Balochistan- The New Regional Tinderbox?

Monish Gulati

On 25 October 2013, the Iranian State News Agency reported that fourteen Iranian border guards were killed and five wounded in clashes with “armed bandits” near Saravan on Iran’s southeastern border with Pakistan. There were also reports of three (to six) soldiers of having been taken hostage and moved across the border into Pakistan. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has since called for an investigation into the incident.¹ The Balochistan region (with areas falling in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) has for long been associated with instability and armed conflict. On the other hand, events of regional and global significance involving Iran have been unfolding in the Middle East and on the global stage. It is argued that disturbances in Balochistan which are being influenced by events outside Iran can have a significant impact on the strategic environment in South Asia.

Sistan-Baluchestan

Balochistan strategically straddles the borders of three volatile countries. In Pakistan, Balochistan is its largest province (43 percent of the country’s land mass) and home to at least five million Pakistani Baloch. While the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchestan, comprises of 11.5 percent of Iranian land mass and has around 2.5 million inhabitants. In Iran, the Baloch are mainly Sunni Muslims, who share the province of Sistan-Baluchestan with Persians and Sistanis, who are mainly Shia .

Sistan-Baluchestan's proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan makes it one of the world's most dangerous narcotics, arms, and human trafficking conduits. The involvement of Baloch operated smuggling networks in regional trafficking activity and their extension into Pakistan and Afghanistan, has influenced Iran's perspective of the Baloch. Iran is also worried about the threat Baloch nationalism poses to its territorial integrity and regional stability. This has resulted in a rather severe Iranian approach to governance, development and security in Sistan-Baluchestan. The Iranian attitude in turn has only served to distance the Baloch and accentuate the sectarian divide.

Saravan Attack

Iranian Deputy Interior Minister Ali Abdollahi said that the Saravan attack had been carried out by Iranians who were "members of hostile groups". The Iranian Sunni insurgent group Jaish ul-Adl (“Army of Justice”), formed last year, has claimed responsibility for the hour long encounter.² Some analysts believe Jaish ul-Adl to be an offshoot of another Sunni terrorist group, but presently passive; the Jundallah, which has been responsible for terrorist attacks on civilians, assassinations and kidnappings in Iran. In retaliation for the Saravan attack, the Iranian authorities on 26 October executed 16 "rebels" held at a prison in Zahedan .³ According to available information, eight of these rebels belonged to Jundallah, while the remaining were hanged on drug offences.

After the attack, Iran lodged a protest with the Pakistani government over the apparent lack of control on illegal movements along the common border.⁴ Pakistan government has been requested to abide by the mutual security cooperation pact and the accord on extradition of criminals in force between the two countries since 18 February this year.

Over the past year, Iran has seen an upsurge in Sunni separatism in Sistan-Baluchestan, including from another Sunni terrorist group, Harakat Ansar Iran. ⁵ Recently, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that the IRGC have successfully foiled 11 terrorist attacks in south-eastern Iran in the first half of the Iranian calendar year (March 21-September 22, 2013)⁶. Jafari blamed “agents of Iran’s enemies and counter-revolutionary groups”. Although the grievances of these groups are local, they are however increasingly linked via media networks to a conceptual framework of “global jihad” and a wider sectarian fight of Sunni versus Shia Islam. Jaish ul-Adl makes extensive use of the social media to network and propagate its cause including posting videos of its actions on its Facebook account.

Jaish ul-Adl

Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), which describes itself as a “political-military” movement, is motivated by Baloch nationalism and what they claim, Iran’s oppression of the Sunni Baloch people.⁷ The group operates primarily in the Sistan-Baluchestan province and according to a statement on the group’s website, is “composed of young Iranian Sunnis who have come together to defend the oppressed to the divine command”. Jaish al-Adl describes Iranian crimes against the Sunni minority in Iran as destruction of mosques, murder and arrest of clergymen.

The external causes driving the group has been the Iranian involvement in Arab countries, primarily Syria, and its attempt to impose the Twelver Shiism (Ithna Ashariya) in Arab states through the “Hezbollah” branches in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. ⁸ The group recently called on all Sunnis to provide financial assistance. In addition to the better known Jundallah, the other Sunni Baloch terrorist group in operating in the region is the Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI).

Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI)

Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI) differs from its predecessor, Jundullah, in being more than regional in its perspective and joining their cause with wider Sunni issues. ⁹ Recently HAI made an appeal, on a Saudi-based pan-Arab satellite channel (Wesal TV), calling on Sunnis to support the group by sending arms. HAI is cooperating with Sepah-e Sahaba Iran (SSI), another Sunni extremist group with ties to Pakistani terror group Sipah-e-Sahaba¹⁰ Pakistan.¹¹ Operationally HAI also employs suicide bombing and has claimed to have targeted IRGC including members of its elite Qods Force, in Chabahar.¹²

Assessment

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been the target of the US, Israel, and the Gulf Arab monarchies led by Saudi Arabia. In addition to the crippling effect of the economic sanctions due to its nuclear programme, the prospect of the revival of a nationalist Baloch insurgency can severely impact stability in Iran and subsequently the entire region.

Further even though, the grievances of the Baloch Sunni extremist groups in Iran are local, they are getting increasingly linked by ideology and via media networks to a conceptual framework of “global jihad” and the larger sectarian strife between the Sunni versus Shia Islam; or in way a proxy Iran versus Saudi Arabia tussle in the region. Iran recently blamed explicitly its Sunni rivals Qatar and Saudi Arabia for funding and inciting Sunni separatist movements in the country.¹³

The finger pointing on Sistan-Baluchestan has led Iran to foment trouble in the Saudi backyard- Yemen. Iran has been lending support to the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. The Houthi insurgency besides destabilizing parts of North Yemen has managed to bring trouble to the Saudi province of Jizan.

Iran is a key stakeholder in the ongoing discussion over peace talks on Syria and has covertly been influencing ground action in the country. A statement published in Persian on the website of Jaish al-Adl, after the Saravan attack, read as: “This successful operation is an answer to the violent crimes of Sepah (IRGC) in the Islamic land of Syria and is also an answer for oppression and crimes the regime has committed against the oppressed Sunnis of Iran.”¹⁴ On the other hand, Basij, Iran’s volunteer paramilitary organization operating under the IRGC¹⁵ has blamed the US and Israel for the attack.

The border incident at Saravan assumes significance not only by virtue of its geopolitical location or the sectarian tensions being fanned allegedly by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also due to the critical nature of developments concerning Iran on the global stage. Negotiations between Iran and the P-5+1 on the Iran’s nuclear programme have picked up pace after the election of Rouhani as Iran’s president, his recent address to the UN General Assembly and his telephonic discussions with the US President. The subsequent fallout of these events and the US position on Syria has adversely impacted the US-Saudi-Israeli equilibrium in the Middle East, which makes a case for creating ‘distractions’ on Iran’s eastern borders. Israeli Mossad agents have in the past posed as US spies to recruit members of Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran.¹⁶

Given the swift Iranian reaction to the Saravan attack, further disturbances in the area have the potential to raise Sunni-Shia tensions in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. As Afghanistan prepares for its crucial presidential and provincial elections early next year, sectarian tensions will be an added source of instability.

Besides the spilling over of the Syrian conflict to the region and rise of sectarian tensions, India’s concerns would include the Chabahar port, its planned sea-link to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which is located in Sistan-Baluchestan province. In October 2012, a suicide bomber killed two guards at a mosque in Chabahar. Earlier in 2010, an attack by two suicide bombers at the same mosque had killed 39 people.

India would be alert to the fact that as the Syrian conflict drags on and the US stand on Iran and its nuclear programme softens, the frequency and intensity of insurgent and proxy activity in Balochistan is likely to increase to the detriment of peace and stability in the region.

(The author is a Defence Analyst based in Delhi)

Endnotes

1. Iran president calls for probe into border shooting, The Iran Project, October 26, 2013. http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/26/iran-president-calls-for-probe...
2. Joanna Paraszczuk. Iran Spotlight: Sunni Insurgent Group Jaish ul-Adl Claims Responsibility For Attack On Border Guards, EAWorldView, October 26, 2013. http://eaworldview.com/2013/10/iran-spotlight-sunni-insurgent-group-jais...
3. Iran 'hangs 16 rebels' in reprisal for Pakistan border killings, Yahoo news, October 26, 2013.
   http://news.yahoo.com/14-iran-guards-killed-clashes-pakistan-border-0608...
4. Iran protests to Pakistan over negligence of terrorist movements on border area, The Iran Project, October 26, 2013. http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/26/iran-protests-to-pakistan-over...
5. Iran protests to Pakistan over negligence of terrorist movements on border area, The Iran Project, October 26, 2013. http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/26/iran-protests-to-pakistan-over...
6. Eleven terrorist attacks foiled in SE Iran in 6 months: IRGC commander, The Iran Project, October 20, 2013.
   http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/20/eleven-terrorist-attacks-foile...
7. New Iranian Sunni jihadi group claims car bombing, calls for recruits, Iran Military News, December 28, 2012. http://iranmilitarynews.org/2012/12/28/new-iranian-sunni-jihadi-group-cl...
8. Sunni opposition warns of increased Iranian subversive activity designed to disseminate Shiite doctrine, Iran Daily Brief, June 07, 2013.
   http://www.irandailybrief.com/2013/06/07/sunni-opposition-warns-of-incre...
9. Joanna Paraszczuk. Iran Analysis: Sunni Separatists Harakat Ansar Iran Call For Arms on Saudi TV, July 22nd, 2013. http://eaworldview.com/2013/07/iran-feature-sunni-separatist-spokesman-c...
10. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (‘Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet’) is a pro Al-Qaeda Sunni sectarian group and the largest Islamic extremist group in Pakistan. It’s current name is Alhe Sunnat Wal Jamaat but is still referred to as the SSP. SSP was formed in the early 1980s in Jhang in reaction to the Iranian revolution of 1979, and aims to fight Shia influence in Pakistan in the wake of the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its ultimate goal is to create a Sunni state in Pakistan.SSP accuse Iran of sponsoring extremist Shia groups in Pakistan and have targeted Iranian interests in retaliation for killings of Sunni leaders.
11. Sistan and Balochistan Sunni terror group Harakat Ansar Iran announce cooperation with Sepah-e Sahaba, Iran Military News, December 07, 2012. http://iranmilitarynews.org/2012/12/07/sistan-and-Balochistan-sunni-terr...
12. Ibid
13. Iran’s Sunni Jihad groups — Thinking Globally but Acting Locally, Iran Military News, March 11, 2013. http://iranmilitarynews.org/tag/harakat-ansar-iran/
14. Arash Karami. Sunni Group Takes Credit for Attack That Killed 14 Iranians, Iran Pulse, October 27, 2013. http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/10/3123/sunni-group-takes...
15. Ali Alfoneh. The Basij Resistance Force, USIP.
    http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force
16. Mark Perry. False Flag, Foreign Policy, January 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=full&wp...

Will China Checkmate India on Chabahar? Printer-friendly version

Radhakrishna Rao, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In a development that could very well upset India’s geo-strategic apple cart, China is making deft and vigorous moves to woo Iran to accept its offer of US$80-million to upgrade the Chabahar port located on the coast of Gulf of Oman, off the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps it could be a well thought out move on the part of China, which through its “string of pearls” strategy is busy expanding its area of influence across the Indian Ocean region, to keep India away from the project and slowly intrude into the Indian geo-political space in Tehran. A toehold in Iran could drive China to cast its “net of influence” far and wide, across the West Asian landscape, with serious consequences for the American presence in this oil rich part of the world.

From building the deep sea ports and launching satellites to constructing all weather highways and putting in place telecom networks, China has become a “partner in progress” for many countries in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladesh are among the Indian neighbours where an impressive “Chinese presence” has become a fait accompli. In the context of the administrative control of the Gwadar port located on Makran coast, overlooking the Arabian sea, in Pakistan’s sparsely populated and restive Balochistan province, passing on into the Chinese hands, Chabahar has come to assume immense strategic and economic significance for India. Clearly and apparently, India’s participation in Chabahar port development could, to some extent, work as a counter-poise to the advantages that China could derive from managing Gwadar port.

Gwadar port, which stands out as a vibrant symbol of strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, could very well give China an easy access to the key energy markets in the Middle East. Further, it could also provide China a convenient access to the warm waters of Indian Ocean and a listening post near the Strait of Hormuz. Incidentally, about 20% of the world’s petroleum and 35% of the petroleum traded by sea pass through the Strait of Hormuz, described as one of the world’s busiest and most strategically located sea lanes.

As part of the ambitious US$18-billion economic corridor project connecting Kashgar in China with Gwadar, it is planned to build a pipeline as well as road and rail links that will involve engineering of around 200-kms of tunnels across the treacherous mountainous landscape. The road link will involve upgrading and realigning the strategically located Karakoram highway. Kashgar is located in China’s disturbed western Xinjiang province where Muslim Uighur separatists are quite active.

Of course, the Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline may help China reduce its dependence on Malacca Strait in so far as transporting oil from West Asia is concerned. Further, it could help meet a part of the energy needs of the Western parts of China. More importantly, this pipeline makes a strategic sense for China in terms of strengthening its long term energy security. On another front, in order to bring down its reliance on the Strait of Malacca for transporting crude, China has invested heavily in building an oil and gas pipeline in Myanmar. As things stand now, China is expected to overtake US as the world’s largest crude importer in 2014.Currently,three fourth of China’s crude import from Middle East are channelled through the Strait of Malacca which is vulnerable to piracy and geo political uncertainties. But then the economic corridor project is still at a conceptual stage and it would be sometime before it gets going. However, both the countries, while highlighting the economic importance of the project, have downplayed its strategic aspects. Meanwhile, reports emanating from Beijing quote Chinese Government officials as saying that security concern could hinder the 2000-km long economic corridor project.

On their part, US security analysts believe that China could very well make use of its control over Gwadar for furthering its military interests. In the ultimate analysis, there are many strategic gains that China can derive from the port with particular reference to protecting its long term interests in the Indian Ocean region in addition to ensuring its energy security. Significantly, Gwadar is located just 72 nautical miles east of Chabahar. However, the daring pre dawn attack on a check post of coast guards near Gwadar in late July has exposed the vulnerability of the port to the prevailing volatile conditions in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan province. This attack is believed to be the handiwork of the banned militant group, Balochistan Liberation Front.

Though the development of the Chabahar port has been on the agenda of India-Iran bilateral discussions since 2003, the political leadership in New Delhi was far from serious about Indian participation in this vital maritime project from which India can stand to make substantial gains. After sitting on this project proposal for nearly ten years, the ruling elite of the country has suddenly realized the vital importance it holds for country’s long term geo political interests. This appears to be a sequel to Chinese move to edge out India.

Of course, India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid during his visit to Teheran earlier this year had driven home the point that India could provide upto US$100-milliion assistance to upgrade the port. About the project, Kurshid had this to say, ”The two sides have pushed for transit pact between India, Iran and Afghanistan which would help India get access to the land locked and resources rich countries in Central Asia. We are going ahead with the Chabahar project. Cabinet has already cleared it”. As things stand now, Iran is yet to give its final clearance for the Indian investment in project. However, political observers are clear in their perception that India should seek fast track negotiations with Tehran to pave the way for the Indian participation in the up-gradation of this port. This could prevent China from upstaging India.

But then USA has all along been hostile to the Indian proposal of joining hands with Iran for this maritime project. Unfortunately, India’s track record in standing up to the US “political pressure and psychological intimidation” is far from impressive. As such, in the backdrop of the Chinese move to corner India, New Delhi should be driven by its own domestic compulsions and interests and get the decks cleared for Indian participation in Chabahar port development without any loss of time. There is no need for India to buy the American argument that Iran should be isolated for its nuclear weapons development programme.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, in early August, the new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani while addressing the Majlis (National Parliament) stated that if the West wants an “adequate response” from Iran, it should not speak the language of sanctions but that of respect. There is no denying the fact that Iranian economy has suffered heavily due to US and European sanctions and threat against the countries that continue to do business with Iran.

But the grim ground reality is that the routine trade between India and Iran have been affected by payment issue following sanctions. The recent visit of an Iranian business delegation to the tea gardens in north east India has raised the hopes of exporting an “appreciable volume” of high end tea varieties to Iran. As it is, early last year, the powerful American Jewish Committee had told the Indian Ambassador to USA, Nirupama Rao, that it was “deeply troubled” by the recent reports of India’s efforts to intensify trade relations with Iran” at the very moment when the US and fellow democracies are applying new economic pressure to persuade Tehran to halt its nuclear programme.”

In May this year, Hassan Nourian, Consul General of Iran in Hyderabad, had observed that the bilateral trade between the two countries is poised to cross US$25-billion within four years. ”We have already entered the second year. Currently, most of the exports from Iran to India are primarily based on oil and petroleum products. To effect this, both have encouraged focussing on non oil exports from India in order to strike a balance between the two countries,” he said. Following sanctions, the annual Iranian crude import by India valued at US$15-billion is being paid for in the Indian Rupee. However, the annual Indian export to Iran is pegged at around US$2.5-billion per annum. It is planned to boost this to S$4-billion.Even with this figure, it means a surplus credit balance of US$11-billion in favour of Iran. How to offset this huge trade imbalance happens to be the crux of bilateral trade discussions between the two countries.

There is no denying the fact that Indian investment in Chabahar is important for India to protect its “business and commercial interests” in the landlocked Afghanistan as Pakistan has denied India transit access to Afghanistan through its land route. It is planned to construct a railway network connecting Chabahar with Zahedan in Afghanistan. Moreover, the port is already linked to the city of Zarang located in south western Nimroz province of Afghanistan. This road link can serve as India’s entry point to Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond. Indeed, Chabahar could invest India with ability to move quickly goods and supplies and if necessary even defence personnel straight to Afghanistan through Iran which assumes significance in the backdrop of US and allied troops planning a phased pull out from the war torn Afghanistan. Of course, India should nudge Iran to agree to the idea of moving military forces to Afghanistan through Chabahar. But this would again be subject to Iran getting some long term strategic benefits in such an arrangement. However, India is yet to take up this issue with Iran.

Chabahar has been designated as a Free trade and Industrial zone by Tehran. It has also been described as Iran’s best access point to Indian Ocean. Iran has already spent US$350-million on the development of this port. Without doubt, Indian participation could help the port, which because of the sanctions, has not been in a position to corner the business in proportion with its potential, to earn more revenue from catering to the Indian needs on a variety of fronts. India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar. With many of the Indian enterprises keen on entering the lucrative mining sector of Afghanistan, Indian participation in Chabahar project could prove a win win deal for India Inc.

As it is, India’s growing role in Afghanistan focuses on the plan to extract iron ore from the mountain ranges at Hajigak, located about 100-kms to the northwest of the capital city of Kabul. According to Ali Jalali, a Professor at the US National Defence University in Washington and a former Afghan Interior Minister, Indian and Chinese investment will be a major contributor to Afghanistan’s stability as the US is preparing to withdraw its main combat forces between now and 2014.”

On another front, India and Iran are also discussing building a gas pipeline between the two countries along the bed of the Arabian Sea to bypass Pakistan using Chabahar port. Rattled as it is by India’s drastic reduction in purchase of its oil, Iran deemed it prudent to offer India oilfields on lucrative terms along with a proposal to route the gas through the undersea pipeline. Of course, in the wake of sanctions, New Delhi has difficult times paying for the imported Iranian oil in foreign currency. Further, there is also difficulty in getting ships to ferry oil along with the insurance cover.

As it is, India was forced to pull out of Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project on account of a variety of factors including security issues, differences over pricing as well as US pressure. The security concern stemmed from the fact that the pipeline will pass through Balochistan where Baloch separatists and Islamic radical outfits could pose a threat to the safety of the pipeline. But then a section of strategic analysts hold the view that India’s withdrawal from this vital energy pipeline project was a sort of geo-political blunder as India lost an opportunity to create a new equation in the region.

As envisaged now, a consortium with state owned JN Port and Kandla port on-board, is likely to take up the development of Chabahar port. The Indian side is proposing a phase wise development of Chabahar on long term operations, maintenance and transfer basis spread over 60-90 years. Iran has successfully positioned Chabahar as the focal point for development of the east of the country through expansion and enhancement of transit routes among the countries situated in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. But then as is the case with Gwadar, Chabhar too could face a threat from Sunni Baloch insurgents who have no love lost for the regime in Teheran.

For quite sometime now, India has been more than keen on getting a convenient access route to the landlocked Afghanistan through Iran. And in this quest lays the importance of Chabahar for India. By all means, Chabahar is the best option left for the country to reach Afghanistan in a hassle free manner .Indeed, India, Iran and Afghanistan are now edging closer to concluding a transit treaty that would facilitate easier linkage between India and Afghanistan through Iran. As it is, both New Delhi and Kabul are keen on ending their dependence on Pakistan for transit. Both India and Iran have agreed that “the project would provide connectivity with Afghanistan and provide an impetus to Afghanistan’s economic development.”

Going beyond Indian investment on the development of Chabahar, Iran has also made a proposal to India for joint investment and production sharing contract for oil exploration. Indeed, this offer has tremendous strategic significance from the point of view of ensuring Indian energy security. But then New Delhi will have to devise ingenious ways and means to circumvent sanctions if it wants to participate in the Iranian oil exploration venture. For the energy deficit India, collaboration with Iran in the area of oil and petroleum cannot but be a positive development.

By all means, India’s interest in developing strategically important south eastern Iranian sea port of Chabahar as well as New Delhi’s craving for better bilateral relations is seen as a positive step towards regional cooperation and economic gains for the participating countries. India’s construction plans for Chabahar port could also be viewed as reviving of old links and building new bridges of friendship through collaboration. While Iran is all set to derive benefits from positioning Chabhar as a logistical hub and a potential alternative to Bandar Abbas, for Afghanistan, Chabahar could be an alluring alternative to the dependence on Pakistan’s Karachi port for carrying out its international trade. In the ultimate analysis, it is advantages all the way from the Chabahar project for Afghanistan, India and Iran.