Creeping Coup Redux: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

A few months before the 1999 military coup, a monthly newsmagazine in Pakistan carried a cover story titled ‘Creeping Coup’. In his second stint as Prime Minister from 1996-99, Nawaz Sharif had started involving the military in all sorts of things that ideally should have been handled by the civilian government. From checking electricity meters to unearthing ghost schools to cleaning canals, the army was being deployed in the role of a sort of National Guard. The then Army Chief, Gen Pervez Musharraf was always ready to oblige, quite willingly it appeared. Nawaz Sharif, at that point in time, was unassailable. He had a 2/3^rd majority in the National Assembly, the opposition was in disarray, the nuclear tests had beefed up his position even move (even though in the aftermath of these tests, the economy had virtually collapsed), he had sacked a Navy chief and followed it up by forcing out an army chief, the ISI Chief was his man. In short, everything seemed to be going in Nawaz Sharif’s favor.

Then Kargil happened, and things started sliding very fast. So much so that even a statement from the US warning against any extra constitutional move against the elected government didn’t help. Nor for that matter did Nawaz Sharif’s efforts of going out of the way to placate Musharraf. When it came, all it took was what a former Prime Minister Ch. Shujaat Hussain calls ‘one jeep and two trucks’ to overthrow the civilian government. Therefore, the thumb rule number one about civil-military relations in Pakistan is to never imagine that the democratic process is irreversible.

A decade and a half after he was ousted in a military coup, Nawaz Sharif is once again occupying the Prime Minister’s chair. A lot of water has flowed down the Indus during this time and a lot of things appear to have changed. But as recent events have demonstrated, what hasn’t changed is the reality of the military establishment’s ability to destabilize a civilian government and box it into a corner. What also hasn’t changed is the tendency of the civil politicians, whether in government or out of it, to fall back on the military and seek its support to fix their opponents. What is more, with most state institutions steadily becoming dysfunctional, the military has become the default option when things need to be set right. If in 1999 the military was cleaning canals, unearthing ghost schools, reading electricity meters, in 2014 they have gone a step further and have been handed over the security of airports, railway stations, and other vital installations. Worse, not just is the army virtually in control of two major cities – Karachi and now Islamabad – it is practically calling the shots in two provinces – Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The democratic transition from one civilian government to another had led many to imagine that democracy had finally stuck firm roots in Pakistan. Much of the credit for that ‘historic’ transition is due to former President Asif Zardari’s remarkable skill at political gymnastics which ensured that his party’s government completed its term. But he was also aided by individuals and circumstances, without which he might have fallen well short of breasting the tape.

The first thing that helped Zardari was that the PPP was replacing a quasi-military regime and for the military to directly intervene in political affairs soon after restoration of democracy was neither politically feasible nor possible. This is a second thumb rule of Pakistani politics – it is a two party system with the civilians being one party and the military the second party; each side gets a 10 year ‘term’, give or take a couple of years. Viewed from this perspective, the current problems facing the Nawaz Sharif government could be explained as ‘mid-term blues’ of the civilian dispensation. Be that as it may, Asif Zardari got the benefit of this thumb rule. What also worked in his favor was that the main opposition leader was Nawaz Sharif who never really allowed political differences and competition reach the point of no return. Nawaz Sharif’s attitude was partly colored by his experience of the sordid politics of the 1990s when political parties conspired with the military against the government, something that allowed the Army to become the dominant political player in Pakistan. Equally important was the fact that Nawaz Sharif was not left out in the cold after the transition from quasi-military to civilian rule.

By virtue of his party coming into power in the province of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif had a stake in the system which also meant that he could afford to be patient and let the government complete its term. Apart from the role played by Nawaz Sharif in ensuring the survival of the Zardari-led PPP government, there was also a judiciary running amok under the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and a media which fancied itself as a guardian of democracy. Add to all this the international situation that wasn’t conducive to any direct military takeover, and it’s not difficult to figure out how and why Zardari managed to drag his party’s government across the finish line in spite of a terrible record of governance.

Nawaz Sharif started his 3^rd term with some advantages that Asif Zardari never enjoyed. Based on the strength that these advantages gave the Nawaz Sharif dispensation, many observers and analysts were convinced that democracy would only get strengthened. Nawaz Sharif had a comfortable majority in the centre and controlled two provinces –Punjab and Balochistan. The judiciary and media were not hostile to him. In fact, the judiciary was beholden to him because of the role he played in the restoration of judges. The PMLN’s legendary media management skills meant that he would not face the hostility that Asif Zardari had faced from a right-wing, illiberal and intellectually challenged media. Most of all, the army appeared to be a bit on the back foot. They were wary of Nawaz Sharif and weren’t quite sure whether he will adopt a vindictive and vengeful policy towards the military. There were fears in the army that Nawaz Sharif might actually take the rhetoric of civilian superiority seriously and try to implement it. This wasn’t a problem that the army faced with Asif Zardari or his nominated Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, who were more than willing to even grovel before the military to keep it in good humor. So much so, at one point Gilani is reported to have said that he had told the then army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani that he was at the service of the military.

While the army didn’t expect this level of obsequiousness from Nawaz Sharif, it also didn’t think it would be very smooth sailing with the new Prime Minister because of his reputation for never forgiving and his legendary aversion to being pushed around or being dictated to. Therefore, some amount of civil-military tension was inherent, more so because Nawaz Sharif was expected to not just push the envelope but also push back in order assert himself and show who is the boss and who will call the shots.

In the case of the PPP government, the civil-military tussle and tension came fairly early. Within weeks of the ouster of Musharraf from the Presidency, an attempt was made to bring the ISI under the control of the interior ministry. The army let the government know in no uncertain terms where it got off. After this first chastening, the PPP consistently yielded to the wishes and whims of the military. In Nawaz Sharif’s case, it took around six months for the latent tensions to surface. Until October 2013 when Gen Kayani was in office, and given how well-set and well-established he was, Nawaz Sharif bided his time. Another restraining factor on Nawaz Sharif during his first six months in office was the presence of the former chief justice, who retired only in December. It was after the exit of both these people that the transition was complete and Nawaz Sharif was in a position to be pretty much his own boss, or so be thought because almost immediately the problems started.

There were broadly four issues that became the bone of contention. The first was Musharraf and the treason case against him. The second was the government policy on TTP or the Islamist insurgency terrorism. The third was India and the fourth was the media war which broke out after the botched assassination attempt on the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir. All these issues prompted the political hyenas to jump into the fray, either because they thought they could exploit the growing gulf between the civilian government and military, or as many believe, they were put up to this in order to box the government into a corner.

The manner in which these issues became a wedge between the government and the military give rise to two or three more thumb rules of Pakistani politics. Thumb rule number three is what can be called the paradox of power. Briefly, this means that in Pakistan the more powerful and unassailable you appear to be, the weaker and more vulnerable you are because the anti- forces then have a compelling reason to bring you down regardless of the consequences. A corollary to this thumb rule is the ‘devil may cause attitude’ of Pakistan and Pakistanis wherein the culture of ‘bringing down the wall of the neighbor or enemy even if you come under it’ has been internalized. This corollary has implications for India because when Indians parrot the nonsense about ‘neighbors can’t be changed’ and ‘geography cannot be changed’, the perversity that guides Pakistani thinking is often ignored. In other words, the Pakistanis would go to any length to bring India’s wall down even if they perish in the process.

The fourth thumb rule is that civil-military relations are based on system of diarchy in which the civilians are allowed a free hand in taking charge of municipal functions, while all the serious strategic, defence and foreign policy matters are controlled by the military. The fifth thumb rule is that once you appoint an army chief you lose control over him. It is a unique country in which an elected Prime Minister appoints his own nemesis. At the very least, it is a unique system in which the appointing authority loses control of the appointee as soon as the appointment is made.

These thumb rules need to be kept in mind to understand why the predicament in which the Nawaz Sharif government finds itself in and despite enjoying a more than comfortable majority in the National Assembly, rumors of its pre-mature demise are starting to do the rounds.

The Musharraf case clearly caused lot of bad blood between the military and the civilian government. It is not that the army is in love with Musharraf but more that it’s an institutional response to a former chief being humiliated and being put on trial. An even bigger issue is that of senior military officials being held accountable by the ‘bloody civilians’. For Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf is both a personal and political issue. At a personal level, Nawaz Sharif and many members of his kitchen cabinet have suffered terrible indignities at the hands of Musharraf and would like to settle scores. Politically, while the hardliners realize that the Musharraf issue can backfire on them, they also don’t want to open themselves to the chance of having resiled from the tough talk they did on Musharraf both while in opposition and after coming into power. The pro-treason trial lobby in the ruling dispensation fears that they will have to pay a heavy political cost if they let Musharraf go scot free. Plus there is the entire argument that if Musharraf is left off the hook, then it will only serve as an encouragement to the next man on the horseback to usurp power. While these people are aware of the heartburn in the military, some of them argue that if they have to run the country they must have a free hand else what’s the point of being in government but without the power to do things they want to do.

To be sure, there is a split within the ruling party on the Musharraf issue with one faction advocating the hard line and another faction led by Shahbaz Sharif and the Interior Minister Ch. Nisar Ali Khan advocating caution and accommodation. What really spoiled matters was when an alleged understanding that Musharraf would be allowed to leave the country after a court allowed him to do so, was scotched by the hard line faction at the last minute. Many formal and informal advisors are now advising the Prime Minister that he should live to fight another day and not fritter away his government on as irrelevant a figure as Musharraf, more so when even the army would like to see his back. For now there is a stalemate on this issue. But increasingly it seems the army will eventually get its way.

The second issue was on how to handle the TTP and other Islamist groups. The army’s strategic calculation demanded that action be taken against the ‘bad’ Taliban and control be established over the ‘no-go’ areas like North Waziristan. The civilian government had its reasons for not being very enthusiastic about giving the army a go ahead to launch a military operation in this area. One reason was of course personal security of the members of the ruling family and party. But another reason was that an operation would mean giving a free hand to the army which would increase its political space, something the government wanted to avoid. There was also the whole issue of blowback or retaliation which would not only affect the political popularity of the government and alienate its conservative right wing vote bank but also ruin the economic and investment climate. But as things have turned out, the military finally got its way when it launched the operation. In a clear signal that it was the military and not the government that called the shots on the operation in North Waziristan, the announcement of the operation was made first by the military spokesman and the Prime Minister’s statement followed.

The third issue bedeviling relations between the civilian government and the Army was India. Nawaz Sharif was very keen and eager to do business with India. A trade deal heavily loaded in favor of the Pakistan was agreed by India in February 2014. But at the last moment the military put pressure and scuttled it. The army clearly is not ready to let the civilians take charge of the India policy and it increasingly appears that the government has given in to the army on this issue. What this means for India is that it should take anything that the civilian government in Pakistan says with a healthy dose of skepticism. In any case, India’s policy on Pakistan should not be predicated on what the Pakistanis say but on what they do and by all accounts what they are doing on ground doesn’t really inspire any confidence that there is any major shift in policy towards India.

The fourth issue which spoiled relations between the government and the military was the media war that broke out after the assassination attempt on the Pakistani journalist, Hamid Mir. After Mir’s TV channel accused the ISI chief of being behind the attempt on his life, a virtual storm was unleashed against the Jang/Geo group. Much of this was orchestrated by the ISI which mobilized other news channels against Geo and used all sorts of strong arm tactics to shut Geo down. This was a moment of truth for the Pakistan media and it exposed the lie of independence of media. The ISI-Geo tussle was in part a commercial fight. For some months now, there were reports that ISI was in the process of starting a news channel of its own. Seed money for this was allegedly being partly contributed by the international terrorist and criminal Dawood Ibrahim. Also allegedly involved was a dubious business group in Dubai which is infamous for gold smuggling and also runs a TV channel in Pakistan.

The big obstacle in the path of these plans was Geo, which not only dominated the news networks and print media but also poked the ISI in the eye by exposing its media plans. As long as Geo’s domination continued, the ISI’s news channel would remain a bit player. Shutting Geo down or blocking its transmission was therefore imperative if space had to be created for another channel in an already crowded media space. The other channels became wiling partners in this misadventure, behaving like typical hyenas to bring down an adversary against whom they couldn’t compete otherwise. A prominent role in this was played by ARY channel which for months had been conducting a campaign of slander and vilification against Geo and its owners. The civilian government was caught in the middle of this media war and tried to walk the tight rope, or if you will the knife’s edge. They couldn’t ignore the army but also could not allow it to ride rough shod over Geo because if today it was Geo, tomorrow it would be someone else, perhaps even the government itself.

The Geo episode exposed the armpit of Pakistan politics and media. It became clear who stood where and how independent or subservient the media was. It also exposed the helplessness of the judiciary vis-à-vis the army, and irrelevance of civil society. The limitations of the civilian government in reining in the military became apparent. But ironically, the episode also revealed the weakness of the Army which despite all its efforts could only go so far and no further in targeting Geo. The point is that while the Army remains the most powerful political force in Pakistan, it no longer enjoys the kind of domination that it did some years back. Over the years, it has been challenged politically and militarily and its monopoly over the national narrative has also been dented.

While the Army’s ability to destabilize the government remains quite intact as does its power to overthrow the government, it probably no longer enjoys the power to run the country as it did in the past, not that it ran the country well when it got the chance. In fact, most of the problems confronting Pakistan today can be traced back to the military regimes or the military’s control over national security and foreign policy. What, however, gives the military an advantage over the civilians is the bugling and inefficient and uninspiring performance of the civilian governments – not just in the political realm but also in the economic and administrative domain. The failure of civilians to give even a modicum of good governance and solve the problems of the people has created space for the military.

Today, the political situation is once again in a bit of flux. Just one year after winning a third term as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif’s government is finding itself under siege. Partly the situation is of the government’s own making and its bumbling and bungling ways. Apart from the fact that the government has failed to give even a little relief from the crippling energy shortages despite doubling the electricity tariffs, it is the almost amateurish political management which has created the spectre of instability despite the government having an almost 2/3rd majority in the National Assembly. For now a challenge is being mounted in the street by Imran Khan and a somewhat clownish cleric from Canada, Tahirul Qadri who is promising an instant revolution like it is some kind of instant coffee. Imran Khan, whose intellectual capacity and political thinking, is limited to drawing silly cricketing analogies wants the system to stay but at the same time is threatening to overthrow it by using street power and set the date of Aug 14 for forcing the government out of office. On the other hand, Tahirul Qadri, who was given a huge issue after the Punjab government fired on his supporters in Lahore and killed around a dozen people and injured around a 100, is making no bones about wanting to scrap the whole system.

Normally, a demonstration or even a massive anti-government protest shouldn’t be much cause for worry for a legitimate government, even less so when the demands being made by the protestors are illogical, extra-legal and even extra-constitutional. But Nawaz Sharif’s style of politics has come back to haunt him. Apart from the fact that many in the ruling party think that the agitation on streets is being orchestrated by the army to bring the government under pressure, perhaps even oust it, it is the steady isolation of Nawaz Sharif and his immediate circle from rest of the political mainstream and even his own party that is creating the impression of a government that is flailing rather helplessly. Not only has Nawaz Sharif ignored the very institution from which he derives his strength and legitimacy i.e. Parliament, he has also alienated members of his party by appointing cronies and family members to all plum positions in government. Even the decisions being taken are by a tiny group comprising the kitchen cabinet. The neglect of elected legislators has meant that they really don’t have any stake in the system. Worse, Nawaz Sharif has also ignored the main opposition party, PPP, which has suddenly woken up to the uncomfortable fact that by maintaining a posture of friendly opposition it is getting marginalized in the larger political game. The space that PPP has ceded has been filled by Imran Khan’s party, especially in the Punjab. Not surprisingly, PPP leaders from Punjab are restive and itching to take on the government. In order to keep the flock together, the PPP has now started making noises which have only added to the discomfiture of the ruling dispensation.

The nightmare for the government now is that if there are large scale street disturbances which go out of control, it could lead to a military intervention even if the military doesn’t want to intervene. The Army finds itself caught on many fronts and taking over the government will only stretch it further. Apart from confronting all the economic, political and other problems facing the government, the army will also have to face up to the diplomatic implications of ousting an elected government. Conversely, given that the army has already been involved in so many things, it might even consider taking over if things go out of control of civilian government. For its part, the civilian government has demonstrated its weakness by asking the military to intercede and convince Imran Khan to back off. It has also made a rather clumsy attempt by pitting the army against Imran Khan’s supporters by handing over security of Islamabad to the Army.

Under these circumstances, even if the current round of political confrontation passes off without incident, the government has already subordinated itself to the military and the only logical conclusion of this is that henceforth it will be left with only municipal functions while the military will call the shots on all issues of foreign and security policy including the mother of all issues which is India. What this means is that any engagement that India enters into with the civilian government will remain hostage to the Pakistan Army’s unreconstructed and unreformed view of India.

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Published Date: 20^th August 2014, Image source: http://images.thenews.com.pk

Karachi Airport Attack and its Portents

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The terrorist strike on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi was neither the first nor the worst attack on such a high profile target in Pakistan. Just as similar attacks in the past – the GHQ and the Parade Lane mosque in Rawalpindi, the Naval War College, FIA building and ISI HQs in Lahore, the Mehran Airbase in Karachi and the Minhas Airbase in Kamra, the DI Khan and Bannu jailbreaks – did not quite serve as a wake-up call for Pakistan, there is no reason that the Karachi airport attack will. After the usual blame-game and finger pointing, followed by some bombastic declarations of how the country will not surrender before the terrorists, followed by a series of high level meetings on how to meet the terrorist challenge, it will be back to business as usual, until the next attack when the whole familiar cycle will repeat itself. And yet, like in the case of every major terror strike, there is always a method behind the madness that has been unleashed by the Taliban on Pakistan.

Given their savage and barbaric behaviour, there is generally a tendency among analysts and commentators to underestimate the sophistication and carefully calculated and calibrated nature of the Taliban strategy. This is a mistake that should be avoided. While it is true that the bestiality of the Taliban (and the rest of Islamist cohorts) has no modern parallel, they must be given credit for choosing their targets and planning their attacks with great care and calculation to cause maximum impact. To explain away an attack either as a sign of their growing desperation (a familiar tack used by governments to put a shine on their failure to pre-empt or prevent an attack) or as a senseless revenge attack or even as an attack whose only purpose was to create a splash, is nothing but self-deception.

Even worse are the bizarre conspiracy theories that are conjured up to somehow lessen the import of the attack and dilute the horror perpetrated by the actual culprits against whom neither the Pakistani people nor their political and security establishment are ready to take an unequivocal stand. Among the most popular of these conspiracy theories is the involvement of the Indian or Afghan intelligence in directing the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks on Pakistan. According to the latest conspiracy theory (i.e. after the Karachi attack), the Indians were retaliating against the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s attack on its consulate in Herat and the Afghan presidential candidate, Dr Abdullah Abdullah was doing the same against the suicide bombing aimed at assassinating him. The evidence: recovery of some Indian made medicines, conveniently glossing over the fact that these carried the label of the Karachi based importer; recovery of Indian origin ‘weapons’, and even though no one ever specified what these weapons were, everyone kept parroting the line. Quite frankly, if indeed India was behind this and other attacks and was using the TTP against Pakistan, it would be the greatest intelligence coup of the millennium and would be every Indian spook’s dream come true. Only it isn’t. Come to think of it, if India had such covert capabilities, why has it not used them to take out international terrorist like Dawood Ibrahim, Hafiz Saeed and some Khalistani terrorists who continue to strut around inside Pakistan?

Clearly, if the Pakistanis were really serious about fighting terrorism, then instead of wasting their time on silly theories that hold no water, they would worry about dreadful implication of the attack on Karachi and the ground (or is it a trap?) that the Taliban are preparing for taking on the Pakistani state. In other words, rather than looking for the apparition of India behind the attack, they should be worried about the possibility that just as 9/11 was a trap that the Al Qaeda laid out for getting USA enmeshed in the Afghan quagmire, the Karachi attack could be aimed at embroiling Pakistan in something similar. But first, a bit about the timing and circumstances of the attack and why it presages something far more serious about the fight that Pakistan faces if it wants to get rid of terrorism.

Unless it is somebody’s case that this attack was planned and executed independently of the political and military situation facing the Taliban, the question of when the attack was planned becomes critical to understand its significance. Normally such assaults take weeks of recce and meticulous planning to get all the nuts and bolts in place. It is of course possible that the Taliban have made blueprints of plans to attack a multitude of targets around Pakistan and these are put into action at a time and place of the terrorists’ choosing and in accordance with their larger strategic game plan. The problem with such set plans is that they tend to become somewhat dated if not executed within a certain timeframe. At the very least, their damage potential reduces in direct proportion to the time they remain on the shelf because of changes in the security and other procedures in the target area which could hamper the original plan. Even so, if such plans exist, it means that there is probably no high value target in Pakistan that is not in the cross-hairs of the terrorists.

Alternatively, it is entirely possible that the Karachi attack was mounted with only rudimentary planning and the terrorists went in ‘blind’. Although published accounts of the attack belie this possibility, even if this was the case, the fact that the terrorists were willing to attack, and in the process create a massive psychological impact, is scary in terms of what it implies for the future. What is more, the fact that the Taliban were able to get together all the elements that go into the launching of such an attack in such a quick time speaks volumes about their network and strike ability.

Clearly then, the first objective that the TTP has achieved is that it has once again proved its firepower and reach. This was important given that many analysts, within the government and without, were gloating about the split in the TTP ranks after the breaking away of the Mehsud faction from the main Fazlullah-led TTP. There appeared to be a consensus among most of these analysts that this split would deal a body blow to the TTP and deprive it of its most lethal component and significantly impair its ability to strike outside of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Karachi attack rebuffs all these analyses.

Another objective of the attack could be to exploit the divisions between the civilian government and the military on the strategy to combat terrorism. While the former is keen on continuing to pursue the dialogue track – it points to the sharp fall in terror attacks during the month or so of ceasefire between the Taliban and the Pakistani state – the military is itching to (or is at least making a show of it) launch an operation against the Taliban. Although it is not quite clear what sort of an operation the military has in mind – whether it will strike only from the safe distance of the skies and not send in foot soldiers or it will carry out steam-roller military operations – the civilians are reportedly reluctant to give a free hand to the military. The Karachi attack will only deepen this civil-military divide and add to the existing confusion and lack of national consensus on how to combat the menace of terrorism. Under these circumstances, even if the civilians give a go-ahead to the military to launch an operation, questions will continue to be raised and doubts will continue to be expressed on whether or not this was the right path to take, something that works well for the Taliban.

Finally, the Karachi attack could be part of a strategy to provoke a major military operation that would not only lead to the Taliban of all hues closing ranks but also enmeshing the Pakistan army in a debilitating war of attrition. Even if the closing of ranks does not happen, the TTP (and for that matter so should the Pakistani state) would be calculating that if the breakaway faction of Mehsud Taliban, which is as fanatical and committed to radical Islam as the main TTP faction, sides with the Pakistani state it will not be for free. It will demand a price that the Pakistani state will be loath to pay. In addition, the ham-handed approach that the Pakistan army adopts in clearing out areas only works to the advantage of the Taliban who get new recruits with enough cause to fight the Pakistani state. The resulting destabilisation of the region will be exploited by them to extend their area of influence, both inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. The big dilemma for the Pakistani authorities is that they are damned if they move in, and they are damned if they don’t. By not launching an operation, they will buy some more months of peace but it will make any subsequent operation even more difficult, if not impossible; But launching an operation may precipitate the crisis and ensnare the Pakistani security forces in a bloody battle of attrition eventually breaking its will and coherence.

Whatever the real objective/s of the attack, and regardless of whether or not it was successful in achieving all it aimed for or how much actual physical damage it caused, it is a no-brainer that the Taliban have for now stuck yet another body blow to the state of Pakistan, not just psychologically (their strike reach and ability) and perceptually (image as an unsafe investment and business centre, something the Taliban spokesman also pointed out while taking responsibility for the attack), but also financially (in terms of actual and notional loss of business opportunities), and in terms of prestige (bumbling government response).

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Published Date: 17^th June 2014, Image source: http://cache.pakistantoday.com.pk

Attack on Hamid Mir: Pak Media Caught in Pincer of Military, Militants & Market Printer-friendly version

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The attack on one of the best known Pakistani journalists, Hamid Mir, has only reaffirmed Pakistan's reputation as one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists. Mir, who took six bullets, barely survived the well planned ambush carried out in broad daylight on a busy road in Karachi when he was heading from the airport to his office. The attempt on his life created a veritable storm in the Pakistani media, more so after his brother alleged that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen Zaheerul Islam, was responsible for the attack.

According to reports in the Pakistani media, Mir had confided in his friends and family about the threats to his life from ISI and had even recorded his testimony on paper and in a video which was to be made public if something happened to him. Naturally, as soon as news of the attack broke, fingers started being pointed at the ISI. The military spokesman was quick to condemn the incident and deny any involvement of the ISI in the incident. But cut to the bone by the audacity and temerity of the journalists who were accusing the ISI of being behind the attack, the intelligence agency, which is a virtual state within a state, unleashed its army of plants in the media to launch a fierce counter offensive, not just against Mir (accusing him of all sorts of anti-national activity) but also the media group –Jang/Geo – that he works for. For the rival channels, this was a Godsend opportunity to pull the Jang Group down from its pedestal as the most popular and powerful media group in Pakistan.

For some months now, the ISI has been using a rival channel ARY (owned by a dubious UAE based Pakistani-origin businessman who is alleged to be hand in glove with Dawood Ibrahim and involved in all sorts of shady deals, including Hawala and gold smuggling) to target Jang, its owner and its journalists. After the Hamid Mir attack, other channels like Express (owned by the Lakhani group) have also jumped into the act. The idea is to severely damage, if not destroy, Jang’s credibility and popularity and at the same time increase their own market share at Jang’s expense. The icing on the cake will be currying favour with the real power centre in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.

The Jang group has faced tough situations in the past, but always came out winner. This is however the first time that it is pitted directly against the military. The tiff with Musharraf in the last few months of his regime cannot be compared with what is happening today when it is facing a sustained and vicious campaign entirely backed by the dirty tricks department of the military. To an extent, the Jang group must share the blame for what it is facing. Over the years, it has carried out exactly the same sort of campaigns against civilian governments, weakening them to a point where they became pushovers for the ‘establishment’. The only time they failed was with Asif Zardari who despite the unremitting and unfair hostility of the Jang group managed to ride out all the storms that this media powerhouse created. In the case of the Nawaz Sharif, the Jang group was clearly seen to be leaning in support of the PML (N) government by demanding greater accountability of the army and was not just backing the prosecution of the former dictator, Pervez Musharraf, but also raking up other issues that rankled with the Men in Khaki. Perhaps, with the Jang group starting to believe that it could make and break (and even save) governments, the Pakistani establishment had already made up its mind to disabuse it of this notion and de-fang it. The charges levelled against the army and ISI in the Hamid Mir case will only give further impetus to the plan which is already underway.

What makes the attempt on Mir’s life so sinister is that it comes against the backdrop of mounting tensions between the civilian government and the military. Apparently, the army was pretty cut up with the government on the issue of former dictator Pervez Musharraf’s treason trial, the peace process with the Pakistani Taliban and the trade deal that the government was all set to sign with India. Things got a little tense after some rather strong words were used by cabinet ministers against Musharraf, which the media twisted to present as though these were aimed at the army. Adding further fuel to fire, some TV channels started playing an eight year old fiery speech of the Defence Minister, Khwaja Asif, in which he had railed into the military for meddling in politics and taking away the Lion’s share of the national cake without having anything to show for it.

Things seemed to have cooled down a bit after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad and expressed his confidence in the army and held up the Army Chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, as a role model for the newly commissioned officers. But the attack on Mir, coupled with the allegations against ISI, seems to have muddied the waters once again. Although Nawaz Sharif has set up a judicial commission of inquiry, the Mir case threatens to snowball into a test case for establishing civilian supremacy and making the military accountable. However, if Nawaz Sharif tries to brush this under the carpet, and the army continues on its offensive against those who question its dubious policies as well as its monopoly on defining national interest, then all the tall talk of civilian supremacy will remain just that. Already, the government, under pressure from the army, has retreated on the issue of opening trade with India (which isn’t such a bad thing from India’s point of view because of the sort of concessions which the Manmohan Singh government had given in return for getting a not quite MFN status). Even on Musharraf, there seems to be a move to let him off the hook and allow him to flee Pakistan. If now the government backs down on getting to the bottom of the attack on Mir, then it will be, for all practical purposes, reduced into a glorified municipality, like its predecessor. It may survive in office for a full term, but wield no real power to take any important decision, unless this is endorsed and sanctioned by the military.

Mir is of course not the first prominent journalist to come under fire, nor will he be the last. Just a couple of weeks earlier, another well-known journalist Raza Rumi escaped by the skin of his teeth after his car was ambushed in Lahore. Raza’s driver died in the incident and he has reportedly left Pakistan. Although in Raza’s case, the Taliban (through one of their affiliated organisations, the Sunni sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) are believed to be responsible, a number of other journalists have claimed threats from state, quasi-state and non-state actors. Interestingly, the ideological persuasions of the threatened journalists cover the entire spectrum of opinion. In other words, it is not just liberal people like SAFMA Secretary General Imtiaz Alam and columnist Kamran Shafi, but also Taliban advocates and sympathisers like Ansar Abbasi and Ahmed Noorani who have received threats, from both the military and the militants. Hit lists containing the names of journalists have also been floating around for some time now. But more than the threats, which are a professional hazard in a country as disturbed, divided and intolerant as Pakistan, it is the sheer impunity with which journalists are threatened and targeted that exemplifies the dysfunctional nature of the state and its institutions. Nothing illustrated this fact better than the utterly useless report of the commission that investigated the murder of journalist Saleem Shahzad, who is also believed to have been killed by the ISI after he published a story that the Al Qaeda had infiltrated the Pakistan Navy.

Like Shahzad, Mir had frequently been crossing the unwritten red lines of the military by highlighting issues like the enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings by the army and paramilitary forces, the human rights violations in Balochistan, the need to prosecute Musharraf, the rising civil-military discord etc. The problem was not just with the stories he was covering but also the fact that Mir thought he had become too big to be touched. This hubris was his undoing, as it has been of scores of journalists before Mir who thought that their prominence put them out of harm’s way. In Mir’s case, his past must also have gone against him. He was at one time seen as a blue-eyed boy of the ISI (his detractors claim he was on the payroll) and an Urdu paper he used to edit some years back was alleged to have been funded by the ISI. What is more, he used to espouse the cause of Jihadist terrorists and had developed close links with them. He also had a very rabid stance on India and Kashmir. When such a person tries to assert his independence, his former patrons are bound to be furious and the attack on him is likely to have a ‘salutary’ impact on other journalists who were outspoken, something that is already becoming apparent in the sort of guarded statements and comments that Mir’s colleagues have been making on TV and in the print media.

It wasn’t, however, just the military, but also the militants who were reported to be gunning for him. Although he was quite adept at walking the tight-rope on the issue of Taliban, there were times when he took positions that didn’t go down well with the Islamists. While the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has denied any involvement in the attack, there are some unconfirmed reports that the Punjabi Taliban have claimed responsibility. But this claim doesn’t appear to be very credible because Mir is known to have close links with the Punjabi jihadists, something that came out clearly when a tape emerged of a conversation between him and the Punjabi Taliban discussing the links of a kidnapped former ISI official, Khalid Khwaja, with the CIA. Khwaja was later shot dead by the Taliban after Mir virtually pronounced a death sentence on him by declaring him a CIA agent. If the Punjabi Taliban have now launched this murderous attack on Mir, then it would mean that there has been a big break between Mir and the so-called mujahideen.

Although the involvement of the TTP or its affiliates cannot be completely ruled out, the circumstances surrounding the attack on Mir shifts the needle of suspicion away from them. Despite their strong presence in Karachi – they have claimed responsibility for at least three or four attacks on media houses like Express and AAJ in recent months – for the Taliban to target an Islamabad-based Mir in the port city would require an intelligence and operational network capability which is probably out of their league. But if indeed it was the Taliban that carried out the attack on Mir, then it means that Pakistan is in far more serious trouble than what it is apparent. Apart from the Taliban, the ISI mouthpieces in the media have been quick to blame India for the attack. Some of these loonies have also named CIA and Mossad. Clearly, the intellect and worldview of these characters (which includes fairly senior retired military officers) is based on Bollywood masala movies like Ek Tha Tiger and Agent Vinod. Even more hilarious was the bizarre theories that some of the ‘analysts’ came up with: Mir was dubbed a RAW agent who was shot because he had outlived his usefulness; one genius morning show anchor even doubted that he was injured; another ‘analyst’ asked whether he staged the incident himself and accidentally got shot more than planned; yet another blamed the Jang/Geo group for the attack so it could paint the ISI in lurid colours!

More seriously, the fact that ISI touts have been using this opportunity to train their guns on India, their favourite whipping boy, raises serious questions about all the talk of the army being on the same page as the civilian government on the issue of improving relations with India. For some months now, known military mouthpieces have been carrying out a vitriolic and virulent campaign against India and have been taking pot shots at the Nawaz Sharif government accusing it of a sell-out. While the Manmohan Singh government, as is its wont, remained somnolent on this issue, what is surprising is that the so-called well informed Indian analysts on foreign affairs have continued to delude themselves that Pakistan has changed. The fallout of the Hamid Mir attack should serve as a reality check to all these Indians about how nothing has changed in Pakistan.

Sanjay Dutt must be Wary of his Friends

A Surya Prakash, 

Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Ever since the Supreme Court pronounced its verdict and sentenced actor Sanjay Dutt to five years rigorous imprisonment in the 1993 Bombay blasts case, a motley group of friends and so-called well-wishers of the actor have sprung to his defence and are pleading, cajoling and even demanding that his prison term be curtailed. Among those who are pleading on his behalf are Mr. Markandey Katju, Mr. Digvijay Singh, Ms. Jaya Bachchan and a host of friends from the cinema world. All of them argue that he has “suffered a lot” over the last 20 years during the pendency of the trail, that he has a family to take care and that he is a much reformed man now. Are these arguments valid? What are its implications for us as a democratic nation?

First of all, it must be made clear that there is nothing new or original in these arguments. His counsel made similar pleadings before the Supreme Court as well, but the court did not see any reason to curtail his prison term and send him on parole. Therefore to advance these very arguments all over again after the court has sentenced him, smacks of disrespect for the judicial process, to say the least. But the bigger issue is the unconstitutionality of these arguments because they go against a basic tenet in our constitution- equality before law and the equal application of the laws (Article 14). This tenet is the corner stone of any democratic constitution. It is therefore shocking to see even a former judge of the Supreme Court and seasoned parliamentarians openly campaigning for remission of Dutt’s sentence after the Supreme Court’s verdict.

Their arguments are flawed for other reasons as well. They say he got married some years ago, that he has two little children to take care and that he has already suffered because of the prolonged trial over 20 years. Often the justice system and judges are blamed, but just look at the number times Dutt has approached the higher courts for bail over this period. Also, how is Dutt worse off than other accused in this case. In fact, there are some other accused who deserve sympathy because they did not have Dutt’s resources to hire expensive lawyers and bombard the courts with a variety of pleas. As a result they languished in jail for years. And, most certainly, they have families too which, unlike Dutt’s family, have languished as well. That is why the Supreme Court has been lenient to many of them. The Aam Aadmi may not know the fine points of constitutional law but he can certainly see how a section of the elite is trying to short circuit the justice system for the sake of a film star. Dutt must protect himself from his friends!

How twisted these arguments in support of Sanjay Dutt are can be gauged from the following facts of the case: The police charged Sanjay Dutt and other accused in this case of hatching a criminal conspiracy between December, 1992 and April, 1993 to commit terrorist acts and to disturb communal harmony in the Bombay region by using bombs, hand grenades, explosive substances like RDX, weapons like AK-56 rifles and carbines and that all this was used to trigger a series of bomb blasts and terrorist strikes in a number of locations in Bombay on March 12, 1993 in which 257 persons were killed and 713 injured. Dutt was also charged with illegal possession of arms which were smuggled into the country by Dawood Ibrahim and his associated.

Following his arrest, .Sanjay Dutt made a confessional statement on April 26 and again on April 28, 1993 before a Deputy Commissioner of Police in Bombay, in which he said:

He possessed three fire arms – a 270 Bruno Rifle, a 370 Magnum Double Barrel Rifle and a 12 bore Double Barrel gun- with valid licenses. He bought these weapons because he was fond of hunting. In December, 1991, while shooting for a film in Dubai, he was introduced to Dawood Ibrahim and his brother Anees Ibrahim. Thereafter, Anees used to visit him regularly on the sets. In mid-January, 1992, Hanif Kandawala, Samir Hingora and two others visited his residence and gave him three AK-56 rifles, some magazines and 250 rounds. Two days later, he returned two rifles, but kept one along with some ammunition. In September, 1992 he purchased another 9 mm pistol with ammunition from a member of the Dawood gang, who visited him on the sets of a movie in R.K.Studios, Bombay. In April, 1993 he went to Mauritius for a movie shoot. There he heard of the arrest of Kandawala and Hingora and got frightened. He asked a friend – Yusuf Nulwalla -to rush to his house, collect a black bag that was in his room and dispose off the contents. This bag contained the third AK 56 rifle. This confessional statement of Sanjay Dutt was corroborated by the confessions made by Kandawala, Hingora, Nulwalla and three others.

Look at the kind of company that Dutt kept between 1991 and 1993 (Dawood Ibrahim, Anees Ibrahim et al) and look at the kind of weapons he stored in his house. Although he had three licenced fire arms, he accepts three AK-56 rifles, hand grenades and huge cache of ammunition from his friends. His lawyers and friends say this was for “self defence”! Have you ever come across another citizen who arms himself in this manner? Where will India be if all those who can afford it, followed Dutt’s example? In short, the arguments advanced in Dutt’s support are preposterous to say the least.

All these bleeding hearts need to introspect and consider the following: Although the Bombay Police had credible information that Sanjay Dutt was in possession of deadly weapons which he had acquired from those who had planned and executed the terrorist acts in March, 1993 in Bombay, they did not raid his house; the designated TADA Court, which heard the Bombay blast cases declared that Dutt had not committed a TADA offence but only offences under the Arms Act. As a result of this decision, the court sentenced him to only six years of rigorous imprisonment, whereas the punishment could have been much harsher if he was found guilty of a TADA offence; The CBI strangely allowed this decision of the court to go unchallenged. As a result, the issue before the Supreme Court was limited only to the appeal of Dutt for probation; and lastly, the Supreme Court itself reduced Dutt’s sentence from six to five years. How many offenders in terrorist cases in this country will be so lucky? After all these fortuitous circumstances, you have people like Mr.Katju, and Mr.Digvijay Singh argue that he be let off. Do they have any consideration for the 257 persons who were killed and 713 who were injured in blasts and grenade attacks engineered by Dutt’s friends?

Actually, all those who want the rule of law to prevail in the country ought to ask the man who was Bombay Police Commissioner in April, 1993 as to why he did not raid Sanjay Dutt’s house when he had information that the actor had acquired illegal weapons. They also must ask the man who was Director of CBI in 2007 to explain why he did not challenge the TADA Court judgement in Sanjay Dutt’s Case in the Supreme Court even though he challenged the verdicts in respect of some other offenders. These are the real issues in this case and the people have a right to know the truth.

If Sanjay Dutt shuns his friends for a while and shuts himself off from the cacophony created by them, he will be able to engage with his conscience and take a decision to accept the Supreme Court verdict, serve out the remaining three and half years in jail and come back to the world of glamour and cinema in the latter part of 2016 with his head held high. Such a decision would be in consonance with the Constitution of India (which mandates equality before law and equal application of the law) and the best democratic principles. It would also show him as a citizen who acknowledges that the safety and security of millions of fellow citizens is above everything else. He can return to do the next Munnabhai movie in 2017 with dignity and moral authority and this will catapult him to the pinnacle of his profession.

If on the other hand, Dutt remains a prisoner of his so-called well wishers who see a three year jail term as something of a calamity, he will be missing the woods for the trees. The political manoeuvrings of his friends may mean a few months less in jail, but the short cut he takes today will haunt him throughout his life.

So, Sanjay Dutt must make up his mind. Will he succumb to his short-sighted friends or will he opt for the right kind of prayaschit, choose to be a long distance runner and emerge taller than many of his so-called well wishers? Let us wait and watch!

Mollycoddling Miandad is Tantamount to Legitimising Dawood Ibrahim

Sushant Sareen 

(Senior Fellow, VIF)

 

Even while seething with anger over the news that the close relative of the international terrorist Dawood Ibrahim and former Pakistani cricketer Javed Miandad had been given a visa to visit Delhi to watchthe final one-day match between India and Pakistan, one couldn’t help being utterly perplexed over the decision of the government of India to allow this man into India. The only rational explanation probably came from a Shiv Sena leader who said that the visa was given not in spite of Miandad’s close relationship with Dawood Ibrahim but because of it. Perhaps given the muted allegations of links between one of India’s most wanted criminals and terrorists and senior members of the UPA-II cabinet and the BCCI, the Shiv Sena’s take on the visa for Miandad sounds quite plausible. 

All other explanations, including those of officials (Miandad was not on any black list; he was given the visa as part of a group comprising office-bearers of the Pakistan Cricket Board; due diligence had been undertaken before giving him the visa; and other such equally silly reasons) and those of apologists and hangers-on of the ruling Congress party (he is a great cricketer; India and Pakistan are improving relations; just because he is related to a terrorist is no reason not to give him a visa; and other such inane, if not idiotic justifications) don’t stand to any reason whatsoever. 

Clearly, for all the noise that the government in India makes on the issue of terrorism and bringing terrorists like Dawood Ibrahim to justice, its actions and its policies are completely at variance with what it professes. What is more, the giving of a visa to Miandad has laid bare the sheer absence of any sort of statecraft in this current dispensation (which unfortunately seems to have rubbed off on the bureaucracy as well, especially since many of the time-servers are seeking extensions in service and are therefore currying favour with the political leadership even at the cost of the nation’s interest). One of the basic principles of statecraft is the use of all those instruments that help to further the interests and objectives of the State. But obviously, this simple rule has escaped the government of the day.

Despite the constant lament of both ordinary citizens as well as the strategic community in India about the failure of the government to emulate country's like the US and Israel (to name just two) in going after enemies of the State, the fact of the matter is that successive governments have neither been interested nor have they had the courage and conviction to develop capabilities to carry out extra-territorial operations against terrorists and saboteurs. The absence of such capabilities means that India cannot carry out covert actions to exact retribution for terrorist acts against its citizens. This leaves only a couple of tool in the hands of the government to use as leverage against countries and people who cross India’s path. 

In the case of Pakistan specifically, two of the most potent tools are visas and economic clout. Ask any Indian diplomat who has dealt with Pakistan and he will tell you that the only game in town is visas. Add to this the economic power of the BCCI and India has a very powerful instrument to reward or punish Pakistan. Rather than using this power to force the issue, the current government has decided to surrender it and allow Javed Miandad into India. If at the time of announcing the cricket tour (even this should have been used as a leverage to get something out of Pakistan instead of mouthing meaningless banalities about cricket being a unifying force and cricket being bigger than people...) the government and BCCI had made it clear that Miandad would not be welcome, it would then have been Pakistan’s call on whether or not to come for the tour. If they still went ahead with the tour, a strong signal would have been sent that India neither forgives nor forgets acts of mass murder and anyone who associates with a mass murderer of India will also not be forgiven. Even if Pakistan has not accepted the condition, the same message would have gone home. Instead the message India has now sent is that you can trifle with India, hobnob with a mass murderer and international terrorist and still be welcome in India without any fear of punishment or penalty.

Which serious country which also aspires to play a big role on the international stage behaves in such a foolish manner? We need to keep in mind that the UK refused entry to Osama bin Laden’s son even though he was married to a British citizen and had rejected his father’s ideology. India too had refused a visa to a foul-mouthed Pakistani politician Sheikh Rashid after it became known that he had run a terrorist training camp for Kashmiri terror groups in the early 1990’s. But now it seems it is kosher to grant permission to such disreputable characters to enter India.

To argue that Miandad is not a terrorist is to miss the point. He entered into a matrimonial alliance with Dawood not out of ignorance of Dawood’s antecedents but because of them. In doing so, Miandad was cocking a snook at India and as it turns out has been allowed to get away with it. Equally specious is the argument equating Miandad with some of Dawood’s relatives who are still in India. Have we even lost the ability to distinguish between a foreign national and Indian citizens’? As for Miandad being invited because of his cricketing past, will India allow a relative of Hafiz Saeed just because he is a cricketer or a poet or a singer? 

Clearly, the Manmohan Singh government’s Pakistan policy, if at all it can be called that, neither instils any confidence nor inspires any hope among a people who have been facing the scourge of criminality and terror from across the border. Much like the ancient Romans, it believes in providing Spectacles (read cricket matches) to lull the people into complacence.

Genuflecting before Pakistan

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow, VIF

The Indian external affairs minister’s visit to Pakistan from September 7-9 epitomised India’s composite re-engagement with Pakistan. It flies in the face of the assurances provided by the prime minister in his address to the Lok Sabha on July 29th that India “can have a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan only if they fulfil their commitment, in letter and spirit, not to allow their territory to be used in any manner for terrorist activities against India.”

Krishna’s visit to Pakistan marks the culmination of two rounds of comprehensive talks between the two countries decided upon during the February 2011 foreign secretary-level talks in Thimphu. During his visit to Islamabad Krishna not only had discussions with his counterpart but also had meetings with the president, the prime minister, the interior minister and with leaders of political parties like the MQM, ANP and the PMLN. The visit was also marked by the signing of a liberalised visa agreement, a cultural agreement and a meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission that was last held in 2007. The joint commission identified areas of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, education, environment, health, information, Information Technology and telecom, science and technology, and tourism. A series of measures were also agreed upon for easing travel and trade across the line of control. It was further decided that the next round of the secretary-level comprehensive dialogue process be launched that will come up for ministerial level review in New Delhi in 2013.

The lengthy 28 paragraph joint statement states that the talks were held in a ‘cordial, candid and constructive atmosphere’ and that there were ‘substantive discussions on the whole range of issues within the framework of the dialogue process’ with the ministers ‘expressing satisfaction over the progress achieved since their last review meeting in July 2011’. While there may have not been forward movement on many important issues like terrorism, Sir Creek and Siachen, the talks were cordial and wide ranging which is inexplicable in the light of the assurances given by PM in the Lok Sabha and given Pakistan’s continued hostility towards India.

Evidence of Pakistan’s inimical attitude towards India after the 26/11 attacks is borne out not only by its failure to make any serious efforts to bring to book the perpetrators but also by continued involvement in terrorist actions against India, like the Pune bombings of February 13, 2010 resulting in 17 deaths, the Mumbai serial blasts of July 13, 2011 resulting in 18 deaths and the Delhi High Court bombings of September 7, 2011 resulting in 11 deaths. Indeed, Abu Jindal’s debriefings confirm that Pakistan continues to plan similar terrorist actions against India. The resumption of cross-LoC firing by Pakistan, which had been stopped by Musharraf, continued terrorist infiltration from across the LoC, the relentless and massive pumping in of fake currency by Pakistan into India, the revival of its support to the Babbar Khalsa, its refusal to hand over to India any of the nearly 50 wanted terrorists, like Dawood Ibrahim, to whom its provides shelter, and its unwillingness to shut down the infrastructure of terror are proof that it means to continue to use terror against India in a ‘business as usual’ mode.

To add insult to injury the Pakistan foreign minister in an interview just before our external affairs minister’s visit urged that India should look at the 26/11 attacks “unemotionally”, drawing a parallel between them and the attacks on the Samjhauta Express and the 1971 conflict. This insensitivity was further reinforced in the joint press conference addressed by the two foreign ministers when she asserted that the two sides “should not be held hostage to history” but should look to the future.

Instead of challenging the Pakistan foreign minister at the joint press conference for the aforesaid comments and underlining the critical importance of addressing our terrorism-related concerns Krishna not only complimented the Pakistani leadership for bringing about “a positive change in the atmosphere” but echoed her thinking by stating “let us not look back, as you have very rightly said; let us not be held hostage to whatever has happened earlier…….Let us look to the future”. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Pakistani media has drawn the conclusion that India no longer attaches the importance it earlier did to bringing to book those involved in the Mumbai attacks.

It is logical to assume that it is only a matter of time before the PM who is “keen” to visit Pakistan will do so. Though prior to his departure in an interview to the Express Tribune the external affairs minister had stated that the “right atmosphere” would have to be created for it and that it should have a “substantive outcome” in Pakistan, in the joint press conference in Islamabad while not indicating any date for the visit he asserted that there was no question of progress on the 26/11 attacks being a condition for PM’s visit to Pakistan. Clearly, the government seems to have given up all pretence of pressurising Pakistan to give up the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy against us.

PM’s visit to Pakistan irrespective of whether or not Pakistan addresses our concerns on terrorism is supported by some in India on the grounds that it would provide an impetus to the current upturn in ties and would strengthen the hands of the civilian set up in that country. In this context, it may be mentioned that the upturn in ties is an illusion based on sweet nothings mouthed by Pakistan and our failure to retaliate against its many provocations. It tactically suits Pakistan to maintain this illusion as it is isolated and as this illusion deflects the pressure on it to shut down the infrastructure of terror.

Forward movement on trade by Pakistan, which is acclaimed as a sign of its positivity, has been long delayed and tardy and is, primarily, in its own interests. To date it has not accorded us the MFN status, which we did in the mid 1990s. It still maintains a negative list of nearly 1,200 items, allows movement of only about 200 items through land, and does not permit us transit rights for overland exports to Afghanistan. As regards the civilian government in Pakistan, our investing in it is pointless since it does not exercise real power, it will have to demit office latest by March 2013, and, in the ultimate analysis, it is also imbued with an anti-Indian mindset.

The ISI’s Psychological Operations

Dr. Prem Mahadevan,

Senior Research Associate, VIF

The government has stated that recent distress migrations of northeastern Indians were triggered by electronic messages originating from Pakistan. Investigators have found that the first hints of pogrom-style killings appeared on Pakistani internet forums, and rapidly spread to India as part of a coordinated psyops offensive. The modus operandi was vaguely familiar: doctored images and vitriolic texts flooded telecommunications networks, gaining credibility before law enforcement agencies could react. The apparent purpose was to stir up public anger in an already polarized setting and prepare the political mood for an outbreak of communal violence. During 1989, Pakistan had adopted similar methods when it broadcast television footage of anti-communist revolts in Eastern Europe and urged Kashmiri Muslims to likewise rise up against New Delhi.

What intelligence agencies now need to assess is whether their Pakistani counterparts were merely out to embarrass India, or if the scare campaign had a deeper purpose. It is possible that the Inter Services Intelligence, if it was involved, has no strategic end-game regarding present tensions between Bangladeshi immigrants and Bodo tribesmen. The agency’s covert operations cells might just be taking opportunistic advantage of the situation in Assam. Provided Indian authorities maintain public order, the matter might rest there. However, past experience of ISI psyops suggests that the agency rarely desists from coordinating its propaganda offensives with paramilitary action. Its favourite tactic is to combine persistent low-visibility subversion with sporadic high-visibility attacks, conducted on a deniable basis using local assets or expendable mercenaries.

A Suggestive Pattern

On at least three occasions, the ISI is thought to have used psychological and paramilitary operations in a synergistic role. The first was in late 1983, when masked turban-wearing gunmen hijacked buses in Punjab and selectively killed Hindu passengers. Since the attacks occurred amidst worsening Hindu-Sikh relations, most commentators assumed that they were carried out by Sikh separatist militants. However, eyewitness accounts cast doubt on this theory: the killers’ language and demeanour had indicated a military background. Furthermore, local intelligence was unable to identify them, suggesting that they were not based in Punjab itself. As such attacks continued into early 1984, arguments were advanced that the masked gunmen could have been Pakistani Punjabi mercenaries, working as agent provocateurs in a ‘false-flag’ campaign.

Irrespective of whether the hijackers were Indian or Pakistani, what is unquestionable was that their actions were intended to deepen Hindu-Sikh tensions. Furthermore, it is now generally acknowledged that Islamabad did intervene covertly in Indian Punjab. Throughout the 1980s and ‘90s, radio broadcasts expressed support for Sikh separatism. Pakistani scholars wrote about a possible second partition of India along Hindu-Sikh lines. ISI officials posted in Western capitals funded Sikh separatist publications and organized publicity events. These propaganda initiatives were matched operationally by linking terrorist attack cells to ISI networks. One occasion in 1992 saw two ISI operatives being killed in the company of a Sikh terrorist leader. Although Islamabad initially tried to deny their Pakistani nationality, it relented after protests from their families.

The second case of (suspected) ISI subversion being used to camouflage (largely proven) paramilitary action occurred in Mumbai in 1993. A spate of rioting plunged Hindu-Muslim relations in the city into a downward spiral. With innocent Muslims having suffered disproportionately, some of their co-religionists within the criminal underworld plotted retaliation. Led by Dawood Ibrahim, they organized eleven synchronized blasts across the city in March 1993, targeting Hindu-majority areas. The explosive material used was military-grade, suggesting a state supplier. A detonator recovered by Indian investigators from one of the blast sites was traced to Pakistan army ordnance stores.

What is interesting is that the pre-blast riots had occurred in two distinct waves. The first, in December 1992, was spontaneous; a symptom of country-wide religious polarization following the Babri Masjid demolition. The second wave, in January 1993, appeared to have been planned: it began with knife fights in the Mumbai docks, which expanded into pitched battles across the city. Investigators noted that the docks were a stronghold of Dawood Ibrahim, whose smuggling operations were based there. Although a causal relationship was difficult to prove, circumstantial evidence indicated that Ibrahim’s men had deliberately triggered the second round of rioting. If true, this hypothesis would suggest that the January 1993 riots were a classic intelligence provocation operation.

Ibrahim himself is believed by this time, to have come under ISI influence. Defectors from his group later revealed that the Pakistani government had impounded his shipping fleet, thus gaining leverage over him. The men who actually planted the bombs were trained in explosive-handling in Pakistan, but their passports contained no stamps by Pakistani immigration authorities. Surmising on this, one reputed American commentator has noted that such free movement could only have been facilitated by powerful elements within Pakistani state institutions. ¹ The ISI is the logical suspect.

The third case is Mumbai 2008. It is now known that the ISI was aware of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s plan to attack Mumbai. Testimony from Zabiuddin Ansari, one of the planners, even states that the agency provided the weapons and ammunition used in the attack and that two ISI officers personally supervised its implementation from a control room in

Karachi. The Indian prime minister and national security advisor have long asserted that the Mumbai 26/11 attacks bore signs of state support. Even if the Pakistani government as a whole was not involved, highly influential elements within it appear to have been.

This brings the context of the attacks into sharp focus. During the fall of 2008, alarm had been growing in India about a possible terrorist threat from Hindu extremists. These concerns were exploited by members of the political class, to deflect attention from the government’s failure in preventing jihadist attacks. The Mumbai gunmen played to this discourse, forging identity cards under Hindu names and wearing saffron wristbands. The attack planners had calculated that once the gunmen were killed by Indian police, these ‘clues’ would mislead the subsequent investigation and media commentary.

In this regard, it is important to note that the initial reaction from Islamabad was to reject any possibility of Pakistani involvement. The killings in Mumbai were projected as an outcome of domestic instability within India. Seen from hindsight, such discourse (later discredited by theconfession of AjmalKasab, one of the gunmen) seems to fit the thesis that the ISI masks its paramilitary activities with calibrated propaganda offensives.

The Logic of Pakistani Psyops

Reacting to claims made over the Assam crisis, Pakistani officials have accused Indian authorities of evading responsibility. They insist that India address its own domestic problems rather than attribute culpability to Pakistan. Such demands would be credible, if they were not preceded by episodes such as Kargil ’99 and Mumbai ‘08. On both occasions, Pakistani diplomats had initially ridiculed charges of cross-border involvement and accused India of spoiling bilateral relations. However, once the immediate crisis had subsided and international attention had drifted elsewhere, Islamabad found it expedient to quietly admit to such involvement. It did so in order to claim ownership over a spoiling action that had disrupted bilateral relations and driven up the price of further engagement.

Therein lies the real ‘core’ issue that bedevils India-Pakistan relations. It makes sense for the Pakistani security establishment to occasionally bring bilateral rapprochement to a shuddering halt. There are three reasons for this obstructionist stance:

1. Spoiler actions derail grassroots-level peace initiatives and stop them from assuming an independent forward momentum, which Islamabad might later not be able to regulate. Civil activism for friendly bilateral ties is thereby held in check.
2. These actions also drive a political wedge between India and its main security partners. They compel countries such as the US and UK to abandon New Delhi and instead assume a neutral refereeing posture on Indo-Pak tensions – one which invariably glosses over past jihadist transgressions against India.
3. Lastly, spoiler actions cement the Pakistan army’s domestic image as protector of the people against a vengeful Indian government and public. Certain actions such as Mumbai ‘08 are also meant to serve narrower objectives, such as deflecting domestic Islamist militancy onto a foreign (and thus ‘legitimate’) target.

In each of the cases outlined above, Pakistani officials loudly proclaimed that terrorist attacks in India resulted from domestic tensions. This consistency in emphasizing India’s internal fissures is revealing: it implies that at the governmental level, Pakistan views India as an artificial state, riddled by identity-based conflicts. Such views, if they actually do dominate official Pakistani thinking, would represent a colonial inheritance from the British Raj. During the 1940s, Raj officials had derided secular Indian nationalism as a doomed experiment. They predicted that, post-independence, India would fragment under the centrifugal influence of its own diversity. Building a common polity from a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious population was thought to lie beyond the capabilities of the country’s native leaders. So far, this prediction has been proven wrong, but continuing societal rifts provide hope to some ISI officers that it might yet come true.

Thus, while Pakistani writers claim that Indian elites have never accepted the logic of Partition, the same can be said of Pakistani elites. If India refuses to endorse the principle of religious exclusion that underwrote Pakistan’s formation, Pakistan has also refused to recognize the legitimacy of the secular nationalism that keeps India together. The ISI, if it orchestrated the hate campaign that prompted thousands of northeastern Indians to flee to their home states, was merely acting in conformity with Pakistani ideological dogma.

What Indian security forces now have to prepare for is the more serious possibility that this might not be the end of it. As might have occurred previously in Punjab, there is a chance that ISI operatives shall create a communal flashpoint through agent provocateurs. Reports suggest that the Pakistani agency is keen to erase international memories of the Mumbai ’08 attack. It hopes to achieve this by facilitating a major act of domestic terrorism in India, using only local assets. Islamabad could then argue, with all apparent reasonableness, that even if the Mumbai attack had featured Pakistani involvement, India still needs to put its own affairs in order. Towards this, ISI officials have already met with leaders of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in Dubai, to discuss possible collaboration. The Maoists have allegedly asked for military-grade explosive, and the ISI is believed to have asked in turn that the Maoists use these explosives to attack economic targets, such as oil refineries, so as to attain maximum strategic impact.

Even if the ISI were to support the Maoists however, the main focus of its psyops would still be on identity-based conflicts rather than ideology-based ones. The agency has plenty of experience in exploiting ethnic and linguistic fault lines to its own advantage. One example would be the East Pakistan civil war (1971), when the ISI organized Bihari Muslims into vigilante groups to fight Bengali separatists. Another would be its covert support for Mohajir militancy in Karachi during the 1980s – a tactic intended to contain Sindhi and Pashtun nationalism. However, the agency has little insight into ultra-leftist discourse, having never confronted a communist insurgency. Its ability to relate to the peasant and tribal revolution in central India is likely to be quite limited. Moreover, class struggle is not an issue that ISI strategists would want to publicize, as it might backfire on Pakistan, given the country’s own quasi-feudal social structure. For these reasons, it would make sense if the agency focused on Hindu-Muslim/Bodo-Bengali tensions.

Further ‘Rogue’ Operations Likely

Following the Mumbai ’08 attack, the then ISI chief told US officials that rogue officers from the agency might have been involved. This same argument had previously served Pakistan well in 1993, when ISI involvement with Dawood Ibrahim had attracted American queries. Basically, the ‘rogue operative’ thesis capitalizes on the tendency of Western listeners to equate such operatives with ‘enemies of the state’. Western analysts assume that if individuals within the ISI support terrorist attacks, Pakistani authorities would seek to identify and pursue them. Instead, India’s experience has so far belied this paradigm – although some ISI paramilitary activities might have been carried out without express sanction from above, these have not resulted in punitive measures against the officials involved. Rather, the immediate consequence tends to be a reshuffling of agency postings, to throw off Indian and Western counterintelligence efforts against the ‘rogues’.

There is a strong possibility that ‘rogues’ within the ISI will plan and assist a major act of terrorism in India, using local proxies as the triggermen. Such a scenario may not occur in the short term (i.e. the next three months), since the renewed India-Pakistan dialogue has not yet made much progress. A major improvement in atmospherics however, such as a summit between civilian politicians of the two countries, would likely set attack preparations afoot. By a spoiler action, the Pakistan army and ISI would want to emphasize their veto rights over any political process that bypasses them. Given the ongoing instability in India, caused by poor governance and communal polarization, they are likely to have many opportunities for combining psychological and paramilitary operations. The Bodo-Bangladeshi conflict shall probably be just one among these.

Dr. Prem Mahadevan is working with Centre for Security Studies, Zurich

Endnotes

1. Jessica Stern, ‘Pakistan's Jihad Culture’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, accessed online at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jstern/pakistan.htm, on 20 August 2012.