No First Use Nuclear Doctrine with “Chinese Characteristics”

Dr. Adityanjee

Introduction

Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use” (NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test, China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011.

Recently, there is some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper. However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning. Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding your time, the current (5^th) generation of China’s leaders are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo).

The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27^th 2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons essentially as “paper tigers”.

Fundamentals of NFU Commitment

Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently, only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine.

An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components:

1. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
2. Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
3. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
4. Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons

NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario, it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern sector because China will consider this use not against any other country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province. Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile, it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix.

Chinese Nuclear Arsenal

China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates, since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce 1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave 800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained.

Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions

Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April 2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic (read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts. China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”.

Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD system.

Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line because the government controls their funding and hence independent viewpoints are not possible.

In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep its nuclear capabilities fully opaque.

China’s 2013 Defence White Paper

For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the international community.

Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed piece in Asia Times Online on April 24^th 2013 when she called for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US Strategic Command by August 15^th 2013 to describe the Chinese underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces. Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds.

Implications for India

Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment. Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of China.

Indo-US Relations and Balance of Power

Kanwal Sibal

Member Advisory Board, VIF

The direction of our strategic ties with the US has come under renewed focus with US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s visit to India on June 5-6 and the third round of the Strategic dialogue between India and the US at the Foreign Minister level at Washington on June 13.

During his visit to Delhi after visiting the US Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii, Singapore, Cam Ranh Bay and Hanoi in Vietnam- an itinerary that speaks for itself- Panetta spoke about the new US defense strategy of “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific region by expanding US military partnerships and presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. A few days earlier at the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore he announced that the US will shift 60% of its naval fleet, including as many as six aircraft carriers, to the Pacific Ocean by 2020. The Pentagon has also referred to India as a link India between East and West Asia and a net provider of security from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan and beyond.

The US seems to have concluded that there is no political down-side to identifying India openly as a crucial element in this new defence strategy. In its judgment neither the Indian government nor the majority of public opinion will recoil at being so visibly enlisted as a defence partner of the US in its expanded military role in Asia. The US is aware of the degree of controversy generated in India by the Indo-US nuclear deal, in terms of its ramifications for India’s strategic independence. It is cognizant of Indian sensitivities about unwanted messages going out to Russia and China from the degree of India-US defence engagement. Yet, Panetta has not hesitated in Delhi to describe India, with its size and military capability, as a lynchpin in this US strategy.

General Dempsey, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has subsequently underlined India’s enormously important geostrategic location on the sea lanes of communication from the Mid-east to the Pacific. Noting that India will soon have the second largest fleet of in the world with an expanded reach and ability to rapidly deploy, Panetta sees an India-US partnership in assuring a peaceful Indian Ocean region, besides seeing India’s voice and involvement in Southeast forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus as being critical to prevent and manage regional tensions.

Panetta spoke publicly in Delhi about India-US defence relationship becoming more strategic, practical and collaborative through regular defence policy exchanges, military exercises that cover all functional areas of naval warfare, prospects for advanced R&D, sharing of new technologies and joint production of defence equipment, as well as defence sales and intelligence sharing.

In understanding the import of these statements one needs to sift reality from future possibilities. Military exercises undoubtedly constitute a very substantial element of growing India-US defence ties, but these precede the declaration of a strategic partnership between the two countries. US defence sales to India have grown from virtually nothing to US $ 8 billion in the last five years or so, which is remarkable progress. It is doubtful if the content of defence policy exchanges with the US is substantial, not the least because the integration of defence and foreign policy, unlike in the US, is inadequate in India, which is a big handicap in such discussions with a global power like the US. Collaboration in advanced R&D, sharing of new technologies and joint production will be, in Panetta’s own words, “over the long term”. He has acknowledged that moving ahead will require hard work and breaking down bureaucratic hurdles on both sides.

All these developments signify that space now exists for us to play an enhanced international role, which we seek. We are being wooed by the US, at times quite unabashedly, for political, economic and military reasons. The US has taken a more forward looking position on India’s permanent membership of the Security Council, without, however, taking any practical step so far to push for this at the international level. It has committed itself to support India’s membership of the various non-proliferation and technology denial regimes such as the NSG, MTCR etc, but this agenda too is languishing in terms of effort at accomplishing it. The Joint Statement issued at the end of the Strategic Dialogue did not indicate any new initiative in this regard. The US is exhorting India to invigorate its Look East policy. Already a trilateral India-US-Japan political dialogue has been put in place, apart from trilateral naval exercises, a development welcomed in the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Strategic Dialogue in Washington.

This Joint Statement is all-embracing in scope, covering virtually every aspect of the bilateral relationship- political, strategic, security, defence, intelligence, nuclear cooperation, space, trade and investment, energy, science and technology, higher education and empowerment, as noted by Minister Krishna. For Secretary Clinton closer ties between the people, private collaborations, and public-private partnerships is at the center of the Strategic Dialogue, which would explain why issues that can be hardly classified as “strategic” find place on the agenda. Our strategic dialogue with other key countries is much more restricted in scope, focusing primarily on political, security and defence related issues, of bilateral, regional or global interest.

The announcement by Clinton just before the commencement of the strategic dialogue exempting- for 180 days- India from sanctions on the ground that India had diversified its sources of crude imports and reduced oil purchases from Iran as required by US legislation avoided a potentially major political blow to efforts to build a strategic understanding between the two countries. The avoidance of such a step shows nevertheless the fragility of such understanding, as reduced supplies from Iran is the result not of a political decision by India but practical compulsions, but this gave the US a way out from following the pernicious logic of its unilateralist policies.

The road blocks in the way of forging India-US collaboration in civilian nuclear cooperation continue to be a source of disgruntlement for US companies. The scant progress made in this area has been disguised by exaggerating the import of the announcement made to time with the Strategic Dialogue that a MOU had been signed between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) committing both sides to negotiate an Early Works Agreement for the preliminary licensing and site development work associated with construction of the new Westinghouse reactors in Gujarat, and the ongoing progress between General Electric-Hitachi and NPCIL on their MOU. The nuclear liability issue remains a problem for the US, as was mentioned in Washington.

Irrespective of whether the subjects discussed, progress in relations noted and projects of future cooperation envisioned can be veritably called “strategic” in content, some highlights of the dialogue in Washington can be identified. Both sides intend consulting with each other with regard to forums like the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus. India will support the US bid to become a dialogue partner with the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation. Both sides-in an allusion to Chinese claims to the South China Sea-affirmed the importance of maritime security, unimpeded commerce, and freedom of navigation, in accordance with international law, and the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. Significantly, any direct reference to the South China Sea has been avoided, obviousy with Chinese sensitivities in mind, though it is unclear why if other regions can be mentioned there is squeamishness with regard to these waters.

Noting that both countries have signed Strategic Partnership Agreements with Afghanistan, the intention to intensify their consultation, coordination and cooperation to promote a stable, democratic, united, sovereign and prosperous Afghanistan has been expressed in the Joint Statement. On regional connectivity through South and Central Asia, India seems to have desisted from openly endorsing the New Silk Road project proposed the US, with the two sides discussing only the “vision” of enhanced regional connectivity. The two have “reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security require elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, a language that Pakistan is bound to have resented. This is half-satisfaction for us though, as safe-havens and the infrastructure of terrorism are mentioned uniquely in the context of Afghanistan and not India.

Cyber-security is now figuring more prominently on the bilateral agenda, with consultations having already begun between the National Security Councils of the two countries. The first bilateral exercise between the respective Computer Emergency Response Teams will be held later this year.

India has requested the US government to permit LNG exports from the US to India. This would be important in terms of India reducing its reliance on the Gulf countries and benefiting from the expansion of natural gas production in the US that will also give the latter considerable energy autonomy and affect the geopolitics of oil trade globally.

While at the governmental level any anti-China dimension to the India-US strategic relationship is pointedly denied, yet it is widely accepted that US overtures to India in general, and especially the encouragement given to it to intensify its ties with Southeast and East Asia, are part of US’s hedging strategy against an inexorably rising China.

The China issue is very complex as China does not merit being treated as a friend by either the US or India as both countries have serious strategic differences with it, and cannot be treated as an adversary either as both countries have productive ties with it in several spheres. In any case, China’s weight in the international system and the degree of its integration with it makes confrontation with it highly costly and liable to fail.

To attenuate negative perceptions, Panetta underlined in Delhi that as the United States and India deepen their defence partnership, both will also seek to strengthen their relations with China. The US, he said, welcomes the rise of a strong, prosperous and a successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs and “respects and enforces the international norms that have governed this region for six decades”- underlining the core aim of America’s new Asia pivot.

If Panetta chose to speak explicitly about the China context of India-US strategic ties, the China factor was side tracked at the strategic dialogue in Washington, with Clinton avoiding any comment on the subject. The subsequent State Department’s briefing was couched in re-assuring terms to the effect that China was discussed but not focused on, that both India and the United States wanted a good, strong engagement with China, and that their strategic partnership was not in way at China’s expense. It was stated that a zero-sum relationship with Beijing would have negative results. dampening the opportunities for a stronger, more prosperous Asia. To further disarm anti-Chinese interpretations, it was added that a trilateral dialogue with China had been mooted, with the hope expressed that it will be agreed to.

The Chinese would undoubtedly pay less attention to what is stated publicly by US and India about the larger strategic thrust in Asia of their developing partnership and more to its underlying implications for China. It cannot be lost on the Chinese that the US intends to be the central player in Asia to which economic, political and military power is shifting at the expense of the trans-Atlantic alliance. While maintaining a relationship of engagement and competition with China, the US would want to draw India to its side as much as it can, not only to have a combination of the world’s foremost power and an Asian power like India with all the potential attributes of China in terms of demographic, geographic, economic and military strength to balance that country, but also to prevent the development of a potential India-China axis, even if it seems unlikely at present.

The Chinese, even as they remain unyieding on core differences with India, do exhibit some concern through commentators and think tanks about an India-US axis in Asia. According to reports, on the day Panetta was in Delhi, the Chinese vice-premier Le Keqiang, who is expected to replace Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, pledged to Minister Krishna in Beijing to “work together with India to maintain strategic communication, improve political mutual trust, and appropriately address disputes and safeguard the peace and tranquility in border areas to advance the bilateral relationship to a new phase.”

A Chinese analyst from a government sponsored think tank, commenting on Panetta’s wooing of India, has opined that “India was unlikely to get involved in any such containment policy on somebody’s behalf”, noting that India wants to be independent in making its own foreign policy while maximizing its interests. He also underscored that India’s interests lie in wider economic and cultural cooperation with China and spoke of “China’s opportunity to break up the US intention to contain China”. Chinese specialists are noting with satisfaction that both PM Manmohan Singh and Minister Krishna conveyed their reservations about the US “rebalancing” strategy to Panetta. China is pressing through these messages the sensitive points in Indian foreign policy thinking.

In actual fact, Panetta’s explicit statements on incorporating India into its Asia strategy did not evoke any sharp negative reaction in India at the political level, though some cautious, balancing comments were made and briefings given. A Defence Ministry release referred to the need to set up a security architecture in Asia at a pace that would be comfortable to all countries concerned. This could be construed as cautionary advice to the US not to make precipitatory military moves in the region and unduly alarm China. Unless India has consulted other Asian countries and is reflecting a large consensus amongst them that Chinese sensitivities should be kept in view by the US, proffering such advice may suggest that India is not comfortable with the pace the US is moving. Why we should feel concerned about Chinese reaction to security precautions being taken against an assertive China is not clear, especially as China’s strategic policies in our region damage us enormously.

In response to Le Keqiang’s gesture, Minister Krishna reportedly said that the Sino-Indian relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, echoing, oddly, what the US Administration has said in the past about its relationship with China.

The US is now making a more realistic projection of its relationship with India even as its wooing of India appears too ardent at times. A confident US is always inclined to push while a diffident India is by nature cautious. Panetta recognized in Delhi that the two countries “may not agree on the solution to every challenge facing us, and we both face the challenge of political gridlock at home that sometimes prohibits advancing our broader strategic objectives”.

Clinton struck a similar note at Washington in remarking that “there is less need today for the dramatic breakthroughs that marked earlier phases, but more need for steady, focused cooperation” and effort to work “through the inevitable differences”. “This kind of weekly, sometimes daily, collaboration is not always glamorous, but it is strategically significant”, she said, adding that she looks at the totality of the relationship rather than denying the existence of differences. According to her, “the strategic fundamentals of our relationship are pushing our two countries’ interests into closer convergence”.

Minister Krishna introduced a note of caution even while playing up to the rhetoric by remarking that the India-US global partnership “could” be one of the most important or defining relationship of the 21st century. He acknowledged that “sometimes there are questions and doubts about the relationship”, but explained that “they are inevitable in something so unique and new”. That India and the US “should” (hedged language again) work towards a close relationship has been settled as a question, the Minister said while warning against complacency. The sense here is that the strategic partnership is work in progress and should not be considered a fait accompli, which is a signal to the US that it has to do more to meet Indian expectations and to other major powers that India is moving at a measured pace with the US.

Broadly speaking, India’s response to US overtures is crafted as well as it can be, as the diplomatic challenge it faces is very complex. India should not appear to be rushing to embrace the US strategy in Asia, though India’s need to put constraints on Chinese ambitions is greater than that of the US. India has less means to deal with these ambitions than the US has. We should not allow ourselves to be put in a position of having to make concessions in the future to ward off the pressures generated from China’s growing strength.

India has to defend its territorial integrity vis a vis China; the US wants simply to retain the upper hand against China. We should therefore establish a basis of cooperation with the US that neither sends a dampening signal to it nor is an enthusiastic endorsement of its strategy.

We should continue our engagement with China bilaterally and in regional and international forums, without forgetting that our real rival is China not the US. If we want to tactically send reassuring signals to China, even as we become partners with the US, we may do so, but what is important is that it should not be done in the belief that we need to equate our relations with the US with those with China as part of preserving our strategic autonomy.

Most of all, we must not take upon ourselves, as we did at Bandung, to do diplomacy on China’s behalf with others and help China appear less of a threat to the others than it actually is. Which is why, statements by us that the security architecture in Asia should move at a pace comfortable to concerned countries make little sense.

Strategic autonomy yes, strategic confusion no!