Sri Lanka, UNHRC Resolution and India

Dr. N Manoharan 

(Senior Fellow, VIF)

Sri Lanka is facing second successive resolution in as many years at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) this month. Exactly last year at the 19th session of the UNHRC, a US-sponsored resolution was passed against the island state. Backed by 24 countries, including France, Norway and India, the resolution placed three requests for Sri Lanka:

1. To “implement the constructive recommendations made in the report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission” (LLRC) and to “initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Sri Lankans.”
2. To “present a comprehensive action plan as expeditiously as possible detailing the steps the Government has taken and will take to implement the LLRC recommendations and also to address alleged violations of international law.”
3. To “accept, advice and technical assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and relevant special procedures mandate holders on implementing the above-mentioned steps, and requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a report on the provision of such assistance to the Human Rights Council at its 22nd session”

One year down the line, how far these requests were taken forward by Sri Lanka? It would be prudent if the upcoming voting depends on the evaluation of the progress made and a clear plan of action for the future. There are two aspects to the debate: one is fixing accountability for excesses committed by the Sri Lankan forces during ‘Eelam War IV’; and the other is the way forward in the form of post-war reconciliation in the island.

On the question of accountability, the Army has appointed a Court of Inquiry as an initial fact-finding mission. The five-member body in its first part of report submitted on 15 February 2013 concluded that the Army “took all the precautions to avoid civilian casualties and all those who came under the control of the Sri Lanka Army, including surrendered/captured LTTE cadres, were treated humanely observing the IHL [international humanitarian law] to the letter.” On the other hand, it blamed the LTTE for “using of civilians as Human Shields, summary executions of civilians who attempted to escape to army lines, forced conscription of children for combat purposes etc.” and the international community for failing “in their duty to stop the war crimes committed by the LTTE terrorists.” While there is no doubt about the LTTE’s involvement, the Army’s total denial of the killings is perplexing. According to the Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka submitted in November 2012, “most casualties were caused by Government fire and included attacks on UN premises and hospitals.”¹ Even if the UN’s report is discounted as an exaggeration and consider that both sides were equally responsible for the killings then the Army would still be responsible for at least 20,000 of estimated 40,000 killings. Fresh video evidences on the killing of 12-year-old son of the LTTE’s leader Prabhakaran has made the task of the Sri Lankan delegation at the UNHRC bit more difficult. The call, therefore, has been for an independent international enquiry.

On the implementation of LLRC recommendations, some headway has been made but results on the ground are not encouraging. Colombo presented the National Action Plan in July 2012 listing out implementation of recommendations according to Activity, Key Responsible Agency, Key Performance Indicator and Timeframe. A Task Force (headed by the Secretary to the President) was appointed to oversee the implementation of the Action Plan. But there were too many implementing agencies identified without clear-cut budget breakups.² Surprisingly, Provincial Councils and other local bodies, which are closer to the people and which are in a better position to implement the recommendations, are totally left out.

Though the United States acknowledged “some progress” in the LLRC implementation, some of the undemocratic acts like impeachment of Sri Lankan Supreme Court’s Chief Justice and the passage of Divinugema Act (that encroached on Provincial Councils on development) turned the tables against the island state. Therefore, Washington that is once again sponsoring the resolution has indicated that the new “resolution will ask the Government of Sri Lanka to follow through on its own commitments to its people, including implementing the constructive recommendations from the report by Sri Lanka's Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.”

India is once again in a dilemma. On the one hand, it does not wish to support an “intrusive” resolution against Sri Lanka. At the same time, New Delhi wants Colombo to take reconciliation and devolution seriously. Pressures from Tamil Nadu in this regard are difficult to ignore. Tempers are higher this time with even ruling members of Parliament from Tamil Nadu joining the others. India’s stand is keenly watched by fence-sitters at the UNHRC before taking a decision on the voting. With countries like China and Russia not being part of the Council this year, India’s influence as member of the UNHRC is going to be important. Last year, India, though voted for the resolution yet it played a significant role in toning down the original draft making it more “non-intrusive and non-judgemental”. This year, India has so far not divulged its stand on the resolution. However, New Delhi has advised Colombo to engage directly with Washington “on the draft resolution and aim for a mutually acceptable outcome.” A consensual resolution acceptable to all would be easier when it comes to implementation. Outside pressure has its own limitation and an expiry date. On its part, Sri Lanka should realise that military defeat of the LTTE was not the end of all. Only a political settlement that addresses grievances of minority communities is the gateway to lasting peace in the island.

End notes

1. Full text of the Report is available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_re..., accessed on 28 February 2013.
2. The action plan lists the Ministry of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, Department of Census and Statistics, Police Department, Legal Aid Commission, Ministry of Justice, Information and Communications Technology Authority, Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Education, Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Resettlement, the Presidential Task Force for the North and East, Ministry of Mass Media and Communication, the Press Council, Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Department of National Planning, Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Child Development and Women’s Affairs, Ministry of Plantation Industries, Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration, University Grants Commission, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Sports, and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs as implementing agencies.

The State of India-Sri Lanka Relations: Ethnic Issue as an Irritant

Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF

In the recent days, the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu has figured in at least four issues pertaining to Sri Lanka: protests against training of Sri Lankan defence personnel in the state, threats to Sri Lankan pilgrims touring the state, turning over of Sri Lankan sports teams, and agitation over alleged attacks on Tamil Nadu fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy. All these have resulted in an unusual response from Colombo in the form of a travel advisory directing its citizens not to visit Tamil Nadu. These incidents have also raised doubts on the upcoming visit of the Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, to India. Few months back, the bilateral ties perceivably took a slight dip when India voted for a US-sponsored resolution advising Sri Lanka on post-conflict reconciliation measures. How far have these events impacted bilateral ties between the two countries?

Despite few strains from time-to-time, traditionally, bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka have by-and-large been cordial. India has always stood by Sri Lanka’s difficult times and strived to remove those irritants that stood in the way of maintaining friendly relations. No two countries in the world enjoy bilateral relations as unique as India and Sri Lanka with differing characteristics. India is not only Sri Lanka’s closest, but also important and powerful neighbour. Relations between the two neighbours stretch to more than two millennia in wide-ranging areas – political, economic, socio-cultural and military. In the post-LTTE phase, the bilateral ties between the two countries have revolved around four issues: short and long-term aspects of the island’s ethnic issue, straying of fishermen, economic/trade interactions, and the role of forces inimical to Indian interests. Of all these, the dominance of the island’s ethnic question in steering the bilateral relations is telling.

Since the end of Eelam War IV, India has taken keen interest in the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of those displaced by the conflict. Apart from providing requisite monetary assistance, India has sent 2,600 tonnes of galvanized steel sheets to construct shelter for approximately 5,000 families living in relief camps in northern Sri Lanka and an additional aid to construction of 50,000 houses to the IDPs. New Delhi has also deployed over eight demining teams in sanitising the conflict areas of landmines and unexploded objects to facilitate resettlement. From time-to-time India expressed concerns to the Sri Lankan government over the progress of the resettlement. To New Delhi, decent resettlement of the IDPs would also take care of hue and cry in Tamil Nadu over the humanitarian issue.

On the long-term aspect of the ethnic issue, India’s consistent position has been in favour of “a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka and consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.” India wants Colombo to deliver a meaningful devolution package to the minorities. New Delhi believed that with the military defeat of the LTTE, the armed component of the Sri Lankan ethnic issue has come to an end, making the conflict resolution easier. However, to India’s disappointment, Colombo has not taken the political process forward. The report of much-hyped All Party Representative Committee (APRC) has long been forgotten. The focus then shifted to the report of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submitted in November 2011. LLRC was a good step, but its mandate was very limited. Although it was not 100 percent objective, it was not disappointing either. It tried to do a balancing act containing both positive and negative aspects. On positives it talked about the need for demilitarisation, investigation of disappearances, apart from acknowledging existence of ethnic grievances; surprisingly, it supported devolution of powers to minorities, although did not spell them out. At the same time, it did not fix accountability for human rights abuses during Eelam War IV. On the killings during Eelam War IV, the report reasoned them out as a result of LTTE action and military reaction. Most importantly, the LLRC did not give any action plan on the way forward either on reconciliation or devolution. Yet, to India’s disappointment the implementation of recommendations of LLRC has been lethargic despite gentle reminders. It was in this context India supported US-sponsored resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in March this year. The move was not to upset Colombo, but with good intentions to move the process of reconciliation forward. India is convinced that a successful reconciliation is the first step in arriving at a meaningful long-term solution to the ethnic issue. In the present situation, devolution of powers to provinces through the ‘13th Amendment Plus Plus’ is a realistic option. There will be stiff opposition from the Sinhalese hardliners to this. However, riding on popular support, President Rajapaksa should be in a position to withstand these nationalistic pressures and forge an island-wide consensus for a lasting solution to the ethnic question.

All hoped that with the military defeat of the LTTE there would be a political settlement to the ethnic question. But, the issue lingers on. India has repeatedly conveyed its willingness to do whatever is required for the satisfactory resolution of the ethnic question in a manner that respects the sentiments of all the communities in Sri Lanka. New Delhi must voice its concerns without hesitation to ensure that Colombo moves forward in resolving the ethnic issue at the earliest and in all seriousness. Simultaneously, India, in the short-term, should continue to provide the resources required for the resettlement of IDPs and invest in the economic development of the war-ravaged Northeast of Sri Lanka. This will not only ensure that another armed conflict does not occur, but also open up immense economic opportunities for India. A durable peace in Sri Lanka will also take care of supplementary issues in the bilateral relations like security of Indian fishermen, the space for foreign powers like China and Pakistan in the island and, most importantly, anti-Sri Lankan sentiments in Tamil Nadu.

Sri Lanka: Where is the Reconciliation?

Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF

Sri Lanka has recently submitted the Universal Periodic Report to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on the status of implementation of recommendations made by Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). The Report cites drafting of a National Action Plan¹ to implement the LRRC recommendations and setting up of a Task Force to oversee the implementation as per the Action Plan. The Action plan has rearranged the 285 LLRC recommendations under five themes: International Humanitarian Law issues, Human Rights, Land Return and Resettlement, Restitution/ Compensatory Relief and Reconciliation. The key question is how serious is the Government of Sri Lanka on reconciliation and especially in finding a long-term political settlement to the ethnic issue?

On reconciliation, to pre-empt United Nations’ move to appoint an experts panel on “war crimes” during the last stages of war, Sri Lankan President appointed a eight-member Commission on ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation’ (LLRC) in May 2010. LLRC is a good step, but its mandate is very limited and ethnic reconciliation in the real sense has not been looked into seriously. As per the notification, the Commission was mandated to inquire and report on the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) operationalised on February 21 2002 and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to 19 May 2009 when the war ended; whether any person, group or institutions directly or indirectly bear responsibility; lessons to learn from those events and their attendant concerns in order to ensure that there will be no recurrence; and methodology whereby restitution to any person affected by those events or their dependents or their heirs, can be effected.² The assumption that the CFA was a failure is not true. Although, it is claimed that the LLRC is on the model of Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, there is no mechanism for reconciliation in the real sense. When the LLRC submitted its report in December 2011, things became clear. Although it was not 100 percent objective, it was not disappointing either.³ It tried to do a balancing act containing both positive and negative aspects. On positives it talked about the need for demilitarisation, investigation of disappearances, apart from acknowledging existence of ethnic grievances; surprisingly, it supported devolution of powers to minorities, although it did not spell them out. At the same time, it did not fix accountability for human rights abuses during Eelam War IV. On the collateral damage, the report reasoned that as a result of LTTE action and military reaction. Most importantly, the LLRC did not give any action plan on the way forward either on reconciliation or devolution. Yet, the major concern is that the need for fuller implementation of whatever the LLRC report has recommended. This was the main emphasis of the resolution passed in March 2012 at the UNHRC meeting in Geneva.⁴

Efforts in finding a long-term political settlement to the ethnic issue is nowhere in sight. Devolution of powers to the minorities seems to be the last priority. The Rajapaksa government has been talking of finding a “home grown solution” to the ethnic issue. In this regard, President Rajapaksa did appoint an ‘All Party Representative Committee’ (APRC) in 2006 to “fashion creative options that satisfy minimum expectations as well as provide a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the national question”. However, instead of exploring “creative options”, the APRC, in its interim report submitted in January 2008, advised the President to implement the 13^th amendment to the Constitution, which outlined devolution to the provinces in the aftermath of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. Even after 20 years, ideas for seeking a solution were back to square one. At last, the APRC reportedly submitted its final report to the President in June 2010. The President, however, chose not to make it public as of now.⁵ It is more or less a dead piece of document, though the process is being continued through a Parliament Select Committee appointed to forge a consensus on the issue.

Tamil minorities called the PSC appointment as a “time-buying tactic”, but President Mahinda Rajapaksa, in an interview, observed that “We are keen on a sustainable political settlement. But it must have wide acceptance, especially in the context of the post-conflict situation.”⁶ When this pronouncement is taken seriously, writing on the wall is clear. At the maximum, what is on cards is some arrangement revolving around the existing 13^th amendment. Through 13th Amendment, the island was divided into various provinces and granted some powers under Provincial List. However, the Provincial Councils lacked sufficient powers – especially land, police and finance – to run their affairs in an efficient manner. In addition, the Centre wields immense powers of overruling any of Provincial decisions. Instead of strengthening the Provinces, the present government is planning to dilute the present arrangement further. Unless there is genuine power sharing, the Provincial Council arrangement will be mere eyewash.

The Rajapaksa government also has to go beyond the constitutional tinkering in reaching out to minorities by showing magnanimity. Trust deficit that exists between various communities of the island must be bridged on a priority basis. Talks with TNA were a good move, but that did not take things any further. Any kind of sincere confidence building measure will go a long way in assuaging the Tamil diaspora that is presently keeping the hopes of Tamil Eelam alive. It is important for the Sri Lankan government to constructively engage the diaspora to make them positively contribute to the development of the country.

In the same vein, the Sri Lankan government must count-in the Opposition’s contribution in the nation-building. Without bi-partisan consensus, any political settlement to the ethnic question would be unsustainable. Political history of Sri Lanka since independence is witness to this. Colombo should also reconcile diplomatically with the West that is upset with former’s stand on human rights issues. Western and UN concerns are genuine and there is no “Church conspiracy” in this. It is vital to have them as ‘partners in development’ rather than overly depending on countries like China.

Endnotes

1. The full text of the Action Plan is available at http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201207/20120726national_plan_action.htm, accessed on 12 August 2012.
2. For the text of the Warrant issued by President Mahinda Rajapaksa dated 15 May 2010, see http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/LLRC%20news/20100826warrent_issued.htm
3. Full report of the LLRC is available at http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201112/FINAL%20LLRC%20REPORT.pdf, accessed on 12 August 2012.
4. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Resolution Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka,’ 19th Session, 22 March 2012, Full text of the Resolution is available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/03/22/sri-lanka-resolution/, accessed on 13 August 2012.
5. Leaked version of the final report is available at http://www.groundviews.org/wp-content/uploads/July-20-APRC-Final-Report.pdf, accessed on 13 August 2012.
6. Interview with Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa by R. Bhagwan Singh, Asian Age, 28 December 2011.

Fishermen Issue and India - Sri Lanka Relations

Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF

The Problem:

The issue of fishermen straying in each other’s territorial waters has come as a potential irritant in the otherwise generally good bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka.In the latest instance, the Sri Lankan Navy on 26 June reportedly “chased the fishermen near Katchatheevu and cut the ropes and damaged the nets of 10 boats.” Citing this incident, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha urged New Delhi to “impress upon Lanka the need to instruct their navy to exercise restraint and refrain from harassing innocent Indian fishermen pursuing their livelihood in their traditional waters.” Indeed, wherever sovereign coasts are in proximity (as in the case of India-Pakistan, India-Bangladesh and India-Sri Lanka), straying of fishermen is normal. Fishes know no frontiers; fishermen choose to ignore them, principally for livelihood reasons. However, in the India-Sri Lanka case, the issue is more complex and, therefore, calls for holistic approach.

Maritime border between the two countries is about 400 kilometres spreading along three different areas: the Bay of Bengal in the north, the Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar in the centre and the Indian Ocean in the south. In the Palk Bay region, distances between the coasts of the two countries varies between 16 and 45 kms. This means territorial waters of each country in some areas strays into the other’s if 12 nautical mile criteria is strictly applied.

The issue of fishermen came to the fore only with emergence of violent ethnic conflict between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government in the mid 1980s. Increased vigilance by the Sri Lankan Navy to check intermittent flow of Tamil refugees into India and flow of arms and supplies to Tamil militant groups made fishing difficult and risky. With the LTTE emerging as a dominant militant group, with a naval wing of its own (‘Sea Tigers’), things changed for worse to fishermen on both sides. They were caught in the crossfire between the Sri Lankan Navy and the ‘Sea Tigers’.

Logically speaking, after the ‘Eelam War IV’ and with the decimation of the LTTE, the fishermen issue should have come to an end. In reality, it has not. When the ethnic war was on, the Sri Lankan Navy focussed on ‘Sea Tigers’ and the movement of LTTE boats around the island. It overlooked straying of Indian fishermen, who were entrepreneurial enough to take the risk to smuggle goods that could be use to the LTTE. After the ethnic war, the Sri Lankan Navy is back to its primary task of patrolling the island’s maritime borders. The monitoring is also aimed at preventing possible return of LTTE cadres, who fled from the island during the height of the conflict in 2009, to revive the insurgency all over again. Security concerns still persist in Sri Lanka. Its Navy, therefore, has not let the guard down.

The end of war, however, has resulted in relaxation of fishing restrictions along Sri Lankan coasts resulting in its fishermen to venture into the seas around without any fear. The Indian fishermen, who thus far enjoyed monopoly of resource-rich waters, have now got competitors in massive numbers. At times, this leads to confrontations between the two fishing communities and in turn drawing intervention of either of naval forces. The main complaint of Sri Lankan fishermen has been against Indian mechanised trawlers that indulge in pair, mid-water, pelagic, and bottom trawling severely damaging marine resources and the sea bed. Ironically, most of the trawlers from Tamil Nadu are owned by merchant capitalists from non-fishing and other social backgrounds. The entry of ‘outsiders’ has not only threatened the local customary laws of fishing communities, but also turned several traditional fishermen from owners to labourers. Trawler sector in Tamil Nadu is also politically influential and financially sound making it more obdurate to solutions that could cut down its profit margins.

Straying of fishermen also takes place inadvertently due to ignorance of imaginary marine boundaries, engine failure or even due to sudden turbulence at seas. But, to be fair to Sri Lanka, not all Indian fishermen who stray into Sri Lankan waters are arrested or shot. Most of the times, they are warned and shooed away. Sri Lankan fishermen, who venture on high seas for ‘multi-day fishing’, are also caught poaching in Indian waters off coasts of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and even Orissa. They are, however, not shot at, but arrested and prosecuted.

Solutions:

Looking at solutions, at the outset, the right to life of fishermen should be respected; then comes the livelihood issue. To avoid shooting incidents due to “mistaken identity”, ‘coordinated patrolling’ between marine forces (Sri Lankan Navy and Indian Coast Guards) of both countries can be considered. Additionally, developing fish farming extensively in Indian waters would prevent its fishermen from venturing into other waters in search of a ‘big catch’. India can also consider leasing fishing blocks, especially those identified as ‘surplus total available catch’, from Sri Lanka. Through this, Sri Lanka could also earn much required foreign exchange. To preserve marine resources and to provide enough sustenance to the traditional marginal fishermen of both the countries, it is important to impose strict and complete ban on mechanised trawlers. However, given the dependency, immediate phasing out of mechanised trawlers from coastal fishing may be difficult. But, it has to be done sooner than later. As an alternative, these large trawlers could be encouraged to venture into high seas in India’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) rather into territorial waters of Sri Lanka. With suitable modification, they can also be used as patrol boats by the Coast Guards on hiring basis. Presently, the Indian Coast Guards faces immense shortage of patrol vessels.

Reinventing sustainable fisheries is vital for solving many issues. The issue ultimately lies in proper fisheries management. If adequate fish population is maintained in Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar areas, most of the fishermen would not find the need to venture into other’s ‘territories’. India also can consider taking on Katchchativu Island that has been the centre of controversy, on long-term lease. As a bigger neighbour, India has been accommodative to Sri Lankan sensitivities on the issue to the extent of gifting strategically vital Katchchativu Island despite opposition from Tamil Nadu. It should be noted that the Maritime Agreements of 1974 and 1976, which fixed marine boundaries between India and Sri Lanka, were done much before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that came into force in 1994. New Delhi never asked for renegotiation in the light of this new development, despite immense pressures from Tamil Nadu to wrest the island back from Sri Lanka so as to protect the interests of its fishermen. Colombo should take note of this and reciprocate accordingly by taking a liberal approach on Katchchativu Island and its visitors.

As an additional safety measure, the Indian Navy's proposal of fitting Global Positioning System (GPS) in every Indian fishing boat should be implemented. GPS provides the fastest and most accurate method for fishermen to navigate, measure speed and determine locations. Costs of installation could be shared by the governments of India and Tamil Nadu, with a token contribution from the concerned fishermen. Apart from training the fishermen of its usage, the local administration should sensitise them on the dos and don’ts in the international waters. Apart from respecting the rights of their Sri Lankan counterparts, the Indian fishermen should voluntarily try and avoid using trawlers that damage plankton and in turn make the seabed unfavourable for breeding of new fishes and prawns. There is already an agreement between the fishermen of two countries on this, but it is not abided by.

Arranging frequent meetings between fishing communities of both countries could be explored so as to develop a friendlier atmosphere at mid-seas during fishing. ‘Solution from below’ has greater chances of success than a ‘solution imposed from above’ by the governments. There have indeed been meetings between fishing communities since 2003, but erratic and not so fruitful in terms of tangible results. If they are systematised and institutionalised, one can expect them to be more successful. It is important that whatever agreements reached by the fishing communities amongst themselves receive strong backing from the governments and their marine forces. Otherwise, all these agreements would be futile.

China’s Footprints in Sri Lanka and India’s Concerns

Dr. N. Manoharan

Senior Fellow, VIF

China’s footprints in Sri Lanka go beyond the so called “String of Pearls” framework. Being a “time-tested friend” of Sri Lanka, China is one of the major players in the island in many fields. The diplomatic engagement goes to 1950s though intensity of it has picked up tremendously in the recent years.

In the present context, the bilateral relations between the two countries are cast within the broad structure of the ‘China-Sri Lanka All-round Cooperation Partnership of Sincere Mutual Support and Ever-lasting Friendship’ proclaimed in 2005. The Chinese involvement ranges from infrastructure development, economic aid, oil exploration, investments, trade and a strong diplomatic support to the island state when in need, especially in the wake of human rights accountability issue that emerged after the end of ‘Eelam War IV’.

Infrastructure development having wider strategic ramifications is the main Chinese footprint in Sri Lanka that has attracted considerable attention of India. Some of the important infrastructure projects developed by China in the island state include Hambantota port, Katunayake-Colombo Expressway, the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, Maththala Airport, Colombo South Harbour Expansion Project, 661-room Shangri La hotel and the Center for Performing Arts in Colombo. Statistically speaking, funding from China accounts for more than half of Sri Lanka’s construction and development loans. In value terms, it is estimated at over USD six billion; more than any other country.

The most talked about project is Hambantota port. The first phase of the port was completed in 2010 by the China Harbour Engineering Co. Ltd at a cost of $360 million. It includes a high-quality passenger terminal, cargo handling, warehousing, bunkering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, medical supplies and customs clearing facilities. The harbour is strategically located not only for the Chinese merchant vessels and cargo carriers sailing to and from Africa and the Middle East to make a stopover, but can also be used by any military fleet. A strong foothold for the Chinese in Hambantota would allow them to have dominance over a vast area of the Indian Ocean extending from Australia in the east, Africa in the west and up to Antarctica in the south. It may not be difficult for China to closely monitor all ships – military and non-military – that shuttle between east and west coasts of India encircling Sri Lanka. Ironically, Colombo had proposed building the Hambantota port as a joint venture with India, but New Delhi had let the offer pass.

When it comes to infrastructure development, India’s involvement in Sri Lanka is less, if not insignificant, in comparison to China. Sri Lankans rate the Chinese better in terms of timely completion of projects, cost effectiveness and quality of infrastructure. Indian companies have certain inherent disadvantages compared to their Chinese counterparts. While most Indian companies are privately owned, Chinese ones are state-owned and supported by state financial institutions like China Development Bank Corporation, and Exim Bank. Profit motive comes last for the Chinese companies. Their priority is to look towards aspects like strategic advantages, diplomatic mileage and good will gained through projects. Most importantly, in the Indian case, the private sector and the government do not seem to complement each other’s efforts and gains. Risk-averse Indian companies care less about projection of Indian ‘soft power’ without much state support and motivation. This point should be taken into consideration by the government of India in its economic diplomacy.

Sri Lanka is not alone where China’s presence is increasingly seen. Beijing has for long been building maritime and other linkages with, apart from Sri Lanka, countries of eastern Africa, Seychelles, Mauritius, West Asia, Pakistan, Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Southeast Asian countries. The main objective behind is to ensure the security of its sea lanes, especially unhindered flow of critically-needed energy supplies from Africa and West Asia. At the same time, these linkages have doubled up as virtual encircling of India, which some experts call as “String of Pearls” construct.

Although India’s presence in reconstruction of post-war Sri Lanka is huge, China’s involvement is also notable. It has already provided one million dollars for the humanitarian needs. This apart, it gave tents meant for IDPs worth 20 million Yuan. As far as economic engagement is concerned, the volume of trade between China and Sri Lanka reached nearly 2.1 billion US dollars in 2010 and grew further to USD 3.14 bn in 2011. The balance of trade is hugely in favour of China (ratio of 1:19 compared to 1:10 with India in 2011); yet Sri Lankans are not complaining. China is Sri Lanka’s largest foreign investor and lender. To cite recent figures, China gave USD 1.2 billion and USD 821 million respectively in 2009 and 2010; this accounted for 54 percent of total foreign loans in 2009 and 25 percent in 2010. Sri Lanka’s Central Bank announced in June 2011 that China’s national currency, the Yuan (renminbi), would be allowed to be used in international transactions. On the other hand, the Indian rupee does not enjoy the same privilege, despite India remaining as Sri Lanka’s largest trading partner and one of the largest donors and investors.

The more the Sri Lankans appreciate is China’s diplomatic support to Colombo against West-led call for international investigations on war crimes committed during ‘Eelam War IV’. China, along with India and Russia, was instrumental in defeating the UN resolution in May 2009 censuring Sri Lanka. China once again supported Sri Lanka when US-sponsored resolution was passed in March 2012. When India insisted on providing only “non-lethal weapons” to Colombo during the ‘Eelam War IV’ considering domestic political implications especially in Tamil Nadu, China liberally supplied requisite arms and ammunition to Sri Lankan troops to defeat the LTTE. These fetched China tremendous good will from the Sri Lankan government and the Sinhalese in general.

There is no free lunch, however. In return, apart from deeply appreciating China’s help, Sri Lanka has time and again reiterated its strict adherence to ‘one China policy’: “that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory.” Colombo does not seem to mind giving more leeway to Beijing in the island to strengthen its economy, which is the top priority at the moment. In the words of President Rajapaksa himself, “Sri Lanka’s economy is currently at an important turning point and it is our country’s strategy to enhance our ports-related economy.” Rajapaksa’s vision is to “reposition Sri Lanka as the ‘pearl of the old Silk Route’.” Colombo is more than happy to be one of the pearls in China’s “String of Pearls”. In turn, India’s interests and concerns are not in Sri Lanka’s radars, although the island state tries its best to do the fine balancing act to keep both big powers of Asia in good humour, while at the same time benefitting from both. To distinguish India from other players, President Rajpaksa recently observed, “We are a non-aligned country. Our neighbours are Indians. I always say, Indians are our relations. From the time of Asoka, we have had that culture… but that doesn’t mean we won’t get commercial benefits from others; from China, or Japan, or whoever. They will come here, they will build and they will go back. India comes here, they will build and they will stay. This is the difference…” Keeping this in mind, development projects are offered to both India and China from time-to-time. But, China is closer to the heart of present Left-of-the-Centre regime headed by Mahinda Rajapaksa.

India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure development cannot be underestimated. They range from helping fund the Matara-Colombo rail line, the dredging and refurbishment of the Kankesanthurai Harbor, and the renovation of Palaly Airport. India’s line of credit is about USD $1.8 billion, although the figure is roughly half of China’s current line of credit which stands at roughly USD $3.4 billion. Sri Lanka’s preference, therefore, is known. It is now in a position to juggle India and China, but is closer to Beijing, which has “no strings attached”, at least overtly, to any of the projects implemented or aid granted. Sri Lanka knows well that China will never demand to address the grievances of Sri Lankan minorities through a reasonable negotiated political settlement, and will not place restrictions on the involvement of any other country in the island in any manner. Beijing’s interests in Sri Lanka are purely strategic and, to a little extent, commercial.

India is not panicky about China’s footprint, but at the same time concerned about the strategic implications. The main concern is the possibility of use of infrastructure put in place by China against Indian interests. In the Annexure of the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 India and Sri Lanka have agreed that “Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka would not be made available for military use to any country in a manner which is prejudicial to India's interest.” India trusts that Colombo would abide by this provision seriously. But, caution is better, given the fact that Sri Lanka has not fully abided by even the core provisions of the Accord citing various excuses and justifications. To flout this provision in the Annexure will not take much time. The matter of concern for India is the possibility of dual-use mode of certain infrastructure projects. Like for instance, China is allowed to have storage and fuelling facilities at Hambantota, although India has also been offered to enjoy the same facilities. Similarly, the Colombo port that handles about 70 percent of India’s shipping is being modernised with Chinese assistance. If China’s wishes, it can always turn these projects to India’s disadvantage in a conflict situation.

New Delhi has indeed been taking various steps to address these concerns. In a similar situation in the 1980s, India was assertive in conveying its viewpoint. It in fact made sure that Sri Lanka was not used by forces inimical to India’s interests through the bilateral Accord of July 1987. But, in the present context, India has been dealing the issue in a more subtle manner. India has to balance out between regional peace, its own strategic interests and that of long-term peace, and development of Sri Lanka. The key is to sustain bilateral ties with Sri Lanka in the long run and make up for the lost ground.