India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Analysis

Prof Nirmala Joshi

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) forthcoming annual summit meeting in Bashkortostan in Russia in July 2015 , it is expected that India’s status would be elevated from an Observer to a full member. If reports are true, it would indeed be a positive development for India. A regional Grouping, the SCO, comprises of countries some of whom are part of its extended / strategic neighbourhood. Today India’s neighbourhood is in a state of flux, the shape of future scenario in Afghanistan is uncertain.The process of withdrawal of Western coalition forces from Afghanistan has begun. Afghanistan is in the midst of a complex transition; security, political and economic. In the months ahead, it will be clear as to how strong the resurgence of the Taliban is. Simply put, Afghanistan is the pivot of regional stability, an imperative necessity both for the consolidation of the new democracy and for the region. .

The withdrawal of Western coalition forces from Afghanistan, after over thirteen years of an inconclusive ‘war on terror’ has undoubtedly weakened the Taliban, but has not been able to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. Therefore, the resurgence in insurgency will continue depending upon the ability of the Afghan government to control these forces. The violent activities of the Islamic State (IS) in West Asia serve as an encouragement to extremist forces in Afghanistan. A new security paradigm, however, will emerge in the months ahead. In this shifting geopolitical paradigm, military action will be ruled out to counter the threats emanating from non traditional sources. . At this critical juncture, the best approach is the cooperative approach by the stakeholders of peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.

In this unfolding scenario, the SCO is the only regional grouping that has a security agenda for the region. The SCO is not a military alliance or ‘an Eastern NATO‘ in the making as some opine, nor a mere ‘ discussion club’. The focus of the SCO is on comprehensive security, that includes social and economic aspects as well. The question is, can the SCO emerge as the security provider for the region? What are India’s interests in joining the SCO?

Since India has a high stake in the stability of the region, its membership of the SCO will give it an opportunity to contribute towards its objective. Indian experience of confronting the challenge of nontraditional threats for decades could be useful in broadening the discourse on regional stability. The regional security agenda of fighting the ’ three evils’, extremism, separatism and terrorism as spelt out by China are in congruence with Indian security interests. Under the Taliban rule, Afghanistan had emerged as the hub of extremism and radical Islam which affected all the members of the SCO. The Taliban have proved to be a resilient force, despite the war on terror. Consequently, the insurgency has emerged as a festering sore. India and the member countries of the SCO are multi ethnic pluralist societies, and have been afflicted with the scourge of extremism and radical Islam, though the level of this challenge varies from country to country.

The non-traditional threats are trans-national in character and are carried out by non state actors cooperation among the countries of the region is an absolute necessity to deal with this danger as it does not have its own Collective Rapid Reaction Force, a para military organisation to deal with counter terrorism, it can nevertheless initiate a positive discourse on the need for a cooperative approach. Another dimension of insurgency is the well known fact that drug profits is one of the sources that sustains extremism and terrorism. The issue of drug production and its continued trafficking has not received its due attention. As a result, drug cartels have come up along the borders and they oversee the trafficking of drugs. Drug trafficking is also having a negative fallout at the societal level in the region. The SCO had earlier suggested the creation of a drug belt around Afghanistan for protection of its members. It had put forward the suggestion of training border guards. However, nothing further has been heard about this suggestion. Moreover the region is awash with weapons and its illicit trade has also helped in keeping insurgency alive.

The SCO has, however, established a Regional Anti Terrorists Structure (RATS) at Tashkent in 2002 which became operational in2004. The focus of RATS is to “…arrange studies of regional terrorist movements and exchange information about counter terrorist policies. The RATS also coordinates military exercises among its members as a way of training the forces. As mentioned, the RATS does not have its own Collective Rapid Reaction Force. It still has to create one, and importantly it has to work out a multilateral legal document which could provide for joint action on struggle against counter terrorism. Till then, RATS will remain a coordinating centre. Nevetheless, India has been actively cooperating with RATS sharing experience and information, and gaining useful inputs into the movements of various groups and organizations. The SCO has also set up a Contact Group on Afghanistan whereby Afghanistan became a permanent invitee as a ‘guest’ to SCO summit meetings. At the Dushanbe summit in 2014, Afghanistan was given the Observer status. Thus, SCO comprises of countries which have crucial ramifications for its security concerns.

In the present day world order, the trend towards globalistaion has gathered momentum wherein nations are drawing closer to each other particularly in the sphere of economy. Paradoxically, the tendency towards regionalism has become dominant feature of a region. This tendency is because the nature of issues today are transnational in character; be it security or economic ones, and these require a collective voice. A collaborative approach helps in strengthening its bargaining position with other regions. The SCO is a regional grouping and can promote a discourse on regional cooperation. As a founder member of the Non Aligned Movement in the sixties, India has varied experience of participating in several multi lateral groupings. The Indian experience could prove to be an asset for the SCO.

Moreover, the countries that are part of the SCO are also part of the vast Eurasian landmass. The total population of this landmass is over 1.5 billion. It has opened up prospects for commercial interests for India of this huge market. Since India’s ‘strategic vision’ broadened to include the wider Asian region, it wants to enhance its engagement with its extended neighbourhood for mutual benefit. India is likely to negotiate a free trade zone with the Russia led Customs Union.

Similarly the Central Asian Republics have reached a stage in their development, where they would now like to focus on the southern vector of their foreign policies. The SCO has established an Energy Club, Business Forum etc. Recently at the Dushanbe summit in September 2014, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj expressed India’s readiness to participate in these economic forums. India has already participated in the Energy Club and the Business Forum. Among its other areas of focus is the Transport sector. It is hoped that Pakistan’s likely membership of the SCO along with India would facilitate the opening of a trade route for India to Central Asia and beyond.

Besides, there is a perception among the academic and strategic community, journalists and others, that the SCO is an instrument in the hands of China to spread its influence in Central Asia. Probably for this reason China, a leading member of SCO, has been reluctant to upgrade India’s status from an Observer nation to a full member. It may be apprehending, that within the grouping two broad viewpoints could emerge; one led by Russia, the Central Asian Republics and India, and the other one by China and Pakistan. In any future discussions and resolutions of the SCO, the view point led by Russia and others could prevail. The latent differences between Russia and China may have strengthened Chinese apprehensions. The Central Asian Republics have always perceived India as a ‘soft balancer’ and hence supported its candidature. If India is made a full member, some of these Chinese concerns will no longer be untenable.

In conclusion, the SCO cannot be a security provider to the region, in view of the nature of threats and challenges. It can at best facilitate regional cooperation. From that perspective, the Indian membership of the SCO would be a positive step and its rich experience of multilateral diplomacy could provide valuable inputs to SCO’s efforts.

(The author is former Professor at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

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Published Date: 3^rd April 2015, Image source: http://infoshos.ru

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

India Must Choose the Right Strategic Partner

Mohan Kumar S

Current Scenario

It has been rightly stated that, as a nation we can change our friends, but not our neighbours. We have been destined to live in the most dangerous part of the world with two nuclear armed countries, China and Pakistan in our immediate neighborhood. India also faces the problem of state sponsored terrorism or proxy war from Pakistan. China after annexing so much of our land during the 1962 war, still lays claim over large Indian territory. They also support Pakistan in building their defence, nuclear weapon and missile programmes, which are wholly India centric. China is also involved in building up the so called string of pearls strategy by bringing into their fold, countries like Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives in our neighbourhood, to encircle and choke our country. The recent emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq and the threat it may pose to us also in the not too distant future is another cause of worry. The situation in Afghanistan is also not appearing promising in the long run, after the pull out of US forces.

Pakistan has created terrorist groups as a tool for its geostrategic agenda. Pakistan had long been accused by India, and now understood by western nations like the United States and the United Kingdom for its involvement in terrorist activities in India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's tribal region along the border of Afghanistan has been claimed to be a "haven for terrorists" by western media also. According to an analysis published by the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution in 2008, Pakistan was, perhaps the world’s most active sponsor of terrorist groups. Many nonpartisan sources believe that officials within Pakistan’s military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sympathise with, and aid Islamic terrorists, saying that the ISI has provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar. US intelligence officials claim that Pakistan's ISI sponsored the 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul. The attack was carried out by Jalaluddin Haqqani group, which runs a network that Western intelligence services say are responsible for a campaign of violence throughout Afghanistan, including the Indian Embassy bombing. Pakistan has been playing both sides in the fight against terror, on the one hand, pretending to help curtail terrorist activities and availing grants worth billions of dollar from America while on the other hand, covertly promoting it. The ISI is also accused of supporting Taliban forces, recruiting and training Mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

In the above scenario, we have to be extremely cautious and strengthen our defence forces by keeping their morale high and providing them with the best, state of the art weapons which can be made available. It has also to be supplemented with well planned infrastructure like all weather roads, rail links, air fields, communication net works stretching to our borders, so that we can quickly mobilize adequate troops and equipments to the required areas, at short notice. Till the beginning of the last decade, we were having very good relationship with Russia from whom we met most of our weapon requirements. This was mainly due to the extremely warm relation and mutual trust we enjoyed with them. With the breaking down of the old Soviet Union, their defence sector also was not able to cope up with the challenges posed due to financial crunch and lack of strategic support from their government. There was also a lag in meeting deadlines and quality. Compelled by the situation, we started looking for alternate sources for meeting our strategic needs to countries like Israel, France, Sweden and USA. From our point of view, it was justifiable also to have diversified sources for procuring our legitimate defence requirements for reducing risk and to have better flexibility.

Indo-Russian Ties

Despite being one of the pioneers and founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, India developed a closer relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, India's relatively cooperative strategic and military relations with Moscow and strong socialist policies had a distinctly adverse impact on its relations with the United States. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India began to review its foreign policy in a unipolar world, and took steps to develop closer ties with the European Union and the United States. During the Cold War, India and the Soviet Union (USSR) enjoyed a strong strategic, military, economic and diplomatic relationship. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia inherited the close relationship with India, even as India improved its relations with the West after the end of the Cold War. India is the second largest market for the Russian defence industry. In 2004, more than 70% of the Indian Military's hardware came from Russia, making Russia the chief supplier of defence equipment. The relationship began with a visit by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and Khrushchev's return trip to India in the fall of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union supported Indian sovereignty over Kashmir. The Soviet Union declared its neutrality during the 1959 border dispute and the Sino-Indian war of October 1962, although the Chinese strongly objected. The Soviet Union gave India substantial economic and military assistance during the Khrushchev period, and by 1960 India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. This disparity became another point of contention in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1962, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to co-produce the Mikoyan MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which they had earlier denied to China.

Defence relations between India and the Russian Federation have a historical perspective. The Soviet Union was an important supplier of defence equipment for several decades, and that relationship was inherited by Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1997, Russia and India signed a ten-year agreement to further military-technical cooperation. Today, the co-operation is not limited to a buyer-seller relationship but includes joint research and development, training, service to service contacts, including joint exercises. Energy sector is an important area in Indo-Russian bilateral relations. In 2001, ONGC-Videsh acquired 20% stake in the Sakhalin-I oil and gas project in the Russian Federation, and has invested about US $1.7 billion in the project. The Russian company Gasprom and Gas Authority of India have collaborated in joint development of a block in the Bay of Bengal. Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project with two units of 1000 MW each is a good example of Indo-Russian nuclear energy co-operation.

Indo US Relations

Our relation with US after the assassination of Kennedy in 1963 deteriorated gradually and hit an all time low under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s. Richard Nixon established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, was seen as leaning towards the Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close. The frosty relationship between Nixon and Indira Gandhi worsened the relations further. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the US openly supported Pakistan and even deployed its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal, which was seen as a show of force by the US in support of the West Pakistani forces. Later, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha in 1974, which was opposed by the US, In the late 1970s, with the anti-Soviet Janata Party leader Morarji Desai becoming the Prime Minister, India improved its relations with the US, led by Jimmy Carter, despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to the latter's non-proliferation record. But with Indira Gandhi returning to power in 1980 and India supporting the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the relations between the two countries weakened again in the 1980s. Until 1997 there was any significant effort by both countries to improve relations with each other.

Soon after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Indian Prime Minister, he authorised nuclear weapons testing at Pokhran. The United States strongly condemned this testing, and initiated sanctions, and voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning the tests. President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid, freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies, prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases, prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India, and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies. However, these sanctions proved ineffective - India was experiencing a strong economic rise, and its trade with the US constituted a small portion of its GDP only. Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region, and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent great power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China.

Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India are under way. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow, while significant two-way investment also grows and flourishes. During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change. On 8 November, Obama also became the second US President to ever address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Calling the India-US relationship "a defining partnership of the 21st century", he also announced the removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies, and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion, which are expected to create and/or support 50,000 jobs in the US.

In March 2009, the Obama Administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight P-8 Poseidons to India. This deal, and the $5 billion agreement to provide Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and General Electric F414 engines for our Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, makes the US one of the top three military suppliers to India (after Israel and Russia). Indian has raised concerns about contract clauses forbidding the offensive deployment of these systems. India is trying to resolve performance-related issues on the Boeing P-8I that have already been delivered to India. The India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement also referred to as the "123 Agreement", signed on 10 October 2008 is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms to participate in each other's civil nuclear energy sector. For the agreement to be operational, nuclear vendors and operators must comply with India’s 2010 Nuclear Liability Act which stipulates that nuclear suppliers, contractors and operators must bear financial responsibility in case of an accident. The US is one of India's largest trading partners. In 2011, the US exported $21.50 billion worth of goods to India, and imported $36.15 billion worth of Indian goods.

The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $9 billion. Americans have made notable foreign investments in power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries. Key recent developments include the rapid growth of India's economy and bilateral trade, the close links between the Indian and American computer and Internet industries, a geopolitical coalition to balance the rise of an increasingly assertive China, the weakening of U.S.-Pakistan relations over various ongoing disputes, and the 2008 reversal of long-standing American opposition to India's nuclear program. Today, India and the US share an extensive cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship.

Indo-US Ties- Recent Irritants

India, in July and November 2013, demanded that the US respond to revelations that the Indian UN mission in New York City and the Indian Embassy in Washington had been targeted for spying. In December 2013, the arrest, strip-search and temporary detention of an Indian diplomat in New York following a domestic labour dispute caused uproar in India. Deputy Consul General Devyani Khobragade was arrested by US State Department Police on allegations of visa-fraud and handed over to US Marshals for detention.

The female consular official was subjected to repeated handcuffing, stripping and cavity searches, DNA swabbing, and placement in a hold-up alongside common criminals and drug offenders. Another issue was the 2010 document leaked by Edward Snowden and published by the Washington post revealed that US intelligence agencies had been authorised to spy on the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In July 2014, U.S. diplomats were summoned by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to discuss allegations that the National Security Agency had spied upon private individuals and political entities within India.

Prior to Narendra Modi becoming the Prime Minister of India, the US Government had made it known that Modi as Chief Minister of Gujarat would not be permitted to travel to the US. Sectarian violence during the 2002 Gujarat riots damaged relations between the US Government and Narendra Modi, the then Chief Minister of Gujarat. American based human rights activists accused Modi of fostering anti-Muslim violence. The Obama administration maintained the 2005 decision taken by the George W. Bush administration to deny Narendra Modi entry into America. In 2012, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) appointed by the Indian Supreme Court found no “prosecutable evidence” against Modi. The Supreme Court of India absolved Narendra Modi of any criminal wrongdoing during the 2002 Gujarat riots. The US Government completely failed to anticipate the political rise of Narendra Modi to the office of Prime Minister of India. Now the US Government is of the view that Modi can circumvent the USCIRF sanctions regime by visiting Washington as heads of government on A1-visa as long as he is the Prime Minister of India.

India’s Defence Ties with Russia vis a vis US: An Analysis

Neglecting our time tested friend Russia, and before making a strategic shift in our defence procurements from US, we have to evaluate our long term security risks and issues like availability of spare parts, technology transfer etc. Russia was more than willing to supply India their latest weapons as per our wish list in the earlier decades and even now. However, we cannot conclude the same about America. For example, Russia was willing to agree for joint development of 4plus generation fighter Su30 MKI, 5th generation fighter Sukhoi/HAL FGFA, Ilyushin/HAL tactical transport aircraft, lease of TU22 M3 bombers. We cannot expect America to sell us their best fighter F22 Raptor. Although we had recently acquired C - 130 J Super Hercules and Boeing C-17 Globemaster III strategic lift aircrafts, Boeing P-8i Poseidon multi mission maritime aircraft etc from US, we have to consider factors like their prohibitive cost, future supply of spare parts, technology transfer possibility etc:.

It may be noted that we are reconsidering our plan to procure ultra light weight M777 Howitzer artillery gun from US because of their prohibitive cost. Factors like denial of technology, spare parts/information during hostile situation like what we faced during Kargil incursion by denying the satellite data required by us has strengthened our decision to go for our own IRNASS (satellite navigation system). Moreover, India had always taken a principled stand on non interference in other countries’ internal affairs, respecting the sovereignty of other nations. America cannot be judged to have followed these principles when they had interfered in countries like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya in recent times. The result of such military interference had caused internal turmoil and chaos in those countries and instability in that region. The acts of our strategic partner should also be such that it is fair, justifiable and based on sound principles acceptable to us and the world community, since we may also have to support its acts in world forums like United Nations.

There are still areas or defence equipments which Russia have an edge or upper hand like S - 500 long range aircraft and anti ballistic missile defence system, new state-of-the-art Novorossiysk submarine etc, which show that they are still a force to reckon with. Joint development of Brahmos supersonic cruise missile which is under induction with our tri services, leasing of their powerful Akula II class nuclear submarine, sale to India of their Aircraft carrier (our INS Vikramaditya), their long time association with us in nuclear technology, space, developments in the cryogenic engine technology, cooperation in our development of Arihant class nuclear submarines etc, we owe much to Russia. Of course, there has been long delays and cost overrun in the aircraft carrier deal. However, during their difficult times, if we reciprocate by supporting them with offers to coproduce and in research for developing next generation weapons, which will in turn help them also to tide over their present crisis, set a new vigor to their industries, our strategic interest is also protected in the long term. It will also ensure that Russian made weapons do not go to countries which are inimical to us. A stronger Russia will ensure a multipolar world which will be in Indian interest also and for promoting world peace.

Meanwhile, let us hope that our DRDO, HAL, our shipyards and our other indigenous industry take up this challenge and make us self sufficient to meet the requirements of our defence forces by absorbing the latest technology available and providing us with next generation weapon systems so that we can reduce our dependence on foreign sources. Policies and recent statements made by our new government to substantially increase our domestic defence research activities, to cut delays in executing the ongoing projects and to evolve new technology and weapons instead of trying to emulate what other countries had already developed, are rightly in this direction. Till such substantial changes are visible on the ground, we will have to judiciously balance our external defence procurements in a way which will promote our strategic interest. Indian foreign policy should be based on maintaining strategic autonomy to promote and safeguard our long term national interest.

(The author is a Dubai-based observer of Strategic Affairs)

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Published Date: 19^th September 2014, Image source: http://ibsindia.org

India-China Relations: Mutual Concerns

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute. The other major concern is the “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, as has been widely reported in the international media. China and Pakistan are also known to have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1/JF-17 fighter aircraft. China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s war waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, it is also China’s proxy war.

From the Indian perspective, there are several other contentious issues. These include China’s continuing opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and, its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen by many Indian analysts as forming part of a “string of pearls” strategy to contain India and develop the capacity to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20. Though at present the Indian Navy dominates the northern Indian Ocean, a maritime clash is possible in future as the PLA Navy begins operating in the Indian Ocean – ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanes and protect its merchant ship traffic. Hence, China’s moves are seen by Indian analysts to be part of a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in the long-term to counter-balance India’s growing power and influence in Asia, even as China engages India on the political and economic fronts in the short-term.

As both China and India are nuclear-armed states, it is in the interest of both to ensure that strategic stability is maintained and that the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear exchanges is minimised. This would be possible only if negotiators from both the sides sit down together and discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). However, China’s insistence that it cannot discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs with India as India is not a nuclear weapons state recognised by the NPT is proving to be a stumbling block. China’s official position is that India should cap, roll back and eliminate its nuclear weapons in terms of UNSC Resolution No 1172. That is unlikely to happen. India has been recognised as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and has been given a backdoor entry into the NPT through the NSG waiver and the IAEA safeguards agreement. India has also signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Russia and the United States (US). It would be in the interest of both the countries to discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs so as to enhance strategic stability in Southern Asia. It is also in China’s interest to enter into a nuclear trade agreement with India as India is rapidly emerging as a large market for nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

India realises that its growing external relations with its new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with some suspicion India’s willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a “quadrilateral” engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing influence of the US over New Delhi. China knows that the US is several years ahead of Beijing in recognising India's potential as a military and economic power and has greatly increased its cooperation with India in both spheres. China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a loose alliance and that the two countries are ganging up against China. It should be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the US – unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also China’s “all weather” friend. India has always pursued an independent foreign policy and cherishes its strategic autonomy. It will be recalled that India steadfastly supported the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) for several decades during the Cold War and has never entered into a military alliance with any country. The US is an Asian country in strategic terms and it is necessary for India to maintain good relations with it. It is also India’s largest trading partner and has a large Indian Diaspora. There are major convergences of interests between India and the US. Hence, India’s newfound strategic relationship with the US need not come in the way of India-China relations, which have their own strategic significance for India.

In an article entitled “Warning to the Indian Government” (posted on the website of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies on March 26, 2008), Zhan Lue, a Communist Party member, warned India not to “walk today along the old road of resisting China” as the People’s Liberation Army is now well-entrenched in Tibet and will not repeat its mistake of withdrawing after a border war as it did in 1962. He extolled the virtues of the PLA’s newly developed capabilities and went on to advise India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.” This surprisingly sharp attack in a scholarly journal did not appear to be an isolated piece of writing. Another Chinese scholar advised his government to engage India’s neighbours to break India into 26 parts. In the wake of the Tibetan unrest in India and across the world earlier during 2008, anti-India rhetoric in the Chinese media had been ratcheted up several notches. Analysts in India believe that such scurrilous writings could not have been published without the express sanction of the Chinese authorities as almost all Chinese media are state controlled. This type of rhetoric sets back efforts at reconciliation and mutual understanding.

China is concerned about the situation that might develop when the Dalai Lama passes away. Despite all the raving and ranting against him, the Chinese government is acutely conscious of the fact that the present Dalai Lama’s is a voice of moderation and accommodation. They know that there will be a major uprising in Tibet when he passes away as the Tibetan youth will no longer feel constrained to respect his cherished desire for peace and harmony and are likely to resort to violent attacks against the Han Chinese people and officials and state property. Despite India’s remarkable restraint over 50 years, the Chinese are not sure of how India will react to a post-Dalai Lama rebellion in Tibet. In fact, the Chinese harbour a fair deal of ill will against India for providing the Dalai Lama with sanctuary – even though India has forbidden him from any anti-China political activities from Indian soil and the Dalai Lama has honoured the restraints imposed on him by his hosts. A senior Chinese interlocutor told this analyst at a bilateral think tanks’ dialogue at Bangkok in October 2009 that relations between China and India would flourish very well if India was to hand over the Dalai Lama to China even at this belated stage. From this the depth of Chinese resentment with India for providing shelter to the Dalai Lama can be gauged. Since such a course of action would be completely out of character with India’s civilisational and spiritual values, handing over the Dalai Lama is simply out of the question. China would, therefore, do well to put this issue aside and move forward in its relationship with India.

Another area of concern for India is the rapid development of military infrastructure in Tibet by China. The Gormo-Lhasa railway line is now fully operational. The rail network is proposed to be extended towards Shigatse and then into Nepal. China has recently developed a road network of 58,000 km and five new air bases. New military camps have come up close to the border with India. Telephone and radio communication infrastructure has been considerably improved. China has been practicing the rapid induction of airborne divisions into Tibet. Some Indian analysts have estimated that China is now capable of inducting and sustaining about 25 to 30 divisions in Tibet in a single campaign season. Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), some of them nuclear tipped, are also known to be deployed in Tibet. Surely, all these developments are not for sustaining Tibet’s fledgling economy. The continuing improvement of military infrastructure in Tibet does not augur well for future peace and stability between the two nations in the light of an unresolved territorial and boundary dispute.

Will China Checkmate India on Chabahar? Printer-friendly version

Radhakrishna Rao, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In a development that could very well upset India’s geo-strategic apple cart, China is making deft and vigorous moves to woo Iran to accept its offer of US$80-million to upgrade the Chabahar port located on the coast of Gulf of Oman, off the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps it could be a well thought out move on the part of China, which through its “string of pearls” strategy is busy expanding its area of influence across the Indian Ocean region, to keep India away from the project and slowly intrude into the Indian geo-political space in Tehran. A toehold in Iran could drive China to cast its “net of influence” far and wide, across the West Asian landscape, with serious consequences for the American presence in this oil rich part of the world.

From building the deep sea ports and launching satellites to constructing all weather highways and putting in place telecom networks, China has become a “partner in progress” for many countries in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladesh are among the Indian neighbours where an impressive “Chinese presence” has become a fait accompli. In the context of the administrative control of the Gwadar port located on Makran coast, overlooking the Arabian sea, in Pakistan’s sparsely populated and restive Balochistan province, passing on into the Chinese hands, Chabahar has come to assume immense strategic and economic significance for India. Clearly and apparently, India’s participation in Chabahar port development could, to some extent, work as a counter-poise to the advantages that China could derive from managing Gwadar port.

Gwadar port, which stands out as a vibrant symbol of strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, could very well give China an easy access to the key energy markets in the Middle East. Further, it could also provide China a convenient access to the warm waters of Indian Ocean and a listening post near the Strait of Hormuz. Incidentally, about 20% of the world’s petroleum and 35% of the petroleum traded by sea pass through the Strait of Hormuz, described as one of the world’s busiest and most strategically located sea lanes.

As part of the ambitious US$18-billion economic corridor project connecting Kashgar in China with Gwadar, it is planned to build a pipeline as well as road and rail links that will involve engineering of around 200-kms of tunnels across the treacherous mountainous landscape. The road link will involve upgrading and realigning the strategically located Karakoram highway. Kashgar is located in China’s disturbed western Xinjiang province where Muslim Uighur separatists are quite active.

Of course, the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline may help China reduce its dependence on Malacca Strait in so far as transporting oil from West Asia is concerned. Further, it could help meet a part of the energy needs of the Western parts of China. More importantly, this pipeline makes a strategic sense for China in terms of strengthening its long term energy security. On another front, in order to bring down its reliance on the Strait of Malacca for transporting crude, China has invested heavily in building an oil and gas pipeline in Myanmar. As things stand now, China is expected to overtake US as the world’s largest crude importer in 2014.Currently,three fourth of China’s crude import from Middle East are channelled through the Strait of Malacca which is vulnerable to piracy and geo political uncertainties. But then the economic corridor project is still at a conceptual stage and it would be sometime before it gets going. However, both the countries, while highlighting the economic importance of the project, have downplayed its strategic aspects. Meanwhile, reports emanating from Beijing quote Chinese Government officials as saying that security concern could hinder the 2000-km long economic corridor project.

On their part, US security analysts believe that China could very well make use of its control over Gwadar for furthering its military interests. In the ultimate analysis, there are many strategic gains that China can derive from the port with particular reference to protecting its long term interests in the Indian Ocean region in addition to ensuring its energy security. Significantly, Gwadar is located just 72 nautical miles east of Chabahar. However, the daring pre dawn attack on a check post of coast guards near Gwadar in late July has exposed the vulnerability of the port to the prevailing volatile conditions in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan province. This attack is believed to be the handiwork of the banned militant group, Balochistan Liberation Front.

Though the development of the Chabahar port has been on the agenda of India-Iran bilateral discussions since 2003, the political leadership in New Delhi was far from serious about Indian participation in this vital maritime project from which India can stand to make substantial gains. After sitting on this project proposal for nearly ten years, the ruling elite of the country has suddenly realized the vital importance it holds for country’s long term geo political interests. This appears to be a sequel to Chinese move to edge out India.

Of course, India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid during his visit to Teheran earlier this year had driven home the point that India could provide upto US$100-milliion assistance to upgrade the port. About the project, Kurshid had this to say, ”The two sides have pushed for transit pact between India, Iran and Afghanistan which would help India get access to the land locked and resources rich countries in Central Asia. We are going ahead with the Chabahar project. Cabinet has already cleared it”. As things stand now, Iran is yet to give its final clearance for the Indian investment in project. However, political observers are clear in their perception that India should seek fast track negotiations with Tehran to pave the way for the Indian participation in the up-gradation of this port. This could prevent China from upstaging India.

But then USA has all along been hostile to the Indian proposal of joining hands with Iran for this maritime project. Unfortunately, India’s track record in standing up to the US “political pressure and psychological intimidation” is far from impressive. As such, in the backdrop of the Chinese move to corner India, New Delhi should be driven by its own domestic compulsions and interests and get the decks cleared for Indian participation in Chabahar port development without any loss of time. There is no need for India to buy the American argument that Iran should be isolated for its nuclear weapons development programme.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, in early August, the new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani while addressing the Majlis (National Parliament) stated that if the West wants an “adequate response” from Iran, it should not speak the language of sanctions but that of respect. There is no denying the fact that Iranian economy has suffered heavily due to US and European sanctions and threat against the countries that continue to do business with Iran.

But the grim ground reality is that the routine trade between India and Iran have been affected by payment issue following sanctions. The recent visit of an Iranian business delegation to the tea gardens in north east India has raised the hopes of exporting an “appreciable volume” of high end tea varieties to Iran. As it is, early last year, the powerful American Jewish Committee had told the Indian Ambassador to USA, Nirupama Rao, that it was “deeply troubled” by the recent reports of India’s efforts to intensify trade relations with Iran” at the very moment when the US and fellow democracies are applying new economic pressure to persuade Tehran to halt its nuclear programme.”

In May this year, Hassan Nourian, Consul General of Iran in Hyderabad, had observed that the bilateral trade between the two countries is poised to cross US$25-billion within four years. ”We have already entered the second year. Currently, most of the exports from Iran to India are primarily based on oil and petroleum products. To effect this, both have encouraged focussing on non oil exports from India in order to strike a balance between the two countries,” he said. Following sanctions, the annual Iranian crude import by India valued at US$15-billion is being paid for in the Indian Rupee. However, the annual Indian export to Iran is pegged at around US$2.5-billion per annum. It is planned to boost this to S$4-billion.Even with this figure, it means a surplus credit balance of US$11-billion in favour of Iran. How to offset this huge trade imbalance happens to be the crux of bilateral trade discussions between the two countries.

There is no denying the fact that Indian investment in Chabahar is important for India to protect its “business and commercial interests” in the landlocked Afghanistan as Pakistan has denied India transit access to Afghanistan through its land route. It is planned to construct a railway network connecting Chabahar with Zahedan in Afghanistan. Moreover, the port is already linked to the city of Zarang located in south western Nimroz province of Afghanistan. This road link can serve as India’s entry point to Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond. Indeed, Chabahar could invest India with ability to move quickly goods and supplies and if necessary even defence personnel straight to Afghanistan through Iran which assumes significance in the backdrop of US and allied troops planning a phased pull out from the war torn Afghanistan. Of course, India should nudge Iran to agree to the idea of moving military forces to Afghanistan through Chabahar. But this would again be subject to Iran getting some long term strategic benefits in such an arrangement. However, India is yet to take up this issue with Iran.

Chabahar has been designated as a Free trade and Industrial zone by Tehran. It has also been described as Iran’s best access point to Indian Ocean. Iran has already spent US$350-million on the development of this port. Without doubt, Indian participation could help the port, which because of the sanctions, has not been in a position to corner the business in proportion with its potential, to earn more revenue from catering to the Indian needs on a variety of fronts. India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar. With many of the Indian enterprises keen on entering the lucrative mining sector of Afghanistan, Indian participation in Chabahar project could prove a win win deal for India Inc.

As it is, India’s growing role in Afghanistan focuses on the plan to extract iron ore from the mountain ranges at Hajigak, located about 100-kms to the northwest of the capital city of Kabul. According to Ali Jalali, a Professor at the US National Defence University in Washington and a former Afghan Interior Minister, Indian and Chinese investment will be a major contributor to Afghanistan’s stability as the US is preparing to withdraw its main combat forces between now and 2014.”

On another front, India and Iran are also discussing building a gas pipeline between the two countries along the bed of the Arabian Sea to bypass Pakistan using Chabahar port. Rattled as it is by India’s drastic reduction in purchase of its oil, Iran deemed it prudent to offer India oilfields on lucrative terms along with a proposal to route the gas through the undersea pipeline. Of course, in the wake of sanctions, New Delhi has difficult times paying for the imported Iranian oil in foreign currency. Further, there is also difficulty in getting ships to ferry oil along with the insurance cover.

As it is, India was forced to pull out of Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project on account of a variety of factors including security issues, differences over pricing as well as US pressure. The security concern stemmed from the fact that the pipeline will pass through Balochistan where Baloch separatists and Islamic radical outfits could pose a threat to the safety of the pipeline. But then a section of strategic analysts hold the view that India’s withdrawal from this vital energy pipeline project was a sort of geo-political blunder as India lost an opportunity to create a new equation in the region.

As envisaged now, a consortium with state owned JN Port and Kandla port on-board, is likely to take up the development of Chabahar port. The Indian side is proposing a phase wise development of Chabahar on long term operations, maintenance and transfer basis spread over 60-90 years. Iran has successfully positioned Chabahar as the focal point for development of the east of the country through expansion and enhancement of transit routes among the countries situated in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. But then as is the case with Gwadar, Chabhar too could face a threat from Sunni Baloch insurgents who have no love lost for the regime in Teheran.

For quite sometime now, India has been more than keen on getting a convenient access route to the landlocked Afghanistan through Iran. And in this quest lays the importance of Chabahar for India. By all means, Chabahar is the best option left for the country to reach Afghanistan in a hassle free manner .Indeed, India, Iran and Afghanistan are now edging closer to concluding a transit treaty that would facilitate easier linkage between India and Afghanistan through Iran. As it is, both New Delhi and Kabul are keen on ending their dependence on Pakistan for transit. Both India and Iran have agreed that “the project would provide connectivity with Afghanistan and provide an impetus to Afghanistan’s economic development.”

Going beyond Indian investment on the development of Chabahar, Iran has also made a proposal to India for joint investment and production sharing contract for oil exploration. Indeed, this offer has tremendous strategic significance from the point of view of ensuring Indian energy security. But then New Delhi will have to devise ingenious ways and means to circumvent sanctions if it wants to participate in the Iranian oil exploration venture. For the energy deficit India, collaboration with Iran in the area of oil and petroleum cannot but be a positive development.

By all means, India’s interest in developing strategically important south eastern Iranian sea port of Chabahar as well as New Delhi’s craving for better bilateral relations is seen as a positive step towards regional cooperation and economic gains for the participating countries. India’s construction plans for Chabahar port could also be viewed as reviving of old links and building new bridges of friendship through collaboration. While Iran is all set to derive benefits from positioning Chabhar as a logistical hub and a potential alternative to Bandar Abbas, for Afghanistan, Chabahar could be an alluring alternative to the dependence on Pakistan’s Karachi port for carrying out its international trade. In the ultimate analysis, it is advantages all the way from the Chabahar project for Afghanistan, India and Iran.