Commentary: Year End Missile Launch by DRDO - An Important Milestone

3 Jan, 2018 | Lt Gen (Dr) V K Saxena (Retd), PVSM,AVSM,VSM, Visiting Fellow, VIF

On 28 Dec 17, DRDO launched a supersonic interceptor missile (referred to as Advanced Air Defence or AAD Missile) which achieved a direct hit on its intended target at a low altitude of 15 km. The launch not only validated the realisation of the capability of the interceptor but also marked the successful harnessing of certain niche technologies like, the Fibre Optic Gyro (FOG) based on Inertial Navigation System (INS), state-of-the-art guidance and actuation systems and the critical Radio frequency (RF) seeker for the end game. This article attempts put this launch event in the context of the overall system so as to highlight how it marks an important milestone in the nation's march to realising an indigenous Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability.

A Macro View of the System

In order to counter the constantly growing threat of Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles from Pakistan (range 80-3000 km) and China (range 1770-12900+ km), a decision was taken in 2000-2001 to go in for an indigenous BMD system.

This system under the Project named ‘Programme AD (Air Defence)’ was to be developed by the DRDO in two phases. Phase I was to build the BMD shield against an incoming missile threat of ranges up to 2000 km, while Phase 2 extended this capability to cover the missile threat from 2000 to 5000 km. The system was meant to have such interceptors in both the phases that will be effective both in the endo as well as exo-atmospheric region. The timelines for completion of Phase I were 2012 and for Phase 2 by 2016. As the year 2017 is just about to pass into history, the capability envisaged for completion in 2016 is just about getting realised.

The strategy for interception follows a typical air defence engagement sequence. In that, the incoming missile is detected by Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) of range of 500-1000 km. Once classified as hostile and prioritized for engagement, the target information, based on its heading parameters and predicted point of impact (PPI) is designed to be passed to a Multi-Functional Radar (MFR). The MFR tracking the incoming threat is to continuously pass the target parameters to the missile via a secure Target Up-link Transmitter (TUT) and Target Uplink Receiver (TUR). At the opportune moment, the interceptor lifts from the launcher and is guided to the target on the TUT-TUR link. Once in the end-game, the target is picked up by the active seeker on board the missile, which closes the missile on to the target.

All the elements are designed to be interconnected through redundant communication links. Since the focus in Phase I and Phase 2 was both endo and exo-atmospheric, interceptors were designed accordingly. For Phase 1, Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is an interceptor for the exo-atmospheric interception up to altitudes of 50-80 km, while Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is meant for interception in the endo-atmospheric region up to an altitude of 30 km. PAD is a two-stage liquid fuelled interceptor. Its future version is Prithvi Development Vehicle (PDV), in which the liquid fuel propulsion stage is replaced by solid fuel stage.

Phase 2 was to have two interceptors, AD-1 and AD-2. Roughly, the Phase 2 systems was supposed to match the capability of THAAD type of missile deployed by the US. Such a missile can intercept target up to 200 km altitude and track targets at ranges in excess of 1000 km. The entire system consisting of weapon and support systems in Phase 1 and Phase 2 are fully configured and tested and are in the process of operationalisation.

As can be seen , the current launch of AAD relates to the interceptor in the endo-atmospheric range and marks a major milestone in completion of a planned capability. The emerging challenge at this stage is to expedite the operationalisation along the following direction:-

1. Quickly move the entire execution of the system from the core DRDO format to the user format, wherein, the end user (Strategic Forces Command or SFC) is fully confident to deploy, operate, maintain and sustain the system independent of the DRDO scientists.

2. Move from the testing to the serial production phase and link this activity with phased raising and equipping of the tri-service BMD unit under the banner of SFC.

3. Realise alongside an integrated command control and battle management system which will integrate multifarious 'sensors' and 'shooters' of air defence and anti missile system into one seamless loop. This life-line system is to be responsible for optimising surveillance resources through multi-sensor fusion in detection of incoming threat and target designation and weapon selection so as to ensure successive punishment to the incoming threat

4. With the above in place, move forward to complete and operationalise a regime for codes, authorisations and decision formats. At the same time, bring up associated infrastructure for Missile storage, testing and maintenance.

5. Rehearse the user-scientist inter-phase (mating the weapons with special warheads where necessary) through regular practice.

6. Prepare the ground for future integration of the BMD system Fire Units (FUs) with the FUs of S-400 air defence and anti-missile system.

7. Attend to such issues like user training , building up stocks and spare support and related administrative aspects.

It can thus be seen that the launch event on 28 Dec 17 marks an important milestone in an ongoing journey of realising the full-fledged capability of an indigenous BMD system.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

Defence Procurement: Learning from Experience

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

On May 1, 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, appointed a 10-member committee headed by former Home Secretary Dhirendra Singh, to review the defence procurement policies and procedures and to recommend fresh guidelines with a view to implementing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s exhortation to ‘make in India’.

According to news reports, the committee has made several far reaching recommendations, including the nomination of selected Indian companies as strategic partners of the government to assume the role of ‘prime integrators’ of defence technology for complex projects at par with DPSUs and ordnance factories. The committee is also of the view that the indigenisation ratio of ‘Buy (Indian)’ acquisitions should be progressively increased with each revision in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP).

Transfer of Technology (ToT)

The aim of indigenisation of defence manufacture should be to make India a design, development, manufacture, export and servicing hub for weapons and defence equipment by 2025. The review being undertaken now must be utilised to learn from the experience gained in the implementation of the present Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) that was first formulated in 2006 and is now in its sixth edition.

No country that is not substantially self-reliant in defence technology can aspire to become a dominant military power in its region and, in due course, on the world stage. India is hungry for state-of-the-art defence technology but has a low technology base. For over 50 years India had a buyer-seller, patron-client relationship with the USSR and then with Russia. MiG aircraft, tanks and other major weapons platform were manufactured under license, but there was no transfer of technology (ToT).

For that matter, no technology has been transferred by US companies despite US$ 10-12 billion worth of weapons acquisitions. However, purchases from the US were mostly government-to-government deals and ToT was not part of the contract. Defence technology is proprietary; the selling company’s government must be willing to allow the transfer and the buyer must be prepared to pay for it.

The essence of all efforts to achieve self-reliance lies in acquiring defence technology through original research or by gaining access to it through ToT. No country will give India strategic technologies, such as nuclear warhead and ballistic missile technologies, know-how on building nuclear-powered submarines and ballistic missile defence technology (BMD), among others. It is the responsibility of the DRDO to conduct original R&D into strategic technologies and this must continue.

For the development of hi-tech weapons platforms like fighter-bomber aircraft and sophisticated defence equipment like over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, there should be no need to reinvent the wheel. These should be developed jointly in conjunction with India’s strategic partners. The route adopted should be to form joint venture (JV) companies between Indian defence PSUs (DPSUs) and private sector companies and international defence MNCs. In these cases, the role of the DRDO and the Services HQ should be mainly supervisory and to act as facilitators.

The design and development of low-tech items should be outsourced completely to the private sector, with the DRDO monitoring progress of the projects. Services HQ should establish their own Design Bureaus to inculcate a technology development culture. They should initiate R&D projects in their training institutions, especially for the purpose of product improvement during the life-cycle of weapons systems and defence equipment. At present very little innovation is taking place within the Services, perhaps with the singular exception of the navy.

In fact, some R&D projects should be outsourced to universities and IITs to involve the institutions of higher learning in this important national endeavour. Also, DRDO should invite and put in place a system for the evaluation of project proposals from individual entrepreneurs.

In 11 years, the DRDO budget increased from Rs 3,443 to Rs 14,354 crore for FY 2015-16, that is six per cent of the defence budget. At present there are far too many DRDO laboratories. There is a need to rationalise the justification for these and close down those whose work can be outsourced to the private sector. The Rama Rao committee had gone into the functioning of the DRDO. Its recommendations must be expeditiously implemented after scrutiny by the Defence Technology Board headed by the Defence Minister. The inputs of the Services HQ must be taken into account.

Policy Issues

The starting point for the acquisition of new weapons systems and other defence equipment are General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs – army term). It is often alleged that the Services ask for the moon when they formulate GSQRs. The services, naturally, strive to acquire the best. As it is, the nation calls upon them to fight with weapons and equipment made by the lowest bidder. The MoD should ensure that representatives of the DRDO are made available to the Services teams assembled to formulate GSQRs. If there is still a disagreement between the desirable and the achievable, the DTB should act as the final arbiter. However, during the trials stage the Chiefs of Staff should be empowered to approve deviations from the GSQRs for single-Service acquisitions and the Chairman, CoSC, for tri-Service acquisitions.

At the policy level, many contentious issues remain to be resolved, including the privatisation of most of the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs. Publicly owned manufacturing facilities are always inefficient and seldom meet the laid down production targets. They also lack dynamism and normally develop a risk averse professional culture. Today it is well accepted that it is not the business of the government to be in business.

Though FDI in defence manufacture has been increased from 26 to 49 per cent, this is still not attractive enough for the MNCs to invest in India. Given the time and effort that goes into locating a joint venture partner and the risks involved, they prefer to have a controlling stake. This policy should be reviewed by the government, but adequate regulatory measures should be built in to guard against the pitfalls of permitting majority stake.

The present offsets policy has not worked to India’s advantage. The defence industry’s ability to absorb hi-tech offsets is still limited. Absorbing 50 or even 30 per cent offsets is extremely difficult at present. It may be more prudent to consider offsets only in cases where the benefits expected to accrue will outweigh the additional costs and Indian JV partners can absorb the technology that is brought in. While exports of defence equipment have been permitted, the procedures for according the approvals that are necessary and the regulatory framework need to be streamlined.

Streamlining Production

At present, the time frame for the acquisition of defence equipment is excessive. From the submission of a Statement of Case for a new acquisition to according approval in principle (Acceptance of Necessity – AON) takes six months to one year. Then the case goes into RFI (request for information) and RFP (request for proposals) stages and prolonged negotiations with the selected bidder. The actual conclusion of the contract takes up to three years. The inconclusive negotiations for the Rafale fighter aircraft are an example. The delivery of the contracted item begins two to three years later. Even according to the current DPP, this is excessive and must be cut down to less than one-third. The DPB should decide on a cut-off date for the conclusion of the acquisition contract and ensure accountability.

There is a need for pre-RfP consultations to avoid incidents of ‘no bid’. Trials on ‘no cost-no commitment’ (NCNC) basis, in which the prospective bidder has to bear the entire expense of transporting the equipment to the trials locations in India, providing crews and ammunition and organising logistics support for the crew, put off many bidders. Like elsewhere in the world, the MoD should bear the cost of trials.

Close supervision during manufacture would help to avoid time and cost overruns. As the Services are the main stakeholders, armed forces officers should be positioned in manufacturing facilities for supervision. At present, the services find quality control to be grossly unsatisfactory. The Directorate of Quality Assurance (DGQA), the organisation responsible, comes under the Defence Secretary. The DGQA must be transferred to HQ Integrated Defence Staff so that it is directly answerable to the Chairman, CoSC.

Concluding Observations

The government should examine the feasibility of establishing Defence Economic Zones (DEZs) to provide incentives for indigenous defence manufacture. There is an inescapable need to establish an Institute of Defence Acquisition under the CoSC. The US has a Defence Acquisition University where all officers nominated for posts dealing with defence procurement are trained. As an example it would be pertinent to mention that the ‘life cycle concept’ of evaluating defence equipment for acquisition was completely alien to the armed forces till very recently. In fact, an exchange programme should be instituted with defence acquisition universities and institutions in countries from which India acquires the bulk of its defence equipment.

Finally, the DPP document is too long and must be cut down to not more than 12 to 15 pages. There is an urgent need to cut red tape, improve time-lines for the conclusion of contracts, ensure better quality control, involve armed forces officers more effectively at every stage of the acquisition and introduce greater transparency in the acquisition process.

As the full report of the Dhirendra Singh committee is not yet available in the public domain, it is not clear whether the committee has undertaken a holistic review of the entire gamut of defence procurement, including the DPP, the production process, R&D, the offsets policy, timely conclusion of contracts, quality control and accountability. The committee’s recommendations must be widely debated before these are considered by the Defence Procurement. The procurement of defence equipment is an extremely important facet of preparedness for future conflict and must be streamlined to obtain maximum value from every Rupee spent on the acquisition of weapons and equipment.

The writer is Visiting Fellow, VIF, and former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

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Published Date: 15^th July 2015, Image Source: http://forum.blockland.us

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

India Must Choose the Right Strategic Partner

Mohan Kumar S

Current Scenario

It has been rightly stated that, as a nation we can change our friends, but not our neighbours. We have been destined to live in the most dangerous part of the world with two nuclear armed countries, China and Pakistan in our immediate neighborhood. India also faces the problem of state sponsored terrorism or proxy war from Pakistan. China after annexing so much of our land during the 1962 war, still lays claim over large Indian territory. They also support Pakistan in building their defence, nuclear weapon and missile programmes, which are wholly India centric. China is also involved in building up the so called string of pearls strategy by bringing into their fold, countries like Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives in our neighbourhood, to encircle and choke our country. The recent emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the threat it may pose to us also in the not too distant future is another cause of worry. The situation in Afghanistan is also not appearing promising in the long run, after the pull out of US forces.

Pakistan has created terrorist groups as a tool for its geostrategic agenda. Pakistan had long been accused by India, and now understood by western nations like the United States and the United Kingdom for its involvement in terrorist activities in India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's tribal region along the border of Afghanistan has been claimed to be a "haven for terrorists" by western media also. According to an analysis published by the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution in 2008, Pakistan was, perhaps the world’s most active sponsor of terrorist groups. Many nonpartisan sources believe that officials within Pakistan’s military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sympathise with, and aid Islamic terrorists, saying that the ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar. US intelligence officials claim that Pakistan's ISI sponsored the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul. The attack was carried out by Jalaluddin Haqqani group, which runs a network that Western intelligence services say are responsible for a campaign of violence throughout Afghanistan, including the Indian Embassy bombing. Pakistan has been playing both sides in the fight against terror, on the one hand, pretending to help curtail terrorist activities and availing grants worth billions of dollar from America while on the other hand, covertly promoting it. The ISI is also accused of supporting Taliban forces, recruiting and training Mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

In the above scenario, we have to be extremely cautious and strengthen our defence forces by keeping their morale high and providing them with the best, state of the art weapons which can be made available. It has also to be supplemented with well planned infrastructure like all weather roads, rail links, air fields, communication net works stretching to our borders, so that we can quickly mobilize adequate troops and equipments to the required areas, at short notice. Till the beginning of the last decade, we were having very good relationship with Russia from whom we met most of our weapon requirements. This was mainly due to the extremely warm relation and mutual trust we enjoyed with them. With the breaking down of the old Soviet Union, their defence sector also was not able to cope up with the challenges posed due to financial crunch and lack of strategic support from their government. There was also a lag in meeting deadlines and quality. Compelled by the situation, we started looking for alternate sources for meeting our strategic needs to countries like Israel, France, Sweden and USA. From our point of view, it was justifiable also to have diversified sources for procuring our legitimate defence requirements for reducing risk and to have better flexibility.

Indo-Russian Ties

Despite being one of the pioneers and founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, India developed a closer relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, India's relatively cooperative strategic and military relations with Moscow and strong socialist policies had a distinctly adverse impact on its relations with the United States. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India began to review its foreign policy in a unipolar world, and took steps to develop closer ties with the European Union and the United States. During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union (USSR) enjoyed a strong strategic, military, economic and diplomatic relationship. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited the close relationship with India, even as India improved its relations with the West after the end of the Cold War. India is the second largest market for the Russian defence industry. In 2004, more than 70% of the Indian Military's hardware came from Russia, making Russia the chief supplier of defence equipment. The relationship began with a visit by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and Khrushchev's return trip to India in the fall of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union supported Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. The Soviet Union declared its neutrality during the 1959 border dispute and the Sino-Indian war of October 1962, although the Chinese strongly objected. The Soviet Union gave India substantial economic and military assistance during the Khrushchev period, and by 1960 India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. This disparity became another point of contention in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1962, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to co-produce the Mikoyan MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which they had earlier denied to China.

Defence relations between India and the Russian Federation have a historical perspective. The Soviet Union was an important supplier of defence equipment for several decades, and that relationship was inherited by Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1997, Russia and India signed a ten-year agreement to further military-technical cooperation. Today, the co-operation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service to service contacts, including joint exercises. Energy sector is an important area in Indo-Russian bilateral relations. In 2001, ONGC-Videsh acquired 20% stake in the Sakhalin-I oil and gas project in the Russian Federation, and has invested about US $1.7 billion in the project. The Russian company Gasprom and Gas Authority of India have collaborated in joint development of a block in the Bay of Bengal. Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project with two units of 1000 MW each is a good example of Indo-Russian nuclear energy co-operation.

Indo US Relations

Our relation with US after the assassination of Kennedy in 1963 deteriorated gradually and hit an all time low under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s. Richard Nixon established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, was seen as leaning towards the Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close. The frosty relationship between Nixon and Indira Gandhi worsened the relations further. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the US openly supported Pakistan and even deployed its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal, which was seen as a show of force by the US in support of the West Pakistani forces. Later, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha in 1974, which was opposed by the US, In the late 1970s, with the anti-Soviet Janata Party leader Morarji Desai becoming the Prime Minister, India improved its relations with the US, led by Jimmy Carter, despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to the latter's non-proliferation record. But with Indira Gandhi returning to power in 1980 and India supporting the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries weakened again in the 1980s. Until 1997 there was any significant effort by both countries to improve relations with each other.

Soon after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Indian Prime Minister, he authorised nuclear weapons testing at Pokhran. The United States strongly condemned this testing, and initiated sanctions, and voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning the tests. President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid, freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies, prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases, prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India, and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies. However, these sanctions proved ineffective - India was experiencing a strong economic rise, and its trade with the US constituted a small portion of its GDP only. Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region, and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent great power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China.

Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India are under way. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes. During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change. On 8 November, Obama also became the second US President to ever address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Calling the India-US relationship "a defining partnership of the 21st century", he also announced the removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies, and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion, which are expected to create and/or support 50,000 jobs in the US.

In March 2009, the Obama Administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight P-8 Poseidons to India. This deal, and the $5 billion agreement to provide Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and General Electric F414 engines for our Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, makes the US one of the top three military suppliers to India (after Israel and Russia). Indian has raised concerns about contract clauses forbidding the offensive deployment of these systems. India is trying to resolve performance-related issues on the Boeing P-8I that have already been delivered to India. The India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement also referred to as the "123 Agreement", signed on 10 October 2008 is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector. For the agreement to be operational, nuclear vendors and operators must comply with India’s 2010 Nuclear Liability Act which stipulates that nuclear suppliers, contractors and operators must bear financial responsibility in case of an accident. The US is one of India's largest trading partners. In 2011, the US exported $21.50 billion worth of goods to India, and imported $36.15 billion worth of Indian goods.

The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $9 billion. Americans have made notable foreign investments in power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries. Key recent developments include the rapid growth of India's economy and bilateral trade, the close links between the Indian and American computer and Internet industries, a geopolitical coalition to balance the rise of an increasingly assertive China, the weakening of U.S.-Pakistan relations over various ongoing disputes, and the 2008 reversal of long-standing American opposition to India's nuclear program. Today, India and the US share an extensive cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship.

Indo-US Ties- Recent Irritants

India, in July and November 2013, demanded that the US respond to revelations that the Indian UN mission in New York City and the Indian Embassy in Washington had been targeted for spying. In December 2013, the arrest, strip-search and temporary detention of an Indian diplomat in New York following a domestic labour dispute caused uproar in India. Deputy Consul General Devyani Khobragade was arrested by US State Department Police on allegations of visa-fraud and handed over to US Marshals for detention.

The female consular official was subjected to repeated handcuffing, stripping and cavity searches, DNA swabbing, and placement in a hold-up alongside common criminals and drug offenders. Another issue was the 2010 document leaked by Edward Snowden and published by the Washington post revealed that US intelligence agencies had been authorised to spy on the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In July 2014, U.S. diplomats were summoned by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to discuss allegations that the National Security Agency had spied upon private individuals and political entities within India.

Prior to Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister of India, the US Government had made it known that Modi as Chief Minister of Gujarat would not be permitted to travel to the US. Sectarian violence during the 2002 Gujarat riots damaged relations between the US Government and Narendra Modi, the then Chief Minister of Gujarat. American based human rights activists accused Modi of fostering anti-Muslim violence. The Obama administration maintained the 2005 decision taken by the George W. Bush administration to deny Narendra Modi entry into America. In 2012, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) appointed by the Indian Supreme Court found no “prosecutable evidence” against Modi. The Supreme Court of India absolved Narendra Modi of any criminal wrongdoing during the 2002 Gujarat riots. The US Government completely failed to anticipate the political rise of Narendra Modi to the office of Prime Minister of India. Now the US Government is of the view that Modi can circumvent the USCIRF sanctions regime by visiting Washington as heads of government on A1-visa as long as he is the Prime Minister of India.

India’s Defence Ties with Russia vis a vis US: An Analysis

Neglecting our time tested friend Russia, and before making a strategic shift in our defence procurements from US, we have to evaluate our long term security risks and issues like availability of spare parts, technology transfer etc. Russia was more than willing to supply India their latest weapons as per our wish list in the earlier decades and even now. However, we cannot conclude the same about America. For example, Russia was willing to agree for joint development of 4plus generation fighter Su30 MKI, 5th generation fighter Sukhoi/HAL FGFA, Ilyushin/HAL tactical transport aircraft, lease of TU22 M3 bombers. We cannot expect America to sell us their best fighter F22 Raptor. Although we had recently acquired C - 130 J Super Hercules and Boeing C-17 Globemaster III strategic lift aircrafts, Boeing P-8i Poseidon multi mission maritime aircraft etc from US, we have to consider factors like their prohibitive cost, future supply of spare parts, technology transfer possibility etc:.

It may be noted that we are reconsidering our plan to procure ultra light weight M777 Howitzer artillery gun from US because of their prohibitive cost. Factors like denial of technology, spare parts/information during hostile situation like what we faced during Kargil incursion by denying the satellite data required by us has strengthened our decision to go for our own IRNASS (satellite navigation system). Moreover, India had always taken a principled stand on non interference in other countries’ internal affairs, respecting the sovereignty of other nations. America cannot be judged to have followed these principles when they had interfered in countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya in recent times. The result of such military interference had caused internal turmoil and chaos in those countries and instability in that region. The acts of our strategic partner should also be such that it is fair, justifiable and based on sound principles acceptable to us and the world community, since we may also have to support its acts in world forums like United Nations.

There are still areas or defence equipments which Russia have an edge or upper hand like S - 500 long range aircraft and anti ballistic missile defence system, new state-of-the-art Novorossiysk submarine etc, which show that they are still a force to reckon with. Joint development of Brahmos supersonic cruise missile which is under induction with our tri services, leasing of their powerful Akula II class nuclear submarine, sale to India of their Aircraft carrier (our INS Vikramaditya), their long time association with us in nuclear technology, space, developments in the cryogenic engine technology, cooperation in our development of Arihant class nuclear submarines etc, we owe much to Russia. Of course, there has been long delays and cost overrun in the aircraft carrier deal. However, during their difficult times, if we reciprocate by supporting them with offers to coproduce and in research for developing next generation weapons, which will in turn help them also to tide over their present crisis, set a new vigor to their industries, our strategic interest is also protected in the long term. It will also ensure that Russian made weapons do not go to countries which are inimical to us. A stronger Russia will ensure a multipolar world which will be in Indian interest also and for promoting world peace.

Meanwhile, let us hope that our DRDO, HAL, our shipyards and our other indigenous industry take up this challenge and make us self sufficient to meet the requirements of our defence forces by absorbing the latest technology available and providing us with next generation weapon systems so that we can reduce our dependence on foreign sources. Policies and recent statements made by our new government to substantially increase our domestic defence research activities, to cut delays in executing the ongoing projects and to evolve new technology and weapons instead of trying to emulate what other countries had already developed, are rightly in this direction. Till such substantial changes are visible on the ground, we will have to judiciously balance our external defence procurements in a way which will promote our strategic interest. Indian foreign policy should be based on maintaining strategic autonomy to promote and safeguard our long term national interest.

(The author is a Dubai-based observer of Strategic Affairs)

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Published Date: 19^th September 2014, Image source: http://ibsindia.org

Need to Clean Up the Augean Stables of Defence Acquisition

Radhakrishna Rao, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The commitment of the Narendra Modi Government to the ushering in of self-reliance in India’s defence sector, which under the ten years long, lack lustre UPA(United Progressive Alliance) dispensation had got enmeshed in corruption, bureaucratic indecision, tardy and questionable acquisition process as well as scams and scandals of staggering proportions, should be the right starting point for initiating the process of building a vibrant Indian military industrial complex which will not only meet all the needs of Indian defence forces but also transform India into a major player in the global defence hardware market place. That today India, an emerging technological power with a globally recognised resurgent IT and software services industry, is the largest importer of arms and ammunition, only goes to show that there is something seriously and fundamentally wrong with the defence production scenario of the country.

Indeed, the complex systemic problems associated with India’s defence production matrix need to be fixed immediately. Since the shocking eruption of the Bofors scandal in mid-1980s, that stirred a big political storm in the country, the entire defence procurement mechanism of the country came under the spell of “lethargy, indecision and delay ” with serious consequences for the combat readiness of the Indian defence forces. In fact, the defence procurement procedure of the country is yet to come out of the “Bofors syndrome”. What’s more, over the last one decade or so, the defence procurement in the country became synonymous with ‘scams and scandals’ involving shady middle men keen on promoting a culture of “corruption, kickbacks and impropriety”. In the national interest, the kind of political and bureaucratic support these middle men received need to be probed thoroughly. The consequent loss caused to the national exchequer on this score is simply mind-boggling and phenomenal. On the other hand, it has gone to sully the the country’s fair image and caused enormous damage to the efforts towards defence self reliance.

The cancellation early this year of the US$770- million deal for acquiring 12 VVIP helicopters from Anglo-Italian enterprise Agusta Westland without blacklisting the vendor following the exposure of the massive kick back has shocked the Indian defence set up as never before. But as has been the case with most other defence scams and scandals that preceded the Agusta Westland episode, the middle men responsible for “corruption, string-pulling and impropriety” will go unpunished. It is here that the new ruling dispensation should blaze a trail by bringing the guilty to the book that would ultimately act as a deterrent for the recurrence and repetition of such “despicable phenomenon” associated with defence procurement. At the end of the day, self reliance in defence production could alone prove effective in putting behind all the negative features including scams and scandals associated with defence equipment import.

Not surprisingly then there is a growing demand to investigate the silence and indifference of the former Defence Minister A K Antony towards rampant corruption and shocking acts of impropriety in India’s defence acquisition. For as Defence Minister Antony had a constitutional obligation to ensure total transparency and rectitude in the defence procurement programme of the country involving massive financial outlays. This is an area where Antony did fail miserably and shockingly. Of course, Antony’s clean image and integrity has never been in doubt. But that he could do very little to stem the rot of corruption, kickbacks and wrong doings associated with the defence procurement hardware which left the defence ministry in shambles and defence forces without many of the vital fighting equipment is now a part of the history. No wonder, there is a growing clamour for probing the glaring failure of Antony to protect national interests and his conspicuous inaction in so far of bringing the guilty to book was concerned.

According to the public audit watch dog, PAC (Public Accounts Committee), the defence procurement systems and procedures that existed at the time of approving various contracts pertaining to the Ordnance Factory Project at Nalanda were beset with glaring loopholes and lacunae to the serious detriment of national interest. Rightly and appropriately, the PAC headed by M.M.Joshi has warned that “without remedial measures, future defence procurements would continue to be clogged with omissions and commissions leading to the scams to the grave peril of the nation”. About the Nalanda Ordnance Factory project, the PAC said that the it was perturbed to note that Ministry of Defence did not try to prevent the recurrence of acts of omission and commission committed in defence procurements causing huge and recurring but avoidable loss to the public exchequer. Of course, the contract with Israel Military Industries (IMI) for Ordnance Factory Project was subsequently terminated.

A the end of the day, Antony’s keenness to promote transparency and end corruption in defence procurement only contributed to the black listing of overseas vendors with serious consequences for the acquisition of defence hardware. To compound the already complicated situation, the obsession of the UPA-II to rush through a series of ” unproductive populist schemes” whose benefits could hardly reach the targeted population, implied that the budgetary provision for the purchase of defence hardware came down by a substantial extent. While the Finance Commission has been in favour of a defence budget to the extent of 3% of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the budgetary outlay for defence is now less than 2% of the GDP. In distinct contrast, China has already hinted that it would boost its current annual defence budget by more than 10% with immediate effect. The political dispensation in New Delhi should look at the issue of the budgetary outlay for the defence sector to sustain and support India’s defence preparedness in the context of the extremely disturbed security environment in India’s immediate neighbourhood.

Delay, indecision and lack of clarity in defence procurement have gone to seriously erode the combat fitness of the services. For instance, even as Indian Air Force( IAF) continues to be handicapped by the problem of squadron depletion, the deal to acquire 126 Rafale fighter from France could never be finalised even two years after the aircraft emerged a winner in the closely contested Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft( MMRCA) tender. Incidentally, while IAF has sufficient number of heavier Su-30 MKI combat aircraft and the lighter Mirage-2000 and Mig-21 Bis in its fleet, it is lacking in medium range multi- role fighters.

Similarly, the Indian Navy which has an ambitious plan to position itself as a blue water maritime force, is seriously handicapped by the depletion of its under water arm .It is decades since the Indian Government gave its nod for a long term submarine construction programme under Project 75 involving the building of 24 submarines in India. However, only six are now being taken up for construction at the Mumbai based state owned Mazagaon docks. And the plan to build six more subs with advanced Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) is awaiting clearance from the government. This will enable the submarines to stay submerged for longer periods of time. Currently, none of the submarines in service with the Indian Navy has an AIP system on its board. ”The submarine construction plan has to come back on the priority list. Also our dependence on Russia should come down as the Russians have a weak and corrupt supply system” says former Navy Chief Admiral Arun Prakash. The new ruling dispensation in New Delhi should immediately review the need for strengthening the submarine fleet of the Indian Navy followed by a time bound action to strengthen the undersea arm of the Navy which happens to be the youngest of the three services.

Similarly, the proposal for the acquisition of 197 light observation helicopters for the Indian defence forces, which was taken up more than a decade back need to be given a practical shape without a loss of time. And the Indian Navy’s plan to acquire 16 multi role helicopters has been in limbo for more than a decade now. About the artillery acquisition programme of the Indian Army, the less said the better. Ever since allegations surrounding the Bofors deal came to the fore, India has not bought a single artillery piece for its armed forces. The Indian Government should fast track the acquisition of various types of artillery systems projected by the Indian Army to boost its fighting fitness. Beyond this, in the immediate future, there should be a serious study and evaluation of various proposals for the acquisition of defence hardware that are already in pipeline.

Simultaneously, the indigenous production of defence equipment should receive the top most priority. Some of the concrete steps could be ending the state monopoly over the defence production, incentivising and encouraging the Indian private enterprises to participate in defence production, creating conditions conducive for the foreign defence companies to invest in India so that Indian partner companies will be in a position to acquire latest genre technologies as well as the skill for precision manufacturing. However, for the private industrial outfits in India to become a part of the defence production scenario, there is a need for the Government to ensure that the entire exercise will be an economically viable option for the participating industries. Similarly, the Defence and Research Development Organisation (DRDO) should be directed to focus on high end research and development by stripping it of any role in system production. It is here that increased industry participation would help DRDO concentrate on research and development. Further, services should be mandated to actively participate in research and development activities of DRDO for the development of technologies that are well suited for ground level operations. Before taking up the development of any fighting equipment, the services should be made to commit on buying them.

Meanwhile, there is a feeling that from the strategic viewpoint, it would be a good idea to have a tri service commander who will serve as a bridge between the three services for the efficient and effective use and coordination of resources and expertise at every stage of joint operations. Indeed, the ambitious plan for mountain strike corps meant to take on Chinese threat, seems to be in need of rigorous, tri service evaluation to check whether China could be deterred through alternative means including the blockade in the vulnerable Malacca Strait or a tactical missile strike in Tibet. Indeed, this aspect should receive proper and immediate attention from the new Indian Government. More importantly, without succumbing to pressure from any quarter, the political dispensation in New Delhi should hasten the process of giving a green signal to the creation of a tri service aerospace command that could also draw on the resources of DRDO and ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation).

There is now all round recognition of the ground reality that gaping holes in India’s defence preparedness could prove catastrophic in the context of China forging ahead with massive augmentation of its combat capability in all its manifestations. The indifference, ineptitude and decision gird-lock that marked the functioning of the UPA-II government has proved to be a major stumbling block in India’s military modernization programme supported by a technological upgradation process. A new national security agenda taking into account the external threat as well as internal terror and insurgency should be put in place immediately and given a practical shape without any further loss of time.

As it is, the 1.13-million strong Indian Army, considered the third largest in the world, has pitched in with a blue print of a massive investment to overcome the slippages and shortcomings of critical nature. The Indian Army Chief General Bikram Singh has already made it clear that his top most priority is to hon and fine tune the army’s “operational readiness” through a rigorous modernization process. Not to be left behind, both the Indian Navy and IAF need to address the problems of deficiencies and shortcomings on both tactical and strategic fronts to stay at the winning edge of the battlefield.

According to Defence analyst Brig (Rtd) Rahul Bhonsle, “the new government should address the systemic inadequacies and archaic procedures of doing business within the armed forces as well as with the Ministry of Defence, DRDO et.al, increase the defence budget for acquisitions and establish a genuine level playing field for private sector participation”.

Cleaning up the mess, cobwebs and dirt surrounding the defence procurement procedure should be the top most priority of the Narendra Modi led Government. Of course, this should be followed by vigorous and multi faceted efforts to acquire self reliance in all aspects of defence research development and production by exploiting the synergy cutting across the of public-private sector jurisdictional boundaries and exploiting the expertise and resources available in the research and academic institutions spread across the country. More importantly, services should be asked to play a proactive role in the indigenous development of products and systems. Services should be told in no uncertain terms that there is always a home grown alternative to the “glitzy fighting equipment” touted around in the global defence market. Of course, the path of indigenous development is strewn with problems and challenges. And India which has sent a probe to Mars and successfully developed and flight tested a cryogenic fuel driven launch vehicle has the expertise, resources and talent to create a self reliant base for defence production. What was so far lacking was the political commitment which the new government can chip in without any hesitation.

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Published Date: 27^th May 2014, https://farm8.staticflickr.com/7206/7038621421_21739c54ac_o.jpg

Need for Enhanced Indian Surveillance in IOR

Radhakrishna Rao, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

Indian Ocean, the third largest oceanic body in the world accounting for 20% of the total area of the world under water, holds a position of paramount importance for India. Since India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the significance of the Indian Ocean to the maritime security of the country hardly needs to be emphasized. Rightly and appropriately, India considers the Indian Ocean as its own backyard. As pointed out by the historian K.M.Pannikar, “For India, the Indian Ocean is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface.” On another front, Indian Ocean holds the key to the climatic dynamics of the Indian sub continent including monsoon on which is dependent the fortunes of the Indian agriculture, a major contributor to the Indian economy. Further, the Indian Ocean is also crucial to the energy security of the country. According to the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, more than 80% of the world’s sea borne trade in oil transits through the Indian Ocean choke points.

In view of the rapidly expanding strategic importance of Indian Ocean, in recent years, there has been a growing clamour for strengthening and expanding the Indian presence in this vitally located oceanic body with a view to ensure the security of mainland India on a sustainable basis. Against this backdrop, sometime back, Avinash Chander, Director General of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) , had stressed on the need for India to put in place an effective mechanism to fully monitor IOR in a complete and three dimensional manner. To accomplish this objective, he has suggested the development and deployment of about 80-100 satellites designed for covering the IOR in a detailed manner .There are said to be 19 Chinese satellites keeping a watch over the IOR. As it is, the growing Chinese space based ocean surveillance capability with particular reference to the Indian Ocean has been a matter of concern for US strategic planners. In recent years, ocean observation space platforms have emerged as a major technological tool to keep a tab on the oceanic expanse on a sustained basis with a high degree of effectiveness.

By all means, India has vital stakes in the IOR even as the geostrategic focus of the world is shifting slowly to this region through which a bulk of world’s shipping trade passes. The changing geo-political stakes in IOR in the last decade has acted as a stimulus for the littoral nations to look seawards and this presents India with a challenging opportunity to expand its influence over the countries in the IOR. Rapidly shifting geopolitical environment underpins the need for India to not only safeguard its own interests but also cater to the security needs of island nations in IOR. Clearly and apparently, India would need to boost its naval capabilities to reach out to the littoral states with a greater degree of confidence. The recent handing over of India’s home grown Advanced Light Helicopter(ALH) Dhruv to Maldives for helping this island nation carry out search and rescue operations could imply a shot in the arm for the Indian influence in IOR.

As pointed out by India’s former Foreign Secretary and currently the Indian Ambassador to USA Nirupama Rao, as the main resident power, India has a vital stake in IOR. ”We have a vital stake in the evolution of a stable, open, inclusive and balanced security and cooperation architecture in the region,” says Rao. She further observes “By definition, this would need to be a consensus based process where all the stakeholders, who have a legitimate presence in the region, make their respective contribution to the regional security”.

There is no denying the point that the threat of global terrorism, piracy and international crime coming together and converging at the strategically located IOR is real and serious. And the increased trade in raw materials including oil from West Asia has radically transformed Indian Ocean into one of the busiest waterways in the world. In addition, the emergence of a unipolar world in the aftermath of the collapse of the once mighty Soviet empire and the prevailing disturbed security environment in Iraq and Afghanistan have all gone to significantly diminish the importance of Atlantic even while boosting the critical importance of Indian Ocean as a significant conduit for the Western military supplies.

Meanwhile, the Indian Navy whose current primary area of focus is on IOR , has acquired an “eye in the sky” in the form India’s fully home-grown GSAT-7 multi band communications satellite launched in August 2013 .This space platform would help the Indian Navy keep a tab on IOR with a vastly enhanced vigour. Further, it would facilitate the real time networking of all the Indian warships, submarines and deck based fighters and helicopters with the onshore operational centre. The 2625--kg Rukmini, as the satellite is known, will also help the Indian Navy keep a hawk eye in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal regions where arms running and sea piracy are reported with recurring regularity .Indeed, the seizure of the arms laden American private security ship, MV Seaman Guard Ohio by Indian Coast Guard off the Tamil Nadu coast in October this year is a clear indicator of use of IOR for arms trafficking. Evidently, investigation has revealed that the crew of this ship was in possession of sophisticated weapons without any valid documents. Indeed, the threat of arms laden privately owned vessels foraying into IOR would need to be tackled with all the seriousness it deserves.

Against such a scenario of disturbing developments in IOR, GSAT-7 with its reliable and safe communications networking capability will help expand Indian Navy’s maritime security apparatus over a wide swath of both eastern and western flanks of IOR. As things stand now, with this satellite, the Indian Navy would be able to cover well around 70% of the IOR—from Persian Gulf in the West to Malacca Strait in the east. Indeed for more than a decade now, Indian Navy has been clamouring for such an advanced space platform with a view to tighten its “sensor to shoot loop” which implies the ability to swiftly detect and tackle a threat.

Similarly, the easy access that Indian Navy would have to India’s home-grown navigational constellation IRNSS (Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System) will prove to be a game changer. The first of the seven satellites constituting the space segment of IRNSS was launched in July this year. Access to satellite navigation capability would help Indian Navy in enhancing its situational awareness and improving the hitting accuracy of its precision weapons including long range missiles. Of course, to enhance its “power projection” in IOR and beyond, Indian Navy is looking at acquiring a range of satellites designed for a variety of end uses including electronic intelligence and communications intelligence. To dominate IOR, Indian Navy should transform itself into a three dimensional network enabled maritime force with an uninterrupted access to “space resources”.

All said and done, India would, in the years ahead, face a serious challenge from China which is trying to dominate IOR in a systematic manner. As defence analysts point out, China’ strategic calculations in the Indian Ocean is to protect its sea lane of communications especially the transport of energy from West Asia to China through Malacca Strait. But on the other hand, there is also a perception that through its “string of pearls” strategy, China is trying to encircle India by creating its own sphere of influence in India’s neighbouring countries forming part of IOR.

Along with Myanmar and Pakistan, China has been fast expanding its influence in Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh. As diplomatic experts observe, by making available soft loans on generous repayment terms along with the engineering expertise for putting in place infrastructure and utility projects including roads, dams, energy pipelines, as well as military assistance, China has succeeded in expanding its influence and securing goodwill among many of IOR countries. Of particular concern to India should be China’s forays in the telecom, IT and other strategic sectors of the trouble torn Maldives which has historically been a close ally of India. Significantly, Maldives has also sought Chinese assistance for realizing its “space ambition.” Media reports also reveal that China is setting up a naval base in Seychelles. Though on the face of it, this facility is primarily meant for the purpose of seeking supplies and recuperating its navy, it could be a significant addition to China’s expanding footprints in IOR.

And in India’s immediate neighbourhood, China has taken over the administrative control of Gwadar port at the mouth of the Arabian Sea in the restive Balochistan province of Pakistan. Located about 400-kms to the east of the strategically located Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar can provide China an ideal spring board to monitor the US activities in the Gulf region and Indian activities in the Arabian Sea. The proposal for a pipeline from Gwadar to transport oil and gas to China could help this communist giant minimize its dependence of Malacca Strait which can be closed during war or become vulnerable to piracy.

China, which has already built a port for Sri Lanka at Hambantota has also become a space partner of this island nation which shares a common culture and history with India. As part of the Sino-Sri Lankan “handshake in space”, Supremesat-1 communications satellite was launched at the head of a Chinese Long March rocket last year. This partly Sri Lankan owned satellite perched over the Indian Ocean could help China in providing a boost its commercial, strategic and military interests in IOR. And as a follow on, Supremesat-2 is planned to be launched in mid-2016 by means of a Chinese Long March vehicle.

Chinese involvement in building Sonadiya deep water port near to Chittagong in Bangladesh is yet another instance of Chinese strategy of “string of pearls” aimed at encircling India in IOR. Bangladesh is also looking at China for giving a practical shape to its satellite project. The immense strategic significance of space cooperation could provide China with a platform in IOR to expand its geostrategic interests, rapidly and efficiently.

China has also strengthened its presence in IOR by signing a contract with the UN backed International Seabed Authority to gain rights to explore polymetallic sulphide ore deposits in IOR for the next fifteen years. China will have exclusive rights to explore 10,000-sq.kms in Southwest Indian Ocean. And this venture would provide a strategic platform for this communist giant to expand its sphere of influence in IOR.

Of course Indian Navy has developed its own military capabilities in the Strait of Malacca. In IOR, India holds a clear geographical and military advantage over China. India has a natural advantage in the Indian Ocean including short lines of communications to its own bases and resources along its coast. The Indian Ocean is a long way from China as well and control of the choke points could be useful for bargaining in the international power game. However, even though China’s maritime objectives in shipbuilding and port construction projects in the countries of IOR are primarily driven by commercial interests, the possibility of these large Chinese investments being used later for military purposes cannot be ruled out.

In view of its location close to Indian Ocean, India happens to be the country in the IOR having adequate resources and more importantly, a central strategic location to effectively provide a security umbrella for the region. Not surprisingly then IOR occupies a central position in Indian Navy’s strategic vision. India’s strategic doctrine for IOR highlights its willingness to enter into cooperative security in policing the region. India’s initiative in quelling the menace of piracy has been led by the Indian Navy which started its anti piracy operations in October 2008. Indeed, India has responded to China’s perceived presence in the Indian Ocean by trying to pre-empt China’s presence in the region by developing its own military capabilities near the maritime choke point particularly in the vitally important Malacca Strait. India is fully well aware that China’s strategic vulnerability in the Indian Ocean creates a dynamics of its own. 

Why India should Deploy Dedicated Defence Satellites?

Radhakrishna Rao, 
Visiting Fellow, VIF

The successful launch of India’s advanced communications spacecraft, GSAT-7 by means of an Ariane-5 vehicle of the European space transportation company, Arianespace, on August 30 has come as a shot in the arm for the Indian defence set up. For this 2,550-kg multi band satellite designed and developed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) will serve as an exclusive satellite of the Indian Navy, the youngest of the Indian services. The significance of GSAT-7 lies in the fact that it is the first dedicated military satellite that India has put in place. As envisaged now, the safe and reliable communication channels provided by GSAT-7 satellite, will help the Indian Navy strengthen its blue water combat capabilities in all its manifestations. With its 2000 nautical miles footprint over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), GSAT -7 will help Indian Navy network all its 140 warships, 13 submarines and 200 aircraft along with its ground based “resources and assets.” Specifically, GSAT-7 will serve as a “force multiplier” by sharpening Indian Navy’s edge in terms of network centric operations. On another front, it will provide the Indian Navy the necessary level of expertise for its seamless integration into the tri service aerospace command, the formation of which is awaiting clearance from the Government of India. More importantly, the robust communications link up facilitated by GSAT-7 will substantially enhance India’s maritime security over a wide swath of eastern and western flanks of IOR. GSAT-7 communications space platform is well equipped to serve as a “sensitive command post” in space over IOR and help transform the entire maritime domain awareness of the Indian Navy.

With a view to boost its striking punch and also expand its area of influence, Indian Navy is working on a well conceived strategy to link up its long range missiles, radars and air defence systems on all the sea based assets to a central room through a highly reliable satellite network made available by GSAT-7. The synergy between combat platforms moving in the high seas of the world with the land based nodes through GSAT-7 capability would help bring about a radical shift in the operational strategy of the Indian Navy .There is no denying the fact that a satellite based communications network is immune to many of the “deficiencies and limitations” associated with a conventional communications system. As a follow up to GSAT-7, it is planned to launch GSAT-7A for the exclusive use of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Meanwhile, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has revealed that in the years ahead it is planned to launch a range of dedicated military satellites for the exclusive use of the three wings of the services. Clearly and apparently, there is a growing realization that satellites could serve as “ears” and “eyes” of the defence forces on the lookout for a strategic lead. Of course, ISRO has maintained a stoic silence over the use of GSAT-7 by the Indian Navy. For being a civilian space agency, ISRO cannot openly associate itself with a space defence project. GSAT-7, which is the last of ISRO’s seven fourth generation communications satellites, would provide a substantial level of expertise for the optimum utilization of military oriented space platforms that India will launch in the years ahead.

By all means, the Indian Navy is keen on acquiring a range of spacecraft meant for a variety of end uses. For the tech savvy Indian Navy is fully well aware that ocean watch satellites snooping on the naval movements, electronic ferret satellites gathering data on radio frequencies, meteorological satellites predicting weather to facilitate an effective use of the weapons systems, navigation satellites guiding lethal weapons to designated locations with an unfailing accuracy, reconnaissance satellites providing vital data on the strength of the potential adversaries and the communications satellites ensuring a real time link up for the effective use of the resources have all become vital components in the mechanism of the modern day warfare. But then for now, GSAT-7 located over the Indian Ocean will enable Indian Navy to stand up to the expanding Chinese influence in the IOR. As strategic analysts observe, with China beefing up its presence in the Indian neighbourhood including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives through its much hyped “string of pearls” strategy, India should make vigorous efforts to realize a versatile, robust satellite based surveillance network designed to enable Indian Navy enhance its vigil in the Indian Ocean Region with the objective of warding off any threat to the Indian mainland.

Indeed, not long back, Dr.V.K.Saraswat, the former Scientific Adviser to the Indian Defence Minister had rued the fact that the tremendous strides made by India in space exploration has not gone to fill the gap in India’s capability to create space assets designed to help Indian defence forces meet the challenges of the future. According to him, in a futuristic battlefield scenario, successful operations of the defence forces on the ground, sea and air would depend on how efficiently space resources are exploited. Any denial of access to space would mean a clear cut set back to military operations at all levels. As such, ensuring the security of space assets too has assumed more than usual importance.

Space based assets are also critical to the flawless functioning of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) shield being put in place by DRDO. Indeed, in the context of rapidly changing global security scenario, the need for a range of satellites equipped with electro optical sensors and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for early warning and other strategic purposes has become all the more pronounced. Currently, Indian defence forces have a limited access to the INSAT communications and IRS earth observation spacecraft constellations being operated by ISRO. But with the possibility of fighting a battle on the two fronts being very much on the cards, Indian defence forces are clearly in need of a wide variety of dedicated satellites to stay at the winning edge of the war.

But then ISRO’s civilian mandate and nature of operations focused on exploiting the fruits of space technology for the socio-economic development of the country, could act as a significant check on the attempt of the Indian defence establishment to involve the Indian space agency in a big way in realizing a resurgent space defence capability. However, technology developed by ISRO for its satellites meant for earth observation, communication and other end uses could well serve as a test bed for future military space projects. In the context of the efforts to revive the spectre of space war, as highlighted by the Chinese and American moves, India’s political leadership should seriously consider the issue of giving a military edge to India’s exclusive civilian space programme. Not surprisingly then , strategic analysts hold the view that launch by ISRO of increasingly capable, higher resolution earth imaging satellites has implications for surveillance and reconnaissance. The Cartosat series of satellites though designed for cartographic applications can be exploited to meet a part of the requirements of the Indian defence forces. But then there is no denying the point that Cartosat series of satellites fall short of the 10-15 cm resolution featured by the best of the defence satellites.

The launch of the 300-kg RISAT-II all weather microwave imaging satellite realized by ISRO in association with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in April 2009 did give a new edge to the surveillance capabilities of the Indian defence forces. In fact, RISAT-II was built and launched on a fast track mode to meet the challenges posed by the growing terrorist threat to the country and heighten vigil along the Indo-Pakistan border. Equipped with a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), RISAT-II is an all weather satellite capable of collecting data even under conditions of cloud, darkness, haze and dust. The fully home grown RISAT-1 satellite launched in April 2011 can easily complement the surveillance capabilities inherent in RISAT-II. The all weather microwave earth imaging satellites like RISAT-1 and RISAT-II would give early warning about any kind of troop build up and terrorist camps. Indian defence forces can access the remote sensing satellite capability built up by ISRO for meeting a part of their surveillance requirements, as remote sensing and surveillance are considered the two faces of the same coin.

The satellite intelligence capability is expected to provide Indian military planners, tactical and strategic information on military build up in China and Pakistan. The Hyderabad based Defence Electronics Research Laboratory (DLRL) of DRDO has hinted at developing an electronic intelligence satellite for the exclusive use of the Indian defence forces. This satellite would be capable to intercepting radar communications and satphone conversations of the adversaries .The glaring intelligence failure suffered by the Indian Army during 1999 Kargil skirmish with Pakistan has strengthened the urge of the Indian defence establishment to go in for space assets at an accelerated pace.

Clearly and apparently, the limited capability of ISRO in building and launching satellites could be a big hurdle in the way of helping the Indian defence establishment to meet their needs for “space assets”. Moreover, with the Indian industrial base lacking in resources and expertise to build satellites and launch vehicles on a turnkey basis, the Indian defence forces may find it difficult to get the kind of space platforms delivered into orbit well on time. However, a synergy between the technologies developed by ISRO and DRDO could prove a win win development for putting in place a platform for developing and launching a range of defence satellites. Indeed, in early 2010, DRDO had emphasized on a comprehensive Indian space defence capability on the strength of technological advances made by DRDO and ISRO. However, the road map for the building up of defence space capability of the country is far from clear. In particular, enough focus should be given to the institutional support mechanism for meeting the Indian defence forces’ rapidly growing needs of high performance defence satellites.

Of course, Indian industries continue to support the Indian space program by way of the supply of components and systems and hardware for satellites and launch vehicles. In sharp contrast, in US and West Europe, private industrial outfits have built up a technological and manufacturing base resurgent enough to supply both the satellites and launch vehicles in a ready to use condition. Against this backdrop, it may be appropriate to set up a high powered space defence agency authorized to pool the resources, expertise, talent and infrastructure available in the country-cutting across the private-public sector barriers for realizing the space based assets for the exclusive use of defence forces on a fast track mode with least bureaucratic interference.

The Indian Defence Ministry‘s “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap” till 2025 has identified space warfare as a priority area. The concept of integrated warfare and the need for reducing the “sensor to shooter loop” underpins the need for a totally radical approach focussed on “battlefield dynamics” with system capable of making available information on real time basis to all the three wings of the services. The roadmap of the Indian Defence Ministry identifies in unambiguous terms, the development of an anti satellite capability based on “electronics or physical destruction of satellites in both low and geostationary orbits.”

The launch of India’s first full fledged navigation satellite IRNSS-1A on July 2 is a development that could positively impact on the battlefield strategy of the Indian defence forces. IRNSS-1A, the first of the seven spacecraft constituting the space segment of the home-grown Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), would provide the Indian defence forces a robust system for location identification and navigational support for combat aircraft as well as for combat platforms on land and sea. For the defence forces in the thick of the battle field operations, a GPS system like IRNSS enables locating objects in the dark and paves way for the coordination of the troop movements even in hitherto unfamiliar territory in addition to facilitating reconnaissance as well as search and rescue operations. For the Indian defence forces which had difficult times accessing the “restricted capability” of the US GPS system, IRNSS would provide hassle free, uninterrupted access to the satellite navigational capabilities.

Indeed the stunning effectiveness of the American GPS was demonstrated during the ‘Desert Storm’ operations of 1990-91 that was aimed at freeing Kuwait from the clutches of the invading forces from the neighbouring Iraq. Here the potentials of the American GPS was mainly pressed into service to guide bombers to targets, allow infantry and armoured units to locate their bases in frightening, featureless expanse of the desert and position artillery in a war zone ideally suited to fire at enemy lines apart from precisely navigating missiles to chosen targets. The US-led allied forces during their operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq relied heavily on satellite based navigation with hand held portable GPS devices to realize their strategic goals at a rapid pace.

By all means, GPS is considered a veritable force multiplier by the defence forces in the battlefield. Moreover, it has also been instrumental in shaping the contours of the precision warfare. For the Indian defence forces, the IRNSS system capabilities will be of immense use in refining the network centric warfare techniques. Similarly, the proposed Indian tri service aerospace command would need a large and independent satellite navigation capability that can be accessed anytime to boost its combat superiority. Indeed, for the Indian tri service aerospace command, access to GPS along with other satellites meant for communications, surveillance and weather watch would mean a quantum leap in meeting the challenges of the future warfare with confidence.

For India, there is an imminent need to develop a robust system to protect space assets that are critical to every aspect of military operations on the ground, in the air and on the sea. DRDO has hinted that it is working on putting in place the building blocks of an Indian anti satellite system to neutralize hostile satellites moving in low earth and polar orbits. The focus of DRDO would be on laser based sensors and exo atmospheric killer vehicle (EKV), the technology of which could be derived from its missile development programme. As it is, the technologies developed for India’s long range, nuke capable Agni-V missile which had its second successful test flight on Sept.16 could be profitably exploited for boosting India’s space defence and space warfare capabilities.

It was the early 2007 Chinese test that made use of a ground based medium range ballistic missile to smash an ageing weather watch satellite stationed at an altitude of 537-kms above the earth that sent shock waves through the Indian defence establishment. Subsequently, there was a strident clamour to develop a full fledged Indian space war capability along with a range of dedicated defence satellites. And the modest effort now on in this direction seems to be a response to Chinese strides in space defence capability. In realizing the military space capability, India should look beyond the Chinese threat by taking into account the global advances in the area of satellite technology and space warfare techniques.