Showing posts with label Hu Jintao. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hu Jintao. Show all posts

Friday, August 22, 2014

Chinese PLA Modernisation: Perspectives and Issues

Lt Gen (Retd) JS Bajwa

“Build strong National Defence and powerful Armed Forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the need of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s modernisation drive.
-President Hu Jintao At the 18th National Congress of CPC March 2013.

Armed forces of a nation constitute an element of National Power in synergy with diplomacy, economic development, education, technological base and Research and Development (R&D), industry and others. A distinguishing feature of China’s modernisation mission has been the national pursuit of “Comprehensive Power”. They wisely learnt that one key lesson from studying the experience of other previous powers - genuine global powers possess multidimensional strengths.

Chinese scholars and officials have used the term “Peaceful Rise” to describe China’s foreign policy to counter fears about its growing economic and political might. However, the ‘Rise’ has proved controversial as it has fuelled a perception that China is a threat to the existing established world order. Also, ‘Rise’ implies that others will decline in a relative sense. In the 2004 session of BFA (Boao Forum for Asia), President Hu Jintao used the phrase “Peaceful Development” which since has been the preferred term. ‘Development’ suggests that China’s advance can bring others along. The normative aspect of power being equally important as it is about projecting ‘soft power’ and relies primarily on resources of non-military nature. Recently Joseph Nye and Ernest Wilson developed the concept of ‘Smart Power’ which combines elements of soft and hard power to achieve foreign policy goals.

The past three decades of China’s economic rise has witnessed a similar and parallel rise of the Defence Budget translating into a phenomenal modernisation of the Armed Forces. The Defence Budget has risen at par and over a period at a higher rate than the economic growth rate. It has also remained steady at over five percent of total Central Government spending. The 2014 Government released data on Defence Budget indicates a 12.2 percent rise over the previous year (2014 - $131.6 billion; 2013 - $112.2 billion). There, thus, remains a concern of China’s potential for violent conflict with other states especially over territory.

In this context, it may be worthwhile to historically understand the circumstances when governments have exercised the option of war as an instrument of its foreign policy:-


(a) War is chosen even though no specific conflict of interest with another state or cacus belli may exist, only uncertainty about the future.
(b) Preventive Wars: Such a war is defined as ‘a war fought in order to avoid the risks of war under worsening circumstances later’.
(c) Territorial conflicts are dynamic contests. States actively compete to strengthen their claims in a dispute usually by improving their position in the local military balance.
(d) In territorial disputes, states will be able to match each other’s moves and maintain their relative balance and positions. Inaction could be more costly in the long run than using force in the short run.

The political, diplomatic and military moves initiated by China along India’s northern boundary reflect in substantive terms the possibility of China resorting to exercising the aforementioned options. China has used military force more often over territory than over any other type of foreign policy issue. A state may use military force in a territorial dispute not because of the importance of the land being contested but because of the need to invest in a general reputation for toughness. Such an option with respect to China should not be considered hypothetical or a mere figment of imagination.

However, it may appear contradictory that China’s historical record of dealing with territorial disputes has been of cooperation and compromise. From 1960-1964, out of eight disputes, China concluded boundary treaties with six of its neighbours. Similarly, from 1990-1999, nine additional boundary agreements were signed. Interestingly, the compromise periods correspond closely with the periods of ‘acute regime insecurity for China’s leadership. China is very sensitive to any eruption of ethnic revolt and this constitutes the first type of internal threat linked with compromise. Chinese military publications link the defence of its frontiers against external threats with internal political stability. The uncertainty of Tibet and the possibility of ethnic unrest will always be held against India by the Chinese government.

While China has not explicitly enunciated a grand strategic design, certain key elements of its national strategy are seminal. First, safeguard national security. Second, promote national development. Third, secure strategic objectives of China’s national rejuvenation and development. China undertook to build and cultivate power comprehensively across a variety of spheres: economic, science, technology, education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy and other sectors. The Chinese grasped the idea that power is comprehensive and integrative and not atomistic or indivisible.

Keeping this as the backdrop, China took on the modernisation of its armed forces in a phased manner. The stage was set by diplomatically creating an environment of peace and tranquillity along the borders thus freeing the Forces for modernisation. The first major downsizing was undertaken with the surplus manpower diverted to form the PAPF (People’s Armed Police Force) and Border Guards. The modernisation drive was planned and executed to lay a solid foundation by 2010, thereafter make major progress around 2020 and finally reach the goal of building armed forces capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21st Century – 2050. Herein, priority was accorded for the expansion and modernisation of the PLAN. The PLAAF, Second Artillery Corps, and Ground Forces came in subsequent order. An RMA with Chinese characteristics was conceptualised as follows:-


(a) Coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability.
(b) Strong military through science and technology.
(c) Strategic project for talented people.
(d) Improve levels of scientific management.
(e) Develop military theories in an innovative spirit.
(f) Downsize and restructure forces.
(g) Military exchange and cooperation in line with foreign policy.


The PLA Ground Forces are focused on speeding informationisation of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building ‘Pockets of Excellence’ (POE’s) by equipping and restructuring Rapid Reaction Forces/Units, Army Aviation, light mechanised units and information countermeasure units. The inclusion of conventional role capability with the Second Artillery corps has been a significant development in PLA modernisation. With the induction of agile and efficient launch systems, precision strike capability by conventional missiles and cruise missiles the potential of this force at the operational level is now significant. The concurrent technological trends which include terminal guidance for enhanced accuracy, payload variation viz. fragmentation, penetrating, thermo baric, EMP and sub-munitions enable target specific configuration. Along with the well developed infrastructure and its extensive network in Tibet, the reach of this force across India’s northern frontline has serious operational implications for India.

PLA’s doctrine has evolved along with its modernisation. It has been the principle ‘driver’ for force structure, personnel recruitment, military education, training regimes, hardware needs, research and development, weapon procurement and operational strategy. Doctrine, technology and threat have interacted in shaping PLA’s posture over time. The doctrinal thinking and planning enunciates operational principles which includes such concepts as mobility, attrition, annihilation, close or deep-depth defence, layered defence, pre-emptive strikes, asymmetrical warfare, trans-regional operations, offensive operations and other general concepts. The War Zone Concept (WZC) has emerged as an operational-based doctrine and involves all services of the PLA. WZC, simplified, is the doctrine for conducting a limited war under high-tech informationalised conditions. The major characteristic of WZC doctrine is what is referred to as Trans-Regional Support Operations (TRSO) which involves deployment and employment POE’s from other Military Area Commands (MAC) into a possible conflict zone. The mobile nature of the RRU’s and their effectiveness would constitute an indirect forward presence and thus contribute to creation of local and temporary superiority in psychological terms. This, in itself, is presumed, would deter provocation and hence prevent any situation from escalating into a conflict.

China has made no secret of its ambitious space goals. In 2003, it independently launched a man into orbit. In November 2011, it successfully docked two robotic spacecraft in Earth orbit. The quest for manned space station is planned to be put up and made running by 2020. Plans for landing man on the moon remains on its space programme agenda. Currently China has 10 Beidou (Big Dipper) satellites providing a home grown satellite navigation system. By 2020, it will have 35 satellites for the same. In January 2007, China stunned the strategic community when it shot to pieces its own weather satellite with a missile demonstrating an unexpected lethal capability acquired to dominate space. It is now developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. China’s ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies from China’s manned and lunar programmes as well as technologies and methods developed to detect and track space debris. A report dated May 3, 2014 stated that China had destroyed the ‘control chip’ of a Japanese spy satellite with a secret weapon (probably an EMP of several megawatts strength fired for one minute at the satellite). It was reported that this satellite was tracking the trial flight of a J-20 stealth fighter over mainland China. The space programme has enabled China to setup advanced space-based C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and Targeting capability. Presently, China has eight surveillance satellites in orbit besides earth resource satellites and remote sensing satellites.

The PLA is investing heavily in Computer Network Operations (CNO). China’s CNO concept includes computer network attack, computer network exploitation and computer network defence. In addition, PLA has established Information Warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks as well as devised tactics and defence measures to protect friendly computers systems and networks. Since 2002, PLA has been creating militia units comprising personnel from commercial Information Technology sector and academia.

Cyber operations are planned to be launched as psychological warfare tools. In 2005, PLA began to incorporate CNO into its military exercises primarily as first strikes against enemy networks. It recently established a new information support and safeguarding base in July 2010 indicating its emphasis on cyber operations. Its cyber espionage and warfare includes:-

(a) Denying and limiting use of space based assets by adversaries in times of crisis or conflict.
(b) Built capability of deploying direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon.
(c) Counter space measures including jamming, laser and microwave.
(d) Employing CNO as a tool to gain strategic intelligence.


As China’s rise continues and capabilities of its Armed Forces increases manifold, China is likely to be less tolerant to impediments or perceived hindrances of any sort in its single minded pursuit of its goals and in securing its national interests. China as a gargantuan economic and military power may continue to deny hegemony but it will inevitably employ some form of economic and diplomatic coercion against its smaller neighbours and military coercion in other cases when it perceives its interests threatened. Consequently its smaller neighbours will seek to hedge in order to maintain an element of independence and balance the power equation. Otherwise these countries will end “paying tribute” to the seat of power in Beijing as of yore. Does India need to bandwagon with likeminded nations? Making a choice will be a major strategic decision.

India needs to define its strategic goals it seeks to achieve along with clearly pronounced time lines. The ‘Financial Year’ syndrome is certainly not suited to long term strategic planning. Future wars will be more than just bullets and bombs – these can be said to be the ‘hard element’ of hard power. Surveillance, IW, CNO and space domination are the new and critical ‘soft elements’ of hard power which will have a decisive role in the outcome of any future conflict. While India makes progress in the accumulation of assets in the category of hard elements of hard power, it is woefully lacking in the research and development of critical soft elements of hard power, making India strategically vulnerable. Infrastructure along the Northern boundary of India is a serious deficiency. India has been extremely cautious in its approach to building roads in the border areas. Tunnelling, which would have been much more economical in the long run has not been undertaken in any sector.

In addition, there is a weakness in institutionalised future planning, both nationally and within the Armed Forces. The Perspective Planning in the Army needs to look at war fighting doctrine, future logistics, harnessing technology with equipment profile and organisational structures coordinated under one directorate. There is need to focus on comprehensive National Security Strategy which should be the main feeder to NSAB (National Security Advisory Board) / NSA (National Security Adviser). Once the National Defence University is set up, the institutions dealing with defence and strategic affairs, including those dealing with economy, foreign affairs and industry, should be incorporated. Intelligence, surveillance including electronic surveillance (National Intelligence Agency) are loosely related in their functioning. CERT-IN (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) presently under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is not a satisfactory arrangement as it functions like any other office while it requires being vigilant and responsive 24x7x365. Therefore, these elements have to be coordinated under one agency to report to NSCB/NSA.

India needs to plan as a future power and exit out of the slumbering mould of merely reacting to situations that seem to take the Government by surprise ever so often.

(The article is an updated version of the paper presented at the Seminar on Engaging China: Opportunity and Challenges, organised by the VIF on June 26, 2014)
(The authors is a Delhi-based Defence Analyst)

Published Date: 7th August 2014, Image source: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Recent Political Developments in China

Growing signs of ideological hardening

Ambassador PP Shukla 
(Joint Director, VIF)

Back in the days of the Soviet Union, readers of a nationalist newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossiya [Soviet Russia] were exposed to a full-page article by one Nina Andreeva, a chemistry teacher at the Leningrad Technology Institute. The article appeared in March 1988, at the height of the tussle between Mikhail Gorbachev and his opponents in the Soviet Communist Party. The title of Andreeva’s article was “I Cannot Compromise my Principles”, and it was an open attack on the direction that Gorbachev – though without naming him - and his supporters were taking the Party and the country. It created a stir within the Party and became a rallying point for all those who felt that the policies of the westernising neo-liberals were leading the country towards non-socialist pluralism – by implication, to the end of the socialist state. Events were to prove her right, but this was not the response to the article then.

The reason for bringing up this now-obscure event from Soviet history is the appearance of a similar article in the Chinese press. On 1 August, Xinhua carried an article in Chinese under the title “If China Collapses, It Will Be Worse than the Soviet Union”. Before analysing the article and its import, the context needs to be set out. It is actually quite curious how obsessed the Chinese leaders are with the fate of the USSR. Perhaps nowhere else in the world, including in Russia itself, is there the same degree of attention to the developments leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union as in China.

To illustrate, here is a quote from Xi Jinping’s speech at the time of his Southern Tour in December 2012 – he was then already Party leader, but had not yet become President.
Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and beliefs had been shaken. In the end, ‘the ruler’s flag over the city tower’ changed overnight. It’s a profound lesson for us! To dismiss the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historic nihilism, and it confuses our thoughts and undermines the Party’s organizations on all levels. 
Why must we stand firm on the Party’s leadership over the military? ...because that’s the lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union where the military was depoliticized, separated from the Party and nationalized, the Party was disarmed.
In short, as recently as December 2012, the top leader in China was discussing the collapse of the USSR, and presumably drawing lessons for China from that experience. And the key elements he identifies are the lack of ideological commitment at the top, and the fact that the Armed Forces had been de-politicised – a clumsy word that one Soviet Defence Minister had trouble even pronouncing.

The important thing is that it seems the Chinese leadership is still concerned that it too might go the Soviet way. To the outsider, China is a success story par excellence, but apparently, the reality – at least as perceived by the Party - is more shaky.

And now, to turn to the content of the Xinhua commentary: not surprisingly, it spends most of the time on the collapse of the Soviet Union, and describes in detail what hardships befell the country as a result of the collapse. The GDP fell by more than half; its access to and control over the seas, built up over centuries, was lost; the people were reduced to begging, and war heroes were forced to sell their medals; the country is now reduced to selling its natural resources to get by. It goes on to refer to so stern a critic of the Communist Party as Solzhenitsyn as saying that Stalin and the Party were good for the country, and Russia after the break-up was in a worse plight.

In an interesting side-swipe at India, Xinhua suggests that, since China does not have the resources that Russia has, it will, following a collapse, fall below India in terms of living standards!

The commentary dwells a little more on the collapse of the USSR, and concludes that China will suffer a worse fate if it collapses. It argues that China was enslaved and occupied by foreign powers in the past, and it was only the Communist Party that gave China back its standing. The elderly are enjoying a stable old age, and the children have all the amenities they need – all thanks to the Communist Party. And all this would be lost if China were to collapse.

The solution to the danger of the collapse is to contain the micro-bloggers who apparently seek to copy the western system – the “non-socialist pluralism” of Nina Andreeva’s article. It appears that these bloggers reach millions of recipients, mostly sympathetic to their message of constitutionalism, and of western-style democracy with greater individual freedom. The author concludes that he would allow such a change only over his dead body.

The important point of inquiry is why there has been this kind of writing, especially in the public domain. To understand this, there is another strand in the current Chinese discourse that needs to be focussed on. This is “constitutionalism” – the notion that the Constitution of the country is paramount, and that the provisions on individual rights and freedoms need to be upheld and exercised. It is this kind of constitutionalism that Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have criticised for having separated the Armed Forces from the Party in the Soviet Union. [Yes, all three have talked about the collapse of the Soviet Union.] And this is what they are clear shall not be permitted to happen in China.

Constitutionalism is the very banner that some in the Chinese system are raising. The Southern Weekly, a “liberal” paper that comes out in Guangdong, had written an editorial at the beginning of 2013, under the title “China’s Dream, the Dream of Constitutionalism”. This was a reference to the slogan of the “China Dream” coined by Xi Jinping himself, and the editorial was thus filling its own content into the slogan. As it turned out, the content was unacceptable, and the censors changed the title, removing any reference to constitutionalism.

For good measure, there has also been a spate of articles in the Chinese press on the dangers of constitutionalism. The People’s Daily has taken the lead on this and ran three articles in August alone attacking this concept. One of them went so far as to say that the real aim was to overthrow the socialist system and oust the leaders of the Party. In another context, the People’s Daily accused “spies in the higher echelons of the Party” of colluding with foreign enemies.

This kind of fevered writing on a hypothetical event such as the collapse of China or the upholding of the Constitution would definitely indicate a graver source of concern than a couple of editorials in the regional media on the need to uphold the Constitution. There is, of course, the fact that the economy is in serious trouble, and many are beginning openly to express doubts even about the reliability of Chinese growth figures. We know that Premier Li Keqiang, before he rose to the present post, had himself told visitors that many of the statistics were “man-made”, and that he himself did not take them at face value. China’s public finances are another mess in the economy, and one that will lead to major difficulties.

Similarly, there are a growing number of incidents of unrest in the country. In 2012, the number of such incidents rose to 200,000, which must surely be hard to manage. This would also tie in with the remarks made by Xi about the importance of the Armed Forces being loyal to the Party, and not being allowed to be “nationalised” – ie, to become loyal to the State, rather than to the Party.

As to the Constitutionalists, they pose an unusual type of challenge to the Party establishment. After all, the present Constitution was adopted only thirty years ago, and the anniversary of the event was celebrated last December by the Party itself. It becomes very difficult to argue that upholding its provisions is in any way harmful to the country. And yet, that has been the burden of the attacks on those supporting the Constitution – the People’s Daily declared that Constitutionalism was incompatible with socialism! And yet, both Xi and Li have referred to the Constitution as the supreme law, even after they assumed office.

It would appear that a combination of difficulties is closing in on the Party leaders – economic in the first place, but also social and political. Of this last, the Bo Xilai episode is the most visible manifestation, and it is not yet clear what its implications will be. What does appear to be happening is that there is some unhappiness in the Party over the treatment of the entire episode, and some of the angry charges that are reflected in the writings mentioned above are a response to that. There was also a sense in the run-up to the CPC Congress last November and immediately afterwards, that Xi was a “reformer” of the kind that his father was, and that many people, in China and outside, are looking for. He himself has given little ground for expecting any such change from him, and his remarks on the fall of the USSR, quoted above, were made within weeks of taking over as Party leader. Perhaps there is a fear among the traditional elites in the Party that the pressure for change in the face of the mounting difficulties could lead to some experimentation in the direction of political pluralism. The opponents of this are moving pre-emptively to head off any such change.

For India, these are significant issues to sort through, because such internal pressures frequently affect the foreign policy as well. The emphasis on the role of the Armed Forces in preserving the system is particularly worthy of note. This could be linked to the growing aggressiveness we are seeing on the part of the Chinese forces in the border areas. If the trends towards ideological hardening discussed above were to continue, or worsen, it is likely that tensions on the border along the LAC will also worsen – with unpredictable consequences.


It is to be hoped, against hope really, that our defences are being looked to, for they need to be upgraded, and the earlier the better. History shows that instability in China can spill over into neighbouring countries. Forewarned is forearmed.

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Strike Corps for the Mountains: Upgrading India’s Military Strategy from Dissuasion to Deterrence

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 
Visiting Fellow, VIF

On July 17, 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finally approved the army’s proposal for raising a Strike Corps for the mountains. Though the approval came after considerable delay, it is a pragmatic move that will send an appropriate message across the Himalayas. It will help India to upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence as the Strike Corps, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force (IAF), will provide the capability to launch offensive operations across the Himalayas so as to take the next war into Chinese territory.

The new Strike Corps will comprise two infantry divisions and will be supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades to provide potent firepower, an engineer and air defence brigade each, an aviation brigade and units providing logistics services. The Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army’s manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. The army has already raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and deployed them in Arunachal Pradesh to fill existing gaps in the defences. Some elements of these divisions will act as readily available reserves for the new Strike Corps to add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success. These divisions will also be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations across the Himalayas. Hence, these must be seen as playing a significant supporting role for the Strike Corps.

Territorial Dispute

Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between India and China, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute that is the most disconcerting. Since well before the 1962 border war, China is in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres (sq km) of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. China surreptitiously built its alternative route from Tibet to Xinjiang through this part of Aksai Chin. In addition, in March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in the Shaksgam Valley of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (north of the Siachen Glacier and west of the Karakoram Pass) to China under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through this area China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan.

In India’s north-eastern region, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, even though physically the territory has always been under Indian control. In terms of area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, had publicly reiterated this claim just before President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006. The ambassador single-handedly ensured that his President received a cold shoulder in Delhi and the visit turned out to be inconsequential. Since then, Chinese interlocutors have claimed several times that the Tawang Tract is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. Chinese scholars visiting New Delhi always hint that the merger of the Tawang Tract with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s often stated official position on such issues is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty.

An inherently destabilising situation stems from the fact that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The LAC is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km long boundary between India and Tibet. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor as patrol face-offs are common and could result in an armed clash between patrols. Also, incidents such as the Nathu La border clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung standoff of 1986 can recur. Such incidents have the potential to escalate into another border conflict similar to the war of 1962. Also, over the last decade, China has spent considerable time, effort and resources to upgrade the military infrastructure in Tibet. The PLA has stepped up the number of military training exercises that it has been conducting in Tibet every year. An airborne division, which is a dedicated rapid reaction force, has also practised induction and deployment in Tibet.

Joint Operations during War in the Mountains

Hence, despite the ongoing border talks between India and China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, often punctuated by ugly incidents like the PLA incursion in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in April-May 2013 and repeated incursions into Chumar since then, a limited India-China border conflict cannot be completely ruled. As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is also in the mountains, there is a very high probability that the next conventional conflict involving India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise a new Strike Corps.

In any future war that the armed forces are called upon to fight in the mountains, gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from Indian territory occupied by him will continue to remain important military aims. While these will be infantry predominant operations, no war plan will succeed without achieving massive asymmetries in the application of firepower to destroy the enemy’s combat potential and infrastructure. Therefore, army-IAF operational plans must be fully integrated. These must be jointly evolved, meticulously coordinated and flexible enough to be fine-tuned to exploit fleeting opportunities and to take advantage of the enemy’s reactions during execution. This is especially so in the mountains where the military aims and objectives are limited in scope because of the terrain. Both the Services must work together to create the capabilities that are necessary to take the battle into enemy territory during the next war in the mountains.
As artillery batteries and regiments cannot be moved and re-deployed easily, operations in the mountains place a premium on battlefield air support. Operational mastery over air-to-ground strikes can influence the outcome of tactical battles in the mountains extremely favourably. Firepower ratios can be enhanced to levels necessary for achieving overwhelming superiority only through a major upgradation in the availability of artillery guns, rocket launchers and missiles and offensive air support. A contract for the acquisition of 144 howitzers of 155 mm caliber has been hanging fire for long and needs to be expedited. The new artillery units that will be raised must be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can engage targets deep inside Tibet from deployment areas in the plains. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) need to be acquired in large numbers both by the artillery and the IAF to accurately destroy important targets such as communications centres. The government must also hasten the acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.

Ancillary Support

The peculiarities of terrain and the lack of sufficient road communications, particularly lateral roads that connect the road axes leading to the border, will place heavier demands on helicopter lift for the movement of reserves within divisional and brigade sectors. At the operational level, only an “air assault” formation can turn the tide through vertical envelopment and enable deep offensive operations to be carried out when employed in conjunction with Special Forces. An air assault brigade group inducted across the LoC or LAC by helicopters after the IAF has achieved a favourable air situation can seize an objective in depth. Ideally, each of the infantry divisions of the strike Corps must have one air assault brigade with the requisite air lift. Air-transported operations can also play a major role in influencing the course of the war. During Operation Parakram in 2001-02, almost a complete brigade group was airlifted to Kashmir Valley to enhance the reserves available in 15 Corps for offensive operations. In addition to attack helicopters, which will provide sustained firepower support, a large number of utility helicopters will be required to support offensive operations across the Himalayas, including medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.

The successful launching of Strike Corps operations will depend on the availability of good infrastructure, including double-lane roads with all-weather capability and suitably placed logistics nodes. India’s plans to upgrade the infrastructure in the states bordering China have not been progressing at an adequate pace. In fact, there have been inordinate delays due to the lack of environmental clearances and other reasons. While the new Strike Corps is being raised, equipped and trained, the government must make vigorous efforts to speed up the completion of infrastructure projects. Otherwise, the army will have a new Strike Corps and not be able to launch it effectively.


Friday, May 3, 2013

No First Use Nuclear Doctrine with “Chinese Characteristics”


Dr. Adityanjee

Introduction

Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use” (NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test, China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011.

Recently, there is some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper. However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning. Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding your time, the current (5th) generation of China’s leaders are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo).

The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27th 2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons essentially as “paper tigers”.

Fundamentals of NFU Commitment

Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently, only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine.

An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components:
  1. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
  2. Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
  3. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
  4. Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario, it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern sector because China will consider this use not against any other country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province. Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile, it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix.

Chinese Nuclear Arsenal

China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates, since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce 1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave 800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained.

Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions

Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April 2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic (read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts. China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”.
Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD system.

Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line because the government controls their funding and hence independent viewpoints are not possible.

In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep its nuclear capabilities fully opaque.

China’s 2013 Defence White Paper

For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the international community.

Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed piece in Asia Times Online on April 24th 2013 when she called for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US Strategic Command by August 15th 2013 to describe the Chinese underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces. Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds.

Implications for India

Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment. Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of China.