Attack on Hamid Mir: Pak Media Caught in Pincer of Military, Militants & Market Printer-friendly version

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The attack on one of the best known Pakistani journalists, Hamid Mir, has only reaffirmed Pakistan's reputation as one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists. Mir, who took six bullets, barely survived the well planned ambush carried out in broad daylight on a busy road in Karachi when he was heading from the airport to his office. The attempt on his life created a veritable storm in the Pakistani media, more so after his brother alleged that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen Zaheerul Islam, was responsible for the attack.

According to reports in the Pakistani media, Mir had confided in his friends and family about the threats to his life from ISI and had even recorded his testimony on paper and in a video which was to be made public if something happened to him. Naturally, as soon as news of the attack broke, fingers started being pointed at the ISI. The military spokesman was quick to condemn the incident and deny any involvement of the ISI in the incident. But cut to the bone by the audacity and temerity of the journalists who were accusing the ISI of being behind the attack, the intelligence agency, which is a virtual state within a state, unleashed its army of plants in the media to launch a fierce counter offensive, not just against Mir (accusing him of all sorts of anti-national activity) but also the media group –Jang/Geo – that he works for. For the rival channels, this was a Godsend opportunity to pull the Jang Group down from its pedestal as the most popular and powerful media group in Pakistan.

For some months now, the ISI has been using a rival channel ARY (owned by a dubious UAE based Pakistani-origin businessman who is alleged to be hand in glove with Dawood Ibrahim and involved in all sorts of shady deals, including Hawala and gold smuggling) to target Jang, its owner and its journalists. After the Hamid Mir attack, other channels like Express (owned by the Lakhani group) have also jumped into the act. The idea is to severely damage, if not destroy, Jang’s credibility and popularity and at the same time increase their own market share at Jang’s expense. The icing on the cake will be currying favour with the real power centre in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.

The Jang group has faced tough situations in the past, but always came out winner. This is however the first time that it is pitted directly against the military. The tiff with Musharraf in the last few months of his regime cannot be compared with what is happening today when it is facing a sustained and vicious campaign entirely backed by the dirty tricks department of the military. To an extent, the Jang group must share the blame for what it is facing. Over the years, it has carried out exactly the same sort of campaigns against civilian governments, weakening them to a point where they became pushovers for the ‘establishment’. The only time they failed was with Asif Zardari who despite the unremitting and unfair hostility of the Jang group managed to ride out all the storms that this media powerhouse created. In the case of the Nawaz Sharif, the Jang group was clearly seen to be leaning in support of the PML (N) government by demanding greater accountability of the army and was not just backing the prosecution of the former dictator, Pervez Musharraf, but also raking up other issues that rankled with the Men in Khaki. Perhaps, with the Jang group starting to believe that it could make and break (and even save) governments, the Pakistani establishment had already made up its mind to disabuse it of this notion and de-fang it. The charges levelled against the army and ISI in the Hamid Mir case will only give further impetus to the plan which is already underway.

What makes the attempt on Mir’s life so sinister is that it comes against the backdrop of mounting tensions between the civilian government and the military. Apparently, the army was pretty cut up with the government on the issue of former dictator Pervez Musharraf’s treason trial, the peace process with the Pakistani Taliban and the trade deal that the government was all set to sign with India. Things got a little tense after some rather strong words were used by cabinet ministers against Musharraf, which the media twisted to present as though these were aimed at the army. Adding further fuel to fire, some TV channels started playing an eight year old fiery speech of the Defence Minister, Khwaja Asif, in which he had railed into the military for meddling in politics and taking away the Lion’s share of the national cake without having anything to show for it.

Things seemed to have cooled down a bit after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad and expressed his confidence in the army and held up the Army Chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, as a role model for the newly commissioned officers. But the attack on Mir, coupled with the allegations against ISI, seems to have muddied the waters once again. Although Nawaz Sharif has set up a judicial commission of inquiry, the Mir case threatens to snowball into a test case for establishing civilian supremacy and making the military accountable. However, if Nawaz Sharif tries to brush this under the carpet, and the army continues on its offensive against those who question its dubious policies as well as its monopoly on defining national interest, then all the tall talk of civilian supremacy will remain just that. Already, the government, under pressure from the army, has retreated on the issue of opening trade with India (which isn’t such a bad thing from India’s point of view because of the sort of concessions which the Manmohan Singh government had given in return for getting a not quite MFN status). Even on Musharraf, there seems to be a move to let him off the hook and allow him to flee Pakistan. If now the government backs down on getting to the bottom of the attack on Mir, then it will be, for all practical purposes, reduced into a glorified municipality, like its predecessor. It may survive in office for a full term, but wield no real power to take any important decision, unless this is endorsed and sanctioned by the military.

Mir is of course not the first prominent journalist to come under fire, nor will he be the last. Just a couple of weeks earlier, another well-known journalist Raza Rumi escaped by the skin of his teeth after his car was ambushed in Lahore. Raza’s driver died in the incident and he has reportedly left Pakistan. Although in Raza’s case, the Taliban (through one of their affiliated organisations, the Sunni sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) are believed to be responsible, a number of other journalists have claimed threats from state, quasi-state and non-state actors. Interestingly, the ideological persuasions of the threatened journalists cover the entire spectrum of opinion. In other words, it is not just liberal people like SAFMA Secretary General Imtiaz Alam and columnist Kamran Shafi, but also Taliban advocates and sympathisers like Ansar Abbasi and Ahmed Noorani who have received threats, from both the military and the militants. Hit lists containing the names of journalists have also been floating around for some time now. But more than the threats, which are a professional hazard in a country as disturbed, divided and intolerant as Pakistan, it is the sheer impunity with which journalists are threatened and targeted that exemplifies the dysfunctional nature of the state and its institutions. Nothing illustrated this fact better than the utterly useless report of the commission that investigated the murder of journalist Saleem Shahzad, who is also believed to have been killed by the ISI after he published a story that the Al Qaeda had infiltrated the Pakistan Navy.

Like Shahzad, Mir had frequently been crossing the unwritten red lines of the military by highlighting issues like the enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings by the army and paramilitary forces, the human rights violations in Balochistan, the need to prosecute Musharraf, the rising civil-military discord etc. The problem was not just with the stories he was covering but also the fact that Mir thought he had become too big to be touched. This hubris was his undoing, as it has been of scores of journalists before Mir who thought that their prominence put them out of harm’s way. In Mir’s case, his past must also have gone against him. He was at one time seen as a blue-eyed boy of the ISI (his detractors claim he was on the payroll) and an Urdu paper he used to edit some years back was alleged to have been funded by the ISI. What is more, he used to espouse the cause of Jihadist terrorists and had developed close links with them. He also had a very rabid stance on India and Kashmir. When such a person tries to assert his independence, his former patrons are bound to be furious and the attack on him is likely to have a ‘salutary’ impact on other journalists who were outspoken, something that is already becoming apparent in the sort of guarded statements and comments that Mir’s colleagues have been making on TV and in the print media.

It wasn’t, however, just the military, but also the militants who were reported to be gunning for him. Although he was quite adept at walking the tight-rope on the issue of Taliban, there were times when he took positions that didn’t go down well with the Islamists. While the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has denied any involvement in the attack, there are some unconfirmed reports that the Punjabi Taliban have claimed responsibility. But this claim doesn’t appear to be very credible because Mir is known to have close links with the Punjabi jihadists, something that came out clearly when a tape emerged of a conversation between him and the Punjabi Taliban discussing the links of a kidnapped former ISI official, Khalid Khwaja, with the CIA. Khwaja was later shot dead by the Taliban after Mir virtually pronounced a death sentence on him by declaring him a CIA agent. If the Punjabi Taliban have now launched this murderous attack on Mir, then it would mean that there has been a big break between Mir and the so-called mujahideen.

Although the involvement of the TTP or its affiliates cannot be completely ruled out, the circumstances surrounding the attack on Mir shifts the needle of suspicion away from them. Despite their strong presence in Karachi – they have claimed responsibility for at least three or four attacks on media houses like Express and AAJ in recent months – for the Taliban to target an Islamabad-based Mir in the port city would require an intelligence and operational network capability which is probably out of their league. But if indeed it was the Taliban that carried out the attack on Mir, then it means that Pakistan is in far more serious trouble than what it is apparent. Apart from the Taliban, the ISI mouthpieces in the media have been quick to blame India for the attack. Some of these loonies have also named CIA and Mossad. Clearly, the intellect and worldview of these characters (which includes fairly senior retired military officers) is based on Bollywood masala movies like Ek Tha Tiger and Agent Vinod. Even more hilarious was the bizarre theories that some of the ‘analysts’ came up with: Mir was dubbed a RAW agent who was shot because he had outlived his usefulness; one genius morning show anchor even doubted that he was injured; another ‘analyst’ asked whether he staged the incident himself and accidentally got shot more than planned; yet another blamed the Jang/Geo group for the attack so it could paint the ISI in lurid colours!

More seriously, the fact that ISI touts have been using this opportunity to train their guns on India, their favourite whipping boy, raises serious questions about all the talk of the army being on the same page as the civilian government on the issue of improving relations with India. For some months now, known military mouthpieces have been carrying out a vitriolic and virulent campaign against India and have been taking pot shots at the Nawaz Sharif government accusing it of a sell-out. While the Manmohan Singh government, as is its wont, remained somnolent on this issue, what is surprising is that the so-called well informed Indian analysts on foreign affairs have continued to delude themselves that Pakistan has changed. The fallout of the Hamid Mir attack should serve as a reality check to all these Indians about how nothing has changed in Pakistan.

Pak Charade on Terrorism Stands Exposed

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

After weeks of delays and dithering, hemming and hawing, and some political bargaining, point scoring and grand-standing, the newly elected PMLN government in Pakistan finally managed to hold the much touted All Parties Conference to evolve a consensus on the counter-terrorism policy of the Pakistani state. The APC was never going to be the magic bullet that would find a lasting solution to Pakistan’s tryst with terrorism. But at the very least, it was expected to make a show of national resolve against terrorism even as it endorsed the government’s efforts and attempts to restore peace in the country through negotiations and dialogue. The resolution passed by the APC, however, is a document dripping with and reeking of irresoluteness. For all practical purposes, the only consensus that emerged after the confabulations of the civil and military leadership of Pakistan was to capitulate before the Taliban, and all that now remains to be decided are the modalities of going about this.¹

Not surprisingly, there has been trenchant criticism of the APC resolution by many Pakistani analysts and observers. For one, the very idea of holding an APC when there is a parliament in place to debate issues of vital national importance has been called into question, more so because ostensibly only parties with representation in parliament were invited for the APC.² Apart from procedural and protocol issues, there are other more substantial points on which the APC has been pilloried. For instance, despite all the verbiage in the resolution that was passed, there is no clear roadmap on how negotiations will be conducted, with whom, on what basis and under what framework, what will be the plan ‘B’ if the dialogue fails etc. In other words, none of the nuts and bolts of an anti-terror policy that are critical for determining the pace, direction, and terms and conditions of the negotiation process have been clearly specified. It is almost as though the authorities will decide things as they go along, or if you will, muddle along.

While the Pakistani politicians have been rather unrestrained in hitting out against the US, not just on the issue of drone attacks but also in making clear that in fighting the war Pakistan “will not be guided by the USA or any other country...”, when it comes to even mentioning the Taliban or the T-word (terrorism) all the determination displayed in standing up to the US (arguably Pakistan’s largest benefactor) seems to suddenly disappear. This of course is something that has been in the making for quite some months and, if anything, the pusillanimity of the Pakistani political class has only increased. Earlier this year, the the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Fazl-ur-Rehman Group (JUI-F) held an APC where the luminaries referred to the depredations of the Taliban as ‘lawlessness’ because use of the word ‘terrorism’ would offend the Taliban. The JUI-F APC also called for ‘engaging all concerned parties’, thereby conceding legitimacy to the Taliban by making them a concerned party instead of a combatant. The PMLN has gone a step further by using the term ‘stakeholders’ which is tantamount to placing the Taliban on an even higher pedestal.

The APC resolution quotes a two year old resolution by another APC to reiterate that ‘dialogue had to be initiated to negotiate peace with our own people (emphasis mine) in the Tribal Areas’. Quite asides the fact that this formulation is reflective of the twisted and confused mindset that pervades Pakistani thinking on the Taliban who are responsible for nearly 40000 murders, the talk about talking to ‘our own people’ is just so much hot air and not very different from the nonsense that used to be peddled during the Musharraf and Zardari period that negotiations or deals were not being made with the Taliban terrorists but with tribesmen and tribal elders. The spin that is now being given to this formulation is that it makes a distinction between foreign terrorists – Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs etc. and Pakistani jihadists and Taliban who are targeting the Pakistani people and state – and other groups which are involved in the insurgency because of some grievance or some ideological reasons and are not intrinsically opposed to the Pakistani state. If indeed such a distinction can be made, then the question arises as to what purpose will be served (in terms of restoring peace) by talking only to those combatants who are perhaps peripheral to the whole situation? In other words, the bulk of the people who are waging a war against the Pakistani state will not be part of the dialogue process and to tackle this lot force in any case will have to be used. If so, then this entire APC and the entire dialogue tack is an exercise in futility.

Worse, in what appears to be the Pakistani version of ‘one country, two systems’, the APC has virtually prepared the ground for conceding the formation of ‘Islamic Emirates’ in the areas where the Taliban hold sway. This has been done by the laying out the ‘guiding principles’ which talk of ‘respect for local customs and traditions, values and religious beliefs’. Clearly, such an ambiguously worded formulation allows the Taliban to impose their own version of Shariah and their medieval social norms in the areas they control under the pretext of respecting local customs and religious beliefs. What is more, if reports about Imran Khan’s boasts that the Pakistani authorities have accepted all that he has been demanding are true, then the Pakistan army is all set to effect a ‘phased withdrawal’ of troops from the troubled Tribal Areas, which means handing over complete control of these areas to the marauding Taliban, who will pretty much be free to run or ruin the place as they deem fit.³ Even now, the Pakistani state has effectively ceased to exist in many of the areas – notably North Waziristan and parts of South Waziristan – where it has entered into peace deals with Taliban warlords like Gul Bahadur and the now slain commander Mullah Nazir.

Perhaps the most problematic part of the APC deliberations and resolution is the extent that the civilian and military leadership has gone to appease the Taliban. The political class is apparently so terrified of riling and upsetting the Taliban that apart from use of obsequious phrases, they have also desisted from setting any ground rules that the Taliban would need to observe in order to prove their sincerity and seriousness about the dialogue. Forget about any clarity regarding what the dialogue is to achieve – according to one luminary of the PMLN who is rumoured to become the next governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the government will try to convince the Taliban to adhere to the constitution and accept the Shariah as currently exists in the country! – there are no pre-conditions of any sort that the Taliban will have to meet to come on the negotiation table.

But even though the Pakistani authorities seem reconciled to not insisting on any pre-conditions, there is at the same time an expectation (or at least a hope) that some sort of a ceasefire will be in place during the negotiations. The problem is that while from the side of the Pakistani state, there will be a single entity negotiating (which means that no operations from the side of the state against the insurgents), on the side of the insurgents there are dozens of groups which are operating, some reconcilable, others not so. This means that even though groups ready to negotiate with the government might adhere to a ceasefire, the groups that oppose any dialogue will be free to carry out attacks. Chances are that the Taliban (who are despite the multiplicity of groups constitute a confederation of sorts) follow the same twin track approach of talks and terror going hand in hand that Pakistan adopts with India. In other words, while the Taliban attacks will continue, there will be (and can be) no response from the side of the Pakistani state (because of the over-lapping of many Taliban groups in terms of both space and cadre), something that will only worsen the security situation and put the Taliban in a commanding position.

The TTP has already made it clear that any ceasefire would follow a dialogue and not precede it, as was being demanded by the earlier PPP-led government. To further rub the nose of the Pakistani authorities into the ground, the TTP had earlier this year nominated Adnan Rashid – the former Pakistan Air Force employee who had been given death sentence for his role in the assassination attempt on the former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf and who had been freed during the Bannu Jail break last year – as one of their negotiators. The other negotiators were Taliban leaders who were in custody of the Pakistani authorities. In addition, responding to earlier overtures for talks, the Taliban made it clear that they would neither lay down their arms nor sever their links with the Al Qaeda and other banned terror groups like the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other such groups. As far as this latest dialogue offer is concerned, even though the Taliban have welcomed it, there are reports that they will be insisting on some pre-conditions and confidence building measures before they accept the talks offer. Some of these conditions and CBMs appear to have been accepted, what with reports of half a dozen Taliban fighters and commanders being released as a goodwill gesture.

Quite clearly, the entire peace tack appears to be something of a non-starter and if it does start will in all likelihood backfire badly by reversing whatever little gains had been made by the Pakistani security forces in their half-hearted and unconvincing fight against the Islamist insurgents. Why then has the political class continued to insist on going through with this tack? One reason for this is that both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan (the latter remains an unreconstructed Taliban advocate) had consistently called for a dialogue with the Taliban when they were not in power and for them to now turn turtle on this issue would not go down well with their conservative, Taliban-leaning constituency. Another reason is that Nawaz Sharif might actually be acting out of fear of the Taliban. In recent weeks there have been a number of plots that have been uncovered that were aimed at the First Family, including a plan to attack the Raiwind family estate, kidnapping Shahbaz Sharif and targeting members of the family. As far as other parties like the PPP, ANP and MQM are concerned, they have become willing partners to the APC resolution partly out of fear of the Taliban and partly because they didn’t want to stand out as spoilers and obstructionists in a peace process on which many people had laid their hopes.

Finally, there is the proverbial elephant in the room – the Pakistan Army – which reportedly was not in favour of an accommodation with the TTP and other affiliated groups but has now kowtowed to the desire of the civilian government to enter into a peace negotiation.⁴ There are two possible reasons for the army’s new position. The first is that the Army is perhaps giving a long rope to civilian government and the Taliban, fully convinced that the TTP will renege on any deal it enters into, which in turn will end the ambivalence of the political class and create the national mood for launching a comprehensive operation against the Islamist insurgents. Alternatively, the Army could be using this opportunity as part of its long term plan for the post 2014 situation in which it hopes to partner the Taliban in the pursuit of its grand strategic design for domination of the region. In either case, peace will continue to remain a casualty.

Endnotes

1. For text of resolution passed by the APC on September 9, 2013 see http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-201085-Text-of-the-APC-resolution
2. Apart from the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, the army and ISI chiefs, the participants of the APC included governor Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa‚ chief ministers of four provinces‚ PPP leaders Makhdoom Amin Fahim and Syed Khurshid Shah‚ PTI Chairman Imran Khan‚ JUI-F Chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman‚ PML-Q Chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain‚ PML-F leaders Pir Sibghatullah Rashdi and Imtiaz Sheikh‚ Jamaat-e-Islami leader Liaquat Baloch‚ Muttahida Qaumi Movement leaders Farooq Sattar and Haider Abbasi Rizvi‚ Awami National Party leader Haji Adeel‚ Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party Chief Mehmood Khan Achakzai‚ Balochistan National Party-M Chief Akhtar Mengal‚ National Party leader Mir Hasil Bizenjo‚ Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith Chief Allama Sajid Mir‚ Qaumi Watan Party Chief Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao‚ and Ghazi Gulab Jamal and Abbas Afridi from Fata.
   http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25325-All-parties-agree-on-talk...
3. http://tribune.com.pk/story/602219/imran-khan-convinced-kayani-on-phased...
4. For a report on the army’s position on the dialogue proposal please see the following:
   http://dawn.com/news/1041787/govt-wins-support-for-talks-with-taliban
   http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25329-Army-to-enforce-govt-poli...

PM Visiting PAK Now A Bad Idea

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF

As the bigger country, India is often exhorted to be generous with Pakistan. Those advocating a sustained dialogue with Pakistan, irrespective of its conduct towards us, have such thinking, an off-shoot of which are current urgings to the Prime Minister to go to Pakistan.

Diplomacy, however, is not transacted with the currency of generosity. It is taken for granted that countries act principally in self-interest. No country will easily accept that another has been gratuitously “generous” to it; it would look for hidden motives. A country obtaining more than what it expects from another is likely to think that it succeeded because of diplomatic skills or well-applied pressure. Besides, how does one measure “generosity” and who makes the evaluation? Reciprocity, therefore, is the acceptable currency of diplomacy.

Inequity

Those asking India to be “generous” expect it to make unilateral gestures of kindness towards Pakistan, or giving it more than it gives in return. Such an accommodative approach has, in fact, been tried over the years, but without tangible results. Little political, intellectual and practical basis is therefore left for advocating such an approach today.

In 1947/48 Pakistan committed aggression against us in J&K, but instead of undoing it, we appealed to the UN, which has left Pakistan in possession of vital strategic areas in the north which gives it crucial continguity with China and denies us one with Afghanistan. In 1965 Pakistan was not punished for its second bid to wrest Kashmir as it got back the strategic Haji Pir pass from us at Tashkent. Despite Pakistan’s military defeat in 1971, we did not, in a show of statesmanship, insist on a final settlement of the Kashmir issue at Simla, besides releasing the 93,000 Pakistani POWs in our custody without any political quid pro quo. In 1999, despite a decade of Pakistani terrorist onslaught on Kashmir, Shri Vajpayee journeyed to Pakistan in friendship, but the response was Kargil, to which India reacted purely defensively.

In 2001 the Pakistani terrorists attacked our parliament. The enormity of the provocation compelled us to threaten a military strike, but we stayed our hand and eventually chose a diplomatic response by inviting General Musharraf to Agra. We discuss Kashmir with Pakistan on an unequal basis with Pakistan insisting on its territorial claims on at least the valley and we no longer asserting our claim on the whole of J&K. We have not reacted to Pakistan’s parliamentary resolution in April this year that the Kashmir issue should be resolved on the basis of UN resolutions. We tolerate Pakistani leaders meeting Kashmiri separatists on Indian soil.

We have overlooked Pakistan’s arbitrary extension of the ceasefire line in J&K beyond NJ9842 eastwards to the Karakoram Pass. On Siachen we are willing to consider demilitarization if Pakistan were to agree to delineate and demarcate the actual ground position line there, giving the latter an unwarranted locus standii in our own territory. We are diplomatically quiet on China’s involvement in development projects in POK, including the Neelum river project, even though Pakistan has raised its contestation of the Kishenganga project by the claim that it violates the Indus Waters Treaty(IWT), which we have scrupulously adhered to despite all the Pakistani provocations. We have tolerated Pakistan’s obstruction of the Wullar barrage project for years.

While Pakistan has attacked the India-US nuclear deal for undermining its interests, we have not targetted Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation with China. We have not retaliated against Pakistan’s attacks on our Embassy and other interests in Afghanistan. We have not made an issue of US arms supplies to Pakistan. On the economic front we have lived with Pakistani denial of MFN treatment to us. We have not made Pakistan pay the price for its mischief in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka against our interests.

Terror

Our self-restraint on the issue of Pakistan’s export of terrorism to India since the mid-1980s has been exceptional. Before the Pakistani jihadi elements with official backing perpetrated the Mumbai terrorist carnage, we comforted Pakistan politically by accepting its line that it too was a victim of terrorism like us. We agreed to set up a joint anti-terrorism task force as if genuine cooperation was possible. We have now accepted Pakistan’s linkage of the Samjhauta Express to the Mumbai attack in terms of our answerability, even when the two cases cannot be compared. We are upset by Hafiz Saeed’s jihadist rantings against India, but have not allowed this to affect our dialogue.

Visit

Pakistan is violating the cease fire agreement even today, with training camps in place in POK and incidents of infiltration continuing, but we are overlooking this. While the US has begun targetting Pakistan on its duplicitous conduct on terrorism, we are not only not exploiting this to our advantage, we are actually releasing pressure on Pakistan by engaging it across the board.

By not breaking diplomatic relations despite Kargil and Mumbai attacks etc, India has kept its lines of communication open with Pakistan. We are welcoming the highest Pakistani political leaders to India and our Prime Minister is meeting the top Pakistani leaders bilaterally on the margins of international conferences as part of our bilateral engagement. If, it is felt, that the objectives of the dialogue can be durably attained only if the Indian Prime Minister visits Pakistan, there should also be recognition that the risks of durably derailing it must be removed beforehand. A visit to Pakistan by Prime Minister now will be a huge political mistake on our part as it will signal that the outstanding issue of terrorism and trial of those responsible for the Mumbai massacre has been closed.

Bitten already many times, we should be very shy.

Genuflecting before Pakistan

Satish Chandra
Distinguished Fellow, VIF

The Indian external affairs minister’s visit to Pakistan from September 7-9 epitomised India’s composite re-engagement with Pakistan. It flies in the face of the assurances provided by the prime minister in his address to the Lok Sabha on July 29th that India “can have a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan only if they fulfil their commitment, in letter and spirit, not to allow their territory to be used in any manner for terrorist activities against India.”

Krishna’s visit to Pakistan marks the culmination of two rounds of comprehensive talks between the two countries decided upon during the February 2011 foreign secretary-level talks in Thimphu. During his visit to Islamabad Krishna not only had discussions with his counterpart but also had meetings with the president, the prime minister, the interior minister and with leaders of political parties like the MQM, ANP and the PMLN. The visit was also marked by the signing of a liberalised visa agreement, a cultural agreement and a meeting of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission that was last held in 2007. The joint commission identified areas of cooperation in the fields of agriculture, education, environment, health, information, Information Technology and telecom, science and technology, and tourism. A series of measures were also agreed upon for easing travel and trade across the line of control. It was further decided that the next round of the secretary-level comprehensive dialogue process be launched that will come up for ministerial level review in New Delhi in 2013.

The lengthy 28 paragraph joint statement states that the talks were held in a ‘cordial, candid and constructive atmosphere’ and that there were ‘substantive discussions on the whole range of issues within the framework of the dialogue process’ with the ministers ‘expressing satisfaction over the progress achieved since their last review meeting in July 2011’. While there may have not been forward movement on many important issues like terrorism, Sir Creek and Siachen, the talks were cordial and wide ranging which is inexplicable in the light of the assurances given by PM in the Lok Sabha and given Pakistan’s continued hostility towards India.

Evidence of Pakistan’s inimical attitude towards India after the 26/11 attacks is borne out not only by its failure to make any serious efforts to bring to book the perpetrators but also by continued involvement in terrorist actions against India, like the Pune bombings of February 13, 2010 resulting in 17 deaths, the Mumbai serial blasts of July 13, 2011 resulting in 18 deaths and the Delhi High Court bombings of September 7, 2011 resulting in 11 deaths. Indeed, Abu Jindal’s debriefings confirm that Pakistan continues to plan similar terrorist actions against India. The resumption of cross-LoC firing by Pakistan, which had been stopped by Musharraf, continued terrorist infiltration from across the LoC, the relentless and massive pumping in of fake currency by Pakistan into India, the revival of its support to the Babbar Khalsa, its refusal to hand over to India any of the nearly 50 wanted terrorists, like Dawood Ibrahim, to whom its provides shelter, and its unwillingness to shut down the infrastructure of terror are proof that it means to continue to use terror against India in a ‘business as usual’ mode.

To add insult to injury the Pakistan foreign minister in an interview just before our external affairs minister’s visit urged that India should look at the 26/11 attacks “unemotionally”, drawing a parallel between them and the attacks on the Samjhauta Express and the 1971 conflict. This insensitivity was further reinforced in the joint press conference addressed by the two foreign ministers when she asserted that the two sides “should not be held hostage to history” but should look to the future.

Instead of challenging the Pakistan foreign minister at the joint press conference for the aforesaid comments and underlining the critical importance of addressing our terrorism-related concerns Krishna not only complimented the Pakistani leadership for bringing about “a positive change in the atmosphere” but echoed her thinking by stating “let us not look back, as you have very rightly said; let us not be held hostage to whatever has happened earlier…….Let us look to the future”. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Pakistani media has drawn the conclusion that India no longer attaches the importance it earlier did to bringing to book those involved in the Mumbai attacks.

It is logical to assume that it is only a matter of time before the PM who is “keen” to visit Pakistan will do so. Though prior to his departure in an interview to the Express Tribune the external affairs minister had stated that the “right atmosphere” would have to be created for it and that it should have a “substantive outcome” in Pakistan, in the joint press conference in Islamabad while not indicating any date for the visit he asserted that there was no question of progress on the 26/11 attacks being a condition for PM’s visit to Pakistan. Clearly, the government seems to have given up all pretence of pressurising Pakistan to give up the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy against us.

PM’s visit to Pakistan irrespective of whether or not Pakistan addresses our concerns on terrorism is supported by some in India on the grounds that it would provide an impetus to the current upturn in ties and would strengthen the hands of the civilian set up in that country. In this context, it may be mentioned that the upturn in ties is an illusion based on sweet nothings mouthed by Pakistan and our failure to retaliate against its many provocations. It tactically suits Pakistan to maintain this illusion as it is isolated and as this illusion deflects the pressure on it to shut down the infrastructure of terror.

Forward movement on trade by Pakistan, which is acclaimed as a sign of its positivity, has been long delayed and tardy and is, primarily, in its own interests. To date it has not accorded us the MFN status, which we did in the mid 1990s. It still maintains a negative list of nearly 1,200 items, allows movement of only about 200 items through land, and does not permit us transit rights for overland exports to Afghanistan. As regards the civilian government in Pakistan, our investing in it is pointless since it does not exercise real power, it will have to demit office latest by March 2013, and, in the ultimate analysis, it is also imbued with an anti-Indian mindset.