No First Use Nuclear Doctrine with “Chinese Characteristics”

Dr. Adityanjee

Introduction

Like a chameleon, the dragon, very predictably is changing its colors with regards to its often stated nuclear doctrine of “no first use” (NFU). Since 1964 when China conducted its first nuclear weapon test, China has repeatedly and vociferously insisted that it would not be the first nuclear power to use a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon in pursuit of its strategic objectives. This NFU pledge was explicitly and unconditionally included in each of China’s defense white papers from the first in 1998 through the seventh one in 2011.

Recently, there is some international debate about possible changes in China’s NFU doctrine following publication of China’s biannual 2013 Defense White Paper. However, it appears that China may have moved beyond its so-called NFU doctrine and its duplicitous pledges do not hold any sincere meaning. Strategic deception has been an important part of China’s military DNA since the times of Sun Tzu who wrote in his treatise the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away. Since achieving a great economic success and flush with $ 3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has increased its list of core national issues and has adopted a more belligerent strategic posture and hegemonic attitude towards international community in general and its neighbors in particular. Disregarding the Deng’s advice of lying low and bidding your time, the current (5^th) generation of China’s leaders are adopting aggressive postures militarily though the transformation into visibly hardened strategic claims started really during the reign of the 4th generation leaders (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Wu Bangguo).

The last time a Chinese paramount leader reaffirmed the so-called NFU pledge was on March 27^th 2012 in Seoul Nuclear Conference when Hu Jintao mentioned it in his address. However, in December 2012, the new 5th generation Chinese paramount leader Xi Jinping failed to mention about the so-called no first use pledge in a speech given to Second Artillery Force of the PLA which manages China’s land-based nuclear weapons. Apparently, he also stated that nuclear weapons create strategic support for China’s status as a major world power. This is a significant departure from the previously stated public positions citing Mao Zedong’s ideas about the use of nuclear weapons as a taboo and labeling the nuclear weapons essentially as “paper tigers”.

Fundamentals of NFU Commitment

Out of the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons currently, only two, China and India had explicitly stated “No First Use” as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine.

An absolute and unconditional NFU commitment would have four following components:

1. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
2. Not to threaten use nuclear weapons first against countries that possess nuclear weapons
3. Not to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons
4. Not to threaten to use nuclear weapons first against countries that do not possess nuclear weapons

NFU policy has been a core feature of the Chinese defense policy having been decided apparently by Chairman Mao himself in 1964. Critics of the Chinese NFU commitment claim that it is completely unverifiable and is mere rhetoric. Self-described “China hawks” in the West have derisively dismissed the Chinese NFU pledge as pure propaganda for the last five decades. Chinese strategists have debated the merits of dropping or altering the NFU policy. This debate was reportedly very intense from mid to late 2000s. There are assertions from Chinese officials that Chinese NFU commitment is not applicable to perceived claims on territories. China has territorial disputes with multiple neighbors including India. Presumably since China continues to claim that Arunachal Pradesh is its own territory, in a hypothetical scenario, it may use tactical nuclear weapons in a war with India in eastern sector because China will consider this use not against any other country but in its own perceived territory. Similarly, China will not be bound by its NFU if the US were to intervene in Taiwan in case of a Sino-Taiwanese war as it considers Taiwan as a renegade province. Chinese NFU is not applicable if it apprehends annihilation of its top leadership by conventional means. Similarly, a conventional attack on strategic target like the Three Gorges Dam would be an exception to the NFU pledge. More recently, Chinese have discussed other possible exceptions from their NFU commitment including a massive precision guided conventional attack on their intercontinental ballistic missile silos or their strategic facilities. As China moves away from minimal credible deterrence to “limited deterrence”, a more sophisticated delivery mechanism and an exponential increase in its nuclear stockpile, it has also moved towards greater flexibility and continued opacity in its nuclear operational doctrine. It is pertinent to say that the so-called Chinese NFU commitment has never been taken seriously by both the US and Russia at any time in their policy matrix.

Chinese Nuclear Arsenal

China can be considered the largest nuclear power after the US and Russia. China’s nuclear capability is apparently stronger than those of the next six nuclear states combined. According to Russian estimates, since early 1960s China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons grade uranium and 10 tons of plutonium which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear war-heads. It is probable that half of this fissile material is kept in stocks whereas the rest half has been used up to produce 1500-1800 warheads, half of which may be in storage. This would leave 800-900 warheads that could be available for operational deployment on various types of delivery vehicles. Therefore, the real motives for China’s complete secrecy about its nuclear forces lie not in their “weakness” and “small size” but in much larger strength of China’s actual nuclear arsenal that is much higher than the commonly cited number of 300-400 warheads by the western analysts. There is also a great degree of international uncertainty about the hundreds of tunnels being built in China as their purpose has not yet been officially explained.

Chinese Nuclear Posture and Track II Interactions

Personal interactions with various Chinese academicians and officials during policy conferences suggest that China will continue to add to its nuclear arsenal and will not participate in any nuclear disarmament program till it reaches a certain level. This analyst has interacted with Professor Shen Dingli, Associate Dean of the Institute of International Studies from Fudan University, Shanghai over the last four years with very consistent and candid answers regarding Chinese national nuclear posture. Professor Shen Dingli claims to have independent (but sometimes more hawkish views) from those of the Chinese Government. In 2009 Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, DC, he expressed absolute ignorance about Chinese proliferation activities and the fact that Chinese weapons designs were turned in by Libya to the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) when Libya folded up their clandestine nuclear program. He was totally unaware of China’s both vertical and horizontal proliferation activities as late as April 2009. During the 2009 Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, he agreed that Chinese government will continue to increase its number of nuclear war-heads. In a more recent Carnegie Endowment meeting on India-China dialogue in Washington DC on January 10th 2013, he again reiterated that China will continue to modernize its nuclear arsenals and the delivery systems till a perceived parity is achieved with the two great powers (US and Russia). China will certainly not agree to cut the number of nuclear arsenals as it wants both the US and Russia to implement further reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

Interactions with another Chinese academician Dr. Shulong Chu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and the Deputy Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in a session on China-US Strategic Stability on 4/6/2009 during the Carnegie International Non-proliferation Conference, Washington DC revealed very interesting Chinese perspectives. Chu explicitly stated that since China has accepted US supremacy, analogously both India and Japan should accept Chinese supremacy in the Asia-pacific region. China is a bigger country than Japan and India. It has bigger military requirements. Japan, India and other Asian countries should understand that and should be willing to accept China’s ongoing modernization of its military and strategic (read nuclear) assets. Chu further went on saying: “Russia and the US have too many nuclear war-heads. They can afford to have deep cuts. China cannot do that because China has too few. China wants more and its agenda is to have more nuclear weapons”.

Major-General Yao Yunzhu, Director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing in a session on Deterrence, Disarmament and Non-proliferation during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013, artfully deflected all the questions on China’s growing number of nuclear arsenals with a cute smile, stating again that the onus for nuclear warhead reduction lies on both US and Russia because China has very limited, small number of nuclear weapons. General Yao while doing routine lip-service to the NFU doctrine explicitly admitted that, "A certain amount of opaqueness is an integral part of China's no-first-use policy". She persistently refused to quantify the number of warheads China needed for a credible and effective nuclear deterrence. She officially expressed Chinese Government‘s serious concern at the US shifting its ballistic missiles interceptors in the Pacific island of Guam to deal with DPRK nuclear threat, thereby degrading the quality of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. She enumerated three essential characteristics for the Chinese nuclear deterrent: it has to be survivable against first strike; it has to be credible enough in numbers and in delivery system, and lastly it has to have an effective and punitive second strike retaliatory capability. She was asked about recent BMD tests by China on January 22nd 2013 and she categorically confirmed that China will, from now on, indeed develop its own BMD system as the US is not willing to commit to cease its BMD system.

Professor Li Bin from the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing and also a Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC admits formally in his writings that China’s non-proliferation posture has evolved over a period of time and now is an important and essential part of its nuclear theology. However, in private discussions he passionately justified Chinese horizontal proliferation activities outside the scope of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by providing Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear plants to Pakistan on grounds that China had helped India also with nuclear fuel supplies for the Tarapore Atomic Reactor when India was under the US nuclear embargo. He assertively implied that China will continue to provide nuclear materials and technology to its all-weather friend Pakistan analogous to US-India civil nuclear deal though the latter deal was approved by the NSG. Interestingly a younger researcher Zhu Jianyu from the Center for Strategic Studies of the China Academy of Engineering Physics during the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, held in Washington, DC on April 8-9th 2013 candidly admitted that Chinese press and academicians usually toe the government line because the government controls their funding and hence independent viewpoints are not possible.

In private discussions with Major General Yao, it became quite clear that China will now vigorously pursue development of its national ballistic missile defense system; something which China had vociferously denounced earlier. She also stated that China will continue to develop its ASAT weapons till a legally binding multi-lateral treaty banning weaponization of the space is signed and ratified. Major General Yao attributed to and categorically linked this shift in Chinese strategic thinking to the recent US decision to deploy 14 long-range ballistic missile interceptor batteries in the Pacific Island of Guam ostensibly in response to threats posed by the DPRK thereby potentially degrading the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Changes in the Chinese nuclear posture are also linked to the US development and deployment of advanced precision guided conventional warheads in the Asian theatre capable of destroying Chinese multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) ballistic missile silos thereby degrading the Chinese minimum nuclear deterrent. China is focused on modernizing and its strategic survivability and beefing up its effective second strike capability and therefore will continue to develop more nuclear warheads and will keep its nuclear capabilities fully opaque.

China’s 2013 Defence White Paper

For the first time, the 2013 edition of China’s defense white paper entitled: “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” conspicuously fails to mention re-adherence to and re-affirmation of China’s often-stated “No first use pledge”. This is significant departure from the 2011 version of China’s Defense White Paper. The absolutely deafening silence in the 2013 version on NFU is deliberate and is very significant for its reverberating eloquence. The new white paper introduces ambiguity as it endorses the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack but does not rule out other uses. In the last few years, Chinese analysts and officials have done an excellent job of qualifying the original Chinese “NFU” pledge with myriads of qualitative exceptions so as to render it effectively meaningless. This carefully contrived departure is strategically significant for the international community.

Following a vigorous international debate on China’s departure from the NFU policy, Major General Yao floated a trial balloon in an op-ed piece in Asia Times Online on April 24^th 2013 when she called for a legally binding multi-lateral NFU agreement. She wrote a point by point rejoinder while still defending the reasons as to why China should depart from the often stated NFU policy and acknowledged that domestic discussions happening in China regarding junking the NFU policy. She has tried to invoke new exceptions to China’s so-called NFU commitment linking it to a new US law (2013 National Defense Authorization Act) that seeks a report from the Commander of the US Strategic Command by August 15^th 2013 to describe the Chinese underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to neutralize such networks with conventional and nuclear forces. Ostensibly, with a view to creating more confusion and more opaqueness about China’s intentions, she explicitly states: “To alleviate China's concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international agreement.” Li Bin, in bilateral context, has previously suggested that India and China should begin their nuclear engagement with mutual reassurance of NFU and should work together in advocating NFU in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

China very well knows such a legally binding international agreement will not be negotiated for several decades owing to US dogmatic postures. The US is already spending $10 billion to upgrade its nuclear weapons despite Obama’s initial call for a global zero goal. This gives a window of opportunity for China to increase its nuclear warheads exponentially while keeping its so-called NFU pledge under suspended animation and even junk it de facto. Interestingly, China refuses to enter into an official government to government nuclear weapons dialogue with India on the grounds that India is non-signatory to the NPT. At the same time, China has shrewdly refused to engage in bilateral dialogue with the US on nuclear arms reductions on grounds of asymmetry of nuclear forces of respective countries. China does complain of discrimination and nuclear asymmetry while discussing US-China relations but fails to address genuine Indian concerns on similar grounds.

Implications for India

Western debate on the perceptible change in Chinese nuclear posture has focussed only on its narrow impact on the strategic environment of the US and its allies including Japan. India should not behave like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. Perhaps, time has come for India to review her own strategic nuclear doctrine revising the no-first use pledge. Robust evidence has come cumulatively over a period of time from multiple sources reflecting the new nuclear reality in our neighborhood. Totality of the evidence available convinces this analyst that China has indeed changed its nuclear posture from defensive to offensive and is on a large-scale nuclear build-up. China is indeed willing to consider first strike capability to preserve its core national issues though vehemently denying such intentions at the moment. Predictably, China will continue to obfuscate this change in nuclear posture using ambiguous, turgid and opaque language while simultaneously blaming the US for failing to negotiate a legally binding multi-lateral agreement on NFU. Indeed, this gives the dragon a fig-leaf of deniability. Certainly, India should not countenance being the only nuclear weapon state pledging “no first use” while the global nuclear posturing has become indeed hardened. One has to take into factor Pakistan’s accelerated development of tactical nuclear weapons and its stringent refusal to negotiate and sign a multi-lateral Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and continued Chinese help to Pakistan in and outside the NSG. While Pakistan has never subscribed to an NFU commitment and its nuclear arsenal is specifically India-centric; the recent change in China’s nuclear posture is definitely of concern to India. The writing is on the wall as China does not have good track record of strategic comfort and reliability vis-a-vis India. The current incidence of Chinese incursion into Indian territory in Daulat Beg Oldie region in the Ladakh sector should be an eye-opener. While India must focus on its economic, infrastructure and social development and must not waste her meager fiscal resources in a costly nuclear race, she needs to be prepared for all strategic options. Given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years appropriate and credible policies need to be adopted including having a re-look at evolving nuclear posture of China.

Assessment: PRC’s White Paper on Defence

Brig (retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

China has come out with its latest white paper on defence as part of its regular exercise to covey to the world that it has been exhibiting higher levels of military transparency. However, the paper is an exercise in strategic communication both to its internal and external audience. It shows adequate transparency to deter its regional competitors while putting a lid on many details which the international community would like to know about its ever expanding defence budgets and the direction its growing military power might take. For the internal audience the paper has attempted to highlight some of the roles and missions of the PLA that are meant to be in aid of the people so that it can be justified that it is people’s army and not the Party’s army.

In the preface the paper says “China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion”. However, can it be said that its military muscle flexing in South China Sea, East China Sea and along the borders with India and even Vietnam is nothing but hegemonic behaviour? Evidently, this is merely a slogan and such a pronouncement cannot be taken seriously by China’s neighbours who are at the receiving end of its assertive behaviour.

While surveying the security environment the eighth white paper on defence has chosen to nominate Japan as trouble-maker over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands. Without naming the US the paper adds that“some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser”. Thus, the American pivot to Asia has been causing much concern to the Chinese. For China, the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

However, what is conspicuous by absence from the Chinese assessment is the current and past shenanigans of North Korea which are complicating the security situation in East Asia. In its 2006 White Paper China had commented on North Korean nuclear tests and had observed somewhat cryptically,"DPRK has launched missile tests and conducted a nuclear test. Thus, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia has become more complex and challenging”. This time around there is a complete silence on North Korea’s destabilising activities. Even in its 2008 White Paper China had lauded itself by stating that “The Six-Party Talks on the Korean nuclear issue have scored successive achievements, and the tension in Northeast Asia is much released.”

While concentrating on the US and Japan the White Paper has not included South China Sea and the littoral countries as area of concern thus for time being downplaying the issue and possibly setting priorities for settling/importance of the issues. Similarly, the border issue with India also does not find mention. This in contrast to articulations made in earlier papers. For instance, the white paper of 2006 talked of having settled border disputes with 11 out of 13 countries. This formulation implied that India and Bhutan were being unreasonable. In his ‘Five Point Proposal’ for improving Sino-Indian ties made in mid- March this year President Xi Jinping had observed that “The border question is a complex issue left from history and solving the issue won't be easy.” And just to prove this observation there are media reports that PLA troops have intruded 10 kilometres deep inside Indian territory at Daulat Beg Oldi in Ladakh. Thus it would be safer to assume that not much effort is going to be invested by the new Chinese leadership in the resolution of the border issue during its reign of next ten years.

Curiously the White Paper on Defence has been titled as ‘Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’, possibly to underline variety of roles and missions of the armed forces. This is a distinct departure from the past where all the papers were titled as White Paper on Defence. In contrast to the past practice many other details like defence expenditure and the progress of the respective services have been either totally excluded or mentioned in the passing.

Explaining its policy of active defence the paper says China's armed forces unswervingly implement the military strategy of active defence, guard against and resist aggression, contain separatist forces, safeguard border, coastal and territorial air security, and protect national maritime rights and interests and national security interests in outer space and cyber space. "We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked."

The paper briefly reiterates PLA’s doctrine as ‘to win local wars under the conditions of informationization --, intensify the joint employment of different services and arms, and enhance warfighting capabilities based on information systems. They constantly bring forward new ideas for the strategies and tactics of people's war, advance integrated civilian-military development, and enhance the quality of national defence mobilization and reserve force building’. The doctrine of winning local wars under informationised conditions was mentioned in detail in its 2004 White Paper and subsequent papers wherein considerable details had been given as to how PLA intends to proceed on the process of military modernisation in a step by step process.

For the first time the PLA has given out the structure of its armed forces. It is a different matter that much of it was already available in the open domain, however, what has been revealed by the PLA does not match some of the estimates made by analysts and researchers. The paper states that the PLAA mobile operational units include 18 combined corps, plus additional independent combined operational divisions, and have a total strength of 850,000. The combined corps, composed of divisions and brigades, are respectively under the seven military area commands (MACs): Shenyang (16th, 39th and 40th Combined Corps), Beijing (27th, 38th and 65th Combined Corps), Lanzhou (21st and 47th Combined Corps), Jinan (20th, 26th and 54th Combined Corps), Nanjing (1st, 12th and 31st Combined Corps), Guangzhou (41st and 42nd Combined Corps) and Chengdu (13th and 14th Combined Corps). Of particular interest to India are the corps based in Chengdu and Lanzhou which have operational role on Sino-Indian border. Apparently, the strength many logistic and other supporting elements has not been included. Indian Army with much lesser number of corps and other formations has a strength of 1.2 million. Thus, the PLAA is hiding its actual numbers.

Similarly, the paper gives out the strength of the PLA Navy as 235,000 officers and men with three fleets under it, namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet. For long China had stressed that it was not keen to acquire an aircraft carrier; now with commissioning of Liaoning in September 2012 the paper proudly notes that ‘China's development of an aircraft carrier has a profound impact on building a strong PLAN and safeguarding maritime security’.

So far as PLA Air Force is concerned the paper mentions that the PLAAF now has a total strength of 398,000 officers and men, and an air command in each of the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) of Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. In addition, it commands one airborne corps. The 15 Airborne Corps is an elite strategic formation and its capability also can be brought to bear against India in a very limited time frame. Some years back the formation had carried out a training exercise wherein a division is supposed to have been inducted in Tibet in 48 hours.

The strength of PLA Second Artillery Force has not been mentioned though it has been described as ‘a core force for China's strategic deterrence’. According to the paper Second Artillery Force (SAF) is ‘enhancing the safety, reliability and effectiveness of its missiles, improving its force structure of having both nuclear and conventional missiles, strengthening its rapid reaction, effective penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection and survivability capabilities’. The current political leadership has been paying particular attention to SAF. After having taken over as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 2012, Xi Jinping visited Second Artillery Force and observed that “the artillery force is the core strength of China's strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the country's status as a major power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security”. Many advanced versions of ballistic and cruise missiles are being fielded with appropriate integration with C4ISR assets which are both ground and space based. PLA has carried out another anti- ballistic missile test in January this year indicating that it is moving towards acquiring a ballistic missile defence capability which would impact the value and worth of India’s nuclear deterrent.

The paper also gives insights into China’s nuclear posture though to a very limited degree. It states “If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of the CMC, go into a higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services. The conventional missile force is able to shift instantly from peacetime to wartime readiness, and conduct conventional medium- and long-range precision strikes”. It is for the first time that there is no explicit reference to its No First Use Policy. Though, by inference from the formulation mentioned in the paper one may conclude that China may not be the first to launch a nuclear strike yet this needs further elucidation. There could be some message in the new wording and China is needs to elaborate further on this aspect. It is also safer to assume that this principle will not apply to the conventional tactical or strategic strike. However, China’s ‘ No First Use’ nuclear doctrine remains an enigma for India as China’s NFU does not apply to its own territories or territories claimed by it i.e. Arunachal Pradesh. Further, China possesses tactical nukes and it is yet to clarify as to how the SAF intends to use such capabilities.

What is also cause of concern to India is increase in frequency of joint training exercises in Tibet region. Not only the Chinese army and air force have carried out India centred exercises it has also conducted live missile firing exercises in Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Area Commands which have their operational areas opposite Indian border. Trans-MAC troops movement exercises and simulation exercises have also been carried out raising the level of military preparedness along Sino-Indian border. The paper notes that“Since 2010, a series of campaign-level exercises and drills code-named "Mission Action" for trans-MAC manoeuvres have been carried out. Specifically, in 2010 the Beijing, Lanzhou and Chengdu MACs each sent one division led by corps headquarters, together with some PLAAF units, to participate in the exercise. In 2011, relevant troops from the Chengdu and Jinan MACs were organized and carried out the exercise in plateau areas. In 2012, the Chengdu, Jinan and Lanzhou MACs and relevant PLAAF troops were organized and carried out the exercise in south-western China”. Thus, India can ill afford to neglect its border infrastructure and military preparedness which leaves much to be desired.

The paper also describes the role of People’s Armed Police Force(PAPF) which is a para military force meant for internal security duties and to assist the PLA in war time. However, its strength has not been mentioned. Some of its main tasks include performing guard duties, dealing with emergencies, combating terrorism and participating in and supporting national economic development. It is also employed for national development tasks and is composed of some special forces assigned for various miscellaneous civil and military tasks. Possibly, the Chinese troops which have been sent to POK for so called development activities are from this force.

For instance the paper states that ‘Since 2011, the PLA and PAPF have contributed more than 15 million work days and over 1.2 million motor vehicles and machines, and have been involved in more than 350 major province-level (and above) projects of building airports, highways, railways and water conservancy facilities. The PAPF hydroelectric units have partaken in the construction of 115 projects concerning water conservancy, hydropower, railways and gas pipelines in Nuozhadu (Yunnan), Jinping (Sichuan) and Pangduo (Tibet)’. The three new hydro-power dams built on Brahmaputra in Tibet are possibly the handiwork such a force.

What has been expanded upon this time in the paper is PLA’s role in aid of the people and national development so that PLA can be truly seen as peoples’ army. This aspect was completely missing from China’s White Paper on Defence of 2002. Since 2004 this role of PLA is being stressed upon more and more. The paper says that “The Constitution and relevant laws entrust China's armed forces with the important tasks of safeguarding the peaceful labour of the Chinese people, taking part in national development and serving the people wholeheartedly”. During the CPC’s 18^th Congress conclave in November, 2012 the party leadership had emphasised that “We must unwaveringly adhere to the principle of the Party's absolute leadership over the armed forces and continue to educate them in the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In the paper the PLA is being portrayed as peoples and not the Party’s army.

What is all together missing in the paper is any mention of the defence expenditure of the PLA which has been invariably mentioned in all the white papers issued so far. China’s defence expenditure according to its 2006 paper was US dollars 36 billion; this year the budget according to figures released in 12^th National People’s Conference in early March this year the defence budget was estimated to be between US dollars 115 to 117 billion, more than three times the size of 2006 figures. Last year the defence budget was around 107 billion dollars. However, according to a US Defence Intelligence Agency Report of 17 April 2013 China has spent as much as 215 billion dollars on military related services and goods in contrast to the last year’s official budget of 107 billion dollars. One of the major factors contributing to rise in the defence expenditure in Asia-Pacific is the double digit growth in PRC’s defence budget from 1990 to 2013 as China’s neighbours remain wary of its growing military might and enlargement of its ‘core interests’.

Overall the White Paper hides more than it reveals and there is more of opacity rather than military transparency.

So far as India is concerned it is quite evident that India has to accelerate its military modernisation which has been stymied due to politico-bureaucratic system and processes. Though inadequacies and gaps in our military capabilities are well known yet sufficient effort has not been put in to fill the voids and gaps in our military capabilities. We need to improve our ground holding capabilities, C4ISR capabilities, accretion of space assets, missile warfare capabilities, long range precision capabilities besides infrastructure development in border regions. Further, China through its various manoeuvres has been aspiring to dominate Indian Ocean region which is critical to Indian security; this challenge needs to be met both through diplomacy and modernisation of our maritime capabilities.