Showing posts with label Gen Raheel Sharif. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gen Raheel Sharif. Show all posts

Friday, May 9, 2014

The Message Behind Raheel Sharif Raking up Kashmir

In a speech on the occasion of Martyrs Day, the Pakistan Army chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, parroted a nearly seven decade old, and by now tired and worn out cliché that Kashmir was Pakistan’s ‘jugular vein’ and demanded a resolution to the issue in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions and ‘aspirations of the Kashmiri people’, adding for good measure that there can be no ‘durable peace’ in the region if the Kashmir issue is not resolved, presumably according to Islamabad's wishes.

Coming as it does in the midst of India’s General Election, Gen Sharif’s speech was bound to raise hackles in India and it was quite natural for the main political parties to close ranks and attack these remarks. The reaction in India was a lot stronger this time as compared to what happened just a couple of months back when Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, had said the same thing in his address to the UN General Assembly. Although there is neither anything new nor anything novel in what Raheel Sharif or for that matter Nawaz Sharif have said on Kashmir, this sort of statement is offensive to the Indian ears. More importantly, India cannot and should not remain blasé about the signals that are coming out of both Islamabad and Rawalpindi because, if nothing else, Pakistan’s position has once again significantly regressed from the ‘out of the box’ thinking during the Musharraf years. In other words, the Kashmir solution that was being worked out on the back channel is now history.

The rhetoric of ‘jugular vein’ is in itself quite empty and illogical: if Pakistan could survive for seven decades without what it imagines to be its ‘jugular vein’, then Kashmir clearly is not its jugular vein. That aside, the timing and the occasion of the reference to Kashmir by Gen Raheel Sharif is important in terms of the message that is being sent. The speech has been made in the backdrop of rising tensions between the civilian government and the military over the trial of the former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf, the government’s efforts to normalise relations with India by pushing ahead on the trade front, and the differences between the government and the Army on the issue of talks with the Taliban. Adding to the tensions is the stand-off between the army and Pakistan's largest media network, Jang/Geo Group, after the botched assassination attempt on journalist Hamid Mir which has been blamed on the ISI. With the government caught in a bind on this issue, Gen Sharif’s speech was the army asserting itself and drawing red-lines for the civilian government on Kashmir, media freedom and Taliban talks.

The occasion too is important. This is the first time that in a ceremony to mark Martyrs Day, an army chief has thought it fit to talk about Kashmir. It is one thing for a military dictator to talk about political and diplomatic issues on such an occasion and quite another for a ‘professional’ army chief to do so. In no other democracy does an army chief make a statement that pretty much draws a line in the sand for the civilian government like Gen Raheel Sharif has done. What this has done is bust the myth of civilian supremacy in Pakistan. Even though Gen Sharif paid lip service to democracy, constitution and the rule of law in his speech, he has sent out a clear message that the Pakistan Army continues to retain the veto on issues traditionally handled by it– relations with India (Kashmir included), Afghanistan, US and nuclear programme. This should serve as a wake-up call for those in India who harboured the illusion that Nawaz Sharif would use his mandate to push ahead on normalising relations with India and the Pakistan Army would have no choice but to follow his lead. Quite aside, the fact that there are serious doubts in India about Nawaz Sharif’s own intentions, recent events, including the scuttling of the trade agreement by the Pakistan Army, prove that when it comes to India, the civilian government is subservient to the army.

For quite some time, Track-II seminarists have been trying hard to sell the line in India that the focus of the Pakistan Army has shifted from India to its internal troubles and its western borders. India is being told that the Islamist terror groups have now replaced India as enemy no. 1 and that both the civilian government and the military is on the same page as far as normalisation of relations with India is concerned. But Gen Sharif’s speech makes it clear that while the page may be the same, the understanding of the civilians and the military appears to be poles apart over what’s on that proverbial page. If anything, the Pakistan Army remains ideologically unreconstructed and unreformed when it comes to its irredentist claims over the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. India was and remains the enemy no. 1 and the sooner Indians get over their tendency to deceive themselves on this issue, the better. This means that the apprehensions being expressed in India for some time now that the Pakistanis will once again ratchet up the export of terrorism into India, and particularly in Kashmir, are likely to unfold in the not too distant a future. Gen Sharif’s speech is also a warning that the next government in New Delhi will be tested by the Pakistani sponsored terrorists within weeks, if not days, of taking office.

The Pakistanis tend to be rather economical with the truth when they complain that unlike in India where Pakistan is an election issue (even if not a central one), in Pakistan there is a general consensus on improving relations with India. The fact is that India remains a convenient bogey that all sides in Pakistan use to target their rivals. In the recent civil-military scrap, the army has used its ‘assets’ in the media, ‘civil society’ and political parties and its jihadist auxiliaries to drum up public opinion in its favour and target people who refuse to toe the army line by insinuating and sometimes directly accusing them of being on the Indian payroll. The point is that if even the remotest association with India is seen as tarnishing someone’s patriotic credentials in Pakistan, then what does it say about all the talk of a consensus on improving relations with India. In order to browbeat and bludgeon those in Pakistan who speak in favour of good relations with India, banned terrorist organisations have been unleashed to hold street demonstrations to express their love and loyalty to the army and ISI. In the process, not only have the organic links between the ISI and these jihadist terror groups been exposed, but also an open threat has been hurled at those who demand civilised and constitutional behaviour from the army to either fall in line behind the state actors or lose their lives to bullets fired by the non-state actors acting at the behest and on the instructions of the state actors. So much for Pakistani democracy, freedom of expression, and civilian supremacy.

Some incorrigible optimists in India would argue that it is precisely for this reason that India must continue to engage Pakistan as it will strengthen those favouring normalised relations and, at the very minimum, deepen the cleavages within Pakistan. But what these people need to understand that it is better to prepare to confront a strong enemy than to depend upon a weak friend. Before India clasps that hand of those who advocate good relations with it, let them first prove their strength in their own country before they expect some concession from India to strengthen their hand. In this, India should take lead from the example of Bangladesh where Sheikh Hasina has proved her credentials as a reliable partner in solving problems and improving India-Bangladesh relations.

Like his other countrymen, Gen Raheel Sharif has also spoken about how there cannot be durable peace without a resolution of the Kashmir issue. There can be no two views about the desirability of peace. But the urgency of peace is more for Pakistan than for India. Ever since Pakistan started sponsoring large scale terrorism in India in the late 1980s and early 1990s, its economy has gone into a tailspin, in large part because Pakistan is seen by the international community as a net exporter of terrorism. India, on the other hand, has been the toast of the world in these years and, but for the interregnum of the Manmohan Singh years, would have had an economy far more vibrant and strong than what it is today. In other words, while India’s USP has been its manpower, market and economy, Pakistan’s USP has been that it is a country too dangerous to fail, ‘an international migraine’ to quote Madeleine Albright! As an international basket case and a country being torn apart by its self-created terrorist monsters, it is Pakistan which has a greater need for durable peace. People like Gen Raheel Sharif should, therefore, do their own country a favour and pipe down on their war-mongering, which neither impresses India nor does anything for Pakistan.



Published Date: 5th May 2014, Image source: http://www.nationalturk.com

Thursday, April 24, 2014

Attack on Hamid Mir: Pak Media Caught in Pincer of Military, Militants & Market Printer-friendly version

Sushant Sareen, 
Senior Fellow, VIF

The attack on one of the best known Pakistani journalists, Hamid Mir, has only reaffirmed Pakistan's reputation as one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists. Mir, who took six bullets, barely survived the well planned ambush carried out in broad daylight on a busy road in Karachi when he was heading from the airport to his office. The attempt on his life created a veritable storm in the Pakistani media, more so after his brother alleged that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen Zaheerul Islam, was responsible for the attack.
According to reports in the Pakistani media, Mir had confided in his friends and family about the threats to his life from ISI and had even recorded his testimony on paper and in a video which was to be made public if something happened to him. Naturally, as soon as news of the attack broke, fingers started being pointed at the ISI. The military spokesman was quick to condemn the incident and deny any involvement of the ISI in the incident. But cut to the bone by the audacity and temerity of the journalists who were accusing the ISI of being behind the attack, the intelligence agency, which is a virtual state within a state, unleashed its army of plants in the media to launch a fierce counter offensive, not just against Mir (accusing him of all sorts of anti-national activity) but also the media group –Jang/Geo – that he works for. For the rival channels, this was a Godsend opportunity to pull the Jang Group down from its pedestal as the most popular and powerful media group in Pakistan.
For some months now, the ISI has been using a rival channel ARY (owned by a dubious UAE based Pakistani-origin businessman who is alleged to be hand in glove with Dawood Ibrahim and involved in all sorts of shady deals, including Hawala and gold smuggling) to target Jang, its owner and its journalists. After the Hamid Mir attack, other channels like Express (owned by the Lakhani group) have also jumped into the act. The idea is to severely damage, if not destroy, Jang’s credibility and popularity and at the same time increase their own market share at Jang’s expense. The icing on the cake will be currying favour with the real power centre in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.
The Jang group has faced tough situations in the past, but always came out winner. This is however the first time that it is pitted directly against the military. The tiff with Musharraf in the last few months of his regime cannot be compared with what is happening today when it is facing a sustained and vicious campaign entirely backed by the dirty tricks department of the military. To an extent, the Jang group must share the blame for what it is facing. Over the years, it has carried out exactly the same sort of campaigns against civilian governments, weakening them to a point where they became pushovers for the ‘establishment’. The only time they failed was with Asif Zardari who despite the unremitting and unfair hostility of the Jang group managed to ride out all the storms that this media powerhouse created. In the case of the Nawaz Sharif, the Jang group was clearly seen to be leaning in support of the PML (N) government by demanding greater accountability of the army and was not just backing the prosecution of the former dictator, Pervez Musharraf, but also raking up other issues that rankled with the Men in Khaki. Perhaps, with the Jang group starting to believe that it could make and break (and even save) governments, the Pakistani establishment had already made up its mind to disabuse it of this notion and de-fang it. The charges levelled against the army and ISI in the Hamid Mir case will only give further impetus to the plan which is already underway.
What makes the attempt on Mir’s life so sinister is that it comes against the backdrop of mounting tensions between the civilian government and the military. Apparently, the army was pretty cut up with the government on the issue of former dictator Pervez Musharraf’s treason trial, the peace process with the Pakistani Taliban and the trade deal that the government was all set to sign with India. Things got a little tense after some rather strong words were used by cabinet ministers against Musharraf, which the media twisted to present as though these were aimed at the army. Adding further fuel to fire, some TV channels started playing an eight year old fiery speech of the Defence Minister, Khwaja Asif, in which he had railed into the military for meddling in politics and taking away the Lion’s share of the national cake without having anything to show for it.
Things seemed to have cooled down a bit after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad and expressed his confidence in the army and held up the Army Chief, Gen Raheel Sharif, as a role model for the newly commissioned officers. But the attack on Mir, coupled with the allegations against ISI, seems to have muddied the waters once again. Although Nawaz Sharif has set up a judicial commission of inquiry, the Mir case threatens to snowball into a test case for establishing civilian supremacy and making the military accountable. However, if Nawaz Sharif tries to brush this under the carpet, and the army continues on its offensive against those who question its dubious policies as well as its monopoly on defining national interest, then all the tall talk of civilian supremacy will remain just that. Already, the government, under pressure from the army, has retreated on the issue of opening trade with India (which isn’t such a bad thing from India’s point of view because of the sort of concessions which the Manmohan Singh government had given in return for getting a not quite MFN status). Even on Musharraf, there seems to be a move to let him off the hook and allow him to flee Pakistan. If now the government backs down on getting to the bottom of the attack on Mir, then it will be, for all practical purposes, reduced into a glorified municipality, like its predecessor. It may survive in office for a full term, but wield no real power to take any important decision, unless this is endorsed and sanctioned by the military.
Mir is of course not the first prominent journalist to come under fire, nor will he be the last. Just a couple of weeks earlier, another well-known journalist Raza Rumi escaped by the skin of his teeth after his car was ambushed in Lahore. Raza’s driver died in the incident and he has reportedly left Pakistan. Although in Raza’s case, the Taliban (through one of their affiliated organisations, the Sunni sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) are believed to be responsible, a number of other journalists have claimed threats from state, quasi-state and non-state actors. Interestingly, the ideological persuasions of the threatened journalists cover the entire spectrum of opinion. In other words, it is not just liberal people like SAFMA Secretary General Imtiaz Alam and columnist Kamran Shafi, but also Taliban advocates and sympathisers like Ansar Abbasi and Ahmed Noorani who have received threats, from both the military and the militants. Hit lists containing the names of journalists have also been floating around for some time now. But more than the threats, which are a professional hazard in a country as disturbed, divided and intolerant as Pakistan, it is the sheer impunity with which journalists are threatened and targeted that exemplifies the dysfunctional nature of the state and its institutions. Nothing illustrated this fact better than the utterly useless report of the commission that investigated the murder of journalist Saleem Shahzad, who is also believed to have been killed by the ISI after he published a story that the Al Qaeda had infiltrated the Pakistan Navy.
Like Shahzad, Mir had frequently been crossing the unwritten red lines of the military by highlighting issues like the enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings by the army and paramilitary forces, the human rights violations in Balochistan, the need to prosecute Musharraf, the rising civil-military discord etc. The problem was not just with the stories he was covering but also the fact that Mir thought he had become too big to be touched. This hubris was his undoing, as it has been of scores of journalists before Mir who thought that their prominence put them out of harm’s way. In Mir’s case, his past must also have gone against him. He was at one time seen as a blue-eyed boy of the ISI (his detractors claim he was on the payroll) and an Urdu paper he used to edit some years back was alleged to have been funded by the ISI. What is more, he used to espouse the cause of Jihadist terrorists and had developed close links with them. He also had a very rabid stance on India and Kashmir. When such a person tries to assert his independence, his former patrons are bound to be furious and the attack on him is likely to have a ‘salutary’ impact on other journalists who were outspoken, something that is already becoming apparent in the sort of guarded statements and comments that Mir’s colleagues have been making on TV and in the print media.

It wasn’t, however, just the military, but also the militants who were reported to be gunning for him. Although he was quite adept at walking the tight-rope on the issue of Taliban, there were times when he took positions that didn’t go down well with the Islamists. While the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has denied any involvement in the attack, there are some unconfirmed reports that the Punjabi Taliban have claimed responsibility. But this claim doesn’t appear to be very credible because Mir is known to have close links with the Punjabi jihadists, something that came out clearly when a tape emerged of a conversation between him and the Punjabi Taliban discussing the links of a kidnapped former ISI official, Khalid Khwaja, with the CIA. Khwaja was later shot dead by the Taliban after Mir virtually pronounced a death sentence on him by declaring him a CIA agent. If the Punjabi Taliban have now launched this murderous attack on Mir, then it would mean that there has been a big break between Mir and the so-called mujahideen.

Although the involvement of the TTP or its affiliates cannot be completely ruled out, the circumstances surrounding the attack on Mir shifts the needle of suspicion away from them. Despite their strong presence in Karachi – they have claimed responsibility for at least three or four attacks on media houses like Express and AAJ in recent months – for the Taliban to target an Islamabad-based Mir in the port city would require an intelligence and operational network capability which is probably out of their league. But if indeed it was the Taliban that carried out the attack on Mir, then it means that Pakistan is in far more serious trouble than what it is apparent. Apart from the Taliban, the ISI mouthpieces in the media have been quick to blame India for the attack. Some of these loonies have also named CIA and Mossad. Clearly, the intellect and worldview of these characters (which includes fairly senior retired military officers) is based on Bollywood masala movies like Ek Tha Tiger and Agent Vinod. Even more hilarious was the bizarre theories that some of the ‘analysts’ came up with: Mir was dubbed a RAW agent who was shot because he had outlived his usefulness; one genius morning show anchor even doubted that he was injured; another ‘analyst’ asked whether he staged the incident himself and accidentally got shot more than planned; yet another blamed the Jang/Geo group for the attack so it could paint the ISI in lurid colours!


More seriously, the fact that ISI touts have been using this opportunity to train their guns on India, their favourite whipping boy, raises serious questions about all the talk of the army being on the same page as the civilian government on the issue of improving relations with India. For some months now, known military mouthpieces have been carrying out a vitriolic and virulent campaign against India and have been taking pot shots at the Nawaz Sharif government accusing it of a sell-out. While the Manmohan Singh government, as is its wont, remained somnolent on this issue, what is surprising is that the so-called well informed Indian analysts on foreign affairs have continued to delude themselves that Pakistan has changed. The fallout of the Hamid Mir attack should serve as a reality check to all these Indians about how nothing has changed in Pakistan.

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

New Pak Army Chief: Nawaz Sharif Gambles on Old Criteria

Sushant Sareen, 
Senior Fellow, VIF

Out of all the names being tossed around as the possible replacement for Gen Ashfaq Kayani, it is the dark horse – Gen Raheel Sharif – who has finally been appointed as the Pakistan Army’s 15th chief. Apparently, Gen Sharif’s name was on the panel of names forwarded by Kayani to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; but he was never the favourite. The grapevine was that Nawaz Sharif, who has had a run-in with all the army chiefs he has worked with in his previous two tenures as Prime Minister, would stick to the book and go by the seniority criteria. Nawaz Sharif had himself declared on more than one occasion that he would go by seniority in selecting the next army chief.

If indeed this was the course he had followed, then there were only two options: either he would appoint the two senior-most generals – Haroon Aslam and Rashad Mehmood – to the two positions that were available i.e. the ceremonial Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) and the substantive Chief of Army Staff (COAS); or else he would pick the Naval chief for the post of CJCSC and appoint Aslam as COAS. But the fact that Nawaz Sharif was taking his time in announcing the CJCSC, a position that has become vacant in early October, and was not disclosing the name of the next COAS led many to believe that he would once again break the chain of seniority and select an army chief he was comfortable with. This meant that apart from seniority, he would also go by other criteria – loyalty, background (both family as well as political ideology in terms of attitude towards army’s role in politics), affiliations or the lack of them with Nawaz Sharif’s detractors and enemies (for instance, closeness to the former dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf), and the person’s thinking on issue like relations with the US and how to tackle the tide of terrorism, among other things.

While there were three front-runners – Haroon Aslam, Rashad Mehmood and Raheel Sharif – there was another name that was often mentioned as a possible chief – Tariq Khan. The Mess gossip was that Aslam, a Jat and a commando to boot (bringing back bad memories of another commando who was made army chief by Nawaz Sharif – Pervez Musharraf), was a man with a mind of his own which would hardly be something that Nawaz Sharif would be comfortable with. The next in line was Rashad Mahmood. He was regarded as the favourite of the outgoing chief and almost an alter ego and mirror image of Kayani. This would have certainly spooked Nawaz Sharif. The fourth was Tariq Khan who was seen as the favourite of the soldiery and very popular within the army. He was also reputed as a no-nonsense kind of general who would take a hard line on the Taliban and not allow the politicians to play footsie with the Islamists. Worse, he was seen as someone who has little patience for the shenanigans of politicians and was not the kind of guy who would keep quiet and let the drift in the affairs of state continue endlessly.

Finally, there was Raheel Sharif, the third on the seniority list. He was regarded as a good officer, not exceptionally bright or professionally cutting edge, but reasonably competent. He has a good pedigree – younger brother of the man awarded Pakistan’s highest gallantry award. But more importantly, he is a Kashmiri. The biradari factor would certainly count with Nawaz Sharif, who is himself a Kashmiri. Much like the Kashmiri Pandit Diaspora in India, the Kashmiri Muslim Diaspora in Pakistan is very clannish – a look at the composition of Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet, which has a high proportion of Kashmiris, proves this point. In fact, Raheel Sharif is the second Kashmiri army chief appointed by Nawaz Sharif, the first being the ill-fated Ziauddin Butt who was imprisoned within hours of his appointment which has triggered the coup that ousted Nawaz Sharif 2.0 and brought in Musharraf.

The remarkable thing about the selection of the new army chief is not so much the man who has been picked as it is the manner in which Nawaz Sharif and his close coterie managed to keep this choice so close to their chest that hardly anyone was able to guess who he would appoint. That this happened in a place like Pakistan, where nothing remains secret for very long and where rumours are generally ‘premature facts’, is quite creditable. Practically all of the commentators who were wittingly or unwittingly lobbying for one or the other contenders will be eating crow today. For instance, there is a man by the name of Brian Cloughley who is regarded by many in Pakistan as a foreigner who is often used by the Pakistan army for hatchet jobs and writing nice things about them and projecting their views in the West. A highly opinionated but just as equally ill-informed Cloughley wrote some weeks ago: “Then there’s Lt-Gen Raheel Sharif, another competent and well-above-average officer – but a close associate of Musharraf. I think, perhaps, forget him, because Nawaz is an unforgiving man.” Whether Cloughley was misleading or misled is hardly the point. The fact is that Nawaz Sharif made his decision and didn’t let anyone get a whiff of what he was going to do.

It is difficult to say what sort of a chief Raheel Sharif will be. Commissioned in the Frontier Force regiment in 1976, he is the first Pakistan Army chief who hasn’t fought in a war against India. In terms of appointments, he has done all the necessary command and staff postings that would qualify him for the top job. As the Commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy, he is credited with introducing training modules to prepare the cadets for the new type of war that the army is facing. Until recently, asymmetric war was something that Pakistan unleashed on others; now however the shoe is on the other foot! Apart from commanding the Gujranwala corps, and serving as GOC Lahore, Raheel Sharif’s last appointment before becoming chief was Inspector General Training and Evaluation. This was quite obviously a sidelining position, but as IGT&E he has had the opportunity for interacting closely with the Afghan Army and was the point man for providing training and designing training courses for the Afghan Army. It is another matter that these courses have not found many takers in the Afghan Army. He is also believed to have been involved in preparing and evaluating plans to counter the Indian Army’s ‘cold start’ doctrine.

On a personal level, there isn’t a great deal of information in the public domain about Raheel Sharif. According to Pakistani press reports, he has a soldierly swagger and is a bit of a showman. This is something that makes for good TV as well as in regimental durbars, but is no substitute for taking tough decisions, and there are bound to be many new pressures and hard decisions that the next army chief will have to take. Of course, now that he has been appointed, we can rest assured that the Pakistani press will be labelling him as a ‘tough, professional soldier’. Asides of the obvious question of how a ‘non-professional’ soldier can ever rise to be a General officer in a professional army, this is really short-hand for saying that he is not involved in politics. But this is something that has also been said of other generals, including a certain Musharraf, who later usurped power by overthrowing civilian governments. The simple reality of life in Pakistan is that no army chief in Pakistan can ever completely divorce himself from politics. Even if he is totally apolitical, he will eventually be dragged into the political quagmire.

With Pakistan likely to face some decisions in the not too distant a future – how to handle drones and relations with the US, what to do about the Pakistani Taliban and whether to negotiate with them and how much space to cede to them, how to deal with India, the policy on Afghanistan post 2014, how to handle the civil-military relations – it is a long list of existential questions that the next army chief cannot just close his eyes to and let the civilian government call all the shots. Pundits in Pakistan and also some Western diplomats are predicting that the next army chief will be forced, partly by institutional pressure and partly by circumstances, to indulge in some tough talking with the civilian leadership. During Kayani’s tenure, there were rumblings in the army over his hands-off and non-interventionist approach. It seems unlikely that Raheel Sharif can adopt the same approach and resist pressure from rank and file to take up issues with the government that are agitating the Army. How the civil-military equation settles in this sort of a situation is something that will determine the future of Pakistani politics, and also Pakistan’s relations with rest of the world.

Given his profile, it is quite possible that Raheel Sharif won’t rock the boat too much on major strategic issues, even less so because he is not the sort of charismatic and inspirational figure who can affect any kind of paradigm change in the outlook, worldview and thinking of the Pakistan army, especially in relation to India. Even if he is subservient to the civilian government, a very heroic assumption if ever there was one, what he can do at best is only on the margins. At best he could try reorienting the army’s focus from the Eastern front to the Western and internal fronts.

Conversely, if he is one of those inveterate and incorrigible India baiters i.e. run of the mill kind or garden variety military officer in the Pakistan army, then there is every chance that he will use the dirty tricks department of the army to undermine and even sabotage any initiative that Nawaz Sharif might want to take.


It isn’t quite clear what sort of impact his brother’s death in the 1971 war has left on him; nor is it quite clear as yet what impact the Zia years, when he was a young officer, have had on him. It is possible that he might espouse moderate, even liberal values in personal life. But often enough these do not translate into the values he espouses as part of an institution because the latter could be diagrammatically opposite to personal values. Such schizophrenia is pretty common in the Pakistan army – for instance, Ayub and Musharraf were whisky swilling and generally progressive approach on a range of issues but when it came to India, the former was an undiluted communalist and the latter a confirmed Jihadist. Although the Pakistani media and government will try and project the appointment of Raheel Sharif as a sign that Nawaz Sharif is calling the shots, Indian policy makers would do well to remember the empty boast of Mushahid Husain, Nawaz Sharif’s Information Minister in his last term, who claimed that by demanding the resignation of Gen Jehangir Karamat and appointing Gen Pervez Musharraf as chief, Nawaz Sharif had shown the army who was the boss! The bottom-line is that the army chief is his own boss and anyone who has other ideas tests this truism at his own peril, something that Nawaz Sharif has learnt to his cost in both his previous terms – first, when his resignation was extracted by Gen Wahid Kakar and second, when Musharraf ousted him. What now remains to be seen is what Raheel Sharif does.