In recent months, the Pakistan army has been behaving in a rather
aggressive manner on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir in
blatant violation of the mutually observed cease-fire. Following closely
on the heels of the beheading of an Indian soldier in January 2013, on
August 5th, the Pakistan army once again engineered a brutal incident
that resulted in the death of five Indian soldiers in the Poonch sector.
Since then, there have been daily incidents of trans-LoC firing and
thousands of small arms rounds have been fired. The Indian Army has
responded appropriately to this unprovoked firing.
The Pakistan army has denied that its personnel were involved in the
latest incident. By this, the army implies that so-called Kashmiri
terrorists sneaked across the LoC and ambushed the Indian patrol. Or,
worse, that the incident took place between Indian army personnel and
Kashmiri insurgents entirely on the Indian side. This preposterous
denial lacks credibility as every military professional familiar with
the LoC environment knows that incidents of this nature can occur only
with the direct involvement, wholehearted operational planning and full
logistics support of the Pakistan army.
According to past experience, it has been seen that such complex
operations by Border Action Teams (BATs) are invariably led by personnel
of the Special Services Group (SSG, Pakistan’s Special Forces) and
comprise specially selected regular soldiers. A large-sized terrorist
group simply cannot get through the Pakistan army’s well-coordinated
defences, navigate the anti-personnel minefields and then come back
safely after several rounds of firing have taken place and plenty of
noise has been generated. In short, explicit connivance is an
inescapable prerequisite for a trans-LoC raid to succeed.
Why did the Pakistan army orchestrate such an incident at a time when
the Nawaz Sharif government wishes to reach out to India and its Chief
of Army Staff has himself admitted that India is not Pakistan’s number
one national security threat and that the danger lies within? Several
reasons can be adduced for such irresponsible behaviour. Quite
obviously, the Pakistan army is not in sync with Prime Minister Sharif
about his policy of normalising relations with India and would like to
keep the pot simmering in Kashmir. Though it has carefully calibrated
the number of incidents of violence and the targets to be attacked, the
army considers it necessary to keep the machinery created for terrorism
and insurgency well-oiled so that the so-called Jihad can be ratcheted
up when needed.
Perhaps the Pakistan army is of the view that the Jihad in Kashmir is
flagging and needs to be revived through a series of spectacular
incidents designed to raise the morale of terrorists already inside and
those waiting in POK to be inducted across the LoC. The Indian Army has
successfully eliminated many hard core terrorists of late and the
security situation in Kashmir has been relatively calm. Approximately
500 terrorists now remain, including sleeper cells, and about 2,000 are
waiting in Pakistan and POK to be infiltrated across the LoC, but the
Indian Army is making it difficult for them due to sustained
counter-infiltration operations. This summer has seen a major increase
in the number of attempts that are being made to infiltrate
newly-trained terrorists. According to a statement made by Defence
Minister A K Antony in Parliament, there have already been 57 violations
of the cease-fire agreement so far this year compared with 93 in 2012.
Most such violations are of small arms fire to aid and facilitate
infiltration across the LoC.
On another plane, there could be a connection with the situation in
Afghanistan. The incident on the LoC has come close on the heels of the
ISI-sponsored attack on India’s consulate in Jalalabad. Is the Pakistan
Army is sending a message to India to reduce its involvement in
Afghanistan, particularly its military aid and training support to the
Afghan National Army? It is well known that the Pakistan Army is deeply
concerned with India’s continuing commitment to Afghan reconstruction
and the support India enjoys in Afghanistan and would like to limit
India’s presence. No matter what the real reasons for the incident on
the LOC might be, it has the stamp of the Pakistan Army all over it.
Besides its primary responsibility of ensuring the territorial
integrity of Pakistan, the army considers itself the protector of Islam
and the guarantor of the idea of Pakistan. In this capacity it has
intervened several times to take direct charge of the day-to-day affairs
of the country by overthrowing lawfully elected civilian governments.
The Pakistan Army’s clearly stated objective is to wrest Kashmir from
India at all costs. It calls this endeavour the “unfinished agenda of
partition”. Given its present vulnerability due to extensive internal
security commitments, the army may have temporarily shelved the military
option, but is unlikely to give up on continuing its proxy war at low
ebb.
Therefore, the real question is whether the Pakistan army can ever
have a genuine change of heart about the futility of prolonged hostility
towards India. The answer is very simple. Pakistan’s recent overtures
towards India are a tactical ploy to tide over the army’s current
difficulties, rather than a paradigm shift in grand strategy and should
not be seen as a change of heart at the strategic level.
What should be India’s response? Should India continue to engage
Pakistan and discuss peace and stability? Even during war, it is always
advisable to keep a channel of communication open with the adversary. In
the case of India and Pakistan, this is even more important as the two
nuclear-armed nations have a long history of conflict and have come
close to war at least twice in the last decade. Hence, it is important
to continue the dialogue process, but after first giving a befitting
response for the Pakistan Army’s grave provocations on the LoC. Edward N
Luttwak, well-known military strategist, said a few days ago, “Be good
to Nawaz Sharif, be harsh with the army.” This advice is appropriate
under the circumstances. However, the immediate aim of the peace talks
should be to get Pakistan to end terrorism directed against India from
its soil, bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks to justice
and stop the army’s ‘rogue’ acts on the LoC.
The Indian Army has been given a free hand to retaliate punitively at
one or more places of its choosing on the LoC by the Defence Minister.
The aim should be to cause maximum damage to the forward posts of the
Pakistan army, particularly those through which recent attacks have been
launched. This will raise the cost for the army and the ISI to continue
to wage their proxy war. The selected instrument should be the
firepower of the artillery – guns, mortars, multi-barrel rocket
launchers – supplemented by infantry weapons like medium machine guns.
Every single bunker visible on the targeted Pakistani post should be
razed to the ground.
Planning for these fire assaults should be carefully undertaken so
that collateral damage is avoided and civilians are not hurt. For
example, precision-guided munitions should be used to the extent
possible. Every time acts of similar provocation are repeated in future,
the quantum of punitive retaliation must be correspondingly enhanced.
The dose should be repeated as often as necessary even while peace talks
are underway. Quite soon, when it bleeds and hurts, the Pakistan Army
will get the message that wanton acts of violence do not pay.
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