Showing posts with label BMD. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BMD. Show all posts

Thursday, September 26, 2013

Why India should Deploy Dedicated Defence Satellites?

Radhakrishna Rao, 
Visiting Fellow, VIF

The successful launch of India’s advanced communications spacecraft, GSAT-7 by means of an Ariane-5 vehicle of the European space transportation company, Arianespace, on August 30 has come as a shot in the arm for the Indian defence set up. For this 2,550-kg multi band satellite designed and developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) will serve as an exclusive satellite of the Indian Navy, the youngest of the Indian services. The significance of GSAT-7 lies in the fact that it is the first dedicated military satellite that India has put in place. As envisaged now, the safe and reliable communication channels provided by GSAT-7 satellite, will help the Indian Navy strengthen its blue water combat capabilities in all its manifestations. With its 2000 nautical miles footprint over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), GSAT -7 will help Indian Navy network all its 140 warships, 13 submarines and 200 aircraft along with its ground based “resources and assets.” Specifically, GSAT-7 will serve as a “force multiplier” by sharpening Indian Navy’s edge in terms of network centric operations. On another front, it will provide the Indian Navy the necessary level of expertise for its seamless integration into the tri service aerospace command, the formation of which is awaiting clearance from the Government of India. More importantly, the robust communications link up facilitated by GSAT-7 will substantially enhance India’s maritime security over a wide swath of eastern and western flanks of IOR. GSAT-7 communications space platform is well equipped to serve as a “sensitive command post” in space over IOR and help transform the entire maritime domain awareness of the Indian Navy.

With a view to boost its striking punch and also expand its area of influence, Indian Navy is working on a well conceived strategy to link up its long range missiles, radars and air defence systems on all the sea based assets to a central room through a highly reliable satellite network made available by GSAT-7. The synergy between combat platforms moving in the high seas of the world with the land based nodes through GSAT-7 capability would help bring about a radical shift in the operational strategy of the Indian Navy .There is no denying the fact that a satellite based communications network is immune to many of the “deficiencies and limitations” associated with a conventional communications system. As a follow up to GSAT-7, it is planned to launch GSAT-7A for the exclusive use of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Meanwhile, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has revealed that in the years ahead it is planned to launch a range of dedicated military satellites for the exclusive use of the three wings of the services. Clearly and apparently, there is a growing realization that satellites could serve as “ears” and “eyes” of the defence forces on the lookout for a strategic lead. Of course, ISRO has maintained a stoic silence over the use of GSAT-7 by the Indian Navy. For being a civilian space agency, ISRO cannot openly associate itself with a space defence project. GSAT-7, which is the last of ISRO’s seven fourth generation communications satellites, would provide a substantial level of expertise for the optimum utilization of military oriented space platforms that India will launch in the years ahead.

By all means, the Indian Navy is keen on acquiring a range of spacecraft meant for a variety of end uses. For the tech savvy Indian Navy is fully well aware that ocean watch satellites snooping on the naval movements, electronic ferret satellites gathering data on radio frequencies, meteorological satellites predicting weather to facilitate an effective use of the weapons systems, navigation satellites guiding lethal weapons to designated locations with an unfailing accuracy, reconnaissance satellites providing vital data on the strength of the potential adversaries and the communications satellites ensuring a real time link up for the effective use of the resources have all become vital components in the mechanism of the modern day warfare. But then for now, GSAT-7 located over the Indian Ocean will enable Indian Navy to stand up to the expanding Chinese influence in the IOR. As strategic analysts observe, with China beefing up its presence in the Indian neighbourhood including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives through its much hyped “string of pearls” strategy, India should make vigorous efforts to realize a versatile, robust satellite based surveillance network designed to enable Indian Navy enhance its vigil in the Indian Ocean Region with the objective of warding off any threat to the Indian mainland.

Indeed, not long back, Dr.V.K.Saraswat, the former Scientific Adviser to the Indian Defence Minister had rued the fact that the tremendous strides made by India in space exploration has not gone to fill the gap in India’s capability to create space assets designed to help Indian defence forces meet the challenges of the future. According to him, in a futuristic battlefield scenario, successful operations of the defence forces on the ground, sea and air would depend on how efficiently space resources are exploited. Any denial of access to space would mean a clear cut set back to military operations at all levels. As such, ensuring the security of space assets too has assumed more than usual importance.

Space based assets are also critical to the flawless functioning of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield being put in place by DRDO. Indeed, in the context of rapidly changing global security scenario, the need for a range of satellites equipped with electro optical sensors and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for early warning and other strategic purposes has become all the more pronounced. Currently, Indian defence forces have a limited access to the INSAT communications and IRS earth observation spacecraft constellations being operated by ISRO. But with the possibility of fighting a battle on the two fronts being very much on the cards, Indian defence forces are clearly in need of a wide variety of dedicated satellites to stay at the winning edge of the war.

But then ISRO’s civilian mandate and nature of operations focused on exploiting the fruits of space technology for the socio-economic development of the country, could act as a significant check on the attempt of the Indian defence establishment to involve the Indian space agency in a big way in realizing a resurgent space defence capability. However, technology developed by ISRO for its satellites meant for earth observation, communication and other end uses could well serve as a test bed for future military space projects. In the context of the efforts to revive the spectre of space war, as highlighted by the Chinese and American moves, India’s political leadership should seriously consider the issue of giving a military edge to India’s exclusive civilian space programme. Not surprisingly then , strategic analysts hold the view that launch by ISRO of increasingly capable, higher resolution earth imaging satellites has implications for surveillance and reconnaissance. The Cartosat series of satellites though designed for cartographic applications can be exploited to meet a part of the requirements of the Indian defence forces. But then there is no denying the point that Cartosat series of satellites fall short of the 10-15 cm resolution featured by the best of the defence satellites.

The launch of the 300-kg RISAT-II all weather microwave imaging satellite realized by ISRO in association with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in April 2009 did give a new edge to the surveillance capabilities of the Indian defence forces. In fact, RISAT-II was built and launched on a fast track mode to meet the challenges posed by the growing terrorist threat to the country and heighten vigil along the Indo-Pakistan border. Equipped with a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), RISAT-II is an all weather satellite capable of collecting data even under conditions of cloud, darkness, haze and dust. The fully home grown RISAT-1 satellite launched in April 2011 can easily complement the surveillance capabilities inherent in RISAT-II. The all weather microwave earth imaging satellites like RISAT-1 and RISAT-II would give early warning about any kind of troop build up and terrorist camps. Indian defence forces can access the remote sensing satellite capability built up by ISRO for meeting a part of their surveillance requirements, as remote sensing and surveillance are considered the two faces of the same coin.

The satellite intelligence capability is expected to provide Indian military planners, tactical and strategic information on military build up in China and Pakistan. The Hyderabad based Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL) of DRDO has hinted at developing an electronic intelligence satellite for the exclusive use of the Indian defence forces. This satellite would be capable to intercepting radar communications and satphone conversations of the adversaries .The glaring intelligence failure suffered by the Indian Army during 1999 Kargil skirmish with Pakistan has strengthened the urge of the Indian defence establishment to go in for space assets at an accelerated pace.

Clearly and apparently, the limited capability of ISRO in building and launching satellites could be a big hurdle in the way of helping the Indian defence establishment to meet their needs for “space assets”. Moreover, with the Indian industrial base lacking in resources and expertise to build satellites and launch vehicles on a turnkey basis, the Indian defence forces may find it difficult to get the kind of space platforms delivered into orbit well on time. However, a synergy between the technologies developed by ISRO and DRDO could prove a win win development for putting in place a platform for developing and launching a range of defence satellites. Indeed, in early 2010, DRDO had emphasized on a comprehensive Indian space defence capability on the strength of technological advances made by DRDO and ISRO. However, the road map for the building up of defence space capability of the country is far from clear. In particular, enough focus should be given to the institutional support mechanism for meeting the Indian defence forces’ rapidly growing needs of high performance defence satellites.

Of course, Indian industries continue to support the Indian space program by way of the supply of components and systems and hardware for satellites and launch vehicles. In sharp contrast, in US and West Europe, private industrial outfits have built up a technological and manufacturing base resurgent enough to supply both the satellites and launch vehicles in a ready to use condition. Against this backdrop, it may be appropriate to set up a high powered space defence agency authorized to pool the resources, expertise, talent and infrastructure available in the country-cutting across the private-public sector barriers for realizing the space based assets for the exclusive use of defence forces on a fast track mode with least bureaucratic interference.

The Indian Defence Ministry‘s “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap” till 2025 has identified space warfare as a priority area. The concept of integrated warfare and the need for reducing the “sensor to shooter loop” underpins the need for a totally radical approach focussed on “battlefield dynamics” with system capable of making available information on real time basis to all the three wings of the services. The roadmap of the Indian Defence Ministry identifies in unambiguous terms, the development of an anti satellite capability based on “electronics or physical destruction of satellites in both low and geostationary orbits.”

The launch of India’s first full fledged navigation satellite IRNSS-1A on July 2 is a development that could positively impact on the battlefield strategy of the Indian defence forces. IRNSS-1A, the first of the seven spacecraft constituting the space segment of the home-grown Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), would provide the Indian defence forces a robust system for location identification and navigational support for combat aircraft as well as for combat platforms on land and sea. For the defence forces in the thick of the battle field operations, a GPS system like IRNSS enables locating objects in the dark and paves way for the coordination of the troop movements even in hitherto unfamiliar territory in addition to facilitating reconnaissance as well as search and rescue operations. For the Indian defence forces which had difficult times accessing the “restricted capability” of the US GPS system, IRNSS would provide hassle free, uninterrupted access to the satellite navigational capabilities.

Indeed the stunning effectiveness of the American GPS was demonstrated during the ‘Desert Storm’ operations of 1990-91 that was aimed at freeing Kuwait from the clutches of the invading forces from the neighbouring Iraq. Here the potentials of the American GPS was mainly pressed into service to guide bombers to targets, allow infantry and armoured units to locate their bases in frightening, featureless expanse of the desert and position artillery in a war zone ideally suited to fire at enemy lines apart from precisely navigating missiles to chosen targets. The US-led allied forces during their operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq relied heavily on satellite based navigation with hand held portable GPS devices to realize their strategic goals at a rapid pace.

By all means, GPS is considered a veritable force multiplier by the defence forces in the battlefield. Moreover, it has also been instrumental in shaping the contours of the precision warfare. For the Indian defence forces, the IRNSS system capabilities will be of immense use in refining the network centric warfare techniques. Similarly, the proposed Indian tri service aerospace command would need a large and independent satellite navigation capability that can be accessed anytime to boost its combat superiority. Indeed, for the Indian tri service aerospace command, access to GPS along with other satellites meant for communications, surveillance and weather watch would mean a quantum leap in meeting the challenges of the future warfare with confidence.

For India, there is an imminent need to develop a robust system to protect space assets that are critical to every aspect of military operations on the ground, in the air and on the sea. DRDO has hinted that it is working on putting in place the building blocks of an Indian anti satellite system to neutralize hostile satellites moving in low earth and polar orbits. The focus of DRDO would be on laser based sensors and exo atmospheric killer vehicle (EKV), the technology of which could be derived from its missile development programme. As it is, the technologies developed for India’s long range, nuke capable Agni-V missile which had its second successful test flight on Sept.16 could be profitably exploited for boosting India’s space defence and space warfare capabilities.

It was the early 2007 Chinese test that made use of a ground based medium range ballistic missile to smash an ageing weather watch satellite stationed at an altitude of 537-kms above the earth that sent shock waves through the Indian defence establishment. Subsequently, there was a strident clamour to develop a full fledged Indian space war capability along with a range of dedicated defence satellites. And the modest effort now on in this direction seems to be a response to Chinese strides in space defence capability. In realizing the military space capability, India should look beyond the Chinese threat by taking into account the global advances in the area of satellite technology and space warfare techniques.

Friday, June 14, 2013

Dynamics of Asia Pacific Strategy and Missile Defence: Implications for India

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 
Senior Fellow, VIF

At the recently concluded Shangri La security conference, the emerging security scenario in the Asia Pacific was the main theme for discussions. Interposed between many plenary sessions on regional security and military transparency issues was an entire session devoted to the question of missile defence. Chuck Hagel , the US Defence Secretary, in his first appearance at the conference, while dwelling on the American approach to regional security stated that “With Japan, we have agreed to review the Defense Guidelines that underpin our Alliance cooperation, and are making substantial progress in realigning our force posture and enhancing Alliance missile defense capabilities; With the Republic of Korea, we are working to implement the Strategic Alliance 2015 and discussing a shared vision for a more globally-oriented Alliance out to 2030;… Similarly, the United States is working to build trilateral cooperation with Japan and India.”

On the other hand, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov, speaking at the same forum, observed that “We are concerned about the unilateral deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense elements [in the Asia-Pacific Region]. We believe such actions could undermine the foundation of the strategic balance and lead to a polarization of powers in the region.” The Russian leader needed firm guarantees to prove that “the missile shield potential is adequate to the declared goals and will not upset global and regional balances.”

Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff, PLA, in his exposition on ‘New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security’ spoke only in platitudes like ‘peaceful, cooperative and win-win development’ and chose to skip any substantive military and security issue. However, Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center for China-America Defense Relations, China’s Academy of Military Science, PLA, expressed her apprehensions about the US missile defence architecture being created in the Asia Pacific region. Not only this, she confronted Chuck Hagel to better explain the US military‘s Asia pivot in the question and answer session after his speech which included a warning to China over cyber warfare. So far as the US Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) is concerned, China remains unconvinced that missile defence deployments have not been designed with China in mind.

In fact, the US Defence Strategic Guidance of January, 2012 observes that “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well”. The document also stresses that the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defences, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.

Further, the US, as part of the military aspect of its Asia-Pacific strategy, has paid great attention to the missile defence component of its military deployments in the region. With 60 percent of its naval fleet being deployed in Asia-Pacific, the US would eventually have six Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) based in the region. These CSGs would have integral components of Aegis destroyers and cruisers armed with Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems along with advanced surveillance sensors and missile interceptors. The U.S. Army Air and Missile Defence Command (AAMDC) is in the process of deploying a missile defense task force in Guam. This would include a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery and a PAC-3 battery for ballistic missile defence. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been included in the emerging BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific.

US forces in Japan have deployed a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) battalion in Okinawa. For some years now, the US has been deploying BMD capable Aegis destroyers armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in and around Japan. This is in addition to four Japanese destroyers armed with Aegis SM-3 (which would eventually go up to eight ships) systems and a number of PAC-3 batteries of its own. South Korea has also acquired Aegis ships and PAC-3 batteries and opted to cooperate with the US on BMD.

Though ostensibly the missile threat is painted to be from North Korea, the strengthening of missile defence in the Asia-pacific is largely driven by the rising capabilities of China in missile warfare domain. There are also some reports that China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) has reached the stage of operationalisation. ASBM with maneuvering re-entry vehicle warhead and termed as a Carrier –Killer would be a potent addition to China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities. Further, the testing of China’s DF-41 ICBM last July with 12000 km range and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability besides missile threats emerging from North Korea (including a nuclear test this February) has moved the US to plan for deploying additional 14 ground based missile defence interceptors in Alaska and California by 2017. Earlier, the plan called for deploying 30 ground based interceptors on the US West Coast; with the latest developments, the total number of interceptors would go up to 44.

What has been China’s response the US moves on missile defence? Since the unveiling of the US plans for national missile defence in May 2001 China along with Russia has been a strong opponent of the missile defence. Both China and Russia argue that missile defence dilutes the value of their strategic deterrence. The American argument is that missile defence is only meant for rogue nations like North Korea and Iran that can launch attacks with a limited number of missiles as larger size of missile attack would overwhelm the missile defences.

However, of late, China has not shied away from building capabilities in this field. Conducting of an anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007, followed by a Ground based mid course anti-ballistic missile in January 2010 along with another ABM test in January 2013 were designed to strengthen its capabilities to interfere with the US space assets and possibly deal with some ballistic missile threats to China’s vital areas/assets.

China is also known to have developed an underground tunnel system where its strategic assets appear to have been located for protection. China possibly may also be concerned with the latest development of the US having built a ‘Bunker-Buster’ bomb that can be delivered by a B-2 stealth bomber and which can penetrate 100 feet of overhead cover thus posing a threat to China’s underground silos.

While China’s efforts in the direction of building its ballistic and cruise missiles along with ballistic missile defence systems are driven by the US military strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing’s strategic competition with the US in the missile defence arena has the effect of reducing the value of India’s strategic deterrence against China. India’s incipient missile defence capabilities would only be able to offer a limited degree of protection to a few counter value targets. A preponderance of missile attacks are expected to overwhelm Indian missile defences. Therefore, it has been argued that China’s missile defence capabilities would be more effective against India’s deterrent rather than that of the US. Thus, China’s recent BMD tests could have been designed as a response to development of India’s Agni V missile that can reach important counter value targets in China.

Taking this argument further, India’s BMD capability is perceived by Pakistan to be causing a negative impact on the value and worth of its strategic deterrent. Pakistan has embarked upon not only expanding its nuclear arsenal but also the quantitative and qualitative aspects of its missile inventory. It has also been looking for technical means and various other counter measures to defeat the BMD. However, Pakistan has not as yet gone in for acquiring missile defence capabilities. On the other hand, it can also be said that Pakistan would have continued to expand its missile arsenal irrespective of India’s acquisition of missile defence capabilities. Development of such a capability by India in any case offers Pakistan an excuse to justify its efforts in the missile arena.

China, for long, as part of its balancing strategy against India, has proliferated nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan. To counter balance the Indo-US nuclear deal, China has gone in for providing two civil nuclear reactors to Pakistan.

Therefore, whatever happens in the Asia-Pacific scenario which causes China to respond by strengthening its nuclear and missile defence portfolio would have a concomitant effect on India’s strategic deterrent. India’s response in turn may move Pakistan to go in similar direction. Does this mean that there would be an arms race? Largely, there are no indications of an arms race as yet. India’s acquisition of nuclear and missile defence capabilities are proceeding at a very measured pace. In fact, the number of nuclear weapons held by India is less than that of Pakistan. However, China’s progress in advanced ballistic and cruise missiles combined with its rapid buildup in other military and strategic capabilities is already threatening the regional power balance. China’s neighbours also worry about its rising defence budgets year after year. And in the long run, negative effects of arms racing would be first felt by an economically weaker power.

What India needs to do is to pay more attention in developing its attack missiles rather than get charmed by ballistic missile defence which is enormously expensive. In fact, a right balance needs to be struck between acquiring missile defence and attack missile capabilities. Needless to say that development of missile warfare capabilities along with supporting systems would be an important component of modernizing our defence forces to deter our potential adversaries.

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for India & Pakistan

Brig (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 
Visiting Fellow, VIF

Introduction

Even though 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear warheads were produced since the arguably senseless bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, some basic human survival instinct “repeatedly stayed the finger that might have pushed the button.” The world’s abhorrence for nuclear weapons is now so widespread and deep-rooted that even if battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were to be used against a purely military target in a conflict in future, the effect would be strategic. In fact, the impact would be geo-strategic as the explosion of even a single nuclear weapon anywhere on earth would be one too many and would not be acceptable to the international community. The employment of nuclear weapons as useful weapons of war was always doubtful; it is even more questionable today. Given the widespread abhorrence for nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Rubicon cannot be lightly crossed now and whichever nation decides to cross it will have to bear the consequences.

According to authors William R. Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen, “… the term tactical nuclear weapons in the closest approximation refers to battlefield nuclear weapons, for battlefield use, and with deployment ranges and yields consistent with such use and confined essentially in each respect to the area of localised military operations.” Some air-dropped nuclear glide bombs, carried by fighter-bombers, have been known to have yields of over one megaton. Parts of NATO’s erstwhile TNW forces, including Pershing missiles, were on constant readiness alert as part of the Quick Reaction Alert force. The line dividing tactical (including theatre) and strategic nuclear weapons is rather blurred. While a strategic strike can be conducted with weapons of low yield, a tactical strike can be effected with virtually any class of nuclear weapons – though the results achieved may not be commensurate with the effort put in. For example, hitting a forward military airfield with an Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) would be a gross overkill and would result in extremely high collateral damage. In fact, the phrase ‘tactical use of nuclear weapons’ would convey a more accurate sense of the intended use rather than ‘use of tactical nuclear weapons’.

In the public perception, the most popular TNWs have been the 8 inch (203 mm) M-110 and the 155 mm M-109 atomic artillery weapons, and the Lance and Honest John Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). At the upper end of the range scale were the Pershing missiles with a range of 160 to 835 km. These were intermediate range theatre SRBMs. The erstwhile Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces had their own corresponding TNWs. Among the better known ones were the FROG and Scud series of rockets and missiles. In addition, there was a category of weapons known as ‘mini-nukes’. These had yields from 0.05 to 0.5 kilotons. TNWs, particularly those of the US and its NATO allies, were nuclear warfighting weapons and formed an important part of NATO’s strategy of flexible response or ‘first use’ policy. These weapons were among the first that would have been used in the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.

Reasons Advocated for Use

During the Cold War, the proponents of TNWs justified their requirement on these grounds: they deter the use of TNWs by the enemy; they provide flexible response over the whole range of possible military threats; they offer nuclear military options below the strategic level; they help to defeat large-scale conventional attacks; and, they serve the political purpose of demonstrating commitment to the allies. The opponents of TNWs asserted that these ‘more usable’ weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear use more likely. Fears of collateral damage in the extensively populated and developed NATO heartland spurred European opposition to TNWs. Many European political and military leaders convincingly argued that NATO would be better off without TNWs. Alain Enthoven, economist and former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, wrote: “Tactical nuclear weapons cannot defend Western Europe; they can only destroy it… there is no such thing as tactical nuclear war in the sense of sustained, purposive military operations…”

There are other compelling reasons too for leaving TNWs out of the nuclear arsenal. Firstly, these are extremely complex weapons (particularly sub-kiloton mini-nukes, because of the precision required in engineering) and are difficult and expensive to manufacture and support technically. Inducting them into service even in small numbers would considerably raise the budget of the strategic forces. Secondly, the command and control of TNWs needs to be decentralised at some point during war to enable their timely employment. Extremely tight control would make their possession redundant and degrade their deterrence value. Decentralised control would run the risk of their premature and even unauthorised use – Kissinger’s ‘mad major syndrome’. Thirdly, since the launchers must move frequently to avoid being targeted, dispersed storage and frequent transportation of TNWs under field conditions, increases the risk of accidents. Lastly, the employment of conventional artillery and air-to-ground precision weapons by the enemy may damage or destroy stored nuclear warheads.

Reasons for Discarding TNWs

It was for many good reasons that the US and its NATO allies and the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact forces developed, produced, stockpiled in large numbers and planned to use tactical nuclear weapons as weapons of war. It was also for many good reasons that the weapons were never put to use. (TNWs exist in arsenals of both nations still and the Russians have refused to negotiate any arms control US makes concessions on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Even the mini-nukes and the so-called ‘clean’ enhanced radiation neutron bombs would have, if used in substantial numbers in a European war, afflicted a few hundred million civilians, including future generations, with long-term radiation sickness of incalculable magnitudes. Even the professed military utility of blunting a major armoured offensive is debatable as the attacker would ensure that he does not present a concentrated target before the bulk of tactical nuclear weapons, or at least their delivery systems, have been destroyed in an initial phase that itself would turn out to be apocalyptic. Even then, the attacker would concentrate rapidly for short durations only at the point of decision and then disperse quickly. For instance, in the well-developed, semi-urban terrain of Punjab on both the sides of the Indo-Pak boundary, collateral damage would be unavoidable. Hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties would be unmanageable for an army fighting a war.

Political and diplomatic reasons also militate against the use of tactical nuclear weapons. A nuclear posture with a first use option – NATO’s in Europe (it still is first use as per the latest Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) and Pakistan’s current nuclear policy – is both repugnant and dangerous. It is also inherently destabilising and naturally escalatory. With the megamedia revolution public opinion is bound to undermine the credibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons and, as deterrence is more than anything else a mind game, the lack of credibility does nothing for enhancing deterrence. Rather it creates new dangers.

The command and control of tactical nuclear weapons has naturally to be decentralised during war to enable their timely employment. Extremely tight control would make their possession redundant and degrade their deterrence value by several orders of magnitude. Decentralised control would run the risk of their premature and even unauthorised use based on the discretion of field commanders, however discerning and conscientious they may be.

Dispersed storage and frequent transportation under field conditions, since the launchers must move from hide to hide to avoid being easily targeted by the enemy, increases the risk of accidents as well as complicate nuclear security. The employment of conventional artillery and air-to-ground precision weapons by the enemy may damage or destroy forward stored nuclear warheads and, though the probability is low, may even set off a nuclear explosion.

India and Pakistan: Contrasting Approaches

India has wisely opted not to go down the TNW route, but Pakistan has chosen to acquire these dangerous weapons. The Pakistan army’s continuing efforts to arm the 60-km Hatf-9 (Nasr) SRBM with nuclear warheads will adversely impact deterrence stability on the Indian subcontinent as tactical nuclear weapons are inherently destabilising and invariably escalatory. The Nasr missile was first tested in April 2011 and then a few times since then and is reported to be a replica of the Chinese M-20. According to Pakistani analysts, the Hatf-9 (Nasr) missile is their answer to India’s Cold Start doctrine as the use of TNWs will stop India’s armoured spearheads advancing into Pakistan in their tracks. They miss the centrality of India’s no first use doctrine completely: even one nuclear strike – whether in India or against Indian forces – will invite ‘massive retaliation’, which Pakistan can ill afford.


Because of their inherent destructiveness, their indiscriminate nature and their gruesome genetic effects extending to future generations, nuclear weapons must never be used again. Hence, those who attempt to make them ‘usable’ by claiming to limit their effects to soldiers on the battlefield, presumed to be justifiable targets even for otherwise forbidden weapons, are on the wrong path. According to Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, “Any nuclear weapon, of any quality, mode of delivery or yield, used against any type of target, will result in a strategic impact to which the logical response would be the use of nuclear weapons, more often than not, on an overwhelming scale.” The tactical nuclear weapons carpet cannot now be rolled back; it must not at least be unrolled any further. India and Pakistan must learn from the mistakes of the West and not take the lead in repeating them without justifiable political and military gains.