Chinese Chequers in Pakistan: Hyperbole, Hazards and some Heft for The Economy

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

Forty-six billion dollars. A figure like this not only makes for a great headline but also creates a hype which deflects from the fine print and details that lie behind this number. Not surprisingly, the focus of attention – in Pakistan, in India and in other parts of the world, including the US – is the big number and how it will be a ‘game-changer’, how it will change the destiny of Pakistan, how it will change the strategic balance in the region and so on and so forth. But start breaking down the number into its component parts, and the hyperbole surrounding China’s grand plans for Pakistan appear to be somewhat over the top. Equally important, the sort of alarm being sounded by some Indian analysts is also a trifle misplaced. While India must keep a hawk-eye on the China-Pakistan nexus, it surely doesn’t behove India to have a knee-jerk reaction to every Sino-Pak collaboration.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project is going to come up over the next 15 years. This means that the $46 billion is not going to be dumped in Pakistan in the next few months but will be spread over more than a decade. There are a few ‘early harvest’ projects – about $ 28 billion worth – that will come up in the next 3-5 years. Most of these are in the power sector (about $ 22 billion). The rest ($ 6 billion) are infrastructure projects which include building the Gwadar port and expanding the existing road networks. While the Karakorum Highway is to be extended and broadened, there is as yet no firm plan to either build a railway line through the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) or an oil and gas pipeline linking Gwadar to Kashgar in Xinjiang province of China. These projects may eventually come up but as of now they haven’t moved beyond the drawing board stage. The rest of the $ 17 billion will be spread over another ten years beyond 2020 and will once again include some power projects, roads networks and industrial townships and Special Economic Zones.

The plan to link up the restive provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan with the CPEC is going to happen in the second stage, if at all. There are also plans to extend the CPEC to Afghanistan. But this will depend in large part on how the political and security situation develops in that country. Come to think of it, a lot of the CPEC will also depend on how the security situation develops inside Pakistan, and if things don’t look up, a lot of the investment will simply not come.

To be sure, even if half of the investment and projects that are envisaged under the CPEC come up, it will provide a fillip to the anaemic Pakistan economy. Assets will be created, as will jobs. Business and economic activity will also get a kick-start. So far so good. But this will all come at a cost, which one daresay, may not have been calculated or factored in by the Pakistani side. Whether this is because of their desperation to get things moving any which way, or it is because of their exuberance, excitement and even their servility towards the Chinese, or it is because of the Pakistani inability to think things through before taking the plunge, is a matter of debate. Suffice to say, there are serious economic implications of these projects. It is of course entirely possible that ultimately the Chinese write off their investments in Pakistan as a gift to their ‘Iron Brother’ and instead of the economic dividends that will flow China’s way through its investments in the CPEC, China remains satisfied with the political and strategic dividends that it expects from the project. If this happens, then it would fit into a pattern set by Pakistan's benefactors before China.

For now, however, the Chinese are demanding and getting their pound of flesh.The rate of return on the power projects they are setting up is anything between 24-37 per cent. What is more, the Chinese projects will get their payment before any other power producer gets it. This is because the Chinese are extremely wary of the horrendous ‘circular debt’ crisis that has brought the Pakistan power sector to near financial collapse. Many of the projects that will be set up are coal based projects. These are being shut down in China because of the environmental havoc they have caused. For the Chinese, shifting these power plants to Pakistan is a win-win. They dump their obsolete and polluting technology on Pakistan and make top dollar in the process. Although the Pakistan electricity regulator has declared an upfront tariff for different kinds of power plants, what the final tariff will be remains unknown for now. The apprehension expressed by some Pakistani economic analysts is that the entry of the Chinese might end up worsening the financial crisis of the power sector instead of solving the energy crisis that has crippled industry and homes for many years now. There is also the whole issue of building supply chains for the coal-based power projects and the cost this will entail, not just in terms of infrastructure building but also in terms of imports and how this cost will be factored in the power prices.

What is also causing disquiet in some circles in Pakistan is the fact that the Chinese projects have not come in through any competitive bidding process but as part of what cynics call ‘sweet-heart’ deals. Despite the fact that many Chinese investors are public sector companies, they are not at all squeamish about buying and bribing their way into countries like Pakistan, which for political and strategic reasons find it difficult to say no to the Chinese.

Apart from the Chinese, the Turks and the Qataris have also been taking advantage to seal some sweet-heart deals with Pakistan. In many of these cases – Chinese locomotives, Turkish electricity ships and Qatari LNG and road projects – Pakistan has ended up either with junk or paying a very heavy price (Rs 42 a unit for buying electricity from the Turkish power ship before it was scrapped by the Pakistan Supreme Court). There are fears that something similar may happen with the power and infrastructure projects that will be set up under the aegis of CPEC.

Questions have also been raised over both the funding of the projects (investments and repayments) as well as the Chinese model of investment under which practically everything – labour, machinery, equipment, raw material and what have you – is brought from China and very little is sourced from the local market. This could well mean that there will be little economic spin-off of these projects and Pakistan could end up with white elephants for which its people will be made to pay through their noses for the rest of their and their children’s lives.

While the economics of the projects is quite iffy, the strategic assumptions and dimensions underpinning CPEC are also not as awe-inspiring as is being made out by both the detractors as well as backers of this project. Given the topography of the area through which corridor is going to pass, it is unlikely to become a replacement for the sea traffic going to and from China through the Straits of Malacca. This is so even if a railway line was to be built through the Karakorum range going into Xinjiang. While the Corridor will provide a closer sea access to Western China – Xinjiang and to an extent Tibet – it will be quite a stretch to imagine that it will also provide an alternative route to the Eastern Seaboard of China to access the Arabian sea and beyond. The Corridor also doesn’t need Afghanistan to access Central Asia or even Iran, the former can be accessed through links already established and the latter can be accessed through Pakistan. Afghanistan is important only to the extent that the Chinese can transport raw material out of that country, which is also contingent on whether Afghanistan indeed has the sort of mineral wealth that is often cited and on Afghanistan not descending into chaos and anarchy in the next few months and years. The Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa legs of the Corridor are also not going to come up because once the Sindh-Punjab route is settled, no one will sink money into building another route through these two restive provinces.

In the end, the Corridor is primarily about China getting a solid base in Gwadar and getting a land access to this port from its Western borderlands. All the other projects are just embellishmentsthat ostensibly sweeten the deal for the Pakistanis, partly through creation of assets and partly through under-the-table deals that will further enrich theruling classes of that country. A lot will of course depend on how the security and political situation develops inside Pakistan. But as long as the Chinese have a secured Gwadar, they will have got what they want out of this deal, especially since they will have tied Pakistan into a neo-colonial arrangement in which it will become a virtual colony and a captive market for Chinese goods. Although the Pakistanis are happy being the recipient of Chinese largesse – aptly summed by the acronym of the new China-Pakistan think-tank titled ‘RANDI’ or Research and Development International – because the Chinese have desisted from interfering in Pakistan's political affairs (unlike the overbearing Americans), this too could start changing with the rising Chinese involvement and investment in Pakistan.

Over the last few years, Pakistan has had to initiate major operations against their own jihadist proxies on Chinese demands – first in the Lal Masjid operation and later in Operation Zarb-e-Azb. This could become a precursor of things to come.

From the Chinese point of view, there are two additional factors that they need to take into account. The first is Pakistan's track record of double-dealing with their benefactors, something that the Americans and now the Saudis are finding out to their cost. The second is the civilizational disconnect between China and an increasingly Islamised Pakistan.

Although the Pakistanis have downplayed the heavy-handed crackdown by China against Muslims in Xinjiang, the jihadists in Pakistan as well as the international jihadists narrative has started portraying China as a Dar-ul-Harb, or land of war. This could in future become a major flashpoint between China and Pakistan and could become the trigger for the latter double-dealing the former. An additional factor is also that the Chinese people don’t have a very high opinion about their ‘Iron Brother’. The Pew Survey claims that only 30 per cent of the Chinese have a positive image of Pakistan, equal to the number who have a positive image of India!

As far as India is concerned, the most objectionable part of the CPEC is that it traverses through PoK. The increasing Chinese involvement and presence in that region is going to effect a material change in the status of this part of India which is under Pakistan's illegal occupation. Other than this, there isn’t much reason for India to be overly concerned. The CPEC is not about encircling India, at least that doesn’t appear to be the primary purpose at this point in time. Interestingly, even though the Pakistanis are crowing about CPEC, they are also trying to sell this project to the world by saying that it will bind together 3 billion people of the region. Given that there are 1.4 billion Chinese, .2 billion Pakistanis and throw in the Afghans, Iranians and Central Asians (about another 100-150 million), the figure of 3 billion has to include India. Ironically, while Pakistan implicitly includes India in the CPEC, it explicitly excludes India by denying transit rights and routes and refuses to enter into a normal trading arrangement under WTO rules.

Be that as it may, the CPEC is more about China’s expanding role and influence in the region that it considers its backyard and falling within its sphere of influence. It is also about finding new, practically captive markets for its industry which is already showing signs of slowdown. The way the Chinese see it, by going in for the CPEC, they will help in stabilising Pakistan and thereby limiting the regional destabilisation that a failing Pakistan will cause. At the same time, they will make some money in the process and also increase their strategic footprint. To the extent that China’s expanding footprint spooks, even riles, India, it will be an issue in Sino-Indo relations. But if India plays it well, it can turn this Chinese footprint into an advantage, much like it did with the US. It is another matter that the US hasn’t been very effective as a partner in altering Pakistan's rank bad behaviour. But if the Americans could do anything to Pakistan in their own cause, it is pointless to expect them to deliver anything in India’s cause against Pakistan. This may not be the trajectory if India can get China right. Thus, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi must protest the use of PoK territory for the CPEC, he must have a plan in place to win over China for a mutually beneficial economic and strategic partnership. That will give India another pressure point against Pakistan.

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Published Date: 27^th April 2015, Image Source: http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk

Xi Visit Unites Disparate, Feuding Freedom Activists

Ahmar Mustikhan

It was all gung-ho in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi as President Xi Jinping arrived in Pakistan – the first-ever visit of a Chinese President in almost a decade--to sign projects worth almost $50 billion to get the much-trumpeted China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) rolling. The CPEC project largely hinges on connecting Kashgar with Gwadar, the port projected as a strategically important outpost located at the northern tip of the Straits of Hormuz.

Apart from the outcomes announced by both sides, President Xi’s visit helped forge a semblance of unity among the quarrelsome Baloch militant supporters after a long time. The Baloch freedom activists started focussing on various dimensions of President Xi’s visit, including the funny name of a CPEC linked think-tank launched by ISI’ blue-eyed boy Mushahid Hussain Sayed called. The think-tank named “RANDI, (a term used in the Indian sub-continent for women engaged in the world’s oldest profession).

Hitherto, supporters of various Baloch militant groups had been engaged in a frivolous war of words over “muddee” or arms that the Soviet Red Army had reportedly given to Marri tribesmen at the time of their departure from Afghanistan, according to Marri sources. Some fatalities were also reported in the “muddee war” between two militant groups. The unending bickering was creating a sense of despondency in the liberation camp since the death of icon of the Baloch resistance, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, in June last year. It was evident that the Baloch liberation movement was yet to attain organizational finesse and ideological and political maturity. Even a balance between militant actions and popular protests was missing. Moreover, feudal egos have been a detrimental factor for the movement, leading to sentimental, rigid and apolitical approaches.

On 11 April, almost 10 days before President Xi’s visit began, the Baloch Liberation Front had killed 20 workers of the Army-run Frontier Works Organization in Gogdhan, 15 miles outside Turbat. Moderate nationalists like former chief minister Sardar Akhtar Mengel did not appreciate the action. Mengel tweeted, “The result of innocent blood will lead to no destination and will only make chains of slavery and suppression stronger.” However, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) chief Dr Allah Nazar described those killed as combatants working on an army-controlled project. His close ally Kachkol Ali, a former fisheries minister and leader of the opposition in Balochistan Assembly, chimed in and called the 20 FWO workers “mercenaries.” In an editorial, Dawn newspaper confirmed that FWO project at Gogdhan, is part of the strategic CPEC project.

Now, amid the fanfare in Islamabad over Xi visit, it is clear there will be no middle ground between Islamabad and the nationalists on the future of Gwadar. Whilst Baloch nationalists claim that they are rightful owners of the Gwadar port, Pakistan insists the port is part of the federal domain since Balochistan is the province of Pakistan and ports are a federal subject in the legislative list of the 1973 Constitution. The Baloch however, challenge Islamabad’s contention on the grounds that their homeland was occupied by military invasion and aggression by Pakistan Army on March 27, 1948, and their status is different from the three other provinces.

Baloch politicos like Kachkol Ali, who is a leader of the Baloch National Movement (BNM) insist Baloch people were not a signatory to the 1973 Pakistan Constitution. “At the time when the constitution was tabled for discussion, debate and approval, Nawab Khair Bux Marri and Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch, who represented Balochistan in the National Assembly, did not sign the document,” said Kachkol Ali, who now lives in exile in Oslo, Norway. “The precise reason was that they disputed the constitution of Pakistan on the grounds that Balochistan was defined as a unit of Pakistan.” Incidentally, Kachkol Ali’s son Nabeel Ahmad, 22, disappeared on August 30 last year, allegedly kidnapped and killed at the ISI’s behest. Nabeel’s disappearance has failed to break Ali’s will though. The paramilitary Frontier Corps also illegally occupied his two houses in Turbat two years ago.

But coming back to the CPEC, Baloch Warna, which is run under supervision of Hyrbyair Marri, operational chief of the Baloch Liberation Army and former Balochistan communications and works minister, had predicted in February that an unprecedented increase in military operation in the region is likely because of the CPEC. The BLA-run website said since the area will be made a “free trade zone,” hundreds of thousands of foreigners will flood into Gwadar and surrounding areas, turning the Baloch people into a minority in their own homeland.

“Nonetheless the biggest hurdle in the way of Pakistan and its partner in crime, China, is the Baloch armed resistance,” Baloch Warna has said in an article. The write up said Pakistan and China have finalized an agreement under which Pakistan will provide 2,281 acres of land to China on a 40-year lease to build a “free trade zone.” Analysts argue that China will not only use Gwadar for its economic interests but it will also build a naval base as part of a “string of pearls” on the rim of the Indian Ocean to gain dominance over India and the US. As much as 654 acres have already been approved for a Chinese naval base, Baloch Warna said.

Assorted Baloch militant groups have attacked Chinese interests in Balochistan during the last decade since the first BLF attack left three Chinese engineers dead in Gwadar in 2004.Kachkol Ali recalls an incident many years ago after the killing of Chinese engineers. “I remember a Chinese official came and visited me in my office in 2004. At the time, I was leader of the opposition. He discussed with me the issue on the lines that the Chinese authorities had an agreement with Islamabad and the port is a federal subject and so on and so forth.But I categorically challenged his argument that without Baloch consent, the Balochis would not allow the port and its affiliated networks construction (roads and railway tracks).”

Kachkol Ali said the Baloch liberation movement operates within the framework of the UN`s 1960 Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which states that all peoples have the right to self-determination, but that this necessarily includes the right freely to determine their political status and freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. He says the crux of matter is that neither Pakistan nor China is sincere on upholding the UN laws. He recalls that the Chinese run Saindak gold-cum-copper project was “an eye-opener” as Balochistan was allocated just two per cent profit, but in reality Pakistan did not provide even that small share to the Balochis. China took 75 per cent and Pakistan pocketed more than 23 percent of the money.

The BNM leader, whose organization has some differences in tactics and strategy with the BLA, nonetheless echoed the same sentiment over the issue of ethnic flooding. “Actually, Pakistan means Punjab. The population of Punjab is a big problem for them and the establishment has nefarious long-term designs to somehow marginalize the Baloch population and to shift a huge population from the Punjab to Balochistan,” Kachkol Ali said. “It is their plan to change the demography of Baloch and to some extent they have succeeded in achieving this with the influx of a large number of Afghan refugees in Balochistan.”

Kachkol Ali said discovery of mass graves in Khuzdar,Panjgur and Turbat; kill and dump policy, destruction of houses without justification and killing of the innocent Baloch people as combatants substantiates that Pakistan is committing war crimes and genocide of Baloch people.

Former Balochistan Senator Sanullah Baloch in an article in The Express Tribune saidthe PPP government of President Ali Zardari, without any transparent process,hastily handed over Gwadar Port to China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC) in February 2013, even though the Supreme Court had barred the predecessor Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) from any such transfer. “Moreover, along with violation of national laws, the International Monetary Fund’s Revised Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency was also disregarded by giving away a strategic jewel to the Chinese without due process,” Sana Baloch wrote in an article in The Express Tribune, adding, “Not a single detail of the contract was released to the media, neither was it published on the Gwadar Port Authority’s website.”

BLF chief Dr Allah Nazar believes China's role in Balochistan is imperialistic as it is supporting Pakistan militarily and financially to crush the Baloch freedom movement. “Now a huge Chinese army unit is present in Gwadar,” Dr Allah Nazar told OneIndia. “As the world's largest democracy India and the civilized world must realize the importance of a free Balochistan. India can never get the superiority of waters without a free Baloch state.

Sher Mohammed Bugti, who is officially recognized as a leader of the Baloch Republican party (BRP) also echoed the same sentiment. “China’s investment will only encourage Pakistan to intensify its military operations and brutality on the Baloch nation #shameonpakistan,” he said on twitter.

Now, reports say the Pakistan army is planning to extend the so-called Operation Zarb-e-Azb to Balochistan. Army chief General Raheel Sharif recently met Southern Army Commander, Lieutenant General Nasir Khan Janjua and the inspector general of the Frontier Corps Major General Sher Afgan--the troika of power in Balochistan. General Sharif warned “foreign states, intelligence agencies” against trying to destabilize Pakistan by supporting terrorists in Balochistan. In addition to India, Pakistan intelligence and security analysts have blamed countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, United States, Israel, and even Norway, of having moles in Balochistan.

The Chinese too seemed to be concerned over the fragile security situation. As if to allay their fears, late Tuesday night, army spokesman major General Asim Bajwa tweeted, “Spec Security Div for Pak-China Eco Projs will comprise of 9 Army Battalions,6 Wings Civil armed forces. Will be commanded by a Maj Gen.” Clearly, further militarization of Balochistan is now inevitable.

(Ahmar Mustikhan is a senior Balochistan journalist who now lives in exile in Washington DC area. He can be contacted on twitter @mustikhan)

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Published Date: 22^nd April 2015, Image Source: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

China Eyeing Enhanced Role in Afghanistan Post US Drawdown

Monish Gulati

China's Foreign Ministry on 18 July said that it had appointed a special envoy for Afghanistan, underscoring its concerns on the political and security developments in the country. Sun Yuxi, a former ambassador to both Afghanistan (between 2002 and 2004) and India, has been named as the special envoy and will have "close communication" with Afghanistan and other relevant parties to help "ensure lasting peace, stability and development for Afghanistan and the region", the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in its statement.

Recent events, both internal and external, appear to drive the ramping up of Chinese interest in Afghanistan. Continued disturbances in Xinjiang, cooling of relations with Myanmar, Pakistan’s tussle with its internal security, Saudi-Iran rivalry and the developments in Afghanistan itself are some of the drivers. To that end, Sun Yuxi’s appointment not only signals Chinese concerns regarding possible threats emanating from the region, but also an intent to firm up some of its geo-economic initiatives in the wake of US drawdown from Afghanistan. This article examines the current Chinese focus on Af-Pak.

Terrorism

One of China's chief worries is that Uighur militants, who are fighting for a separate state called East Turkestan in China's Xinjiang region, will step up their activities by exploiting the security vacuum in Afghanistan after most of the NATO forces withdraw by the end of the year. China believes hundreds of Uighur militants of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) are holed up in the tribal areas straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is a good cause for the Chinese worry- despite employing a wide range of measures it has failed to get a grip on the insurgency in Xinjiang.

Early on 28 July, the last day of Ramadan, 215 Uighurs armed with knives and axes attacked a police station and government offices in Elixku and Huangdi towns in Shache County in Xinjiang.¹ Chinese police shot dead 59 attackers in response and 37 civilians also died during the incident. A total of 13 armed Chinese personnel were killed and about 67 people were arrested in this connection. On 30 July, Jume Tahir, the Imam of China’s largest mosque in the westernmost city of Kashgar was attacked as he was leaving the Id Kah mosque and stabbed to death.² The 74-year-old Imam, who was also a former deputy to the official National People’s Congress (NPC), was reportedly supporting China’s Communist party by publicly speaking out against the wave of violence in Xinjiang and accusing the separatist Muslims for halting progress and social and ethnic cohesion.

The recent Ramadan violence is amongst a string of incidents that have been taking place in Xinjiang over past few months. Among the most shocking incidents was a market attack in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi in which 39 people were killed in May, and a deadly rampage by knife-wielding assailants at a train station at Kunming in China’s southwest in March, which left 29 dead. Earlier this month, Chinese courts in Xinjiang sentenced 32 people to prison terms ranging from four years to life for terrorism-related charges. In June, authorities executed 13 people, and sent more than 100 to jail in a public mass sentencing on mostly terrorism-related offences in Xinjiang.

China’s approach to curb insurgency in Xinjiang is a combination of economic inducements and harsh security measures. To that end, it seeks to bring economic development, jobs and higher standard of living to Xinjiang by creating economic corridors or Silk routes through the region to the Central Asian Republics and Pakistan.

The insurgency in Xinjiang has been acquiring external dimensions. According to China's special envoy for the Middle East, Wu Sike, Muslim extremists from Xinjiang have gone to the Middle East for training and some may have crossed into Iraq to participate in the upsurge of violence there.³The Af-Pak region is key to curbing the disturbances in Xinjiang; both in terms of promoting economic development of the region and denying sanctuaries to the Uighur militants.

Afghanistan

Appropriately Sun Yuxi commenced his charge with a visit to Kabul, and on 23 July, he had talks with President Karzai and presidential candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani on separate occasions. During his stay in Afghanistan, Sun also met with US and European Union ambassadors to the country as well as the head of United Nations Assistance Mission.⁴

Sun reaffirmed China’s support for the ongoing political and reconciliation process in Afghanistan and said if groups in Afghanistan including Taliban reach agreement on national reconciliation then nobody will make trouble."So far we have not directly got involved with Afghan groups including Taliban and we place our hope on the new government." He said he will visit US, Russia, India and Iran to discuss the situation in Afghanistan.

On Afghanistan's future, Sun said the immediate and most important task is to achieve reconciliation for all parties and sectors as only nationwide reconciliation is an effective measure for long term stability. He added that China is concentrating on economic development and raising standard of living to help create peace and security in Afghanistan and to that end the private sector must be involved.

Pakistan

In his first presser in China on 21 July, Sun Yuxi had praised Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for their fight against terrorism and all but absolved them of any involvement in the recent attack on the Indian consulate in Herat.⁵Sun Yuxi said "I think ISI has been effective in fighting against terrorism. I do believe that Pakistan government or any responsible agency of Pakistan will only fight against terrorism instead of being involved with any terrorist." Sun told the media that he saw in the future, the Pakistan government playing an important and positive role in the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan.

While visiting Pakistan, Sun Yuxi called on the Pakistani Foreign Secretary and expressed China's solidarity with Pakistan in this endeavour and appreciated Pakistan's contribution to global efforts against terrorism.⁶ Pakistan highlighted its constructive engagement to promote regional cooperation. The two sides also conferred on the Ministerial Meeting of the Heart of Asia/Istanbul Process, to be held in Tianjin, China.

At the same time, Pakistan is eyeing Beijing’s proposed huge investment of about $40 billion over the next eight years in the country’s energy, water, coal, roads and other infrastructure projects. China has reportedly commissioned a "preliminary research study" to build an international rail link connecting its westernmost city of Kashgar in Xinjiang with Pakistan's deep-sea Gwadar Port, according to the Director of Xinjiang's Regional Development and Reform Commission.⁷ The 1,800-km China-Pakistan railway is planned to also pass through Pakistan's capital of Islamabad and Karachi, with land ports to India and Afghanistan also being proposed.

India

As regards India, China is aware of the US influence on its Afghan policy and that as US forces withdraw, sooner or later Washington will lose its effective veto over more aggressive Indian approach. If Afghan politics and security start to unravel or India feels it has been short-changed strategically, it is likely to make its own costs and benefits calculations and chose a path of greater intervention.⁸ There would therefore a requirement to factor in Indian interests to some measure.

Assessment

Sun Yuxi statements during his visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan are indicative of Chinese approach to Af-Pak. Pakistan is the primary partner, who will play a dominant role in the reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Efforts will be made to integrate the Taliban into politics and governance at the provincial level and ideally at the national level. Chinese capital would power the Kashgar-Gwadar economic corridor; Pakistan would ensure its security and indirectly contribute to the security of Xinjiang. Exploitation of natural resources would be the main plank of the Chinese strategy to revive Afghan economy and Pakistan would gain the control of the Afghan transit trade.

Beijing has come to perceive that its near-term aims in Afghanistan are consistent with those of the US, that being fighting terrorism and avoiding a relapse into civil war. To the extent the two sides disagree, it is over the specific sources of threat; Uighur separatists or al-Qaeda. Beijing, therefore, appears remarkably eager to cooperate with the US in Afghanistan. However, the key is how China is reading the situation in Afghanistan; does it anticipate a complete US drawdown from the region by 2016 or will find space to articulate its interest despite US presence in a counter-terror posture in Afghanistan. If not would it look to squeeze out US from the region with support from Pakistan; which would make it easy for it to negotiate with the Taliban and of course call the shots in Af-Pak .

Russian buy-in would come from the fact that it would get access to a land route for selling its gas; diverting it away from Europe and expand its arms supply to Afghanistan and other nations in Central Asia. It would assist in curbing narcotics trade and receive support in checking the rise in Islamist militancy. Iran would get to retain its cultural influence in Western Afghanistan, sell gas to Pakistan and probably India through a land pipeline and have the main Chinese “silk route” to Europe running through northern Iran.

In the coming few months Beijing would be focussed on the establishment of the new Afghan government and the Istanbul Process, a ministerial-level dialogue that brings together all of Afghanistan’s neighbours and major donors. China is hosting the next conference in Tianjin and is eager to make it a meaningful event by using the meeting as a means to confer the international community’s approval on the next Afghan government.

China is also conscious of the fact that its top down approach of doing work may not succeed in post-Karzai Afghanistan and that it would need Pakistani support. To this end, some Chinese officials even suggest that the present diplomatic initiative is aimed at expanding Chinese regional expertise and capacity to understand the political dynamics in developing states.

In the current situation, with the US seemingly keen on just curbing terrorism emanating from Afghanistan (and directed at the US), it would most likely be happy to go along with China as long as these objectives are achieved. The current imbroglio in Ukraine would to an extent have compromised the Russian stand in support of India, when faced with Chinese opposition. India would most probably then be coerced into accepting the Chinese game-plan in Afghanistan, with the prospect of TAPI/IPI, a land port on the Kashgar-Gwadar corridor and SCO/ APEC membership thrown in as sweeteners.

Endnotes

1. Dozens killed in terror attack in China’s Xinjiang, Agence France-Presse , July 30, 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/624792/dozens-killed-in-terror-attack-in-ch...
2. ‘Imam of China’s largest mosque stabbed to death,’ Al Arabiya News, July 31, 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/07/31/Imam-of-China-s-largest-...
3. Ben Blanchard. ‘China says may have citizens fighting in Iraq,’ Reuters, July 28, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/china-says-may-citizens-fighting-iraq-065750770.html
4. China to give more support for Afghanistan's development: Envoy, Eastday.com, July 26, 2014. http://english.eastday.com/auto/eastday/nation/u1ai10370_K3.html
5. Sutirtho Patranobis. ‘China's new Afghan envoy lauds Pak spy agency ISI,’ Hindustan Times, July 21, 2014. http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-spy-agency-isi-a-respo...
6. ‘Pakistan, China renew resolve for Afghan peace,’ The Nation, July 28, 2014
   http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=vign&nid=8642
7. China launches study to build rail link to Pakistan via Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, PTI, June 28, 2014. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-06-28/news/50929596_1_...
8. Daniel Markey.’ Afghanistan Anxieties Reign in India and China,’ CFR, July 24, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/07/24/markey-afghanistan-anxieties-reign-...

(The author is an independent analyst based in New Delhi)

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Published Date: 22^nd September 2014, Image source: http://www.wadsam.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

String of Pearls or A Garrotte

Kanwal Sibal

Member Advisory Board, VIF

While China Skilfully Plays With Wei Qi, India seems to be playing noughts and crosses

China’s relations with our neighbours have two dimensions. One, its policies towards them are derived from the state of its relations with India. Two, they are bilateral in scope, independent of China’s relations with us. Within these two broad parameters, there are several strands that together weave the tapestry of China’s ties with our neighbouring countries.

It should be kept in mind that some of India’s neighbours are China’s neighbours too by virtue of its occupation of Tibet. If India has geographical, political, economic and strategic reasons to fashion viable neighburhood policies, China cannot but seek to build bridges with countries that are its neighbours. Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, which are our direct neighbours are directly contiguous with Tibet. China will therefore have active policies of neighbourhhood with these countries and we have to accept it as an ineluctable fact.

It would not be abnormal for China to believe that Indian power has to be kept in check for having a trouble free periphery on its western borders. There are border differences between the two countries; the issues around Tibet and the Dalai Lama continue to distort ties. India alone in Asia has the potential to balance China. The geopolitical strategy of China towards India would therefore be to neutralize Indian power as much as possible by encouraging its neighbours to stand up to India, build their capacities to do so, and also establish its own presence in the sub-continent as a power with legitimate interests there. This is why China talks about India’s hegemonic ambitions in the sub-continent. It capitalizes on the fears that smaller countries in the subcontinent harbour against their giant neighbour with which they have their own bilateral differences.

China is pursuing a policy of shoring up our individual neighbours to the extent they have the capacity as well as depth of antagonism to challenge India. Its political, military and economic relationship with them is calibrated to its own strategic needs and an assessment how much load these countries can bear in the face of the possible scale of India’s reaction and countervailing policies.

Militarily, Pakistan has been the obvious choice for countering India because of its perennial hostility towards India and the size of its armed forces. Pakistan has therefore become China’s privileged partner in the sub-continent, with hyperbolic descriptions of the quality of their relationship. It is Pakistan’s biggest defence partner. The relationship is being shored up further by collaborating in developing the JF-17 fighter aircraft, the K-8 Karakoram advance training aircraft, AWACS systems, Al Khalid tanks etc. It has transferred nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan to strategically neutralize India. This has been the biggest strategic blow delivered by China to India in which the West has also been complicit. It is now collaborating with Pakistan to develop the Babur cruise missile. To balance the India-US nuclear deal, China has agreed to supply two additional power reactors to Pakistan in violation of its NSG obligations. This demonstrates the depth of the strategic ties between the two countries and the length China is willing to go nurture them. China also does not fail to deflect western and Indian pressure on Pakistan on the issue of terrorism by praising its contribution to the combat against international terrorism and asking the international community to recognize this and show understanding Pakistan’s domestic compulsions.

China has developed military ties with our other neighbours. This is a critical area in bilateral relations between countries, but we are not able to match China because of our policies on arms sales and, even more importantly, the lack of a large enough domestic defence manufacturing base which severely limits our export potential. This vacuum in our neighbourhood has been filled up by China and others, with India making some limited and often token transfers. This has created a relationship of dependence between China and most of our neighbours in a vital area.

China has now established a military relationship with Nepal, limited in scope in terms of transfers but very significant politically. Chinese arms supplies to Nepal have been an extremely sensitive issue for India. Whereas Nepal’s provocation in this regard had created a crisis in the relationship during Rajiv Gandhi’s time, China supplied arms to Nepal in 2005 during Gyanendra’s time without an Indian riposte. They invited the Nepalese Defence Minister in September 2008 to observe a military exercise and announced a military aid package worth $1.3 million. In December 2008, a PLA General visiting Nepal pledged $2.6 million of non-lethal military aid. Two Chinese military teams visited Nepal in the course of 2008-2009. The political point has been made that the provisions of the relevant treaty with Nepal requiring it to first approach India for military supplies before approaching any other country can be disregarded, especially with regard to acquisitions from China. Nepal has been helped by China to recover its “sovereignty” through these defence dealings.

China is one of the top sources of arms supplies to Bangladesh. It has helped to revamp the country’s air force, supplied a short range defence air defence system, a squadron of F-7 fighter planes, three MI-171 helicopters worth about $600 to 800 million. Bangladesh has bought 44 tanks and 3 armoured recovery vehicles from China for $164 million. The Bangladesh navy is equipped with Chinese frigates and missile boats. In 2002, China and Bangladesh signed a “Defence Cooperation Agreement” which includes military training and defence production. In 2008 Bangladesh established an anti-ship missile launch pad near the Chittagong port with Chinese assistance.

China is Myanmar’s closest defence ally, supplying most of its military hardware: fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, naval vessels, surface to air missiles. It has assisted in constructing a naval base in Sittwe. Access to Myanmar’s ports and naval installations provide China with strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal. In 2009 Myanmar placed an order for 50 K-8 Karakorams, a joint venture between China and Pakistan. in August 2010 the Chinese and Myanmarese navies held a naval exercise; it was the first visit by Chinese naval warships to Myanmar.

Sri Lanka’s relations with China have always posed a difficult challenge for India. Sri Lanka has for decades tried to balance its relations with India by courting China. Since 2005, under the Rajapakse government, the already multi-dimensional and deep-rooted relationship has become even stronger. China has helped modernize and expand the Sri Lankan armed forces, providing it with tanks, jets, naval vessels, radars, communication equipment, night vision devices, deep penetration bombs, rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles etc, all the weapons Sri Lanka needed to crush the LTTE . In Sri Lanka we have to contend with Chinese and Pakistani military supplies. No doubt President Rajapakse assures us that Sri Lanka will remain vigilant about India’s security sensitivities, but that depends on how we define our security needs and how Sri Lanka understands them. India is not in a position to demand the curtailment of Chinese defence supplies to Sri Lanka, particularly as we cannot fill the breach.

The second leg of Chinese penetration of the sub-continent is the economic one. Since China’s objectives are essentially strategic the accent on the economic side is on infrastructure projects of strategic significance. China built the strategic Karakoram highway to establish a direct land-link between the two countries. China has agreed to rehabilitate and partially realign this crucial link that has been ruptured because of flooding and landslides. A railroad link has been mooted. China and Pakistan are discussing major development projects in POK with not only business as the objective but also the consolidation of Chinese presence in this area to better secure Sinkiang and add pressures on India, but also “legitimize” Pakistan’s illegal occupation of this territory which can become a hub of connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Gwadar deep-sea port, built with Chinese assistance, seems intended initially to be the receiving point for transporting hydrocarbons from the Gulf through Pakistan to Sinkiang, but it has also a military significance as it has the potential of becoming a lunch pad for Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Gwadar gives China access to the Arabian sea in the west just as corridors through Myanmar give it access to the Bay of Bengal in the east.

If in the west China has been able to pursue its strategic projects in Pakistan in a highly favourable political atmosphere, in the east it has had similar favourable conditions in Myanmar. China has helped build roads, railways, dams, bridges, airfields and seaports in Myanmar. It is building a crude oil port as part of a pipeline project to transport oil to its western provinces without having to go through the Malacca Straits. It is active in securing oil and gas reserves in Myanmar. It has built a strategic road along the Irrawady River linking Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal, besides a railroad through Kunming via Dali that links up with the Mandalay-Rangoon railway. Myanmar has officially commenced the construction of the main gas pipeline from the natural deep seaport of Kyaukpyu to Kunming in Yunnan. A railroad running adjacent to the pipelines is planned. If all goes as planned the route for the transport of Gulf oil and gas to China will change radically. This will enhance China’s energy security besides expanding the presence of Chinese ships in this part of Bay of Bengal to India’s strategic discomfort.

As part of a strategy to build connectivity that ties neighbouring countries to China, the latter is ready to participate commercially in developing the deep-sea port in Sonodia Island near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has sought China’s assistance to develop and use the Chittagong port. This along with the port at Sonadia Island will give China the connectivity it wants between Yunnan and the Bay of Bengal. China, Myanmar and Bangladesh have signed an agreement to establish a road and rail link.

China is giving special attention to infrastructure in Sri Lanka because of its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, very close to India’s southern coast. This fits into China’s plans to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean both to protect its trade and energy flows through these waters (80% of China’s oil goes through a sea lane a few nautical miles from Sri Lanka) but also to project its naval power there eventually, rather than remain vulnerable to US and Indian pressures in possible future scenarios. The massive $ 1.5 billion Hambantota Development project being built by China (it is financing more than 85% of the project which will take 10 years to complete) will include an international container port, an oil refinery, dry docks for ship repairs and construction, bunkering and refuelling facilities, an international airport etc. It will become a major transhipment hub. While at present there is no talk of a Chinese naval base on Hambantota, concerns about the future will remain. To keep an eye on developments India has opened a consulate in Hambantota in 2010.

In the case of Nepal, the strategic economic stakes are less important, but there is talk to extend the railway line built in Tibet till Lhasa to the Nepalese border and complete a connecting highway within Tibet to create greater connectivity in order to boost trade exchanges, with a dry port being planned at Tatopani near the Tibet border to create a “cross-border free trade zone”. The longer term scenario of connecting Tibet to the Bay of Bengal through Kolkata is not realizable until China settles its border issue with India. The connectivity being created with Tibet cannot alter fundamentally Nepal’s line of communication through India, though it provides Nepal with an option to temporarily relieve any Indian squeeze.

The nature of China’s economic priorities in our neighbourhood is demonstrated by its willingness to invest in strategic projects but unwillingness to be generous in doling out assistance in general. China’s direct investment in Pakistan until 2010 was relatively small at $1.83 billion according to Chinese figures. Pakistan has little to offer by way of strategic sectors like iron, copper, oil, gas and coal in which China invests abroad to meet domestic needs. China does not seem to have given any large loans to Pakistan. Its humanitarian aid is modest. When massive floods hit Pakistan in 2010, China’s initial contribution was a meagre $18 million, raised later to $250 million. China has been directing Pakistan’s aid requests to the IMF.

China has been involved in aid projects in Nepal since decades, in the highway sector, in particular. Other areas are health, education and hydropower. It annual assistance to Nepal is not too large at about $ 35 million. During his January 2012 visit to Nepal the Chinese Premier announced a grant aid of US $120 million to be spent on mutually defined projects.

Chinese investment in Bangladesh is modest at $200 million. Trade between the two countries has grown to $8.26 billion in 2011 with a huge imbalance in China’s favour (with Bangladesh’s exports at $449 million). Imports from China constitute 21% of the total Bangladesh imports, which is huge. While Bangladesh has traditionally complained vociferously about its trade imbalance with India, its tolerance levels towards China has been high. The two countries have agreed on introduction of 3G and 2.5G network and a fertilizer project. China has been more generous with Sri Lanka. Since 2006, it has provided $3.06 billion in financial assistance for various projects.

An important element conditioning China’s policies in our neighbourhood is the Tibetan question. China’s hold over Tibet remains politically insecure though its military position there cannot be shaken. The huge economic investments China has made in Tibet has not turned political opinion in its favour. This problem will continue till China’s political system changes, moving towards democracy and tolerance of dissent. There is no political, ethnic, cultural or linguistic glue that binds the Tibetans and Chinese. India can manage its diversity without the heavy stick of state authority because of democracy; China cannot at this stage. The uprising in Tibet in 2008 exposed the failure of China to win the hearts and minds of the Tibetans. The rash of current instances of self-immolations in the Greater Tibet area confirms that failure.

In this context Nepal is important. The Chinese put pressure on India on the issue of the Dalai Lama, which India both yield to and resists. Nepal cannot resist such pressure and cooperates with China in keeping an eye on the Tibetans in Nepal. The Chinese want to exclude any source of instability in Tibet fuelled through Nepal. For that they need to be active in Nepal itself rather than hunkering down defensively on their side of Tibet and warding off any threat. China has always had a policy of “balancing” Indian influence in Nepal, not the point of outright confrontation, but enough to prevent India from completely dominating Nepalese politics. Nepal is important for them, but they have been realistic enough to realize that that they cannot dominate the country or take the burden of sustaining it in case of an Indian squeeze as a result. It serves their interests adequately to nourish politically and economically influential anti-Indian lobbies in Nepal to a sufficient degree. Earlier it was the Palace whose insecurities and prejudices against India they exploited. The Palace nourished the Maoists to counter the democratic forces in Nepal. China did not have to actively back them. With the Maoists now in electoral politics and sharing power in the country, China has now a replacement tool in its hands to continue to wield influence in Nepal to further its own interests at India’s expense.

In recent years, encouraged by the Maoists and the general hardening of its position on the border issue with India, China is seeking more parity with India in its relations with Nepal. They are pressing for a bilateral treaty with Nepal similar to its treaty with India. China’s challenge to Indian interests in Nepal has grown substantially but not dramatically. China cannot manage the very turbulent politics of Nepal given its limited experience of handling political party politics of the highly convoluted and fractured type that operates in Nepal. China has opened several Confucian Institutes in the Terai, which poses a challenge in terms of Chinese activity close to our open border with Nepal. The China-Pakistan connection, even without the two countries working together in Nepal, facilitates Pakistani activity there as the pro-Chinese forces in Nepal would logically have a more tolerant view of Pakistan.

Bhutan has eschewed the kind of irrational attitudes that Nepal has adopted towards India. It has not played the China card against India for a variety of reasons. It has not had the kind of Palace versus democratic forces confrontation that Nepal has had, and so the Bhutanese monarch has not felt the need to cultivate an outside power against India. The Bhutan King’s conservative attitude towards opening the country to outsiders, his reluctance to allow any big power to open a resident mission in Thimphu in order to have a plausible reason to deny such a mission to China, his cooperation with India on water resources for generating revenues for the country for its development, Bhutan’s Buddhist identity that is separate from that of the Dalai Lama and which therefore excludes the Tibetan religious and refugee factor from the Bhutan-China relationship, all these factors cast the China-Bhutan relationship in terms of Indian interests very differently from that of China and Nepal.

The challenge for Bhutan is to settle the unresolved boundary issue with China, something that it would like to do if it did not have to contend with India’s concerns. India would not want China to succeed diplomatically in isolating India and making it look intransigent by settling the border issue with Bhutan and leaving the border with India unresolved. Apart from this, and, indeed, more importantly, it is most important for us that the delineation of the border between Bhutan and China in the Chumbi valley takes into account our vital security interests. We want therefore Bhutan to closely coordinate with us its border talks with China which have been going on since the 80s, with 19 rounds of talks till 2010. The Chinese tempt the Bhutanese with “concessions” in the pastoral lands in the north against acceptance of their claims in the Chumbi valley area. They also pressure Bhutan to open up diplomatic relations with China. So far the Bhutanese have cooperated, though elements there have the sentiment that Bhutan is paying a price because of India-China differences. In other words, they would be able to get a good deal from China but for the complicating Indian factor. The Chinese Prime Minister met the Bhutanese Foreign Minister at the Rio+20 conference in June where he raised the question of establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and this was publicized by the Chinese side. India has to be watchful about Chinese blandishments to Bhutan and ensure that Bhutan continues to be firm in its policy of not allowing any gap to develop in Indian and Bhutanese approaches to the sensitive border question, especially with a new and young monarch in power in Bhutan in a more democratic framework.

With the patchy and fluctuating nature of India-Bangladesh ties over the years, China has had ample opportunity to secure a deep footing in Bangladesh. All India’s neighbours, barring Bhutan, play the Chinese card against us in order to balance the overwhelming weight of India in the subcontinent. They have tried to exploit to their advantage the antagonistic ties between India and China and have deliberately created space for China to expand its presence in their countries. Bangladesh has been a thorn in India’s side under the military dictatorship and Begum Zia; it has blocked us from promoting connectivity not only with our own north-east but also Myanmar, with further linkages beyond with South-east Asia. It has sheltered anti-Indian insurgents on its soil, tying down Indian armed forces in the region and also retarding the development of this part of India. It suits the Chinese that Bangladesh should be a geopolitical problem for India in integrating its north-east and raising its profile in South-east Asia. To what extent China has given direct encouragement to Bangladesh when it has been under unfriendly rule to counter Indian interests is difficult to pin-point, but common sense suggests that they would play such a game subtly. It would be in their interest to prevent Bangladesh from moving into the Indian orbit decisively, and their presence and programmes ensure this. The two countries have agreed on a “Closer Comprehensive Partnership for Cooperation” with a strategic perspective. On Bangladesh’s invitation and Nepal’s support China was admitted as an observer in SAARC.

China steadily tightened its grip on Myanmar during the long period the West sought actively to isolate it through boycotts and sanctions. This policy has undergone a change with the easing of military rule in Myanmar, the introduction of limited democracy and US’s “re-balancing” strategy in Asia-Pacific that seeks to hedge against the unpredictable consequences of China’s rise. With the changed environment Myanmar has cancelled a $3.6 billion dam project at Myitsone because of strong public opposition to it. This might suggest that Myanmar will seek to loosen China’s embrace, but the logic of neighbourhood and benefits that Myanmar can derive from China’s economic strength will not necessarily mean any dramatic downgrading of the bilateral relationship.

With growing Chinese economic and military power the challenges for India to manage the inroads China will make into our region will become increasingly difficult to manage in a situation where China, now far ahead of India in its overall capacity to project power, continues its policy of effectively containing India but continuing to engage it in order to deflect attention away from this reality and creating economic opportunities for itself in the Indian market, which, in turn, will tie India’s hands even more in any push back policy directed at China. The foretaste of our domestic resistance to this is the bizarre statement recently by Ratan Tata that India should seek a way to become an ally of China and that he is not aware of anything adversarial done by China against us !!

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Iran, Israel and India's Interests

Barry Bharathan
Distinguished Fellow, VIF & Former Vice Chief, Indian Navy

Geo Politics of Civilisations and Culture

Two civilisations, India and Iran and a very ancient culture consecrated in the creation of Israel are in an enigmatic triangle. India is involuntarily at the apex with inimical, Iran and Israel at the two distanced points of this triangle.

India has managed relations on an “Iran & Israel” approach. Iran supplies nearly 12% of oil and the promise of gas though a pipeline is also a critical consideration. An agreement on this pipeline would also perhaps bring down the confrontationist temperature existing in the region. This may be also a pipe dream in the present context of India-Pakistan-China geo-political intransigence. Many also believe that India and Iran enjoy a civilisational relationship that endures periodic differences. Israel and India cooperation that began in the early 90's has progressively evolved into a robust engagement across the span of defense, agriculture, science, technology and research. In many ways, over the last two decades India has successfully responded to “Shalom and Salaam ale kum” of both Israel and Iran. The 13th February attack on an Israeli diplomat's car, the American led Western isolation of Iran has triggered of a reaction asking for India to choose a Iran or Israel approach. The house is divided on this as is expected in our democracy. Pressure from USA too is a significant factor. The media, information highway is full of articles assuming polarised positions. Whatever be the views, India's Interests come first and foremost.

Never a Zero Sum Game

International relationship is never a zero sum game. This self evident truth shows up in all the "Geo Political and Military" happening in the South Asian, Central Asian, Gulf; land and ocean Mass over the last two decades. Most critically, this entire swathe has been subject to cross currents of International interests, inter and intra country upheavals. Artificial divisions of the region by the British also spawned regional tensions. Israeli - Arab animosity, the Iran - Iraq war, the Cold War between the super powers, the, then unique Iraq- Soviet Union engagement and the incessant quest for energy has scarred this swathe into being a land of constant violence, conflict, radical ethnicity and geo-political instability. In effect whatever path India chooses, would be irrelevant in the background of a much larger and simmering volcano of visceral distrust and misperceptions. Even on this single factor India would perhaps do well to maintain status quo in its Iran and Israel relationships.

USA and China

USA and China too are intrinsic to this construct. The former has binding, bonding ties with the Jewish state. It is at present in the politics of confrontation with the Persians on a host of well known issues. Iran's nuclear posturing and anti American stand off, rattles the West. It is also an avowed enemy of Israel with openly declared intentions of completely destroying the latter. The probability of a pre emptive Israeli strike on Iran with attendant ramifications cannot be ruled out. Its attack on Iraq, years ago cannot be forgotten. China has a unique Iran relationship. It is a silent, covert supplier of nuclear and missile material to Iran. Maragin steel for centrifuges, that since have been destroyed by Israel, and the silk worm missiles are but a few glaring examples of Chinese complicity. This is in line with a China policy of pursuing a path of setting up a long-term presence in the Middle East and Africa. An important and ignored aspect is Beijing's plans to influence affairs in Afghanistan, Central Asia. In more ways than one, the wake of an American led NATO withdrawal is waiting to be filled in by China supported by Pakistan. Iran is a proxy Ocean guarantor along with Pakistan. The port of Gwadar and Mir Quasim are already being readied for China.

Cross Domino Effects

There are also some cross domino effects that need to be in the calculus of Gulf geo politics. A few of them are:

Shia- Sunni Schism

The historic Shia- Sunni schism is a silent strategic divider in the region. This divide constantly simmers between tension and violent confrontation. Arab spring happenings do involve this divide in its own dynamic. This Islamic schism is violent, visceral and unrelenting over the last several centuries,

Saudi Arabian - American Appliqué

Applique virtually means external application or superimposition. Appliqué is indeed apt in describing the American- Saudi Arabian connection in the context of a democracy dealing with a theocratic monarchy. The USA, the lone super power, is committed to the free World and the idealism of democracy. Yet it has an open and also closed long lasting relationship with the Saudis. In more ways than one, this borders on invidiousness. Saudi Arabia is distinctly a totalitarian theocracy. It is also a strident sponsor of International terrorism. The horrific 9/11 World Trade Centre attack had many Saudi nationals. Al Qaeda was spawned there and is resident in that kingdom. Saudi Arabian relationship with China and Pakistan is also unique. While USA is its prime arms and military training ally, it is purported to have missiles from China. Terrorism in Pakistan flourishes with Saudi Arabian money. Closer home, in India too, its efforts in engaging many madrassas is motivated by a bigoted obsession to aggressively spread Islam at the cost of everything else. The porous polity of India is passive on this too. The USA is also impervious to a similar successful attempt in its own continent.

Wahabism

In the Gulf region this oil-rich kingdom follows Wahabi Islam alongside a closed society. Saudi Royalty with tacit American support has kept a stranglehold on its people. There is neither freedom nor fairness in that society in the name of Islam. Islamic views on the "infidel" (kafir) are perpetuated in Saudi Arabia. Wahabi ways condone many wrongdoings in the name of Allah. The Arab spring uprisings are only a symptom of the disease of unrest with no real end in sight. Egypt, Libya and now Syria are examples of failed and failing leadership. Western influence was the genesis and is now the ironic, iron force behind the people movement who aspire for freedom from autocratic regimes. It is no more a question of whether the Saudi royalty will cave in but when. This too is bound to trigger a tsunami of uncertainty and chaos! It would be a deja vu repeat of the collapse of the American- Iranian honey moon post the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi.

Energy Security and Security of Energy

Global Energy needs are on exponential rise. Oil is black gold. It controls the pulse of International trade. Keeping sea lanes open and providing security to this energy are onerous tasks. The Persian Gulf, Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the concerned choke points are all vulnerable, but vital and valuable to ensure the flow of oil and gas from the Middle East to the East and Far East. Any conflict in the region is bound to have a catastrophic impact on energy availability." No oil, No care" is also an Arab fatalistic belief.

Arms Bazzar

The region spreading from the Gulf to the Far East is an arms bazaar. There is a plethora of lethal conventional weapons of intense concentration in the Gulf. The western countries headed by USA and China along with some eastern bloc countries led by Russia are part of the military vendors club. The famous book tilted Arms Bazaar by Anthony Sampson clearly illustrates that the military supplies have been on since the last four decades. More telling is the simple fact of backwards and volatile nations having easy and ready access to fierce fire power. Wild West syndrome echoes in the deserts, dunes and the waters of the land. The West is futilely trying to put out the fires that it had started decades ago!

Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is the “Life line” between West and East. Over 1000 million tons of oil pass through close to Indian shores every year. India is dependent on the seas for 95% of its trade and 80% for oil. It cannot simply afford to allow closure of sea lanes for more than 10 days. This Ocean being every one’s lake is the reality today. As the largest stake holder in the region we at least ought to know what is happening in our waters and be able to rightfully secure ourselves as a sovereign democracy. Others may sail away but we cannot. This subtle difference has gross, telling implications in effect, impact and consequences for the Sub-continent. What happens in the Persian Gulf will have a lasting, and long-term impact on all Indian Ocean rim countries. The Indian Ocean is a floating home to about 35 to 40 warships from different nations, not to speak about the Indian, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lankan navies and task Force 150 led by USA. At any given time there are at least 10 to 15 submarines transiting underwater. Nearly 2000 to 3000 merchant ships ranging from super tankers, gas carriers, cargo ships, container vessels, traverse these waterways every day. Fishing fleets, dhows, trawlers, exploratory vessels, big oil rigs also cross the sea lanes. In peace time alone the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the important straits from east to west are all subject to threats of:

• Mutual interference among submarines
• Environmental degradation due to discharge of dirty oil by empty oil tankers in violation of UNCLOS(United Nations Convention on laws of the Seas) agreed upon rules of behavior.
• Major oil Pollution disasters due to collisions between tankers.
• Tsunamis and cyclones.
• Low intensity threats of piracy, smuggling and hijacking.
• Strangulation of traffic, in choke points, due to any of the above.

In these circumstances to ask India to choose between Iran and Israel is hypothetically and geo-politically anathema.

Indian Interests

Indian interests do not need great debate and discussion. We are a benign power, a secular stable democracy from an ancient civilisation. The International arena flocks to us, despite our many endemic weaknesses. Therein lies our intrinsic strengths. Today, the world needs us. We never need to be in a position to choose but let others want us. Our Interests can be realised by being what we are. Let greater or lesser powers do the asking of India to be what it can be for their sake!

Iran

We need Iran for counter balancing the gulf security calculus. Western influence while being of immense use has inherent limitations of distanced and obtuse alien content. India has historic, cultural, commerce and trade foot prints that are etched in the DNA of the Mediterranean, Maghreb, Malacca, Near and Far East long before the influx of the Europeans. We simply cannot abdicate this even if we are tempted to unwittingly attempt this exercise. 12% of oil is also critical. Constructive engagement with Iran would give India some leverage towards resolution of pending contentious issues in the region. Equally important is the Chinese dragon that is breathing fire to anneal an agenda of its own. Countering this without confrontation requires an amalgamated, calming, Indian presence with tacit support of the other players in the region.

Israel

Many Israelis, specially from their Political, Military, diplomatic corps believe that their population is 1. 7 billion by simply adding their 3 half million to our people. They have a fervent belief that the Jews and Indians have a destiny together for the common good of the World. This small State adds great value to India and brings surgical precision to our diplomatic, military, and government matrices. India-Israel cooperation focuses on space, water management, non-conventional energy sources, nanotechnology, biotechnology and self reliance in military technology. There are also agrarian thrusts between both countries. Israel is our sixth largest trading partner. With trade value of nearly $10 billion and increasing, a bi-lateral free trade agreement is also in the offing. Israelis have also learned to live with our pro-Palestine Posture.

Gulf Countries

India enjoys a unique stature in the Arab World. In many ways, Pakistani attempt to discredit India has not found much favour. Over the years the number of Indians who work in the Gulf, have gone up significantly across various disciplines. This is indeed a major factor that brings in valuable foreign exchange, contributing to our economy. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy have once, been trained by us very well on Military basics. Oman and India have also a special relationship that has prospered over the years. Saudi Arabia and India too have now entered into a positive arrangement, highlighting a tectonic shift in perceptions. These have taken place despite our ongoing Israeli connection. India's decision not to join USA in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was perhaps most prudent and strategically sensible. This has kept us in good stead and earned the appreciation of the regional leadership. Iran-India relationship is also perceived by the Middle East as a salutary influence in the region. India-GCC trade stands around $120 billion. Approximately 6 million Indian nationals work in the Gulf with yearly remittances of $30 billion. 70 to 75% of India’s energy imports are from the Gulf countries, including Iran. These are irrevocable links that have to be further strengthened.

Indian Sovereignty

We are a Sovereign system, with a track record of sound law and order in the national and international arena. Justice and prosecuting terrorist activities are part of our jurisprudence. It goes beyond consideration of our relationships. There is need for objectivity in our dealing with the attack on the Israeli diplomat with the heavy hand of the law. We also need to preempt any Israeli retaliation in our soil. On no account should we be seen as a vacillating system that is indecisive. Our handling of Kasab caught red handed in the 26/11 Mumbai attack, though frustrating does vindicate our full commitment to the letter of the law.

India's Signature Tune

India is an enigmatic miracle. The last 25 years has seen us grow as one of the leading economies starting with our liberalised economic strategy. 1998 saw us become a nuclear power. We are now recognised by the USA through the aegis of defense cooperation and Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreements. Several significant partnerships have also emerged with a host of G-8 and G-20 countries. Prospects of us being elected into the UN Security Council also appear bright.

India at home appears diffident and disjointed. Nation Management, Political leadership apathy and lack of accountability are all part of our evolution. Nevertheless the intrinsic strength of India resting with our seasoned office establishment has always ensured that we muddle through, without too much mud on our face. The international image of India is yet another positive paradigm. India is predictable, staid, stable, secular and restrained. Our protests are loud but our violence is subdued. Our elections are peaceful, with our laws mostly enforced. We have come off age without too much trauma of a colonial dominion. Our eclectic absorption, adaptability and the phenomenal success of Indians abroad are all noticed by others.

We are no more in a position of having to choose or measure our march. On the way we may falter at times but would not fall down. Let India continue with Iran and Israel triad and not consider this a triage. This would be our rightful and rational call.