India-China Border Talks: No Progress to Show

Existing Agreements need to be Diligently Implemented

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The Special Representatives of the Prime Ministers of India and China met on March 23, 2015 at New Delhi to discuss the resolution of the territorial dispute. This was the 18^th round of border talks that have made little progress so far. A typically bland statement was issued by the Ministry of External Affairs after the talks: “The Special Representatives continued the discussions to reach a mutually acceptable Framework for resolution of the Boundary Question on the basis of the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles.”

The Special Representatives noted that the interaction between the border management forces had been growing. They said such contacts should be expanded as “these constitute important confidence building measures for maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas.”

The two sides should have accorded the highest priority to discussing the measures that are necessary to give practical effect to the implementation of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), signed during then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trip to Beijing in October 2013, and its previous avatars so that the occurrence of destabilising incidents along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) can be minimised. This is important because of the recent instances of Chinese military assertiveness along the LAC.

The BDCA commits the two sides to “periodic meetings” of military and civilian officers and to exchange information – including information about military exercises, aircraft movements, demolition operations and unmarked mines. It emphasises the avoidance of border patrols “tailing” each other and recommends that the two sides “may consider” establishing a hot-line between military headquarters in both countries.

A close examination of the BDCA reveals that it falls substantially short of removing the anomalies and impracticalities of similar agreements that have not worked well in the past. These include the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, September 7, 1993; the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, November 29, 1996; the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, April 11, 2005; the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas, April 11, 2005; and, the Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, January 17, 2012.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and Tibet is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km-long international boundary. The term LAC implies de facto military control over respective areas and came into use after the 1962 border war. However, the LAC is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The un-delineated LAC is a destabilising factor as major incidents such as the Nathu La clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung stand-off of 1986 can recur. In fact, the two sides have failed to even exchange maps showing their perception of the LAC except in the least contentious Central Sector, that is, the Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh borders with Tibet. Despite the lofty rhetoric of all the agreements, it has not been possible for India to withdraw a single soldier from the LAC so far. It clearly shows how intractable the challenge is.

There are frequent incidents of Chinese transgression of the LAC both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which the LAC runs in their perception. On many occasions in the recent past, Indian and Chinese patrols have met face-to-face. Such meetings have an element of tension built into them and, despite the best of military training, the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out. An armed clash that stretches over several days and in which there are heavy casualties can lead to a larger border incident that may not remain localised.

This is the reason why it is critically important to demarcate the LAC on the ground and map. Once that is done, the inadequacy of recognisable terrain features can be overcome by exploiting GPS technology to accurately navigate up to the agreed and well-defined LAC on the ground and even unintentional transgressions can be avoided.

Chinese intransigence in exchanging maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the western and the eastern sectors, while talking of high-sounding guiding principles and parameters to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, is neither understandable nor condonable. It can only be characterised as an attempt to put off resolution of the dispute “for future generations to resolve”, as Deng Xiao Ping had famously told Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. China’s obvious negotiating strategy is to resolve the territorial dispute with India only when the Chinese are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they can dictate terms.

Fresh efforts need to be made to fine-tune the operationalisation of the Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, signed on January 17, 2012. The agreed measures include regular consultations and flag meetings or telephone and video conferences during emergencies along the LAC. The mechanism was expected to help prevent misunderstanding between the two countries arising from incursions into each other's territory. The joint mechanism was also expected to study ways to strengthen exchanges and cooperation between military personnel on the ground.

None of this has obviously happened as serious Chinese incursions continue and tensions continue to persist. This has been evident in recent incidents of reckless behaviour. The deep transgression by PLA troops at Depsang near Daulat Beg Oldie in May 2013 could have led to an armed clash if the PLA had not backed off. In September 2014, even as President Xi Jinping was being entertained by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the bank of the Sabarmati River in Ahmedabad, Chinese and Indian troops were once again engaged in a tense face-off at Chumar in Ladakh.

The BDCA has failed to address the basic issue that is the root cause of most transgressions and patrol face-offs, which is the non-demarcation of the LAC, which leads to varying perceptions about where it runs. As such, it is merely another “feel good’ agreement that has not brought the two sides any closer to a final settlement of the territorial dispute and has achieved virtually nothing substantive to further even the immediate necessity of improving border management. Finally, it is in India’s interest to strive for early resolution of the territorial dispute so that there is only one military adversary to contend with. It is in this direction that the Government of India must firmly nudge the Chinese leadership during future meetings of the political interlocutors.

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Published Date: 6^th April 2015, Image source: http://ichef.bbci.co.uk

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Enter The Dragon

Kanwal Sibal
Member Advisory Board, VIF

In the background of a perceived shift in global power from the West to the East, future relations between a rising China and India are a fit subject for analysis and speculation. The title of Bertil Lintner’ book - “Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier” whets even more the reader’s appetite as it conjures up chess-board strategic moves and countermoves by China and India to promote their respective geopolitical interests in the insurgency-ridden region spanning India’s North-east and Burma.

Associated with the Far Eastern Economic Review for 20 years, with expertise on ethnic minorities and insurgencies in South East Asia and South Asia, and personal knowledge of ground conditions and contact with key rebel leaders, Lintner’s credentials for writing this book are impressive. In 1985 he travelled with his Shan wife 2275 kilometers overland from north-east India- which he entered illegally- through rebel held Burmese territory to China, for which he was blacklisted by the Indian government until the early 2000s.

The author acquaints the reader with the historical roots of the insurgencies in India’s north-east, their evolution, the role played by China, Bangladesh and Pakistan in providing arms, training, shelter and travel assistance to the insurgents, and India’s political astuteness in containing the revolts. Lintner credits India with masterly use of Kautilya’s four principles of sham (political reconciliation), dan ( monetary inducement), danda (force) and bhed (split) to control if not end the insurgencies, and admires R&AW’s human intelligence capabilities that combined with Kautilya’s maxims on statecraft makes it, according to him, a formidable force- a view hardly supported by the organization’s current reputation.

China’s direct support ended with Deng Xiao Ping’s ascendancy but Indian insurgents apparently continue to have access to the grey arms market in Yunnan run as private businesses by former officers of the PLA. Under Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh’s support to ULFA and Manipuri rebels has ceased, which makes Pakistan’s mischief-making more difficult.

Lintner tries to fit the seemingly localized conflicts in the region into its geopolitics defined by the rising Indian challenge to Chinese supremacy in Asia, the differences between the two over Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese arms supply links with ethnic rebel movements in India’s north-east, with continuing turmoil in Burma providing the vital geographical link for such activity. But Lintner also says, somewhat contradictorily with the book’s title, that while the Himalayas will remain important strategically, the main conflict of interest between India and China will play out in the Indian Ocean.

This book should caution those in India who are enticed by the idea of linking Yunnan to India’s north-east to end its isolation and enable its development in a regional context. It also underscores the necessity of a lasting solution to insurgencies in the north-east for the connectivity through Burma and Thailand to Singapore that our Look East policy seeks to establish.

This is a book by a journalist, not an international relations scholar, and relies a great deal on anecdotes and personal accounts. There is much detail that displays the author’s rich knowledge of personalities and events in the separate chapters on the Nagas, Mizos, Manipur, Assam and Bangladesh as well as Burma, but it is the introductory chapter and that on the Indian Ocean that provides some geopolitical perspective.

The book does not quite live up to its dramatic title. On closing it the reader is not left with the feeling of having experienced the strategic thrills of a new Great Game East being played out inexorably by the elephant and the dragon.