Mountain Strike Corps along Indo -Tibet Border and Strategic Advantage

Lt Gen (Retd) Gautam Banerjee, 

Executive Council, VIF

“Begin, be bold and venture to be wise” – Horace

Cause for a Mountain Strike Corps

Right from the days when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decided to use military power to address its border issues with India, the Indian Army suffers from a serious operational debility. This debility arises from an absence of counter-offensive capability across the watershed of the Indo-Tibet Border or the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Indeed, India’s defence oriented military strategy remains inconclusive unless it has within its ambit a viable component of autonomous counter-offensive or riposte capability to confront the aggressor with counter-threat(s) that forces him to divert or recoil from his venture.

The decade past has found that Beijing, perhaps buoyed by fruition of her military modernisation, is no more able to restrain from exercising her tactic of forcing gradual migration into claimed territories. Having already firmed up her possession of the Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley, she is engaged in preparing grounds for her next phase of expansionism through outlandish claims over the Arunachal Pradesh and many other bits. Accordingly, the LAC is subject to increasing intrusions at Hayuliang-Fish Tail, Asaphila-Longju and Lungma-Kerang areas in the Eastern Sector, Thag La – Barahoti areas in the Central Sector and Chumar, Demchok, Pangong Tso, Depsang Plains and Daulat Beg Oldi areas in the Western Sector of the Indo-Tibet Border. In the process, the PRC has advanced its notional claim-lines well into the Indian territory.

Offensive-in-Defence

Captain B H Liddell-Hart had argued, with substance of historical proof, that though neither flamboyant nor spectacular as the offensive, it was the defensive strategy in most cases that brought assured victory in the end. However, there is a caveat. According to the universal ‘Principles of War’, for a defensive strategy to come successful, an effective offensive content must be intrinsic to each level of its prosecution. It is so that the various stages of defensive operations to harass, delay, resist, limit and cause attrition to the enemy’s attacking forces have to be infused with offensive characteristics. At the tactical level, this principle manifests in the form of the defender’s raids, spoiling attacks, reinforcing manoeuvres and local as well as deliberately planned counter-attacks, the last named being an exclusive operation for which contingency plans are made and forces earmarked.

Further, as the history of warfare teaches, to trigger final collapse of the enemy’s aggression, a capability to undertake autonomous counter-offensive – as distinct from the aforementioned ‘counter-attack’ phase of a defensive battle – at a place and time of the defender’s choosing must be but imperative to what may essentially be an ambit of defensive strategy.

Beyond the Line of Defence

Navies perform their mandate of defending national waters and coastlines by engaging in operations beyond the nation’s maritime boundaries. The Air Forces too target the enemy beyond the national air space; only in case of hostile ingress would they direct their attack into own territory. In similar vein, in order just to maintain the sanctity of a given line of defence but no more, ground forces have to resort to offensive action across that line. To be really effective, these offensive operations – call it counter-offensive or riposte – have to be launched from distinct firm base(s) and at timing(s) that are well clear from the tumult of defensive engagements; needless to state, in the contemporary context, all of these would be joint serviceoperations. The purpose here is to exploit those sectors where the aggressor prefers to remain in relative dormancy, and so upset his strategic designs by disrupting his force-matrix, terrain-orientation and ‘task-to-time’ equation. The United Nations Forces’ offensive on Inchon in the Korea War of 1951-53, India’s counter-offensive in the Lahore Sector during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and Israel’s encirclement of the 3rd Egyptian Army in the 1973 Yom Kippur War are apt demonstrations of this principle.

The Idea of 17 Corps

By the Year 2007 or so, the extent of build up of the PRC’s military infrastructure along the Indo-Tibet Border had at last stirred the Indian Government’s conscience. Thus, it raised two army divisions and beefed up air power to round off India’s defence capability in the Eastern Sector. However, the void of that element of autonomous offensive action which must be intrinsic to any defensive strategy, remained unaddressed. That is the deficiency which is sought to be filled by the raising of a ‘Mountain Strike Corps’, the proposal for which had been pending with the Government since some years past; the Depsang La incident in April 2013 may have been the last straw. That was when the Chinese troops set up camp well behind India’s LAC and refused to budge, just as it had done earlier in the Zimithang, Asaphila and Hayuliang areas in Arunachal Pradesh and Demchok area in Ladakh, thus highlighting – for the nth time - the helpless situation that could confront India should Beijing decides to spurn India’s entreaties to vacate intrusion.

According to the official version and its implications, the 17 Corps is under raising at Ranchi, where during the Second World War, General William Slim’s 14^th Army had geared up to win back Burma from the Japanese, and where the Eastern Command Headquarters was located till 1953. Once fully raised, the Corps Headquarters would move to establish itself at Panagarh in West Bengal, another World War II logistic base from where the wars in Burma and China were sustained. The Corps would have two specially structured mountain divisions - 59 & 72 Divisions - headquartered at Panagarh and Pathankot respectively. Besides, there would be two each of independent armoured and infantry brigades, one of each being located in Ladakh in the West and the other two stationed in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh in the East. A Corps being a very large formation of nearly 70,000 troops and vast paraphernalia of weapons, equipment, transport etc., the brigades and units, numbering above 200 odd, would be located variously from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. Another division is reportedly being considered to be orbatted to this Corps in which case the strength would be around 90,000 troops. Of course, there would be many changes affected in the force-structure and their locations as the Corps shapes up in step with its evolving concepts of operations.

The idea of 17 Corps is unique in military history. No field formation has ever been assigned to operational contingencies so fluid, across so distinctly separated frontages and axes spread over 4000 odd kilometres, over freezing deserts of 4300 to 5300 metres altitude where living itself is no less a battle, to prosecute offensive operations as a corollary to strategic defence. These challenges are sought to be tackled over the next seven odd years, to which end elaborate surface and air transportation, communications and base infrastructure are to be created along the border belt. Formations and units are to be located close to air bases and surface communication hubs, expansion of the Air Force transportation, railways and border roads being a step complementary. Even then, it would have to be a formation that is structured to operate at the far ends of tenuous lines of communications, build up and deploy astride rudimentary axes after acclimatising the troops over one to two weeks, and prosecute offensive operations in confrontation with a great military power.

The charter is mind boggling. It is doable of course, but there are complexities and concerns to be dissected in all seriousness and addressed with strategic sagacity. Therefore, a discussion on the core considerations would be in order.

Role and Objectives

The likely role of 17 Corps, within the overall ambit of the nation’s defensive strategy, may be envisaged in light of the preceding discussion. Foremost, it would be to launch in counter-offensive - autonomous or conjoined with other formations - to unhinge any military aggression. Next, it would be to balance out territorial loss in one sector by sallying out in sector(s) of choice, to secure, in part or whole, the Indian version of the boundary alignment. Other roles could be to deploy to limit and destroy the attacking forces, or to invest the adversary’s ingress and to evict it if necessary. In other words, besides its classical counter-offensive role in war, even in ‘no-war’ scenarios when the option of forcible eviction of the intrusion may not be exercised in order to avoid escalation, it would be possible to, firstly, contain the intrusion, and secondly, to counter it by advancing the LAC in some other location – a sort of tit-for-tat.

Proceeding further, the first question to arise in the context of any worthwhile ‘strike’ relates to the possible objectives of significance. Obviously, the objectives would be such as to unhinge PRC’s military aggression, and that purpose would be indicative of the optimum depth of operations. Starting from the Indo-Tibet-Myanmar Tri-junction and ending at the Aksai Chin, the Western periphery of Gongrigabu Qu (River)-Chayu, the Southern periphery of Yarlung Zangbu (Brahmaputra River)-Langquen Zangbu (Sutluj River) and the Eastern periphery of Lingzi Tang-Kailash Range - inclusive of the Western Tibet Highway or its subsidiaries - could be that reckonable depth.

Within the aforementioned belt, one class of objectives could be territorial in nature. Considering the historical legacy, these territorial objectives may be broadly identified as: one, in the North-East, the areas West of Chaya (Rima) and South of Nyngchi, Tsona Dzong, the Chumbi Valley, Khamba Dzong and the Brahmaputra River; two, the Mansarovar (Mapam Yumco)-Sutluj River Belt in the Central Sector; and three, in the Western Sector, the Pangong-Indus (Senge Zangbu) Valleys and the Depsang-Soda Plains. Herein, any of the tactically feasible axes of operations, single or multiple, leading to territories across the LAC or up to and beyond the Indo-Tibet Border may be activated. Indeed, there are many possible areas which may be logistically upgraded within a decade or two to support offensive operations of battle formations ranging in composition from brigade group size to two divisions plus; some of these axes may even be upgraded in just a few year’s time. Notably, while the desolate terrain may not offer classical military objectives, the very act of pulling off territorial riposte would be sufficient to lever India’s cause. Besides, targeting logistic hubs at Nyngchi, Gyangze, Ngari, Rudog and some more, denial of bridges over Yarlung Zangbu and Langquen Zangbu, and breach of the Western Highway or its subsidiaries would definitely tell upon the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) aggression.

The other class of objectives could aim at force-destruction, in which the attacker would be contained in hostile terrain, weakened and then destroyed. Notably, the modest scale of India’s retaliatory strike in comparison to China’s doctrine of massive offensive may not be an issue – just penalising and holding up a giant would dampen his blustery, and therefore could be seen as a politico-military redemption.

Organisational Structure

By far the biggest challenge in raising the 17 Corps would be to structure a potent and cost-efficient force and equipping it for the kind of terrain - and as a corollary the kind of warfare - it would be called upon to master. In that context, recourse to replication of orthodox tactics, structures and equipment profile would offer strong attractions. However, having seen that the force, terrain and mission, all three are unparalleled, adoption of templates would be a grave mistake. For the right organisation to be devised therefore, it would be appropriate to evaluate the functions of the terrain and conceptualise appropriate battle tactics to harness its nuances.

From India’s view point, the terrain is like a funnel, its narrow stem widening into an expanse as the watershed is approached and the Tibetan Plateau unfolds. Resultantly, for nearly three-fourth of the 300-450 kilometres to the watershed, deployment of forces would have to be along relatively narrow, steep, winding and rugged valleys, mostly over single axes, with availability of shunts and laterals few and far between. Obviously, forces would have to move and deploy in echelons over restricted axes till they cross over to the plateau-land whence they would have the option of either diverging or converging combat power to reduce selected objective(s). Indeed, in that remote and desolate expanse of cold high altitude desert, the quantum of force-application would be decided by the logistic capability to field and sustain battle formations. As a corollary, the Corps may need to divide itself to operate astride multiple axes, even across multiple sectors – North-East, Central and West – in varying combinations of divisions and independent brigades to sally out into the plateau-land.

The severe dictates of the terrain attributes may be turned into tactical advantages provided organisation, tactics, equipment and logistics are customised in exclusivity. For example, induction, establishment of logistic bases and movements through the rugged mountains on Indian side of the watershed may well be rendered much safer from air and missile attacks as compared to the enemy on the plateau-land who would be open to detection and interdiction from air-ground operations. Even from the consideration of time and space, the factors would not be adverse towards India when the traversing distances, communications and altitudes are weighed in comparison. Lastly, when well reconnoitred and adapted to, the plateau-land would offer to the Indian forces good scope for ‘behind the line’ operations.

Factoring analogies from past campaigns as well as concurrent tactical concepts, the tactics would hinge upon manoeuvre of multiple combat elements to shape the battle-matrix and followed up with sharp engagements, rather than a replay of mass assaults of the kind propagated before the advent of Revolution in Military Affairs. The objectives could either be communication and logistic hubs, or opponent forces. Indeed, the campaign would follow the eternal practice of what is currently described as ‘Hybrid Warfare’, in which 4th Generation battles would shoot-off from field formations engaged in deliberate offensive campaigns. Of course, dominance in air power would play a singular role in reconnaissance, information war, destruction, interdiction, support to ground operations, troop mobility and logistic sustenance of the war effort.

In the overall context therefore, organisation and equipment for the 17 Corps have to be exclusive. For example, the Corps may be composed of integral scout, reconnaissance and special service units and brigade groups integrated into flexible mix of light and heavy combat arms. It may also have to be structured for transportable, manoeuvrable and higher volume of fire-power and enhanced grouping of support arm elements. Similarly, provision of in-built force-multiplication elements of information warfare - like command and control warfare, reconnaissance, intelligence preparation and deception – and geo-spatial survey teams would be mandatory for the Corps to fulfil its role. Above all, the Corps operations must be tuned to true articulation of air power for manoeuvre, air assault and operational logistics.

Equipment

Needless to emphasise, it would be wise to equip 17 Corps with transportable and manoeuvrable war-like equipment, the loss of mass being compensated by higher scales of holdings and brisk operational momentum. The problem is that the global arms industry has not found it profitable to invest in development of weapons and equipment that answer to the characteristics of high altitude mountain warfare, and therefore most such equipment do not form part of importable inventory. Most of its theatres of war being mountainous, India’s defence planners could have turned this dearth into self-advantageous force-superiority through indigenous research and development. Regrettably, they failed to adapt to that rather obvious need, confined as they were with dated notions about ponderous characteristics of mountain warfare. Equipping the 17 Corps in a manner operationally desired would therefore require specific design modifications, field trials and mix of import and customised production under an overarch of economical viability. Given India’s system of functioning, the officially promulgated time-line of seven to eight years to acquire the right range of weapons and equipment may therefore turn out to be rather tight.

But more than that, optimal equipping of the 17 Corps would be an exercise advantageous only if the Indian military fraternity sets out to assimilate what weapons and equipment that may be readily acquired, and subsume the qualitative shortcomings into specifically devised battle-tactics and operational procedures. In other words, to begin with, it would be wise to foster tactical ingenuity to customise orthodox tactical concepts, and accept redundancies in scales to overcome lesser performance from what military hardware is available at hand. Great armies are known to do so; Indian Army has done so before.

Logistic Springboard

The quantum of force that can be committed to offensive operations through a given sector would be dictated by the extent of sectoral logistic capacity, existence of operational axes therein, and the robustness of these. Besides, final outcome of trans-Himalaya operations would be decided by logistic survivability of that force in a terrain so unliveable. By implication therefore, based on the intended counter-offensive tasks of the 17 Corps, logistic infrastructure would have to be developed, both in terms of sectors and axes of possible operations as well as the quantum of likely force-application along those sectors and axes. This capability would have to be built up in the form of static installations - such as roads, air-heads, administrative bases, dumps, services, survivable-habitat, etc – as well as expendables like ammunition, rations and fuel. Besides, once across the watershed, the burden of logistic sustenance would require to be extended, insulation, portability and mobility being the key determinants in this case. Further, logistic capacity-building would have to be maximised to conform to foreseeable operational contingencies. No doubt, planning and build up of logistic infrastructure calls for intelligent forethought and deliberate time-and-cost intensive undertaking at the national level.

Even if well within India’s engineering capabilities, infrastructure development projects would necessitate deployment of additional construction agencies and enormous funding; these two factors would determine whether the projects would take a decade or double that to be in place. As for the turnover or replacement of expendables, the challenge would be even more complex. Life-cycle stocking and turnover of ammunition in itself would be a tedious and costly commitment. Lastly, in environs so excruciatingly hostile, air-power would have to play a lead role in forward provisioning to the forces for them to survive and fight. The period of seven or eight years for the Corps to be fully operational must have been decided based on such considerations. But as to the implementation, there must be alacrity - India’s traditional elephantine pace would not deliver.

In adopting the above mentioned measures, logistic services to be integrated at unit, formation and theatre levels would have to be freed from the standard templates and reconstructed according to the unique conditions of Himalayan warfare, grouping of detachments, manpower, load handling equipment, mobility and communications being the thrust areas. The orthodox advocates of the ‘teeth-versus-tail’ issue may have to reconcile to larger complements of logistic services if they set their hearts to winning a war in the High-Himalayas.

Notably, not just the raising of a Mountain Strike Corps, it would be the build up of commensurate military infrastructure that would signal to the adversary, the scope and options of India’s military deterrence. To forestall military adventurism from PRC therefore, Indian defence planners would be wise to break-out of the festering stagnation that grips infrastructural development in border areas.

A Larger Strategic Dividend

If there is one matter to which the Indian psyche would never reconcile, the military debacle and political drubbing India got in 1962 from Mao’s China would be that one. No wonder therefore that even when conscious of the People’s Liberation Army’s overwhelming combat power, making China pay heavily for any future aggression remains a matter of faith for all Indians, indeed the Indian Armed Forces. So far this aspiration had been stifled by the void of autonomous offensive capability that, to reiterate, must form part of any worthwhile defensive strategy. Raising of a Mountain Strike Corps will therefore round-off the Indian strategy for the defence of its territories. No doubt, the cabal of India baiters cannot be enthused by the advent of the 17 Corps.

Raising of the 17 Corps is one of the landmark events of India’s military strategy. However, to make the best of this unique military formation, the Indian defence fraternity must prepare to prosecute wars that are exclusively ‘Indian’ in nature – exclusive in terms of tactical concepts, force-composition, and balance in deployment.

Finally, as military history tells us, when marshalled with tactical innovation, a strategic force of the nature of the 17 Corps will invariably offer a range of strategic options which may go beyond its role initially mandated. Articulated with free flow of strategic acumen, this military asset therefore may offer exponential peace dividends.

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Published in Vivek: Issues & Options, July-Aug 2014

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Biden’s India Visit – Points to Ponder Over

Prabhat P Shukla 

(Joint Director, VIF)

Vice President Joe Biden was in India for four days in July, visiting Delhi and Mumbai. The visit got less than the usual level of media exposure than high-level visits from the US normally attract. This was effectively the second visit at this level since Independence, not counting the visit of Hubert Humphrey for Shastri’s funeral, and therefore a purely protocol affair. Then it was Vice President George HW Bush who visited India in 1984. And now, after a gap of almost three decades, Vice President Biden came visiting.

Whatever the reason for the low-key treatment of the visit, it deserved more attention, not so much for the discussions in Delhi, but for a noteworthy speech he delivered in Mumbai. This was made before a gathering of business persons, but covered more than the normal fare at business gatherings.

Two important points were made by Biden, among several others of course, that need attention, both in the public discourse and among the officials dealing with the US. For some time now, the dominant one-word summation of the Indo-US relationship has been stagnation. There appears to be a resignation, on both sides, that nothing more can happen until a new Government takes office in Delhi. This is probably true, but not because of any calculations or policies, or even compulsions – it is more a function of this Government being unable to muster up the intellectual energy to address the emerging opportunities in the India-US relationship.

And that is what the two openings mentioned by Biden are about. The first was about the “rebalance” towards Asia, and the second was about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Both of these require some elucidation.

Biden was up-front in telling the audience that India was an indispensable element in the rebalance. This is something we have been hearing from American leaders for some time now. What is not clear – at least in the public domain or even in Track II exchanges – is what this means in terms of detail or action. But first, it is important also to note that Biden waded into the internal debate here by adding that there was no contradiction between strategic autonomy and strategic partnership. This is an important practical point, because in India, the view seems to dominate that nonalignment – 1.0 or the new, improved version 2.0 – is the key to strategic autonomy.

In point of historical fact, this is not true; Indira Gandhi enhanced her strategic autonomy by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty in 1971. Without that, India would have been restricted in its actions even as events hurtled towards war in the subcontinent. Of course, we all made statements that nonalignment was not affected by the Treaty, but for that brief period of 1971-72, India was aligned with the Soviet Union – and a good thing it was too. The Treaty formally ran on until 1991, but had lost much of its strategic value by the mid-1970’s. Similarly, Nehru was all too willing to jettison nonalignment in the face of the Chinese aggression in 1962, by asking for not just US military equipment, but even personnel to man the weaponry. It was, in fact, so much the subject of controversy within Indian political circles that many of the Americans, who visited India with different missions to extend military and other aid, were plied with this very question – was America bent upon India giving up nonalignment?

To the fear that the US was keen to steal the nonaligned crown jewels under the guise of military assistance, the US Ambassador in India then, JK Galbraith, put his thinking with his characteristic mix of frankness and acerbity. He wrote the following passage to his President and repeated it to any questioner from the Indian press, though this last he did with a little more finesse:

If the Chinese should really come down the mountain in force, there will be more political changes here. Much so-called nonalignment [has already gone] out the window... Popular opinion and our military assistance has worked a further and major impairment. The problem in face of a really serious attack would be how we would react to the prospect of a new, large and extremely expensive ally. I personally hope the Chinese do not force this choice. The Indians are busy worrying about the end of nonalignment. It is we that should be doing the worrying on this. [Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal; letter to President Kennedy on 13 November 1962]

These are home truths that we need to ponder even today, for we seem to be agonising over the same issues. Putting aside the question of nonalignment, what really needs an answer is – just how much autonomy does India have at the moment? It is unable to take even basic measures in defence of its own security in the face of Chinese and even Pakistani provocations. This is what Galbraith meant when he described India as an “extremely expensive” ally. And we really ought not to have too many illusions regarding continuity and change since those times. In the polite terms employed in the Asia-Pacific Region, the code word for the same syndrome is that India needs to be a “net provider of security”. But that can only happen once we have the means and the will to provide for our own security. The bitter reality is that there is not much strategic autonomy we are exercising in producing dossier after dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks, only to have them rejected with disdain by the recipient.

This should be the basis of the dialogue with America on the issue of the rebalance. Whereas America is seeing India as the indispensable partner in adding to the economic and military strength in the Western Pacific, we have serious issues on our land frontiers where we are facing military and sub-conventional pressure simultaneously on two fronts. A serious partnership would need to address these concerns of ours just as much as the concerns of our putative partners in the Pacific.

To spell this out in some detail: one small step that can quite easily be taken by our partners, for which the US would have to provide the lead, would be to adopt clear positions on the Indian territorial claims vis-a-vis both China and Pakistan. In 1962, at the height of the war, the US made a formal declaration through the Embassy in Delhi that it recognised the McMahon Line. It is time now to come down on India’s side in the western sector – Aksai Chin – as well.

Similarly, the Line of Control with Pakistan needs to be extended from beyond where it was left off in 1949 – Pt NJ 9842. It is time for America to extend recognition to the Actual Ground Position Line along the Saltoro Ridge. This is both the legally correct position, and accurate from the viewpoint of the ground reality. And yet, American maps continue to depict the line as joining the current end point of the LoC to the Karakoram Pass – for reasons that nobody can explain.

Understanding on these issues is important for India, and it is to be hoped that it is also important for those in America who believe that India needs to be part of their Asia-Pacific strategy. And to be blunt about it, it is not any atavistic attachment to nonalignment that is holding India back, but the fact that our security concerns are not being addressed in the framework of this pivot.

The second major point in the remarks by Biden concerns the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This proposal has been under discussion for some years now, and most of the large economic players in the region are in it. Japan, Canada, and Mexico have all signed on in recent months, while China is out. The project looks well set to become a reality, though it will take time for the negotiations to be completed.

First, of course, we need to be certain as to what the remarks made by Biden actually portend. The formulation used by Biden falls short of inviting India to join, but that could be a conscious decision to couch it in terms that do not embarrass India into taking a position – just as the pivot appears to be doing. But they were sufficiently clear for the Chinese press to take note and to conclude that India was being invited to join the TPP. Nonetheless, the burden of comment in the Chinese press maintains, India will not abandon its nonalignment and become a strategic ally of America, in part because it also fears that America will abandon the pivot and set up a G2 with China.

None of this is to say that the TPP will make easy progress. And as far as India and America are concerned, we have not even been able to work out an investment treaty so far. Moreover, American positions on outsourcing and visas for Indians are incomprehensible, especially for a country that touts the benefits of free trade. The known clauses of the proposed TPP – for the details are closely held – also suggest that India will have difficulties with some of the commitments on labour standards, on environmental obligations and on intellectual property issues. Granting all of this, it is still at least worth India’s while to take the dialogue forward. Several of the current negotiating members of the TPP began by becoming observers in the dialogue. This should certainly be something for India to consider favourably too.

We also need to understand that our current economic slow-down is not one that will be fixed easily or quickly, notwithstanding the positive assertions being made at the official level. The days when we took a 6-7 percent GDP growth rate as a given are gone, and it will take careful policy planning to get back to a steady and high rate of growth. We are going to need all the leverage that the world’s largest economy can provide. America is clearly fashioning a new economic strategy, the twin pillars of which are the TPP and its mirror in the Atlantic region. The obvious exclusions are the BRICS countries, and they will lose out on economic opportunities if these strategies come to fruition. Not surprisingly, Goldman Sachs, the originator of the term BRIC, has recently stated that the judgement on them was mistaken.

For the doubters, Biden had a word of caution – it is not a good idea to bet against America. This piece of advice is particularly valid for Indian audiences, who have largely convinced themselves that America is yesterday’s story, and China is tomorrow’s. Judging by the kind of writing that we are seeing in the Chinese press, this latter conclusion needs very careful examination. As does the theory of America’s decline – and here Biden’s admonition was on the mark.

Thus, the visit of Vice President has left much of substance for the Indian policy makers to chew on. Although it was largely projected as a visit to prepare for Prime Minister Singh’s visit to the US, it went well beyond this, as it should have done. And to the extent that it was a curtain-raiser for the visit of the Prime Minister, it would be good if our side did have well-argued positions on the issues discussed above. They do not, of course, exhaust the agenda, which is full of urgent and operational matters of concern, not the least to do with Afghanistan. But there are longer-term currents flowing globally and across the Asia-Pacific region that will affect us materially in the coming years. It would be good if we were to move with serious intent on these issues.

Strike Corps for the Mountains: Upgrading India’s Military Strategy from Dissuasion to Deterrence

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

On July 17, 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finally approved the army’s proposal for raising a Strike Corps for the mountains. Though the approval came after considerable delay, it is a pragmatic move that will send an appropriate message across the Himalayas. It will help India to upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence as the Strike Corps, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force (IAF), will provide the capability to launch offensive operations across the Himalayas so as to take the next war into Chinese territory.

The new Strike Corps will comprise two infantry divisions and will be supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades to provide potent firepower, an engineer and air defence brigade each, an aviation brigade and units providing logistics services. The Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army’s manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. The army has already raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and deployed them in Arunachal Pradesh to fill existing gaps in the defences. Some elements of these divisions will act as readily available reserves for the new Strike Corps to add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success. These divisions will also be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations across the Himalayas. Hence, these must be seen as playing a significant supporting role for the Strike Corps.

Territorial Dispute

Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between India and China, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute that is the most disconcerting. Since well before the 1962 border war, China is in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres (sq km) of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. China surreptitiously built its alternative route from Tibet to Xinjiang through this part of Aksai Chin. In addition, in March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in the Shaksgam Valley of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (north of the Siachen Glacier and west of the Karakoram Pass) to China under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through this area China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan.

In India’s north-eastern region, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, even though physically the territory has always been under Indian control. In terms of area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, had publicly reiterated this claim just before President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006. The ambassador single-handedly ensured that his President received a cold shoulder in Delhi and the visit turned out to be inconsequential. Since then, Chinese interlocutors have claimed several times that the Tawang Tract is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. Chinese scholars visiting New Delhi always hint that the merger of the Tawang Tract with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s often stated official position on such issues is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty.

An inherently destabilising situation stems from the fact that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The LAC is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km long boundary between India and Tibet. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor as patrol face-offs are common and could result in an armed clash between patrols. Also, incidents such as the Nathu La border clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung standoff of 1986 can recur. Such incidents have the potential to escalate into another border conflict similar to the war of 1962. Also, over the last decade, China has spent considerable time, effort and resources to upgrade the military infrastructure in Tibet. The PLA has stepped up the number of military training exercises that it has been conducting in Tibet every year. An airborne division, which is a dedicated rapid reaction force, has also practised induction and deployment in Tibet.

Joint Operations during War in the Mountains

Hence, despite the ongoing border talks between India and China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, often punctuated by ugly incidents like the PLA incursion in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in April-May 2013 and repeated incursions into Chumar since then, a limited India-China border conflict cannot be completely ruled. As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is also in the mountains, there is a very high probability that the next conventional conflict involving India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise a new Strike Corps.

In any future war that the armed forces are called upon to fight in the mountains, gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from Indian territory occupied by him will continue to remain important military aims. While these will be infantry predominant operations, no war plan will succeed without achieving massive asymmetries in the application of firepower to destroy the enemy’s combat potential and infrastructure. Therefore, army-IAF operational plans must be fully integrated. These must be jointly evolved, meticulously coordinated and flexible enough to be fine-tuned to exploit fleeting opportunities and to take advantage of the enemy’s reactions during execution. This is especially so in the mountains where the military aims and objectives are limited in scope because of the terrain. Both the Services must work together to create the capabilities that are necessary to take the battle into enemy territory during the next war in the mountains.

As artillery batteries and regiments cannot be moved and re-deployed easily, operations in the mountains place a premium on battlefield air support. Operational mastery over air-to-ground strikes can influence the outcome of tactical battles in the mountains extremely favourably. Firepower ratios can be enhanced to levels necessary for achieving overwhelming superiority only through a major upgradation in the availability of artillery guns, rocket launchers and missiles and offensive air support. A contract for the acquisition of 144 howitzers of 155 mm caliber has been hanging fire for long and needs to be expedited. The new artillery units that will be raised must be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can engage targets deep inside Tibet from deployment areas in the plains. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) need to be acquired in large numbers both by the artillery and the IAF to accurately destroy important targets such as communications centres. The government must also hasten the acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.

Ancillary Support

The peculiarities of terrain and the lack of sufficient road communications, particularly lateral roads that connect the road axes leading to the border, will place heavier demands on helicopter lift for the movement of reserves within divisional and brigade sectors. At the operational level, only an “air assault” formation can turn the tide through vertical envelopment and enable deep offensive operations to be carried out when employed in conjunction with Special Forces. An air assault brigade group inducted across the LoC or LAC by helicopters after the IAF has achieved a favourable air situation can seize an objective in depth. Ideally, each of the infantry divisions of the strike Corps must have one air assault brigade with the requisite air lift. Air-transported operations can also play a major role in influencing the course of the war. During Operation Parakram in 2001-02, almost a complete brigade group was airlifted to Kashmir Valley to enhance the reserves available in 15 Corps for offensive operations. In addition to attack helicopters, which will provide sustained firepower support, a large number of utility helicopters will be required to support offensive operations across the Himalayas, including medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.

The successful launching of Strike Corps operations will depend on the availability of good infrastructure, including double-lane roads with all-weather capability and suitably placed logistics nodes. India’s plans to upgrade the infrastructure in the states bordering China have not been progressing at an adequate pace. In fact, there have been inordinate delays due to the lack of environmental clearances and other reasons. While the new Strike Corps is being raised, equipped and trained, the government must make vigorous efforts to speed up the completion of infrastructure projects. Otherwise, the army will have a new Strike Corps and not be able to launch it effectively.

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Bested by China’s Strategy

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

China’s two-track policy towards India, that of targetting our territory as well as our market is proving effective. The Chinese calculate that they can periodically rile India politically without much cost on the economic front. They want to freeze the border issue but flood our market with their goods.

We have not found an effective counter to this strategy because we are uncertain about where the lines of our security concerns about China and our readiness to pragmatically engage with it economically should intersect. Consequently, even as the provocations from China increase so do our trade relations, which is impolitic, more as our trade deficit with China is growing.

The Chinese leaders have clearly stated that the border issue will not be resolved for a very long time. Logically, this means that they do not see the talks between the Special Representatives producing results in the foreseeable future. Yet, the talks continue and the impression created by the Indian side primarily for its domestic opinion that progress is being made.

Contradiction

The Chinese are served well by the contradiction between their positions that they see no results from border talks till the next generation and yet continuing negotiations. By this they shift the onus of progress on India. The sub-text of their position is that India is not ready to settle the issue by accommodating China’s fair and reasonable demands, but that China can wait patiently till India makes up its mind on required concessions. By maintaining the facade of a dialogue, they seem open to a solution and therefore appear less unreasonable to a section of our body-politic that wants better ties with China. The talks also provide political cover to work for expanding trade ties.

Putting a map on e-passports that shows Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as well as disputed South China Sea islands as part of China well reflects China’s dual strategy. While staking their political position even more firmly through such unilateral actions, the Chinese preach, disingenuously, that differences should be resolved through dialogue. When a major power like China with growing military strength asserts a position on extremely sensitive and difficult to resolve territorial issues, stepping back later to forge a compromise becomes even less likely.

This additional Chinese provocation comes when tensions in the South China Sea have already erupted because of China’s territorial assertiveness there. It now thinks it has acquired enough political, economic and even military clout to disregard adverse reactions from neighbours. China is compelling weaker neighbours to adjust to unpleasant realities.

Just as South Asia has divided views on China which China exploits to advance its interests there, in the ASEAN group too divisions have surfaced on how to deal with China’s territorial claims, which China is manipulating to prevent a united ASEAN front from being forged against it. Actually, for ASEAN members generally, China is too powerful and too geographically close a reality to take on frontally. This is so even when some of these countries have military arrangements with US and the latter is “pivoting” towards Asia to counter China strategically.

India

Even the huge volumes of two-way trade and investment, on the rise after the 2010 China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, have not prevented China from following a political track that is contrary to the logic of the economic track. This carries a lesson for us, both as regards our developing economic ties with China as well as US role in limiting China’s territorial ambitions.

India is well aware of Chinese claims on its territory. China does not need to spell them out periodically for our better comprehension. We are discussing them confidentially at the level of specially designated representatives. Rather than, as common sense would dictate, drawing attention away from these differences if the intention is to build a practical relationship in other areas bilaterally and multilaterally, China insists on provoking India (and others) as illustrated by its latest passport stratagem.

India is reluctant to react strongly to such provocations because it does not want to whip up negative feelings against China already pervasive in its strategic and media circles. Actually, India gives explanations for Chinese nettling which the Chinese themselves do not offer- as, for example, that Chinese intrusions occur because of differing perceptions of the two sides of the Line of Actual Control, which is an exculpatory discourse. We also see utility in cooperating with China in international fora on specific issues for which the atmosphere will be vitiated by slanging matches with China. We are aware that overt tensions with China only constrain our foreign policy choices vis a vis other powers. China as the stronger power is not reasoning in a similar manner and therefore feels less need for restraint.

Need

In response to the latest Chinese provocation, India, by affixing maps that depict our boundaries on visas we issue to the Chinese, has reacted with commendable imagination. But then, our Army Chief is quoted as saying that we have a perfect relationship with China- which is not the case. Our Naval Chief, who gets trapped by the media into saying that his navy is prepared to protect our investments in the South China Sea is called to order, though the statement he made would not have been necessary if China were not threatening foreign ships in its unilaterally defined maritime jurisdiction. In the wake of our Strategic Economic Dialogue with China we have begun talking about buying bullet trains from China. We are unable to handle coherently either the negatives or the positives of our relationship with China because we have not yet mastered the steps for dancing with the dragon.

India-China Relations are Marked by Strategic Stability, Tactical Aggressiveness

Gurmeet Kanwal

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Relations between India and China have been fairly stable at the strategic level. Economic relations are much better now than these have been in the past. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly even though the balance of trade is skewed in China’s favour. 

The two countries have been cooperating in international fora like WTO talks and climate change negotiations. There has even been some cooperation in energy security. However, at the tactical level, China has been exhibiting a markedly assertive political, diplomatic and military attitude. Instability in the security relationship, in particular, has the potential to act as a spoiler; and, it is this relationship that will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains. The major cause for instability in the China-India relationship is the half-century old territorial and boundary dispute over which the two countries fought a border war in 1962.

The pointers to the future are not particularly positive. China continues to be in physical occupation of large areas of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir. On the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh in J&K, China is in possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres of territory since the mid-1950s. In addition, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory to China in 1963 in the Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Close to this area, the Chinese built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan. China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory in the eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Southern Tibet. 

Chinese interlocutors have repeatedly claimed that the Tawang Tract, in particular, is part of Tibet and that the merger of this area with Tibet is non-negotiable. In 2005, India and China had agreed on “guiding principles and parameters” for a political solution to the territorial dispute. One important parameter was that “settled populations will not be disturbed”. In the case of Tawang, the Chinese have gone back on their commitment. If such errant behavior continues, India will find it difficult to accept Chinese assurances of peaceful resolution of the territorial dispute at face value.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. In fact, despite the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) signed with the Chinese in 1993 and the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field signed in 1996, border guards of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have transgressed the LAC repeatedly to intrude into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. They have even objected to Indian road construction efforts and the presence of Indian graziers at their traditional grazing grounds. To be fair to the Chinese, they too claim similar transgressions by Indian patrols.

Patrol face-offs are commonplace and usually end with both the sides warning each other to go back to their own territory. While no such incident has resulted in a violent clash so far, the probability of such an occurrence is high. Demarcation of the LAC without prejudice to each other’s position on the territorial dispute would be an excellent confidence building measure but little progress has been made in 15 rounds of talks between the two Special Representatives, including the January 2012 meting at New Delhi. Under the circumstances, China’s intransigence in exchanging maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the western and the eastern sectors is difficult to understand. 

The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the PLA is modernising at a rapid pace due to the double-digit annual growth in the Chinese defence budget while India’s military modernisation plans continue to remain mired in red tape. China’s negotiating strategy is to stall resolution of the dispute till the Chinese are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they can then dictate terms. The rapidly blossoming strategic partnership between China and Pakistan is also a major cause for concern. Chinese leaders have proclaimed that their friendship with Pakistan is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.” China has also guaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

During any future conflict with either China or Pakistan – even though the probability is low, India will have to contend with a two-front situation as each is likely to collude militarily with the other – a situation for which the Indian armed forces are not prepared. Hence, it is in India’s interest to strive for the early resolution of the territorial dispute with China so that India has only one major military adversary to contend with.