Thoughts on India’s Central Asia Strategy

Amb Rajiv Sikri, 

Distinguished Fellow, VIF

It is indeed encouraging that in a few days Prime Minister Modi will be visiting all the Central Asian countries simultaneously, something that no Indian Prime Minister has done so far. However, India seems to be grappling with the same issues and dilemmas in relation to Central Asia that were present in the nineties, notwithstanding periodic efforts to kick-start the relationship. Why is this so? There are both objective constraints, as well as some missed opportunities.

If it is to have an enduring impact, Prime Minister Modi’s visit will have to go beyond promoting goodwill and the usual bilateral agreements and discussions. He must go with a clear strategic perspective of India’s relations with the Central Asian countries; without that, it won’t be possible to develop a viable Central Asia policy. India’s relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) must take into account developments in the wider Eurasian space that includes the five CARs, Afghanistan, Pakistan west of the Indus, Iran, Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including those regions currently occupied by Pakistan and China.

Throughout history, Eurasia has been a strategic not a mere geographic space. As a geographical area on to which the back doors, so to speak, of major Asian powers open, Eurasia has always attracted, and will continue to attract, the attention of outside powers. It is a ‘negative security space’, an area where major powers cannot afford to let competing major powers or forces exercise a dominating influence because that would pose a threat to their own security. The Cold War and the impermeable political borders of Eurasia during this period dulled strategic perceptions about this region, but that was a geo-strategic aberration.

For the last quarter century, Eurasia has been once again at the centre of global geopolitics. In the second half of the 19^th century and the early 20^th century, it was the setting for the ‘Great Game’ between imperial Britain and Tsarist Russia. A century later, the geostrategic imperatives remain unchanged, only the ‘game’ has become more complicated, with energy emerging as an additional factor in strategic calculations. Connectivity across Eurasia has dramatically improved. Roads, railway tracks as well as oil and gas pipelines and power transmission lines are criss-crossing the region. Of course, so are drug smugglers, terrorists and fundamentalists.

The CARs, both collectively and individually, are today much weaker than their geographically contiguous large neighbours like Russia and China. Between the two, Russia’s influence has declined while China’s has steadily increased in the CARs over the last quarter century. Since 9/11, the United States has also become an active player in the region. These three powers are the principal outside players. Other powers such as Europe, Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India still play only marginal roles.

Russia is taking purposeful steps to regain its preponderant influence in the CARs. It has enmeshed most of them in regional security and military arrangements like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well as through bilateral military agreements. A Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been set up; Tajikistan too may join it. Russia has many additional levers in Central Asia viz. a significant and influential Russian origin population; good networking; dependence of many CARs on remittances of migrants working in Russia; transit facilities for landlocked CARs; and considerable economic interdependence of CARs with Russia. While wanting to reduce the strong grip of Russia that held them for seven decades, the CARs realize that they can neither ignore nor do without Russia.

A rising China is systematically and relentlessly sucking the CARs into its economic whirlpool. Energy supplies for its fast-growing economy, a proximate market for its products, and a security buffer for Xinjiang – these are China’s main concerns vis-à-vis the CARs. Having taken over Xinjiang, it now seeks to dominate the CARs. This won’t be easy, since China faces many serious long-term challenges. Xinjiang, which has extensive ethnic, economic, social and other ties with the CARs could turn out to be China’s Achilles heel. Uighur nationalism remains strong. The fate of the Muslim Uighurs carries resonance among the Islamic ummah. Some Uighur elements appear to have developed linkages with the al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, more recently, the Islamic State too. Xinjiang’s security and stability could be compromised by turmoil or turbulence in the CARs. China realizes this – its latest Defence White Paper mentions the dangers from separatist forces fighting for “East Turkestan independence.” Moreover, despite benefiting from China’s economic growth the CARs remain wary of becoming economically too dependent on China, and worry about creeping Chinese demographic expansionism. Historically, China has been viewed by Central Asians as an expansionist and dominating power, and recent Chinese muscle flexing in Southeast Asia would have reinforced traditional suspicions about China’s attitude towards weak neighbours.

Capitalizing on the favourable climate after 9/11, the United States rushed to establish a number of bases in the region, which it has since had to vacate under the combined pressure of Russia and the CARs. While its other global preoccupations have reduced US interest in Central Asia under President Obama, US policy has always been to somehow detach the CARs from Russia’s sphere of influence and integrate them economically with Afghanistan and South Asia. The ongoing Russia-US standoff over Ukraine would have only reinforced US determination in this respect. Central Asians welcome the United States as a check on both China and Russia, but they realize the fickleness of US policies and level of interest, and remain wary of US proclivity to work for regime change and exert pressure on human rights issues.

Where does India fit into this picture? Over the centuries the most extensive connections of Central Asians with the outside world have been with India. Nor has India ever posed any ideological, demographic or territorial threat to Central Asia. Thus Central Asians have always had a romantic attraction towards India, reinforced by close and friendly relations during Soviet times. That is a good starting point, but nothing more. Today, at a general level, the CARs want a more active Indian presence to balance the other major players who carry considerable baggage. So far, however, the CARs and India haven’t been able to reconnect meaningfully principally because of the absence of easy and reliable connectivity. Since there does not appear to be any immediate solution to this problem, economic and people-to-people linkages between the CARs and India remain weak. Trade routes are long, cumbersome and uneconomical. The legal systems, regulatory and taxation provisions in the CARs leave much to be desired. There are other factors too why Indian private entrepreneurs find the CARs comparatively less attractive than many other places viz. poor air connectivity; difficulties in getting visas; unfamiliarity with local languages; and some bad experiences of Indian companies in the CARs in the early years after their independence. Perhaps economic relations will get a boost if India were to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. A study group has been recently set up to examine this proposal.

More than trade in goods, the two sides should focus on trade in services and use of the CARs as a transit point. Leveraging their location, the CARs could, however, become a passenger and cargo hub for air traffic from India to Siberia and the Russian Far East region in one direction, and to Europe in the other, in the way Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Singapore have positioned themselves. The CARs could also develop their potential as a tourism destination for Indians with competitive pricing, a more liberal visa regime and better air connectivity. There could even be joint marketing of Central Asia and north India to the rest of the world as a “Mughal Trail.

A blueprint for India-Central Asia cooperation was outlined in India’s ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ three years ago. This needs to be fleshed out and implemented earnestly. One of the first things that India should do is to change its image in the CARs. Instead of the traditional stereotype of Soviet times, India should be projected as a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced country with capabilities that are relevant for the development of the CARs. Some of the concrete initiatives that could be pushed are: encouragement to private Indian airlines and charter flights to operate between India and Central Asia; significant expansion of existing programmes of technical cooperation so that more young people visit India to develop skills that are needed in their home countries; larger loans on soft terms for infrastructure projects. In return, India would very much like to gain access to the rich natural resources of the CARs and some specialized defence technologies and production facilities.

It must be emphasized, however, that India’s interests in Eurasia are fundamentally strategic. The CARs are superficially stable but inherently fragile states, with incomplete nation building, underdeveloped political institutions and traditions, no accepted mechanism for periodic transfer of political power, and economically still considerably tied to a beleaguered Russia. Weak and unstable states with centrifugal tendencies could become a haven for terrorists, separatists, drug dealers and fundamentalists, linked up with similar elements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and West Asia. India has a strong interest in seeing stable and secular CARs. This is a formidable challenge that will not be easily met without large-scale investments that promote economic development and reduce unemployment among the youth, thereby giving people long-term hope about a brighter future.

A stable Eurasia is in the interest of all countries of the region. However, the prospects of long-term stability and peace are bleak if the great powers indulge in a new zero-sum ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. Wisdom lies in all countries adopting a cooperative rather than a competitive approach. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is potentially a promising vehicle for such cooperation. India hopes to join it as a full member, but this is not a given since the attitude of China remains ambivalent. Unfortunately, the SCO is China-dominated and China-driven. While full membership will certainly raise India’s profile in Central Asia, it is unlikely to help India achieve its core interests in Central Asia. China and Pakistan, both individually and jointly, seem determined to unilaterally pursue their perceived strategic interests in the region.

Apart from the CARs, developments in Xinjiang, geographically contiguous to both the CARs and India, have direct and far-reaching implications for India’s security. India needs to carefully study and anticipate various scenarios in Xinjiang. China’s strong strategic partnership with Pakistan, and physical connectivity via Xinjiang, has been reinforced by the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. The success of China’s Silk Route Economic Belt initiative will enable China to dominate the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan (where it is making significant investments and is also trying to play a political role). If China were to emerge as the preponderant power in Eurasia, this would constitute a tectonic geopolitical shift that India, can countenance with equanimity, as this would significantly undermine India’s strategic interests and security.

Thus India’s approach to this region cannot be passive. India must strive to get a firm foothold in the Eurasian space, including Afghanistan, so that forces inimical or hostile to India’s interests like China and Pakistan do not dominate it, particularly if economic and other influence is backed by a military presence. In order to ensure its security, India has to exercise at least some degree of influence, if not control, over the trans-Himalayan strategic space in Eurasia. It must become relevant to the growth, development and prosperity of the CARs. For this to happen, it has to be involved in Eurasian energy politics. Small individual investments of the kind India has made in Kazakhstan are inadequate. What is needed is a big project that creates long-term mutually beneficial linkages of India and the CARs and, equally important, is in conformity with the strategic interest of the concerned parties.

In this context, Iran’s strategic relevance to India has gone up. Apart from other factors like Iran’s intrinsic importance as a major player in the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s rich oil and gas reserves, Iran is currently India’s only route to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. India and Iran will also need to cooperate to try to stabilize Afghanistan. Already a formidable regional power, Iran’s role will only increase after a nuclear deal is clinched with the P-5+1. After submitting to US pressure over Iran for a decade, India is now repairing its disrupted ties with Iran. The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding on the development of Chabahar port, not merely as an economic but more so as a strategic project, and the reactivation of the North-South Corridor are long overdue and important concrete steps in this direction. These need to be followed up urgently with high-level exchanges, including at the Prime Minister’s level.

Since Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Qatar have about two-thirds of the world’s exportable surplus of natural gas, Eurasia should be at the centre of India’s gas import strategy. For all these countries too, India is a proximate and attractive long-term market. Russia can no longer count on the long-term loyalty and dependence of its traditional European customers, the more so after the Ukraine crisis. India is an important alternative market. Turkmenistan is already pushing the TAPI pipeline project to export its gas to India and Pakistan. As for Iran, it will definitely want to tap large gas markets like India once sanctions are removed, hopefully quite soon. Qatar’s future as a major gas exporter is linked with Iran, with which it shares the same principal gas field (South Pars/ North Dome). India already has energy investments in Russia and Kazakhstan and there is an agreement in principle with both countries to explore the possibility of energy pipeline projects to India. If the Central Asian countries work with Russia and Iran, Eurasia can be hard-wired with India in a web of interdependence. This has to be conceived and executed as a strategic project, not merely as an economic or energy deal.

India must try to persuade Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to let India develop, or at least allocate to India, some large gas fields that can be a source of long-term gas supply to India. The greater challenge will lie in transporting Eurasian gas to India. The LNG route is too long and expensive, at least for now. Purely land routes from Eurasia to India pose many problems. Given the continuing lack of trust between India and Pakistan, and the uncertainties surrounding Afghanistan, it is doubtful if either the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) or the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline projects will actually fructify. Under these circumstances, the only feasible alternative is a land-cum-sea pipeline from Eurasia to India via the Iranian port of Chabahar.

One possible route is from western Siberia in Russia to Chabahar via west Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The advantage of this route is that it involves fewer countries and can also incorporate existing swap arrangements between Iran and Turkmenistan. Another route is from eastern Siberia in Russia to southeast Kazakhstan via the Altai region, on to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley, thence west to Khojent in Tajikistan at the mouth of the Ferghana Valley, and thereafter into Afghanistan, along the Mazar-e-sharif – Herat – Delaram - Zaranj route (which is outside the Taliban’s area of influence) before entering eastern Iran and down south to Chabahar. The advantage of this route is that it would also serve Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and western Afghanistan, and thereby help to stabilize these countries. On the flip side, it would definitely be a more complicated project. Perhaps it might be better to start with the first option and then consider the eastern route later.

From Chabahar, there would be an undersea pipeline via Oman to ports in Gujarat. Two gas hubs would come up. One would be in Chabahar, fed by Russian, Turkmen and possibly also Kazakh gas from the north, together with Iran’s own gas from South Pars. Another hub would be in Oman where the gas piped from Chabahar under the sea would meet up with Qatar gas piped across the UAE. An Indian company, South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE), has done a study on the commercial and technical viability of such undersea pipelines between Iran/Oman and India, and is actively working with the concerned governments to take it forward.

One hopes that as Prime Minister Modi prepares to visit Central Asia, his Government and his advisers are looking at conceptualizing a major strategic project of the kind suggested above. If such a project were to be endorsed by the CARs during his visit, that would be a significant breakthrough in India’s floundering Central Asia policy.

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Published Date: 2^nd July 2015, Image Source: http://www.presstv.ir

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

President Putin Redux

PP Shukla,
Joint Director, VIF

Even with the North Atlantic orientation of today’s
European policy, we cannot forget that NATO and
Europe are not one and the same thing. And I’ve already
said that Russia is a country of European culture, not
NATO culture.

- Vladimir Putin, First Person

On 7 May, as has been happening every four years since 2000, a President was sworn into office on the Kremlin in Moscow. Vladimir Putin took the oath of office for the third time – actually for the fourth time, since he had been acting President since late 1999. It must have been quite a contrast for him. When he took office duly elected in May 2000, he told the Russian people that his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had handed over power to him with one plea: “Save Russia”. And at that time, it was a big ask. Russia was going through fresh convulsions, economic and political, and the ailing Yeltsin was demonstrably unequal to the task.

It is to the credit of Putin that he did indeed save Russia. He did more: he restored it to the level of a great power. He brought stability, he ended the free-for-all that Russia, including even its capital city had been reduced to. And he oversaw a revival of the country’s economy as well. As a result, by the early 2000’s, Goldman Sachs had identified it as part of the BRIC economies whose future was to become one of the major economies in the world. True, not all of this was Putin’s doing, but in large measure it was, and he had created the stability that was so essential for the economy to take advantage of the commodity boom that was to follow. And a grateful populace indicated its recognition of his role by giving him a degree of support that - even after discounting for some exaggeration in the opinion polls – most democratic leaders can only dream of.

But time marches on, new events occur, the stability and other basics begin to be taken for granted. Memories fade, and new ideas emerge. Above all, a new President had to be elected as the Russian Constitution allows only two consecutive terms to an incumbent. Medvedev held the job for four years, starting in 2008, and in both tone and substance, his approach to governance was markedly different. Some degree of popular impatience with the “sovereign democracy” that was the flavour of the Putin-Medvedev era was clearly manifest, especially on the streets of Moscow and St Petersburg. The irony was that these were the cities that had gained the most from the policies of Putin, and he himself is a native of St Petersburg.

This would explain why the return of Putin as President has not been welcomed with the enthusiasm that he certainly feels entitled to. Public opinion has clearly shifted in the four years of the Medvedev Presidency, and this has targeted both the leaders, as well as their Party, the United Russia Party [URP]. This would also explain why there have been street demonstrations against both the Parliamentary elections that were held last December [won by URP of course, though with a diminished mandate], and the Presidential elections in March.

Anyway, Putin is in power now for six years – the term of the Presidency was increased to six years by Medvedev in one of his early acts as President, and it is important to try and understand his [Putin’s] persona and current strategic views. It would be important to recognise that the situation in Russia – indeed all of Europe – is fluid, and there are few certainties, including of politics in the continent.

A look at his views as they have been since his first term as President suggests that he sees Russian interests best served in a strong European tie-up. This is coupled with an understanding [right or wrong] that Europe and America are distinct cultures, as the quote given at the opening of this article indicates. This is coupled with a strong personal German exposure during his career in the KGB, with the result that he speaks fluent German, and is well acquainted with the culture. In his early book – a long interview actually – “First Person”, he describes with feeling how he was impressed by Helmut Kohl of Germany, and observes: “And it was especially gratifying to hear him [Kohl] say that he couldn’t imagine a Europe without Russia”. This view has been only reinforced over the years, and German Chancellors like Schroeder have been particularly close to Russia and to Putin. [It would be fair to say that Medvedev is more exposed, and sympathetic, to the Anglo-Saxon world and culture.]

Putin has revealed his attitude very early in his new stint as President. He blamed the street disturbances on the Americans even before he took office; and he has declined to attend the G8 Summit in America. The message clearly is that America is not to be his first visit outside the CIS. In fairness, President Obama also did not help matters by declaring that Putin had one leg in the Cold War era, and demonstrating a clear preference for dealing with Medvedev. Nonetheless, the fact that Putin has retained Medvedev as Prime Minister and sent him to the G8 Summit, suggests that he [Putin] is pragmatic enough to see that the American relationship is important enough not to be damaged just in order to make a point. Of course, this move to stay away may also play into the American Presidential elections, and Putin would not mind that either, for he is not one to forget a slight.

On present indications, the first country Putin is likely to visit outside the CIS will be China. It is reported that there is to be an SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation] Summit, and he will be going for that. This makes it doubly significant, for he is also signalling the importance he attaches to SCO, in contrast to his attitude towards the G8. In turn, China has welcomed Putin’s return to the Presidency. An article in the People’s Daily, under the title “A stable prosperous Russia under Putin is good for China” hailed his electoral success, adding that he rode “a wave of popularity for his no-nonsense incorruptible image” – just the sort of message that would please him.

It is also instructive to examine Putin’s inaugural speech. It is a short speech, as all his inaugural speeches have been, but there is this significant passage: “We must all understand that the life of our future generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on us today and on our real achievements in building a new economy and developing modern living standards, on our efforts to look after our people and support our families, on our determination in developing our vast expanses from the Baltic to the Pacific,and on our ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia.” [Emphasis added].

This idea of Eurasia is very much part of Putin’s persona, and embraces both a strong tie-up with Europe and Germany as its anchor, and with China at the other end of the Eurasian land-mass. In the same speech, Putin also praised Medvedev for the work he did as President. The latter also spoke at the inaugural ceremony and hinted that the civil and social changes he introduced need to be preserved. This could contain the seeds of future trouble between the two men.

On the same day that he took office, Putin signed a number of Executive Orders, some five in number; of these, three are of immediate interest, as they also tell us something about the priorities that he will follow. They concern Demographics, the Economy, and Foreign Policy. Each of them is worth considering in some detail. The Russian population has been in steady decline for some decades now, particularly the Slavic part. Despite Governmental efforts, this trend has not been arrested. There is not only the question of maintaining the population growth at a level that would be enough to replenish the labour force, important though that is, there is also the problem of depopulation – over time – of the Siberian region. A very small part of the population lives in these regions, no more than 7 million in the Far East. Facing them across the border is a Chinese population that is some 120 million, if not more. At the moment, the problem has been contained, despite scare stories to the contrary in Russian lore, and the number of Chinese settlers, registered and unregistered, in the area are not more than half a million at the most. But the potential imbalance is too serious to be ignored. The Order issued by Putin calls for more incentives to all families that have three or more babies; nothing really new here. The important element is the suggestion that migration is to become a serious effort to address the labour shortage. Again, this is not entirely new, and there are migrants from the CIS in large numbers. But the intent here appears to be to cast a wider net, something that has been bubbling under the surface for some years now. The document is short on substance, but this is a thought that has found high-level expression, and will need to be followed carefully.

On the foreign policy side, there are a number of important indications of what we may expect. The order in which issues are taken up may be taken to reflect their importance. The list of tasks begins with international issues like terrorism, proliferation, drug-trafficking, etc. Then comes the regional prioritisation, and the first area listed is the CIS. Next comes the European Union, where the most important subject is Energy cooperation and the need to develop a common space in this sector. Asia-Pacific is the next and there is the following formulation used to define priority tasks: “deepening equal, trust-based partnership and strategic cooperation with China, strategic partnership with India and Vietnam, and developing mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and other key nations in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Until recently, India and China were mentioned on par with each other, but here the standing of China is clearly enhanced. There is a suggestion that the two countries are not only trusted partners, but that they also cooperate at the strategic level. This is a trend in Russian thinking and action that needs to be watched carefully. China is the only major power that has shown some understanding of Russian concerns over Western policies towards it, notably Ballistic Missile Defence deployments in East Europe, and NATO expansion, and this has been well-received in the Russian elite policy circles.

The US is the next to be mentioned, and has the distinction of being only one of four countries mentioned in a stand-alone formulation. There is nothing unexpected in the details of policy priorities but it is important to note that there is an explicit reference to the threat Russia perceives from the American plans for a global missile defence system. This is one of the major Russian concerns, as mentioned above, and will continue to bedevil relations. Obama was overheard asking Medvedev to ask Putin to give him some time to work through this issue after the election, but Russia will clearly not cut any slack on this one.

The other countries that get a stand-alone mention are Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea – all problem areas that concern Russia deeply. There is nothing remarkable in the formulations, though it is worth noting that on Afghanistan, the Order mentions the importance of SCO and of CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organisation – a grouping of some former Soviet states], and of the Russia-NATO Council. But there is no direct mention of NATO itself, which is odd considering that the Russians at various times have indicated their desire for ISAF not to pull out prematurely from the country.

The economic policy contains some of the expected targets, such as on ease of doing business. But the most significant hint is that concerning the main State monopolies on aircraft manufacturing and ship building. There is a hint that the monopolies hae not performed as expected, and they are to be audited for their performance. These were monopolies from the Soviet times, which were broken up in the 1990’s, then re-consolidated under Putin himself. They have clearly not performed up to the mark, and it is not surprising that their functioning is to be examined. But the approach is still decidedly statist, and it would be fair to say that this is not the thinking that guided Medvedev in his policies as President.

An important aspect that deserves close attention going forward is the nature of the Defence cooperation between Russia and China. After some serious problems in the mid-2000’s, things appear to have got better lately. A recent statement by one of China’s Deputy Ministers emphasised the importance of this in the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries. and the financial problems of the Russian Defence industry would make China an attractive partner. There are continuing problems over IPR issues, no doubt, but this is where the dynamic between the financial problems and the overall relationship on the one hand, and the IPR issue on the other will bear watching.

The early personnel changes have also been announced. There are some changes in the Government Ministers though the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence remain unchanged. The most intriguing aspect of the change is the dropping of the powerful Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, who controlled the Energy and Fuel complex. It has now been announced that he is to become CEO of the State oil company Rosneft – a clear demotion. There were suspected differences between him and President Medvedev, but this looks like a concerted move by both the leaders in the new tandem, Putin and Medvedev.

The removal of Sechin from the post of Deputy Prime Minister opens the way for a Medvedev protégé – Arkady Dvorkovich – to take his place as the overall in-charge of the Energy and Fuel Complex. The retention of Igor Shuvalov as First Deputy Prime Minister, and the only such [there were two First DPM’s in the outgoing arrangement] is another indicator of a willingness to reach out to the West for deeper economic engagement. It is also worth noting that Vladislav Surkov seems to have been forgiven for the disappointing performance of the United Russia Party at the Parliamentary elections and is now to be the Head of the Government Staff, a powerful post. None of the three has any exposure to India, and this would suggest that we would have to continue to work at the top leadership levels in order to keep the economic relationship healthy.

Many of the Ministers who were in charge of economic and social portfolios in the outgoing Government have been moved to the Kremlin as advisers to Putin. This suggests that he will run the Government with tight control over decision-making, and with the help of the team that he had with him as Prime Minister. But perhaps the most important move from the old Government team is the complete rehabilitation and return to power and trust of Sergei Ivanov, who was earlier the Deputy Prime Minister. He was a candidate for the Presidency and very close to Putin in 2008, but Putin chose Medvedev over him then. Ivanov was brought in as the Head of the Presidential Administration in December last year, while Medvedev was still President. However, it was clearly a preparation for the new President, namely, Putin. The position of Head of the Presidential Administration is effectively the most important position after that of the President himself in the Kremlin. Ivanov, who speaks fluent English, knows India well and will be an important channel for developing ties between the two countries.

For India, it is important to take note of the changing overall outlook in the Russian establishment. Nothing drastic is expected in our bilateral ties, and the relationship is strong and stable, as is shown by the quality of the Defence and Hi-tech cooperation between the two countries. The importance of India is also reflected in the positive reference in the foreign policy priorities, even though it comes below China and the description is of a lesser order.

However, of late, our high-level dialogue has been losing the quality it had during Soviet times, or even early in the 2000’s, and is becoming formal and transactional. There is also the changing Russian attitude towards Pakistan. It is not as yet a cause of concern, but the pace of development of the relationship will bear careful scrutiny in the coming months and years. This is almost a Russian reflex: whenever they fear that India is getting too close to America, they reach out to Pakistan. While it may have been a viable approach in the 1960’s and 1980’s, it would be serious mistake in the current context, and it is to be hoped that those in Moscow who understand South Asia well will see the pitfalls of this policy.

All in all, this adds up to a very ambitious approach to Russian policy and ambitions. The big question is whether this is feasible. The Russian system has atrophied quite a bit since the days of the USSR. The kind of capabilities it had in science and technology, in defence, in space – all this has suffered attrition. Above all, their long-standing weakness in economic thinking and management, especially in the context of a market economy, and a probable slowdown in the commodity boom, is going to prove to be a serious challenge. There is also going to be unprecedented resistance to Putin’s vision and programme – it does not take much to see that. The street demonstrations after the Parliamentary and Presidential elections were among the largest since the fall of the USSR. The public mood is changing, and the media are reflecting a desire for more changes – once again in a liberal direction, after the control they accepted in the early period of this century. If the leadership is up to the challenge of adapting to the new circumstances, economic and social, Russia can look forward to another period of stability and economic growth. As a major power on the global scene, Russia will be an important factor in the emerging shape of the world, one way or another.