Commentary- Uzbekistan and Afghanistan Enhance Cooperation

2 Jan, 2018 | Dr Rashmini Koparkar, Research Associate, VIF

President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani has recently paid an official visit to Uzbekistan. His meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has resulted in signing of 20 agreements in fields of trade, transit, security, electricity and education. As a matter of fact, relations between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have seen an upper trajectory in last one year, marked by sustained political dialogue and high economic engagements. Improvement of relations between these two landlocked neighbors is a welcome sign for the region at large.

Tashkent- Kabul Relations at a Glance

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan are ‘strategically located’ neighbors. Uzbekistan borders all other Central Asian Republics (CAR) and Afghanistan. On the other hand, Afghanistan is a bridge between South and Central Asia. It borders three of the five CARs, namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Both these countries are landlocked and therefore, depend on each other for trade, transport and connectivity. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan share the border of about 137 kilometers, which is a ‘natural’ boundary of the river Amu Darya.

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan enjoy historical commonalities and ethno-cultural linkages, as they were part of the same geo-political space for considerable time in history. During the Soviet times, interaction from across the border was very high, especially during its Intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989). The Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Friendship Bridge was constructed in 1982 near the Afghan border-town of Hairatan, establishing a firm link across Amu Darya.

Diplomatic relations established after the Uzbek independence in 1991 crumbled down after the capture of Kabul by the Taliban. In 1990’s, Uzbekistan was also facing the challenges of radicalism and violent extremism, which multiplied because of the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997) and emergence of the Taliban. Uzbek government was concerned about the spillover from across the border, and thus, closed the Friendship Bridge in 1997, which was reopened only in 2002. The 9-11 and subsequent War on Terror was a big breakthrough in the regional dynamics. Uzbekistan at that time had provided an airbase to the United States (US) at Karshi-Khanabad and a base for German unit at the bordering town of Termez. However, US base was closed down in 2005 after the Uzbekistan- US estrangement over the Andijan incident. One of the supply lines of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) passed from Uzbekistan through the Friendship Bridge, which carried almost 70 percent of the oil used for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations.

Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations have experienced steady improvement in last couple of years, based on cooperation in fields of trade, transport, electricity, etc., as follows:-

• A railway line from Termez to Hairatan carries wheat and flour, fuels, fertilizers and consumer goods from Uzbekistan. This is one of the most important freight carriers to Afghanistan.
• In 2011, Uzbek national railway company Temir Yu’llari constructed the 75 kilometer long Hairatan-Mazar-e-Sharif railway. The cost of USD 1.5 billion was funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
• Uzbekistan also constructed 11 bridges and crossings on the road connecting Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul.
• Uzbekistan is one of the most significant suppliers of electricity to Afghanistan. A power transmission line was laid in 2009 with the capacity of 150 megawatt (mW) to supply electricity to Kabul. It was then increased to 300 mW.

With the population of 32 million, Uzbekistan is the most-populous country in Central Asia. With its vibrant and diversified economy, it can potentially offer a lot to Afghanistan in its process of national re-construction, especially in terms of food security, energy and technological assistance.

Uzbekistan has been concerned with the spillover of insecurity from Afghanistan, which has multiplied in the aftermath of US withdrawal. Any blow to security and stability in Afghanistan is seen as the destabilizing factor for neighboring CARs. Even though considerable number of ethnic Uzbeks live in Afghanistan, it has seldom been a decisive factor in the bilateral relations. Major drivers in this regard are security concerns and economic interests.

Mirziyoyev’s Policy of ‘Neighborhood First’

President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, after coming to power in 2016, reiterated that Central Asia forms the top priority agenda of his external affairs. Being a landlocked country, Uzbekistan heavily depends on all its neighbors for internal as well as external growth. Keeping this in mind, Mirziyoyev has been working hard to improve relations with other CARs and Afghanistan. This was reflected in his 12 visits to the CARs in a year and several rounds of bilateral meetings during the visits and on the sidelines of various international summits.

In first nine months of 2017, the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan has increased by 30 percent. Similarly, its improving relations with Kyrgyzstan are underlined by the delimitation of border, opening of border crossings and attempts at solving the water dispute. In case of Tajikistan, a direct flight between Tashkent and Dushanbe was resumed after the lapse of more than 25 years. The balanced, open and pragmatic foreign policy of Mirziyoyev has created a positive environment of regional cooperation.

Enhancing Uzbek-Afghan Ties

Relations between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have considerably enhanced in last couple of months. In January 2017, the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan Mr Abdulaziz Kamilov paid an official visit to Kabul. During this visit, the two sides signed a bilateral trade and economic ‘Road map’ for increasing the bilateral trade up to one billion USD. In 2016, the trade turnover was about USD 520 million. Agreements were also signed for cooperation in fields of transport infrastructure, security and combating drug trafficking.

Uzbek-Afghan Presidents held bilateral meetings in Astana on the sidelines of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in June 2017 and the Science and Technology Summit of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in September 2017. In May 2017, Mirziyoyev appointed Mr Ismatilla Irgashev as President’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.

In November 2017, a direct passenger flight between Tashkent and Kabul was started for the first time by Kam Air, Afghan national airline. Aviation cooperation between the two countries also includes training of Afghan pilots, maintenance of Kam Air aircrafts, and transit facilities in Tashkent.

President Ghani’s December 2017 visit to Uzbekistan was a step forward in enhancing Uzbek-Afghan ties. The two presidents conducted talks in narrow as well as extended format and signed a Joint Statement. 20 inter-ministerial agreements were signed in the fields of trade, transit, security, electricity and education. Take away points from the visitare as follows;

• Agreement on constructing a railway line between Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat.
• Construction of Surkhan- Pul-i-Khumri Power Transmission Line with capacity of 500 kw.
• Establishment of Joint Commission on the Security matters.
• Agreement on cooperation in security of the Hairatan Bridge.
• Uzbek-Afghan Trading Houses set up in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif, and International Logistic Center in Termez.
• Afghan Consulate was opened in the border city of Termez.

The two countries pledged for joint efforts to fight the challenges posed by international terrorism and foreign fighters, extremism, transnational organized crime, illegal migration, illicit drug and trafficking of psychotropic substances. The Presidents also stressed the need for political solution to ensure peace and reconciliation between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban through an Afghan-led process. It was emphasized that peaceful settlement should be in compliance with funda
mental international norms and principles enshrined in the United Nation Charter.

Conclusion

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, being neighbors, form the core of each other’s foreign policy. Security situation in Afghanistan can have a direct impact on security and stability of Central Asia. Therefore, Uzbekistan is supporting the Afghan government in restoring peace. It is also providing assistance for development of transport and energy infrastructure and integration of Afghanistan into the regional economic process.

India has also cultivated robust relationship with Afghanistan, which spans political, security, economic, educational, cultural and humanitarian spheres. Recently, we have sent the inaugural consignment of 15000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan through the Chabahar Port. This has opened up a new trade and transit corridor for India to connect with Afghanistan and CARs. Cooperation in arenas of trade, connectivity, energy and security can bring closer the regional powers like India, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, which cherish Civilizational Connect of thousands of years.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

India-Uzbekistan Relations: New Opportunities

Amb D P Srivastava, Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Important Neighbour

There are common elements in the Indian and Central Asian experience. Both were connected by constant flow of men, goods and ideas. Samarkand and Bokhara are as much part of our history as Uzbek history. In the contemporary period, Tashkent is associated in Indian minds with the Tashkent Declaration, and Prime Minister Shastri ji’s death in that city in January, 1966. Since the birth of the new republic in 1991, our bilateral relations have been strengthened by high level visits from both sides. PM Modi made a bilateral visit to Uzbekistan in July, 2015. He visited the country again in June 2016 to attend Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) summit. The process culminated in India joining SCO during Astana Summit in June, 2017. Recently, a high level Uzbek delegation led by Uzbek Foreign Minister, and Foreign Trade Minister, visited India. Uzbekistan provides opportunities for enhancing regional connectivity, trade and investment.

The Central Asian renaissance in the 9^th and 10^th century was linked to wider intellectual under-currents in the region extending from India to the Abbasid Caliphate in Iraq. There are three outstanding personalities from this region, who have left their imprint on history - Muhammad Ibn Musa Khworezmi, Abu Reyhan Beruni and Abu Ali Ibn Sina.

Khorezmi’s work, “On the calculation with Hindu numerals”, written around 825 AD was mainly responsible for spreading the Hindu-Arabic numeral system throughout the Middle East. Al-Beruni came to India with Mahmoud Ghazni. He produced a very detailed account of contemporary India, its social practices, mathematics and science. He was influenced by arguments of Indian scholars that the earth was round. Ibn Sina was born in 980 AD in the village of Afshana, near Bukhara. He learnt arithmetic from an Indian green-grocer. He authored a five volume medical encyclopedia, “The Cannon of Medicine”, which remained the most authoritative work on medicine till the 18^th century. Uzbekistan gave rise to Naqshbandi movement. An exponent of this school of thought in India was Sirhindi.

At the time of creation of the new Republic in 1991, 46 percent of the people of Uzbekistan were below poverty line. This percentage came down to 14 percent by 2015. Uzbek GDP grew 6 times during the period. The economy also diversified. 57 percent of Uzbek exports are finished products now. After President Karimov’s demise, the political transition was smooth. Shavkat Mirziyoyev was elected President in a land-slide victory in December, 2016. He has since taken steps to strengthen relations with Uzbekistan’s neighbours. Bi-weekly direct flight was introduced between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in April, 2017 after 22 years. President Mirziyoyev also visited Turkmenistan twice to sign three agreements on energy co-operation with Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. Uzbekistan has also opened two border-crossing points with Kazakhstan. Progress has been achieved in settling border disputes with Kyrgyzstan.

Afghanistan

Uzbekistan is a State bordering Afghanistan, and has a stake in political and economic developments in that country. Uzbekistan was part of Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for supply of non-lethal equipment to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), after Pakistan closed supply routes running through its territory in November 2011.

Uzbek President Mr. Shavkat Mirziyoyev in his speech to the 72^nd session of the UN General Assembly supported “direct dialogue among the (Afghan) central Government and main domestic political forces without preconditions”. He also suggested that the “negotiations should be Afghan-led on the territory of Afghanistan and under the auspices of the United Nations”. Significantly, he stated, “We support the appeal of the US President Mr. Donald Trump to Afghanistan’s neighbor-states to promote the peace process of the inter-Afghan settlement” - President Trump has criticized Pakistan for providing safe havens to terrorist organizations fighting US forces in Afghanistan. President Shavkat emphasized religious tolerance, mutual respect, non-discrimination and commitment to promote moderation, and oppose extremism.

Uzbekistan has also played a role in Afghanistan’s re-construction and development. It has completed a rail-road from Termez on Uzbek-Afghan border to Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan. Once the segment Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat and Herat to Iran is completed, this will provide a route for Uzbek as well as Afghan exports.

Regional Connectivity

Uzbekistan is often described as a ‘double land-locked’ country - it is not only land-locked, but its immediate neighbors are also land-locked. Conversely, Uzbekistan’s central position makes it critical to any country trying to reach Central Asia. India is a founder member of International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC). So is Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan is the missing link, without which India’s access to Kazakhstan will be difficult. Most of the physical infra-structure of INSTC, including rail, road and port connectivity already exists. What is needed is greater awareness on part of the business to take advantage of opportunities this route offers.

Though Uzbekistan is not party to INSTC, it is party to Ashgabat Agreement, which will provide a transport and transit corridor from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. Uzbekistan is also party to Transport Internationaux Routiers or International Road Transport Convention (TIR). This is a multilateral treaty to simplify and harmonise the administrative formalities for over-land movement of goods across international borders. India has recently joined this Convention. Lack of connectivity accounts for low volume of India-Uzbekistan trade. The two-way trade of around USD 370 million is dwarfed in comparison with Uzbekistan’s trade with Russia and China. Uzbekistan’s trade with Russia is around USD 4 billion, with surplus in Russia’s favour. Uzbekistan’s trade with China is USD 4.2 billion with surplus in Uzbekistan’s favour. 40 percent of Uzbek gas is exported to China.

Uzbekistan participated in OBOR Summit in China, but has adopted a cautious attitude. It is interested in investment, not credit. Also it does not want investment in extraction industries, such as mining. Uzbekistan has not joined Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus. It has however, signed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. This has broader scope with all members of CIS being party to it. From Uzbek perspective, it also has more equitable decision-making structure as compared to EEU.

India’s participation in the development of Chabahar Port will complement the rail-road construction programme that Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Iran have undertaken. The Port will provide an outlet to the Arabian sea. With India joining the SCO, points of convergence between India and Uzbekistan will multiply. Uzbekistan is an original member of the SCO. PM Modi attended the SCO Summit held in Uzbekistan in 2016, which paved the way for full membership for India in Astana Summit in 2017. SCO has emphasized the need for fighting terrorism and extremism. SCO member states have stake in stability of Afghanistan. India shares these concerns. India’s presence in SCO will give CAR more space to follow a multi-vector foreign policy.

Bilateral Ties

Uzbekistan has supported India’s candidature for Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. There is potential for supply of Uranium by Uzbekistan to India. The visit of Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov and Foreign Trade Minister Elyor Ganiev to India in August, 2017, has reinforced bilateral relations. The two sides decided to increase two way trade to USD 1 billion. Cheap gas prices in Uzbekistan makes it an attractive destination for Indian investment in petro-chemical sector. While distance and lack of geographical contiguity makes it difficult to evacuate gas from Uzbekistan, products would be easier to transport through INSTC route. Export of ‘moong dal’ from Uzbekistan to India is an interesting idea which emerged during the recent visit of Uzbek Trade Minister. Though a contract was signed, import has been postponed due to current surplus in the Indian market. However, this needs to be followed-up.

Uzbekistan is also a major cotton producer. But most of the produce is exported as raw cotton. There is scope for value addition. Indian industry has considerable experience of textile and apparel sectors, and could invest in these sectors in Uzbekistan. The pharmaceutical sector could be another area for Indian investment. Uzbekistan welcomes foreign investment, and has set up a number of Free Trade Zones (FTZ). Recently, the exchange rate has been unified, and profit can be repatriated. Uzbekistan has diversified its industry. It used to produce aircraft; while aircraft production has been discontinued, General Motors manufactures automobiles near Andijan. India provides technical assistance through ITEC programme. There is considerable demand for training imparted by Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The two countries could also explore possibility of defence co-operation and training.

Uzbekistan and India are modern nations with millennia old history. There is convergence in their political interests; their economies are complementary. This provides a strong foundation to build their future relations.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

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ISIS: Is Central Asia the Next Stop?

Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, 

Research Associate, VIF

There is a growing debate whether the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will advance into the heartland of Central Asia or not, although the figures of people from the region joining the outfit differ from source to source. But considering the prevailing situation in most of these countries, even a few hundreds could be a worrying number. The rise in radicalism gained momentum after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Reportedly, in the past three years, approximately 2,000 to 4,000¹ people started to seek a radical path as an alternative to the systems provided by their respective governments. This emerging trend fits well into that ambition of the ISIS to spread its tentacles globally.

The appearance of the black flag of the ISIS on a bridge in Tashkent on 28 August last year became one of the earliest incidents which marked the penetration of ISIS influence in this country. Thereafter, the outfit announced the appointment of an “emir” for Uzbekistan, whose identity has not been revealed,² and this was followed by another appointment of an emir for Raqqa, which is the headquarters of the group. Thereafter, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), under the leadership of Usman Gazi, extended support to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in mid-September 2014.³ This group is believed to have close relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban, but some of its cadres “had been thrown out over ideological differences or for insubordination.”⁴ However, IMU’s similar vision to establish a caliphate took it closer to ISIS without even declaring an outright allegiance to the latter. If both the groups merge someday, then the IMU will likely assist ISIS in staging more attacks in northern Afghanistan as well as in different parts of Central Asia.⁵

The resentment of the people with regard to political system in their respective countries can be attributed for the rise of religious extremism, which is tilting in favour of the ISIS. The power vacuum that was created after the fall of the Soviet Union led to the strengthening of radical elements in the region, and the mushrooming of several Islamists groups in the 1990s in Tajikistan is one such case. The governance of authoritarian rulers in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and equally corrupted political systems in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have driven many of the residents to call for “radical Islamism.”⁶ Similar is the situation in Kazakhstan, a country with vast oil and gas reserves, where there is an autocratic rule and rural population living in poverty. When these people feel they are economically or politically marginalised, they resort to violence, which, as a result, received crackdown form the state forces. This further estranged the relationship between them, and leads to the growth of radicalism.

Various sources have given different figures of Central Asians who have joined ISIS fighters. According to the International Centre for Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)⁷, there are at least 250 Kazakh fighters in the ISIS, 100 Kyrgyz citizens (while another source talks of as many as 600 fighters⁸), 360 from Turkmenistan, 500-odd Uzbek fighters (both citizens of Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from the neighbouring countries), and for Tajikistan, the figure ranges between 400 and 2,000.⁹ The movement of these people has become easier due to the 30-days visa-free regime with Turkey. In some cases, Afghanistan is an alternative but this is a less used route.

Factors

The radicalisation process which began in the early 1990s played an important role in making people move towards Syria, today. However, it is difficult to pick out any particular motive for Central Asians to join ISIS ranks, but “some are driven by the spirit of jihad, while others may be drawn to it due to ignorance and bigotry. The search for the employment and earnings remains one of the main factors”.¹⁰ Moreover, the belief of these people that ISIS can provide better prospects somehow facilitates the departure. A study conducted by the International Crisis Group (ICG) sums up that “All are inspired by the belief that an Islamic state is a meaningful alternative to post-Soviet life. Some wish to fight, others to facilitate.”¹¹

Wide-ranging socio-economic problems in most of the Central Asian countries have induced a strong sense of dissent against the state authorities. Such dissatisfaction which exists within a society, with a sizeable radicalised people, is a prime target for the group’s recruitment process. Therefore, those without employments or with a very insignificant salary become highly vulnerable to various terror outfits operating in the region, not only the ISIS. There were even reports of leaflets circulated by the ISIS in Tajikistan “offering Tajik fighters salaries of $5,000 a month, far more than the average salary” in the country.¹²

In the words of P. Stobdan, a former diplomat:

They [Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz] are often tricked into the jihadi net by unscrupulous recruiters who promise them jobs in Turkey and Europe. One reason why Central Asian fighters find lucrative to rush to Middle East than to Af-Pak region, is because they find ISIS more inspirational, prestigious, and rewarding than fighting in Af-Pak region. Moreover, Central Asians are never empathetic towards the Af-Pak Taliban for they pose direct threat to the region. They perhaps find other reasons like better living standards (permission to bring family, permission to marry local women) to go to Syria. It is also less hazardous to reach Syria than Af-Pak as Turkey provides easy gateway. All the Central Asian States have favorable visa regime with Turkey.¹³

The adherence to the extreme religious ideologies propagated by terror outfits such as ISIS is another strong reason for the flights of young men and women to Syria, in particular. The ambition to create an Islamic state wherever possible appears to have takers in this part of Asia. Under such circumstances, the contributions of the volunteers need only concentrate on battle fights but they are willing to provide humanitarian assistance. Therefore, their profiles are varied and they are mainly constituted of schools and university dropouts, businessmen, women abandoned by their husbands, 

etc.¹⁴ This comes in conjunction with that call on Muslims, by al-Baghdadi in July 2014, to travel to Iraq and Syria to lend helping hand in the establishment of an Islamic state. “Special calls” were made for “judges, doctors, engineers and people with military and administrative.”¹⁵ And, for the jihadists and religious ideologues, setting up of such a state, which is to be governed by strict Islamic laws, have become a commonly shared goal with that of ISIS.

Recruitment

Although social media remains as a pivotal instrument, it is not the most important recruiting strategy. The numbers of people having access to internet are low in many places in the region. While this tool acts as a communicating bridge between fighters in Iraq or Syria and those aspiring jihadist in Central Asia, the role of local institutions such as mosques and places of religious learning are equally gaining momentum. Influential religious leaders are believed to have assisted in radicalising the citizens who are susceptible to their preaching. For instance, radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which has strongholds in the region, particularly in Uzbekistan,¹⁶ and Tabligi Jamaat are reportedly playing a “peripheral role in so far as both men and women may be radicalised as they gravitate toward their teachings.”¹⁷ But the links to their direct involvement in recruiting Central Asians have remained limited, whereas some members of the IMU are believed to have done this job for ISIS in the Fergana Valley comprising of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The close proximity of Central Asian countries to Russia is also serving as a conduit for recruitment. This is due to the migration of workers towards Russian towns and cities in search of employment, particularly in the constructions sites. Several workers are said to have travelled to Syria after they were recruited by “Chechens in Moscow.”¹⁸ Tajik fighters constitute a majority of the migrant recruits. However, the identities of these “Chechens” recruiters are vague, but some of them are probably from the Pankisi George region in Georgia,¹⁹ the hometown of the "Omar the Chechen”, also known as Omar Ash-Shishani, the Islamic State military commander who was allegedly killed in November last year. ²⁰ The availability of online forums in Russian and other local languages make the recruitment endeavours easier. It is perhaps with this motive ISIS released first Russian-language publication called “Furat.Press” in May, and the second one, Istok (The Source) in June this year.²¹

The increasing activity of recruitment inside Russia takes place amidst the efforts to curb the issue of religious extremism. This phenomenon is prevalent in Moscow, which has perhaps the largest Muslim concentration in the country. While some of them get access to Mosques, which is limited in numbers, there are others who use temporary or “inappropriate” buildings for prayers. This, according to a source, “Prompts the police and the security services to regard them as sectarians and adherents to unofficial Islam, which automatically puts them in the category of potential terrorists.”²² As a result, dissatisfaction with the government and the role of law enforcement authorities has promoted the growth of radicalism. Finally, these disgruntled people have become the target for the recruiters.

Concerns and Countermeasures

The influence of ISIS inside Central Asia is taken to be dormant by many. There is an impression that the group is still far away from making inroads in the region. But these presumptions must not lead the countries to complacency. The developments in its immediate neighbourhoods, that is, inside Russia (as recruitment zone) and Afghanistan, where ISIS announced the establishment of its Khorasan wing (covering Pakistan as well) during late January 2015, are alarming. Moscow will not like to see an increase in the number of recruits on its soil (who then travel towards West Asian region) as there is always the possibility of those fighters returning home. These fighters can be source of strengths for other terror organisations inside the country as well. Moreover, the returnees can ignite unrest or influence like-minded people in their native countries. Equally worrying trend is developing in Afghanistan where limited group of fighters are spreading in the eastern part of the country. Although ISIS presence is still insignificant in Afghanistan, it is increasingly attracting new recruits, particularly, the dissatisfied or disillusioned former Taliban commanders.²³ Therefore, It is possible that the ISIS will carry forwards its fights towards Central Asia after establishing a sustainable presence in the Af-Pak region.

Since security measures alone cannot prevent the deepening of extremism in the region, there should be civilian approaches as well. The latter will require improving the overall socio-economic and political situation in every country. But for all these to materialise, a strong political will and resources are required. This is where the role of the affluent international powers will become appropriate, beyond providing military assistance. And, to prevent the upsurge of radical elements and that of the ISIS, the need of the hour is for the Central Asian countries to start engaging constantly amongst themselves. A robust regional cooperation framework in military-intelligence sharing should be established. 

Since Central Asia is India’s extended neighbourhood, New Delhi should step up its cooperation with the countries there. Owing to its strategic interests in this region with abundance of natural resources, the current visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the five states should give equal importance in discussing the long-term security implications, particularly, counter-terrorism, beyond oil and energy trade. This is an opportune moment for India in particular, keeping in mind the development of Chabahar port in Iran, a Persian Gulf country which it will use as a transit for Central Asia.

Finally, the efforts to prevent the ISIS from making Central Asia as its stop in the future will flounder if the countries in and around the region fail to understand the gravity of the situation. The vigour of this organisation should never be underestimated.

Endnotes

1. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, Policy Briefing, No. 72, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group, 20 January 2015, p. 1.
2. “Islamic State Flag Hung from Tashkent Bridge”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 4 September 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-islamic-state-flag-tajikistan-sy...
3. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan declares support for ISIS”, alakhbar, 6 October 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/islamic-movement-uzbekistan-declare...
4. Joseph Goldstein, “In ISIS, the Taliban Face an Insurgent Threat of Their Own”, The New York Times, 4 June 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-face-in...
5. Damon A. Mehl, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue. 6, pp. 11, 13-14.
6. Reid Standish. “Shadow Boxing with the Islamic State in Central Asia”, Foreign Policy, 6 February 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/shadow-boxing-with-the-islamic-state...
7. Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s”, International Centre for Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 26 January 2015, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-200...
8. Anna Dyner, et al, “Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into Central Asia”, Policy Paper, No. 19 (121), The Polish Institute for International Affairs, June, p. 6.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. P. Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”, IDSA Issue Brief, 22 October 2014, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/ISISinCentralAsia_pstobdan_221014.html, p. 4.
11. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 4.
12. Shawn Snow, “ISIS Looks for Foothold in Central Asia”, The Diplomat, 18 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/isis-looks-for-foothold-in-central-asia/
13. Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”.
14. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 4.
15. “Isis leader calls on Muslims to ‘build Islamic state’, BBC, 1 July 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28116846
16. Samantha Brletich, “Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the Rise”, International Relations and Security Network, 8 August 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=88668
17. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 6.
18. For a brief report, see Daniil Turovsky, “How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria”, The Guardian , 5 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-e...
19. Ibid.
20. “ISIS commander 'Omar the Chechen' allegedly killed”, RT, 13 November 2014, http://rt.com/news/205239-russia-chechen-isis-killed/
21. Umberto Bacchi, “Isis targets jihadists in former Soviet nations with Russian-language propaganda magazine Istok”, International Business Times, 3 June 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-targets-jihadists-former-soviet-nations-ru...
22. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Moscow Remains Fertile Recruiting Ground for Aspiring Jihadists”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 12, Issue. 41, 5 March 2015.
23. “Can the Islamic State Defeat the Taliban”, Stratfor, 25 June 2015. For further reading, see Lauren McNally, “Is the Islamic State Escalating in Afghanistan”, Institute for the Study of War, 27 April 2015.

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Published Date: 8^th July 2015, Image Source: http://www.theguardian.com (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Thoughts on India’s Central Asia Strategy

Amb Rajiv Sikri, 

Distinguished Fellow, VIF

It is indeed encouraging that in a few days Prime Minister Modi will be visiting all the Central Asian countries simultaneously, something that no Indian Prime Minister has done so far. However, India seems to be grappling with the same issues and dilemmas in relation to Central Asia that were present in the nineties, notwithstanding periodic efforts to kick-start the relationship. Why is this so? There are both objective constraints, as well as some missed opportunities.

If it is to have an enduring impact, Prime Minister Modi’s visit will have to go beyond promoting goodwill and the usual bilateral agreements and discussions. He must go with a clear strategic perspective of India’s relations with the Central Asian countries; without that, it won’t be possible to develop a viable Central Asia policy. India’s relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) must take into account developments in the wider Eurasian space that includes the five CARs, Afghanistan, Pakistan west of the Indus, Iran, Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including those regions currently occupied by Pakistan and China.

Throughout history, Eurasia has been a strategic not a mere geographic space. As a geographical area on to which the back doors, so to speak, of major Asian powers open, Eurasia has always attracted, and will continue to attract, the attention of outside powers. It is a ‘negative security space’, an area where major powers cannot afford to let competing major powers or forces exercise a dominating influence because that would pose a threat to their own security. The Cold War and the impermeable political borders of Eurasia during this period dulled strategic perceptions about this region, but that was a geo-strategic aberration.

For the last quarter century, Eurasia has been once again at the centre of global geopolitics. In the second half of the 19^th century and the early 20^th century, it was the setting for the ‘Great Game’ between imperial Britain and Tsarist Russia. A century later, the geostrategic imperatives remain unchanged, only the ‘game’ has become more complicated, with energy emerging as an additional factor in strategic calculations. Connectivity across Eurasia has dramatically improved. Roads, railway tracks as well as oil and gas pipelines and power transmission lines are criss-crossing the region. Of course, so are drug smugglers, terrorists and fundamentalists.

The CARs, both collectively and individually, are today much weaker than their geographically contiguous large neighbours like Russia and China. Between the two, Russia’s influence has declined while China’s has steadily increased in the CARs over the last quarter century. Since 9/11, the United States has also become an active player in the region. These three powers are the principal outside players. Other powers such as Europe, Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India still play only marginal roles.

Russia is taking purposeful steps to regain its preponderant influence in the CARs. It has enmeshed most of them in regional security and military arrangements like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well as through bilateral military agreements. A Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been set up; Tajikistan too may join it. Russia has many additional levers in Central Asia viz. a significant and influential Russian origin population; good networking; dependence of many CARs on remittances of migrants working in Russia; transit facilities for landlocked CARs; and considerable economic interdependence of CARs with Russia. While wanting to reduce the strong grip of Russia that held them for seven decades, the CARs realize that they can neither ignore nor do without Russia.

A rising China is systematically and relentlessly sucking the CARs into its economic whirlpool. Energy supplies for its fast-growing economy, a proximate market for its products, and a security buffer for Xinjiang – these are China’s main concerns vis-à-vis the CARs. Having taken over Xinjiang, it now seeks to dominate the CARs. This won’t be easy, since China faces many serious long-term challenges. Xinjiang, which has extensive ethnic, economic, social and other ties with the CARs could turn out to be China’s Achilles heel. Uighur nationalism remains strong. The fate of the Muslim Uighurs carries resonance among the Islamic ummah. Some Uighur elements appear to have developed linkages with the al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, more recently, the Islamic State too. Xinjiang’s security and stability could be compromised by turmoil or turbulence in the CARs. China realizes this – its latest Defence White Paper mentions the dangers from separatist forces fighting for “East Turkestan independence.” Moreover, despite benefiting from China’s economic growth the CARs remain wary of becoming economically too dependent on China, and worry about creeping Chinese demographic expansionism. Historically, China has been viewed by Central Asians as an expansionist and dominating power, and recent Chinese muscle flexing in Southeast Asia would have reinforced traditional suspicions about China’s attitude towards weak neighbours.

Capitalizing on the favourable climate after 9/11, the United States rushed to establish a number of bases in the region, which it has since had to vacate under the combined pressure of Russia and the CARs. While its other global preoccupations have reduced US interest in Central Asia under President Obama, US policy has always been to somehow detach the CARs from Russia’s sphere of influence and integrate them economically with Afghanistan and South Asia. The ongoing Russia-US standoff over Ukraine would have only reinforced US determination in this respect. Central Asians welcome the United States as a check on both China and Russia, but they realize the fickleness of US policies and level of interest, and remain wary of US proclivity to work for regime change and exert pressure on human rights issues.

Where does India fit into this picture? Over the centuries the most extensive connections of Central Asians with the outside world have been with India. Nor has India ever posed any ideological, demographic or territorial threat to Central Asia. Thus Central Asians have always had a romantic attraction towards India, reinforced by close and friendly relations during Soviet times. That is a good starting point, but nothing more. Today, at a general level, the CARs want a more active Indian presence to balance the other major players who carry considerable baggage. So far, however, the CARs and India haven’t been able to reconnect meaningfully principally because of the absence of easy and reliable connectivity. Since there does not appear to be any immediate solution to this problem, economic and people-to-people linkages between the CARs and India remain weak. Trade routes are long, cumbersome and uneconomical. The legal systems, regulatory and taxation provisions in the CARs leave much to be desired. There are other factors too why Indian private entrepreneurs find the CARs comparatively less attractive than many other places viz. poor air connectivity; difficulties in getting visas; unfamiliarity with local languages; and some bad experiences of Indian companies in the CARs in the early years after their independence. Perhaps economic relations will get a boost if India were to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. A study group has been recently set up to examine this proposal.

More than trade in goods, the two sides should focus on trade in services and use of the CARs as a transit point. Leveraging their location, the CARs could, however, become a passenger and cargo hub for air traffic from India to Siberia and the Russian Far East region in one direction, and to Europe in the other, in the way Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Singapore have positioned themselves. The CARs could also develop their potential as a tourism destination for Indians with competitive pricing, a more liberal visa regime and better air connectivity. There could even be joint marketing of Central Asia and north India to the rest of the world as a “Mughal Trail.

A blueprint for India-Central Asia cooperation was outlined in India’s ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ three years ago. This needs to be fleshed out and implemented earnestly. One of the first things that India should do is to change its image in the CARs. Instead of the traditional stereotype of Soviet times, India should be projected as a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced country with capabilities that are relevant for the development of the CARs. Some of the concrete initiatives that could be pushed are: encouragement to private Indian airlines and charter flights to operate between India and Central Asia; significant expansion of existing programmes of technical cooperation so that more young people visit India to develop skills that are needed in their home countries; larger loans on soft terms for infrastructure projects. In return, India would very much like to gain access to the rich natural resources of the CARs and some specialized defence technologies and production facilities.

It must be emphasized, however, that India’s interests in Eurasia are fundamentally strategic. The CARs are superficially stable but inherently fragile states, with incomplete nation building, underdeveloped political institutions and traditions, no accepted mechanism for periodic transfer of political power, and economically still considerably tied to a beleaguered Russia. Weak and unstable states with centrifugal tendencies could become a haven for terrorists, separatists, drug dealers and fundamentalists, linked up with similar elements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and West Asia. India has a strong interest in seeing stable and secular CARs. This is a formidable challenge that will not be easily met without large-scale investments that promote economic development and reduce unemployment among the youth, thereby giving people long-term hope about a brighter future.

A stable Eurasia is in the interest of all countries of the region. However, the prospects of long-term stability and peace are bleak if the great powers indulge in a new zero-sum ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. Wisdom lies in all countries adopting a cooperative rather than a competitive approach. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is potentially a promising vehicle for such cooperation. India hopes to join it as a full member, but this is not a given since the attitude of China remains ambivalent. Unfortunately, the SCO is China-dominated and China-driven. While full membership will certainly raise India’s profile in Central Asia, it is unlikely to help India achieve its core interests in Central Asia. China and Pakistan, both individually and jointly, seem determined to unilaterally pursue their perceived strategic interests in the region.

Apart from the CARs, developments in Xinjiang, geographically contiguous to both the CARs and India, have direct and far-reaching implications for India’s security. India needs to carefully study and anticipate various scenarios in Xinjiang. China’s strong strategic partnership with Pakistan, and physical connectivity via Xinjiang, has been reinforced by the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. The success of China’s Silk Route Economic Belt initiative will enable China to dominate the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan (where it is making significant investments and is also trying to play a political role). If China were to emerge as the preponderant power in Eurasia, this would constitute a tectonic geopolitical shift that India, can countenance with equanimity, as this would significantly undermine India’s strategic interests and security.

Thus India’s approach to this region cannot be passive. India must strive to get a firm foothold in the Eurasian space, including Afghanistan, so that forces inimical or hostile to India’s interests like China and Pakistan do not dominate it, particularly if economic and other influence is backed by a military presence. In order to ensure its security, India has to exercise at least some degree of influence, if not control, over the trans-Himalayan strategic space in Eurasia. It must become relevant to the growth, development and prosperity of the CARs. For this to happen, it has to be involved in Eurasian energy politics. Small individual investments of the kind India has made in Kazakhstan are inadequate. What is needed is a big project that creates long-term mutually beneficial linkages of India and the CARs and, equally important, is in conformity with the strategic interest of the concerned parties.

In this context, Iran’s strategic relevance to India has gone up. Apart from other factors like Iran’s intrinsic importance as a major player in the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s rich oil and gas reserves, Iran is currently India’s only route to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. India and Iran will also need to cooperate to try to stabilize Afghanistan. Already a formidable regional power, Iran’s role will only increase after a nuclear deal is clinched with the P-5+1. After submitting to US pressure over Iran for a decade, India is now repairing its disrupted ties with Iran. The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding on the development of Chabahar port, not merely as an economic but more so as a strategic project, and the reactivation of the North-South Corridor are long overdue and important concrete steps in this direction. These need to be followed up urgently with high-level exchanges, including at the Prime Minister’s level.

Since Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Qatar have about two-thirds of the world’s exportable surplus of natural gas, Eurasia should be at the centre of India’s gas import strategy. For all these countries too, India is a proximate and attractive long-term market. Russia can no longer count on the long-term loyalty and dependence of its traditional European customers, the more so after the Ukraine crisis. India is an important alternative market. Turkmenistan is already pushing the TAPI pipeline project to export its gas to India and Pakistan. As for Iran, it will definitely want to tap large gas markets like India once sanctions are removed, hopefully quite soon. Qatar’s future as a major gas exporter is linked with Iran, with which it shares the same principal gas field (South Pars/ North Dome). India already has energy investments in Russia and Kazakhstan and there is an agreement in principle with both countries to explore the possibility of energy pipeline projects to India. If the Central Asian countries work with Russia and Iran, Eurasia can be hard-wired with India in a web of interdependence. This has to be conceived and executed as a strategic project, not merely as an economic or energy deal.

India must try to persuade Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to let India develop, or at least allocate to India, some large gas fields that can be a source of long-term gas supply to India. The greater challenge will lie in transporting Eurasian gas to India. The LNG route is too long and expensive, at least for now. Purely land routes from Eurasia to India pose many problems. Given the continuing lack of trust between India and Pakistan, and the uncertainties surrounding Afghanistan, it is doubtful if either the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) or the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline projects will actually fructify. Under these circumstances, the only feasible alternative is a land-cum-sea pipeline from Eurasia to India via the Iranian port of Chabahar.

One possible route is from western Siberia in Russia to Chabahar via west Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The advantage of this route is that it involves fewer countries and can also incorporate existing swap arrangements between Iran and Turkmenistan. Another route is from eastern Siberia in Russia to southeast Kazakhstan via the Altai region, on to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley, thence west to Khojent in Tajikistan at the mouth of the Ferghana Valley, and thereafter into Afghanistan, along the Mazar-e-sharif – Herat – Delaram - Zaranj route (which is outside the Taliban’s area of influence) before entering eastern Iran and down south to Chabahar. The advantage of this route is that it would also serve Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and western Afghanistan, and thereby help to stabilize these countries. On the flip side, it would definitely be a more complicated project. Perhaps it might be better to start with the first option and then consider the eastern route later.

From Chabahar, there would be an undersea pipeline via Oman to ports in Gujarat. Two gas hubs would come up. One would be in Chabahar, fed by Russian, Turkmen and possibly also Kazakh gas from the north, together with Iran’s own gas from South Pars. Another hub would be in Oman where the gas piped from Chabahar under the sea would meet up with Qatar gas piped across the UAE. An Indian company, South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE), has done a study on the commercial and technical viability of such undersea pipelines between Iran/Oman and India, and is actively working with the concerned governments to take it forward.

One hopes that as Prime Minister Modi prepares to visit Central Asia, his Government and his advisers are looking at conceptualizing a major strategic project of the kind suggested above. If such a project were to be endorsed by the CARs during his visit, that would be a significant breakthrough in India’s floundering Central Asia policy.

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Published Date: 2^nd July 2015, Image Source: http://www.presstv.ir

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Ghani's Gambit is Failing, Afghanistan is Unravelling

Lt General R K Sawhney, PVSM, AVSM, Dean, Centre for Defence Studies, VIF

Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF

The spring of 2015 was always going to be ‘hot’ in Afghanistan. The Taliban had already made clear their intention to bring the Ashraf Ghani government to its knees. It was also going to test the mettle of the Afghan National Army (ANA) which for the first time was going to face the Taliban without the support of the US-led ISAF. And if truth be told, things haven’t quite gone the way of the Afghan state. Even though there has been no major reverses for the Afghan army, the Taliban have through their unrelenting attacks managed to shake the confidence in the ability of the Afghan state to survive. Not only have the Taliban managed to strike, practically at will, in the heart of Kabul, they have also managed to significantly shift the theatre of war to the North, an area which was supposed to be safe from them.

For India, the situation in Afghanistan is both a cause for concern and consternation. Although India had reconciled itself to the President Ashraf Ghani throwing in his lot with Pakistan, there was a sense that sooner rather than later he would realise his folly (much like his predecessor) and reach out for support to India, which was now ready to provide the military assistance that Afghanistan had been seeking for so long. But increasingly, it seems that not only has Ghani got stuck in the quicksand of Pakistan out of which he seems unable to extricate himself, India too has not moved out of the mode of ‘strategic pause’ that Ghani’s gambit had forced on it. By now it should have been clear in New Delhi which way things are moving in Afghanistan. But so far India like other countries doesn’t seem ready to give up on Ghani. Instead of taking the lead to build up the anti-Taliban forces for the inevitable fight that is staring everyone in the face, India remains in a wait and watch mode even as the grounds is slipping not just from under Ghani’s feet but also under the feet of those who intend to stand up to the Taliban.

Paradoxically, the ferocity and brazenness of Taliban attacks and their expanding the war theatre to the predominantly non-Pashtun North Afghanistan is directly proportional to the appeasement policy followed by President Ashraf Ghani towards Pakistan. In other words, the more Ghani concedes ground to Pakistan – the latest being an agreement between the intelligence agencies of the two countries which not only involves NDS officials being 'trained' by ISI but worse, NDS and ISI working together to rehabilitate Pakistan's image in Afghanistan – the more the Taliban seem to ratchet up the violence inside Afghanistan. Equally important is the fact that the more the Pakistani civil and military authorities condemn Taliban violence – they have even gone to the extent of calling it terrorism – and declare that Afghanistan’s enemies are Pakistan’s enemies and pledge action against Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan, the more the Taliban seem to become active inside Afghanistan. Clearly, the ground situation suggests that Ghani’s great gamble on Pakistan is failing and Afghanistan is starting to unravel. The future of Afghanistan increasingly seems a toss-up between either a civil war or a Taliban takeover.

Ghani putting all his money on Pakistan was understandable. Since Pakistan controlled, directed and provided sanctuaries to Taliban, if he managed to win over Pakistan, it would solve most of his problems. Apparently, this was also the playbook given to him by the Americans. But after having conceded on every Pakistani demand and despite leaning over backward to accommodate Pakistan, things are only going from bad to worse. Part of the reason for this in internal Ghani’s domestic political support, like his election, is dodgy. Worse, his overtures to Pakistan has alienated many of those who had reconciled to him despite the ‘industrial scale fraud’ in the Presidential election. Compounding the problem has been his effort to Pashtunise the government, administration and army. Not only has this riled the non-Pashtuns but also divided the Pashtuns. The Durrani Pashtuns are cut up with him because he has concentrated power among Ghilzai Pashtuns. Politics apart, the economy is running on empty. Afghanistan is not a viable state without external assistance, which has been drying up. He cannot run the country with the resources he has. There is no certainty if the international community will continue to pick the tab for running Afghanistan endlessly because at the end of the day Afghanistan has really nothing to offer in return.

Even as his internal position has got severely compromised, he hasn’t got anything other than verbal assurances from Pakistan. The Pakistani playbook is more complicated than Ghani’s. While they are making a show of standing with Ghani, it just doesn’t make sense for Pakistan to give up the Taliban option, even less so after having supported and sustained them for 14 years and just when they are on the verge of victory. Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game: they are making the right noises to Ghani and getting what they want from him for nothing more than nice sounding but empty assurances; at the same time winking at the Taliban to continue what they are doing. At the diplomatic level, the Pakistanis are making efforts to rehabilitate the Taliban and reduce any reservations that the pivotal countries in the region – China, Iran, Central Asian States, the countries like UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia – may harbour about them. Militarily, the extension of conflict to the North is aimed at ensuring that potential spoilers – the erstwhile Northern Alliance – are vanquished before they can regroup and pose a potent challenge to the Taliban.

The Taliban, meanwhile, have their own playbook. They are wary of Pakistan double-crossing them. It suits them to raise their military operations because not only does it strengthen their negotiating position, it also provides them an opportunity to confront Pakistan and rest of the world with a fait accompli and prevent any possible double-cross by Pakistan. Equally important, the Taliban also need to guard against the potential challenge from IS and the best way to do this is by remaining active militarily.

As things stand, Ghani’s gamble has failed and he is now seen by most Afghans as a liability, or worse a Shah Shuja. Alongside him, the Chief Executive Dr Abdullah has also become damaged goods in the eyes of his supporters who are furious with his kowtowing to everything that Ghani and the Americans are proposing. The anti-Taliban forces, which includes the bulk of Afghanistan's population cutting across regions and ethnicities, are now girding up for a fight for their existence. But they are not getting the support they need from anywhere. In the end, whether they are able to keep the Taliban at bay, or they get swept aside by the Taliban, Afghanistan is going to go through yet another paroxysm of violence. The recent spike in violence is just the start of things to come.

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Published Date: 22^nd May 2015, Image Source: www.telegraph.co.uk

Walking Away or Ignoring Afghanistan is not an Option for India

Lt General R K Sawhney, PVSM, AVSM, Dean, Centre for Defence Studies, VIF

Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF

The policy shift being attempted by Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani in which he sought to relegate India to the fourth circle of priority and appease Pakistan has had mixed reception in the Indian strategic community. It ranges from disappointment over side-lining of India to a resigned acceptance of an emerging situation in which India's space may get constricted. The result is both a sort of detachment over what happens in Afghanistan and hope of seeing China and Pakistan getting steadily bogged down in the Afghan quagmire.

At the policy level, uncertainty about how to handle the emerging situation in Afghanistan is visible. Some reports suggest that India has started to reduce its footprint in Afghanistan and slow down some of its projects. While it is entirely possible that India might be entering a phase of 'strategic pause', it can neither detach itself from Afghanistan nor be despondent over developments there. Between an aggressive 'forward policy' which India probably can't sustain on its own, and 'masterly inactivity' which it cannot afford because of its security and strategic implications, there is enough space available to India to keep itself relevant and in play in Afghanistan.

Given the fluid state of affairs in Afghanistan, a case can be made for a strategic review of India's Afghan policy. This must include a realistic assessment of what India can and cannot do and what it should and should not do. In other words, India must neither over-reach itself nor underplay itself. Even as India must remain conscious of its limitations-- economic, geographic and logistical--it should not lose sight of the advantages it enjoys that mitigate many of these limitations. Apart from clearly defining India's strategic objectives in Afghanistan and how these can be achieved, India also needs to work out contingencies and fallback positions in the event these objectives become unattainable.

In survey after survey, India has emerged as the most liked country in Afghanistan. The tremendous goodwill that India enjoys there is its biggest asset. Unlike countries like Pakistan that have only contributed to destruction of Afghanistan, or countries like the USA that has been involved in both rebuilding Afghanistan and using heavy handed methods to pacify the country, India has exercised only soft power. It is, therefore, seen as a benign and benevolent neighbour. But soft power has its limitations, especially in a country like Afghanistan that has had to contend with unremitting hostility from an implacable enemy--Islamist insurgents--supported by an inimical neighbour. What this means is that while India can help in stabilising Afghanistan, it has not been able to prevent Afghanistan's destabilisation.

Providing economic assistance, funding developmental projects, helping through military and administrative capacity building and security assistance in the form of intelligence cooperation and even providing some modest equipment to the Afghan security forces, was all necessary in the effort to help Afghanistan stabilise. But it wasn't sufficient because India's reluctance to exercise hard power was seen as a sign of weakness, not just by the Pakistanis, but to some extent even by the Afghans who saw India conceding to Pakistani concerns and sensitivities even when Pakistan had used all opportunities to damage India’s interests. If, therefore, the pre-eminent regional power was hesitant to play hard ball with Pakistan, then surely the Afghans needed to rethink their view of India as a solid counterbalance to the Pakistanis. This is precisely the kind of negative perception of India that needs to be removed, not just in Afghanistan, but also in the region and beyond. Such perception seriously reduces India's strategic space.

In Afghanistan, the overbearing nature of the Pakistani military establishment as well as its proclivity to overplay its hand works in favour of India. Regardless of which regime comes into power in Kabul, sooner or later it will seek to have a counterbalance to Pakistan, unless either the Afghans reconcile to living under Pakistani domination or else Pakistan changes its strategic thinking. Neither of this is likely to happen. For India therefore to ignore this natural advantage it has in the Afghanistan-Pakistan equation as a balancing factor would be a folly.

Much of India's strategic diffidence comes from its tendency to over-emphasise its limitations and underestimate its advantages. Partly to offset some of these limitations, India preferred to ride on American shoulders in Afghanistan. Although India thus benefitted from US presence in Afghanistan, it also paid the price of having to accept US pressure to limit its activity in Afghanistan to development areas so that the US could manage Pakistani paranoia about a strong Indian presence in Afghanistan. As long as the Americans were present in Afghanistan India could not altogether disregard some US demands and re-jig its policy accordingly.

But this is no longer a compulsion, now that the Americans are in the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan. In the last couple of years there is a growing dis-connect between India and the US on the emerging situation in the AF-PAK region. Both want stability in the region but differ on how this can be achieved. The Americans seem to be tilting towards Pakistan as a stabilising factor, while India is convinced that Pakistan being the problem it cannot be part of the solution. The Indian government should therefore safe guard the country’s interests without being too concerned about US reaction. We need not take the lead from the Americans and pay too much attention to Pakistani views, especially as Pakistan has always totally disregarded Indian sensitivities and concerns. India, unlike the US, cannot wash its hands off this region. To the contrary, India will have to bear the consequences of American mistakes.

India's fundamental interest Afghanistan is not economic, whether in terms of benefiting from its market or mineral wealth (whose exploitation is beset with difficulties) or from its geographical location as the main trade and transit route to Central Asia (whose economic potential remains a question mark). Nor is it centred on encircling Pakistan. These are incidental to Indian interests. For India, a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is critical because instability and conflict in that country has a deleterious impact on India’s security. A Taliban type dispensation in Afghanistan will have a massive destabilising effect on rest of the region, and as such is not acceptable.

For India to protect its interests in Afghanistan, it can neither detach itself from the situation there nor become discouraged by any temporary setback. In Afghanistan there is never an endgame, and what is often called an endgame is usually the beginning of a new Great Game. This means India needs to not just maintain but expand its presence in Afghanistan as much as possible. At the very least, India's economic and developmental footprint must increase in Afghanistan, because unless there is more economic activity inside that country, ensuring security will remain a huge challenge. Therefore, India should do whatever it can to give a fillip to the Afghan economy. In this context, India should stop talking about its much quoted $ 2 billion assistance to Afghanistan, because as a two trillion dollar economy, India has the capacity to do more.

Pakistan will of course be the big stumbling block in terms of India’s enhanced involvement in the Afghan economy. By restricting Afghanistan's connectivity to its natural market in India, Pakistan is behaving true to form. Instead of harming India, it is harming Afghanistan as it is preventing it from becoming economically self-sustaining. Of course, where it suits Pakistan's interests- as in the case of the TAPI gas pipeline project- Pakistan’s reasons to block Afghan access to India and vice versa are set aside. Pakistan also believes that by restricting transit through its territory it will also deny India access to Central Asia. But as India can access Central Asia through Iran, Pakistan is effectively is cutting its own nose (it has the most to gain by becoming a bridge between Central Asia/ Afghanistan and India) to spite India's face. Despite all the impediments placed by Pakistan, India should still do what it can to meet Afghan’s expectations, not just in the realm of economics but also in terms of capacity building through training of civil and military personnel, and funding and building economic infrastructure. India should also continue to encourage and promote people-to-people ties between India and Afghanistan, especially in the fields of medicine and education.

At a time when the Modi government has a declared policy of reaching out to India's neighbours and tying them more closely to India's development process, to disengage ourselves from Afghanistan because of certain statements and actions of the new dispensation there, is against the strategic vision that India has developed for the region. No matter what the Afghans say in public- which is music to Pakistani ears- the fact remains that the Afghans don't trust or even like the Pakistanis, who, on their part, treat the Afghans with an element of disdain and misplaced superiority. Any tactical adjustment that the Afghans make with Pakistan should not cause an exaggerated reaction in India. We should display strategic patience and stay the course in Afghanistan. Lowering our presence in Afghanistan because of certain policy adjustments being made by the new Afghan government is not the way a regional power should behave. Not only will this mean leaving India's considerable number of friends in Afghanistan in the lurch, it would have serious negative implications for India's regional strategy because other regional countries will question India’s staying power in the face of a challenge to its interests.

This is precisely the advice that India's long-standing friends in Afghanistan give us. They ask India not to react to every small statement or policy shift by Afghanistan, stay the course and play the long game because given the convergence of interests of India and the Afghan people things will ultimately move in India's direction. Their message is that India is indispensable for Afghans and that India needs to understand this. Therefore, for India to detach itself from Afghanistan or reduce its footprint considerably – a form of masterly inactivity--would be leaving the field open to its and Afghanistan's adversaries. And while India cannot play the role that the Americans played in terms of propping up Afghanistan, there is much that India can do to support the Afghan state, which it should continue to do in the interest of the Afghans and of India itself.

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Published Date: 24^th April 2015, Image Source: http://www.thelondoneveningpost.com