India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Analysis

Prof Nirmala Joshi

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) forthcoming annual summit meeting in Bashkortostan in Russia in July 2015 , it is expected that India’s status would be elevated from an Observer to a full member. If reports are true, it would indeed be a positive development for India. A regional Grouping, the SCO, comprises of countries some of whom are part of its extended / strategic neighbourhood. Today India’s neighbourhood is in a state of flux, the shape of future scenario in Afghanistan is uncertain.The process of withdrawal of Western coalition forces from Afghanistan has begun. Afghanistan is in the midst of a complex transition; security, political and economic. In the months ahead, it will be clear as to how strong the resurgence of the Taliban is. Simply put, Afghanistan is the pivot of regional stability, an imperative necessity both for the consolidation of the new democracy and for the region. .

The withdrawal of Western coalition forces from Afghanistan, after over thirteen years of an inconclusive ‘war on terror’ has undoubtedly weakened the Taliban, but has not been able to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. Therefore, the resurgence in insurgency will continue depending upon the ability of the Afghan government to control these forces. The violent activities of the Islamic State (IS) in West Asia serve as an encouragement to extremist forces in Afghanistan. A new security paradigm, however, will emerge in the months ahead. In this shifting geopolitical paradigm, military action will be ruled out to counter the threats emanating from non traditional sources. . At this critical juncture, the best approach is the cooperative approach by the stakeholders of peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.

In this unfolding scenario, the SCO is the only regional grouping that has a security agenda for the region. The SCO is not a military alliance or ‘an Eastern NATO‘ in the making as some opine, nor a mere ‘ discussion club’. The focus of the SCO is on comprehensive security, that includes social and economic aspects as well. The question is, can the SCO emerge as the security provider for the region? What are India’s interests in joining the SCO?

Since India has a high stake in the stability of the region, its membership of the SCO will give it an opportunity to contribute towards its objective. Indian experience of confronting the challenge of nontraditional threats for decades could be useful in broadening the discourse on regional stability. The regional security agenda of fighting the ’ three evils’, extremism, separatism and terrorism as spelt out by China are in congruence with Indian security interests. Under the Taliban rule, Afghanistan had emerged as the hub of extremism and radical Islam which affected all the members of the SCO. The Taliban have proved to be a resilient force, despite the war on terror. Consequently, the insurgency has emerged as a festering sore. India and the member countries of the SCO are multi ethnic pluralist societies, and have been afflicted with the scourge of extremism and radical Islam, though the level of this challenge varies from country to country.

The non-traditional threats are trans-national in character and are carried out by non state actors cooperation among the countries of the region is an absolute necessity to deal with this danger as it does not have its own Collective Rapid Reaction Force, a para military organisation to deal with counter terrorism, it can nevertheless initiate a positive discourse on the need for a cooperative approach. Another dimension of insurgency is the well known fact that drug profits is one of the sources that sustains extremism and terrorism. The issue of drug production and its continued trafficking has not received its due attention. As a result, drug cartels have come up along the borders and they oversee the trafficking of drugs. Drug trafficking is also having a negative fallout at the societal level in the region. The SCO had earlier suggested the creation of a drug belt around Afghanistan for protection of its members. It had put forward the suggestion of training border guards. However, nothing further has been heard about this suggestion. Moreover the region is awash with weapons and its illicit trade has also helped in keeping insurgency alive.

The SCO has, however, established a Regional Anti Terrorists Structure (RATS) at Tashkent in 2002 which became operational in2004. The focus of RATS is to “…arrange studies of regional terrorist movements and exchange information about counter terrorist policies. The RATS also coordinates military exercises among its members as a way of training the forces. As mentioned, the RATS does not have its own Collective Rapid Reaction Force. It still has to create one, and importantly it has to work out a multilateral legal document which could provide for joint action on struggle against counter terrorism. Till then, RATS will remain a coordinating centre. Nevetheless, India has been actively cooperating with RATS sharing experience and information, and gaining useful inputs into the movements of various groups and organizations. The SCO has also set up a Contact Group on Afghanistan whereby Afghanistan became a permanent invitee as a ‘guest’ to SCO summit meetings. At the Dushanbe summit in 2014, Afghanistan was given the Observer status. Thus, SCO comprises of countries which have crucial ramifications for its security concerns.

In the present day world order, the trend towards globalistaion has gathered momentum wherein nations are drawing closer to each other particularly in the sphere of economy. Paradoxically, the tendency towards regionalism has become dominant feature of a region. This tendency is because the nature of issues today are transnational in character; be it security or economic ones, and these require a collective voice. A collaborative approach helps in strengthening its bargaining position with other regions. The SCO is a regional grouping and can promote a discourse on regional cooperation. As a founder member of the Non Aligned Movement in the sixties, India has varied experience of participating in several multi lateral groupings. The Indian experience could prove to be an asset for the SCO.

Moreover, the countries that are part of the SCO are also part of the vast Eurasian landmass. The total population of this landmass is over 1.5 billion. It has opened up prospects for commercial interests for India of this huge market. Since India’s ‘strategic vision’ broadened to include the wider Asian region, it wants to enhance its engagement with its extended neighbourhood for mutual benefit. India is likely to negotiate a free trade zone with the Russia led Customs Union.

Similarly the Central Asian Republics have reached a stage in their development, where they would now like to focus on the southern vector of their foreign policies. The SCO has established an Energy Club, Business Forum etc. Recently at the Dushanbe summit in September 2014, Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj expressed India’s readiness to participate in these economic forums. India has already participated in the Energy Club and the Business Forum. Among its other areas of focus is the Transport sector. It is hoped that Pakistan’s likely membership of the SCO along with India would facilitate the opening of a trade route for India to Central Asia and beyond.

Besides, there is a perception among the academic and strategic community, journalists and others, that the SCO is an instrument in the hands of China to spread its influence in Central Asia. Probably for this reason China, a leading member of SCO, has been reluctant to upgrade India’s status from an Observer nation to a full member. It may be apprehending, that within the grouping two broad viewpoints could emerge; one led by Russia, the Central Asian Republics and India, and the other one by China and Pakistan. In any future discussions and resolutions of the SCO, the view point led by Russia and others could prevail. The latent differences between Russia and China may have strengthened Chinese apprehensions. The Central Asian Republics have always perceived India as a ‘soft balancer’ and hence supported its candidature. If India is made a full member, some of these Chinese concerns will no longer be untenable.

In conclusion, the SCO cannot be a security provider to the region, in view of the nature of threats and challenges. It can at best facilitate regional cooperation. From that perspective, the Indian membership of the SCO would be a positive step and its rich experience of multilateral diplomacy could provide valuable inputs to SCO’s efforts.

(The author is former Professor at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

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Published Date: 3^rd April 2015, Image source: http://infoshos.ru

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

India-China Relations: Mutual Concerns

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute. The other major concern is the “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, as has been widely reported in the international media. China and Pakistan are also known to have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1/JF-17 fighter aircraft. China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s war waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, it is also China’s proxy war.

From the Indian perspective, there are several other contentious issues. These include China’s continuing opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and, its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen by many Indian analysts as forming part of a “string of pearls” strategy to contain India and develop the capacity to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20. Though at present the Indian Navy dominates the northern Indian Ocean, a maritime clash is possible in future as the PLA Navy begins operating in the Indian Ocean – ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanes and protect its merchant ship traffic. Hence, China’s moves are seen by Indian analysts to be part of a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in the long-term to counter-balance India’s growing power and influence in Asia, even as China engages India on the political and economic fronts in the short-term.

As both China and India are nuclear-armed states, it is in the interest of both to ensure that strategic stability is maintained and that the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear exchanges is minimised. This would be possible only if negotiators from both the sides sit down together and discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). However, China’s insistence that it cannot discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs with India as India is not a nuclear weapons state recognised by the NPT is proving to be a stumbling block. China’s official position is that India should cap, roll back and eliminate its nuclear weapons in terms of UNSC Resolution No 1172. That is unlikely to happen. India has been recognised as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and has been given a backdoor entry into the NPT through the NSG waiver and the IAEA safeguards agreement. India has also signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Russia and the United States (US). It would be in the interest of both the countries to discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs so as to enhance strategic stability in Southern Asia. It is also in China’s interest to enter into a nuclear trade agreement with India as India is rapidly emerging as a large market for nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

India realises that its growing external relations with its new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with some suspicion India’s willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a “quadrilateral” engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing influence of the US over New Delhi. China knows that the US is several years ahead of Beijing in recognising India's potential as a military and economic power and has greatly increased its cooperation with India in both spheres. China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a loose alliance and that the two countries are ganging up against China. It should be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the US – unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also China’s “all weather” friend. India has always pursued an independent foreign policy and cherishes its strategic autonomy. It will be recalled that India steadfastly supported the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) for several decades during the Cold War and has never entered into a military alliance with any country. The US is an Asian country in strategic terms and it is necessary for India to maintain good relations with it. It is also India’s largest trading partner and has a large Indian Diaspora. There are major convergences of interests between India and the US. Hence, India’s newfound strategic relationship with the US need not come in the way of India-China relations, which have their own strategic significance for India.

In an article entitled “Warning to the Indian Government” (posted on the website of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies on March 26, 2008), Zhan Lue, a Communist Party member, warned India not to “walk today along the old road of resisting China” as the People’s Liberation Army is now well-entrenched in Tibet and will not repeat its mistake of withdrawing after a border war as it did in 1962. He extolled the virtues of the PLA’s newly developed capabilities and went on to advise India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.” This surprisingly sharp attack in a scholarly journal did not appear to be an isolated piece of writing. Another Chinese scholar advised his government to engage India’s neighbours to break India into 26 parts. In the wake of the Tibetan unrest in India and across the world earlier during 2008, anti-India rhetoric in the Chinese media had been ratcheted up several notches. Analysts in India believe that such scurrilous writings could not have been published without the express sanction of the Chinese authorities as almost all Chinese media are state controlled. This type of rhetoric sets back efforts at reconciliation and mutual understanding.

China is concerned about the situation that might develop when the Dalai Lama passes away. Despite all the raving and ranting against him, the Chinese government is acutely conscious of the fact that the present Dalai Lama’s is a voice of moderation and accommodation. They know that there will be a major uprising in Tibet when he passes away as the Tibetan youth will no longer feel constrained to respect his cherished desire for peace and harmony and are likely to resort to violent attacks against the Han Chinese people and officials and state property. Despite India’s remarkable restraint over 50 years, the Chinese are not sure of how India will react to a post-Dalai Lama rebellion in Tibet. In fact, the Chinese harbour a fair deal of ill will against India for providing the Dalai Lama with sanctuary – even though India has forbidden him from any anti-China political activities from Indian soil and the Dalai Lama has honoured the restraints imposed on him by his hosts. A senior Chinese interlocutor told this analyst at a bilateral think tanks’ dialogue at Bangkok in October 2009 that relations between China and India would flourish very well if India was to hand over the Dalai Lama to China even at this belated stage. From this the depth of Chinese resentment with India for providing shelter to the Dalai Lama can be gauged. Since such a course of action would be completely out of character with India’s civilisational and spiritual values, handing over the Dalai Lama is simply out of the question. China would, therefore, do well to put this issue aside and move forward in its relationship with India.

Another area of concern for India is the rapid development of military infrastructure in Tibet by China. The Gormo-Lhasa railway line is now fully operational. The rail network is proposed to be extended towards Shigatse and then into Nepal. China has recently developed a road network of 58,000 km and five new air bases. New military camps have come up close to the border with India. Telephone and radio communication infrastructure has been considerably improved. China has been practicing the rapid induction of airborne divisions into Tibet. Some Indian analysts have estimated that China is now capable of inducting and sustaining about 25 to 30 divisions in Tibet in a single campaign season. Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), some of them nuclear tipped, are also known to be deployed in Tibet. Surely, all these developments are not for sustaining Tibet’s fledgling economy. The continuing improvement of military infrastructure in Tibet does not augur well for future peace and stability between the two nations in the light of an unresolved territorial and boundary dispute.