to emulate the US success in this regard. The US is oceans away from the epicenter of terror; its neighbours cooperate fully to shield North America from terrorism; by drawing its frontline against terrorism thousands of miles away from its shores the US has given itself vast protective geographical depth.

India has no such cushions. Our neighbour has used terrorism as a weapon against us for almost 30 years now. Having long judged our weak response, Pakistan can fine tune the timing, periodicity and degree of its provocations to suit its political needs. It knows that deniability is important to create space for doubt about its culpability so that an immediate Indian riposte is deflected and the risk of being declared a terrorist state is avoided. For that it has raised jihadi groups to attack India, whose violence is then politically justified as being driven by the unresolved Kashmir question. As international scrutiny of its terrorist links grows, Pakistan has also outsourced terrorism to extremist groups in India by mobilizing them through pan-Islamist ideologies on the back of local grievances.

Pakistan also has a class of politicians, diplomats and members of civil society that come across as educated, modern, articulate and rational and they counter with finesse accusations that it is promoting terrorism. The rise of domestic terrorism, although an offshoot of the complicity of state organizations with jihadi groups, gives them an added argument to deny Pakistan’s terrorist affiliations.

Additionally, the rampant belief in conspiracy theories in Pakistan about the West, Israel and India conniving at slandering Islam creates a sense of victimhood, precluding self-introspection about its own failings as a society. In this narrative, Islam is the embodiment of peace and justice and terrorism is alien to it. If Islamic groups commit acts of terrorism, it is because of manipulation by hidden hands. The other defence is that either those guilty are not true Muslims, or that the entire community should not be tarnished because of the misdeeds of a few with no proper understanding of Islamic tenets. This explains the widespread belief that the 9/11 attacks against America was a Jewish conspiracy. The remarks in Delhi by Pakistan’s interior minister alleging an external hand behind the 2008 Mumbai attacks is part of this syndrome.

Pakistan

Iran and North Korea are castigated for terrorism, as was Libya earlier, even if what is attributed to them has no parallel in scale and scope to Pakistan’s involvement with such activity. Pakistan is spared the same ignominy because its relationship with the West is not one of unalloyed hostility. Its attitude to western demands, even on terrorism, is both compliant and defiant. In any case, a non-Nato US ally, receiving substantial American arms and economic assistance and geopolitically vital for extricating the US from Afghanistan, can hardly be declared a terrorist state. This western ambivalence towards Pakistan severely limits the extent to which India can bilaterally and multilaterally make Pakistan more accountable for its terrorist misdeeds. A nuclearized Pakistan makes the problem even more complex to handle.

India’s democratic system, its openness, its internal watchdogs such as the independent judiciary and the press, the accountability of the instruments of force in the hands of the executive in a constitutional system, do not allow India to use the instrument of terrorism against Pakistan as a deterrent.

Mistakes

While all these difficulties and handicaps are understandable, what is not is the absence of a coherent national strategy to combat terrorism despite repeated assaults. We have made matters worse for ourselves by diluting the centrality of terrorism in our dialogue with Pakistan; we have accorded Pakistan the status of a terrorism stricken state just like us; we have lowered the heat on Pakistan by conceding the amplitude of our problem of home grown terrorism; we have weakened our position by equating a few isolated terrorist attacks by Hindus with scores of such attacks over two decades by jihadi groups; further harm has been done by the Home Minister accusing the main opposition party of training Hindu terrorists; we have politicized the terrorism issue for electoral reasons so much that any corrective action will be interpreted with political bias; the disproportionate sympathy in sections of our intelligentsia for Afzal Guru shows the soft belly of any potential resolve to combat terrorism without quarter.

No wonder that all we can do when a terrorist attack occurs is to call it “dastardly” and vow that the “perpetrators” will not go unpunished, and repeat the same clichés when innocent Indian citizens are bloodied again by jihadi groups. 

How We Lost the Peace

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

 

The ceasefire violations occurring on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir are not abnormal. Such incidents occur when two armies with a history of fighting each other face each other in contested territory. It is the act of the Pakistani army in mutilating the bodies of Indian soldiers killed by them that is abnormal. So is the response of the Pakistani government to this deplorable incident.

Pakistan, true to form, has denied the mutilation charge. Its foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, is “appalled” at India’s outlandish claim, as their internal investigation shows that no one from Pakistan crossed the LOC and killed Indian soldiers. She made the worthless proposal for joint investigation, having already announced the result of Pakistan’s own enquiry. She then deliberately tweaked us by proposing an investigation by UNMOGIP whose role India does not recognise since 1971.

The Pakistanis claim that the highly “professional” army would do no such thing as mutilation. But then, is it normal for a professional army to have “jihad” in its motto, along with “faith” and “piety”. Is it a professional army or a religious army of the faithful whose profession is to fight for Islam?

Once again, in the face of Pakistan’s provocation India is at a loss to react effectively. We wonder what Pakistan gains by such an act when the overall relationship is improving, forgetting that this has happened before, with Kargil, various acts of terror against our cities, pilgrimage centres, and economic institutions, and finally, the Mumbai attacks taking place even while the dialogue process was on. For those behind such provocations the “gain” is political and psychological- of mobilizing anti-Indian elements behind the army, boosting the morale of the Pakistani armed forces by demonstrating that Pakistan can take on India, and expose the latter’s inability to exercise any military option.

Pakistan looks strong as a result. The intention may also be to prevent the thinking of the rank and file from being overly influenced by the positive momentum of the peace process. It may also be to show contempt for the fuss made in India lately over the mutilation of the body of Lt. Kalia during the Kargil war and show that such acts can be repeated with impunity. The Pakis-tani side knows that taking the case to the ICJ is not an option as Pakistan has to agree to the reference.

India has stated many times at the highest levels that it has no option but to continue the dialogue with Pakistan, acknowledging publicly our helplessness. We have shown to Pakistan in recent years that we can absorb serious provocations without retaliating. We did not break diplomatic ties even after the Mumbai attacks; doing so now would seem an over-reaction. It is extremely difficult for the government to reverse course as that would be an avowal of a dramatic failure of its Pakistan policy.

In the face of the defiant Pakistani attitude in the present case, we could take some steps that will not be seen as an over-reaction, but will help to retrieve some ground that we have lost in our over-eagerness to engage Pakistan, as if we need to placate them.

We should cease saying that we have no option but to negotiate with Pakistan; we should change our discourse that both countries are victims of terrorism, as we are not responsible for terrorism in Pakistan. We must forbid visits by Hurriyat leaders to Pakistan and insist that Pakistani leaders will not meet Hurriyat leaders in Delhi. We should postpone for the present any exchange of visits and delay the convening of the next round of the composite dialogue. We should not encourage sporting exchanges.

We could review some of our decisions, depending on developments. Cross LOC trade and movement is incompatible with our interests as we are unnecessarily encouraging the Kashmiris on our side to feel connected and have a sense of solidarity with Pakistani Kashmiris, which is a dynamic that Pakistan can control better than us.

On Kashmir our position should be that there is nothing to discuss except Pakistan’s interference in J&K, and this should be said in private and in public. We should remove Siachen from the dialogue agenda as having it there implies that Pakistan has some locus standi in the matter. The Hurriyat leaders, after their visit to Pakistan, are warning of the fall-out of the Afghan problem in J&K after 2014. We could be less squeamish about Baluchistan and consider permitting invitations to go to separatist Baluch leaders by Indian think-tanks.

As a smaller, more vulnerable country, wracked by extremism and violence, in economic distress, over-stretched by its ambitions, militaristic in thinking, adept at cynically exploiting its geopolitical position, capable of extreme obduracy, animated by fear and defiance of India and attitudes distorted by its Islamic vocation that makes it resort to terrorism as an instrument of state policy, Pakistan is not like us.

Unless we are willing to understand that, we will continue to make mistakes in our Pakistan policy. It is not our responsibility to save Pakistan from itself.

India Thinks Chimera is for Real

Satish Chandra

Distinguished Fellow,VIF

Despite repeated rebuffs by Pakistan, New Delhi continues to entertain the belief that the troublesome neighbour will soften up with sweet diplomacy. What else explains the need for India’s Foreign Secretary to mouth the untruth that Pakistan wants to be constructive?

While having little to show by way of a concrete and tangible outcome, the recently held India-Pakistan Foreign Secretary level talks are nonetheless significant in terms of providing indicators of the likely timbre and trend of the relationship between the two countries in the months ahead.

A critical analysis of the media interaction of the Foreign Secretaries and the joint statement issued after their talks would lead to the following conclusions.

Discussions on Jammu & Kashmir were held as required but they did not yield any result other than an agreement to continue the talks. It would appear that even the four-point ‘Musharraf proposal’, which was being explored through the back channel, no longer enjoys much traction.

Pakistan has refused to acknowledge that it was in any way involved in the Mumbai attacks despite the additional corroborative evidence made available to it by way of Abu Jundal’s revelations. It also did not provide any credible assurance that it would bring the perpetrators of those attacks to justice expeditiously. The best that it could come up with was that it was prepared to engage in a joint investigation, which naturally India did not take up. Indeed, on his way back home the Pakistani Foreign Secretary made out to the Indian media that no evidence on Abu Jundal had been shared with him by his Indian counterpart.

However, the Secretaries agreed on certain issues, such as the convening of meetings of the expert-level working group on nuclear and conventional confidence building measures and the convening of another meeting on July 19 at Islamabad to maintain peace along the Line of Control so as to streamline and strengthen travel and trade arrangements. They also decided that the two sides should work for the early signing of the already finalised bilateral visa agreement as well as enhance media and cricketing exchanges. Finally, both leaders agreed that the India’s Minister for External Affairs will visit Pakistan in September 2012.

Despite the slim pickings from the aforesaid talks and the heat generated by the Jundal disclosures, both Secretaries went out of their way to paint an unrealistically rosy picture of the discussions. On his part, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary stated that the exchanges had been “substantive”, were held in a “cordial atmosphere” and over the years the level of cooperation on terrorism between India and Pakistan had “improved”. While it is understandable that Pakistan should wish to give a positive spin to its relations with India, given that it is in the dog house, it was strange to see our own Foreign Secretary doing likewise, albeit on a slightly lower key. Was there any reason for him to state, “There is a determination on both sides to take forward our dialogue with an open mind and a constructive spirit”, when this is manifestly not the case?

The convening of the Foreign Secretary level talks amidst such bon- homie despite the lack of any meaningful forward movement, and the scheduling of the Indian External Minister’s visit to Pakistan in September 2012, in the immediate backdrop of Abu Jundal’s corroborative disclosures regarding the ISI’s involvement in the Mumbai attacks, is a clear indicator that India will continue to engage Pakistan, whether or not the latter brings to book the perpetrators of those attacks. Indeed, it would be fair to extrapolate that even if there were to be another major terrorist incident in India, aided and abetted by Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that the Government would go beyond verbal protestations.

India’s pusillanimous approach vis a vis Pakistan is based on two factors. First, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh lacks the will to take stern measures against Pakistan and to penalise it for its involvement in terrorist actions against India. He appears to be convinced of the logic of what he signed on to in July 2009 at Sharm el-Sheikh with his Pakistani counterpart, that dialogue is the only way forward and that action on terrorism should not be linked with the peace process. Both processes must proceed independently.

Though in the wake of the upsurge of popular criticism following the enunciation of this approach at Sharm el-Sheikh, Mr Singh put on hold the resumption of the composite dialogue and made it contingent on forward movement in addressing India’s concerns on terror, this was only a temporary adjustment. Throughout 2010, steps were taken which gradually led to the resumption of the composite dialogue process the following year even though Pakistan did absolutely nothing to address India’s concerns on terrorism.

As a result, today India is in the strange position of being engaged in broad-based discussions with Pakistan on all bilateral issues at a time when Islamabad not only refuses to bring to book the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, but is actively involved in terrorist activities directed against India, which can at any time result in another 26/11.

Second, Mr Singh is keen to visit Pakistan, and for that an aura of normalcy in the relationship is critical. This is being sought to be achieved by creating a false sense of positivity in bilateral interactions and by refraining from taking any punitive steps against Pakistan.

The danger of such a weak approach is that it will only encourage Pakistan to continue its use of terrorism as a policy against India. The only way in which New Delhi can get Pakistan to seriously consider addressing India’s concerns on terrorism is by penalising it. Regrettably, India has never done so and is, therefore, in a sense responsible for Pakistan’s persistent delinquency in this regard.

The dangers posed by the Prime Minister’s desire to visit Pakistan arise from the requirement that such an exercise must be a ‘success’ or put in another way, marked by a number of agreements. But conclusion of the latter would come at the cost of major concessions by India. Pakistan, particularly in its dealings with India, is not known for it’s proclivity to go the extra mile in making settlements.

Accordingly, in the event of Mr Singh’s visit to Pakistan, as speculated, towards the end of this year, one should be prepared not merely for much bonhomie but also for sell-outs on issues like Sir Creek and Siachen, appropriately sweetened by economic goodies.

India-Pakistan Relations: A Misplaced Euphoria

Satish Chandra

Distinguished Fellow,VIF

It is ironical that at a time when Pakistan’s standing in the international community is down in the dumps its relationship with India is on the mend. While the rationale for the former is clear there is no such simple explanation for the latter.

The downward spiral in Pakistan’s standing in the international community is due to numerous factors notably its having been exposed as a source of terrorism, its role as a spoiler in finding a satisfactory resolution to the Afghan problem, its unsavoury record as a proliferator, and finally its emergence as a nation whose democratic credentials are suspect and where the observance of the rule of law is more the exception than the norm.

In contrast, there is no such linear logic to explain the upward trend in Pakistan’s relations with India as would seem to be case from the near euphoric statements being made in this regard from many sections, official and non official, in the latter. Have the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks been brought to book by Pakistan? No. Instead terrorists like Hafiz Saeed are allowed to function freely and openly spew venom against India. Has Pakistan wound down the infrastructure of terror created by it for use against India? No. Indeed, after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 there have been at least three other major Pakistani inspired terrorist attacks against India. Has Pakistan handed over to India any of the 50 or so terrorists elements like Dawood Ibrahim whose extradition had been requested by the latter? No. Has Pakistan stopped trying to push infiltrators into Kashmir? No. Has Pakistan shown any indication of genuinely seeking reconciliation with India by giving up its opposition to India’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, by curbing the pumping in of fake currency into India or by desisting from pursuing an India centric nuclear policy? No. On the contrary it has encouraged the formation of the Defence of Pakistan Council led by extremists like Hafiz Saeed who revel in making aggressive anti Indian statements.

In the light of the foregoing it would be obvious to all objective analysts that there is no basic change of heart in Pakistan about India and that a new dawn in the relationship between the two countries is not on the cards in the foreseeable future. Indeed, given Pakistan’s continued involvement in terrorism directed against India another major terrorist incident in India is just waiting to happen.

Notwithstanding the foregoing many in India still insist on projecting a new found positivity in Pakistan’s attitude towards India on the basis of the very fact of Zardari’s April 8th visit to India, his call for “better relations”, Kayani’s subsequent assertion about the need for peaceful coexistence between the two countries and resolution of all issues, and Pakistan’s move towards according India MFN treatment. In this context, one may caution that it would be imprudent to be swayed by sweet nothings which is the sum and substance of Zardari’s India visit and the assertions made by Kayani and him. They by no means represent any tangible positivity on Pakistan’s stance vis a vis India and have merely been induced by the desire to ensure a peaceful eastern front at a time when Pakistan is under considerable pressure from the USA and has a troubled western front. It is, ofcourse, true that on trade Pakistan has made some forward movement by progressing from a positive list to a negative list though one should note that it is yet to accord MFN status to India. It must also be clearly understood that the halting moves taken by Pakistan in this regard are in part in response to our accord of MFN treatment to Pakistan way back in the 1990’s, and in part in response to our not having opposed the EU move to provide Pakistani textiles duty free access to the Eurozone even though this adversely affected our own textile exports. Finally, it should be kept in mind that by deciding to give India MFN treatment Pakistan is only doing itself a favour as its failure to do so all these years has denied it access to cheaper Indian goods---- something which is particularly painful at a time when its economy is in dire straits.

Clearly, projections of a change of heart in Pakistan vis a vis India are untenable. They are also unfortunate as they have created a totally misplaced euphoria about the possible upward trajectory of India-Pakistan relations and induced all manner of ill considered calls for further concessions by India to woo Pakistan even in disregard of all security implications. Such calls are gathering traction as our Prime Minister is all set to visit Pakistan within the next few months and a “successful” visit would demand the conclusion of some agreements.

Some of the agreements being touted are an easing of the visa regime, removal of existing restrictions on Pakistani investments in India, and settlement of the Sir Creek and Siachen issues. It is submitted that no such agreements should even be contemplated until and unless there is clear evidence that Pakistan is prepared to bring to book the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, shut down its India centric terrorist infrastructure and give up its inimical attitude towards India. Conclusion of such agreements in the absence of such evidence would not only amount to dishonouring the memories of the countless Indians who have been the victims of Pakistani inspired terror but would also embolden Pakistan to continue to involve itself in terrorist actions directed against India confident that the latter will never penalize it. Furthermore, it needs to borne in mind that even relatively innocuous measures like an easing of visa restrictions or removal of constraints on Pakistani investments in India will exponentially enhance Pakistan’s capabilities to destabilize India and should not, therefore, be considered as long as the former does not give up its inimical approach towards India. In this context, one need only refer to recent reports to the effect that Pakistan has been using the eased travel opportunities across the LOC for smuggling large amounts of fake currency into India.

Finally, as regards the proposed agreements on Sir Creek and Siachen the same will only be reached if India makes all the concessions. Historically, on no issue has Pakistan made any major concession and agreements between it and India have only been arrived at on when the latter has done all the running. Though the differences between the two countries on both issues are relatively small there is no reason for India to make any special gestures as long as Pakistan continues to give us no satisfaction on the issue of terrorism and retains its inimical mindset vis a vis India. This is all the more so as the special gestures made by India in the past as in the Indus Waters Treaty and in the Simla Agreement have earned it no gratitude or appreciation from Pakistan.

Both on Sir Creek and Siachen, though the differences between the two countries are relatively small they embody important issues of principle and there is no reason why India should make concessions and give in to the utterly unreasonable demands made by Pakistan.

Specifically, in respect of Sir Creek while India has taken the internationally accepted position that the boundary between the two counties should be the mid channel of the Creek, Pakistan demands that it should be the eastern shore line of the Creek. While acceptance by India of the Pakistani position would entail a marginal loss of territory on land it will have a much greater adverse impact in the determination of our maritime boundary and Extended Economic Zone. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate for us to give up our principled position on the issue. This is all the more so as the region is believed to be rich in hydrocarbons.

In respect of Siachen both sides have been calling for a demilitarization of the area and withdrawal of forces to specified points. It has, however, not been possible to arrive at an agreement as Pakistan has been unwilling to authenticate the existing location of the forces of the two sides. This is essential in order to be able to establish breach of faith by either side. Given Pakistan’s proclivity to violate such understandings with India, as most recently demonstrated by their breach of the LOC in 1999 which led to the Kargil conflict, it would be imprudent for us to give up our insistence on Pakistan’s authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line. Indeed, some may argue and rightly so that we should not pursue an agreement at all on this issue because when it was originally mooted in the 1980’s we were taking many casualties in the area which is not the case today due to vastly improved logistics. Furthermore, while we could, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, have addressed Pakistan’s stealthy occupation of the area, through a breach of faith, by bringing to bear our superiority in conventional arms this is much more difficult in the current nuclearised environment. Above all we should not lose sight of the fact that demilitarization of Siachen will enhance the possibility of Sino-Pak collusive activity in the area.