ISIS: Is Central Asia the Next Stop?

Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, 

Research Associate, VIF

There is a growing debate whether the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will advance into the heartland of Central Asia or not, although the figures of people from the region joining the outfit differ from source to source. But considering the prevailing situation in most of these countries, even a few hundreds could be a worrying number. The rise in radicalism gained momentum after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Reportedly, in the past three years, approximately 2,000 to 4,000¹ people started to seek a radical path as an alternative to the systems provided by their respective governments. This emerging trend fits well into that ambition of the ISIS to spread its tentacles globally.

The appearance of the black flag of the ISIS on a bridge in Tashkent on 28 August last year became one of the earliest incidents which marked the penetration of ISIS influence in this country. Thereafter, the outfit announced the appointment of an “emir” for Uzbekistan, whose identity has not been revealed,² and this was followed by another appointment of an emir for Raqqa, which is the headquarters of the group. Thereafter, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), under the leadership of Usman Gazi, extended support to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in mid-September 2014.³ This group is believed to have close relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban, but some of its cadres “had been thrown out over ideological differences or for insubordination.”⁴ However, IMU’s similar vision to establish a caliphate took it closer to ISIS without even declaring an outright allegiance to the latter. If both the groups merge someday, then the IMU will likely assist ISIS in staging more attacks in northern Afghanistan as well as in different parts of Central Asia.⁵

The resentment of the people with regard to political system in their respective countries can be attributed for the rise of religious extremism, which is tilting in favour of the ISIS. The power vacuum that was created after the fall of the Soviet Union led to the strengthening of radical elements in the region, and the mushrooming of several Islamists groups in the 1990s in Tajikistan is one such case. The governance of authoritarian rulers in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and equally corrupted political systems in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have driven many of the residents to call for “radical Islamism.”⁶ Similar is the situation in Kazakhstan, a country with vast oil and gas reserves, where there is an autocratic rule and rural population living in poverty. When these people feel they are economically or politically marginalised, they resort to violence, which, as a result, received crackdown form the state forces. This further estranged the relationship between them, and leads to the growth of radicalism.

Various sources have given different figures of Central Asians who have joined ISIS fighters. According to the International Centre for Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)⁷, there are at least 250 Kazakh fighters in the ISIS, 100 Kyrgyz citizens (while another source talks of as many as 600 fighters⁸), 360 from Turkmenistan, 500-odd Uzbek fighters (both citizens of Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from the neighbouring countries), and for Tajikistan, the figure ranges between 400 and 2,000.⁹ The movement of these people has become easier due to the 30-days visa-free regime with Turkey. In some cases, Afghanistan is an alternative but this is a less used route.

Factors

The radicalisation process which began in the early 1990s played an important role in making people move towards Syria, today. However, it is difficult to pick out any particular motive for Central Asians to join ISIS ranks, but “some are driven by the spirit of jihad, while others may be drawn to it due to ignorance and bigotry. The search for the employment and earnings remains one of the main factors”.¹⁰ Moreover, the belief of these people that ISIS can provide better prospects somehow facilitates the departure. A study conducted by the International Crisis Group (ICG) sums up that “All are inspired by the belief that an Islamic state is a meaningful alternative to post-Soviet life. Some wish to fight, others to facilitate.”¹¹

Wide-ranging socio-economic problems in most of the Central Asian countries have induced a strong sense of dissent against the state authorities. Such dissatisfaction which exists within a society, with a sizeable radicalised people, is a prime target for the group’s recruitment process. Therefore, those without employments or with a very insignificant salary become highly vulnerable to various terror outfits operating in the region, not only the ISIS. There were even reports of leaflets circulated by the ISIS in Tajikistan “offering Tajik fighters salaries of $5,000 a month, far more than the average salary” in the country.¹²

In the words of P. Stobdan, a former diplomat:

They [Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz] are often tricked into the jihadi net by unscrupulous recruiters who promise them jobs in Turkey and Europe. One reason why Central Asian fighters find lucrative to rush to Middle East than to Af-Pak region, is because they find ISIS more inspirational, prestigious, and rewarding than fighting in Af-Pak region. Moreover, Central Asians are never empathetic towards the Af-Pak Taliban for they pose direct threat to the region. They perhaps find other reasons like better living standards (permission to bring family, permission to marry local women) to go to Syria. It is also less hazardous to reach Syria than Af-Pak as Turkey provides easy gateway. All the Central Asian States have favorable visa regime with Turkey.¹³

The adherence to the extreme religious ideologies propagated by terror outfits such as ISIS is another strong reason for the flights of young men and women to Syria, in particular. The ambition to create an Islamic state wherever possible appears to have takers in this part of Asia. Under such circumstances, the contributions of the volunteers need only concentrate on battle fights but they are willing to provide humanitarian assistance. Therefore, their profiles are varied and they are mainly constituted of schools and university dropouts, businessmen, women abandoned by their husbands, 

etc.¹⁴ This comes in conjunction with that call on Muslims, by al-Baghdadi in July 2014, to travel to Iraq and Syria to lend helping hand in the establishment of an Islamic state. “Special calls” were made for “judges, doctors, engineers and people with military and administrative.”¹⁵ And, for the jihadists and religious ideologues, setting up of such a state, which is to be governed by strict Islamic laws, have become a commonly shared goal with that of ISIS.

Recruitment

Although social media remains as a pivotal instrument, it is not the most important recruiting strategy. The numbers of people having access to internet are low in many places in the region. While this tool acts as a communicating bridge between fighters in Iraq or Syria and those aspiring jihadist in Central Asia, the role of local institutions such as mosques and places of religious learning are equally gaining momentum. Influential religious leaders are believed to have assisted in radicalising the citizens who are susceptible to their preaching. For instance, radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which has strongholds in the region, particularly in Uzbekistan,¹⁶ and Tabligi Jamaat are reportedly playing a “peripheral role in so far as both men and women may be radicalised as they gravitate toward their teachings.”¹⁷ But the links to their direct involvement in recruiting Central Asians have remained limited, whereas some members of the IMU are believed to have done this job for ISIS in the Fergana Valley comprising of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The close proximity of Central Asian countries to Russia is also serving as a conduit for recruitment. This is due to the migration of workers towards Russian towns and cities in search of employment, particularly in the constructions sites. Several workers are said to have travelled to Syria after they were recruited by “Chechens in Moscow.”¹⁸ Tajik fighters constitute a majority of the migrant recruits. However, the identities of these “Chechens” recruiters are vague, but some of them are probably from the Pankisi George region in Georgia,¹⁹ the hometown of the "Omar the Chechen”, also known as Omar Ash-Shishani, the Islamic State military commander who was allegedly killed in November last year. ²⁰ The availability of online forums in Russian and other local languages make the recruitment endeavours easier. It is perhaps with this motive ISIS released first Russian-language publication called “Furat.Press” in May, and the second one, Istok (The Source) in June this year.²¹

The increasing activity of recruitment inside Russia takes place amidst the efforts to curb the issue of religious extremism. This phenomenon is prevalent in Moscow, which has perhaps the largest Muslim concentration in the country. While some of them get access to Mosques, which is limited in numbers, there are others who use temporary or “inappropriate” buildings for prayers. This, according to a source, “Prompts the police and the security services to regard them as sectarians and adherents to unofficial Islam, which automatically puts them in the category of potential terrorists.”²² As a result, dissatisfaction with the government and the role of law enforcement authorities has promoted the growth of radicalism. Finally, these disgruntled people have become the target for the recruiters.

Concerns and Countermeasures

The influence of ISIS inside Central Asia is taken to be dormant by many. There is an impression that the group is still far away from making inroads in the region. But these presumptions must not lead the countries to complacency. The developments in its immediate neighbourhoods, that is, inside Russia (as recruitment zone) and Afghanistan, where ISIS announced the establishment of its Khorasan wing (covering Pakistan as well) during late January 2015, are alarming. Moscow will not like to see an increase in the number of recruits on its soil (who then travel towards West Asian region) as there is always the possibility of those fighters returning home. These fighters can be source of strengths for other terror organisations inside the country as well. Moreover, the returnees can ignite unrest or influence like-minded people in their native countries. Equally worrying trend is developing in Afghanistan where limited group of fighters are spreading in the eastern part of the country. Although ISIS presence is still insignificant in Afghanistan, it is increasingly attracting new recruits, particularly, the dissatisfied or disillusioned former Taliban commanders.²³ Therefore, It is possible that the ISIS will carry forwards its fights towards Central Asia after establishing a sustainable presence in the Af-Pak region.

Since security measures alone cannot prevent the deepening of extremism in the region, there should be civilian approaches as well. The latter will require improving the overall socio-economic and political situation in every country. But for all these to materialise, a strong political will and resources are required. This is where the role of the affluent international powers will become appropriate, beyond providing military assistance. And, to prevent the upsurge of radical elements and that of the ISIS, the need of the hour is for the Central Asian countries to start engaging constantly amongst themselves. A robust regional cooperation framework in military-intelligence sharing should be established. 

Since Central Asia is India’s extended neighbourhood, New Delhi should step up its cooperation with the countries there. Owing to its strategic interests in this region with abundance of natural resources, the current visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the five states should give equal importance in discussing the long-term security implications, particularly, counter-terrorism, beyond oil and energy trade. This is an opportune moment for India in particular, keeping in mind the development of Chabahar port in Iran, a Persian Gulf country which it will use as a transit for Central Asia.

Finally, the efforts to prevent the ISIS from making Central Asia as its stop in the future will flounder if the countries in and around the region fail to understand the gravity of the situation. The vigour of this organisation should never be underestimated.

Endnotes

1. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, Policy Briefing, No. 72, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group, 20 January 2015, p. 1.
2. “Islamic State Flag Hung from Tashkent Bridge”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 4 September 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-islamic-state-flag-tajikistan-sy...
3. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan declares support for ISIS”, alakhbar, 6 October 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/islamic-movement-uzbekistan-declare...
4. Joseph Goldstein, “In ISIS, the Taliban Face an Insurgent Threat of Their Own”, The New York Times, 4 June 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-face-in...
5. Damon A. Mehl, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue. 6, pp. 11, 13-14.
6. Reid Standish. “Shadow Boxing with the Islamic State in Central Asia”, Foreign Policy, 6 February 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/shadow-boxing-with-the-islamic-state...
7. Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s”, International Centre for Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 26 January 2015, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-200...
8. Anna Dyner, et al, “Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into Central Asia”, Policy Paper, No. 19 (121), The Polish Institute for International Affairs, June, p. 6.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. P. Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”, IDSA Issue Brief, 22 October 2014, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/ISISinCentralAsia_pstobdan_221014.html, p. 4.
11. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 4.
12. Shawn Snow, “ISIS Looks for Foothold in Central Asia”, The Diplomat, 18 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/isis-looks-for-foothold-in-central-asia/
13. Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”.
14. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 4.
15. “Isis leader calls on Muslims to ‘build Islamic state’, BBC, 1 July 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28116846
16. Samantha Brletich, “Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the Rise”, International Relations and Security Network, 8 August 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=88668
17. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 6.
18. For a brief report, see Daniil Turovsky, “How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria”, The Guardian , 5 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-e...
19. Ibid.
20. “ISIS commander 'Omar the Chechen' allegedly killed”, RT, 13 November 2014, http://rt.com/news/205239-russia-chechen-isis-killed/
21. Umberto Bacchi, “Isis targets jihadists in former Soviet nations with Russian-language propaganda magazine Istok”, International Business Times, 3 June 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-targets-jihadists-former-soviet-nations-ru...
22. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Moscow Remains Fertile Recruiting Ground for Aspiring Jihadists”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 12, Issue. 41, 5 March 2015.
23. “Can the Islamic State Defeat the Taliban”, Stratfor, 25 June 2015. For further reading, see Lauren McNally, “Is the Islamic State Escalating in Afghanistan”, Institute for the Study of War, 27 April 2015.

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Published Date: 8^th July 2015, Image Source: http://www.theguardian.com (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Thoughts on India’s Central Asia Strategy

Amb Rajiv Sikri, 

Distinguished Fellow, VIF

It is indeed encouraging that in a few days Prime Minister Modi will be visiting all the Central Asian countries simultaneously, something that no Indian Prime Minister has done so far. However, India seems to be grappling with the same issues and dilemmas in relation to Central Asia that were present in the nineties, notwithstanding periodic efforts to kick-start the relationship. Why is this so? There are both objective constraints, as well as some missed opportunities.

If it is to have an enduring impact, Prime Minister Modi’s visit will have to go beyond promoting goodwill and the usual bilateral agreements and discussions. He must go with a clear strategic perspective of India’s relations with the Central Asian countries; without that, it won’t be possible to develop a viable Central Asia policy. India’s relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) must take into account developments in the wider Eurasian space that includes the five CARs, Afghanistan, Pakistan west of the Indus, Iran, Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, including those regions currently occupied by Pakistan and China.

Throughout history, Eurasia has been a strategic not a mere geographic space. As a geographical area on to which the back doors, so to speak, of major Asian powers open, Eurasia has always attracted, and will continue to attract, the attention of outside powers. It is a ‘negative security space’, an area where major powers cannot afford to let competing major powers or forces exercise a dominating influence because that would pose a threat to their own security. The Cold War and the impermeable political borders of Eurasia during this period dulled strategic perceptions about this region, but that was a geo-strategic aberration.

For the last quarter century, Eurasia has been once again at the centre of global geopolitics. In the second half of the 19^th century and the early 20^th century, it was the setting for the ‘Great Game’ between imperial Britain and Tsarist Russia. A century later, the geostrategic imperatives remain unchanged, only the ‘game’ has become more complicated, with energy emerging as an additional factor in strategic calculations. Connectivity across Eurasia has dramatically improved. Roads, railway tracks as well as oil and gas pipelines and power transmission lines are criss-crossing the region. Of course, so are drug smugglers, terrorists and fundamentalists.

The CARs, both collectively and individually, are today much weaker than their geographically contiguous large neighbours like Russia and China. Between the two, Russia’s influence has declined while China’s has steadily increased in the CARs over the last quarter century. Since 9/11, the United States has also become an active player in the region. These three powers are the principal outside players. Other powers such as Europe, Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India still play only marginal roles.

Russia is taking purposeful steps to regain its preponderant influence in the CARs. It has enmeshed most of them in regional security and military arrangements like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well as through bilateral military agreements. A Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been set up; Tajikistan too may join it. Russia has many additional levers in Central Asia viz. a significant and influential Russian origin population; good networking; dependence of many CARs on remittances of migrants working in Russia; transit facilities for landlocked CARs; and considerable economic interdependence of CARs with Russia. While wanting to reduce the strong grip of Russia that held them for seven decades, the CARs realize that they can neither ignore nor do without Russia.

A rising China is systematically and relentlessly sucking the CARs into its economic whirlpool. Energy supplies for its fast-growing economy, a proximate market for its products, and a security buffer for Xinjiang – these are China’s main concerns vis-à-vis the CARs. Having taken over Xinjiang, it now seeks to dominate the CARs. This won’t be easy, since China faces many serious long-term challenges. Xinjiang, which has extensive ethnic, economic, social and other ties with the CARs could turn out to be China’s Achilles heel. Uighur nationalism remains strong. The fate of the Muslim Uighurs carries resonance among the Islamic ummah. Some Uighur elements appear to have developed linkages with the al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, more recently, the Islamic State too. Xinjiang’s security and stability could be compromised by turmoil or turbulence in the CARs. China realizes this – its latest Defence White Paper mentions the dangers from separatist forces fighting for “East Turkestan independence.” Moreover, despite benefiting from China’s economic growth the CARs remain wary of becoming economically too dependent on China, and worry about creeping Chinese demographic expansionism. Historically, China has been viewed by Central Asians as an expansionist and dominating power, and recent Chinese muscle flexing in Southeast Asia would have reinforced traditional suspicions about China’s attitude towards weak neighbours.

Capitalizing on the favourable climate after 9/11, the United States rushed to establish a number of bases in the region, which it has since had to vacate under the combined pressure of Russia and the CARs. While its other global preoccupations have reduced US interest in Central Asia under President Obama, US policy has always been to somehow detach the CARs from Russia’s sphere of influence and integrate them economically with Afghanistan and South Asia. The ongoing Russia-US standoff over Ukraine would have only reinforced US determination in this respect. Central Asians welcome the United States as a check on both China and Russia, but they realize the fickleness of US policies and level of interest, and remain wary of US proclivity to work for regime change and exert pressure on human rights issues.

Where does India fit into this picture? Over the centuries the most extensive connections of Central Asians with the outside world have been with India. Nor has India ever posed any ideological, demographic or territorial threat to Central Asia. Thus Central Asians have always had a romantic attraction towards India, reinforced by close and friendly relations during Soviet times. That is a good starting point, but nothing more. Today, at a general level, the CARs want a more active Indian presence to balance the other major players who carry considerable baggage. So far, however, the CARs and India haven’t been able to reconnect meaningfully principally because of the absence of easy and reliable connectivity. Since there does not appear to be any immediate solution to this problem, economic and people-to-people linkages between the CARs and India remain weak. Trade routes are long, cumbersome and uneconomical. The legal systems, regulatory and taxation provisions in the CARs leave much to be desired. There are other factors too why Indian private entrepreneurs find the CARs comparatively less attractive than many other places viz. poor air connectivity; difficulties in getting visas; unfamiliarity with local languages; and some bad experiences of Indian companies in the CARs in the early years after their independence. Perhaps economic relations will get a boost if India were to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. A study group has been recently set up to examine this proposal.

More than trade in goods, the two sides should focus on trade in services and use of the CARs as a transit point. Leveraging their location, the CARs could, however, become a passenger and cargo hub for air traffic from India to Siberia and the Russian Far East region in one direction, and to Europe in the other, in the way Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Singapore have positioned themselves. The CARs could also develop their potential as a tourism destination for Indians with competitive pricing, a more liberal visa regime and better air connectivity. There could even be joint marketing of Central Asia and north India to the rest of the world as a “Mughal Trail.

A blueprint for India-Central Asia cooperation was outlined in India’s ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ three years ago. This needs to be fleshed out and implemented earnestly. One of the first things that India should do is to change its image in the CARs. Instead of the traditional stereotype of Soviet times, India should be projected as a modern, scientifically and technologically advanced country with capabilities that are relevant for the development of the CARs. Some of the concrete initiatives that could be pushed are: encouragement to private Indian airlines and charter flights to operate between India and Central Asia; significant expansion of existing programmes of technical cooperation so that more young people visit India to develop skills that are needed in their home countries; larger loans on soft terms for infrastructure projects. In return, India would very much like to gain access to the rich natural resources of the CARs and some specialized defence technologies and production facilities.

It must be emphasized, however, that India’s interests in Eurasia are fundamentally strategic. The CARs are superficially stable but inherently fragile states, with incomplete nation building, underdeveloped political institutions and traditions, no accepted mechanism for periodic transfer of political power, and economically still considerably tied to a beleaguered Russia. Weak and unstable states with centrifugal tendencies could become a haven for terrorists, separatists, drug dealers and fundamentalists, linked up with similar elements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and West Asia. India has a strong interest in seeing stable and secular CARs. This is a formidable challenge that will not be easily met without large-scale investments that promote economic development and reduce unemployment among the youth, thereby giving people long-term hope about a brighter future.

A stable Eurasia is in the interest of all countries of the region. However, the prospects of long-term stability and peace are bleak if the great powers indulge in a new zero-sum ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. Wisdom lies in all countries adopting a cooperative rather than a competitive approach. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is potentially a promising vehicle for such cooperation. India hopes to join it as a full member, but this is not a given since the attitude of China remains ambivalent. Unfortunately, the SCO is China-dominated and China-driven. While full membership will certainly raise India’s profile in Central Asia, it is unlikely to help India achieve its core interests in Central Asia. China and Pakistan, both individually and jointly, seem determined to unilaterally pursue their perceived strategic interests in the region.

Apart from the CARs, developments in Xinjiang, geographically contiguous to both the CARs and India, have direct and far-reaching implications for India’s security. India needs to carefully study and anticipate various scenarios in Xinjiang. China’s strong strategic partnership with Pakistan, and physical connectivity via Xinjiang, has been reinforced by the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. The success of China’s Silk Route Economic Belt initiative will enable China to dominate the Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan (where it is making significant investments and is also trying to play a political role). If China were to emerge as the preponderant power in Eurasia, this would constitute a tectonic geopolitical shift that India, can countenance with equanimity, as this would significantly undermine India’s strategic interests and security.

Thus India’s approach to this region cannot be passive. India must strive to get a firm foothold in the Eurasian space, including Afghanistan, so that forces inimical or hostile to India’s interests like China and Pakistan do not dominate it, particularly if economic and other influence is backed by a military presence. In order to ensure its security, India has to exercise at least some degree of influence, if not control, over the trans-Himalayan strategic space in Eurasia. It must become relevant to the growth, development and prosperity of the CARs. For this to happen, it has to be involved in Eurasian energy politics. Small individual investments of the kind India has made in Kazakhstan are inadequate. What is needed is a big project that creates long-term mutually beneficial linkages of India and the CARs and, equally important, is in conformity with the strategic interest of the concerned parties.

In this context, Iran’s strategic relevance to India has gone up. Apart from other factors like Iran’s intrinsic importance as a major player in the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s rich oil and gas reserves, Iran is currently India’s only route to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. India and Iran will also need to cooperate to try to stabilize Afghanistan. Already a formidable regional power, Iran’s role will only increase after a nuclear deal is clinched with the P-5+1. After submitting to US pressure over Iran for a decade, India is now repairing its disrupted ties with Iran. The recently signed Memorandum of Understanding on the development of Chabahar port, not merely as an economic but more so as a strategic project, and the reactivation of the North-South Corridor are long overdue and important concrete steps in this direction. These need to be followed up urgently with high-level exchanges, including at the Prime Minister’s level.

Since Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran and Qatar have about two-thirds of the world’s exportable surplus of natural gas, Eurasia should be at the centre of India’s gas import strategy. For all these countries too, India is a proximate and attractive long-term market. Russia can no longer count on the long-term loyalty and dependence of its traditional European customers, the more so after the Ukraine crisis. India is an important alternative market. Turkmenistan is already pushing the TAPI pipeline project to export its gas to India and Pakistan. As for Iran, it will definitely want to tap large gas markets like India once sanctions are removed, hopefully quite soon. Qatar’s future as a major gas exporter is linked with Iran, with which it shares the same principal gas field (South Pars/ North Dome). India already has energy investments in Russia and Kazakhstan and there is an agreement in principle with both countries to explore the possibility of energy pipeline projects to India. If the Central Asian countries work with Russia and Iran, Eurasia can be hard-wired with India in a web of interdependence. This has to be conceived and executed as a strategic project, not merely as an economic or energy deal.

India must try to persuade Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran to let India develop, or at least allocate to India, some large gas fields that can be a source of long-term gas supply to India. The greater challenge will lie in transporting Eurasian gas to India. The LNG route is too long and expensive, at least for now. Purely land routes from Eurasia to India pose many problems. Given the continuing lack of trust between India and Pakistan, and the uncertainties surrounding Afghanistan, it is doubtful if either the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) or the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline projects will actually fructify. Under these circumstances, the only feasible alternative is a land-cum-sea pipeline from Eurasia to India via the Iranian port of Chabahar.

One possible route is from western Siberia in Russia to Chabahar via west Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The advantage of this route is that it involves fewer countries and can also incorporate existing swap arrangements between Iran and Turkmenistan. Another route is from eastern Siberia in Russia to southeast Kazakhstan via the Altai region, on to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley, thence west to Khojent in Tajikistan at the mouth of the Ferghana Valley, and thereafter into Afghanistan, along the Mazar-e-sharif – Herat – Delaram - Zaranj route (which is outside the Taliban’s area of influence) before entering eastern Iran and down south to Chabahar. The advantage of this route is that it would also serve Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and western Afghanistan, and thereby help to stabilize these countries. On the flip side, it would definitely be a more complicated project. Perhaps it might be better to start with the first option and then consider the eastern route later.

From Chabahar, there would be an undersea pipeline via Oman to ports in Gujarat. Two gas hubs would come up. One would be in Chabahar, fed by Russian, Turkmen and possibly also Kazakh gas from the north, together with Iran’s own gas from South Pars. Another hub would be in Oman where the gas piped from Chabahar under the sea would meet up with Qatar gas piped across the UAE. An Indian company, South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE), has done a study on the commercial and technical viability of such undersea pipelines between Iran/Oman and India, and is actively working with the concerned governments to take it forward.

One hopes that as Prime Minister Modi prepares to visit Central Asia, his Government and his advisers are looking at conceptualizing a major strategic project of the kind suggested above. If such a project were to be endorsed by the CARs during his visit, that would be a significant breakthrough in India’s floundering Central Asia policy.

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Published Date: 2^nd July 2015, Image Source: http://www.presstv.ir

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Iran, Israel and India's Interests

Barry Bharathan
Distinguished Fellow, VIF & Former Vice Chief, Indian Navy

Geo Politics of Civilisations and Culture

Two civilisations, India and Iran and a very ancient culture consecrated in the creation of Israel are in an enigmatic triangle. India is involuntarily at the apex with inimical, Iran and Israel at the two distanced points of this triangle.

India has managed relations on an “Iran & Israel” approach. Iran supplies nearly 12% of oil and the promise of gas though a pipeline is also a critical consideration. An agreement on this pipeline would also perhaps bring down the confrontationist temperature existing in the region. This may be also a pipe dream in the present context of India-Pakistan-China geo-political intransigence. Many also believe that India and Iran enjoy a civilisational relationship that endures periodic differences. Israel and India cooperation that began in the early 90's has progressively evolved into a robust engagement across the span of defense, agriculture, science, technology and research. In many ways, over the last two decades India has successfully responded to “Shalom and Salaam ale kum” of both Israel and Iran. The 13th February attack on an Israeli diplomat's car, the American led Western isolation of Iran has triggered of a reaction asking for India to choose a Iran or Israel approach. The house is divided on this as is expected in our democracy. Pressure from USA too is a significant factor. The media, information highway is full of articles assuming polarised positions. Whatever be the views, India's Interests come first and foremost.

Never a Zero Sum Game

International relationship is never a zero sum game. This self evident truth shows up in all the "Geo Political and Military" happening in the South Asian, Central Asian, Gulf; land and ocean Mass over the last two decades. Most critically, this entire swathe has been subject to cross currents of International interests, inter and intra country upheavals. Artificial divisions of the region by the British also spawned regional tensions. Israeli - Arab animosity, the Iran - Iraq war, the Cold War between the super powers, the, then unique Iraq- Soviet Union engagement and the incessant quest for energy has scarred this swathe into being a land of constant violence, conflict, radical ethnicity and geo-political instability. In effect whatever path India chooses, would be irrelevant in the background of a much larger and simmering volcano of visceral distrust and misperceptions. Even on this single factor India would perhaps do well to maintain status quo in its Iran and Israel relationships.

USA and China

USA and China too are intrinsic to this construct. The former has binding, bonding ties with the Jewish state. It is at present in the politics of confrontation with the Persians on a host of well known issues. Iran's nuclear posturing and anti American stand off, rattles the West. It is also an avowed enemy of Israel with openly declared intentions of completely destroying the latter. The probability of a pre emptive Israeli strike on Iran with attendant ramifications cannot be ruled out. Its attack on Iraq, years ago cannot be forgotten. China has a unique Iran relationship. It is a silent, covert supplier of nuclear and missile material to Iran. Maragin steel for centrifuges, that since have been destroyed by Israel, and the silk worm missiles are but a few glaring examples of Chinese complicity. This is in line with a China policy of pursuing a path of setting up a long-term presence in the Middle East and Africa. An important and ignored aspect is Beijing's plans to influence affairs in Afghanistan, Central Asia. In more ways than one, the wake of an American led NATO withdrawal is waiting to be filled in by China supported by Pakistan. Iran is a proxy Ocean guarantor along with Pakistan. The port of Gwadar and Mir Quasim are already being readied for China.

Cross Domino Effects

There are also some cross domino effects that need to be in the calculus of Gulf geo politics. A few of them are:

Shia- Sunni Schism

The historic Shia- Sunni schism is a silent strategic divider in the region. This divide constantly simmers between tension and violent confrontation. Arab spring happenings do involve this divide in its own dynamic. This Islamic schism is violent, visceral and unrelenting over the last several centuries,

Saudi Arabian - American Appliqué

Applique virtually means external application or superimposition. Appliqué is indeed apt in describing the American- Saudi Arabian connection in the context of a democracy dealing with a theocratic monarchy. The USA, the lone super power, is committed to the free World and the idealism of democracy. Yet it has an open and also closed long lasting relationship with the Saudis. In more ways than one, this borders on invidiousness. Saudi Arabia is distinctly a totalitarian theocracy. It is also a strident sponsor of International terrorism. The horrific 9/11 World Trade Centre attack had many Saudi nationals. Al Qaeda was spawned there and is resident in that kingdom. Saudi Arabian relationship with China and Pakistan is also unique. While USA is its prime arms and military training ally, it is purported to have missiles from China. Terrorism in Pakistan flourishes with Saudi Arabian money. Closer home, in India too, its efforts in engaging many madrassas is motivated by a bigoted obsession to aggressively spread Islam at the cost of everything else. The porous polity of India is passive on this too. The USA is also impervious to a similar successful attempt in its own continent.

Wahabism

In the Gulf region this oil-rich kingdom follows Wahabi Islam alongside a closed society. Saudi Royalty with tacit American support has kept a stranglehold on its people. There is neither freedom nor fairness in that society in the name of Islam. Islamic views on the "infidel" (kafir) are perpetuated in Saudi Arabia. Wahabi ways condone many wrongdoings in the name of Allah. The Arab spring uprisings are only a symptom of the disease of unrest with no real end in sight. Egypt, Libya and now Syria are examples of failed and failing leadership. Western influence was the genesis and is now the ironic, iron force behind the people movement who aspire for freedom from autocratic regimes. It is no more a question of whether the Saudi royalty will cave in but when. This too is bound to trigger a tsunami of uncertainty and chaos! It would be a deja vu repeat of the collapse of the American- Iranian honey moon post the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi.

Energy Security and Security of Energy

Global Energy needs are on exponential rise. Oil is black gold. It controls the pulse of International trade. Keeping sea lanes open and providing security to this energy are onerous tasks. The Persian Gulf, Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the concerned choke points are all vulnerable, but vital and valuable to ensure the flow of oil and gas from the Middle East to the East and Far East. Any conflict in the region is bound to have a catastrophic impact on energy availability." No oil, No care" is also an Arab fatalistic belief.

Arms Bazzar

The region spreading from the Gulf to the Far East is an arms bazaar. There is a plethora of lethal conventional weapons of intense concentration in the Gulf. The western countries headed by USA and China along with some eastern bloc countries led by Russia are part of the military vendors club. The famous book tilted Arms Bazaar by Anthony Sampson clearly illustrates that the military supplies have been on since the last four decades. More telling is the simple fact of backwards and volatile nations having easy and ready access to fierce fire power. Wild West syndrome echoes in the deserts, dunes and the waters of the land. The West is futilely trying to put out the fires that it had started decades ago!

Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is the “Life line” between West and East. Over 1000 million tons of oil pass through close to Indian shores every year. India is dependent on the seas for 95% of its trade and 80% for oil. It cannot simply afford to allow closure of sea lanes for more than 10 days. This Ocean being every one’s lake is the reality today. As the largest stake holder in the region we at least ought to know what is happening in our waters and be able to rightfully secure ourselves as a sovereign democracy. Others may sail away but we cannot. This subtle difference has gross, telling implications in effect, impact and consequences for the Sub-continent. What happens in the Persian Gulf will have a lasting, and long-term impact on all Indian Ocean rim countries. The Indian Ocean is a floating home to about 35 to 40 warships from different nations, not to speak about the Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lankan navies and task Force 150 led by USA. At any given time there are at least 10 to 15 submarines transiting underwater. Nearly 2000 to 3000 merchant ships ranging from super tankers, gas carriers, cargo ships, container vessels, traverse these waterways every day. Fishing fleets, dhows, trawlers, exploratory vessels, big oil rigs also cross the sea lanes. In peace time alone the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the important straits from east to west are all subject to threats of:

• Mutual interference among submarines
• Environmental degradation due to discharge of dirty oil by empty oil tankers in violation of UNCLOS(United Nations Convention on laws of the Seas) agreed upon rules of behavior.
• Major oil Pollution disasters due to collisions between tankers.
• Tsunamis and cyclones.
• Low intensity threats of piracy, smuggling and hijacking.
• Strangulation of traffic, in choke points, due to any of the above.

In these circumstances to ask India to choose between Iran and Israel is hypothetically and geo-politically anathema.

Indian Interests

Indian interests do not need great debate and discussion. We are a benign power, a secular stable democracy from an ancient civilisation. The International arena flocks to us, despite our many endemic weaknesses. Therein lies our intrinsic strengths. Today, the world needs us. We never need to be in a position to choose but let others want us. Our Interests can be realised by being what we are. Let greater or lesser powers do the asking of India to be what it can be for their sake!

Iran

We need Iran for counter balancing the gulf security calculus. Western influence while being of immense use has inherent limitations of distanced and obtuse alien content. India has historic, cultural, commerce and trade foot prints that are etched in the DNA of the Mediterranean, Maghreb, Malacca, Near and Far East long before the influx of the Europeans. We simply cannot abdicate this even if we are tempted to unwittingly attempt this exercise. 12% of oil is also critical. Constructive engagement with Iran would give India some leverage towards resolution of pending contentious issues in the region. Equally important is the Chinese dragon that is breathing fire to anneal an agenda of its own. Countering this without confrontation requires an amalgamated, calming, Indian presence with tacit support of the other players in the region.

Israel

Many Israelis, specially from their Political, Military, diplomatic corps believe that their population is 1. 7 billion by simply adding their 3 half million to our people. They have a fervent belief that the Jews and Indians have a destiny together for the common good of the World. This small State adds great value to India and brings surgical precision to our diplomatic, military, and government matrices. India-Israel cooperation focuses on space, water management, non-conventional energy sources, nanotechnology, biotechnology and self reliance in military technology. There are also agrarian thrusts between both countries. Israel is our sixth largest trading partner. With trade value of nearly $10 billion and increasing, a bi-lateral free trade agreement is also in the offing. Israelis have also learned to live with our pro-Palestine Posture.

Gulf Countries

India enjoys a unique stature in the Arab World. In many ways, Pakistani attempt to discredit India has not found much favour. Over the years the number of Indians who work in the Gulf, have gone up significantly across various disciplines. This is indeed a major factor that brings in valuable foreign exchange, contributing to our economy. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy have once, been trained by us very well on Military basics. Oman and India have also a special relationship that has prospered over the years. Saudi Arabia and India too have now entered into a positive arrangement, highlighting a tectonic shift in perceptions. These have taken place despite our ongoing Israeli connection. India's decision not to join USA in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was perhaps most prudent and strategically sensible. This has kept us in good stead and earned the appreciation of the regional leadership. Iran-India relationship is also perceived by the Middle East as a salutary influence in the region. India-GCC trade stands around $120 billion. Approximately 6 million Indian nationals work in the Gulf with yearly remittances of $30 billion. 70 to 75% of India’s energy imports are from the Gulf countries, including Iran. These are irrevocable links that have to be further strengthened.

Indian Sovereignty

We are a Sovereign system, with a track record of sound law and order in the national and international arena. Justice and prosecuting terrorist activities are part of our jurisprudence. It goes beyond consideration of our relationships. There is need for objectivity in our dealing with the attack on the Israeli diplomat with the heavy hand of the law. We also need to preempt any Israeli retaliation in our soil. On no account should we be seen as a vacillating system that is indecisive. Our handling of Kasab caught red handed in the 26/11 Mumbai attack, though frustrating does vindicate our full commitment to the letter of the law.

India's Signature Tune

India is an enigmatic miracle. The last 25 years has seen us grow as one of the leading economies starting with our liberalised economic strategy. 1998 saw us become a nuclear power. We are now recognised by the USA through the aegis of defense cooperation and Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreements. Several significant partnerships have also emerged with a host of G-8 and G-20 countries. Prospects of us being elected into the UN Security Council also appear bright.

India at home appears diffident and disjointed. Nation Management, Political leadership apathy and lack of accountability are all part of our evolution. Nevertheless the intrinsic strength of India resting with our seasoned office establishment has always ensured that we muddle through, without too much mud on our face. The international image of India is yet another positive paradigm. India is predictable, staid, stable, secular and restrained. Our protests are loud but our violence is subdued. Our elections are peaceful, with our laws mostly enforced. We have come off age without too much trauma of a colonial dominion. Our eclectic absorption, adaptability and the phenomenal success of Indians abroad are all noticed by others.

We are no more in a position of having to choose or measure our march. On the way we may falter at times but would not fall down. Let India continue with Iran and Israel triad and not consider this a triage. This would be our rightful and rational call.