Elections in Sri Lanka and Evolving Relationship with India

Brig Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The coming elections for the Presidency in Sri Lanka have heightened the political activity. President Mahinda Rajapakse is seeking a third term based on the 18^th Amendment to the Constitution (carried out in 2010 to overcome the two-term limitation for a President) that had been objected to by the Opposition parties. The Opposition parties have thrown up a joint candidate Maithripala Sirisena (who was General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party and has now defected to the opposing side) to present a unified front in order to defeat Rajapakse. Two other cabinet ministers have also joined the opposition. This only shows the level of resentment even within the ruling party to the present dispensation which to all accounts is being controlled by one family. Rajapakse government has been termed as corrupt and authoritarian by the opposition.

In a recent online survey carried out 52% of the respondents selected corruption while 21% selected the economy, 19% selected constitutional reform and balance chose human rights as the major issues in elections. The survey also opined that if the Presidential election is to be held tomorrow, majority of respondents believed that Maithripala Sirisena would win. Only 23.94% believe that President Rajapakse would win. Many of the political leaders from the ruling party and the opposition have crossed over to the other side but the opinion-poll says that the opposition’s common candidate has benefited the most.

Srisena has also promised cleaning up government corruption and full implementation of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’s recommendations as suggested by the UN Human Rights Commission besides repealing the 18^th Amendment. By all accounts, there is a viable opposition even while Rajapakse remains confident that he will come out as a winner. However, it is expected to be a close contest. There is also the question of executive Presidency which the opposition parties have resolved to abolish. But then the question of whether executive Presidency should continue or not has been part and parcel of Sri Lanka’s politics for long with both sides favouring it or going against it as is politically expedient to them at a given point of time. The possibilities of violence and fraud during elections cannot be ruled out given the total control on the polity and power by the present government. Rajapakse had used money and muscle power and the government machinery and distributed favours to defeat Sarath Fonseka in the 2009 presidential election.

India would be naturally interested in a free and fair poll that reflects the wishes of Tamil majority areas in North and East of Sri Lanka. The possibilities of Bodu Bala Sena (a radical Buddhist outfit) being utilized by the current dispensation to improve its electoral prospects in certain areas cannot be ruled out. There are also apprehensions that Rajapakse government may indulge in malpractices in Tamil majority areas because of their antipathy to the current government and concomitant lack of support. Devolution of powers to Tamil areas had been promised by Rajapakse but he has not delivered. India has been insisting on Rajapakse that he should implement the 13^th Amendment to the Constitution which mandates devolution of powers to the provinces. There is also the question of human rights violations in the closing phase of civil war in 2009. There is a view that an opposition victory might be able to address these issues positively.

Ethnic issue has been one of the contentious issues in the bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka. India has indeed been the most important external actor in the Sri Lankan ethnic issue that was determined by its geo-strategic interests, internal political factor and as a regional power, apart from its desire to find a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict in its neighbourhood. India has been caught in a ‘dilemma’ of finding a solution meeting the sentiments and rights of the aggrieved Tamil community, but without affecting the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. New Delhi has been encouraging Sri Lanka to reach an accommodation with the main Sri Lanka Tamil political group, the Tamil National Alliance on the issue of devolution of power to Tamil majority areas in North and East.

With the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 that put an end to the three decade long conflict, conditions were created to work towards peace and prosperity. Presently, New Delhi’s broad concerns are resettlement and development of and bringing a lasting political settlement of the ethnic issue in the long run. India has been implementing developmental assistance projects for the Internally Displaced Persons and disadvantaged sections of the population in Sri Lanka. Despite ups and downs in relations on the ethnic issue, cooperation in economic and cultural fields improved tremendously over the years. Economic relations especially received big boost after entry into force of a bilateral Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement in March 2000. In few years, India became Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner, and Sri Lanka, India’s largest trading partner in South Asia. Sri Lanka has also been a priority destination for India’s Foreign Direct Investment. The estimates are that bilateral trade could be doubled to 10 billion USD from the current levels of 5 billion in three years or so. The question of Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has been pending since 2009 as Sri Lanka feels that existing FTA needs to become more effective before progressing to CEPA.

The aspect of increasing presence of extra-regional powers like China with strategic objectives has created some complications in the evolving Indo-Sri Lankan relations.

The docking of Chinese submarines in September and October this year in Colombo (the second one Changzheng 2 is nuclear powered), despite some reasoning offered by the Chinese, have created strategic concerns for India. Chinese naval ships have also docked at the container terminal of Colombo raising apprehensions. While Sri Lanka has readily joined China’s New Maritime Silk Route initiative because of possible commercial benefits, India is still weighing the benefits or otherwise of this new initiative and its strategic connotations.

Response from Sri Lankan side has been that their government was fully aware of India’s security concerns and it will not do anything to undermine India’s security concerns. Seemingly intractable issues over many decades have been solved through negotiations between the two countries. Sri Lanka’s leadership feels that their security and prosperity is tied with that of India. Although the three decades conflict has been brought to an end in 2009, yet Sri Lanka’s security concerns regarding residual elements of LTTE and its supporters (Tamil diaspora and Tamils of Tamil Nadu) remain because they still have some foothold inside and outside Sri Lanka. Thus, according to Colombo, their security also gets impacted in the same manner as on India. They also feel that with a strong Modi government at the Centre, the problem of coalition compulsions could be overcome and India’s approach towards Sri Lanka would not get affected by domestic politics. However, looking at the issue from New Delhi’s perspective, no Indian government can ignore the sentiments of Tamils both in Tamil Nadu and in North East areas of Sri Lanka.

Further, in so far as China’s activities in Indian Ocean are concerned, the Sri Lankan interlocutors emphasise the point that Beijing also needs to secure its SLOCs against piracy. Location of Sri Lanka makes it a hub of communications in the Indian Ocean and it is inevitable that ships from different countries would use its ports. However, it is incumbent on Sri Lanka to ensure that such activities do not affect India’s security. Further, the balance of power has shifted to Asia and both China and India will play a major role in the Indian Ocean. Thus, in Sri Lanka’s perspective, China will use Indian Ocean more frequently and this can’t be avoided in the same manner as India would need to expand its activities in South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. No single country can meet the threats to maritime security and this is reflected in a number of joint naval exercises being held in Indian and Pacific Oceans.

On the other hand, Indian interlocutors feel that sending of submarines is not necessary for anti-piracy or any other connected maritime security operations; submarine operations are meant for projection of power into Indian Ocean.

Further, despite India’s presence in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure, the Chinese investments have triggered India’s security threat perceptions. Balancing a larger neighbour by inviting outside help is a game that is played by the smaller neighbour. It is happening all across SAARC and it is no wonder that Sri Lanka is also doing it. Colombo was also in favour of granting full membership to China in SAARC. Obviously, such a step would have affected the centrality of India in this regional multilateral organization.

It also needs to be remembered that during the civil war that ended in 2009, China and Pakistan had provided weapons and other defence equipment to Sri Lankan armed forces while India had only given defensive systems to them in their struggle against the LTTE.

Further, while China has been voting against UNHCR resolution against investigation of human rights violations committed by Sri Lankan armed forces in the last stages of the civil war, India has voted twice in favour and has once absented itself during the UN vote. Though China and India might have their own logic for such action, nevertheless this has had an impact on India-Sri Lanka and China dynamics.

In so far as US and European Union are concerned, they account for two-thirds of Sri Lankan exports. However, Rajapakse’s stance on human rights issues and accountability etc. are not helpful in strengthening their relationship. The US and EU continue to sponsor UNHCR resolutions against Sri Lanka and have called for investigations and holding of war crime trials. In fact, Sri Lanka’s relations with Western powers have deteriorated over the years.

Notwithstanding the likely results of forthcoming Presidential elections in Sri Lanka, India needs to strengthen its defence and economic relationship with Sri Lanka. India’s record in implementing projects in Sri Lanka has not been good; as pointed out by Sri Lankan interlocutors in a recent interaction. New Delhi needs to be nimble and agile while executing infrastructure projects, they felt.

(This is largely based on interaction with experts and scholars from Pathfinder Foundation, Sri Lanka with VIF Faculty and additional independent inputs)

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Published Date: 22^nd December 2014, Image source: http://www.ft.lk

India-China Relations: Mutual Concerns

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute. The other major concern is the “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan, as has been widely reported in the international media. China and Pakistan are also known to have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1/JF-17 fighter aircraft. China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s war waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, it is also China’s proxy war.

From the Indian perspective, there are several other contentious issues. These include China’s continuing opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and, its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen by many Indian analysts as forming part of a “string of pearls” strategy to contain India and develop the capacity to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20. Though at present the Indian Navy dominates the northern Indian Ocean, a maritime clash is possible in future as the PLA Navy begins operating in the Indian Ocean – ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanes and protect its merchant ship traffic. Hence, China’s moves are seen by Indian analysts to be part of a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in the long-term to counter-balance India’s growing power and influence in Asia, even as China engages India on the political and economic fronts in the short-term.

As both China and India are nuclear-armed states, it is in the interest of both to ensure that strategic stability is maintained and that the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear exchanges is minimised. This would be possible only if negotiators from both the sides sit down together and discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). However, China’s insistence that it cannot discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs with India as India is not a nuclear weapons state recognised by the NPT is proving to be a stumbling block. China’s official position is that India should cap, roll back and eliminate its nuclear weapons in terms of UNSC Resolution No 1172. That is unlikely to happen. India has been recognised as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and has been given a backdoor entry into the NPT through the NSG waiver and the IAEA safeguards agreement. India has also signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Russia and the United States (US). It would be in the interest of both the countries to discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs so as to enhance strategic stability in Southern Asia. It is also in China’s interest to enter into a nuclear trade agreement with India as India is rapidly emerging as a large market for nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

India realises that its growing external relations with its new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with some suspicion India’s willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a “quadrilateral” engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing influence of the US over New Delhi. China knows that the US is several years ahead of Beijing in recognising India's potential as a military and economic power and has greatly increased its cooperation with India in both spheres. China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a loose alliance and that the two countries are ganging up against China. It should be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the US – unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also China’s “all weather” friend. India has always pursued an independent foreign policy and cherishes its strategic autonomy. It will be recalled that India steadfastly supported the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) for several decades during the Cold War and has never entered into a military alliance with any country. The US is an Asian country in strategic terms and it is necessary for India to maintain good relations with it. It is also India’s largest trading partner and has a large Indian Diaspora. There are major convergences of interests between India and the US. Hence, India’s newfound strategic relationship with the US need not come in the way of India-China relations, which have their own strategic significance for India.

In an article entitled “Warning to the Indian Government” (posted on the website of the China Institute of International Strategic Studies on March 26, 2008), Zhan Lue, a Communist Party member, warned India not to “walk today along the old road of resisting China” as the People’s Liberation Army is now well-entrenched in Tibet and will not repeat its mistake of withdrawing after a border war as it did in 1962. He extolled the virtues of the PLA’s newly developed capabilities and went on to advise India “not to requite kindness with ingratitude.” This surprisingly sharp attack in a scholarly journal did not appear to be an isolated piece of writing. Another Chinese scholar advised his government to engage India’s neighbours to break India into 26 parts. In the wake of the Tibetan unrest in India and across the world earlier during 2008, anti-India rhetoric in the Chinese media had been ratcheted up several notches. Analysts in India believe that such scurrilous writings could not have been published without the express sanction of the Chinese authorities as almost all Chinese media are state controlled. This type of rhetoric sets back efforts at reconciliation and mutual understanding.

China is concerned about the situation that might develop when the Dalai Lama passes away. Despite all the raving and ranting against him, the Chinese government is acutely conscious of the fact that the present Dalai Lama’s is a voice of moderation and accommodation. They know that there will be a major uprising in Tibet when he passes away as the Tibetan youth will no longer feel constrained to respect his cherished desire for peace and harmony and are likely to resort to violent attacks against the Han Chinese people and officials and state property. Despite India’s remarkable restraint over 50 years, the Chinese are not sure of how India will react to a post-Dalai Lama rebellion in Tibet. In fact, the Chinese harbour a fair deal of ill will against India for providing the Dalai Lama with sanctuary – even though India has forbidden him from any anti-China political activities from Indian soil and the Dalai Lama has honoured the restraints imposed on him by his hosts. A senior Chinese interlocutor told this analyst at a bilateral think tanks’ dialogue at Bangkok in October 2009 that relations between China and India would flourish very well if India was to hand over the Dalai Lama to China even at this belated stage. From this the depth of Chinese resentment with India for providing shelter to the Dalai Lama can be gauged. Since such a course of action would be completely out of character with India’s civilisational and spiritual values, handing over the Dalai Lama is simply out of the question. China would, therefore, do well to put this issue aside and move forward in its relationship with India.

Another area of concern for India is the rapid development of military infrastructure in Tibet by China. The Gormo-Lhasa railway line is now fully operational. The rail network is proposed to be extended towards Shigatse and then into Nepal. China has recently developed a road network of 58,000 km and five new air bases. New military camps have come up close to the border with India. Telephone and radio communication infrastructure has been considerably improved. China has been practicing the rapid induction of airborne divisions into Tibet. Some Indian analysts have estimated that China is now capable of inducting and sustaining about 25 to 30 divisions in Tibet in a single campaign season. Short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), some of them nuclear tipped, are also known to be deployed in Tibet. Surely, all these developments are not for sustaining Tibet’s fledgling economy. The continuing improvement of military infrastructure in Tibet does not augur well for future peace and stability between the two nations in the light of an unresolved territorial and boundary dispute.

The Jumbo Everyone Loves to Take for A Ride

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy

Some caveats are necessary before pronouncing on the UPA government’s foreign policy, especially the apparent mishandling of relations with Sri Lanka and the case of the Italian marines, as well as the setback in the Maldives. First, no country can have a foreign policy that is seen as being without fault by the public. This is particularly true of democracies where all kinds of opinions get expressed; political partisanship is normal as Opposition parties will always find some reason to contest government decisions, and the civil society has its own views on how policies should be framed on humanitarian and peace-building issues in particular.

Second, even countries more powerful than India, better governed, with wider internal debates and inputs from specialists, with greater sense of purpose and more aggressive in safeguarding national interest appear to make serious foreign policy mistakes or manifestly fail to achieve their objectives.

Third, it should not be assumed that big countries can have their way with small countries. The international system presents an obstacle as principles of sovereignty are involved and the reaction of competing powerful countries, in the region or outside, have to be factored into decision-making, especially if the smaller countries have a sensitive geopolitical location.

A further point needs to be made specifically with regard to India. Our foreign policy problems are numerous and complex. Pakistan has been a perennial problem ever since we became independent, confronting us with military challenges, religious extremism and terrorism. Our other neighbours, barring Bhutan, have played external powers against us as a balancing factor. China and Pakistan have boosted the capacity and the confidence of our neighbours to oppose us and, until the major improvement of our relations with the US, the American card has come in handy too. It is not absent even today in the triangular India-US-Pakistan diplomatic equation, with the situation in Afghanistan adding to its complexity.

The issues relating to the presence and treatment of Indian ethnic groups in neighbouring countries makes the management of relations with the latter more difficult. These issues spill over into domestic politics and cannot be treated solely as a foreign policy agenda. Our response to Islamic terrorism from Pakistan, which is essentially a foreign policy challenge, gets embroiled with the secular-communal debate in India as well as electoral considerations because a robust physical and legal response to local linkages of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is seen as targeting our own Muslim population unfairly.

With all these caveats, our handling of the Sri Lanka issue at the recent UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) at Geneva deserves to be seen as a particularly low point in our diplomacy. Sri Lanka has not been an easy partner to deal with; its discriminatory policies towards the Tamil population have been the source of tensions with India for long. If Sri Lanka had been wiser, it would have avoided creating a festering domestic ethnic situation that objectively impinged on India and was bound to provoke Indian interference and be a source of mistrust between the two countries. Sri Lanka has not, as a result, been sufficiently cognisant of our security concerns. It has exploited its geopolitical position and our adversarial relationship with China and Pakistan to carve out space for itself to frustrate us in many ways. It has played its cards ably by also cooperating with us in some areas and giving us enough stakes to blunt our responses to its provocations.

Sri Lanka’s failure to resolve ethnic issues after crushing the LTTE, the lack of progress on reconciliation and accountability issues, the reneging on implementing the 13th Amendment, the agitation of the issue of human rights violations of the civilian Tamil population in the final stages of military operations against the LTTE by the Sri Lankan diaspora, amplified by reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, all led to the stigmatisation of Sri Lanka on human rights issues in a US-sponsored resolution at the UNHRC last year. India departed from its principled position not to back country-specific resolutions at Geneva by voting in favour of the resolution after working to dilute those parts of it that were too intrusive and disrespectful of Sri Lankan sovereignty.

Our positive vote then and this year was a mistake. India has itself been targeted for human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir by the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International without any allowance for its democracy, the independence of its judiciary, an alert press and the fact these organisations largely relied on exposures of abuses by Indian sources. The US too has played its part to embarrass India in the past on human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir in a bid to be even-handed towards Pakistan accused of abetting terrorist attacks against us. We have had to fight attempts by Pakistan to castigate us at the human rights forum at Geneva.

This time too, India worked initially to moderate the resolution on these counts. Having departed from its principled position last year, India could not vote against the resolution or abstain this year without a show of tangible progress by Sri Lanka on pending issues, including on the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. What made our diplomacy almost farcical at Geneva was the bizarre attempt by India to work at the last minute to strengthen the very resolution that it had worked to soften earlier, not because any objective external policy factor had changed or the Sri Lankan government had committed a new breach of human rights or that India had not done its diplomatic homework earlier thoroughly enough and new factors had emerged to warrant a review of its earlier position. It was simply a case of internal threats to the UPA government form the DMK, the latter’s demagoguery on “genocide” in Sri Lanka four years after military operations in the island nation have ended that led to this last-minute scramble to appease an internal regional lobby at Geneva.

Worse for us, we got rebuffed by the US as it feared toughening the resolution may reduce the number of countries supporting it. We ended by looking bloody-minded and the US looking moderate. Such conduct erodes the credibility of our diplomacy abroad, besides raising fears at home that the government in New Delhi is losing grip over foreign policy under regional pressures. This has other longer-term implications — unless the primacy of New Delhi in foreign policy is restored — in that foreign countries and missions will start interacting at the regional level in terms of understanding the dynamics of Indian foreign policymaking and influencing it outside New Delhi.

The case of the Italian marines has lost its dramatic edge after their return to India. The Italians were escalating the issue by defying the Supreme Court and treating India with political disdain. The Supreme Court, in return, was escalating a bilateral issue with Italy into a multilateral one with the larger international community by interpreting the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) on diplomatic immunity in a way that would uphold its dignity. The government was caught in a vice as it could not give precedence to its international obligations over the views of the highest court of the land. When the Italians protested against the court’s order restraining the Italian Ambassador from leaving the country, it took the plea that while it was aware of the provisions of the VCDR, it was bound by the court’s decision.

The problem might have been avoided in the first place if the government was not so accommodative towards the marines by opposing back-to-back furloughs to them in Italy on unconvincing grounds. The government also did not guide the Supreme Court properly on the issue of diplomatic immunity of the Ambassador and the unenforceable nature of his undertaking, which was political rather than legal in character. Of course, by disowning its word, Italy was guilty of a serious breach of faith. The government can take credit that its firmness compelled Italy to review its decision on the marines, and the Supreme Court even more so by its willingness to reinterpret the VCDR to suit the particular circumstances of the case.

The Italian government has shown political courage in reversing its decision despite potential backlash at home and deserves to be commended for acting sensibly and honourably at the end. It would be wise for India not to claim a diplomatic victory as escalation would have hurt the interests of both countries.

The defiance with which the Maldives have treated Indian interests in the commercial dispute with GMR over the airport contract and later the way the understanding reached with Indian emissaries over the arrest of former president Mohamed Nasheed was violated has provoked a debate on the conduct of the country’s foreign policy reflected in its inability to exercise sufficient weight in its periphery.

Since India looms large in our smaller neighbours and our representatives there get will-nilly involved in their domestic politics, we need to pay greater political attention to even the smallest of them and assign diplomats there with appropriate political skills. Beyond this, of course, we have to keep in mind that even powerful countries cannot easily bully neighbours — the US has tasted the defiance of Venezuela and Cuba. We have also to contend with the China factor in our neighbourhood.

What is important, however, is the assessment countries make of India’s likely responses if its vital interests are undermined. If their experience tells them that India’s tolerance levels are very high and that they can get away with defiance, they will be prone to do so. But if the perception of India changes and it is seen as acting boldly to protect its interests, the inclination to defy India would be less. Our softness towards both China and Pakistan, despite provocations, gives an image of accommodation, prudence, undue caution, a disinclination to be provoked and a reluctance to make hard choices. There is a range of conduct between being aggressive and being pusillanimous. Our foreign policy has to show greater firmness, which has not been the hallmark of the UPA government or those before it.

India, Sri Lanka – The Tamil Question

Dr M N Buch, Dean, 

Centre for Governance and Political Studies

The island country of Sri Lanka is geographically part of the Indian sub-continent and though the Palk Strait does provide a narrow stretch of water physically separating Sri Lanka from India, not far below the surface is the land link provided by Ram Setu or Adams Bridge. I refer here to a geological phenomenon and not a mythical, religious or a metaphysical belief. Geographically, ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously Sri Lanka, despite being a separate nation, is very much a part of India. The objective of this paper is not to lead to a merger of Sri Lanka into India, but to emphasise that we enjoy a common heritage which virtually mandates that India and Sri Lanka should have the closest links with each other and that no third party should be permitted to divide us.

Sri Lanka as an island is large but in total area is only 65,610 square kilometers. That makes it the size of one of the smaller States of India. Its population is about two crores. The demographic composition is interesting. The majority consists of the Sinhala people, who claim their origin from Bengal and Orissa and whose language, Sinhalese, is highly Sanskritised and certainly belongs to the Indo Aryan group of languages. There is a sizable Muslim minority, many of them of Maldivian, Arab and Indian origin. There is also a small group of Burghers who are roughly equivalent to our Anglo-Indians. Then there are two major Tamil groups. The first, by far the largest, is of Tamils inhabiting the North and part of North Eastern Sri Lanka, who will hereinafter be referred to as Jaffna Tamils for the sake of convenience. They form the vast majority in the five districts of the Northern Province, that is, Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. The two districts of the North Central Province, Anuradhapura and Pollonnaruva also have a substantial Tamil population and two of the three districts of the Eastern Province, Batticaloa and Trimcomalee, also have a number of Jaffna Tamils. These Tamils have been living in Sri Lanka virtually from the very beginning and have always been recognised as full and original citizens of Sri Lanka. There is a second group of Tamils who were brought in as indentured labour by the British when they introduced plantation crops, especially tea but also some rubber, mainly in the Central Province consisting of the districts of Kandy, Matale and Nuwara Eliya. They came on indentured contract and it was not originally the policy to settle them permanently in Sri Lanka. As time went on, however, they settled permanently in the plantation areas and are now very much a part of the Sri Lankan population. They were not accepted as such by either the Sinhalese or the Jaffna Tamils and there were several pacts between India and Sri Lanka about what to do with these Tamils. The Sri Lanka Government disenfranchised them and this led to a major outbreak of discontent amongst the plantation Tamils. Some were repatriated to India which undertook their rehabilitation on the mainland, but ultimately the majority were granted citizenship. These Tamils, however, are not part of the Eelam movement launched by the Jaffna Tamils.

Under British rule the Jaffna Tamils went in for education in a big way, in which English and Tamil were the two languages of instruction. A large number of senior posts in the Sri Lanka Army, Police and Civil Service and Judiciary were occupied by Tamils because they were the best educated citizens of Sri Lanka. The situation was not very different from what existed in India in that people from the South, especially Tamil Brahmins and Malayalees, dominated the Civil Service in the Centre. When Hindi was introduced as the State language there was an outcry in Tamil Nadu because it was felt that this would put Tamils at a disadvantage for public service in India, resulting in the overall development of the South slowing down and easing out South Indians from the instrumentalities of power. In India we took the anti Hindi movement in Tamil Nadu very seriously and, therefore, by adopting the three language formula and retaining English as the link language we have, by and large, been able to prevent a serious secessionist movement in the South. Today even the most extreme Tamil parties in India no longer talk about a separate Tamil homeland. The way in which we have tackled the situation is exemplified by the State emblem of India in which the motto is “Satyameva Jayate”, which means that “Truth Ever Triumphs”. In Tamil Nadu, at the height of the anti Hindi movement, the State Government changed the Tamil emblem motto to ‘Vayi Meyi Vellum’, which also means Satyameva Jayate. Instead of reacting strongly to this the Central Government preferred to ignore it and now the State emblem and its motto are no longer an issue. The Malayalees, being practical people, knowing that they are the best educated in India, chose to ignore the language issue and could gain new proficiency in the languages of different States and continue to form an extremely important part of the government structure in every State of India. In Madhya Pradesh the Secretariat would collapse if the Malayalee officials withdrew and certainly the health services would receive a fatal blow if nurses from Kerala were to go away.

Sri Lanka is a Buddhist country whose Constitution in Article 9 states, “ The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be its duty to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1) (e)”. This gives the right of religious freedom to every citizen of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is not quite a theocracy and it is not quite a secular State in the same way as India is, but it does allow the religious freedom of a secular State. However, because of Article 9 the Buddhist Mahasangha is very powerful and its pronouncements and diktats have a profound influence on how the Sri Lankan Government acts and behaves. This is a fact which must be borne in mind when we do any thinking on Sri Lanka, its problems, and our policy towards it. In 1956 Sri Lanka very foolishly adopted the policy of Sinhala as the only State language, with this being given full effect to in 1961. That knocked Tamil off its equal perch with Sinhala and English and in fact removed it from the list of State languages. This automatically led to the fear that not only would Tamils no longer be qualified for government service but also that those who were Tamils in high position would be eased out of their jobs. There was very powerful Tamil reaction and this is one of the main causes for the demand for a separate Tamil homeland, preferably an independent country created by partitioning Sri Lanka. Simultaneously there were extremely violent anti Tamil riots in 1958 and 1977, culminating in the worst riot of all 1983, in which there was virtual ethnic cleansing of Tamils from Colombo and the Western Province.

The two main Tamil parties were Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) which is a party dating back to 1949 through its predecessor, the so-called Federal Party, followed in 1978 by the creation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Thereafter the entire separatist movement was taken over by LTTE, whose undisputed leader was Velupillai Prabhakaran. Incidentally, LTTE cadres had been initially trained in India and a large part of LTTE’s initial armaments came from transfer of weapons seized by us from the Pakistan armed forces in the 1971 Bangladesh War. There is, therefore, some justification for the Sri Lankan allegation that LTTE was supported by us, even though its creation was of local Sri Lankan origin. I state this because though this is not a paper on the Sri Lankan civil war and our role in it, we were very much a part of it at the start and that makes us as guilty as the Tamil and Sinhala protagonists. I have not been able to understand the psychology of our government in the manner in which it evolved its Sri Lankan policy. We were annoyed with the Sri Lanka Government for the manner in which it was treating the Kandy Tamils, but did that justify our arming a group which ultimately became the most powerful guerilla force in the world and which brought us into open conflict with it when Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister?

For India the complications began with the question of the Kandy Tamils, which we were ultimately able to sort out through a series of agreements with the Sri Lanka Government. However, the situation in Northern Sri Lanka was very different because here it was not the question of status of Tamils who were originally Indian but rather the relationship between two indigenous groups in Sri Lanka, both of Indian origin but now rooted firmly in Sri Lanka. As the Buddhist Sinhala attitudes hardened and as the Jaffna Tamils reacted, one could see Sri Lanka sliding first into a cycle of ethnic violence and thereafter into a fratricidal civil war. Did the fear of what happened in Sri Lanka and its effect on Tamil Nadu drive us to a policy which has left us with more problems than it has solved? Did we misread the Tamil movement in Tamil Nadu, led by Annadorai and his successors, as an incipient civil war which could lead to the breakup of India? We have a great deal of experience of fighting insurgency in the North East and there our handling was quite deft. We have been successful in putting down militancy in the Punjab and separatist movements in Jammu & Kashmir. Even today we are tackling Naxalism in what I would describe a weak manner but which could also be viewed as a measured response of the State to a situation which is internal and must be handled by the civil government. Hyderabad and Junagadh did not dismember India. Even as late as 1983 did we really think that Tamil Nadu would break away on the language issue? In 1978 when the Emergency was declared Tamil Nadu fell in line in the same manner as every other State. Why did the Indian State lack such a confidence in itself to tackle any movement in Tamil Nadu without resorting to uncalled for adventurism in Sri Lanka because the Tamils there had a dispute with the Sinhalese people?

Anyway, as the situation in Sri Lanka degenerated into a civil war Sri Lanka was left to handle two different situations which threatened the very existence of that country. The first was the increasing strength of the separatist movement in the North. The second was the extremely violent, extreme left wing movement of the Janatha Vimukti Peruman (JVP) whose obvious objective was to dismantle the Sri Lankan regime and to establish an extreme left wing State. Comparisons with the nihilistic regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia come to mind. A stage came when Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the President of Sri Lanka, called for our assistance to protect that country from JVP and our first intervention took place by sending units of the Central Reserve Police Force to guard Colombo. This was welcomed by the Sri Lankans. Meanwhile the situation in the North and North East kept deteriorating and the Sri Lankan Army and Police also retaliated with force. The whole of Jaffna Peninsula, the districts of Mannar, Kilinochchi, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu, together with Jaffna passed out of the control of the Sri Lankan Government, Anunadhapura and Pollonnaruwa were centres of major LTTE activity, Batticaloa and Trincomalee were affected and even a district as far south as Ampara was not free of LTTE terror. In Colombo there were a large number of bombings and shooting incidents in which the LTTE played a major role.

Into this cauldron stepped our young Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and his Chief of Army Staff, General K. Sunderji. Prabhakaran was called to Delhi and was made to sign some sort of a pact which could bring about an end to civil war. On return to Jaffna he said that he was virtually held a prisoner in Delhi and pressurised to sign the agreement and that he repudiated it in totality. Meanwhile Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayawardane, the President of Sri Lanka, signed a pact which opened the doors for intervention by India in Sri Lanka. We first went in with humanitarian aid in Jaffna. Then Indian troops were inducted and soon we were engaged in a full-fledged war with LTTE. We suffered horrendous casualties, including more than 1450 dead and between four thousand and five thousand injured and maimed. Lt. Gen. Kobakaduwa, who was the Northern Army Commander in Sri Lanka, told me that he had advised the Indian Army that the LTTE did not consist of uneducated guerilla fighters but consisted of highly educated young persons, many of them science and engineering graduates, who had mastered the art of ambush, use of remotely detonated explosive devices and were experts in defence in depth. He had suggested that the Indian Army take Sri Lankan officers who were experienced in fighting LTTE on board for liaison purposes, but this offer was rejected. What resulted was that IPKF was in the vanguard of fighting LTTE and the Sri Lankan Army and Police were released to launch a massive onslaught on JVP and destroy it. The Indian Army, being the professional force that it is, took heavy casualties but succeeded in suppressing LTTE and driving it into a few isolated forest strongholds, where it was bottled up. Given a free hand the Indian Army and Air Force could have completely destroyed LTTE, but as is often the case in India, this free hand was not given. However, the LTTE occupied districts were restored to near normalcy and Sri Lankan civil government became functional.

Meanwhile the government changed in India and in Sri Lanka. V.P. Singh became our Prime Minister and R.Premadasa became President of Sri Lanka. Premadasa was a very wily politician, expert in intrigue and with his own hidden agenda of politics. He and Prabhakaran had a secret pact whereby he asked for withdrawal of IPKF, a demand to which V.P. Singh acceded. Without fully completing its task IPKF left Sri Lanka, thus enabling LTTE to claim a great victory. As soon as the last Indian soldier left Prabhakaran reneged on his agreement with Premadasa and in sixteen police stations of the North and more than four hundred and fifty Sri Lankan policemen were murdered. LTTE revived, the civil war dragged on and thousands of Sri Lankans were killed. The entire Jaffna Peninsula, once a very prosperous agricultural area and a centre of education, was virtually destroyed.

Neither Premadasa, who was himself assassinated, nor Chandrika Kumaratunga, who became Prime Minister and then President, were able to re-establish control over the Tamil areas, though the army continued to fight. Ultimately Mahinda Rajapaksa became President and he was cut from a different cloth. He resolutely rebuilt the Sri Lankan Army and posted as its commanders officers of a strong will and truly professional training and attitude. The Army was given all the equipment it needed, China being its main source because India would not give Sri Lanka heavy weapons and a resurgent Sri Lankan Army went about its task professionally, first clearing the North East and then driving the LTTE out of all its strongholds in the North. Ultimately, LTTE was driven into a corner where it was virtually pounded into extinction. The last stages of the civil war were savage and perhaps some elements of the Sri Lankan Army did commit excesses which a section of the Western media has projected as atrocities amounting to war crimes. In all this India was increasingly marginalised, unable to save the Tamils, unwilling to help the Sinhalese, a witness to the end of a civil war but no longer a powerful entity which could help in rebuilding Sri Lanka. All this happened because throughout this unpleasant episode of history India either adopted wrong policies or played the part of a helpless onlooker. In the process we have alienated the Sinhala and the Tamil alike. We should have rejoiced at the destruction of the most violent guerilla movement in the world, LTTE, an organisation second to none in committing atrocities against its enemies. This organisation was the origin of the suicide bomber, one of whom assassinated Rajiv Gandhi. This is the organisation which taught the Indian Army a lesson in irregular warfare which it can never forget. This is the organisation which has rekindled a highly disruptive movement in Tamil Nadu which, though it does not raise fears of separatism, is still powerful enough to influence the policy of India towards Sri Lanka, a policy that has caused us to self-destruct in that country.

I had been international observer of the elections in Sri Lanka on four occasions, ranging from local government to provincial, national and presidential elections. I have toured twenty-two out of the twenty-five districts of that country. After the parliamentary elections when I returned to Delhi my batch mate, P. Murari, who was Secretary to the President, R. Venkatraman, called me to brief the President on what I had observed in Sri Lanka and what I could suggest about our policy towards that country. Fortunately, I had been briefed fully by N.N. Jha, my batch mate and High Commissioner in Sri Lanka and I was able to communicate some of the ideas which had originated from Jha. I told the President that China was already establishing a foothold in Sri Lanka and had built a magnificent conference complex and research facility in Colombo called the Bandaranaike Centre, where international conferences were held. I told the President that we must counter Chinese influence and participate in the development of Sri Lanka so that our economic ties become closer. Carrying forward N.N. Jha’s excellent ideas I said that:

1. We should gift to Sri Lanka one institute of IIT level and one of IIM level so that the quality of education in that country took a leap upward.
2. We should open the doors of our technical, management, medical, scientific, humanities and liberal arts institutes and universities to Sri Lankans so that huge numbers of students from that country could be educated in India and we could thus virtually create a pro India class in Sri Lanka.
3. Fishing is big business and the major means of livelihood of coastal people in that island country. Hitherto it is the Norwegians who had helped the Sri Lankan fishing industry. My suggestion was that we should make available about five hundred motorised inshore and offshore fishing vessels to Sri Lanka so that coastal communities could benefit. We could also help in setting up fishing harbours and processing industries.
4. Our jewellery industry should be given free access to Sri Lanka gems, on which there should be no import duty. Whole districts which provide gems, such as Ratnapura in Sri Lanka, would benefit if the market was enlarged.
5. We should freely allow duty free import of Sri Lankan tea, with our best quality tea being exported to the West. This would benefit both the Indian tea industry and Sri Lankan tea industry, which is a major employer of labour in that country.
6. We should invest heavily in infrastructure, especially roads, railways, power, housing and social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, thus helping that war ravaged country to recover, rehabilitate displaced persons and restore prosperity to devastated area.

Unfortunately, none of the items initiated by Jha and suggested by me have been implemented by government. The Sri Lankan Government offered us Hambantota Port for development in the South, but we stupidly did nothing about it. That port is now being developed by the Chinese, whose footprint in Sri Lanka is now not only visible but strong.

Based on television visuals and research by people who obviously have a strong pro Tamil stance, the West, led by the United State of America, has been leading a campaign for condemning Sri Lanka for atrocities against the Tamils. The Sri Lankans have been living for a quarter of century with a situation in which thousands of Sri Lankans have been killed and the country virtually torn apart. The Indian Army has experienced the ferocity of LTTE fighters who fought to the last bullet and rather than surrender committed suicide by chewing on a cyanide capsule. Such people cannot be winkled out through police or military action because they are prepared to die rather than surrender. They can only be killed to the last man and this is the situation which the Sri Lankan Army faced. Obviously in a situation such as this civilian casualties could take place. The carpet bombing of Japanese and German cities which more or less exclusively killed civilians during the Second World War did not invite charges of genocide or war crime against the allies because they were the victors. Why should the Sri Lankan Government now be accused of these crimes for what happened during a war in which the taking of prisoners was a remote possibility? The United States Government moved a resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) which virtually accused Sri Lanka of atrocities and worse and called for a plausible and credible investigation, obviously under international supervision. China and Pakistan voted against this resolution but India, under pressure from Tamil politicians and with the government facing a possibility of downfall if DMK withdrew support, voted for the resolution. In Sri Lankan eyes would not Pakistan and China be considered better friends than India? Does government have to be driven in foreign policy by Mamta Banerjee in the case of Bangladesh and M. Karunanidhi in the case of Sri Lanka? What about the self-interest of India? Has it ever occurred to our government that tomorrow if UNHRC adopts a resolution calling for a credible and plausible probe into alleged killing of innocent Sikhs by the Punjab Police, or human rights violation in Jammu & Kashmir by central forces, how would India react? No wonder India is no longer the flavour of the month in Colombo.

What are our options? First and foremost we should enter into a meaningful dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government for rehabilitation of Tamils and rebuilding of the northern districts. For this we should make available aid on an even more liberal scale than is being done in Afghanistan. The suggestions given by me to President Venkatraman are still valid and we should implement them. We should make it clear to the Sri Lankans that we believe that in the terms of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, within the overall ambit of the constitutional provision that Sri Lanka is a unitary state, the devolution of powers to the provinces must be done meaningfully, speedily and in the right spirit. If devolution is done then there would be a good case to argue that Jaffna Tamils do not have any grounds of grievance because both in intent and deed the Sri Lankan Government is keen to empower them to the maximum degree possible.

We have already lost Nepal to the Maoists and the Chinese despite the fact that Hindu and Buddhists in Nepal are so intrinsically a part of India that the two countries should actually breathe as one. This is because we have no policy towards Nepal. We are repeating the same mistake in Sri Lanka. The United States still has the Monroe Doctrine whereby there is a cordon sanitaire into which no third country can step. We do not have the advantage of a vast sea surround which protects continental America from the rest of the world. However, there are certain things on which we cannot compromise and that includes keeping Sri Lanka within the Indian zone of influence. As I have already stated there have been two armed interventions by India in Sri Lanka and to protect our interests there this is an option which must be available to us and of which the Sri Lankan Government must be aware. Economic and foreign policy ties between India and Sri Lanka must be very strong, but India must lay down the bottom line which can be transgressed by Sri Lanka only at peril. Will we ever have a government strong enough to do this? It is India’s interests which must govern our foreign policy and certainly the compulsions of Tamil politics cannot drive our policy towards Sri Lanka.

Stance on Sri Lanka a Blunder

Kanwal Sibal, Dean, 

Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy

Our conduct at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) at Geneva on the US sponsored resolution against Sri Lanka on human rights violations of the tamilian population has raised questions about the coherence, maturity and objectivity of our policy towards our neighbour. Our Sri Lanka policy has to be based on wider considerations than politicking within the UPA government and exaggerated posturing for electoral reasons by the DMK on the ethnic issue.

The anguish in Tamilnadu about the Rajapakse government’s failure to make tangible political progress on the ethnic issue should be recognized. The Sri Lankan government has not been able to shed the mood of truimphalism after the decisive military victory over the LTTE; it has gone back on its promises on devolution; an honest probe into alleged large scale human rights violations during the last days of military operations remains pending; the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission have not been implemented.

However, to allow this anguish to govern our policy towards Sri Lanka, to the exclusion of other factors, would be a serious mistake, especially when demagoguery is resorted to by sections of political opinion in Tamilnadu and the tamilian diaspora abroad. There is loose talk of genocide despite the cessation of miltary operations four years ago. Why is that between 2009 and now this genocide of tamilians was not discovered? Why castigate the deplorable political failure of the Rajapakse government as genocide?

Foreign Policy

No doubt foreign policy cannot be altogether divorced from domestic opinion and regional sentiments therefore cannot be ignored in foreign policy making. Foreign policy, however, operates in a context quite different from domestic politics, the stakes are different, the involvement and interests of third parties is a complicating factor, and national security and geo-political factors come into play. Besides, the weightage to give to regional sentiments as distinguished from national sentiment has salience in decision-making.

If our foreign policy towards Sri Lanka should be based on the sentiments of the people of Tamilnadu today, then sentiments in West Bengal should dictate our foreign policy towards Bangladesh tomorrow, and those in UP and Bihar should determine what we do with Nepal day after. It would be a mistake to begin treating our relations with our neighbours as extensions of the pulls and pressures of our domestic politics. Our neighbours are independent, sovereign countries, which requires that we control our domestic lobbies and prevent them from distorting our policies in our periphery. Moreover, when the states are today resisting strongly encroachment on their powers in a federal system, they should also respect the prerogative of the centre to make foreign policy.

Unlike ours, US stakes in Sri Lanka are limited. They do not need to calculate the consequences of the initiative they take to censure Sri Lanka at the UNHRC with as much care as we have to. They promote the human rights dimension of their foreign policy as part of the larger objective to universalize their values, to retain the high moral ground in international affairs and avert attention from the human costs of their military operations abroad. They do not take into account the stress they put on our policy towards Sri Lanka by moving resolutions in the UNHRC against it, forcing us to adopt a position that we would like to leave undefined so as to retain sufficient space to deal with the complex situation there.

Apart from this gap in managing our strategic relationship with the US in our neighbourhood, it is galling that we have to support the targeting of Sri Lanka by bodies like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International which gave us a miserable time in the 1990’s over allegations of human rights violations by our forces in J&K, boosting the Pakistani campaign against us on this issue.

Past

Even the US State Department was complicit in this. We opposed the objectivity and credibility of these human rights organisations when we were targeted; now we endorse their findings to put Sri Lanka on the mat.

Our policy of not supporting country specific human rights resolutions at Geneva was sound, as these resolutions are used by the West to erode the international legitimacy of regimes considered adversarial. We have been criticized for not taking a clear cut position on human rights issues as behoves a democracy and a rising power called upon to assume greater responsibility for upholding the international order. Apart from a disinclination to play by double standards, we have favoured dialogue over denunciation in dealing with human rights abuses in countries. We abandoned this policy last year in voting against Sri Lanka and did so again this year.

Resolution

This time too we began by softening the US resolution where it was too intrusive and undercut Sri Lankan sovereignty too blatantly. However, because of extreme DMK pressure on the government our diplomatic strategy fell into an embarrassing disarray. In a last ditch effort to placate the DMK we sought a toughening of the US resolution after our previous efforts to soften it. Worse, the US rebuffed India because it did not want the balance of the resolution disturbed for fear of losing numbers in support. We put ourselves in a situation where the US appeared moderate and we unprincipled and opportunistic.

We do not have to condone Sri Lanka’s failure on reconciliation and accountability issues. But we should deal bilaterally with Sri Lanka, and forcefully at that to contain the mounting backlash in Tamilnadu. As a regional power we should not outsource such responsibility to others, as this erodes our position and exposes our irresolution, adding to our neighbourly woes. If we don’t use our power we will be seen as powerless.

Sri Lanka, UNHRC Resolution and India

Dr. N Manoharan 

(Senior Fellow, VIF)

Sri Lanka is facing second successive resolution in as many years at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) this month. Exactly last year at the 19th session of the UNHRC, a US-sponsored resolution was passed against the island state. Backed by 24 countries, including France, Norway and India, the resolution placed three requests for Sri Lanka:

1. To “implement the constructive recommendations made in the report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission” (LLRC) and to “initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.”
2. To “present a comprehensive action plan as expeditiously as possible detailing the steps the Government has taken and will take to implement the LLRC recommendations and also to address alleged violations of international law.”
3. To “accept, advice and technical assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant special procedures mandate holders on implementing the above-mentioned steps, and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a report on the provision of such assistance to the Human Rights Council at its 22nd session”

One year down the line, how far these requests were taken forward by Sri Lanka? It would be prudent if the upcoming voting depends on the evaluation of the progress made and a clear plan of action for the future. There are two aspects to the debate: one is fixing accountability for excesses committed by the Sri Lankan forces during ‘Eelam War IV’; and the other is the way forward in the form of post-war reconciliation in the island.

On the question of accountability, the Army has appointed a Court of Inquiry as an initial fact-finding mission. The five-member body in its first part of report submitted on 15 February 2013 concluded that the Army “took all the precautions to avoid civilian casualties and all those who came under the control of the Sri Lanka Army, including surrendered/captured LTTE cadres, were treated humanely observing the IHL [international humanitarian law] to the letter.” On the other hand, it blamed the LTTE for “using of civilians as Human Shields, summary executions of civilians who attempted to escape to army lines, forced conscription of children for combat purposes etc.” and the international community for failing “in their duty to stop the war crimes committed by the LTTE terrorists.” While there is no doubt about the LTTE’s involvement, the Army’s total denial of the killings is perplexing. According to the Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka submitted in November 2012, “most casualties were caused by Government fire and included attacks on UN premises and hospitals.”¹ Even if the UN’s report is discounted as an exaggeration and consider that both sides were equally responsible for the killings then the Army would still be responsible for at least 20,000 of estimated 40,000 killings. Fresh video evidences on the killing of 12-year-old son of the LTTE’s leader Prabhakaran has made the task of the Sri Lankan delegation at the UNHRC bit more difficult. The call, therefore, has been for an independent international enquiry.

On the implementation of LLRC recommendations, some headway has been made but results on the ground are not encouraging. Colombo presented the National Action Plan in July 2012 listing out implementation of recommendations according to Activity, Key Responsible Agency, Key Performance Indicator and Timeframe. A Task Force (headed by the Secretary to the President) was appointed to oversee the implementation of the Action Plan. But there were too many implementing agencies identified without clear-cut budget breakups.² Surprisingly, Provincial Councils and other local bodies, which are closer to the people and which are in a better position to implement the recommendations, are totally left out.

Though the United States acknowledged “some progress” in the LLRC implementation, some of the undemocratic acts like impeachment of Sri Lankan Supreme Court’s Chief Justice and the passage of Divinugema Act (that encroached on Provincial Councils on development) turned the tables against the island state. Therefore, Washington that is once again sponsoring the resolution has indicated that the new “resolution will ask the Government of Sri Lanka to follow through on its own commitments to its people, including implementing the constructive recommendations from the report by Sri Lanka's Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.”

India is once again in a dilemma. On the one hand, it does not wish to support an “intrusive” resolution against Sri Lanka. At the same time, New Delhi wants Colombo to take reconciliation and devolution seriously. Pressures from Tamil Nadu in this regard are difficult to ignore. Tempers are higher this time with even ruling members of Parliament from Tamil Nadu joining the others. India’s stand is keenly watched by fence-sitters at the UNHRC before taking a decision on the voting. With countries like China and Russia not being part of the Council this year, India’s influence as member of the UNHRC is going to be important. Last year, India, though voted for the resolution yet it played a significant role in toning down the original draft making it more “non-intrusive and non-judgemental”. This year, India has so far not divulged its stand on the resolution. However, New Delhi has advised Colombo to engage directly with Washington “on the draft resolution and aim for a mutually acceptable outcome.” A consensual resolution acceptable to all would be easier when it comes to implementation. Outside pressure has its own limitation and an expiry date. On its part, Sri Lanka should realise that military defeat of the LTTE was not the end of all. Only a political settlement that addresses grievances of minority communities is the gateway to lasting peace in the island.

End notes

1. Full text of the Report is available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_re..., accessed on 28 February 2013.
2. The action plan lists the Ministry of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, Department of Census and Statistics, Police Department, Legal Aid Commission, Ministry of Justice, Information and Communications Technology Authority, Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Education, Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Resettlement, the Presidential Task Force for the North and East, Ministry of Mass Media and Communication, the Press Council, Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Department of National Planning, Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Affairs, Ministry of Plantation Industries, Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration, University Grants Commission, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Sports, and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs as implementing agencies.