Another Indo-Pak Reset: The Good, The Bad and The Question Marks

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The curious thing about the Joint Statement issued after the meeting between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers in Ufa is that it is being interpreted by both sides in a way that suits them. The problem is that these divergent interpretations raise questions about whether there is indeed a clear understanding on where the road map that the two countries have set to re-engage with each other will lead. That the statement was somewhat loosely worded and left enough wriggle room for both sides could either be a case of masterly drafting or a monumental goof up. In either case, it doesn’t inspire much confidence that the nth resumption of talks (even this is debatable) will end up any different from the previous talks between the two countries.

Besides getting the monkey of international pressure to engage with Pakistan off India’s back, perhaps the only positive spin that can be put on the ‘understanding’ reached by the two Prime Ministers is the fact that they are both being criticised in their countries is indicative of their having met each other mid-way. This means they both showed a degree of flexibility to accommodate each other in order to kick-start a dialogue of sorts. At the same time, they haven’t given away anything substantial that would open them to the charge of a sell-out. In other words, compromise yes, capitulation no. It is another matter that public opinion in both countries has hardened so much that even a compromise which ostensibly entails no significant cost has very few takers.

If things were to be stretched more and another positive spin was to be given to the Ufa statement, then it could be said that the main talking point between India and Pakistan is now going to be terrorism and security. India has long been insisting on terrorism being accorded centrality in any discussion with Pakistan. Ufa has achieved that with the two NSAs to discuss terrorism, and security officials from both sides to open a track to ensure stability along the borders. Having got what it wanted, the Indian side accommodated Pakistan’s desire to put the issue of Jammu and Kashmir on the table by tangentially including a reference to it under the rubric of being “prepared [emphasis mine] to discuss all outstanding issues”. Presumably this includes not just J&K but also trade and all other issues because in the statement it comes in the context of and follows the bit about “collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development”.

The criticism of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan over the absence of the K-word is perhaps not as silly as the excitement in India at the inclusion of the phrase “voice samples” and the reference to the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. In other words, the exclusion of the K word doesn’t necessarily mean that Kashmir is off the table, just as the inclusion of “voice samples” and expediting the Mumbai case trials (in Pakistan) doesn’t mean there will be any forward movement on it. If anything, the reference to 26/11 is merely cosmetic because both sides agreeing “to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case trials…” means nothing. The two sides can discuss these ‘ways and means’ till the cows come home. That the Pakistanis have no intention of delivering on 26/11 should have been clear to India after top ministers declared in the Pakistani parliament that the government has no intention of banning the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. What is more, they even told a brazen lie that there is no evidence of any link between the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jamaat-ud Dawa, even though it is well documented that the JuD was formed on the eve of an international ban on the LeT way back in 2001.

But chances are that if Pakistan gives India the run around on 26/11, India has the space to wriggle out of talking Kashmir because no structure has been specified for discussing it and India can always stonewall by saying that being ‘prepared’ to discuss is not quite the same as actually discussing Kashmir. Clearly, going strictly by the text of Ufa, there is no framework laid out under which Kashmir will be discussed and for the Pakistani Advisor of National Security, Sartaj Aziz, to claim that there will be no talks without Kashmir doesn’t conform to the letter of the Ufa Joint Statement which only says that the two NSAs will “discuss all issues connected to terrorism”. It is of course another matter that India has no reason to be chary of discussing Kashmir with Pakistan. After all, India has a solid claim over a part of the Indian state that is under Pakistan's illegal occupation and which India wants Pakistan to vacate, not by force of arms but through a dialogue. Therefore a dialogue on Kashmir doesn’t mean discussing the issue on parameters determined by Pakistan. On the contrary, if India discusses Kashmir it will be to forcefully put forward India’s position. What is more, since India hasn’t given up its claim over Pakistan occupied Kashmir and it keeps protesting Chinese activity in that area as well as the fraudulent ‘elections’ that Pakistan conducts in the occupied areas, India must discuss these issues on the table with Pakistan.

What the Ufa Joint Statement has also done is that it has for all practical purposes ended the Composite Dialogue process and structure. Out of the basket of issues that comprised the Composite Dialogue, the focus is primarily on terrorism which the NSAs will discuss. There is really no new framework or structure to discuss the other ‘outstanding issues’. Border issues will be discussed between BSF and Pakistan Rangers and between the two DGMOs, which in itself is no earth shaking development considering that the DGMOs and the BSF-Rangers officials have been meeting in the past as well. For now at least this is the sum total of engagement. While earlier it was the Foreign Secretaries who dealt with Peace and Security and J&K, followed by the Foreign Ministers who took stock of the process after each round was over, now it will be the NSAs who will be the points-men on both sides but only for discussing terrorism. They could discuss Kashmir and other issues but it is unlikely if those will be the central point of discussion. It is entirely possible that they may come up with some forum where these issues could be discussed in a more structured manner, but that remains to be seen. The decision to release fishermen and their boats is laudable and addresses a humanitarian issue that affects both sides. The mention of religious tourism is extremely vague and it isn’t clear who will decide on the “mechanism for facilitating religious tourism”.

The problem with the Ufa statement isn’t so much with its text as it is with the context. The text is quite in India’s favour; the context less so. And since the text is somewhat divorced from the context, harbouring any expectations from the tentative resumption of dialogue is quite misplaced.

The fact that India sought a meeting with Pakistan will send a wrong signal to the Pakistanis who will see it as India dealing with them from a position of weakness. The way the Pakistanis see it, the evolving regional strategic environment is going in their favour. Their apprehensions about Afghanistan and its closeness to India are now being addressed. So much so that the Pakistanis think they have pretty much got Afghanistan stitched up with Ashraf Ghani bending over backwards to appease them and their Taliban proxies all set to move into the driving seat in Afghanistan. On the economic front, the Chinese investments in Pakistan under the umbrella of the Economic Corridor will kick-start the economy and prove to be a game-changer. Any compulsion to deal with India for the economic benefits that would come Pakistan's way is no longer operative. Not just India, the Pakistanis also think they don’t need to do every bidding of the Arabs since they now have Chinese money to fall back upon. The Western pressure, for whatever it was worth (and it wasn’t worth much anyways as far as India is concerned) to crackdown on terror infrastructure has for all practical purposes ended. The Americans and the other Western countries are tilting in favour of Pakistan, bestowing them with military equipment and economic assistance. The Russians too are wooing the Pakistanis and appear to be using Pakistan to balance their ties with India which they think is moving away from them. The Central Asian States are also interested in dealing with Pakistan, both to get a handle over terrorism as well as to possibly link up with the CPEC to get an outlet to the Arabian Sea. In this regional context, the Pakistanis will be justified in thinking that India is now getting isolated and hence is forced to reach out to Pakistan. And by asking for talks India has only reaffirmed this feeling among the Pakistanis. Whether or not the Pakistanis are over-estimating their strategic importance is hardly important. What is important is that this is their perception and in light of this it is quite pointless to expect them to be reasonable in their relations with India.

The second aspect of the context is that nothing has changed on the ground which would lead anyone in India to think that Pakistan has decided to turn over a new page in its relations with India. If anything, the ground situation and the sentiment has only turned negative over the last year and a half. Pakistani propaganda against India, much of it directed by the military establishment, has become hysterical with some embedded Pakistani analysts even accusing India of backing the rise of IS in Afghanistan apart from levelling the usual litany of lies about Indian hand behind the Pakistani Taliban, the Baloch insurgents, the disturbances in Karachi and what have you. According to the paid media in Pakistan, the Indian intelligence agency has set aside a sizeable amount of money – some claim around a billion dollars – to sabotage the CPEC. In addition to this propaganda is the ratcheting up of rhetoric on Kashmir, both domestically as well as internationally. There is also the increasing activity inside Pakistan of terror groups operating against India. Hostile actions against Indian interests in Afghanistan are also on the rise, including the suspected attack on a hotel in Kabul where the Indian ambassador was supposed to be present. At the political level, the rhetoric in both countries also belies any possibility of a détente between them, forget about rapprochement.

Given that nothing has changed on the ground, by re-engaging Pakistan, the Modi government has fallen back on the failed template of the past. Prime Minister Modi’s predecessors made the same mistake of imagining that they will be able to make a difference until their imagination was dashed on the rocks of reality on ground. Clearly, by re-engaging Pakistan despite nothing on ground to suggest that the result of this re-engagement will be any different from the past such efforts, Mr Modi has dashed the hopes of those who thought that his government will forge a new template on how to deal with Pakistan. All that has happened in Ufa is that the old template has been tweaked and repackaged but in substance it is no different from the past which is that talks is the only option. If it is the only option then it is so because other options haven’t been developed, which was precisely what was expected from the Modi government. Even otherwise, talks just for the sake of talks has been tried in the past and hasn’t led to anything except shake off whatever international pressure there is to keep the temperature in the subcontinent from boiling over. The problem is that this remains a fragile process and one big terror incident is enough to bring this process crashing down. Worse, the Modi government will have to pay a heavy political price if such an incident takes place.

Arguably the worst thing to happen with the re-engagement process is that it has erased whatever red-lines the Modi government had laid out, particularly on Kashmir. When Finance Minister Arun Jaitley declared that Pakistan will have to decide whether it wants to talk to the government of India or to those who want to break up India, it was a clear red-line. This was breached when during the ill-advised ‘SAARC Yatra’ the government decided to turn a blind eye to meeting between the Pakistani diplomats and those ‘who want to break India’ as long as these meetings happened before or after a respectable and reasonable time of an official meeting between the two governments. The question that now hangs in the wind is whether the government of India will refuse to engage with the Pakistani NSA if during his visit to Delhi he decides to meet with the Kashmiri separatists? Or will the government acquiesce to a meeting between Pakistan and those who want to break India before or after such a meeting. What will be the signal that this will send out?

Finally, there is the whole question of whether Mr Modi’s counterpart in Islamabad has anything in his store to deal with India. Does Nawaz Sharif even call the shots in his country especially when it comes to dealing with India? Will any purpose be served in dealing with a Prime Minister who is reduced to handling municipal functions and performing ceremonial duties while the real power rests in the GHQ in Rawalpindi?

Chances are therefore that the re-engagement with Pakistan will not go anywhere for the reasons outlined above. India may have scored some diplomatic points in Ufa, but there will be a cost to be paid when this process collapses. Instead of taking the Pakistanis at face value – top officials in the Ministry of External Affair have said that they take what is told to them seriously instead of what is said in Pakistan for domestic consumption – India should judge Pakistan on the basis of ground realities. This means laying out a set of metrics by which India can judge if indeed Pakistan is ready to make a break from the past and forge a new relationship with India. If such a change is visible, India should go the extra mile to engage Pakistan; if there is no such change, then India should go the extra-mile to remain disengaged from Pakistan. Hopefully, after the process that started at Ufa collapses, this will be the trajectory that the Indian government will adopt.

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Published Date: 15^th July 2015, Image Source: http://indiatoday.intoday.in

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

First Year: Modi Invigorates Indian Economy and Foreign Policy

Lisa Curtis

Marking one year in office this week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gets high marks for reviving India’s foundering economy and energizing foreign relations with global powers and regional neighbors. The government has experienced some setbacks in implementing its ambitious agenda, like failure (so far) to pass the land acquisition and GST bills, but overall the scales tip toward a largely successful first year. This is good news for the U.S., which is rooting for India to develop a more robust economic, political, and military role in the region and beyond.

With the growth rate projected at 7.5 percent (outpacing China for the first time in 15 years), inflation down, and the current account deficit shrinking, Prime Minister Modi has stuck to his campaign pledge to revive the Indian economy. The opening of the insurance and defense markets and aggressive push of the “Make in India” campaign is generating optimism that the government is moving in the right direction on the economy.

Equally impressive have been Modi’s foreign policy accomplishments. Logging 19 foreign trips, Modi has reasserted India’s role as a regional and global power. While prioritizing moving the U.S.-India relationship on a firmer footing, he also has methodically built up ties with Asian partners like Japan and Australia and tended to relationships with neighbors, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal.

Remarkably, PM Modi and U.S. President Barack Obama held two rounds of meetings within a five-month period, including Obama making the first-ever U.S. appearance as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day parade. The two sides made progress on military cooperation, agreeing to renew the 10-year Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship and announcing joint projects, including the co-production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and specialized equipment for military transport aircraft and establishment of contact groups to explore co-development of aircraft carrier and jet engine technology.

Although characterized as a “breakthrough in understanding,” the two sides made less progress than meets the eye on the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal. U.S. companies are still wary about investing in India’s civil nuclear sector, indicating there remain serious sticking points on the liability issue.

Forming the backdrop of progress on Indo-U.S. defense and strategic ties is undoubtedly the military and economic rise of China. One of the most striking aspects of Obama’s India visit was their joint statement on cooperation in the Asia Pacific, including a reference to the South China Sea, an unambiguous upbraiding of China’s increasingly assertive posture on its maritime claims.

Modi’s highly productive visit to Japan last fall was an elaboration of his strategy to strengthen India’s hand with regard to the China challenge. During that visit, PM Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed to elevate their dialogue to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” and Japan committed to investing $35 billion in Indian projects over the next five years.

He also was the first Indian prime minister to visit Australia in 30 years, a further example of his bold foreign policy agenda. He addressed the Australian parliament and talked about the two countries being natural partners who both depended on the oceans as “lifelines.”

Modi’s successful visit to China earlier this month can be viewed as a vindication of his tougher policy on their border disputes. While speaking candidly about their unresolved border issues, Modi also courted Chinese trade and investment. The two countries signed 24 agreements and nearly $30 billion in business deals. He stopped short of accepting China's invitation to join its “One Belt, One Road” initiative, however, demonstrating they will continue to compete for regional influence.

The Modi government has made some headway on the goal to modernize and bolster the military. It raised defense spending by 11 percent to around $40 billion for the Indian fiscal year beginning April 1st, although defense analysts generally view this figure as still too low, especially when compared to the $140 billion China spends annually on its defense. The finalizing of the fighter jet deal with France accomplished during Modi's visit there last month will help India in its modernization push. Raising FDI caps in the defense sector could eventually help to indigenize Indian defense production, but poor infrastructure, continued bureaucratic obstacles, and failure to allow the private sector to lead the way on research and technological innovation will hinder significant progress and guarantee India continues to rely primarily on imports for its defense requirements.

Backtracks on Pakistan and Religious Freedom

Relations with Pakistan have been on a downward trajectory ever since Modi called off Foreign-Secretary level talks last summer due to a Pakistani official’s meeting with Kashmiri separatists. There has been an uptick in cross-border firing with Pakistani forces along the Line of Control and a slight increase in terrorist activity in Kashmir over the last several months.

Pakistan has done its part to contribute to the downward spiral in relations by releasing from jail in April the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.

A crisis with Pakistan would distract Modi from his broader foreign policy agenda. But New Delhi would also likely win international sympathy, particularly if Pakistan-based terrorists precipitated the crisis as in the three-day terrorist siege of Mumbai in 2008.

Another issue on which there has been some disappointment with Modi is that of religious freedom. He was late in reining in some of the hardcore Hindutva elements of his party when they pursued mass conversion ceremonies in which Muslims and Christians are converted to Hinduism. The so-called “reconversion” ceremonies and a spate of desecrations of churches in New Delhi last December put Modi on the spot.

He responded by reaffirming his government’s commitment to religious freedom during a speech to Christian leaders in February and has apparently quietly discouraged the reconversion ceremonies. But he must find more opportunities to demonstrate he has left communal politics behind for good and will focus instead on protecting religious minorities.

Ready to Assert Influence

U.S. officials look to India to project power and influence in the Asia Pacific to help promote free trade and a stable, democratic order. An assessment of the Modi government’s first year on the job indicates India is beginning to take on this role more readily.

The author is Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation.

(The Heritage Foundation, United States & VIF have a collaboration on matters of mutual interest)

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Published Date: 28^th May 2015, Image Source: http://www.thepoliticalindian.com

Modi visit to China - Looking ahead

Amb TCA Rangachari, 

Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Given the perceptions of a Janus-like character of India-China relations, it is well-nigh impossible to escape the past. Nor does one need to, considering the rich historical and cultural legacy that the two peoples have inherited. In the words of the late Chinese Indologist, Professor Ji Xianlin, India and China are天造地设(Tian Zao, Di She) (“Created by Heaven, Constructed by Earth”). Thus, the past will remain ever present in our current and future dealings. But do we have to be imprisoned in, or by, the past?

Most projections suggest that by 2050 – perhaps even by 2030 – India will emerge as the third, if not second, largest economy in the world. China which is already the second largest economy - with an estimated GDP of USD ten trillion - will move ahead to the first position. Together, China and India are expected to account for a third or more of the global economy. This imposes a particular responsibility on both countries to find ways of working together. The much talked about ‘Asian Century’ will otherwise remain a dream. Neither the ‘Chinese Dream’ nor the ‘Indian Dream’ will translate into reality. As the Prime Minister put it during his visit to China, “the prospects of the 21st century becoming the Asian century will depend in large measure on what India and China achieve individually and what we do together.”

The former Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, said repeatedly that India needed an investment of US$ 100 billion annually over the next ten years for its infrastructure requirements. The one country that can be a possible source for such large funding is China, itself seeking to find productive avenues for profitable utilization of its massive reserves of (approx.) US$ 4 trillion. (The “One Belt, One Road” proposal of Xi Jinping which has been declared the ‘diplomatic priority’ for 2015 is a case in point. Chinese analysts see the willingness to finance the connectivity envisaged under this project to be at least partly driven by the imperative of maximizing utilization of over-capacity in several industries like steel, cement, ship building etc.) According to a Wall Street Journal report last year, China officially held (approx.) US$1.27 trillion of U.S. debt, about 10.6% of the $12 trillion U.S. Treasury market. A somewhat lower figure is held in Euro debt. The yield on these holdings varies anywhere from a little over 1% to 3%. The returns on investments in India might well be more favourable. The signing of 26 MoUs/ Agreements, during the Prime Minsiter’s visit, valued at US$ 22 billion and encompassing multiple sectors including renewable energy, power infrastructure, steel and small and medium industries suggests that Chinese investors endorse this reality.

Seen in this context of current and future needs, India and China have a rare synergy where mutual benefit – the fourth of the Five Principles of Panchsheel – underpins the logic of closer cooperation. True, the declaration of intent has to manifest itself in actual action on the ground. The Prime Minister showed awareness of this in acknowledging that “rewriting policies can be easier than changing mindsets and work culture.” But, as he noted, “we are on the right path.”

The synergy of economic cooperation does not, by itself, erase the bitter legacy of the past nor does it build the trust and confidence the need for which the leaders of the two countries have - repeatedly and publicly – stressed. During the talks, Xi Jinping spoke of the need for “joint efforts to increase mutual trust between the two countries, managing differences and problems, by avoiding interference in overall relation between two countries.”

China’s relations with Japan and the US are good examples to learn from. Booming economic cooperation co-exists – often not very peacefully – with abiding tension; public accusations and condemnations of attempted ‘containment’ or ‘encirclement’; periodic belligerence; and, induced public antipathy. China is wary of India being drawn in too close to the US and Japan. The pattern of the relationship with India is unlikely to be vastly different though given the capability and potential of India, its proclivity for pursuing an independent policy, and the perceived necessity of preventing India from getting too close to the US or Japan, China is more likely to pursue possibilities of keeping the relationship from becoming too prickly. (According to the findings of a survey conducted on 14 May 2015 by Huanqiu Shihbao (Chinese version of the Global Times) with 2174 respondents, three fourths of whom were in the 30-60 age group and were University students, on the visit of the Indian PM to China, nearly 80% felt that in future India’s Comprehensive National Power will not surpass that of China.)

The unresolved border issue is emotive. But it is unrealistic to expect that it is amenable to a quick-fix or to assign to it the role of a litmus test for judging success or otherwise of the visit. How realistic is it for India or China to attain the full extent of their claims? If that is not an option, how willing and capable are one and the other side to compromise, and to what extent, to reach a settlement? On the Indian side, how likely is any territorial ‘adjustment’ to pass muster with constitutional requirements and obtain public endorsement? In the absence of conducive factors essential for finding acceptance for a ‘settlement’, is the best option not to keep reiterating our view and hopes for an early settlement while we focus on our own much needed developmental and reform goals?

That such reiteration has been done with clarity and persistence was conveyed publicly by the Prime Minister when he said “I stressed the need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realizing full potential of our partnership. I suggested that China should take a strategic and long term view of our relations.” On his part, Xi Jinping also spoke of “China-India bilateral relation should be treated from the viewpoint of strategic level and from long term development prospects.”

Specifically, on the boundary issue, the Prime Minister stated “On the boundary question, we agreed that we continue to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution. We both reiterated our strong commitment to make all efforts to maintain peace and tranquility in the border region. I found sensitivity to our concerns on this issue; and, interest in further intensifying confidence building measures. I also reiterated the importance of clarification of Line of Actual Control in this regard.” “I found the Chinese leadership responsive.” 

It is well known that on many international and multilateral issues, India and China have similar approaches. True, there are some issues of particular concern on which China’s position is not fully in sync with ours despite their experience not being dissimilar. There is no indication of support, for instance, to India’s position on Pakistan as a sponsor of cross-border terrorism or PoK being included in the route of the proposed CPEC project to link Gwadar with the Karakoram Highway. It is not that the China is unaware of India’s concerns and sensitivities in this regard. That it chooses to disregard them is a pointer to the continuing need to address them and find resonance. Similarly, the lack of endorsement of India’s candidature for permanent membership of the US – remote though the UNSC expansion remains – and continuing consideration to India’s NSG membership require a change on China’s part for which India will have to continue to work.

There is much else on the substantive side bilaterally that should make the visit an opening for a more cooperative future. The growing trade deficit; promoting people-to-people contacts for better mutual understanding; structured State and Provincial levels exchanges; expansion of sister-city relationships; educational and cultural linkages; opening of a new consulate; bringing together thinks tanks. These initiatives might well take some time to materialize to their full extent but when they do, they will surely make their contribution to expanding the scope of the relationship.

India should not also brush aside the protocol courtesies extended to signal that India and the visit were special. For the first time, a visiting dignitary was received outside the capital and that too by the President of China and General Secretary of the CCP. Even US President Clinton who visited Xian in 1998 was not thus received.

The Prime Minister’s own assessment of the visit is that it was “very productive and positive”. The follow up has to ensure that it is built upon and the basis for an enduring partnership is laid to reinforce the growth path that India has set for itself. Synergies for that exist. Simultaneously, synergies have to be built up for trust and confidence that could lead to the realization of the ‘interconnected’ Indian and Chinese dreams and fulfill the promise of the Asian century.

(The author was in China during Prime minister Modi's visit)

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Published Date: 22^nd May 2015, Image Source: http://indianexpress.com

Playing hardball with China

Nitin A Gokhale, 

Editor & Senior Fellow, VIF

In the midst of a rather euphoric narrative about Prime Minister Narendra Modi's three-day China visit starting 14 May, two factors must serve as a reality check.

One was the revelation by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) that the Chinese Envoy in New Delhi was summoned and conveyed India's protest against the 46 billion dollar worth China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) running through the Pak-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and two, a rather abrasive comment by a Chinese scholar in a semi-official newspaper that Prime Minister Modi is "“playing little tricks” over border disputes and security issues, hoping to boost his domestic prestige and increase his leverage in negotiations with China."

Both these developments remind us that no matter how much progress India and China make in economic and cultural fields, the contentious border issue and China's efforts to promote Pakistan as a cat's paw in South Asia, will always cast a large shadow over Sino-India relations. Prime Minister Modi's national security team would be well aware of the Chinese tendency to be two faced in its dealings with neighbours.

Twice in recent past, China has sought to up the ante on the border on eve of two important visits. In April-May 2013, days ahead of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Delhi, a platoon of Chinese PLA soldiers walked across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Depsang in Ladakh and camped there for three weeks before a diplomatic compromise end the mini-crisis. It was no different when President Xi Jingping came to India last year. In less than six hours after his arrival, 1000 Chinese soldiers tried to repeat Depsang at Chumur, again in Ladakh. However, a robust and swift response in 2014 (India mobilised a brigade plus--3,000 soldiers-- in next to no time) forced the Chinese to back down. Although President Xi tried to play down the incident, it was clear the operation was planned well in advance and with full knowledge of the top leadership.

Given India's decisive response at Chumur and New Delhi's growing bonhomie with US and Japan, a similar border incident again looks unlikely but the pinpricks on the border issue will continue in the form of acerbic comments and belligerent utterances by scholars and analysts working for various think-tanks in China. Thus the commentary in Global Times, the hawkish English newspaper published from Beijing is in keeping with the trend and should not come as a surprise to discerning China watchers. New Delhi on the other hand has used official channels to register its stand vis-a-vis increasing Chinese presence in PoK and the decision on CPEC.

Chinese interlocutors have surely noticed a subtle but firm shift in India's approach to China. When needed, Prime Minister Modi has not hesitated to use strong words to convey India's displeasure on Chinese. India has also been upfront about stitching together informal alliances that are designed to keep China guessing. Two examples will suffice. Speaking to business leaders in Tokyo during his official visit to Japan in September 2014, the Prime Minister said: “The world is divided in two camps. One camp believes in expansionist policies, while the other believes in development. We have to decide whether the world should get caught in the grip of expansionist policies or we should lead it on the path of development and create opportunities that take it to greater heights.” While he did not mention China by name, the signal was loud and clear. Beijing is seen by Asian nations, especially those around the East China Sea and South China Sea as an expansionist power. Then in January his year, India and the US went a step further in specifically commenting on the situation in South China Sea. The Joint India-US Strategic Vision document noted that “regional prosperity depends on security. We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.” In a clear signal to Beijing, the same statement added that the two countries “call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

The current Chinese leadership is surely aware of India’s recent efforts to re-calibrate its relationship with the United States and Japan. The attempt in Beijing would therefore be to ensure that India does not fully migrate into the anti-China camp. India will be offered lucrative economic investments and will be assured about reducing the burgeoning bilateral trade deficit between the two countries but no major breakthrough is expected on the boundary issue, notwithstanding External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s pronouncement in Beijing in February this year that an “out of the box” solution is still possible. The boundary issue is complex and is rooted in many historical developments. Through the decades, Beijing has played a dexterous game on the border issue, pretending to be friendly and accommodation some time, reiterating its claims by aggressive moves on the other, keeping the pot boiling.

In this context it is instructive to take a peep into what happened in the late 1950s in Ladakh. When India accidentally discovered China’s road building activity in Aksai Chin, it was assured that the road was only meant as a link to Singkiang.

On December 26, 1959 Peking (as Beijing was then known) sent a note to India talking about Aksai Chin. It said: "This area is the only traffic artery linking Singkiang to Western Tibet because to its north-east lies the great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible...the area all along belonged to China." Now, nearly 55 years later when India confronts Beijing on its CPEC passing through PoK (which India claims as its own territory), China is likely take a similar stand—‘it’s just an economic compulsion; ‘not meant as a strategic encirclement of India,’ etc etc.

Clearly, the Chinese tendency of bullying weaker neighbours and its policy to keep redefining 'core' interests according to circumstances continues. Policy making in China is one continuous process. In India on the other hand, it has varied according to personalities and political parties in power.

While the military in India has overcome the trauma of the 1962 defeat, civilian policy makers appear to be still bogged down by the burdens of the past in dealing with China. Of course, these mandarins get their act together only under pressure of a crisis like they did post-1986 Sumdorong Chu face off. The 2009 sanction for additional forces and speeding up of infrastructure development projects also came after increasing reports of Chinese belligerence along the LAC.

It is therefore essential to push for another round of capability-enhancing drive. Simultaneously, India must re-look and re-tweak its China policy. For instance:

• Insist with Beijing the need for exchanging maps for all sectors immediately so that each side knows the other's claimed LAC and border negotiations can resume
• Bring the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) under the operational control of the Army to ensure uniformity in border management
• Ensure timely and effective information sharing mechanism with Indian media and through them the Indian people rather than let different stake holders speak in different and sometimes discordant voices during times of crisis
• Educate and prepare the Indian people on the need for give and take on border negotiations in the future

Policy makers in India must be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. By stating India's concern over continuing support to Pakistan in no uncertain terms, Prime Minister Modi has sent a signal that that while his desire to deepen economic ties with Beijing and taking the relationship to the next level is paramount, New Delhi cannot be ignoring the developments in its neighbourhood. Hopefully, as he lands in Beijing in the next 24 hours, Prime Minister Modi's Chinese hosts would have got that message very clearly.

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Published Date: 13^th May 2015, Image Source: http://www.dnaindia.com

Modi’s Canada Visit

Dr Harinder Sekhon, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Canada has been significant in in many ways. The first stand-alone visit by an Indian Prime Minister in over forty-two years seems to have rejuvenated a long neglected relationship. The visit generated business worth CAD $1.6 billion and saw the signing of sixteen commercial agreements between various Indian and Canadian Companies. While India and Canada have a longstanding bilateral relationship based on shared democratic values, pluralistic societies and strong people-to-people contacts, this is a partnership that has so far not realized its full capacity. It is in the interest of both nations to build upon the positive sentiments generated through this visit and maintain the momentum. Complementing 'Act East', this visit to Canada is an opportunity to push India’s 'Link West' agenda.

Economic Relations

India and Canada are industrialized democracies with considerable economic complementarities and as vibrant democracies, share politically convergent views as well. At present the bilateral trade between India and Canada, does not reflect the true potential of the commercial relationship. The two-way bilateral trade in 2013 was US$ 5.7 billion, and the two sides have reiterated their shared desire to see the bilateral trade reach $15 billion by 2015. In the Joint Statement issued on April 15, the two Prime Ministers recognized “that bilateral business and commercial linkages constitute the key drivers of the wide ranging India-Canada friendship.” The Canadian side appreciated steps taken by the current Indian Government to energize the Indian economy and policy initiatives to improve the ease of doing business in India. Specific Indian initiatives like ‘Make in India,’ ‘Affordable Housing for all by 2022,’ and ‘Smart Cities,’ are bound to offer significant commercial opportunities for collaboration between Canadian and Indian business houses and industries. The two Prime Ministers concurred to work towards the early finalization of the mutually beneficial Bilateral Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement as necessary steps to expand bilateral trade between India and Canada.

Energy Cooperation

For an energy hungry India, energy security naturally ranks high in its list of priorities. Canada has surplus energy resources that India could tap. The Joint Statement noted the “significant opportunities available to expand bilateral trade and investment in energy and resources as well as related technologies and services.” Current trends in supplies and price of oil and gas make Canada an economically attractive option for meeting Indian requirements. This is a subject of growing importance in Indo-Canadian dialogue and figures increasingly in the engagement between the private sector companies of the two countries. In a Memorandum of Understanding signed between two countries in 2012, both are committed to joint efforts to develop capacities to maximize the utilization of energy resources ranging from oil and gas to new hydrocarbon resources such as oil sand and shale gas. Indian Oil Corporation is expected to make its biggest investment in Canada to secure shale-gas and liquefied natural gas for India from British Columbia province. Inherent advantages while shipping gas from Canada include short transportation time to Asia via the Pacific, lower operating costs, vast Canadian gas reserves, stable and reliable jurisdiction and a strong regulatory regime.

Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Canada had played a key role in India’s nuclear evolution by supplying uranium to India’s first nuclear reactor CIRUS in 1954. Canada as an energy superpower cooperated in developing the pressurized heavy water reactor technology with New Delhi. But India’s nuclear test in 1974, using Canadian technology, strained relations between the two nations, with allegations that India had broken the terms of the Colombo Plan. Following the signing of the historic US-India Civil Nuclear Deal in 2008, Canada has started collaborating with India once again in the nuclear domain. Canada is the second largest uranium producer in the world, with 16 per cent of the world reserves being located there. India and Canada signed the nuclear cooperation agreement in 2010 and administrative arrangements in 2013.

Being amongst the top two Uranium exporting countries in the world, Canada's potential to be a partner in India's economic transformation and to meet Indian quest for clean energy is undisputable. Against the backdrop of Ottawa’s decades-long moratorium on uranium sale to New Delhi, the recent agreement on procurement of uranium from Canada for India’s civilian nuclear power plants heralds a new era of bilateral nuclear cooperation. In PM Modi’s words, ‘this will contribute to India's efforts to power its growth with clean energy.’ This makes Canada the third country to supply uranium to India after Russia and Kazakhstan. The supplies will be under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The agreement for uranium supply comes two years after protracted negotiations following the 2013 civil nuclear deal between India and Canada. In a landmark event on 15th April 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled a deal worth $350-million with Canada’s largest uranium producer, Cameco Corp, which is set to supply 3,220 metric tonnes of uranium to power India’s reactors over the next five years. This agreement may pave the way for the Saskatchewan Company to further expand its collaboration with India and sell more in the years ahead as India expands its nuclear power generation.

India aims to increase its share of electricity generated by nuclear power to 25 per cent by 2050 from 4 per cent today. Hence for India, the supply of uranium is important and quoting Narendra Modi in this context, ‘For us, uranium is not just a mineral but an article of faith and an effort to save the world from climate change.’

Both the Prime Ministers have agreed to encourage a collaborative programme to leverage their industries’ respective strengths in the field of Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) technology for mutual benefit and energy security. They have agreed to explore mutually beneficial partnerships in the application of radio-isotopes for societal benefits and have encouraged their respective atomic energy establishments and research institutions to establish mechanisms for long-term and mutually beneficial R&D collaboration in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission have finalised an arrangement for regulatory cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety regulation.

Some Canadian critics of the deal suggest that providing India with uranium for its nuclear power plants will free up New Delhi to use its other resources of the radioactive ore for nuclear weaponry. But India has established its credentials as a responsible nuclear power and both countries should not deny themselves this business opportunity. India adheres to international rules and has a proven track record to show that Uranium will be used for peaceful means by it.

Maritime Dimension

In the backdrop of western rebalance and ever increasing homogenization of Asia and Pacific region, maritime cooperation becomes inevitable as the oceans are a vital link in Canada’s and India’s trade with the world. Ships carry about half of Canada’s trade and more than three quarters of that of India’s. Canada has the longest coastline in the world at 243,000 km - as against 7,500 km of Indian coastline - besides large navigable waterways and many ports of call in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Great Lakes and the Arctic. Canadian vision for providing safe, secure and environmentally responsible navigation for all vessels converges well with India’s ambition to emerge as a ‘Net Security Provider’ in the Indian Ocean Region. The geographical location and evolving geopolitical equations provides an opportunity for India and Canada to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and to make significant contributions to efforts toward confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Both the countries are members at ASEAN Regional Forum and CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), which deals with security challenges in Asia Pacific.

With diminishing U.S. Command of the Commons especially cyber, cooperation in this area to bolster Pacific Rim security is the need of hour. Canada has the expertise and well-established mechanisms in cyber security and intelligence gathering. As India and Canada face similar global threats from religious extremism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, according to the Joint Statement, both have decided to “further efforts to eliminate terrorist safe havens and infrastructure; dismantle terrorist networks, their support systems and financing; and stem the cross border movement of terrorists.”

Future Prospects

As India looks to extend its global foot print and move beyond the Indian Ocean to engage more actively in the Pacific region, both India and Canada can pool resources to build a stable security framework in the Asia-Pacific. Maritime security cooperation can therefore be an important driver of the India-Canada friendship. Canada also played an important role in getting a permanent observer status for India at the Arctic Council in 2013. With the Arctic gaining greater strategic prominence, collaboration between the two in that area is also poised to further increase. The Joint Statement has listed a host of initiatives for cooperation in the domains of science, technology, Innovation and Space. These are all important niche areas where the two nations share common interests. This, along with strong cultural and people to people ties, and the contribution of the Indian diaspora to both societies, creates a positive synergy in India-Canada relations.

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Published Date: 29^th April 2015, Image Source: http://www.pm.gc.ca

A Bold Political Decision for a Crucial Defence Need

Nitin A Gokhale, 

Editor & Senior Fellow, VIF

The saga for procurement of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (M-MRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF) actually began in 2001, gathered steam in 2007 and was stuck in price negotiations for the past three years. Meanwhile, the IAF's combat fighter jet strength was depleting fast. Over the past couple of years, the Air Force top brass was alarmed enough to tell the government that its conventional combat edge even against Pakistan was in danger of being lost.

So last week, hours before Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on his three-nation tour, a political decision was taken to explore the option of buying Rafale jets through a government-to-government (G-to-G) contract with France. The breakthrough will now allow the IAF to induct Rafale fighter jets in a two year time frame and at least partially make up for its depleting combat jet strength.

However, it is the next step in aircraft procurement that will be watched intently. Will this decision of going for G-to-G mean that all future purchases of this magnitude will be handled in this manner? If so, what happens to the much-touted Make in India programme? The roadmap is not clear but Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar gave enough hints about what the government is thinking in an interview that this writer co-hosted on Monday for Doordarshan (https://t.co/jktB9j7EYI).

Not surprisingly, skeptics have hit out at the decision. The criticism has ranged from "it's too little too late," to "it goes against the Make in India concept." But both Modi and Parrikar were clear that they had to put the interest of the IAF above everything else and which what they have done. Mind you, procuring 36 Rafales is just a stop-gap arrangement to arrest the rapidly falling numbers in IAF's combat fleet.

Lauding the Prime Minister for taking a bold decision in breaking the Rafale deadlock, Parrikar said future large procurements for the IAF and indeed for the armed forces at large, will have to be G-2-G but Make in India will also get a look in for other projects. For instance, IF more Rafales, were to be bought--over and above 36 decided now--Dassault could be asked to manufacture them in India. Even if any other lighter aircraft was to be selected, the pre-condition will be a tie-up with an Indian company or consortium.

It is to Parrikar's credit that he decided to think differently on a knotty issue and suggested a way out to the Prime Minister. In fact, in less than six months after taking over, Parrikar has studied various complex issues dogging the defence ministry and has come to his own conclusions on what needs to be done. By his own admission, Parrikar spent the first four months as defence minister in taking inputs from a range of experts both within and outside the MoD before making up his mind.

In his review, Parrikar also found that the bureaucracy in the ministry—both civil and military--was sitting on some 400-odd big and small projects that are critical to the three armed forces. Without getting into details, he said: “The first thing I did was to look at projects that are stuck at various stages of clearances since the most common complaint across the board was ‘nothing moves’ in the MoD.” A thorough review revealed that nearly one-third of the 400-odd projects were now irrelevant. So they were discarded. About 50 projects were accelerated since they were of critical importance.

A decade-long impasse in defence acquisitions has been broken with the decision on Rafale, raising renewed hope in the sector. Parrikar has brought in a sense of purpose in the notoriously obdurate MoD bureaucracy. “There was no control over the system. There were no reviews, no feedback and there was no fear of punishment for non-performance. An important ministry like Defence cannot run like this,” Parrikar said in an interview. So he has now instututed a time-bound performance review system aimed at speedy clearances and implementation of projects.

Hopefully, the new measures will revitalise the functioning of the crucial arm of the government in coming months.

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Published Date: 17^th April 2015, Image Source: http://www.worldwide-military.com

India-China Border Talks: No Progress to Show

Existing Agreements need to be Diligently Implemented

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The Special Representatives of the Prime Ministers of India and China met on March 23, 2015 at New Delhi to discuss the resolution of the territorial dispute. This was the 18^th round of border talks that have made little progress so far. A typically bland statement was issued by the Ministry of External Affairs after the talks: “The Special Representatives continued the discussions to reach a mutually acceptable Framework for resolution of the Boundary Question on the basis of the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles.”

The Special Representatives noted that the interaction between the border management forces had been growing. They said such contacts should be expanded as “these constitute important confidence building measures for maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas.”

The two sides should have accorded the highest priority to discussing the measures that are necessary to give practical effect to the implementation of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), signed during then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trip to Beijing in October 2013, and its previous avatars so that the occurrence of destabilising incidents along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) can be minimised. This is important because of the recent instances of Chinese military assertiveness along the LAC.

The BDCA commits the two sides to “periodic meetings” of military and civilian officers and to exchange information – including information about military exercises, aircraft movements, demolition operations and unmarked mines. It emphasises the avoidance of border patrols “tailing” each other and recommends that the two sides “may consider” establishing a hot-line between military headquarters in both countries.

A close examination of the BDCA reveals that it falls substantially short of removing the anomalies and impracticalities of similar agreements that have not worked well in the past. These include the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, September 7, 1993; the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, November 29, 1996; the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, April 11, 2005; the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas, April 11, 2005; and, the Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, January 17, 2012.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and Tibet is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km-long international boundary. The term LAC implies de facto military control over respective areas and came into use after the 1962 border war. However, the LAC is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The un-delineated LAC is a destabilising factor as major incidents such as the Nathu La clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung stand-off of 1986 can recur. In fact, the two sides have failed to even exchange maps showing their perception of the LAC except in the least contentious Central Sector, that is, the Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh borders with Tibet. Despite the lofty rhetoric of all the agreements, it has not been possible for India to withdraw a single soldier from the LAC so far. It clearly shows how intractable the challenge is.

There are frequent incidents of Chinese transgression of the LAC both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which the LAC runs in their perception. On many occasions in the recent past, Indian and Chinese patrols have met face-to-face. Such meetings have an element of tension built into them and, despite the best of military training, the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out. An armed clash that stretches over several days and in which there are heavy casualties can lead to a larger border incident that may not remain localised.

This is the reason why it is critically important to demarcate the LAC on the ground and map. Once that is done, the inadequacy of recognisable terrain features can be overcome by exploiting GPS technology to accurately navigate up to the agreed and well-defined LAC on the ground and even unintentional transgressions can be avoided.

Chinese intransigence in exchanging maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the western and the eastern sectors, while talking of high-sounding guiding principles and parameters to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, is neither understandable nor condonable. It can only be characterised as an attempt to put off resolution of the dispute “for future generations to resolve”, as Deng Xiao Ping had famously told Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. China’s obvious negotiating strategy is to resolve the territorial dispute with India only when the Chinese are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they can dictate terms.

Fresh efforts need to be made to fine-tune the operationalisation of the Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, signed on January 17, 2012. The agreed measures include regular consultations and flag meetings or telephone and video conferences during emergencies along the LAC. The mechanism was expected to help prevent misunderstanding between the two countries arising from incursions into each other's territory. The joint mechanism was also expected to study ways to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between military personnel on the ground.

None of this has obviously happened as serious Chinese incursions continue and tensions continue to persist. This has been evident in recent incidents of reckless behaviour. The deep transgression by PLA troops at Depsang near Daulat Beg Oldie in May 2013 could have led to an armed clash if the PLA had not backed off. In September 2014, even as President Xi Jinping was being entertained by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the bank of the Sabarmati River in Ahmedabad, Chinese and Indian troops were once again engaged in a tense face-off at Chumar in Ladakh.

The BDCA has failed to address the basic issue that is the root cause of most transgressions and patrol face-offs, which is the non-demarcation of the LAC, which leads to varying perceptions about where it runs. As such, it is merely another “feel good’ agreement that has not brought the two sides any closer to a final settlement of the territorial dispute and has achieved virtually nothing substantive to further even the immediate necessity of improving border management. Finally, it is in India’s interest to strive for early resolution of the territorial dispute so that there is only one military adversary to contend with. It is in this direction that the Government of India must firmly nudge the Chinese leadership during future meetings of the political interlocutors.

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Published Date: 6^th April 2015, Image source: http://ichef.bbci.co.uk

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Saudi-Maldivian Ties: An Opportunity or Threat for India?

Anushree Ghisad, 

Research Intern, VIF

The President of Maldives Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia from 18th March. A joint statement issued at the conclusion of Yameen’s visit to the Kingdom said that the two sides have expressed their desire to strengthen cooperation in foreign affairs, defence, Islamic affairs, justice, economic, investment and trade sectors, providing support to the issues of the Muslim nation as well as education, health and social affairs to realize their common interests. The Saudi Fund for Development will continue to finance development projects in Maldives. The statement also said that, “as part of efforts to deepen educational and cultural cooperation, Saudi Arabia will provide 150 scholarships to Maldives’ students.” Both the countries have rejected any foreign interference in their internal affairs. Discussions were also held on strengthening unity of Islam and increasing Saudi investments to give fillip to the Maldivian economy.

Implications of Gayoom’s Saudi Arabia visit

Amidst the ongoing Maldivian turmoil where former President Mohamed Nasheed has been sentenced to 13 years imprisonment without being given a fair trial, which has seen internal clashes in Malidvian society and has evoked a severe reaction from UNHRC and other countries, Prime Minister Narendra Modi cancelled his scheduled Maldives trip in mid-March, so as not to endorse Gayoom’s actions of trampling democracy by undermining opposition and appointing loyalist to all constitutional places. It is China alone which had categorically declined to comment on the developments in the Indian Ocean island citing it as an ‘internal matter’, and now Saudi has joined the hands by endorsing President Gayoom and his policies. This raises substantial concerns for India as Maldives is coming under the influence of China under Gayoom’s regime, wherein Beijing is securing this precious ‘pearl’ in its ‘string of pearls’ by ensuring its multidimensional dependence on China. Saudi too seems to be following in the Chinese footsteps, albeit under the religious garb of promoting ‘Unity of Islam’, however antithetical any pseudo autocratic regime might be in the eyes of Islamic tenets.

Saudi Arabia’s recent mollycoddling with Maldives

Diplomatic relations between the Maldives and Saudi Arabia were established in 1981.It is noteworthy that in 2008, Maldives opened its embassy in Riyadh, which was its first ever mission to the West Asia. Both the countries have always recognized the historic friendship and Saudi’s role in development of Maldives. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has agreed to open an embassy in the island nation during the current visit of Maldivian President.

The Kingdom’s growing role in this Sunni littoral nation became palpable when in February last year many tourist reservations were cancelled with no prior notice as Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (the current Saudi head of state) allegedly booked three islands of Maldives. Tourism is the lifeblood of Maldivian economy and yet Maldivian government did not mind hampering its reputation for hospitality when it came to receiving the then Saudi prince, thanks to the Kingdom’s growing investment in the archipelago.

President Gayoom affirmed that the Republic of Maldives views the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the country that houses the two holy mosques and as the focus of the hearts of all Muslims as it represents their Qibla. He also emphasized that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the primary partner of the Republic of Maldives.

It is this growing camaraderie which infused a confidence in Maldives to take the EU head on when the latter removed the duty free status of Maldives’ fish a couple of years ago. Maldives reacted by attacking EU’s policy and said it would certify its fish as halal and find new markets in countries like Saudi Arabia.

Maldives’ Infatuation with Saudi Arabia

Maldives, like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is a Sunni Muslim country and considers Saudi Arabia the fountainhead of Islamic practices, which is a well-respected fact. Enamoured by Saudi’s Islamic heritage, Maldives seems to have started adopting the customs of the Kingdom, but is it at the cost of undermining its own ancient tradition? For example, the official Maldivian language Dhivehi belonging to Indo-Aryan group of languages and is closely related to Sinhalese. The original Dives Akuru script was replaced by Thaana by around 18th century, which is largely modelled on Arabic style of writing. As against this, Central Asian states continue to follow the local traditions and language despite being Islamic countries.

Does this paradigm shift in the native ethnic orientation of Maldivian society underline its eagerness to submit to Saudi Arabia’s hegemony over Sunni Islam? Two success stories of Asia- Japan and South Korea, are firmly rooted in their respective ancient heritages and do not ape India despite being ardent followers of Buddhism. Invoking religious aping out of a genuine religious awe can turn into formidable identity crisis for locals as is evident in the case of Pakistan. And if this is the case, then will Maldives not try to replicate Saudi’s education system which is largely based on Wahabi ideology, for which Saudi is believed to be funding in this island nation?

Going beyond Religion- Saudi stakes in Maldives

Maldives has undergone lot of struggle since 2003 to throw off the shackles of dictatorial rule to see the light of democracy. It finally succeeded in throwing the three decade long dictatorial yoke of Mohamed Gayoom in 2008, when Nasheed came to power by democratic means. With strings of high profile political ousters and in desperate attempts to consolidate power by throttling Nasheed from contesting next presidential election scheduled in 2018, the current Maldivian regime is undermining the very spirit of democracy which its citizens had fought so hard for. As a result, the Jamhoori Pary (JP) has parted ways with ruling alliance and joined hands with Nasheed’s Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) to start a movement called ‘save the constitution’. Even the ultra-hardliner Adhaalath Party (AP) is disillusioned with the current government due to its brutality and its President Sheikh Imran Abdulla has called for the formation of a “national unity alliance” against the government. Occasional clashes between Gayoomists and Nasheedists on the streets of Male have further intensified this conflict.

Saudi Arabia finds itself cornered after Arab Spring as its roots are secured in economic and democratic reforms, the later one being the existential threat for monarchs of the Kingdom. Hence Saudi is clamouring hard to nip this spirit in its bud wherever it starts surfacing, and Maldives seems to be traversing the same path. Hence, Saudi Arabia might be willing to strengthen the hands of Gayoom by assuring investment and trade.

The usage of wordings in the recently released joint statement emphasises on ‘rejecting any foreign interference in their internal affairs.’ This implies that the arrest of Nasheed, a champion of democracy and human rights; which has clearly been orchestrated with Chinese blessings, has been upheld by Saudi Arabia.

In order to lose its clutches of overdependence on United States, Saudi has embarked upon what is touted in Riyadh as a ‘look east policy’ since mid of last decade, which is an attempt to diversify. Playing on its ‘custodian of holy mosque’ card, Saudi Arabia uses the non-oil Islamic countries like Maldives to ensure a master-client relationship based upon the broader connotations of ‘Islamic unity’. Also, it is in long term commercial interests of the Kingdom to have a stronghold in a strategically located island nation like Maldives, which falls on international sea lanes of communication through which a major chunk of Saudi oil passes.

Saudi Arabia’s alleged role in Indoctrination & Terror Financing

In the joint Communiqué, both the countries have repeatedly focused upon deepening of educational and cultural cooperation, for which, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has announced the allocation of one hundred fifty scholarships for students from Maldives. In 2014, Saudi scholars had pledged a grant of $ 100,000 for Islamic education, while the Saudi prince has pledged to build 10 world class mosques in Maldives.

According to Prof. Shireen Hunter, financial support received from abroad can be divided into two categories; one for maintaining Muslim institutions such as mosques and two, to exercise a degree of political control over various groups that are recipient of such funds. Saudi Arabia is the most important country mainly indulging in second kind of support. Though the impact of Saudi education is not uniform and does not necessarily transform into blind support for the Kingdom’s government as it also produces radical Wahhabis who are highly critical of country’s ruling elite. Yet any outcome, which rides on ‘mine is the only truth’ dictum and fails to appreciate the inherent pluralistic nature of human society, is inimical to long term stability and security structure of that region where such investment is being made. And due to modern tools of communication and social networking and rising people to people contact, the cascading effect of such ideologies can endanger the security structure of neighbouring countries as well.

Saudis follow the Wahabi school of philosophy in its own education model, and has a track record of funding for such education world wide. In India, we have the prime example of growing radicalism under the influence of Saudi funded Wahabi ideology in the Kashmir Valley. In a report in 2011, Asit Jolly indicated this trend and reported the mushrooming of mosques and madrassas, funded by the Ahl-e-Hadith. The report, quoting US intelligence sources, highlighted the House of Saud decision of 2005, to allocate US$35 billion for building mosques in South Asia. A large number of madrassas have also accompanied this growth, and have penetrated the poorer segment of Kashmiri society.

In this backdrop, Maldives can probably emerge as a smaller version of what they have done with PoK and Pakistan, a breeding ground of terrorism. According to Zahid Shahab Ahmed from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia was one of the prominent players who funded madrasas in Pakistan to promote anti- Shia Islam. It eventually resulted in the radicalisation of Pakistani youths.

Saudi is the main financier of Madrasas which creates Taliban type fighters. Saudi Arabia has also emerged as a large source for funds for terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Former Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed told the CNN-IBN news channel during his visit to India in 2009 that "Hundreds of Maldivians" have been recruited by the Taliban and are fighting in Pakistan. Dr. Azra Naseem of Maldives argues that Maldives is tilting towards Deobandi Islam, the religion of the Taliban. There are reports of Maldivian youths fighting alongside Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. The growing radicalism, funded by money received from charities and donations, has led to extremist views on religion and its influence on society.

Saudi’s commitment to build ten world class mosques in Maldives reiterates the taboo of ‘liquor mosques’ where praying in the mosques built out of tourism revenue ( as tourists indulge in relishing alcohol) is considered haraam. Otherwise what logic explains building ten more mosques in a country which has less than 4,00,000 of population and already had more than 725 mosques by mid-1991? Hence such commitments by Saudi Arabia need to be watched carefully as it raises many apprehensions for regional stability.

Saudi: A stabilizing factor amidst growing ISIS threats in Indian Ocean?

Amidst the rising clout of non-state actors and global extremism, Saudi and Maldives have reiterated their determination to fight extremism and terrorism in all their forms and manifestations, as both the countries are based on “tolerant principles of Islam”. This could also be interpreted as a hint towards curbing the ISIS menace. Saudi Arabia, during the early days of ISIS appeared to be smitten by it, as it had pledged to vanquish the Shiite crescent with Sunni fire. But later the Kingdom officially condemned Islamic State’s activities as it started taking shape in the heart of a historical Sunni patrimony and posed existential threat to the Kingdom’s monarchy by promoting the pristine Wahabi ideology of "One leader, One authority, One mosque: submit to it, or be killed". The ‘one leader’ here essentially meant the Caliph of Islamic State and not the king of the Saudi Arabian kingdom. As British diplomat Alastair Crooke observes, ‘On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahabist. On the other hand, it is ultra-radical in a different way. It could be seen essentially as a corrective movement to contemporary Wahabism.’ To add to its woes, neither the pro-reform (spring leaders) nor anti-reform leaders (ISIS) are giving any importance to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Former Maldivian President Mohamed Nasheed had earlier expressed fears that around 200 Maldivian youths have been recruited by ISIS. Even the Commissioner of Police Hussain Waheed has said that it is a cause of concern that Maldivians nationals are leaving the country to fight in wars abroad. The exact number of Maldivians abroad for Jihad remains unclear, with sporadic groups departing to Syria and Iraq every week. The Commissioner of Police has estimated that around 50 Maldivians are working with foreign rebel groups, dwarfing figures suggested by Home Minister Umar Naseer in December 2014. A jihadist group called Bilad Al Sham Media (BASM) – which describes itself as ‘Maldivians in Syria’ – revealed that a fifth Maldivian had died in Syria. Now the figure of youths joining extremist groups can be contested, but the fact cannot be denied that even a small group is potent enough to spread the poison of extremism in this tiny nation, which can have cascading effect over maritime security of Indian Ocean.

If both the nations are genuinely committed to fight the ghost of ISIS, then it is a welcome move as a stable and peaceful Maldives is in the interest of regional security of Indian Ocean Region at large and India in particular. But the question remains as to what Saudi and Maldives are aspiring for? To replicate a Pakistani model in India’s backyard or to create a win-win-win situation for all?

Maneuvering between Two Friends- Way Ahead for India

Saudi Arabia is a time tested friend of India with trade being the dominant factor in the relationship. Diplomatically, Saudi is the gateway into the wider Arab world. India has contributed a lot in the prosperity of Saudi, by buying oil at high prices and by helping in building up its economy. It is largely believed that the Kingdom granted a grace period of six months to correct and regularize status of illegal workers in Saudi Arabia post enactment of Nitaqat wok policy in 2011 (directed at illegal expatriates in Saudi Arabia), keeping in mind more than 280,000 Indians working in Saudi.

Similarly, Maldives has traditionally come under India’s sphere of influence and depends heavily on India for its maritime security and military requirements. New Delhi’s immediate intervention under the banner of ‘Operation Cactus’ after Maldives request in 1988 to thwart the attempted coup against the then President Mohamed Gayoom is still remembered with reverence in Maldives. But the ongoing turmoil in Maldives which essentially is inimical to Indian interest is raising the concerns in New Delhi. Any attempt by an external player to strengthen ongoing consolidation of power and exacerbate the radicalization can have detrimental effects for India.

Deepening Saudi-Maldives relation can prevent Maldives from turning into the launchpad of Islamic State in Indian Subcontinent. But at the same time, India cannot remain insulated if Maldives becomes a safe haven for other extremists due to generous pouring of money from Saudi, which may like to foil Islamic State by emboldening its arch rival Al-Qaeda or LeT. Even the common Maldivian is not willing to endanger the gains of hard earned democracy by turning his homeland into a fertile ground of extremism. The challenge for India is to ensure that the money emanating from Saudi goes for empowerment of Maldivian society by actually promoting ‘the tolerant version of Islam’ than further radicalizing them and to pull out its economy from the current slump, without undermining the friendly relations with both the countries. It is extremely important to turn this credible threat of growing camaraderie between Saudi and Maldives into an opportunity for strengthening regional security mechanism by exchanging information.

The timing of Yameen’s visit to Saudi, barely five days after the pronouncement of Nasheed’s thirteen years jail term is alarming and underscores the urgency with which China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have legitimized President Yameen’s acts. India cannot in any case remain a mute spectator and has to steer the wheel if it aspires to be the ‘Net Security Provider’ of the Indian Ocean region.

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Published date: 31st March 2015, Image source: http://vid.alarabiya.net

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)