Dynamics of Asia Pacific Strategy and Missile Defence: Implications for India

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

At the recently concluded Shangri La security conference, the emerging security scenario in the Asia Pacific was the main theme for discussions. Interposed between many plenary sessions on regional security and military transparency issues was an entire session devoted to the question of missile defence. Chuck Hagel , the US Defence Secretary, in his first appearance at the conference, while dwelling on the American approach to regional security stated that “With Japan, we have agreed to review the Defense Guidelines that underpin our Alliance cooperation, and are making substantial progress in realigning our force posture and enhancing Alliance missile defense capabilities; With the Republic of Korea, we are working to implement the Strategic Alliance 2015 and discussing a shared vision for a more globally-oriented Alliance out to 2030;… Similarly, the United States is working to build trilateral cooperation with Japan and India.”

On the other hand, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov, speaking at the same forum, observed that “We are concerned about the unilateral deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense elements [in the Asia-Pacific Region]. We believe such actions could undermine the foundation of the strategic balance and lead to a polarization of powers in the region.” The Russian leader needed firm guarantees to prove that “the missile shield potential is adequate to the declared goals and will not upset global and regional balances.”

Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff, PLA, in his exposition on ‘New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security’ spoke only in platitudes like ‘peaceful, cooperative and win-win development’ and chose to skip any substantive military and security issue. However, Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center for China-America Defense Relations, China’s Academy of Military Science, PLA, expressed her apprehensions about the US missile defence architecture being created in the Asia Pacific region. Not only this, she confronted Chuck Hagel to better explain the US military‘s Asia pivot in the question and answer session after his speech which included a warning to China over cyber warfare. So far as the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is concerned, China remains unconvinced that missile defence deployments have not been designed with China in mind.

In fact, the US Defence Strategic Guidance of January, 2012 observes that “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well”. The document also stresses that the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defences, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.

Further, the US, as part of the military aspect of its Asia-Pacific strategy, has paid great attention to the missile defence component of its military deployments in the region. With 60 percent of its naval fleet being deployed in Asia-Pacific, the US would eventually have six Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) based in the region. These CSGs would have integral components of Aegis destroyers and cruisers armed with Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems along with advanced surveillance sensors and missile interceptors. The U.S. Army Air and Missile Defence Command (AAMDC) is in the process of deploying a missile defense task force in Guam. This would include a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery and a PAC-3 battery for ballistic missile defence. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been included in the emerging BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific.

US forces in Japan have deployed a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) battalion in Okinawa. For some years now, the US has been deploying BMD capable Aegis destroyers armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in and around Japan. This is in addition to four Japanese destroyers armed with Aegis SM-3 (which would eventually go up to eight ships) systems and a number of PAC-3 batteries of its own. South Korea has also acquired Aegis ships and PAC-3 batteries and opted to cooperate with the US on BMD.

Though ostensibly the missile threat is painted to be from North Korea, the strengthening of missile defence in the Asia-pacific is largely driven by the rising capabilities of China in missile warfare domain. There are also some reports that China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) has reached the stage of operationalisation. ASBM with maneuvering re-entry vehicle warhead and termed as a Carrier –Killer would be a potent addition to China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities. Further, the testing of China’s DF-41 ICBM last July with 12000 km range and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability besides missile threats emerging from North Korea (including a nuclear test this February) has moved the US to plan for deploying additional 14 ground based missile defence interceptors in Alaska and California by 2017. Earlier, the plan called for deploying 30 ground based interceptors on the US West Coast; with the latest developments, the total number of interceptors would go up to 44.

What has been China’s response the US moves on missile defence? Since the unveiling of the US plans for national missile defence in May 2001 China along with Russia has been a strong opponent of the missile defence. Both China and Russia argue that missile defence dilutes the value of their strategic deterrence. The American argument is that missile defence is only meant for rogue nations like North Korea and Iran that can launch attacks with a limited number of missiles as larger size of missile attack would overwhelm the missile defences.

However, of late, China has not shied away from building capabilities in this field. Conducting of an anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007, followed by a Ground based mid course anti-ballistic missile in January 2010 along with another ABM test in January 2013 were designed to strengthen its capabilities to interfere with the US space assets and possibly deal with some ballistic missile threats to China’s vital areas/assets.

China is also known to have developed an underground tunnel system where its strategic assets appear to have been located for protection. China possibly may also be concerned with the latest development of the US having built a ‘Bunker-Buster’ bomb that can be delivered by a B-2 stealth bomber and which can penetrate 100 feet of overhead cover thus posing a threat to China’s underground silos.

While China’s efforts in the direction of building its ballistic and cruise missiles along with ballistic missile defence systems are driven by the US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing’s strategic competition with the US in the missile defence arena has the effect of reducing the value of India’s strategic deterrence against China. India’s incipient missile defence capabilities would only be able to offer a limited degree of protection to a few counter value targets. A preponderance of missile attacks are expected to overwhelm Indian missile defences. Therefore, it has been argued that China’s missile defence capabilities would be more effective against India’s deterrent rather than that of the US. Thus, China’s recent BMD tests could have been designed as a response to development of India’s Agni V missile that can reach important counter value targets in China.

Taking this argument further, India’s BMD capability is perceived by Pakistan to be causing a negative impact on the value and worth of its strategic deterrent. Pakistan has embarked upon not only expanding its nuclear arsenal but also the quantitative and qualitative aspects of its missile inventory. It has also been looking for technical means and various other counter measures to defeat the BMD. However, Pakistan has not as yet gone in for acquiring missile defence capabilities. On the other hand, it can also be said that Pakistan would have continued to expand its missile arsenal irrespective of India’s acquisition of missile defence capabilities. Development of such a capability by India in any case offers Pakistan an excuse to justify its efforts in the missile arena.

China, for long, as part of its balancing strategy against India, has proliferated nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan. To counter balance the Indo-US nuclear deal, China has gone in for providing two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan.

Therefore, whatever happens in the Asia-Pacific scenario which causes China to respond by strengthening its nuclear and missile defence portfolio would have a concomitant effect on India’s strategic deterrent. India’s response in turn may move Pakistan to go in similar direction. Does this mean that there would be an arms race? Largely, there are no indications of an arms race as yet. India’s acquisition of nuclear and missile defence capabilities are proceeding at a very measured pace. In fact, the number of nuclear weapons held by India is less than that of Pakistan. However, China’s progress in advanced ballistic and cruise missiles combined with its rapid buildup in other military and strategic capabilities is already threatening the regional power balance. China’s neighbours also worry about its rising defence budgets year after year. And in the long run, negative effects of arms racing would be first felt by an economically weaker power.

What India needs to do is to pay more attention in developing its attack missiles rather than get charmed by ballistic missile defence which is enormously expensive. In fact, a right balance needs to be struck between acquiring missile defence and attack missile capabilities. Needless to say that development of missile warfare capabilities along with supporting systems would be an important component of modernizing our defence forces to deter our potential adversaries.

No First Use Nuclear Doctrine with “Chinese Characteristics”

Dr. Adityanjee

Introduction

Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use” (NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test, China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011.

Recently, there is some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper. However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning. Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding your time, the current (5^th) generation of China’s leaders are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo).

The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27^th 2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons essentially as “paper tigers”.

Fundamentals of NFU Commitment

Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently, only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine.

An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components:

1. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
2. Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
3. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
4. Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons

NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario, it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern sector because China will consider this use not against any other country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province. Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile, it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix.

Chinese Nuclear Arsenal

China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates, since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce 1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave 800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained.

Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions

Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April 2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic (read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts. China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”.

Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD system.

Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line because the government controls their funding and hence independent viewpoints are not possible.

In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep its nuclear capabilities fully opaque.

China’s 2013 Defence White Paper

For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the international community.

Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed piece in Asia Times Online on April 24^th 2013 when she called for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US Strategic Command by August 15^th 2013 to describe the Chinese underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces. Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds.

Implications for India

Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment. Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of China.