Showing posts with label Pakistan and Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan and Afghanistan. Show all posts

Friday, April 25, 2014

Kunming Stabbing Incident: China under the Shadow of Islamic Radicalism

Radhakrishna Rao, 
Visiting Fellow, VIF

Slowly and surely, the middle kingdom seems to be emerging as a preferred “soft target” of terrorist violence spearheaded by a radical outfit with its alleged links to the notorious Al Qaeda. For the communist China, which not long back was least worried about the devious doings of global terrorist networks, disturbing developments in its home-turf in recent months have brought home the looming threat of terrorism in all its manifestations.


Not surprisingly then the violent stabbing spree at Kunming railway station in Yunnan province on March 1 has set the alarm bells ringing in China’s security set up. Incidentally, the south westerly Yunnan province whose capital is Kunming has had no history of a terrorist attack or social violence. Much to the dismay of Chinese security and intelligence agencies, the knife wielding attackers who encountered virtually no resistance initially left 33 people dead and 130 injured in one of the bloodiest incidents ever reported in this part of the country. China’s official Xinhua news agency described this pre-meditated violent incident as “China’s 9/11 and a severe crime against humanity”. The authorities of the Kunming Municipal Government were quick to point out that evidence at the crime scene showed that the attack was organised by the Xinjiang based Uighur separatists. Significantly, this is for the first time that militants allegedly belonging to the, which is fighting for a sovereign Muslim majority Xinjiang country, managed to carry out such a frightening and violent attack outside their home-turf. The suspicion is that the attack could be a part of the long term strategy of Uighur separatists to hit soft targets deep inside China with a view to create “fear psychosis” and draw global attention to their on-going struggle for a separate Muslim majority Xinjiang country.

The Patronage that the banned East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is said to be receiving from Al Qaeda is considered a major factor behind its rapidly expanding acts of violent terrorism.


Nevertheless, this is not the first act of terrorism mounted by Uighur separatists outside of the Xinjiang province. In October last, a terrorist attack in the capital city of Beijing had stunned and rattled China. This well planned violent attack at the historic Tiananmen Square had resulted in the death of five people. In the aftermath of this incident, the ruling dispensation in Beijing had described this terrorist outrage in the heart of China’s capital city as a “pre meditated and well planned suicide attack” aimed at destabilizing the Communist giant. This attack which was also blamed as the handiwork of ETIM marked a significant shift in the militant activities of ETIM whose violent activities were for long confined to Xinjiang. Chinese authorities drive home the point that ETIM has for long been engaged in Central, East (By "East" , the Chinese authorities imply the possibility of Uighur extremists having linkages with Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand and insurgents in Mindanao island of Philippines) and West Asia and has joined hands with many of the terrorist outfits with global footprints. ETIM cadres are known to have fought alongside Taliban militia in Afghanistan and rebel forces in trouble torn Syria. Clearly and apparently, China has enough to worry about ensuring its domestic peace and territorial integrity in the face of brazen terrorist attacks.

In a well thought out move aimed at psychologically paralysing the terrorist outfits by blocking their funding sources, China’s Central Bank has announced new measures aimed at enabling authorities to freeze assets of domestic terrorist groups and their “overseas patrons’. Cutting off the source of funding could take the sail out of the winds of a terrorist group. India too needs to take steps to end the “hawala racket” which has become a major source of funding for terrorist outfits, criminal gangs and anti social networks in the country. Chinese security agencies believe Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics offer safe sanctuary to the fugitive Uighur separatists owing allegiance to ETIM For long there has been a suspicion that ETIM gets funds, training and psychological motivation from Al Qaeda. The Islamabad based Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies had indicated that Uighur separatists from Xinjiang province of China mainly frequent the mountainous North Waziristan, the most turbulent part of the lawless tribal belt. Indeed, Beijing has on many occasions expressed its displeasure over the failure of Pakistan to crack down on Uighur terror groups. Chinese officials in Xinjiang blame ETIM overseas cadres, chiefly those active in camps of Pakistan, for fomenting trouble in many parts of the province. This largest Chinese province in the extreme west of the country shares porous borders with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Uighur extremists are also known to have forged strong links with radical Islamic groups in the Central Asian Republics.

For well over two decades now, the ruling dispensation in Beijing has been blaming Uighur extremists for acts of sporadic violence and destruction in the sprawling and resources rich Xinjiang where 12-million ethic Uighurs reside. Currently, Uighurs constitute 45% of the total population of Xinjiang. Uighurs are upset that with the state supported plan to settle Chinese Hans in the restive Xinjiang, they are doomed to end up as a minority group.

Since 1990s, Xinjiang has been making it into the media headlines for acts of violence indulged in by the disgruntled Uighurs who see a repressive streak in the policy designed for them by the rulers in Beijing. China is of view that ETIM is trying to insulate itself from the country’s counter terrorism measures by developing robust transnational ties that include alliance with other terrorist groups and safe operational bases in other countries.

Uighurs are quite upset that their religious, cultural and commercial activities are being curtailed by Beijing presumably to put a lid on the separatist sentiments embedded deep in the psyche of the community. In recent years, Chinese authorities have been pressurising Uighur men not to grow beards and Uighur women not to use veil or other Islamic attire. These measures have been justified by Beijing as a cornerstone of the strategy designed to end the spread of religious extremism said do be responsible for the violent separatist movement. Many Uighurs say that they are made to feel like second class citizens in their home turf. Uighurs are upset that the Chinese speaking Hans in Xinjiang have cornered most of the civil service jobs and are forging ahead in business and professions.

In 2009, around 200 people had paid with their lives in one of the bloodiest clashes that took place between native Uighurs and Han settlers in the provincial capital of Urumqi. And in April 2013, violent clashes involving Uighurs and policemen in Kashgar had left 21 dead. Further in June.2013, 35 people were killed in an attack against a Police Station in Luquan. Uighurs who follow a moderate version of Sunni Islam are clear that repressive policies aimed at the community is at the root of on-going “unrest and turbulence” in the province. But Uighur uprising has never attracted the global attention the way Tibet has. Strategic analysts believe, however, that Uighur uprising could pose a serious threat to China’s territorial integrity in comparison to the turbulence in Tibet. For now, by design or accident, Tibet is on the way to slowly getting integrated into the “Chinese mainstream”. But then the festering unrest and turmoil in Xinjiang has all the potentials of graduating into a full scale and well armed separatist movement that China can ignore at its own peril. It is not for nothing that Xinjiang has been described as China’s emerging West Bank.

Friday, November 8, 2013

Balochistan- The New Regional Tinderbox?

Monish Gulati

On 25 October 2013, the Iranian State News Agency reported that fourteen Iranian border guards were killed and five wounded in clashes with “armed bandits” near Saravan on Iran’s southeastern border with Pakistan. There were also reports of three (to six) soldiers of having been taken hostage and moved across the border into Pakistan. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has since called for an investigation into the incident.1 The Balochistan region (with areas falling in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) has for long been associated with instability and armed conflict. On the other hand, events of regional and global significance involving Iran have been unfolding in the Middle East and on the global stage. It is argued that disturbances in Balochistan which are being influenced by events outside Iran can have a significant impact on the strategic environment in South Asia.

Sistan-Baluchestan

Balochistan strategically straddles the borders of three volatile countries. In Pakistan, Balochistan is its largest province (43 percent of the country’s land mass) and home to at least five million Pakistani Baloch. While the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchestan, comprises of 11.5 percent of Iranian land mass and has around 2.5 million inhabitants. In Iran, the Baloch are mainly Sunni Muslims, who share the province of Sistan-Baluchestan with Persians and Sistanis, who are mainly Shia .

Sistan-Baluchestan's proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan makes it one of the world's most dangerous narcotics, arms, and human trafficking conduits. The involvement of Baloch operated smuggling networks in regional trafficking activity and their extension into Pakistan and Afghanistan, has influenced Iran's perspective of the Baloch. Iran is also worried about the threat Baloch nationalism poses to its territorial integrity and regional stability. This has resulted in a rather severe Iranian approach to governance, development and security in Sistan-Baluchestan. The Iranian attitude in turn has only served to distance the Baloch and accentuate the sectarian divide.

Saravan Attack

Iranian Deputy Interior Minister Ali Abdollahi said that the Saravan attack had been carried out by Iranians who were "members of hostile groups". The Iranian Sunni insurgent group Jaish ul-Adl (“Army of Justice”), formed last year, has claimed responsibility for the hour long encounter.2 Some analysts believe Jaish ul-Adl to be an offshoot of another Sunni terrorist group, but presently passive; the Jundallah, which has been responsible for terrorist attacks on civilians, assassinations and kidnappings in Iran. In retaliation for the Saravan attack, the Iranian authorities on 26 October executed 16 "rebels" held at a prison in Zahedan .3 According to available information, eight of these rebels belonged to Jundallah, while the remaining were hanged on drug offences.

After the attack, Iran lodged a protest with the Pakistani government over the apparent lack of control on illegal movements along the common border.4 Pakistan government has been requested to abide by the mutual security cooperation pact and the accord on extradition of criminals in force between the two countries since 18 February this year.

Over the past year, Iran has seen an upsurge in Sunni separatism in Sistan-Baluchestan, including from another Sunni terrorist group, Harakat Ansar Iran. 5 Recently, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that the IRGC have successfully foiled 11 terrorist attacks in south-eastern Iran in the first half of the Iranian calendar year (March 21-September 22, 2013)6. Jafari blamed “agents of Iran’s enemies and counter-revolutionary groups”. Although the grievances of these groups are local, they are however increasingly linked via media networks to a conceptual framework of “global jihad” and a wider sectarian fight of Sunni versus Shia Islam. Jaish ul-Adl makes extensive use of the social media to network and propagate its cause including posting videos of its actions on its Facebook account.

Jaish ul-Adl

Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), which describes itself as a “political-military” movement, is motivated by Baloch nationalism and what they claim, Iran’s oppression of the Sunni Baloch people.7 The group operates primarily in the Sistan-Baluchestan province and according to a statement on the group’s website, is “composed of young Iranian Sunnis who have come together to defend the oppressed to the divine command”. Jaish al-Adl describes Iranian crimes against the Sunni minority in Iran as destruction of mosques, murder and arrest of clergymen.

The external causes driving the group has been the Iranian involvement in Arab countries, primarily Syria, and its attempt to impose the Twelver Shiism (Ithna Ashariya) in Arab states through the “Hezbollah” branches in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 8 The group recently called on all Sunnis to provide financial assistance. In addition to the better known Jundallah, the other Sunni Baloch terrorist group in operating in the region is the Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI).

Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI)

Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI) differs from its predecessor, Jundullah, in being more than regional in its perspective and joining their cause with wider Sunni issues. 9 Recently HAI made an appeal, on a Saudi-based pan-Arab satellite channel (Wesal TV), calling on Sunnis to support the group by sending arms. HAI is cooperating with Sepah-e Sahaba Iran (SSI), another Sunni extremist group with ties to Pakistani terror group Sipah-e-Sahaba10 Pakistan.11 Operationally HAI also employs suicide bombing and has claimed to have targeted IRGC including members of its elite Qods Force, in Chabahar.12

Assessment

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been the target of the US, Israel, and the Gulf Arab monarchies led by Saudi Arabia. In addition to the crippling effect of the economic sanctions due to its nuclear programme, the prospect of the revival of a nationalist Baloch insurgency can severely impact stability in Iran and subsequently the entire region.

Further even though, the grievances of the Baloch Sunni extremist groups in Iran are local, they are getting increasingly linked by ideology and via media networks to a conceptual framework of “global jihad” and the larger sectarian strife between the Sunni versus Shia Islam; or in way a proxy Iran versus Saudi Arabia tussle in the region. Iran recently blamed explicitly its Sunni rivals Qatar and Saudi Arabia for funding and inciting Sunni separatist movements in the country.13

The finger pointing on Sistan-Baluchestan has led Iran to foment trouble in the Saudi backyard- Yemen. Iran has been lending support to the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. The Houthi insurgency besides destabilizing parts of North Yemen has managed to bring trouble to the Saudi province of Jizan.

Iran is a key stakeholder in the ongoing discussion over peace talks on Syria and has covertly been influencing ground action in the country. A statement published in Persian on the website of Jaish al-Adl, after the Saravan attack, read as: “This successful operation is an answer to the violent crimes of Sepah (IRGC) in the Islamic land of Syria and is also an answer for oppression and crimes the regime has committed against the oppressed Sunnis of Iran.”14 On the other hand, Basij, Iran’s volunteer paramilitary organization operating under the IRGC15 has blamed the US and Israel for the attack.

The border incident at Saravan assumes significance not only by virtue of its geopolitical location or the sectarian tensions being fanned allegedly by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also due to the critical nature of developments concerning Iran on the global stage. Negotiations between Iran and the P-5+1 on the Iran’s nuclear programme have picked up pace after the election of Rouhani as Iran’s president, his recent address to the UN General Assembly and his telephonic discussions with the US President. The subsequent fallout of these events and the US position on Syria has adversely impacted the US-Saudi-Israeli equilibrium in the Middle East, which makes a case for creating ‘distractions’ on Iran’s eastern borders. Israeli Mossad agents have in the past posed as US spies to recruit members of Jundallah to fight their covert war against Iran.16

Given the swift Iranian reaction to the Saravan attack, further disturbances in the area have the potential to raise Sunni-Shia tensions in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. As Afghanistan prepares for its crucial presidential and provincial elections early next year, sectarian tensions will be an added source of instability.
Besides the spilling over of the Syrian conflict to the region and rise of sectarian tensions, India’s concerns would include the Chabahar port, its planned sea-link to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which is located in Sistan-Baluchestan province. In October 2012, a suicide bomber killed two guards at a mosque in Chabahar. Earlier in 2010, an attack by two suicide bombers at the same mosque had killed 39 people.
India would be alert to the fact that as the Syrian conflict drags on and the US stand on Iran and its nuclear programme softens, the frequency and intensity of insurgent and proxy activity in Balochistan is likely to increase to the detriment of peace and stability in the region.

(The author is a Defence Analyst based in Delhi)

Endnotes

  1. Iran president calls for probe into border shooting, The Iran Project, October 26, 2013. http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/26/iran-president-calls-for-probe...
  2. Joanna Paraszczuk. Iran Spotlight: Sunni Insurgent Group Jaish ul-Adl Claims Responsibility For Attack On Border Guards, EAWorldView, October 26, 2013. http://eaworldview.com/2013/10/iran-spotlight-sunni-insurgent-group-jais...
  3. Iran 'hangs 16 rebels' in reprisal for Pakistan border killings, Yahoo news, October 26, 2013.
  4. Iran protests to Pakistan over negligence of terrorist movements on border area, The Iran Project, October 26, 2013. http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/26/iran-protests-to-pakistan-over...
  5. Iran protests to Pakistan over negligence of terrorist movements on border area, The Iran Project, October 26, 2013. http://theiranproject.com/blog/2013/10/26/iran-protests-to-pakistan-over...
  6. Eleven terrorist attacks foiled in SE Iran in 6 months: IRGC commander, The Iran Project, October 20, 2013.
  7. New Iranian Sunni jihadi group claims car bombing, calls for recruits, Iran Military News, December 28, 2012. http://iranmilitarynews.org/2012/12/28/new-iranian-sunni-jihadi-group-cl...
  8. Sunni opposition warns of increased Iranian subversive activity designed to disseminate Shiite doctrine, Iran Daily Brief, June 07, 2013.
  9. Joanna Paraszczuk. Iran Analysis: Sunni Separatists Harakat Ansar Iran Call For Arms on Saudi TV, July 22nd, 2013. http://eaworldview.com/2013/07/iran-feature-sunni-separatist-spokesman-c...
  10. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) (‘Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet’) is a pro Al-Qaeda Sunni sectarian group and the largest Islamic extremist group in Pakistan. It’s current name is Alhe Sunnat Wal Jamaat but is still referred to as the SSP. SSP was formed in the early 1980s in Jhang in reaction to the Iranian revolution of 1979, and aims to fight Shia influence in Pakistan in the wake of the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its ultimate goal is to create a Sunni state in Pakistan.SSP accuse Iran of sponsoring extremist Shia groups in Pakistan and have targeted Iranian interests in retaliation for killings of Sunni leaders.
  11. Sistan and Balochistan Sunni terror group Harakat Ansar Iran announce cooperation with Sepah-e Sahaba, Iran Military News, December 07, 2012. http://iranmilitarynews.org/2012/12/07/sistan-and-Balochistan-sunni-terr...
  12. Ibid
  13. Iran’s Sunni Jihad groups — Thinking Globally but Acting Locally, Iran Military News, March 11, 2013. http://iranmilitarynews.org/tag/harakat-ansar-iran/
  14. Arash Karami. Sunni Group Takes Credit for Attack That Killed 14 Iranians, Iran Pulse, October 27, 2013. http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/10/3123/sunni-group-takes...
  15. Ali Alfoneh. The Basij Resistance Force, USIP.
  16. Mark Perry. False Flag, Foreign Policy, January 13, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=full&wp...