India’s Defence Diplomacy as a Component of its Look East Policy

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The dominant impulse of India’s Look East Policy (LEP) that was launched in 1992 was economic and cultural, the objective being to reintegrate India economically and culturally with our civilisational neighbours of South East (SE) Asia. In December 2012, the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit was held in New Delhi to signify two decades of India’s LEP. Growing trade ties have corresponded with the expansion of relationship in the areas of defence and security and thus the engagement which was primarily political and economic has acquired strategic content in the recent years. India and countries of South Asia share many threats and challenges especially in the areas of non-conventional security. India and SE Asian nations have been strengthening their defence and security relationship both at bilateral and multilateral levels to address such threats. Defence cooperation with ASEAN members is geared primarily towards exchanges of high-level visits, strategic dialogues, port calls, training exchanges, joint exercises and provision of defence equipment.

Prime Minster Dr Manmohan Singh during his visit to Myanmar in April 2012 observed that both India and Myanmar need to “expand our security cooperation that is vital not only to maintain peace along our land borders but also to protect maritime trade which we hope will open up through the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe.”

India ramped up cooperation with Myanmar through high level visits by the Defence Minister Mr AK Antony in January, 2013 and last year through the visit of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff, ACM Norman Browne from November 26 to 29. Myanmar army has been looking for hardware and India has been providing items such as transport aircraft, helicopters and other defence equipment. India is also focussed on expanding training and capacity building of the Myanmar armed forces. Further, Myanmar navy has been regularly taking part in India’s Milan series of naval exercises since 2006.

Malacca Straits is the pivotal transiting point through which most of the oil and gas transportation of India, Southeast and East Asian countries take place. Increasing incidence of piracy for ransom and smuggling in the high seas, which threatens uninterrupted transportation of oil and gas, has prompted these states to secure the sea lanes. Here cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia to secure Malacca Straits and the neighbouring areas remains strategically important.

Malacca Straits are important to both India and Indonesia and the two countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2001 and have had regular defence exchanges including the exchange of high level visits, ship visits, officers studying in Staff Colleges in either country and joint coordinated patrols in the mouth of the Malacca Straits. Indonesian Navy ships have consistently participated in the Milan series of exercise conducted near the Andaman and Nicobar islands by the Indian Navy.

Last October, Antony visited Indonesia to attend the first Ministerial level biennial defence dialogue between the two countries, where he observed ‘We have a vital stake in the evolution of balanced security and cooperation mechanisms through which we can build consensus and pursue dialogue. We seek to improve our partnership with all countries in the Indian Ocean Region on bilateral basis as well as through multilateral fora like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) etc’. India has also been supporting the freedom of navigation and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through South China Sea where some of the ASEAN countries are at the receiving end of China’s assertive policies.

Further, as part of deepening its engagement with the Southeast Asian countries through military to military relations, India has provided access to Singapore armed forces to use Indian training facilities like Air Force and Artillery firing ranges. Singapore has signed Defence Cooperative Agreement in 2003 and a “Bilateral Agreement for the Conduct of Joint Military Training and Exercises in India”. Naval exercises between both the Navies are being conducted annually since 1994; in 2011, the naval exercise between both the Navies were conducted in South China Sea and the shore phase of the exercise was conducted at the Changi Naval Base of Singapore.

During Mr Antony’s visit to Singapore in June this year, India and Singapore signed a fresh agreement to extend the use of training and exercise facilities in India by the Singapore Army for a further period of five years. A bilateral agreement for utilization of facilities in India by the Singapore Air Force and Army was signed in October 2007 and August 2008 respectively. Singapore is the only country to which India is offering such facilities.

The third country which remains important in the context of Malacca Straits and adjoining maritime area is Malaysia. India-Malaysia defence relations have been growing over the years after signing of MOU on Defence Cooperation (MIDCOM) in 1993. The ninth meeting of the MIDCOM was held in Kuala Lumpur in January 2012. India’s Chief of Air Staff visited Malaysia in February 2012 and Malaysia’s Chiefs of Army and Navy both visited India in April 2012. The IAF Training Team deployed in Malaysia trained Malaysian pilots on the SU-30 MKM aircraft for two-and-a-half years since February 2008. Malaysia has also been looking for training its Scorpene submarine crew and maintenance of the submarines. These are areas where both sides can cooperate as India is also acquiring such submarines.

Thailand is another important Indian Ocean littoral state with which India shares maritime boundary. Cooperation between the two countries is based on the Joint Working Group on security established in 2003 has been now upgraded to include defence exchanges. The first meeting of India-Thailand Defence Dialogue was held in New Delhi in December 2011 and a bilateral MOU on Defence cooperation was signed in January 2012. The current Defence cooperation comprises regular joint exercises, coordinated maritime patrols near the international maritime boundary to counter terrorism, piracy and smuggling; training of officers at each other’s’ Armed Forces Training institutions and participation as observers in military exercises. Defence Minister Mr AK Anthony visited Bangkok in June this year. The two Ministers reviewed regional security situation and expressed their support for collaborative regional mechanisms such as AEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus for maintaining regional peace and security, freedom of navigation, keeping open sea lanes of communication, and cooperation in areas such as anti-piracy, disaster relief and rescue.

Securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and Malacca Straits is also important for the South East countries like Vietnam that has intensified its defence relationship with India. For the ASEAN countries, it is geo-strategically prudent to forge a defence relationship of a greater or lesser degree with India and the US as some sort of balance of power arrangements possibly against a rising and assertive China that is hardly going to remain status quoist.

An MOU between Vietnam and India was signed in 2009 for defence cooperation though the defence exchanges between both nations pre date this period. India and Vietnam face a common challenge from China and both have been target of its muscular policies. Some of the engines of Vietnamese MiG-21 aircrafts have been overhauled in India. There are also mechanisms for sharing of strategic perceptions and naval cooperation between the two countries. Coordinated patrols by the Vietnamese sea–police and the Indian Coast Guard are conducted jointly in addition to training of Vietnamese air force pilots. Besides providing some defence equipment, India has also been helping Vietnam to set up a domestic defence industry.

Similarly, India has defence cooperation and exchanges with Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Philippines. For instance, India is setting up an Air Force Academy in Laos. An Indian military delegation led by the Army Chief visited Laos in December 2011. Discussions revolved around on going defence cooperation initiatives between India and Laos. The Army Chief reaffirmed India’s commitment to the capacity building of the Lao People’s Army and discussed a range of defence cooperation initiatives with the Lao army leadership. The delegation visited the Kaysone Phomvihane Academy for National Defence, where a two-member training team from the Indian Army has been in place for the last 15 years.

Exchange of visits of defence officials, goodwill visits by Indian Naval Ships to Cambodia’s ports, gift of medical equipment & other stores and imparting of training courses to Royal Cambodian Air Force (RCAF) personnel in demining and peace keeping operations have been part of the defence exchanges. On the security front, India and Cambodia have signed an Agreement on Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crimes and Illicit Drug Trafficking in December, 2005. With Brunei, there has been some degree of defence cooperation with Indian naval ships participating in the first-ever Brunei International Fleet Review to mark the 50th anniversary of Royal Brunei Armed Forces.

So far as Philippines is concerned, an impetus to defence cooperation has been imparted in recent years. With defence cooperation between the two countries having been formally established through the 2006 Philippines-India Agreement Concerning Defence Cooperation, Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships regularly visit the Philippines. The participation of officers of the armed forces of both countries in various specialized training courses in each other’s countries has increased. There are also arrangements for sharing of intelligence and perceptions on certain other sensitive issues. To enhance the defence cooperation further, a Joint Defence Cooperation Committee was constituted which had its first meeting in Manila in January 2012.

At the multilateral level, India has also become a member of ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meet –Plus Eight (ADMM-Plus). The basic objective of creating this framework was to bring about co-operative security, especially in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, counter-terrorism and peace keeping operations. ADMM-Plus Eight has also proposed furthering of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and sharing of expertise among the military forces of member states. The arrangement also advanced proposals to counter particular threats and issues such as piracy and natural disaster through joint military exercises.

Both India and ASEAN members have been on an upward economic trajectory and as they grow, the security and strategic environment has also been becoming complex. While these nations have been in a beneficial economic relationship with India and China, they remain wary of China’s growing assertion and irredentist tendencies. India’s efforts in defence cooperation with ASEAN also aims at addressing its own strategic concerns both in the Indian Ocean littoral as well as in South China Sea. Both Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs need to coordinate their efforts in order to add meaningful substance to the evolving defence and security relationship with the ASEAN members as part of a composite endeavour to achieve success in the strategic objectives of its LEP. The MOD also needs to allot more vacancies to the defence officers of the SE Asian countries for training at our defence establishments. Frequency of joint military exercises also needs to be increased to improve levels of interoperability. There is also a case for reviewing our restrictive policies on export of defence hardware to South East Asian nations. 

Not in Our Interest to Escalate Matters

Kanwal Sibal 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

But it’s up to Rome to find an acceptable way out of the crisis it has created.

The refusal of the Italian government to send back their marines to India for trial complicates an already emotive issue.

The Italian government had till now shown respect for the due process of law by fighting the case upto the Supreme Court. It fulfilled its obligation to return the marines for trial after Christmas holidays in Italy. This time, after the Supreme Court permitted them to go home for voting- an indulgent decision -Rome has decided to dishonour its word to the SC and defy India politically. After showing patience, unavoidable in complex political and legal issues like this one, to precipitate matters like this is surprising.

If public opinion in Italy is agitated over the situation of the marines and had to be satisfied, public opinion in India is distressed too and has to be handled in a more complex federal situation. The reality is that Italian marines have killed Indian citizens close to India’s coast. The injured party is India; it has an independent judiciary and due process of law is assured. There are enough ambiguities in the legal aspects of the case to justify a trial in India. The SC has now ruled that Indian courts have jurisdiction. Why a law-abiding democracy like Italy should show such disregard for law and India is surprising.

The Italian government’s explanation is not convincing. How could it expect India to take a “diplomatic” view of the killing of its citizens in such dubious circumstances and not test facts and jurisdictional issues through the law courts? The formal dispute with India over the terms of UNCLOS, that it claims, can be pursued through mechanisms available in the Convention and not through unilateral action in circumventing the judicial process underway by reneging on its commitment to the Indian government.

This unfortunate development comes in the wake of the Augusta-Westland case, dealing with which will become more problematic with the trust gap now opening wider with the marines case. India-Italy relations are too important to allow them to be degraded. It is not in India’s interest to escalate matters as this case is not central to the relationship. Prime Minister is right in saying that the Italian decision is unacceptable. The burden is on the Italian governement to find an acceptable way out.

Dealing with the Neighbour from Hell - Dangerously Naïve, Naively Dangerous

PP Shukla 

(Joint Director, VIF) 

There has been a veritable barrage of opinion, hectoring and outright abuse from the pro-Pakistan segments of our media activists in the print media over the recent flare-up along parts of the LOC. This requires a substantive and fact-based debate, and an answer to some of the arguments put forward by the pro-Pakistan elements that have written and spoken so passionately on the subject in recent days.

The essence of the arguments put forward by the supporters of the Government policy may be summed up in three principal lines of reasoning. The first is that there is a change inside Pakistan, and this is driven by a realisation that hostility towards India has not paid, so it is time to look at the alternative and to improve ties with India. The second line of argument is that if India takes a tough stand towards Pakistan, it will weaken the moderates, those who want good relations with India. The third line is that this Prime Minister’s policy is actually very wise, and is an example of profound realism. Further, that is it this realism that has established an asymmetry between India and Pakistan in the international discourse.

First: the supposed change inside Pakistan has been much commented upon. Among the pro-Pakistan elements, this is coupled with a conviction that the nationalist segment of opinion in India is too blind, or biased, to see this. The core argument is that, after years of sponsoring terrorism, Pakistan has itself become a victim, and is therefore now ready to drop its earlier policy of promoting terrorism, and seeks a new relationship with India. Pakistan, in this telling, has lost forty thousand lives to terror, and is more victim than sponsor. Pakistan’s economic problems are also part of the reason for the change in mood. All through 2012, we were also told that proof of this change was that Pakistan had given MFN treatment to Indian exports, and there was more to follow. 

The reality is different. The easier point to dispose of is that Pakistan has not given MFN status to Indian goods; even though that is an obligation they have under the WTO and was backed up by a Cabinet decision early last year. This, by the way, also illustrates Pakistan’s approach to its solemn international obligations, which we would be wise to bear in mind as we go forward in our dealings with them, for example, on the TAPI gas pipeline project. It also illustrates our approach: for sixteen years we have unilaterally extended MFN treatment to Pakistani exports to India, and we have not even taken Pakistan to the WTO dispute settlement for its refusal to give our exports MFN status. In short, as always, we have indulged Pakistani violation of the law. The pro-Pakistan elements are not talking about this now, but it is easy to imagine how they would have touted this – had it happened – as evidence of the change they profess to see.

As to terrorism, there is absolutely no evidence that there is any change in Pakistan’s approach to sponsoring anti-India terrorists. They continue to protect and promote the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the other tanzeems that have India as their target. Equally, they continue to sponsor the Taliban and their allies in Afghanistan, and to good effect, judging by the recent developments in the Afghan issue. 

Here, too, the core argument needs to be stripped away: the forty thousand killed over the last ten years is supposed to have induced a sense of the danger from their erstwhile irresponsible policies in the minds of Pakistani leaders. The reality is that this statistic covers all sorts of incidents, including the drone attacks, sectarian killings, and innocent civilians. Among the uniformed forces, the death toll is six thousand over ten years – high, for sure, but not all that much, and certainly not enough to make the security establishment change its mind. The direction of events is clear: judges who pronounce verdicts against terrorists have to flee the country, or seek shelter somewhere; killers of highly-placed officials are showered with petals when they come for trial. It is not surprising that a well-known Pakistani analyst, and an arch nationalist, was forced to lament “the fundamentalist Islam that now seems to hold sway in our unfortunate country.” No, it is more probable that those who advocate a soft line on Pakistan are the ones who are missing the real change inside that country, not the sceptics.

Finally, there is the contrary reality; the growing power and aggressiveness of the religious establishment inside Pakistan. The same people in India, who talk about the growing sectarian killings as one of the factors inducing a sense of responsibility among Pakistani policy-makers, seem to suggest that this is some kind of exogenous phenomenon, and that the poor victims are now asserting themselves. But no, the growing power of the religious extremists is endogenous, and is the more powerful reality inside Pakistan. The minorities - Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, and the Shia - in that country have the scars to prove it. To suggest that there is a growing sense of moderation in Pakistan, while ignoring this powerful fact, is itself to hide from the reality.

Most important of all, we have an easy test of real intent and real change: the Mumbai 26/11 trials. Whenever the Pakistan establishment gets serious about tackling terror, all it has to do is stop playing ducks and drakes with this issue, and we shall all get the message. Sadly, what we are seeing is the opposite. One Pakistani leader advises us to move on and stop being emotional about it, another suggests that there is some kind of linkage between 26/11 and Ayodhya; these are clear signs that, for Pakistan, there is no give on anti-India terror. We are also seeing that the Maoists are now getting weapons from Pakistan. It is hard to discern in all this any let-up in the sponsorship of terror by Pakistan. It is up to us to face this reality.

The second argument is about the moderates and the need for India to strengthen them. The first issue here is – just who are the moderates? It is quite droll to see that when the media in India wish to project a Pakistani moderate, they have to reach out to the cultural fringes of society, a Sufi singer, or an anti-Establishment writer, or some such. All the others who appear on our television screens, former bureaucrats, journalists, lawyers, etc, are all as hawkish as any serving official, civil, political or military. By contrast, you can see any number of Indian mainstream figures among all these professions who argue for a soft approach. There is thus a first issue of exactly who these moderates are, and whether they have any meaningful existence at all. 

Secondly, the presumption is that if you turn the other cheek, you strengthen the moderates, while a hard response plays into the Army and the hardliners’ hands. This deserves closer examination. Even the most recalcitrant on our side among the friends of Pakistan will concede that turning the other cheek is more or less what we have been doing, at least since the days of the Gujral Doctrine, which – without the name – was continued by the subsequent NDA and UPA Governments. The Pakistani response was to give us the Kandahar hijack, the attack on Parliament, train bombings, and - the culmination – Mumbai 26/11. Finally, now there is the beheading on the LOC, and not for the first time at that. One question that arises is - how long before the moderates will be sufficiently strengthened so as to give us some degree of civilised behaviour in our bilateral ties? The pro-Pakistanis are silent on this. This is wise on their part, for the reality is that it is not working.

There is another fact to be considered here. The Pakistan Army has been weakened twice in the recent past, once in 1971, and again after the US raid on Abbottabad in May 2011. Neither happened after the other cheek was turned; they happened after a successful military action against the Pakistan Army. And this illustrates the most fundamental principle of statecraft: you defeat the authors of a policy when you defeat their policy. Hitler was not weakened by the policy of appeasement followed by Chamberlain; it took pressure and finally, force, to fix the problem. Our elites, such as they are, are innocent of statecraft, but they should at least have the humility to learn from history, our own and that of other parts of the world. 

The third argument is the suggestion that this appeasement is really an example of “profound realism” – this is an exact quote from one of the pro-Pakistan elements in recent days. While on the subject of “realism”, it really needs to be emphasised that what we have seen in terms of the joint anti-terror mechanism, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Statement, with its incomprehensible reference to Baluchistan, are hard to defend and justify as examples of realism. Both ideas have been ignored and allowed to lapse in the subsequent engagement, and amen to that.

The writer of the above piece goes on to suggest that this policy of profound realism has altered the perception of India and Pakistan in global opinion, and has altered, too, the earlier symmetry between the two countries in the eyes of international opinion, so that India is now seen as the more attractive and responsible country. This is indeed happening to some extent, and is welcome. But the logic of the argument is highly doubtful: not more than one in a thousand would disagree with the proposition that the asymmetry is a result of our economic growth in the past decade above all, especially contrasted with Pakistan’s poor performance in this field. Our democracy, our soft power, and our military strength, are the other elements in this mix. Realism does not really make the grade. One could make the argument, instead, that the weakness we have displayed has actually worked in Pakistan’s favour. The western accommodation of Pakistan over Afghanistan is evidence of this. The sad truth is that all countries, starting with Pakistan, take it as a given that India will remain passive in the face of any security challenge, no matter what.

And then to be accused of jingoism! That is truly the unkindest cut of all. Here is how the term originated, in a bar room song that was popular in the pubs of London in the late 19th century. “We don't want to fight but by Jingo if we do/ We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too”. None of our leaders has said anything that even remotely qualifies to be called jingoism. Our Prime Minister, with every show of reluctance, has just said that it cannot be business as usual with Pakistan. This, too, came after intense TV and popular pressure. The point is, this is the minimum that any democratic leader could say. And there are already early hints that we are slipping back into opening a high-level dialogue. 

Quite apart from domestic pressure, there is also the straight question of what India should do, if we were to follow the prescriptions of the pro-Pakistan elements. What solution do the friends of Pakistan have to offer? A careful search of all the comment from that side of the argument suggests that there is really no answer, no solution, to this. An editorial in a misleadingly-named newspaper suggests the following: 

“Not every malaise has a cure; some can only be managed better or worse, and certainly not through indiscriminate blood-letting. India’s relationship with Pakistan is one of them.”

And that is exactly what is so wrong with the position of the pro-Pakistan segment of our society. Press hard enough, and the doves have to admit that they have no solution but to continue to suffer it as long as Pakistan continues to dish it out. 

And yet, what the current outrage in India shows is that there is a large body of opinion, neither hawkish nor dovish, that does not accept this counsel of defeat. The problem with the debate is that the pro-Pakistan opinion seeks to posit only a straight two-way choice. We can either talk, or we are war-mongering. As to talking, the problem is first, that they are going nowhere. Clearly, our primary interest is in ending terrorism against us, and it must be clear to all that this is something Pakistan will not give us satisfaction on. Their interest is in Kashmir, and it is clear that we cannot give them satisfaction on this. Of the other subjects, the talks have produced only limited results, and a good case can be made for an altogether new platform for talks in the future. 

This is not war-mongering, as the Pakistanis say – and their cry has been taken up by the doves in India. No, between appeasement and war, there are myriad choices, including, for a start, restricting the level and scope of the talks themselves. There are, besides, many economic, diplomatic, and other means available as well. We could reduce the sizes of the High Commissions in the two countries, and that would curb some of the inimical activities of their Mission; we could also pull out of the TAPI project, which will cripple Pakistan’s energy strategy for the future, since no energy project is viable without India as a stable long-term buyer; there are many others as well, including sub-conventional activity, to match what Pakistan has been doing for decades. In other words, it is time to try a different mix, and work some disincentives into the formula, since that has been completely absent for many years now.

Lastly, the fact is that no one wants wars. Yet, they do happen. It is unwise in the extreme to be unprepared for such an event, especially for one who lives this close to a seething cauldron of religious, social, ethnic and economic turmoil. This is a contingency that the country must also be prepared for.

India’s Look East Policy Gains Momentum

Vinod Anand 

(Senior Fellow, VIF) 

The ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit held in New Delhi last month, was the taking forward of a process that began two decades back with the unveiling of India’s Look East Policy (LEP) in 1992. That was also the time when India had ushered in its new economic policy and put into place economic reforms. During that period while the so called tiger economies of South East Asia were doing very well while India’s economy was in doldrums. The dominant impulse of India’s LEP was economic engagement with the ASEAN countries. Since then India has progressed from a dialogue partner to the present status of a strategic partner. 

In the geopolitical context the India-ASEAN summit was particularly important as it highlighted continued integration of a common policy of peace and stability in the region by building mechanisms of engagement. Within this context, India has attempted to place the South China Sea issue in an appropriate perspective during the Summit as well as in the various bilateral high level meets held on the sidelines. 

Largely, the objective of the Summit was to consolidate the gains made so far in economic, political, security and other spheres and articulate a vision for the future. Thus, at the end of the Summit a Vision statement was issued which underscored the future pathways for enhancing ASEAN-India engagement. 

During the summit, India also endorsed ASEAN’s centrality and its role as the driving force of both economic and security for ASEAN integration. India has also taken initiatives in ASEAN Community building process and cooperation through contributions via ASEAN-India Fund (AIF), ASEAN-India Green Fund (AIGF), ASEAN-India Science & Technology Development Fund (AISTDF) as also through direct financial assistance to various research and development projects which has been well appreciated by ASEAN nations.

Economy and Trade

 India has a robust economic relationship with ASEAN. The trade volume between ASEAN and India has surpassed the USD 79.3 billion level in 2011-12 crossing the target of USD 70 billion by 2012 set in 2009. By 2015, trade figures have been projected to touch USD 100 billion. PM Manmohan Singh envisioned the trade volumes reaching USD 200 billion within 10 years from now. These are very ambitious targets but achievable if FTA in services sector is concluded soon. However, these trade volumes are much less when compared with ASEAN-China trade which stands at USD 362.8 billion. China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner for the past three years. Even with an ambitious target of growth, it is unlikely that India will be able to catch up with China in the near future. After concluding Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN in goods in 2009 (which was operationalized in 2011) India had hoped to sign FTA in services and investments with the ASEAN. However, only the negotiation process on FTA in services and investments has been concluded. It is likely that it may be signed sometime next year as some countries like Philippines are still wary that such an agreement may have negative domestic impact. 

Improved Connectivity is another important factor that would strengthen the linkages between ASEAN and India. India is in the process of building India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and its extension to Lao PDR and Cambodia and has undertaken a new highway project connecting India-Myanmar-Lao PDR-Viet Nam-Cambodia as well as developing the Mekong-India Economic Corridor (MIEC) connecting Southeast Asia to South Asia on the eastern part of India in order to add greater momentum to the growing trade and investment linkages between ASEAN and India. But, as is well known, India has a record of tardy implementation of its projects and there are always some bureaucratic hassles in utilisation of allotted funds. Greater physical connectivity would provide the impetus for economic integration with the region. 

Political and Security Cooperation

Use of existing ASEAN-led regional processes, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus to promote defence and military exchanges and cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues was emphasised during the summit. The aim is to address traditional and non-traditional security challenges, including transnational crimes and implementation of the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. 

India has been advocating further cooperation to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation, and safety of sea lanes of communication to facilitate movement of trade in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. Great emphasis was paid to this aspect largely due to the on-going maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS), though China was not mentioned by name. China’s assertive policies in the South China Sea appear to be the primary drivers for the ASEAN nations to work towards a common approach on the security issues. 

Leaders of some countries especially Vietnam PM touched upon the SCS dispute but India avoided the issue and remained focussed on the centrality of the maritime domain and closer security ties with the ASEAN. Earlier Philippines’ Vice President, Jejomar Cabanatuan who attended the Summit on behalf of his President had observed that “In the present day, the issues are no longer of parochial interest. Freedom of navigation and lawful commerce are universal interests. The statement of the Admiral (Indian Naval Chief) is a confirmation that it is a problem (South China Sea disputes escalation by China) that India cannot turn its back on.” Earlier, PM Manmohan Singh had also underscored some of the above issues when at Pnom Penh (at the 10th ASEAN Summit ) in November, 2012; he stated that  “India and ASEAN should not only work for shared prosperity and closer links between our peoples, but also to promote peace, security and stability in the region” 

Socio-Cultural and Development Cooperation

 Socio-cultural cooperation and promotion of greater people- to-people interaction through increasing exchanges in culture, education, youth, sports, creative industries, science and technology, information and communication technology and software, human resource development and scholarly exchanges are areas which would lead to integration. Dissemination of knowledge about the civilisational links between ASEAN and India was another way forward in this area.

Preservation, protection and restoration of symbols and structures representing civilisational bonds between ASEAN and India like Angkor Wat in the Kingdom of Cambodia and many other such places in other ASEAN countries has been in important area where India and ASEAN countries have been working together with positive results. 

Further, India has also been paying special attention to the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries that represent a bridge between ASEAN and India by intensifying focus on human resource development and capacity building e-initiatives.

Assessment

India’s LEP seems to have come of age after two decades of engagement with the ASEAN. The economic and trade linkages which saw an expansion of trade volumes stand testimony to the intensified economic engagement. However, the FTA in goods signed with the ASEAN may have had some negative effect on some of the goods produced domestically. But, it is the FTA in services which is expected to create more synergies and balance in trade and investments.

One of the key outcomes of the Summit has been elevating the level of ASEAN-India engagement to that of strategic partnership. The relationship which had been largely economic oriented has now acquired the dimension of security cooperation in maritime domain and both in traditional as well as non-traditional areas of security. ASEAN countries, some of whom are at odds with China due to SCS dispute see in India a balancer even though India would not be able to match China in terms of economic and military strength for many years to come. In addition to the multilateral engagement with the ASEAN countries through its security mechanisms India has bilateral cooperation with most of the ASEAN countries to address defence and security concerns. India is particularly keen to strengthen its defence and maritime security cooperation with countries like Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Vietnam and Malaysia also remain important. And it is also not neglecting other countries of the ASEAN. Nevertheless all the ASEAN members and India have deep bilateral relationship with China. Thus, the challenge for India and ASEAN, in the next two decades, would be how to balance their burgeoning inter-se relationship with that of larger and more powerful China.

ASEAN itself is somewhat a divided house, especially when it comes to their approach to China with some of the countries like Cambodia and perhaps even Laos and Myanmar which have seen massive investments from China (China has invested over USD 363 billion 2011in ASEAN) following a different path from some of the political positions articulated by other countries of ASEAN. In addition, America’s Asian pivot strategy is creating its own reverberations in SE Asia complicating the emerging strategic scenario. Meanwhile India’s LEP which was premised on economic engagement has graduated to, as mentioned earlier, to a kind of Secure East policy. However, realisation of such a policy would not be an easy task.

Global Trends 2030 Report by US National Intelligence Council has forecast a scenario in 2030 where India may be doing better than China economically because of several factors as mentioned in the report. In the current scenario, India is being seen by ASEAN as a benign power and a responsible regional stakeholder. There is also a degree of scepticism regarding the ability of a far away power like the US’ capacity to be a security provider in this region considering its declining economic power and other attributes. India has been supporting freedom of navigation and UNCLOS. But the question remains how far India would be willing to contribute to the regional security when push comes to a shove. This would be the most difficult decision to make even if and when India acquires adequate capabilities.

Fishermen Issue and India - Sri Lanka Relations

Dr. N. Manoharan
Senior Fellow, VIF

The Problem:

The issue of fishermen straying in each other’s territorial waters has come as a potential irritant in the otherwise generally good bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka.In the latest instance, the Sri Lankan Navy on 26 June reportedly “chased the fishermen near Katchatheevu and cut the ropes and damaged the nets of 10 boats.” Citing this incident, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha urged New Delhi to “impress upon Lanka the need to instruct their navy to exercise restraint and refrain from harassing innocent Indian fishermen pursuing their livelihood in their traditional waters.” Indeed, wherever sovereign coasts are in proximity (as in the case of India-Pakistan, India-Bangladesh and India-Sri Lanka), straying of fishermen is normal. Fishes know no frontiers; fishermen choose to ignore them, principally for livelihood reasons. However, in the India-Sri Lanka case, the issue is more complex and, therefore, calls for holistic approach.

Maritime border between the two countries is about 400 kilometres spreading along three different areas: the Bay of Bengal in the north, the Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar in the centre and the Indian Ocean in the south. In the Palk Bay region, distances between the coasts of the two countries varies between 16 and 45 kms. This means territorial waters of each country in some areas strays into the other’s if 12 nautical mile criteria is strictly applied.

The issue of fishermen came to the fore only with emergence of violent ethnic conflict between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government in the mid 1980s. Increased vigilance by the Sri Lankan Navy to check intermittent flow of Tamil refugees into India and flow of arms and supplies to Tamil militant groups made fishing difficult and risky. With the LTTE emerging as a dominant militant group, with a naval wing of its own (‘Sea Tigers’), things changed for worse to fishermen on both sides. They were caught in the crossfire between the Sri Lankan Navy and the ‘Sea Tigers’.

Logically speaking, after the ‘Eelam War IV’ and with the decimation of the LTTE, the fishermen issue should have come to an end. In reality, it has not. When the ethnic war was on, the Sri Lankan Navy focussed on ‘Sea Tigers’ and the movement of LTTE boats around the island. It overlooked straying of Indian fishermen, who were entrepreneurial enough to take the risk to smuggle goods that could be use to the LTTE. After the ethnic war, the Sri Lankan Navy is back to its primary task of patrolling the island’s maritime borders. The monitoring is also aimed at preventing possible return of LTTE cadres, who fled from the island during the height of the conflict in 2009, to revive the insurgency all over again. Security concerns still persist in Sri Lanka. Its Navy, therefore, has not let the guard down.

The end of war, however, has resulted in relaxation of fishing restrictions along Sri Lankan coasts resulting in its fishermen to venture into the seas around without any fear. The Indian fishermen, who thus far enjoyed monopoly of resource-rich waters, have now got competitors in massive numbers. At times, this leads to confrontations between the two fishing communities and in turn drawing intervention of either of naval forces. The main complaint of Sri Lankan fishermen has been against Indian mechanised trawlers that indulge in pair, mid-water, pelagic, and bottom trawling severely damaging marine resources and the sea bed. Ironically, most of the trawlers from Tamil Nadu are owned by merchant capitalists from non-fishing and other social backgrounds. The entry of ‘outsiders’ has not only threatened the local customary laws of fishing communities, but also turned several traditional fishermen from owners to labourers. Trawler sector in Tamil Nadu is also politically influential and financially sound making it more obdurate to solutions that could cut down its profit margins.

Straying of fishermen also takes place inadvertently due to ignorance of imaginary marine boundaries, engine failure or even due to sudden turbulence at seas. But, to be fair to Sri Lanka, not all Indian fishermen who stray into Sri Lankan waters are arrested or shot. Most of the times, they are warned and shooed away. Sri Lankan fishermen, who venture on high seas for ‘multi-day fishing’, are also caught poaching in Indian waters off coasts of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and even Orissa. They are, however, not shot at, but arrested and prosecuted.

Solutions:

Looking at solutions, at the outset, the right to life of fishermen should be respected; then comes the livelihood issue. To avoid shooting incidents due to “mistaken identity”, ‘coordinated patrolling’ between marine forces (Sri Lankan Navy and Indian Coast Guards) of both countries can be considered. Additionally, developing fish farming extensively in Indian waters would prevent its fishermen from venturing into other waters in search of a ‘big catch’. India can also consider leasing fishing blocks, especially those identified as ‘surplus total available catch’, from Sri Lanka. Through this, Sri Lanka could also earn much required foreign exchange. To preserve marine resources and to provide enough sustenance to the traditional marginal fishermen of both the countries, it is important to impose strict and complete ban on mechanised trawlers. However, given the dependency, immediate phasing out of mechanised trawlers from coastal fishing may be difficult. But, it has to be done sooner than later. As an alternative, these large trawlers could be encouraged to venture into high seas in India’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) rather into territorial waters of Sri Lanka. With suitable modification, they can also be used as patrol boats by the Coast Guards on hiring basis. Presently, the Indian Coast Guards faces immense shortage of patrol vessels.

Reinventing sustainable fisheries is vital for solving many issues. The issue ultimately lies in proper fisheries management. If adequate fish population is maintained in Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar areas, most of the fishermen would not find the need to venture into other’s ‘territories’. India also can consider taking on Katchchativu Island that has been the centre of controversy, on long-term lease. As a bigger neighbour, India has been accommodative to Sri Lankan sensitivities on the issue to the extent of gifting strategically vital Katchchativu Island despite opposition from Tamil Nadu. It should be noted that the Maritime Agreements of 1974 and 1976, which fixed marine boundaries between India and Sri Lanka, were done much before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that came into force in 1994. New Delhi never asked for renegotiation in the light of this new development, despite immense pressures from Tamil Nadu to wrest the island back from Sri Lanka so as to protect the interests of its fishermen. Colombo should take note of this and reciprocate accordingly by taking a liberal approach on Katchchativu Island and its visitors.

As an additional safety measure, the Indian Navy's proposal of fitting Global Positioning System (GPS) in every Indian fishing boat should be implemented. GPS provides the fastest and most accurate method for fishermen to navigate, measure speed and determine locations. Costs of installation could be shared by the governments of India and Tamil Nadu, with a token contribution from the concerned fishermen. Apart from training the fishermen of its usage, the local administration should sensitise them on the dos and don’ts in the international waters. Apart from respecting the rights of their Sri Lankan counterparts, the Indian fishermen should voluntarily try and avoid using trawlers that damage plankton and in turn make the seabed unfavourable for breeding of new fishes and prawns. There is already an agreement between the fishermen of two countries on this, but it is not abided by.

Arranging frequent meetings between fishing communities of both countries could be explored so as to develop a friendlier atmosphere at mid-seas during fishing. ‘Solution from below’ has greater chances of success than a ‘solution imposed from above’ by the governments. There have indeed been meetings between fishing communities since 2003, but erratic and not so fruitful in terms of tangible results. If they are systematised and institutionalised, one can expect them to be more successful. It is important that whatever agreements reached by the fishing communities amongst themselves receive strong backing from the governments and their marine forces. Otherwise, all these agreements would be futile.