Chinese PLA Modernisation: Perspectives and Issues

Lt Gen (Retd) JS Bajwa

“Build strong National Defence and powerful Armed Forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the need of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s modernisation drive.

-President Hu Jintao At the 18^th National Congress of CPC March 2013.

Armed forces of a nation constitute an element of National Power in synergy with diplomacy, economic development, education, technological base and Research and Development (R&D), industry and others. A distinguishing feature of China’s modernisation mission has been the national pursuit of “Comprehensive Power”. They wisely learnt that one key lesson from studying the experience of other previous powers - genuine global powers possess multidimensional strengths.

Chinese scholars and officials have used the term “Peaceful Rise” to describe China’s foreign policy to counter fears about its growing economic and political might. However, the ‘Rise’ has proved controversial as it has fuelled a perception that China is a threat to the existing established world order. Also, ‘Rise’ implies that others will decline in a relative sense. In the 2004 session of BFA (Boao Forum for Asia), President Hu Jintao used the phrase “Peaceful Development” which since has been the preferred term. ‘Development’ suggests that China’s advance can bring others along. The normative aspect of power being equally important as it is about projecting ‘soft power’ and relies primarily on resources of non-military nature. Recently Joseph Nye and Ernest Wilson developed the concept of ‘Smart Power’ which combines elements of soft and hard power to achieve foreign policy goals.

The past three decades of China’s economic rise has witnessed a similar and parallel rise of the Defence Budget translating into a phenomenal modernisation of the Armed Forces. The Defence Budget has risen at par and over a period at a higher rate than the economic growth rate. It has also remained steady at over five percent of total Central Government spending. The 2014 Government released data on Defence Budget indicates a 12.2 percent rise over the previous year (2014 - $131.6 billion; 2013 - $112.2 billion). There, thus, remains a concern of China’s potential for violent conflict with other states especially over territory.

In this context, it may be worthwhile to historically understand the circumstances when governments have exercised the option of war as an instrument of its foreign policy:-

(a) War is chosen even though no specific conflict of interest with another state or cacus belli may exist, only uncertainty about the future.

(b) Preventive Wars: Such a war is defined as ‘a war fought in order to avoid the risks of war under worsening circumstances later’.

(c) Territorial conflicts are dynamic contests. States actively compete to strengthen their claims in a dispute usually by improving their position in the local military balance.

(d) In territorial disputes, states will be able to match each other’s moves and maintain their relative balance and positions. Inaction could be more costly in the long run than using force in the short run.

The political, diplomatic and military moves initiated by China along India’s northern boundary reflect in substantive terms the possibility of China resorting to exercising the aforementioned options. China has used military force more often over territory than over any other type of foreign policy issue. A state may use military force in a territorial dispute not because of the importance of the land being contested but because of the need to invest in a general reputation for toughness. Such an option with respect to China should not be considered hypothetical or a mere figment of imagination.

However, it may appear contradictory that China’s historical record of dealing with territorial disputes has been of cooperation and compromise. From 1960-1964, out of eight disputes, China concluded boundary treaties with six of its neighbours. Similarly, from 1990-1999, nine additional boundary agreements were signed. Interestingly, the compromise periods correspond closely with the periods of ‘acute regime insecurity for China’s leadership. China is very sensitive to any eruption of ethnic revolt and this constitutes the first type of internal threat linked with compromise. Chinese military publications link the defence of its frontiers against external threats with internal political stability. The uncertainty of Tibet and the possibility of ethnic unrest will always be held against India by the Chinese government.

While China has not explicitly enunciated a grand strategic design, certain key elements of its national strategy are seminal. First, safeguard national security. Second, promote national development. Third, secure strategic objectives of China’s national rejuvenation and development. China undertook to build and cultivate power comprehensively across a variety of spheres: economic, science, technology, education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy and other sectors. The Chinese grasped the idea that power is comprehensive and integrative and not atomistic or indivisible.

Keeping this as the backdrop, China took on the modernisation of its armed forces in a phased manner. The stage was set by diplomatically creating an environment of peace and tranquillity along the borders thus freeing the Forces for modernisation. The first major downsizing was undertaken with the surplus manpower diverted to form the PAPF (People’s Armed Police Force) and Border Guards. The modernisation drive was planned and executed to lay a solid foundation by 2010, thereafter make major progress around 2020 and finally reach the goal of building armed forces capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21^st Century – 2050. Herein, priority was accorded for the expansion and modernisation of the PLAN. The PLAAF, Second Artillery Corps, and Ground Forces came in subsequent order. An RMA with Chinese characteristics was conceptualised as follows:-

(a) Coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability.

(b) Strong military through science and technology.

(c) Strategic project for talented people.

(d) Improve levels of scientific management.

(e) Develop military theories in an innovative spirit.

(f) Downsize and restructure forces.

(g) Military exchange and cooperation in line with foreign policy.

The PLA Ground Forces are focused on speeding informationisation of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building ‘Pockets of Excellence’ (POE’s) by equipping and restructuring Rapid Reaction Forces/Units, Army Aviation, light mechanised units and information countermeasure units. The inclusion of conventional role capability with the Second Artillery corps has been a significant development in PLA modernisation. With the induction of agile and efficient launch systems, precision strike capability by conventional missiles and cruise missiles the potential of this force at the operational level is now significant. The concurrent technological trends which include terminal guidance for enhanced accuracy, payload variation viz. fragmentation, penetrating, thermo baric, EMP and sub-munitions enable target specific configuration. Along with the well developed infrastructure and its extensive network in Tibet, the reach of this force across India’s northern frontline has serious operational implications for India.

PLA’s doctrine has evolved along with its modernisation. It has been the principle ‘driver’ for force structure, personnel recruitment, military education, training regimes, hardware needs, research and development, weapon procurement and operational strategy. Doctrine, technology and threat have interacted in shaping PLA’s posture over time. The doctrinal thinking and planning enunciates operational principles which includes such concepts as mobility, attrition, annihilation, close or deep-depth defence, layered defence, pre-emptive strikes, asymmetrical warfare, trans-regional operations, offensive operations and other general concepts. The War Zone Concept (WZC) has emerged as an operational-based doctrine and involves all services of the PLA. WZC, simplified, is the doctrine for conducting a limited war under high-tech informationalised conditions. The major characteristic of WZC doctrine is what is referred to as Trans-Regional Support Operations (TRSO) which involves deployment and employment POE’s from other Military Area Commands (MAC) into a possible conflict zone. The mobile nature of the RRU’s and their effectiveness would constitute an indirect forward presence and thus contribute to creation of local and temporary superiority in psychological terms. This, in itself, is presumed, would deter provocation and hence prevent any situation from escalating into a conflict.

China has made no secret of its ambitious space goals. In 2003, it independently launched a man into orbit. In November 2011, it successfully docked two robotic spacecraft in Earth orbit. The quest for manned space station is planned to be put up and made running by 2020. Plans for landing man on the moon remains on its space programme agenda. Currently China has 10 Beidou (Big Dipper) satellites providing a home grown satellite navigation system. By 2020, it will have 35 satellites for the same. In January 2007, China stunned the strategic community when it shot to pieces its own weather satellite with a missile demonstrating an unexpected lethal capability acquired to dominate space. It is now developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. China’s ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies from China’s manned and lunar programmes as well as technologies and methods developed to detect and track space debris. A report dated May 3, 2014 stated that China had destroyed the ‘control chip’ of a Japanese spy satellite with a secret weapon (probably an EMP of several megawatts strength fired for one minute at the satellite). It was reported that this satellite was tracking the trial flight of a J-20 stealth fighter over mainland China. The space programme has enabled China to setup advanced space-based C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and Targeting capability. Presently, China has eight surveillance satellites in orbit besides earth resource satellites and remote sensing satellites.

The PLA is investing heavily in Computer Network Operations (CNO). China’s CNO concept includes computer network attack, computer network exploitation and computer network defence. In addition, PLA has established Information Warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks as well as devised tactics and defence measures to protect friendly computers systems and networks. Since 2002, PLA has been creating militia units comprising personnel from commercial Information Technology sector and academia.

Cyber operations are planned to be launched as psychological warfare tools. In 2005, PLA began to incorporate CNO into its military exercises primarily as first strikes against enemy networks. It recently established a new information support and safeguarding base in July 2010 indicating its emphasis on cyber operations. Its cyber espionage and warfare includes:-

(a) Denying and limiting use of space based assets by adversaries in times of crisis or conflict.

(b) Built capability of deploying direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon.

(c) Counter space measures including jamming, laser and microwave.

(d) Employing CNO as a tool to gain strategic intelligence.

As China’s rise continues and capabilities of its Armed Forces increases manifold, China is likely to be less tolerant to impediments or perceived hindrances of any sort in its single minded pursuit of its goals and in securing its national interests. China as a gargantuan economic and military power may continue to deny hegemony but it will inevitably employ some form of economic and diplomatic coercion against its smaller neighbours and military coercion in other cases when it perceives its interests threatened. Consequently its smaller neighbours will seek to hedge in order to maintain an element of independence and balance the power equation. Otherwise these countries will end “paying tribute” to the seat of power in Beijing as of yore. Does India need to bandwagon with likeminded nations? Making a choice will be a major strategic decision.

India needs to define its strategic goals it seeks to achieve along with clearly pronounced time lines. The ‘Financial Year’ syndrome is certainly not suited to long term strategic planning. Future wars will be more than just bullets and bombs – these can be said to be the ‘hard element’ of hard power. Surveillance, IW, CNO and space domination are the new and critical ‘soft elements’ of hard power which will have a decisive role in the outcome of any future conflict. While India makes progress in the accumulation of assets in the category of hard elements of hard power, it is woefully lacking in the research and development of critical soft elements of hard power, making India strategically vulnerable. Infrastructure along the Northern boundary of India is a serious deficiency. India has been extremely cautious in its approach to building roads in the border areas. Tunnelling, which would have been much more economical in the long run has not been undertaken in any sector.

In addition, there is a weakness in institutionalised future planning, both nationally and within the Armed Forces. The Perspective Planning in the Army needs to look at war fighting doctrine, future logistics, harnessing technology with equipment profile and organisational structures coordinated under one directorate. There is need to focus on comprehensive National Security Strategy which should be the main feeder to NSAB (National Security Advisory Board) / NSA (National Security Adviser). Once the National Defence University is set up, the institutions dealing with defence and strategic affairs, including those dealing with economy, foreign affairs and industry, should be incorporated. Intelligence, surveillance including electronic surveillance (National Intelligence Agency) are loosely related in their functioning. CERT-IN (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) presently under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is not a satisfactory arrangement as it functions like any other office while it requires being vigilant and responsive 24x7x365. Therefore, these elements have to be coordinated under one agency to report to NSCB/NSA.

India needs to plan as a future power and exit out of the slumbering mould of merely reacting to situations that seem to take the Government by surprise ever so often.

(The article is an updated version of the paper presented at the Seminar on Engaging China: Opportunity and Challenges, organised by the VIF on June 26, 2014)

(The authors is a Delhi-based Defence Analyst)

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Published Date: 7^th August 2014, Image source: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/

Geopolitical Developments and India-China Relations

Jayadeva Ranade

The world is in a state of continuing flux. The economies of the major powers are still fragile and vulnerabilities exist in those of the bigger emerging powers in the Asia-Pacific like China and India. The balance of power is concurrently undergoing a shift with competing focal points of power surfacing in the East. The fragile nature has been accentuated in the past few years with Beijing’s accelerated push for recognition as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. This is resisted by the US, Japan and India and has made South East Asian countries nervous.

China’s sudden assertiveness since the end of 2007 was prompted by a combination of factors, but mainly by: the global economic downturn; China’s considerably enhanced economic and military strength; and Beijing’s perception that the US as a global power is on the decline and this is now the opportune moment for China to regain its self-perceived rightful position on the world stage and alter the status quo in Asia. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is divided on the issue of whether to write off the US as the sole world power. One view is that the US is a power irreparably on the decline while the other, which seems to be gaining ground, argues that the intrinsic strength and resilience of the US will ensure its return on to the world stage as a stronger, more effective power. There is consensus, however, that the US ability to project power simultaneously in different theatres is presently constrained, thus offering China a window of opportunity that would last at most between 5-10 years.

China’s impetuousness and decision to ‘take on’ the US anticipatedly triggered a response signalling quite clearly that the US is not about to cede either power or influence in the Asia-Pacific. The US encouraged particularly Japan and the Philippines, to react to China’s aggressiveness. It additionally unveiled the seemingly short-lived ‘Asian Pivot’ with its definite military content. The US has now shifted emphasis though, to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Rights (TPIP), which are economic equivalents of the ‘Asian Pivot’. China is now leaning towards joining the TPP/TPIP.

China, however, has not been deterred and continues to press ahead with achieving its global and regional ambitions. The continuing tense stand-off with US ally and East Asia’s strongest power, namely Japan, amidst steady escalation in tensions in the South China Sea, underlines Beijing’s willingness to push the envelope in the apparent confidence that the US will stop shy of confronting it and so will Japan and Vietnam. China reasserted the role it desires in the Asia-Pacific in a statement in Washington DC by its Ambassador to the US, Cui Tiankai, in February 2014. There is little doubt that US credibility as a reliable ally willing to back its partners in the region has been dented in the past 5-odd years.

In the South China Sea, after a series of confrontations with Vietnam and the Philippines where China seized some maritime territories, Beijing has begun to assert its claims over a larger area. It has revived its claims on St. James’ Shoal off Thailand and South Korea’s Ieodo Rock and recently began building airports on some islands and extending others. On May 24, 2014, China’s largest US $ 1 billion oil rig the ‘Haiyang Shi You 981’ sailed into Vietnamese-claimed waters escorted by 86 armed ships and Beijing has now sent four more rigs. Simultaneously, tension with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in Chinese) rose in recent weeks with the increased frequency of patrols by Chinese Navy ships and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft flying very close to Japanese Self Defence Force (SDF) aircraft and at times coming near collision range.

Meanwhile, modernisation of the 2.3 million-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which coincides with China’s continuing assertiveness that has unsettled its neighbours, has entered the final stage of its current phase. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Third Plenum, which was held in November 2013, provided it a substantive push. On January 18, 2014, the Party Secretary of Liaoning province disclosed that the second domestically-produced aircraft carrier being built at Dalian would be ready in six years. China also allocated US$ 1.6 billion for the first phase of indigenous design, development and production of jet engines.

The Third Plenum approved organisational reforms in the PLA’s command structure and the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLAAF and China’s strategic missile strike force, namely the Second Artillery, have been allotted enhanced operational roles and will receive priority in allocation of budgets and manpower. The PLA is to be downsized by 800,000 personnel including a large number of non-combatants. Reports filtering out of Beijing disclose that plans have been finalised to merge the seven military regions into five “combat zones”. This reorganisation will give the PLA a definite “outward orientation” and implies that “recovery” of territories claimed by Beijing will be a central feature of China’s strategic agenda and the PLA will reinforce diplomacy aimed at realising “China’s Dream”.

All this is relevant to India-China relations as is Beijing’s stance on ‘core national issues’ in bilateral relations. Beijing has made it explicitly clear in two despatches of China’s official news agency ‘Xinhua’ in August 2011, addressed to Japan and the Philippines, that ‘burgeoning economic ties do not mean good bilateral relations’ which depend entirely on the recognition and acceptance of China’s ‘core national interests’. The despatches are important because ‘Xinhua’ is China’s authoritative official news agency and even the CCP Central Committee (CC)’s powerful Propaganda Department instructs all Chinese journalists reporting on sensitive topics to adhere strictly to the text of ‘Xinhua’ reports.

To digress slightly, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 2-day visit (June 17-18, 2014) to UK is pertinent. Apart from the fact that Beijing was particular about the minutiae of protocol, the 30-Article Joint Statement issued after the visit revealed UK’s capitulation to China. Article 23 stated that Britain recognises Tibet as an integral part of China and does not recognise Tibetan independence. The English-language ‘Global Times’, a subsidiary of the CCP’s official newspaper ‘People’s Daily’, gloated that Britain was finding it difficult to accept that it was now a “poor power compared to China”. A major inducement were the over US$ 40 billion trade deals signed during the visit and establishment last year of a Yuan swap centre in London.

While assessing a country’s foreign and strategic policies, and particularly in the context of India- China relations where there are major stakes and we are directly affected, it is important to understand the nature of the State and its internal leadership dynamics.

There has been a major change in China’s politics and leadership style since 2011 and particularly with the ouster of former Politburo (PB) member Bo Xilai in 2012. That was a major event in China’s politics, perhaps the first major political upheaval since the Tiananmen Event of 1989, and has seen a visible ‘hardening’ of the Chinese State. Details revealed during the events leading to Bo Xilai’s ouster reinforced the conviction of the CCP’s nomenklatura that the US remains intent on its strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ -- China’s short-hand for US efforts to dismantle the CCP; deprive the CCP of its monopoly rule and introduce multi-Party democracy; and replace the ‘socialist economy’ with a ‘free-market capitalist economy’. Factional differences were subordinated to protecting the Party Centre and ensuring the CCP’s monopoly on power. All senior veteran cadres backed Xi Jinping and supported him as ‘leader’ of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). As a consequence, in addition to the three all important posts of CCP CC General Secretary, Chairman of the CMC and President of China, Xi Jinping now additionally heads seven of the Party’s Central Leading Small Groups, which are the most important and highest decision making bodies. The Party has, in effect, asserted itself and further tightened its grip over key levers of the State.

Doctrinaire policies have also gained ascendance in the Party in the past few years with renewed emphasis on Marxist and Maoist ideology and Party discipline. The Party’s guiding narrative is being enforced by the CCP CC’s powerful Propaganda Department which has been steadily tightening restrictions on the media, social media and journalists (including most recently last week), since Xi Jinping took over. The elevation of Liu Yunshan, former Director of the CCP CC Propaganda Department, as Member of the PBSC and the country’s Propaganda and Ideology Czar is demonstration that the ‘hardening’ of the State is the decision of the Party Centre.

Particularly relevant in this context is Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ which envisages: making the Chinese people wealthy; making China a strong nation; and the rejuvenation of China. This muscular aspiration for China spelt out by Xi Jinping at the 18th Party Congress has been adopted by the entire Party and has already entered the lexicon of the CCP. It is particularly pertinent to India-China relations as ‘rejuvenation’ implies the restoration of China to its self-perceived rightful international status and recovery of all its territories. The new passports published by China depict its claimed territories, as do its actions in the South China Sea and East China Sea and the increased assertiveness and expanding claims over Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.

The Party has concretised Xi Jinping’s status in the CCP hierarchy, thus legitimising his status in China. The Party theoretical fortnightly journal ‘Qiu Shi’ in its latest issue (June 2014) described Xi Jinping as “one of China’s greatest Communist leaders”. Xi Jinping is today China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong.

In India too, there has been a radical change with a new leader emerging after a resounding democratic electoral victory. New Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a reputation as a strong, decisive leader and the BJP as a ‘right wing’ Party and they have a majority in Parliament unprecedented for thirty years. Modi very quickly used his swearing-in ceremony as an opportunity to outline India’s view of its strategic neighbourhood and where Indian interest will focus. The visit to Bhutan and planned visit to Japan reinforces this. The current government can shape and implement medium to long-term policies. In other words, India and China both have strong leaders and this itself offers an opportunity for engagement on fresh and revised terms.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit was intended to show China’s eagerness in engaging with India’s new right-wing Government and is part of its strategy of ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’. It sought to project that China desires good relations with India and prevent India from moving close to Japan or towards a US-led anti-China grouping. A Chinese-language official ‘Xinhua’ despatch of May 29, 2014, is, however, pertinent. Its tone differed noticeably from that of other Chinese media reports which assessed that India’s policies towards China would not change and that economic relations would receive a boost. This Xinhua despatch asserted that Modi has no option other than economic cooperation with China as India perforce has to recognise China’s economic and military superiority in Asia. It stressed that Modi would have to accommodate China, not out of choice or inclination, but out of necessity. While this is arguable, but the Xinhua despatch exhibits China’s self-confidence and at the same time implies there is potential for cooperation.

China’s focus is on economic cooperation with India: Xi Jinping and PM Modi’s meeting on the sidelines of BRICS Summit also pointed towards the same though differences on some of the strategic issues remained. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s forthcoming visit to India has the economy as its focus and he is reportedly being accompanied by 350 Chinese Chief Executives (CEOs) amidst much talk of investing in India’s infrastructure, high-speed railways and the Bullet Train. Chinese diplomatic missions in India have already begun selecting locations for the ‘Special Industrial Parks’ and, at least in Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bengal, have identified middle-men for ‘benami’ purchases of land. China is anxious to find a new market for its huge reserves of surplus cash and as another avenue for investment, and India is an attractive vast market. Undoubtedly it will benefit if China invests in India’s infrastructure, but India will need to carefully decide the direction in which to steer Chinese business as otherwise, in a democratic set up such as India’s, China will soon acquire a powerful business lobby capable of adversely influencing national strategic decisions. Roads, flyovers, railways, hydro-electric projects, multi-storey office and residential buildings, are sectors that can benefit from Chinese investment. In order to ensure strategic flexibility and increased investment, however, these must be balanced by offering similar competitive opportunities to other countries like Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. India can particularly benefit in the hi-tech, advanced electronics and defence sectors by encouraging investments from Japan and Taiwan on very preferential terms.

Nevertheless, two events are worthy of note in this context. First is the protracted 20-day incursion by Chinese troops in Apr/May 2013 in the Depsang Plains of Ladakh that cast a cloud over the bilateral relationship and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit. The intrusion was apparently planned and deliberate. It was proposed by the PLA and approved by the Politburo which, after discussions, assessed that India would not cancel Li Keqiang’s visit for fear of offending China. It was certainly not, as sought to be made out, a local action by a local PLA Commander. On May 14, 2013, the influential, official ‘Zhongguo Qingnian Bao’ (China Youth Daily) published an article implicitly laying claim to Ladakh and describing it as part of Tibet.

Second is the visit (June 8 -9, 2014) of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi. In keeping with past practice, just two days before Wang Yi’s arrival China alluded to the outstanding border issue and the Dalai Lama’s presence by officially protesting the presence of Lobsang Sangay, head of the Central Tibetan Administration, at Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. Wang Yi too, at his press conference in New Delhi, asserted China’s territorial claims by brushing aside questions on border intrusions and made a carefully worded remark that the issue of stapled visas by China were a “unilateral” “flexible” “goodwill gesture” or, in other words, that the status of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir remain disputed.

On the vexed border issue, little progress can be anticipated unless both leaders and, especially Xi Jinping, decide to use their strength and push for a mutually acceptable settlement. China’s recent utterances on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, make this a distant possibility. China can, in fact, be expected to be insistent and expand its claims on Arunachal Pradesh and J&K and may test the resolve of the BJP government on the territorial issue. The status quo in negotiations will not change till India acquires the capability, through asymmetrical power, to impose unacceptable costs on China’s ‘Han heartland’, including Beijing and Shanghai. This will take a couple of years as the Agni V series of missiles become operational and are deployed.

China will continue to deepen relations with Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka and exert to establish a formal diplomatic presence in Thimpu, which is only a matter of time. A new and worrying feature is China’s focus on Lumbini in Nepal. Not only will construction of a modern airport in Lumbini built by the PLA pose a proximate military threat to India, but more insidious is Beijing’s effort to undermine the influence and the authority of the Dalai Lama amongst Tibetan Buddhist monks and lay the ground work for potentially triggering instability and secessionism across the vulnerable Indo-Tibetan Himalayan border belt. Plans of China’s so-called NGOs to build and operate a monastery-cum-seminary points to this.

Finally, it is pertinent to briefly mention China’s strategy of ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’ formulated in October last year. The ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’ strategy for the first time in the history of communist China designates neighbouring countries as ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ and promises huge benefits and economic largesse for countries that accept and assist China’s regional ambitions. These three initiatives aim at obtaining new sources of natural resources and new markets for China and will be secured by China’s expanding military might and strategic reach including in the Indian Ocean.

(The author is Member of the National Security Advisory Board and President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi. He is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India)

(The article is a revised version of the paper presented by the author at the seminar on ‘Engaging China: Opportunities and Challenges’ organised by Vivekananda International Foundation on June 26, 2014)

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Published Date: 31^st July 2014, Image source: http://www.icec-council.org

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Strike Corps for the Mountains: Upgrading India’s Military Strategy from Dissuasion to Deterrence

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

On July 17, 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finally approved the army’s proposal for raising a Strike Corps for the mountains. Though the approval came after considerable delay, it is a pragmatic move that will send an appropriate message across the Himalayas. It will help India to upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence as the Strike Corps, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force (IAF), will provide the capability to launch offensive operations across the Himalayas so as to take the next war into Chinese territory.

The new Strike Corps will comprise two infantry divisions and will be supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades to provide potent firepower, an engineer and air defence brigade each, an aviation brigade and units providing logistics services. The Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army’s manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. The army has already raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and deployed them in Arunachal Pradesh to fill existing gaps in the defences. Some elements of these divisions will act as readily available reserves for the new Strike Corps to add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success. These divisions will also be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations across the Himalayas. Hence, these must be seen as playing a significant supporting role for the Strike Corps.

Territorial Dispute

Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between India and China, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute that is the most disconcerting. Since well before the 1962 border war, China is in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres (sq km) of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. China surreptitiously built its alternative route from Tibet to Xinjiang through this part of Aksai Chin. In addition, in March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in the Shaksgam Valley of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (north of the Siachen Glacier and west of the Karakoram Pass) to China under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through this area China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan.

In India’s north-eastern region, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, even though physically the territory has always been under Indian control. In terms of area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, had publicly reiterated this claim just before President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006. The ambassador single-handedly ensured that his President received a cold shoulder in Delhi and the visit turned out to be inconsequential. Since then, Chinese interlocutors have claimed several times that the Tawang Tract is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. Chinese scholars visiting New Delhi always hint that the merger of the Tawang Tract with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s often stated official position on such issues is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty.

An inherently destabilising situation stems from the fact that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The LAC is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km long boundary between India and Tibet. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor as patrol face-offs are common and could result in an armed clash between patrols. Also, incidents such as the Nathu La border clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung standoff of 1986 can recur. Such incidents have the potential to escalate into another border conflict similar to the war of 1962. Also, over the last decade, China has spent considerable time, effort and resources to upgrade the military infrastructure in Tibet. The PLA has stepped up the number of military training exercises that it has been conducting in Tibet every year. An airborne division, which is a dedicated rapid reaction force, has also practised induction and deployment in Tibet.

Joint Operations during War in the Mountains

Hence, despite the ongoing border talks between India and China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, often punctuated by ugly incidents like the PLA incursion in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in April-May 2013 and repeated incursions into Chumar since then, a limited India-China border conflict cannot be completely ruled. As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is also in the mountains, there is a very high probability that the next conventional conflict involving India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise a new Strike Corps.

In any future war that the armed forces are called upon to fight in the mountains, gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from Indian territory occupied by him will continue to remain important military aims. While these will be infantry predominant operations, no war plan will succeed without achieving massive asymmetries in the application of firepower to destroy the enemy’s combat potential and infrastructure. Therefore, army-IAF operational plans must be fully integrated. These must be jointly evolved, meticulously coordinated and flexible enough to be fine-tuned to exploit fleeting opportunities and to take advantage of the enemy’s reactions during execution. This is especially so in the mountains where the military aims and objectives are limited in scope because of the terrain. Both the Services must work together to create the capabilities that are necessary to take the battle into enemy territory during the next war in the mountains.

As artillery batteries and regiments cannot be moved and re-deployed easily, operations in the mountains place a premium on battlefield air support. Operational mastery over air-to-ground strikes can influence the outcome of tactical battles in the mountains extremely favourably. Firepower ratios can be enhanced to levels necessary for achieving overwhelming superiority only through a major upgradation in the availability of artillery guns, rocket launchers and missiles and offensive air support. A contract for the acquisition of 144 howitzers of 155 mm caliber has been hanging fire for long and needs to be expedited. The new artillery units that will be raised must be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can engage targets deep inside Tibet from deployment areas in the plains. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) need to be acquired in large numbers both by the artillery and the IAF to accurately destroy important targets such as communications centres. The government must also hasten the acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.

Ancillary Support

The peculiarities of terrain and the lack of sufficient road communications, particularly lateral roads that connect the road axes leading to the border, will place heavier demands on helicopter lift for the movement of reserves within divisional and brigade sectors. At the operational level, only an “air assault” formation can turn the tide through vertical envelopment and enable deep offensive operations to be carried out when employed in conjunction with Special Forces. An air assault brigade group inducted across the LoC or LAC by helicopters after the IAF has achieved a favourable air situation can seize an objective in depth. Ideally, each of the infantry divisions of the strike Corps must have one air assault brigade with the requisite air lift. Air-transported operations can also play a major role in influencing the course of the war. During Operation Parakram in 2001-02, almost a complete brigade group was airlifted to Kashmir Valley to enhance the reserves available in 15 Corps for offensive operations. In addition to attack helicopters, which will provide sustained firepower support, a large number of utility helicopters will be required to support offensive operations across the Himalayas, including medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.

The successful launching of Strike Corps operations will depend on the availability of good infrastructure, including double-lane roads with all-weather capability and suitably placed logistics nodes. India’s plans to upgrade the infrastructure in the states bordering China have not been progressing at an adequate pace. In fact, there have been inordinate delays due to the lack of environmental clearances and other reasons. While the new Strike Corps is being raised, equipped and trained, the government must make vigorous efforts to speed up the completion of infrastructure projects. Otherwise, the army will have a new Strike Corps and not be able to launch it effectively.

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India-China Relations: A Reality Check

Lt Gen (Retd) Gautam Banerjee, 

Executive Council, VIF

The Elephant’s Dilemma

New Delhi’s purportedly ‘meek submission’ to what is seen as arbitrary, at times blatant, affront to India’s national dignity that is regularly inflicted by Beijing, often comes in for sharp criticism by our strategic community. Common citizens too are dismayed when they find New Delhi bending-backwards to reconcile to Beijing’s highhandedness, sometimes after lodging meek protest and sometimes allowing the arrogation to pass¹. Many a times, as in the matter of the muscle flexing by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), either the incidents are left unreported, or when that is unfeasible, down-playing explanations are advanced to soothe public consternation - a case of the victim holding brief for the tormentor²!

In more disconcerting vein, there comes grave provocations from China that amount to a sort of ‘hostility’ against our nationhood. Besides, the mind boggling nonsense of staking claim over the state of Arunachal Pradesh, occupation of the Shaksgam Valley in Ladakh, pumping up Pakistan with military, nuclear and missile capabilities – a brazen recourse to destabilize India - and negation of New Delhi’s stance on terrorism go to exemplify Beijing’s obsessive antipathy towards India³. In all such cases, New Delhi suffers these inimical policies in stoic resignation. Thus, the criticism that our strategic community heaps upon the government of the day is not unjustified.

Governance in contemporary India is driven by economic considerations, as indeed it should be. However, there are signs emanating from policy-making confabulations which indicate that the other fundamentals of national security may be consigned to the sidelines in favour of the ‘interests’ of the commercial conglomerate. Obviously, when tested under eternal political wisdom, it is a trend dangerous for the future of our nationhood. Even if the undertakings of national defence are suspended as a temporary trade-off in favour of economic-industrial take-off, as China did during the 1980’s and 1990’s, the governing establishment may not be absolved from its primary charter that mandates, not the promotion of business interests per se, but the provision of secure and sovereign environment for the people to flourish.

The purpose here is, firstly, to suggest that notwithstanding the enchanting dream of ending geo-political rivalry through commercial connections, the Sino-Indian relationship may remain contentious in the foreseeable future; and secondly, to argue that articulation of military power-backed diplomacy would be a hopeful option for India to live in peace with an overwhelmingly powerful and pugnacious neighbour⁴.

Contentions Ever-Interminable

One comes across many theories to explain Beijing’s compulsive hostility towards India. Experts opine that the root causes of China’s aversion is the power-play of regional leadership – of the kind of that usually comes up between the largest and the second largest neighbours. Then of course, there is India’s repudiation of China’s territorial claims and China’s piqué of Indians’ solidarity with the Tibetan people. In economic terms, competition for energy, water and mining rights for strategic minerals, and China’s efforts to secure her sea lines of communication are also identified as the points of contention. No doubt, all these irritants add up to reinforce the already existing mutual suspicion. However, with the kind of sabre-rattling that China is frequently at, there is no doubt that a powerful majority in the Chinese establishment is afflicted with a sense of apprehension vis-à-vis India. But then what might these apprehensions be, and what can India do about it?

The answer may lie in the weight of the contentious issues that cast a shadow of unease upon Sino-Indo relations.

Regional Leadership?

In the question of rivalry for leadership in the region, the verdict is clear. To state the obvious, China encompasses a vast geographical area and unlimited range of resources. Traditionally, she cradles an extraordinary level of socio-political as well as practical intellect, and has developed sublime forms of civic and military wisdom in equal measure. It is her cultural strength that allowed her to preserve her sovereignty through the periodical shrinkages of political authority, never giving up her claims to rule over what she considered her domain and staking her ‘rightful’ status as a superior race of the “Middle Kingdom”.

China’s fortune is again on an up-curve; she is a rising power of mind boggling potential. Her grip over all segments of her society is pervasive and her technological, economic and military clout is galloping sure and fast. While lining up to do business with China so as to keep their domestic economies on track, even powerful nations are compelled to be wary of the inevitability of security challenges emanating from the fire-breathing dragon. Indeed, there is little doubt regarding China’s global ascendancy in the days to come; political thinkers are already articulating the idea of her role as a ‘pro-active superpower’. In bilateral context, her lead over India on every aspect - political authority, structural stability, economy, science and technology and military power - is so overwhelming, and continuously increasing, that even a fleeting thought of closing the gap may be discarded outright.

In contrast, India, though an equally ancient civilisation, has not articulated a proportionate balance between spiritualism, socio-political wisdom and nationalism. All through her history, there have been short periods of powerful centralisation followed by long periods of political disintegration that invited cyclic invasions and foreign rule. Presently, even as her economy improves and she emerges as an accommodative member of the global polity, she is yet unable to articulate her state-power to disperse such anti-national tendencies that emanate from within or without⁵. Thus, notwithstanding a vibrant democracy in play, armed rebellion has displaced the state in nearly one-fifth of the country. One third of her people remain malnourished while numerous groups of ethnic, linguistic, casteist, religious, business and political manipulators assail each other, and by default, harm national ideals. Meanwhile, inimical neighbours continue to sabotage her national interests, with impunity.

To be realistic, there is no way India can stake claim for regional leadership in the foreseeable future. Even if Beijing views India’s growing strategic relationships with US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Central Asian States and Myanmar as ‘ganging up’ to contain her, she may seek remedy not in targeting India, but in controlling her own brusque and over-bearing manner of conducting regional diplomacy. Indeed, China need not slip into a banal belief that India could pose a challenge to her ascendency in any manner⁶.

But that ‘ghost’ of apprehension may be exorcised by the Chinese themselves; India can do little to clear that perception.

The Tibet Issue

The Tibet issue is a cause of concern that sets Beijing on the warpath. History records that the borders of successive Nanjing-Beijing empires have gone through many cycles of expansions and contractions. Thus in some periods, Beijing’s imperialistic control extended westwards right up to Turkmenistan, while at other times, revolt emanating from outlying provinces caused the empires to shrink into just the Han populated areas of the Hwang Ho and Yang Ze River Basins ⁷. Perhaps this ingrained memory makes the ruling communist regime extremely sensitive to situations in Tibet, Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia. Chinese leadership’s avowed purpose being to perpetuate the stability of their autarchic rule, the simmering discontent in Tibet and world-wide solidarity with the Tibetan cause must be a cause of serious anxiety for them. Even her attempts to buy Tibetan people’s loyalty through accelerated economic development have failed to silence the skeptics who see it as a step to cascade Han settlements and so alter the demography of Tibet. Besides, economic prosperity stokes the urge for freedom, and therefore, the “Free Tibet” movement will remain a serious worry for the Chinese leadership in the foreseeable future. India, in sheltering a Tibetan Government-in-Exile, would continue to be viewed as an ‘upstart challenger’, a potential ‘destabiliser’, who needs to be ‘kept in place’⁸.

There is really nothing that India can do about successive Dalai Lamas and their followers taking shelter in her territory. May be China could do something about her ways of dealing with these unfortunate people so that they do not have to escape to India. She could reconcile to India’s compulsions in accommodating Tibetan refugees under the established international convention. May be New Delhi’s support of China’s causes in various forums even in absence of any reciprocal gesture would some day satiate Beijing’s complexes in this regard.

Here again there is little that India can do more than what she already does do to assuage China’s fears.

The Territorial Dispute

India’s repudiation of China’s occupation of the strategically sensitive Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley, and outright rejection of the unwarranted claim over Tawang/Arunachal Pradesh further adds to the latter’s consternation. Indeed, it is difficult to visualise India ceding territories to humour China’s expansionist agenda, just as it is naïve to expect China to rid herself of her deeply ingrained instincts of expansionistic philosophy⁹. India, therefore, will continue to be a target for Beijing to vent her frustrations upon.

Water

The Tibetan Plateau is the major source of sweet water that sustains life in South and East Asia. No doubt, diversion of such waters to enliven her heartlands is an enticing prospect for China. But when considered in the light of international riparian laws and the Middle Kingdom’s compulsive urge to secure great power status, of which display of sense of responsibility is an essential ingredient, the dream may encounter major hurdles. China will have to contend with the fact that diversion of waters from the Bramhaputra, Sutluj and Indus rivers would affect many other neighbours, and that coalescence of a coalition of victims of her highhandedness, even if it is made up of smaller and weaker nations, would be detrimental to her interests¹⁰. Thus, even if technological complexities, enormity of investment, decades of construction and environmental consequences may not deter her, and if the global political equation continues to remain favourable to China during those decades, any arbitrary diversion of waters by China may not be beyond contest.

In the overall context therefore, China may not find India as the sole stumbling block on this issue; in India, it would continue to be a cause of discomfiture though.

Strategic Encirclement?

What is described as China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy - that is, establishment of naval facilities surrounding the Indian Peninsula in alliance with littoral countries - would certainly strengthen her sea lines of communication as well as mining prospects in the India Ocean; it would also enhance her economic and diplomatic clout. Indeed, China is free to seek political arrangements to create this ‘string’ as she wants to, but there is much concern that this ‘string’ would lead to ‘encirclement’ of India. No doubt that ‘string’ would pinch, but only if India fails to invest in sea-power and take advantage of the strategic situation of the peninsular India that is best situated to control the Indian Ocean.

Rationally viewed, factoring facilities for naval replenishment located on foreign shores thousands of nautical miles away from mainland China as unassailable ‘military bases’, from where flotillas of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would supposedly set about to impose adversities upon other users of the Indian Ocean, may cause less anxiety when tested in light of the scales of naval forces and logistics that would be necessary for that purpose. It may take China four to five decades of continuation of favourable internal and international order to realise that purported goal, howsoever delightful that ambition might be to a compulsive hegemonist¹¹. Besides, it would be an entire lot of nations whose interests would be equally threatened by China’s dominance over the Indian Ocean.

This issue, therefore, would be a common concern among many nations, India included, that needs resolute preparations over time to manage.

Competition for Strategic Resources

There may be a case to view the issue of race for resources just as a business competition that is ever present in all deals at all times. Such rivalries may not lead to enmity per se¹². Besides, securing global sources for supply of assured energy and strategic minerals for one country does not imply that the other may have to starve; the architecture of economic exploitation of natural resources is so intimately intertwined across the globe. The concern that India would jeopardise China’s energy hunt, or in securing her sources of energy China will cause India to be shunted out, may not, either way, be so overwhelming ¹³.

The trade race may, therefore, be allowed to gain momentum without acrimony.

Compelling Observations

Sino-Indian relationship is marred by such fundamental in-congruencies which cannot be resolved at India’s instance without compromising her core values. New Delhi has to wait and hope that Beijing will some day get rid of her anxiety over India taking what she believes to be her pie, but lot of water must flow out of Tsang Po before that.

Keeping the ‘Dragon’ at Bay

Beijing’s growing acts of diplomatic hostility, even to the extent that the understandings reached in the past - the peace and tranquility agreement 2005, for example - are sought to be repudiated through deliberate acts of negation, must remain a potential source of trouble for India ¹⁴. Therefore, stakes in geo-politics rise, China’s insidious muscle flexing along our entire Northern borders, across the Indian Ocean region and even on international waters, should be expected. We are also aware of the fact that, Pakistan would continue to serve as China’s proxy detractor against India. How does India deal with a bellicose and belligerent China is a strategic challenge. How to keep the ‘dragon’ off her back? How do we, as many strategic thinkers opine, keep China’s predatory instincts in check while concentrating on own economic progress?

Lure of Complacency

First, we may not take China’s rhetoric of “peaceful rise to power” on face value; firstly, because in geo-politics, power never comes peacefully, and secondly, the peace Beijing speaks of is but a peace on her terms.

Second, we may not be fixated to the view that integration of Taiwan is China’s sole focus. Presently, that goal remains farfetched, whereas Tibet is a ‘live’ issue in contention. Settlement of the Tibet issue will bring her a step closer to integration of Taiwan. Therefore, possibility of a situation when Beijing may bolster her politico-economic measures with military power to overwhelm the Tibetan refraction, is real. India will invariably be embroiled in that conflict in some manner or the other.

Third, growing bilateral trade may not be a harbinger of dispute resolution. History bears testimony to the fact that good business does not come in the way of politico-military confrontation.

Fourth, the claim over whole of the Arunachal Pradesh may not be seen just as a bargaining posture. Such rhetorical claims, when repeated over decades, tend to get crystallised into national aspirations. When that happens, even authoritarian regimes are unable to back out against popular pressure.

Lastly, we may not dismiss those experts who have recently expressed the possibility of another Chinese ‘attack’ on India. Of course, as expected, the manner of the offensive may differ. In any case, we have to do better than repeating our gullibility of the pre-1962, post-Kutch 1965 and pre-Kargil kinds if we do not wish to suffer another visitation of misfortune.

Thus in the context of China’s adversarial posture, New Delhi has to convince Beijing to limit her uncontrollable expansionist urge to nothing beyond a ritualistic war-dance.

Options Oft Articulated

Will a tit-for-tat exchange work? Asking Beijing either to move out the PLA from Occupied Kashmir or face the prospect of the Indian Army moving into Aksai Chin, for example? Or by sallying out to damage some huts and paint some boulders across the LAC? Can India indulge in such charade without poking Beijing to up the ante`? The obvious answer is that such a bizarre ‘game’ may make a subtle gesture, nothing more, but worse, it might invite a reaction that India would be hard put to absorb.

Can New Delhi impose such a regime of trade restrictions that it starts hurting China’s economy? By all accounts, such a step may cause some losses to China, but its counter-effect on Indian economic progress may be many times over. After all, the weaker gets trampled first.

Growing economic inter-dependency could be thought of to marginalise the hawks in Beijing, mainly the PLA and the rank communists. This may be a good option provided the economic benefits are equitably balanced, not biased against India. Besides, it needs to be appreciated that notwithstanding encouraging prophecies, economic bindings have seldom prevented one state from undermining the other. Conversely, in her efforts to keep the trade equation in her favour, China may find another cause to be nasty.

Strength of human resources bolsters national security. Can we bank upon that to stand up to Beijing’s arrogance? Well, that could be possible if we could maintain our lead in mathematical genius, English language, scientific temper and strong civil institutions that we had inherited at independence. Sadly, that lead has been lost, more or less; China catches up fast when she wishes to, while India tends to entangle herself in endless arguments and agitations, nepotism and mobocracy, divisive compromises and farcical politics. This option therefore is contingent upon India reinventing her societal strength – it is a far away option.

Possibly, India can leverage common cause with the United States, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia, to name just a few, to blunt China’s predatory tendency. Can such a leverage be accomplished without provoking China, something that wisdom tells us to better avoid? Can we prevent such collaborations with the ‘like minded’ parties – no saints themselves - from undermining our interests in some other manner? Arguably, it may be possible to forge such a leverage, though it would be a tight-rope act, liable to misfire.

What about retaliatory measures in Tibet? Can India stoke Tibetan resistance in the same manner that China uses Pakistan to tie knots around her? That indeed would be a strong leverage to exercise. But what if China retaliates by promoting Maoist and North East insurgencies; she had been doing so earlier even without any provocation, after all? Obviously, this extreme option may be reserved as a recourse only in war, with due preparations to handle the consequences.

The preceding discussion leaves military deterrence as the sole practicable, and profitable, recourse to keep China on friendly terms.

Role of Military Power

We know that obduracy of an overwhelmingly powerful neighbour may not be contained by reconciliatory or collaborative diplomacy alone. Beijing’s arrogance will rise in step with her progress and power – this is already evident. Considering its ever-present roots as discussed above, Sino-Indian confrontation of some kind or the other is inevitable. Given China’s philosophy of using military might as a catalyst of political ambitions, it is imperative for India to wield such military power that would motivate Beijing to seek her goals through peaceful means. Indeed, that is what our political leadership have sought to do all these years since 1962. But with the military institution frozen in obsolescence and afflicted with debilitating ‘hollowness’, can India’s military power continue to pay its ‘deterrence-dividend’, or even dissuade our eastern neighbour’s innate urge to grab territories? The answer, as honest analysts aver, is ‘no’.

Further, given that our goal of socio-economic uplift precludes the practicality of competing with China’s military prowess, India may not hope to ever acquire that level of military power that could defeat a full-spectrum, all-front, total war that the PLA’s doctrine espouses, even if that strategy is sought to be camouflaged under the beguiling terminology of “limited war under conditions of informalisation”.

A ‘Smile and Gun’ Option

From the preceding discussion, it emerges that given the compulsions under which it has to carry the burden of statecraft, the courses adopted by New Delhi in keeping the overbearing ‘dragon’ at bay have to be double-nuanced. Indeed, it makes sense to promote political and economic engagement, sometimes reconciling affronts with petulance and showing occasional resolve¹⁵. However, since Beijing is no exception in respecting the power of gun, that stoicism needs to be backed up with an efficient military machine that could ‘bite’ painfully even when bound. India could work towards that level of military preparedness which, even if she may not prevail, would make a clash of force prohibitively dear to China. History tell us that it is possible to do so at a cost that is affordable and a pace that is adaptable. Indian strategists may therefore have to come to terms with the aforementioned restraining dispensations, and yet devise strategies that would deny free run to the PLA should Beijing decide to settle her pique with force.

But insight also tells us that the Indian system of administrating its military institution restricts, rather than sponsors such exceptional strategies. Our political culture remains in oblivion of the nuances of cost-efficient management of military organisation and development of strategic articulations, while the burden of defence policy making is consigned to a school of pretending strategists made up of bureaucrats, scientists and auditors - in exclusion of sanctified representation from the military intellectuals! As the show of smug satisfaction among the polity and the media over raising of two army divisions, or positioning some aircraft on the North-East frontier, or successful launches of missiles – all half-measures, titillating but overall lopsided - indicates, innocence of the profound nuances of war-fighting seems to pervade the entire state-apparatus. Consequently, even while maintaining the third largest army in the world, the nation remains bereft of the advantages expected and dividends accrued. That is a sad situation.

Engaging with China

Friendly engagement with China is a necessity that would work only if it is cemented with the backing of military strength. A comprehensive revamp – transformation, so to say – of the Indian defence establishment is therefore overdue. This, however, may be possible only if there is firm resolve in our politico-bureaucratic system to nurture military expertise, foster synergy between India’s numerous defence and quasi-defence establishments and respect the time-lines of force-modernisation.

This condition does not prevail today.

Endnotes

1. New Delhi’s reconciliation with issue of ‘stapled visa’ to the residents of J&K, blocking the Asian Development Bank loan for Arunachal Pradesh and whimsical response to the threat of deluge along Paree Chu in Himachal Pradesh are some examples. Diplomatic protests, when lodged, are disdainfully dismissed by Beijing, mostly so.
2. Instances of damaging Indian bunkers, shooing away bonafide graziers and preventing track construction work near the LAC to proceed are known. Besides, of course, there are ever increasing violations of the LAC. India’s attempts to explain away these violations to her citizens as “differing perceptions of the alignment of LAC between the two sides” does not really wash since the Chinese have consistently avoided specifying their ‘perception’ of the LAC and so settle this irritant till the border issue is resolved.
3. Since 2006, China ‘clarifies’ that the entire Arunachal Pradesh (“Outer Tibet” is the newly invented nomenclature!) is hers. Imagine an international boundary, running not along the watershed of massive Himalayan Ranges, but over and across its reverse foothills! That is a glimpse of ‘Chinese logic’! In the case of Shaksgam Valley, one squatter has gifted its trespass to another! The mischievous deal has gone a step further: Chinese Army is now operating in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
4. China and India have never been neighbours. Tibet has always occupied that place independent of the ever-changing Sino-Tibet political equations, till communist China completely subsumed Tibet nationalism in the 1950’s.
5. Arguably, the eulogistic chants of India being an “economic power” or even an “emerging super-power” notwithstanding, she is actually just a “business destination” for the developed nations to rake profit from. It is the lure of profit that causes the developed world to lip enchanting adulations over India’s supposed “success story”.
6. Of course, China too faces numerous problems. But she is in control and is prepared to keep it that way, notwithstanding from some China-watcher’s wishful predictions of a gathering trouble.
7. All this while, the vast belt of territory starting from Manchuria in the North, and covering what are called Inner Mongolia, Quinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang and Tibet regions in the West, had enjoyed freedom or subjugation – at varying degrees – at one time or the other. It was only during the early Manchu rule that the map of the empire appeared to be somewhat close to what China controls today, or lays claim upon.
8. Recently, the instinctive mindset was revealed when commenting on India’s ‘Agni V’ missile test, a Chinese mouthpiece accused India of ‘entertaining visions of imposing regional hegemony’, a status that was, by implication, considered to be reserved, by divine consensus, for China alone.
9. Ironically, the communist regime fully identifies with its much decried imperialist past. Thus, the communists claim the largest areas that were ever controlled, or even trod upon, by Beijing-based empires at any point of time. By this logic India could claim Pakistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar etc, the Britain may claim half the world, and every other country may claim every other’s territory!
10. As political philosophers have contended, even the most powerful hegemons are consciousness of a virtual ‘red line’ which when crossed, invites self-doom. Beijing will ignore that ‘line’ at her peril.
11. A static international order is nearly impossible to imagine. Besides, ’encirclement’ of the Cold war era is invalid in today’s world. Granting a foothold for naval replenishment does not necessarily mean that hostile acts against another country will find auto-endorsement.
12. India opted to purchase fighter aircraft from the French stable, much to consternation in the US. And that did not lead to a duel.
13. Economic and societal survival of nations that export and import energy and other minerals is so inter-wound that any major disruption in the cycle will devastate societies of both categories. The effect will be global – it will lead to a kind of global chaos.
14. We may recount three cases of Beijing’s diplomatic duplicity. One, when asked as to why wasn’t her territorial claims raised before the late 1950’s, Zhou en Lai replied that “the time was not ripe”!; two, the volte-face on Beijing’s stance on Sikkim; three, claim over all of Arunachal Pradesh and invention of the term “Outer Tibet”. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile to a great nation indulging in such undignified tricks.
15. Instances of either versions of reactions are: one, ‘ignoring’ the recent episode of visa denial to an officer hailing from Arunachal Pradesh and going ahead with a truncated delegation on military exchange; and two, petulant ‘reconciliation’ with PLA’s move into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir by simply stating that the matter was ‘being watched’. Conversely, ‘resolve’ was shown in going ahead with explorations in the South China Sea, rejecting Beijing’s ‘warning’. 

Adrift without a Strategic Culture

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

Does India have a strategic culture? If strategic culture is defined narrowly in the context of the nuclear age alone, then India, as a recent entrant to the nuclear club and still in the process of acquiring minimum nuclear deterrence, evidently lacks one. If the meaning of strategic culture is broadened to include a country’s approach to national security in general, then the question can be debated.

The pre-requisites for the existence of a strategic culture in this sense are sovereignty over territory and decision making on national security issues over a long period of time. It means direct experience of defending frontiers, building national military strength, advancing economic and commercial interests abroad, understanding geo-political strengths and vulnerabilities and accordingly leveraging or neutralizing them through diplomacy.

Tradition

Strategic culture has to be distinguished from state craft or strategic thought and decisions. All sovereign authorities are expected to deal with the outside world in a manner that serves the country’s interest best. They have to deal with longer term opportunities and challenges and take strategic decisions accordingly. Global developments have to be studied, projections about the future made and the rapport of forces assessed in the years to come. All this is part of governance, though individuals and institutions can and do contribute much to strategic thought in a country.

Thus, strategic culture would be a product of a country’s thinking and actions on security matters over a long period, to the point that it marks and reflects its personality and its reflexes while dealing with them. Strategic culture in this sense is part of a country’s deeply embedded tradition. Naturally, a country’s national culture contributes to its strategic culture.

Now, we were not in sovereign control over our territory and armed forces during the period of British rule. The British took decisions on India’s security driven by their strategic culture of empire building, protecting their colonial possessions and maintaining a balance of power. The threat of Czarist Russia and a territorial modus vivendi with China provided the rationale for their Afghan and Tibetan policies, for instance.

Before that the Muslim conquerors ruled large parts of India for centuries. Just as the Hindu princes showed little strategic sense in dealing with the Muslim invaders, the Afghans could not strategically ward off the Mughal threat.The Muslim rulers failed to properly assess the European sea-borne threat. The way the rulers of that period allowed an English trading company to steadily conquer large swathes of Indian territory speaks volumes about the lack of any strategic culture in the India of that period.

Independent India could imbibe virtually nothing in terms of strategic culture from centuries of Muslim rule, especially as Islam became the basis for India’s eventual division and its theology as practised by Pakistan presents an enduring threat to India’s security today.

Inheritance

Similarly, independent India could not inherit the British strategic culture as India no longer needed to be defended as a British possession. The Indian decision makers had to make their own assessments of India’s security needs, evaluate independently the source of short and long term threats and frame policies accordingly, but all this without any direct experience of handling India’s affairs for centuries. There was no fount of their own strategic culture from which they could drink.

But strategic decisions had to be taken and the inadequacies of our strategic thinking became apparent. We failed to properly evaluate Pakistan’s challenge as well as British machinations of the period and took the Kashmir issue to the UN. We did not evict Pakistan from the parts of Kashmir it had forcibly occupied, with the result that today Pakistan has a common border with China and we don’t have a common border with Afghanistan- a huge geo-political blunder on our part.

Failure

We misjudged the security threat to us from China’s military takeover of Tibet and recognized Tibet as part of China without making this conditional on a settlement of border differnces. We courted military defeat in 1962 at China’s hands because our assertive political positions were not backed by credible military strength.

If these early errors occurred because of inexperience, what would explain our unwillingness to recognize the depth of these threats even today and take appropriate steps to build our defences politically and physically? Pakistan uses the instrument of terrorism against us but we think that we can bring this to an end through dialogue. We let Kashmiri separatists meet Pakistani leaders in Delhi and Islamabad as if Pakistan, with its obsessive territorial claims over Kashmir, would give them wise counsel.

We let China dictate the management of our bilateral relations. China allows itself to question India’s territorial integrity, but we hesitate to respond to its provocations. We have procrastinated in building adequate defence capability in the north. We are concerned about Chinese activities in our neighbourhood and its entry into the Indian Ocean, but we say we have to accept the reality and the legitimacy of Chinese presence in our periphery and we favour maritime cooperation with it in the Indian Ocean.

We have been inordinately slow in developing our strategic programmes. Our failure to build an indigenous defence manufacturing base shows the fragility of our strategic thinking. We have reduced our defence expenditure to 1.7 % of GDP in the last budget.

If our strategy is to transform ourselves internally in a peaceful environment- the same as China’s- then the domestic management of our polity and our economic decisions have to show that sense of purpose. On the contrary, we are becoming more fractious internally, with strategic consequences.

That we produced Chanakya almost 2400 years ago is not sufficient ground to claim that today’s India possesses a strategic culture.