The current LoC narrative and India’s response

Lt General S A Hasnain, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM (Bar), VSM (Bar), 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In conventional warfare command decisions are based on a range of options, the escalation matrix is well understood and risk is quite easily calculated on the basis of resources, surprise and leadership. However, in irregular warfare the challenge of decision making is sometimes of a higher order. Keeping the threshold low and escalation within control is difficult. The situation on the LoC in J&K is tricky and quite unlike situations which present themselves in conventional operations. However, a non-military mind may not fully grasp this as common perception prevails that there is nothing more to ceasefire violations than simply kinetic responses, the tit for tat concept. The ‘force on force’ approach has never found winners and is considered the unprofessional way of tackling an adversary. However, India’s military leadership which is quite capable of ‘indirect approach’ is yet to fully exploit the chinks in Pakistan’s armor. Has the time come for ratcheting our response by many notches?

The situation which presents itself needs a brief reiteration. The Valley and its LoC segment is comparatively quiet and even in the hinterland only small scale militant actions are taking place; mainly by our proactive search for contact. South of PirPanjal the LoC is active both in the Poonch-Rajouri segment and the Jammu IB sector. Large scale terrorist actions have not been attempted although the Udhampur ambush, Gurdaspur strike and the earlier actions at Samba and Kathua severely tested India’s will and tolerance despite being classified as small scale in nature, in the comparison of terror related events. Infiltration which can never be zero is down to very low levels although Naveed, the young Pakistani terrorist captured at Udhampur has confirmed his route of infiltration in Gulmarg sector. It may be incorrect to dismiss the ceasefire violations in passing; these are assuming dimensions larger than witnessed for many years. In pre-2003 daysthe exchanges were far heavier but they could still be accepted. In today’s world of televised news they form a breaking news story every day, hurting the sensitivities of the public. This in turn is putting pressure on the Government and much more on the Army which is required to respond and put an end to this. Armies are not very good at calibrated responses; they prefer a no holds barred engagement.

In trans LoC exchanges of fire there can only be temporary victories between armies; the effect on troops is marginal but the civil population in the vicinity suffers immensely. We are apparently still in the mode of counting the number of violations by Pakistan Army without realizing that the ceasefire in the South of Pir Panjal is as good as dead. It continues to hold in the Valley’s LoC segment. Can we declare boldly that the ceasefire has ceased to exist and India reserves the right to use its weaponry and manpower at place and time of choosing? There never was a formal ceasefire agreement, just a declaration by both sides with Pakistan no doubt taking the lead.

Pakistan is firm of the belief that India is too obsessed with her economic growth and development to risk a full scale conflict. It is calculating its risks very carefully so as not to breach the limit of tolerance or the proverbial ‘tipping point’. The nuclear capability is an artificial protection which Pakistan’s military leadership considers its trump card and which it assesses will keep India acting rationally. Its leaders give veiled threats of the use of the nuclear option if India responds conventionally. With this assessment Pakistan feels emboldened to play the J&K card even as it is embroiled in bitter and violent turbulence brought on by home grown terror. It is also seeking to enhance its strategic hold over Afghanistan. Having sensed J&K slipping from its control it has gone into an overdrive which it feels it can calibrate.

Given the analysis above it is clear that the nexus of the Deep State is completely outside the ambit of political control in Pakistan and it can act irrationally to the extreme without considering the impact or outcome of its actions. Pakistan’s recent foreign policy successes with different international players, has added to this confidence. The bottom line seems to be that India will not risk conflict, it will respond in kind on the LoC and this will help in sensitizing the international community on the potential of war in a nuclear environment. From the utterances on media there seems to be a tutored line to demand investigation by a neutral agency recommended to be UNMOGIP, in order to revive the UN resolutions. As a result of its actions Pakistan is attempting to brow beat India militarily, diplomatically and most important psychologically. In the season of the run up to the Golden Jubilee of the 1965 Indo Pak Conflict, Pakistan realizes that there is considerable research going on in India and the celebratory events will project the defeat of the Pakistan Armed Forces. By upping the ante through LoC exchanges it hopes to retain the self-image of being the victor of the 1965 conflict.

What are India’s options? This question a week before the slated NSA level talks does appear strange and puts the Government under pressure. Through history nations have often remained engaged in discussions even as armies fought on the battlefield. It is a part of the comprehensive narrative of war that whatever be the level of engagement the last edge of the war spectrum is never reached; a miniscule window is always open for reason or conveyance of messages. The Indian Government need never be under pressure on the issue of talks and engagement and can adopt other proactive measures which continue to counter the adversary’s intent. We too have a perception of an escalation matrix and can work within its parameters. What would this involve?

Firstly, public perception cannot be wished away. It cannot lose its confidence in the capability of its armed forces. Therefore a response in kind along the LoC is an absolute necessity. It needs to be to a plan and not just a shell for shell and bomb for bomb response. There are many areas in which we hold a major terrain advantage. In 2011 the J&K media would recall reports from PoK of a segment of people there who held a demonstration before the office of the local DC demanding that Jihadi terrorists be evicted from their area as the people did not wish to see the triggering of exchanges of shelling along the LoC. There are many such locations along the LoC where we hold a major advantage towards hurting the logistics of the Pakistan Army and imposing a time and financial penalty. These are well known within the Army. The transLoC small pin prick actions can be responded in kind quite easily as was done prior to 2003. These are just the first baby steps in response and we need not even be in denial mode on these as Pakistan is. Pakistan can escalate in response, by expanding the ambit to Ladakh; it is not as if we have not lived with this in the past. It is just the quest for rationalism and better sense which has dictated our response discourse. In the bargain a perception has been built within the Deep State that we will not defend our honor because we are obsessed with our growth process. This perception has to be firmly put down through an escalatory ladder of response.

Secondly, the openness of media and the free discussion on India’s military capabilities in the true democratic spirit may have hurt us in terms of a negative perception. This perception appears to have seeped into Pakistan’s thinking. The lack of modernization of artillery and air defence, the inability to induct helicopters and the MMRCA as also aspects such as insufficient ammunition holdings are no doubt issues of concern. However, many of these problems have existed and it is not as if the Pakistan Armed Forces are equipped optimally. India’s Armed Forces need to shed their reticence, speak up and demonstrate. They cannot be perceived to be defensive when offensive nature of conflict forms the cornerstone of their doctrine. The message should be clear; we are prepared always, the gaps are work in progress.

In recent years the Indian Armed Forces have taken a psychological beating due to being embroiled in nonprofessional issues. They are tied in thousands of legal cases involving personnel, pensions, land etc which dilutes the perception of their professionalism. This appears to be sending home incorrect messages to our adversaries. It is a world of perception and psychological warfare has never been our strongest point. The recent OROP controversy needs to be placed at rest the earliest as it is harming our national image. Pakistan must be under no delusion that this has affected our war fighting capability.

Only a few aspects of escalation have been explained above due to space constraints. Our professional warriors know the game well and need to demand their space from the Government. At the Government level my only recommendation is the early conception of psychological warfare machinery. It can start with the MoD loosening the ropes on the public information system of the three Services,in which strides are being made but only gingerly. Half the problem on the LoC is because of incorrect perception that the Deep State holds. Time we gave the perception that we can be even more irrational than what Pakistan is. Who better than the NSA to convey that message and leave the spectrum of response open as per our choice.

(The writer is an ex GOC of the Srinagar based 15 Corps, now associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group)

---

Published in DailyExcelsior.Com 19 August 2015. Image Source: http://www.nationalturk.com
(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

PM's Visit to China

Amb Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

The challenge facing India is the degree to which it should separate economic and security issues. China has huge financial resources and sectoral expertise that could be mobilised for India’s development. The CII has identified 18 sectors in which Chinese companies could invest and 5 areas in which we seek more openings for Indian products in the Chinese market. As against this, it should be noted that we have been discussing the opening of these 5 sectors with China for 10 years without success. We will not get a level playing field in China for our companies because of of the role of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). China, besides, has appetite for projects, not investments. Most of the so-called investments announced during President Xi’s visit to Pakistan relate to projects ($38 billion). China uses methods for project implementation (Chinese labour etc) that will not work in India. The SEZ model, that has been successful in China, will not work in India either. The proposed Chinese investments in Industrial Parks in India is unlikely to materialise as expected. The Chinese Law Minister has spoken of studying the legal framework in India, no doubt with the SOEs in mind. The Chinese premier, just before PM’s visit to China has spoken of preferential policies and investment facilitation for its businesses, which suggests that he is looking for special and not competitive conditions.

India has to take a position on the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of China as this will be raised during PM’s visit. In this context it should be noted that China has announced this initiative unilaterally and talked of partnership later. It has already established oil and gas connectivity with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia, besides the Eurasian transport corridor linking Shanghai with Lisbon. Even the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been discussed between the two countries before the OBOR was unveiled. The OBOR is a cover of what they have been already doing, the principal objective of which is to use their excess capacity in the infrastructure sectors to generate external demand. The argument that if India did not join OBOR it will be isolated has no merit. Pakistan has not allowed SAARC to develop its true potential and resists connectivity between India and Afghanistan and onto Central Asia India does bot need the OBOR for economic cooperation either with Pakistan, Afghanistan or the Gulf. In any case, the One Belt excludes India and the One Road includes Kolkata only.

The 1993, 1996, 2005, 2011 and 2013 border agreements are in the nature of CBMs and not settlement of the border issue. India has accommodated itself to the Chinese strategy of focusing on border management and not border settlement, As a defensive argument, some in India argue that we may not actually be politically and institutionally ready for a border settlement through a compromise as it will entail some territorial give and take, which will require a constitutional amendment. India also abandoned the LAC clarification process, abruptly ended by China, in favour of the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism, which after 18 rounds has not produced any notable result either. The lack of progress on the border issue is the root cause of the deep distrust of China’s intentions, aggravated by Chinese policies in our neighbourhood, especially Pakistan. China will have no interest in settling the border till the Dalai Lama is alive. We should also address the possibility that during PM’s visit or soon thereafter China could create an incident. China is also fomenting Tibetan sub-nationalism as an instrument for use against India on the border issue.

The Chinese economy is in trouble, with slower growth, excess capacity and huge internal debt, with possible consequences for political stability. China seeks openings in the India which at present is the fastest growing economy. We should not get into a psychological situation where we see Chinese investments in India as a favour. Our approach to China should not be that of a “loser”. We should, where it suits our interest, move forward with economic cooperation, but within strict parameters. For example, in the Railways sector we can cooperate but not in signalling and routing equipment. On the whole, our strategy should be not to strengthen the Chinese economy when it is in trouble. We have also to keep in mind that more market openings for China could destroy parts of our industry, as has already happened. Unlike in the case of China, there are no strategic costs in economic cooperation with Japan, US, Korea or Europe. This is not to say that increased economic cooperation with China should not be pursued as an option. Our approach should be calibrated, win-win, with security considerations in mind, and not pushed by commercial lobbies in india and other interests which have been assiduously cultivated by China, an opportunity that is not available to us in China because of its state-controlled system, linguistic barriers and the opaque nature of power in China. The example of the massive US-China and Japan-China economic ties despite security issues does not apply in the India-China case because the disparity of power that exists in the US-China relationship and Japan’s capacity to defend itself and its alliance relationship with the US, the kind of security nets that do not exist in India’s case where the need for China to be cautious is much less than in the other two cases.

We have to decide the extent to which we should separate security issues from economic ones. We should seek a quid pro quo from China for opening our market to them, but this should not be in the economic domain only. It should be also in the political and security domains. It has to be conveyed to China that border incidents, increasingly assertive claims on Arunachal and stridently worded protests work against a stronger economic relationship. In a democracy, economic issues cannot be delinked from the security atmosphere. Till such time as the border issue is settled, China should refrain from pronouncing aggressively on the border issue and avoid incremental nibbling away in areas where perceptions over the LAC differ.

We should press for the LAC clarification process, as already publicly proposed by PM during President Xi’s visit. We should not be advocating “out of the box solutions”, as such suggestions will be used against us. The Chinese will expect India to think out of the box, while they adhere to their long held “principled” position.

PM could state publicly during his visit to China where we want the India-China relationship to go. On the border issue, he may affirm our position in public. He may express concern that LAC clarification/ border settlement discussions are proceeding too slowly. Because the Chinese leadership in India does not hesitate to talk in public in India about the border issue in dilatory terms, unmindful of Indian concerns, it would be appropriate for PM to express Indian impatience at Chinese procrastination. It would also signal that the expansion of ties in general, including economic, are linked in our mind to a constructive and honest Chinese approach to the border issue and not a bullying one. The occasion to do this might be the public speech planned at Shanghai.

The CPEC has to traverse POK. We should convey our serious concern to China on this. In this connection it may be recalled that both Pakistan and China accepted in their 1963 Sino-Pakistan Agreement that the territory was not legally Pakistan’s. This Agreement throughout refers to China’s Sinkiang and “the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan”. Article 6 of the Agreement states that “The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on the boundary as described in Article Two of the present agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that in the event of the sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”. China would still go ahead with the project but we would have obtained a pressure point on China which we could use in our border negotiations.

The CPEC gives us good ground to distance ourselves from the OBOR initiative which is a geo-strategic one to extend Chinese power in Asia and the Indian Ocean. China’s strategic goal is to push back US power in the western Pacific and in Central and Southwest Asia. Gwadar will allow extension of China’s economic and political and eventually security influence in Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Gulf at the cost of the US. We can reasonably say that we need more information and more studies on how India fits in. We can take the position that we can effectively deal with connectivity issues bilaterally with countries of interest to us, including with China. We can proceed with the Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia as well as the North-South corridor through Iran to Russia and Central Asia outside the OBOR. In fact these projects predate the OBOR by many years.

India should not proceed with the BCIM corridor as this will expose our inadequately integrated northeast to greater Chinese influence. Allowing this part of India to enter into the Chinese economic orbit will lead to increased Chinese political influence in the region and will aggravate our problems. We should work on northeast connectivity to Myanmar and Thailand and then on to Southeast Asia. We should favour Japan’s involvement in developing our northeast.

So long as China gives stapled visas to Kashmiris and Arunachalis, we should not extend the e-visa facility to the Chinese. There should be a clear bargain on this point. The arguments being given by our side that e-visas are being offered on a non-reciprocal basis and the aim is to encourage Chinese tourism to India misses the point that we have a serious territorial issue with China that we do not have with other countries and that well over 90% of Chinese tourists, as per Chinese statistics, go to developed countries and not developing countries like India which may have great historical and cultural sites to offer. The other argument that there is no clear cut Chinese policy on stapled visas and that this is done “conveniently”, largely in the case of officials and sportspeople etc, seems an artificial plea in China’s favour in order to justify a controversial step.

We had ceased including statements about the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) being part of the PRC because of China’s aggressive statements on Arunachal Pradesh during the tenure of the previous government. In the joint statement issued during Xi’s visit to India we had thanked the government of TAR of the PRC for permitting an alternative route to Mansarovar, thus reversing our position. This has been followed up by China now asserting aggressively its sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh on the occasion of PMs recent visit to Arunachal Pradesh. Consequently, we should revert to our earlier position and exclude any mention of TAR in the joint statement.

We should during the visit seek a better understanding on China’s plans for Afghanistan during PM’s visit. China is now pursuing a connected Pakistan-Afghanistan policy, which Afghan President Ghani too seems to favour, and this has implications for our security.

We do not have enough scholarship and understanding of China. We should send more students to China and encourage more Chinese language studies in India.

On the positive side, we would no doubt highlight points of convergence during PM’s visit on BRICS issues, the BRICS Development bank, AIIB, the reform of international financial and political institutions, G20 issues, energy and climate change issues.

---

Published Date: 14^th May 2015, Image Source: http://blogs.wsj.com

Playing hardball with China

Nitin A Gokhale, 

Editor & Senior Fellow, VIF

In the midst of a rather euphoric narrative about Prime Minister Narendra Modi's three-day China visit starting 14 May, two factors must serve as a reality check.

One was the revelation by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) that the Chinese Envoy in New Delhi was summoned and conveyed India's protest against the 46 billion dollar worth China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) running through the Pak-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and two, a rather abrasive comment by a Chinese scholar in a semi-official newspaper that Prime Minister Modi is "“playing little tricks” over border disputes and security issues, hoping to boost his domestic prestige and increase his leverage in negotiations with China."

Both these developments remind us that no matter how much progress India and China make in economic and cultural fields, the contentious border issue and China's efforts to promote Pakistan as a cat's paw in South Asia, will always cast a large shadow over Sino-India relations. Prime Minister Modi's national security team would be well aware of the Chinese tendency to be two faced in its dealings with neighbours.

Twice in recent past, China has sought to up the ante on the border on eve of two important visits. In April-May 2013, days ahead of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Delhi, a platoon of Chinese PLA soldiers walked across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Depsang in Ladakh and camped there for three weeks before a diplomatic compromise end the mini-crisis. It was no different when President Xi Jingping came to India last year. In less than six hours after his arrival, 1000 Chinese soldiers tried to repeat Depsang at Chumur, again in Ladakh. However, a robust and swift response in 2014 (India mobilised a brigade plus--3,000 soldiers-- in next to no time) forced the Chinese to back down. Although President Xi tried to play down the incident, it was clear the operation was planned well in advance and with full knowledge of the top leadership.

Given India's decisive response at Chumur and New Delhi's growing bonhomie with US and Japan, a similar border incident again looks unlikely but the pinpricks on the border issue will continue in the form of acerbic comments and belligerent utterances by scholars and analysts working for various think-tanks in China. Thus the commentary in Global Times, the hawkish English newspaper published from Beijing is in keeping with the trend and should not come as a surprise to discerning China watchers. New Delhi on the other hand has used official channels to register its stand vis-a-vis increasing Chinese presence in PoK and the decision on CPEC.

Chinese interlocutors have surely noticed a subtle but firm shift in India's approach to China. When needed, Prime Minister Modi has not hesitated to use strong words to convey India's displeasure on Chinese. India has also been upfront about stitching together informal alliances that are designed to keep China guessing. Two examples will suffice. Speaking to business leaders in Tokyo during his official visit to Japan in September 2014, the Prime Minister said: “The world is divided in two camps. One camp believes in expansionist policies, while the other believes in development. We have to decide whether the world should get caught in the grip of expansionist policies or we should lead it on the path of development and create opportunities that take it to greater heights.” While he did not mention China by name, the signal was loud and clear. Beijing is seen by Asian nations, especially those around the East China Sea and South China Sea as an expansionist power. Then in January his year, India and the US went a step further in specifically commenting on the situation in South China Sea. The Joint India-US Strategic Vision document noted that “regional prosperity depends on security. We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea.” In a clear signal to Beijing, the same statement added that the two countries “call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

The current Chinese leadership is surely aware of India’s recent efforts to re-calibrate its relationship with the United States and Japan. The attempt in Beijing would therefore be to ensure that India does not fully migrate into the anti-China camp. India will be offered lucrative economic investments and will be assured about reducing the burgeoning bilateral trade deficit between the two countries but no major breakthrough is expected on the boundary issue, notwithstanding External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s pronouncement in Beijing in February this year that an “out of the box” solution is still possible. The boundary issue is complex and is rooted in many historical developments. Through the decades, Beijing has played a dexterous game on the border issue, pretending to be friendly and accommodation some time, reiterating its claims by aggressive moves on the other, keeping the pot boiling.

In this context it is instructive to take a peep into what happened in the late 1950s in Ladakh. When India accidentally discovered China’s road building activity in Aksai Chin, it was assured that the road was only meant as a link to Singkiang.

On December 26, 1959 Peking (as Beijing was then known) sent a note to India talking about Aksai Chin. It said: "This area is the only traffic artery linking Singkiang to Western Tibet because to its north-east lies the great Gobi of Sinkiang through which direct traffic with Tibet is practically impossible...the area all along belonged to China." Now, nearly 55 years later when India confronts Beijing on its CPEC passing through PoK (which India claims as its own territory), China is likely take a similar stand—‘it’s just an economic compulsion; ‘not meant as a strategic encirclement of India,’ etc etc.

Clearly, the Chinese tendency of bullying weaker neighbours and its policy to keep redefining 'core' interests according to circumstances continues. Policy making in China is one continuous process. In India on the other hand, it has varied according to personalities and political parties in power.

While the military in India has overcome the trauma of the 1962 defeat, civilian policy makers appear to be still bogged down by the burdens of the past in dealing with China. Of course, these mandarins get their act together only under pressure of a crisis like they did post-1986 Sumdorong Chu face off. The 2009 sanction for additional forces and speeding up of infrastructure development projects also came after increasing reports of Chinese belligerence along the LAC.

It is therefore essential to push for another round of capability-enhancing drive. Simultaneously, India must re-look and re-tweak its China policy. For instance:

• Insist with Beijing the need for exchanging maps for all sectors immediately so that each side knows the other's claimed LAC and border negotiations can resume
• Bring the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) under the operational control of the Army to ensure uniformity in border management
• Ensure timely and effective information sharing mechanism with Indian media and through them the Indian people rather than let different stake holders speak in different and sometimes discordant voices during times of crisis
• Educate and prepare the Indian people on the need for give and take on border negotiations in the future

Policy makers in India must be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. By stating India's concern over continuing support to Pakistan in no uncertain terms, Prime Minister Modi has sent a signal that that while his desire to deepen economic ties with Beijing and taking the relationship to the next level is paramount, New Delhi cannot be ignoring the developments in its neighbourhood. Hopefully, as he lands in Beijing in the next 24 hours, Prime Minister Modi's Chinese hosts would have got that message very clearly.

---

Published Date: 13^th May 2015, Image Source: http://www.dnaindia.com

Time for India to use its Soft Power in China

Prof. R Vaidyanathan 

(Member, VIF Advisory Board)

July 2014 is an important month for global economics and China. It is the first time in recent history that China has overtaken USA in GDP [adjusted for purchasing power parity or PPP] and has become number one country in the world according to Euromonitor¹. Now the order is China/USA/India/Japan in terms of GDP at PPP. Of course in per capita terms, USA has ten times more gross income than China given the population size of the latter.

Still China’s growth has been phenomenal and in the next two decades, it is poised to become numero uno even in nominal terms out running USA. This has implications for India from an Asian perspective and also we need to formulate our strategy about China. Traditionally in the last few decades, we have been looking at China using US or UK lens. This is due to the fact that we have not developed many China centers all over India. Hence we have few experts who understand their language and try to look at China with Indian glasses rather than Anglo-Saxon lens.

The major change that is taking place in China is not related to their growth rates and Three Gorges Dam and the shopping malls and Olympics stadia. That is a typical Western way of viewing China. The main change is in religious affiliation and assertion of Islamic followers and development of large scale underground Church. The middle classes have given up rice [perceived to be for the illiterate poor] and are embracing Christianity since it also helps in job mobility particularly in global companies where the heads could belong to the same Church. The Muslim population is less dispersed and more concentrated in specific locations like western part But there is also a growing interest in China about its past. The Ming dynasty tombs in Beijing which are made in marble were painted in red color during the great cultural revolution of the sixties and even today laborers are washing it to make it back in to white color without success. The guides are not reluctant to talk about it. The ten handed Buddha in the Summer Palace of Ching dynasty near Beijing has significant relationship with our idea of Lord Vishnu who destroys evil and even this is mentioned clearly. More importantly, China is opening what are called Confucius Institutes in more than fifty countries which is similar to British Council efforts but more focused on China’s ancient wisdom. . The first thing we should learn is to stop looking at China with Western glasses.

The economic boom in China has given rise to issues related to their faith/religion and associated things. First and foremost, China is facing a severe separatist [called splitters by Chinese] in their western region namely Xinjiang by Uighurs. The region is populated by followers of Islam religion and seeing unrest for the past two decades. But recently it has reached violent proportions. For instance, early last week Chinese claimed that at least 100 have been killed in disturbances in that region². Not only that, some portion of the Uighurs has carried the battle to Beijing itself. In other words, one form of regional separation combined with Islamic terrorism has become a major problem in China. There are also reports that the Islamists are taking shelter in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).

On the other hand, China is also waging a battle with “unrecognized” Church in its territory. Once a hub of Christianity, worshippers in Wenzhou fear their faith is facing its biggest threat since the Cultural Revolution³. The recent visit of the Pope to South Korea as part of his engaging Asia has fuelled concerns in China since China has its own church and does not recognize Papal authority.

“By my calculations China is destined to become the largest Christian country in the world very soon," said Fenggang Yang, a professor of sociology at Purdue University and author of Religion in China: Survival and Revival under Communist Rule.⁴ But for China, both the Abrahamic religions are alien to its culture going back several thousand years. So they are trying to revive “Confucianism” by encouraging the study of it as we’ll as opening several centers to propagate it. Buddhism is their ancient religion and Hindu influences are significant.

The keynote speech by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China- Hu Jintao to the 17^th Party Congress in October 2007 – devoted a paragraph to religion. He stressed that religious people including priests, monks and lay –believers played a positive role in the social and economic development of China. Hence religion is not any more the opiate of the masses. The state controlled Xinhua stresses that there must be freedom of belief. It says that religion can play an important role in realizing a ‘harmonious society” which is the new political role of the party⁵. That is the main issue we at India should be interested in. A 2007 study conducted by two professors of China Normal University based on more than 4500 people concluded that more than 300 million people namely 31 percent are religious and more than 60 % of those are in the 16-40 age group. The number of followers of Christianity has increased to 12 % from a low of less than 8% in the nineties.

This last fact is interesting since a huge underground Church has developed in China and Zhao Xiao, a former Communist Party official and convert to Christianity, thinks there are up to 130 million Christians in China.⁶. This figure is much more than the official figures of 21 million –16 million Protestants and five million Catholics. If the latter figure is true—which is corroborated by other like Pew Forum –then there are more Christians in China than the Communist Party membership which is pegged at 74 million in the last count.

Thus, a significant change that is taking place in China pertains to religion. The economic growth bereft of spiritual underpinnings in the context of death of Marxism is going to be a great challenge for China and India as an elder brother should facilitate orderly transformation based on our common shared ancient wisdom. Let us remember that China is also a multi-cultural and multi religious society but interested in our shared past. In the words of Hu Shih, former Ambassador of China to USA [1938-1942] “India conquered and dominated China culturally for 20 centuries without having to send a single soldier across her borders.”Ship loads of Sanskrit and Pali original works taken away by Chiang-Kai-Shek from mainland to Taiwan bear testimony to it. These are exhibited in the Taipei museum even today.

Hence, India should be sending Sri Sri Ravishankar/Mata Amirtanandamayi / Swami Ramdev/ Pramukh Swami/Sankaracharyas/Vaishnavite Seers and other spiritual leaders, Bharatha Natyam experts, musicians, other artists in hundreds to China to “ Conquer and Dominate” by our soft power. We need to print millions of copies of Ramayana and Mahabharata and our Puranas and Gita and Jataka stories in all modern Chinese languages and widely make them available. The CDs of Mahabharata and Ramayana etc. can also be given free. We should start some fifty Bharatiya Vidya Bhavans in China. Actually China needs this more than USA even though all our soft power is currently on show in the USA. We should create a fund of at least Rs.1000 crore for this effort. There is a statue of Kalidasa in the Shanghai theatre unveiled by the theater academy. I do not think of any metro in India including the so called “cultural capital” Kolkata, having a statue of Kalidasa. At Kolkata, the Theatre street became Shakespeare Sarani and not Kalidasa Marg!

We should strategically recognize the weak point of China and also the need of its masses in the absence of Communism. Many a Chinese even today believe that their next birth should be in India to reach salvation. Culture and religion are not taboos any more.

There are other issues. Officially China recognizes or permits only five religions namely Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, Protestantism and Catholicism⁷. Hence we should take steps to include Hinduism as one of the permitted religions. The Indian Government should take appropriate steps in this regard. The point is that our soft power in culture is interwoven in a tapestry form with the religion. You cannot separate it howsoever one tries it. Carnatic Music without Bhakti is neither music nor art. But our Government of all hues has never raised this issue with the Chinese.

The strategy should be to envelop China with music, dance, art, Yoga. Ayurveda, spiritual texts like Ithihasas, Gita, Puranas etc and capture the hearts of the middle classes as we have done for centuries.

The second issue is related to our own mind-set. We tend to look at China either through the Western spectacles or through local Marxist spectacles—which have more thick glasses. We need to come out of it. Even when invitations come to Indian spiritual leaders, the Government of India remains unenthusiastic and indicates its dis-interest in the false assumptions regarding China’s political orientation. The policy formulators are still living in the sixties and seventies while as China is undergoing a gigantic social crisis due to material prosperity and spiritual vacuum. Unfortunately, as a Chinese colleagueof mine at Shanghai University commented last year, “both our countries are ruled by rootless deracinated foreign educated wonders that do not have any idea of the civilizational roots or the cultural richness of our lands.” Hopefully now it should have changed!!

China is enthusiastically waiting. To quote late B K S Iyengar, the doyen of yoga, “Mr. Iyengar told The Hindu during a visit to Beijing that he saw China as a future home for yoga. When he travelled to Guangzhou to give a lecture, he was stunned to find that organisers had rented out a stadium – more than 1,300 students had come to listen to him”.⁸

But this is the opportunity to us since it is better to have a competitor and neighbour sharing the past cultural commonness. This will be very useful when the world is going to have two super powers from Asia unlike the conflict of last century between two super powers—USA and USSR- who did not have any shared cultural roots.

China is at the threshold of change. It is yearning for spiritual solace. Many groups and sects from Western countries [with or without permission] are trying to spread their influence and message—since this is an opportunity for them.

Are we ready to undertake such a mission?

Endnotes

1. [http://blog.euromonitor.com/2014/07/china-overtakes-the-us-as-the-worlds-largest-economy.html]
2. [http://www.dw.de/china-revises-uighur-unrest-figures/a-17828475].
3. [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/05/china-christianity-wenzhou-zhejiang-churches].
4. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10776023/China-on-course-to-become-worlds-most-Christian-nation-within-15-years.html]
5. [Asia Times Online July -3 -2008].
6. [The Economist 2^nd October 2008]
7. [Government White Paper on Religions, 1997]
8. [http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/india-to-open-yoga-centre-in-china/article6229124.ece]

---

Published Date: 22^nd August 2014, Image source: http://deskofbrian.com/

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Vaidik - Saeed Meeting: A Case of Self-Appointed Diplomats, Self-Serving Charlatans

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

The meeting between internationally designated terrorist chieftain Hafiz Saeed and an Indian journalist (?) and political operator, Dr VP Vaidik, in Lahore has caused a veritable storm in not just political circles but also the media. Normally, no eyebrows should be raised if anyone who claims to be a journalist meets any extremely undesirable and notorious criminal. Howsoever unpleasant and politically incorrect, such meetings are part and parcel of a scribe’s profession. But Vaidik’s meeting with Saeed is extremely problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the hint of misrepresentation by him about his contacts and closeness to the new government and his subtle and insidious efforts to put a human face to someone who is by all accounts a monster and mass murderer.

Before detailing the reasons for condemning Vaidik’s ‘interview’, it must be said that for publicity hounds even notoriety is welcome. After all, Dr Vaidik has managed to capture more airtime with the controversy he has generated than he would have got in his decades long innings as a ‘journalist’. What this fifteen minutes of fame (or should we say, infamy) does for him and his benefactors and mentors is hardly the issue. Dr Vaidik has a penchant for hitting the headlines for wrong reasons. In the early 1990s, he had managed to inveigle himself with Mulayam Singh Yadav (whom he lauded as the best thing that happened to Indian politics….and we all know how that turned out). Over the last few years, he has managed to get close to yoga guru Baba Ramdev, who in turn has been a major supporter of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Dr Vaidik also has a thing for name-dropping and impressing people by referring to senior leaders and politicians by their first names – tell Nawaz I am in such and such hotel…, I asked Ahmed (Shah Massoud) to talk to Gulbadin (Hekmetyar)…, I told Hamid (Karzai) to do this and that…. and so on and so forth. The gullible (which includes some senior Indian officials, including at the highest levels in the Ministry of External Affairs) often assume that he is some kind of a South Asian Henry Kissinger and this tends to open doors for him, especially in places seeking some kind of private access to corridors of power in Delhi. In a sense, he is the quintessential Delhi Durbari, but also an outsider who presents himself as an insider.

Countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan have been an old hunting ground for Dr Vaidik, where he has managed to establish himself as a very consequential man from Delhi. According to Pakistani sources, Dr Vaidik has presented himself in Pakistan as someone who is very in with the new dispensation in Delhi. He is believed to have sent signals or at least given an impression to his Pakistani interlocutors that he was some kind of unofficial mediator for the Modi government. This is also the sense that comes out of his interviews to Pakistani TV channels. More than anything else, it is this that has stirred the hornet’s nest in Delhi. Asides of the fact that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made it very clear that he doesn’t subscribe to back-channel or private diplomacy, even less so by busybodies and self-appointed diplomats, there would have to be something terribly wrong with this government if it was using someone so given to self-promotion like Vaidik to either carry out such diplomacy or even some message. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that someone as indiscreet as Vaidik would be used for sending any message across the Radcliffe line. After all, one of the fundamental qualities of a good diplomat is the ability to zip up.

In any case, it is unimaginable that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would use a mediator to reach out to an international terrorist. This is where the other problems with Vaidik’s meeting come in. From his public utterances, he has tried to give an impression of being Modi’s advocate to Hafiz Saeed. While he claims that he met Saeed in his capacity as a journalist, he has himself stated that he tried to dispel the negative image of Modi that Saeed had. According to Vaidik, Saeed considered Modi as a ‘very dangerous’ man which he tried to correct. But is it a journalist’s job to provide clarification about his Prime Minister to a notified terrorist? And if the terrorist like Saeed considers Modi a ‘dangerous man’, shouldn’t that be welcomed by all Indians? Instead, Dr Vaidik goes out of his way to tell the terrorist who is terrified of Modi not to be afraid. Who, in any case, has given Dr Vaidik the authority to speak on behalf of the Indian Prime Minister or for that matter to seek the ‘permission’ or acceptance of a certified terrorist for a possible visit of India’s PM to Pakistan? Equally offensive is Vaidik’s TV clip where he says if Pakistan is willing to give independence to PoK, he would be in favour of India doing the same, but then adds the caveat that he would prefer if Kashmiris are given the same level of freedom as people in other parts of India. Obviously, Dr Vaidik is either totally ignorant of India’s constitution, or worse, he will say anything depending on the audience he is addressing.

It is also not a journalist’s job to impart human values or change the heart of the person he is interviewing, nor is it their job to engage their interviewees in philosophical and meta-physical discussions. Dr Vaidik defends himself talking about the life changing transformation of Valmiki and Angulimaal from fearsome dacoits and killers into saints. Asides of the fact that Dr Vaidik is neither Lord Ram nor the Buddha who could transform a monster like Saeed into a saint, it is also not his job as a journalist to do any such thing. What offends the sensibilities even more is that there is an insidious attempt on Dr Vaidik’s part to tell his compatriots that perhaps they need to show patience with terrorists like Saeed because there is still a chance of reforming them. From his tone and tenor and his efforts to attach a degree of acceptability and reasonableness to Saeed, Dr Vaidik is almost behaving as Saeed’s ambassador to India. Despite the plethora of evidence against Saeed, Dr Vaidik, who clearly has pretensions of being a psycho-analyst (why else would he want to get inside Saeed’s head?) seems all set to be handing a ‘good character’ certificate to him. Even if he met Saeed as a journalist, Dr Vaidik should have done what all journalists should do when they interview their subject: research on the man, his organisation and his activities. This, he clearly did not do, which is apparent from the ill-informed questions he raised about Saeed’s court cases.

The entire Vaidik-Saeed affair is a wake-up call for the Modi government. There are all sorts of characters moving around acting as unofficial representatives of the government and engaging in their own personal foreign policy initiatives. Even before the election results were declared, Pakistani papers carried stories about an un-named NRI from US who met the top Pakistani leaders claiming to be Modi’s messenger. Then there was the dubious character – a Kashmiri who was a ‘leader’ in Ram Vilas Paswan’s party – who met the separatist leader Syed Ali Geelani. After a furore, he denied representing Modi. And now we have the Vaidik episode. Clearly, the government needs to shut these characters down if it wants to continue enjoying any credibility, both domestically and internationally. Equally important, the government must keep spiritual gurus and other such characters at an arm’s length from interfering in government policy. These people have neither the knowledge of intricacies of diplomacy, nor do they have command over the issues of national security. Yet they insist on making efforts for ‘world peace’. They should be encouraged to stick to what they do best – yoga, pranayama and what have you – and not allowed to interfere in affairs of state and government. Similarly, other religious leaders from other faiths should also not be encouraged to act as envoys of the Indian state. These people do more damage than any good.

Way back in the 1980s when India had taken action against Nepal, one of the Shankaracharyas took it upon himself to intercede on behalf of the Nepalese King, only because he was a Hindu king. While the Shankaracharya received traction from some members of the Rajiv Gandhi government, the then Ambassador gave the Shankaracharya short shrift and did not allow him to interfere and impose himself on government policy. This is what is expected from the Modi government and the sooner they shut these busybodies, the better.

(Courtesy: Rediff.com)

---

Published Date: 16^th July 2014, Image source: http://images.thenews.com.pk

India’s Dialogue with Pakistan a Trap

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Our response to the killing of five Indian soldiers last week by the Pakistanis inside our Line of Control has again shown our inability to deal effectively with the dual issue of dialoguing with Pakistan and scotching the terrorist threat from it.

The issues are closely inter-linked as using the arm of terrorism against a neighbour is not how a normal state conducts itself. To believe that such a state can be persuaded through political talks to give up a lever that it uses to further its strategic goals is not realistic. It will change its conduct either if the cost of use becomes too high or if it achieves its objectives.

Pakistan will, therefore, not cease supporting terrorism unless we impose costs on it or offer it concessions. If we conclude that we cannot force Pakistan to stop terrorist activity against us and that we have no choice but to talk to it, hoping that it will control the jihadi groups in the country’s own longer-term interest, then we play into Pakistan’s hands, leaving it to decide how and when it will deal with the issue based on its internal and external calculus.

The composite dialogue is therefore a political trap for us, as Pakistan views it as a platform to constantly press us for concessions without needing to make any of its own, particularly as we appear unduly anxious politically to keep the dialogue going.

Our appeals to Pakistan to cease support to terrorism for the dialogue process to succeed lack logic. Pakistan actually believes that because we cannot handle terrorist pressure externally as well as internally because of our divided polity, we cling to the dialogue option and seek accommodation with it.

We are in confusion when we say that we can make progress in settling our differences only in an atmosphere free from violence. Are we implying that we are holding up progress in some areas because Pakistan is not suppressing terrorism as we want?

What “progress” will we offer on Kashmir to satisfy Pakistan? Will we withdraw from Siachen if Pakistan controls jihad against us? Will we accept the Pakistani position on Sir Creek? Will we accept its case on the Wullar Barrage and our hydroelectric projects on the western rivers allowed by the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)? What progress can we offer on nuclear matters?

Contradictions

In reality, if no progress is being made on our differences it is because Pakistan is fixated on obtaining concessions from India rather than making any of its own. On Siachen, they want us to basically accept that we are occupying territory that is rightfully theirs and vacate it. Apart from lack of strategic equivalence in the scope of the withdrawals, the reality is that even what Pakistan is currently holding is strictly illegal because we consider the whole of the erstwhile state as legally ours. Pakistan should in the first instance end its cartographic aggression by showing the cease-fire line correctly as ending at NJ9842 and not extended to the Karakoram Pass. Pakistan should also be required to remove the presence of China as an intruding third party in POK, consistent with its claim that J&K is “disputed” territory.

On Sir Creek, Pakistan should accept the median line as the border in accordance with international law rather than insisting on a one-sided solution. On water related issues, it should cease to further vitiate the atmosphere by accusing India of diverting water in violation of the IWT which is in fact is exceptionally generous to it. In the nuclear field, apart from increasing its holdings at a break-neck pace, it is introducing tactical nuclear weapons in the sub-continent and dangerously lowering the threshold of their use.

On trade, Pakistan has yet not moved to grant India MFN status stalled since December last year, even though it is obliged to grant it under international trading rules. If it does so eventually, it will be because of its economic woes rather than as a goodwill political gesture. On our side, were Pakistan to cease violent activity against us, an area in which we could contribute to “progress” would be people to people contacts.

Straitjacket

It is time that we released ourselves from the diplomatic straitjacket of the composite dialogue. On all the agenda items, barring terrorism, Pakistan seeks concessions from India. We are exposing ourselves to blame for being rigid if no progress is made, with some of our own commentators joining Pakistanis in faulting us for not culling the so-called low hanging fruit such as Siachen and Sir Creek. On terrorism and trial of those responsible for the Mumbai attacks, our demands have become ritualistic through fruitless repetition and Pakistan ignores them. Worse, we have allowed

Pakistan to put us on the defensive on the issue by tagging the Samjhauta Express incident to the issue of terrorism.

Need

We had a confused response to the recent border incident because of concern that holding the Pakistan army directly responsible would have jeopardized the resumption of the composite dialogue and the meeting of our Prime Minister with his Pakistani counterpart in New York next month. We have lost our margin of manoeuvre by investing too heavily in the policy of holding a broad-based dialogue with Pakistan despite its truck with terrorism. The Pakistani premier is pressing for the composite dialogue as it serves Pakistan’s interests well, the onus of making progress having been heaped on India’s shoulders. We should reverse the burden and ask Pakistan to deliver concretely on terrorism before we resume a process that has produced virtually nothing for years.

Prime Minister Sharif should put his money where his mouth is to inspire confidence.

Punish the Pakistan Army for Repeated ‘Rogue’ Actions

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

In recent months, the Pakistan army has been behaving in a rather aggressive manner on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir in blatant violation of the mutually observed cease-fire. Following closely on the heels of the beheading of an Indian soldier in January 2013, on August 5th, the Pakistan army once again engineered a brutal incident that resulted in the death of five Indian soldiers in the Poonch sector. Since then, there have been daily incidents of trans-LoC firing and thousands of small arms rounds have been fired. The Indian Army has responded appropriately to this unprovoked firing.

The Pakistan army has denied that its personnel were involved in the latest incident. By this, the army implies that so-called Kashmiri terrorists sneaked across the LoC and ambushed the Indian patrol. Or, worse, that the incident took place between Indian army personnel and Kashmiri insurgents entirely on the Indian side. This preposterous denial lacks credibility as every military professional familiar with the LoC environment knows that incidents of this nature can occur only with the direct involvement, wholehearted operational planning and full logistics support of the Pakistan army.

According to past experience, it has been seen that such complex operations by Border Action Teams (BATs) are invariably led by personnel of the Special Services Group (SSG, Pakistan’s Special Forces) and comprise specially selected regular soldiers. A large-sized terrorist group simply cannot get through the Pakistan army’s well-coordinated defences, navigate the anti-personnel minefields and then come back safely after several rounds of firing have taken place and plenty of noise has been generated. In short, explicit connivance is an inescapable prerequisite for a trans-LoC raid to succeed.

Why did the Pakistan army orchestrate such an incident at a time when the Nawaz Sharif government wishes to reach out to India and its Chief of Army Staff has himself admitted that India is not Pakistan’s number one national security threat and that the danger lies within? Several reasons can be adduced for such irresponsible behaviour. Quite obviously, the Pakistan army is not in sync with Prime Minister Sharif about his policy of normalising relations with India and would like to keep the pot simmering in Kashmir. Though it has carefully calibrated the number of incidents of violence and the targets to be attacked, the army considers it necessary to keep the machinery created for terrorism and insurgency well-oiled so that the so-called Jihad can be ratcheted up when needed.

Perhaps the Pakistan army is of the view that the Jihad in Kashmir is flagging and needs to be revived through a series of spectacular incidents designed to raise the morale of terrorists already inside and those waiting in POK to be inducted across the LoC. The Indian Army has successfully eliminated many hard core terrorists of late and the security situation in Kashmir has been relatively calm. Approximately 500 terrorists now remain, including sleeper cells, and about 2,000 are waiting in Pakistan and POK to be infiltrated across the LoC, but the Indian Army is making it difficult for them due to sustained counter-infiltration operations. This summer has seen a major increase in the number of attempts that are being made to infiltrate newly-trained terrorists. According to a statement made by Defence Minister A K Antony in Parliament, there have already been 57 violations of the cease-fire agreement so far this year compared with 93 in 2012. Most such violations are of small arms fire to aid and facilitate infiltration across the LoC.

On another plane, there could be a connection with the situation in Afghanistan. The incident on the LoC has come close on the heels of the ISI-sponsored attack on India’s consulate in Jalalabad. Is the Pakistan Army is sending a message to India to reduce its involvement in Afghanistan, particularly its military aid and training support to the Afghan National Army? It is well known that the Pakistan Army is deeply concerned with India’s continuing commitment to Afghan reconstruction and the support India enjoys in Afghanistan and would like to limit India’s presence. No matter what the real reasons for the incident on the LOC might be, it has the stamp of the Pakistan Army all over it.

Besides its primary responsibility of ensuring the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the army considers itself the protector of Islam and the guarantor of the idea of Pakistan. In this capacity it has intervened several times to take direct charge of the day-to-day affairs of the country by overthrowing lawfully elected civilian governments. The Pakistan Army’s clearly stated objective is to wrest Kashmir from India at all costs. It calls this endeavour the “unfinished agenda of partition”. Given its present vulnerability due to extensive internal security commitments, the army may have temporarily shelved the military option, but is unlikely to give up on continuing its proxy war at low ebb.

Therefore, the real question is whether the Pakistan army can ever have a genuine change of heart about the futility of prolonged hostility towards India. The answer is very simple. Pakistan’s recent overtures towards India are a tactical ploy to tide over the army’s current difficulties, rather than a paradigm shift in grand strategy and should not be seen as a change of heart at the strategic level.

What should be India’s response? Should India continue to engage Pakistan and discuss peace and stability? Even during war, it is always advisable to keep a channel of communication open with the adversary. In the case of India and Pakistan, this is even more important as the two nuclear-armed nations have a long history of conflict and have come close to war at least twice in the last decade. Hence, it is important to continue the dialogue process, but after first giving a befitting response for the Pakistan Army’s grave provocations on the LoC. Edward N Luttwak, well-known military strategist, said a few days ago, “Be good to Nawaz Sharif, be harsh with the army.” This advice is appropriate under the circumstances. However, the immediate aim of the peace talks should be to get Pakistan to end terrorism directed against India from its soil, bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks to justice and stop the army’s ‘rogue’ acts on the LoC.

The Indian Army has been given a free hand to retaliate punitively at one or more places of its choosing on the LoC by the Defence Minister. The aim should be to cause maximum damage to the forward posts of the Pakistan army, particularly those through which recent attacks have been launched. This will raise the cost for the army and the ISI to continue to wage their proxy war. The selected instrument should be the firepower of the artillery – guns, mortars, multi-barrel rocket launchers – supplemented by infantry weapons like medium machine guns. Every single bunker visible on the targeted Pakistani post should be razed to the ground.

Planning for these fire assaults should be carefully undertaken so that collateral damage is avoided and civilians are not hurt. For example, precision-guided munitions should be used to the extent possible. Every time acts of similar provocation are repeated in future, the quantum of punitive retaliation must be correspondingly enhanced. The dose should be repeated as often as necessary even while peace talks are underway. Quite soon, when it bleeds and hurts, the Pakistan Army will get the message that wanton acts of violence do not pay.