Showing posts with label Jalalabad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jalalabad. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Should the Indian and Pak PMs meet in New York?

Kanwal Sibal, 
Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Whether the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, should meet his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, in New York in September has become a politically controversial issue. The government is being cautious in not ruling in or out such a meeting at this stage, hoping that between now and late September, the surrounding circumstances may change for the better, making the meeting politically less risky in the background of the public agitation over the killing of five Indian soldiers on the Line of Control, and the government’s shaky handling of the Defence Minister’s statement on the incident in the Lok Sabha.

Clearly, the minister’s first statement, casting doubts on whether the regular troops from Pakistan were involved in the killing, was intended to keep open the doors not only for the New York meeting but also the resumption of the composite dialogue prior to that, for which suitable dates were being considered. The second statement accusing Pakistan’s military of direct involvement, followed by giving the Indian military a free hand in responding to Pakistan’s cease-fire violations, has, naturally, complicated the political choreography of dialogue resumption, with the postponement of some envisaged secretary level-meetings as the first casualty.

It is apparent that Nawaz Sharif’s election raised hopes of better relations with Pakistan, especially as improvement of ties with India figured in his party’s election manifesto and his post-election statements on expanding economic cooperation and expediting the trial of those involved in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks struck the right chords. These positive perspectives evidently prompted our Prime Minister to send his special envoy to meet Nawaz Sharif even before he formally took office, a gesture reciprocated by the latter through sending his special envoy to Delhi with the message that all stake-holders in Pakistan — meaning the military — were on board on improving ties with India.

The positive momentum of these early moves has, however, been reversed by subsequent developments. They have raised the question of whether the early optimism on our side was justified in the light of our frustrating experience of decades in dealing with Pakistan, the structural impediments that exist there in normalizing ties, and the long-standing links of Nawaz Sharif and his party with jihadi organizations. To this must be added the region’s changing geo-political scenario with American overtures to the Taliban and its renewed recognition of the Pakistan military’s crucial role in facilitating an orderly American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Already, under Nawaz Sharif’s very brief watch, many negative events have occurred, raising questions of whether we can count on him to control sufficiently the various elements in the body-politic of Pakistan in disagreement with his perceived positive agenda towards India: his political support base, extremist religious organisations, the military and the bureaucracy. For over a decade, Pakistan has been accusing our consulate in Jalalabad of supporting the insurgency in Balochistan. The Pakistani foreign office’s reaction to the Ramban incident in Kashmir was deliberately couched in religiously provocative terms in demanding an Indian inquiry into reports of desecration of the Quran.

Nawaz Sharif has been saying repeatedly that he intends to focus on resolving the Kashmir problem, describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” in his first address to the nation and equating it with the economy as the two priority issues. Such rhetoric cannot but fire up popular anti-Indian sentiments and demands of “progress” on Kashmir to Pakistan’s satisfaction. In June, the numbers for infiltration across the LoC and of terrorists killed went up considerably. The political atmosphere has been worsened by Pakistan’s parliament passing two anti-Indian resolutions in the last few days on cease-fire violations, countered by an Indian parliamentary resolution declaring that the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, with Pakistan illegally occupying a part of it.

On top of it, Pakistan’s finance minister has announced that the grant of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) status to India is not under consideration. Pakistan was supposed to grant it last December, but decided to delay formalizing the decision till after the elections. Nawaz Sharif’s declared commitment to expand economic ties with India would have gained credibility if he had quickly closed the MFN chapter. That the Urdu translation of MFN makes the issue politically sensitive is a dishonest excuse. The latest Pakistani strategem to gain time is to leave business bodies on both sides to discuss the issue and allay the concerns of sectors in Pakistan that fear competition from India, following which the way would have been paved for the grant of MFN status. The issue could well get tagged to the resumption of the dialogue process, which means that it will get further complicated politically.

To cap it all, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa has received sizable funding from the Punjab government headed by Nawaz Sharif’s brother for charitable works, even though it and its leader, Hafiz Saeed, are on the United Nations list of terrorist organizations. Showing disdain for Indian sensitivities about his persona, his anti-India tirades and his involvement in the Mumbai attacks, Hafiz Saeed was allowed to lead the Eid prayers in Lahore in the Gaddafi stadium. Nawaz Sharif has also failed to initiate any new step to bring to justice those responsible for the Mumbai attacks.

When these facts are mentioned by a group of experts to advise the government not to show undue anxiety for a meeting at the prime-ministerial level in New York and for resuming the composite dialogue, as we would be playing into Nawaz Sharif’s hands and giving him in advance what he wants without any positive action on his part to set the stage for a renewed engagement, a former media adviser to the Prime Minister, representing the most puerile position of professional peaceniks in India, descends to a new low in making personal attacks against what he calls the “Punish Pakistan” school, questioning their professional integrity instead of refuting their arguments.


The fact is that Nawaz Sharif has presided over several negative developments, which, if overlooked, would signal that India is once again willing to tolerate Pakistan’s provocations without any dissuasive diplomatic or other response. If such indulgence has not produced any significant result so far, why persist in failed policies? When this is said, the ideological peaceniks distort the debate with imaginary accusations that those advocating a tougher approach to Pakistan are advocating war and that the call for thrashing Pakistan as an errant schoolboy will make India just like Pakistan — home to jingoism, xenophobia and rough patriotism.


This kind of intellectual chicanery is deplorable, as postponing the proposed meeting of the prime ministers at New York, delaying the resumption of the composite dialogue, seeking an end to state-sponsored terrorism and legal action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, restoring the link between dialogue and terrorism, pressing for curbs on Hafiz Saeed, insisting on MFN status as a gauge of Pakistan’s readiness to normalize trade ties, retaliating locally against Pakistan’s ceasefire violations are the many steps in our panoply that can be taken. These are not acts of war against Pakistan, and only those with no grounding in diplomacy can be so obtuse to think that they are.

Wednesday, August 21, 2013

Punish the Pakistan Army for Repeated ‘Rogue’ Actions

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 
Visiting Fellow, VIF

In recent months, the Pakistan army has been behaving in a rather aggressive manner on the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir in blatant violation of the mutually observed cease-fire. Following closely on the heels of the beheading of an Indian soldier in January 2013, on August 5th, the Pakistan army once again engineered a brutal incident that resulted in the death of five Indian soldiers in the Poonch sector. Since then, there have been daily incidents of trans-LoC firing and thousands of small arms rounds have been fired. The Indian Army has responded appropriately to this unprovoked firing.
The Pakistan army has denied that its personnel were involved in the latest incident. By this, the army implies that so-called Kashmiri terrorists sneaked across the LoC and ambushed the Indian patrol. Or, worse, that the incident took place between Indian army personnel and Kashmiri insurgents entirely on the Indian side. This preposterous denial lacks credibility as every military professional familiar with the LoC environment knows that incidents of this nature can occur only with the direct involvement, wholehearted operational planning and full logistics support of the Pakistan army.

According to past experience, it has been seen that such complex operations by Border Action Teams (BATs) are invariably led by personnel of the Special Services Group (SSG, Pakistan’s Special Forces) and comprise specially selected regular soldiers. A large-sized terrorist group simply cannot get through the Pakistan army’s well-coordinated defences, navigate the anti-personnel minefields and then come back safely after several rounds of firing have taken place and plenty of noise has been generated. In short, explicit connivance is an inescapable prerequisite for a trans-LoC raid to succeed.

Why did the Pakistan army orchestrate such an incident at a time when the Nawaz Sharif government wishes to reach out to India and its Chief of Army Staff has himself admitted that India is not Pakistan’s number one national security threat and that the danger lies within? Several reasons can be adduced for such irresponsible behaviour. Quite obviously, the Pakistan army is not in sync with Prime Minister Sharif about his policy of normalising relations with India and would like to keep the pot simmering in Kashmir. Though it has carefully calibrated the number of incidents of violence and the targets to be attacked, the army considers it necessary to keep the machinery created for terrorism and insurgency well-oiled so that the so-called Jihad can be ratcheted up when needed.

Perhaps the Pakistan army is of the view that the Jihad in Kashmir is flagging and needs to be revived through a series of spectacular incidents designed to raise the morale of terrorists already inside and those waiting in POK to be inducted across the LoC. The Indian Army has successfully eliminated many hard core terrorists of late and the security situation in Kashmir has been relatively calm. Approximately 500 terrorists now remain, including sleeper cells, and about 2,000 are waiting in Pakistan and POK to be infiltrated across the LoC, but the Indian Army is making it difficult for them due to sustained counter-infiltration operations. This summer has seen a major increase in the number of attempts that are being made to infiltrate newly-trained terrorists. According to a statement made by Defence Minister A K Antony in Parliament, there have already been 57 violations of the cease-fire agreement so far this year compared with 93 in 2012. Most such violations are of small arms fire to aid and facilitate infiltration across the LoC.

On another plane, there could be a connection with the situation in Afghanistan. The incident on the LoC has come close on the heels of the ISI-sponsored attack on India’s consulate in Jalalabad. Is the Pakistan Army is sending a message to India to reduce its involvement in Afghanistan, particularly its military aid and training support to the Afghan National Army? It is well known that the Pakistan Army is deeply concerned with India’s continuing commitment to Afghan reconstruction and the support India enjoys in Afghanistan and would like to limit India’s presence. No matter what the real reasons for the incident on the LOC might be, it has the stamp of the Pakistan Army all over it.

Besides its primary responsibility of ensuring the territorial integrity of Pakistan, the army considers itself the protector of Islam and the guarantor of the idea of Pakistan. In this capacity it has intervened several times to take direct charge of the day-to-day affairs of the country by overthrowing lawfully elected civilian governments. The Pakistan Army’s clearly stated objective is to wrest Kashmir from India at all costs. It calls this endeavour the “unfinished agenda of partition”. Given its present vulnerability due to extensive internal security commitments, the army may have temporarily shelved the military option, but is unlikely to give up on continuing its proxy war at low ebb.

Therefore, the real question is whether the Pakistan army can ever have a genuine change of heart about the futility of prolonged hostility towards India. The answer is very simple. Pakistan’s recent overtures towards India are a tactical ploy to tide over the army’s current difficulties, rather than a paradigm shift in grand strategy and should not be seen as a change of heart at the strategic level.

What should be India’s response? Should India continue to engage Pakistan and discuss peace and stability? Even during war, it is always advisable to keep a channel of communication open with the adversary. In the case of India and Pakistan, this is even more important as the two nuclear-armed nations have a long history of conflict and have come close to war at least twice in the last decade. Hence, it is important to continue the dialogue process, but after first giving a befitting response for the Pakistan Army’s grave provocations on the LoC. Edward N Luttwak, well-known military strategist, said a few days ago, “Be good to Nawaz Sharif, be harsh with the army.” This advice is appropriate under the circumstances. However, the immediate aim of the peace talks should be to get Pakistan to end terrorism directed against India from its soil, bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks to justice and stop the army’s ‘rogue’ acts on the LoC.

The Indian Army has been given a free hand to retaliate punitively at one or more places of its choosing on the LoC by the Defence Minister. The aim should be to cause maximum damage to the forward posts of the Pakistan army, particularly those through which recent attacks have been launched. This will raise the cost for the army and the ISI to continue to wage their proxy war. The selected instrument should be the firepower of the artillery – guns, mortars, multi-barrel rocket launchers – supplemented by infantry weapons like medium machine guns. Every single bunker visible on the targeted Pakistani post should be razed to the ground.


Planning for these fire assaults should be carefully undertaken so that collateral damage is avoided and civilians are not hurt. For example, precision-guided munitions should be used to the extent possible. Every time acts of similar provocation are repeated in future, the quantum of punitive retaliation must be correspondingly enhanced. The dose should be repeated as often as necessary even while peace talks are underway. Quite soon, when it bleeds and hurts, the Pakistan Army will get the message that wanton acts of violence do not pay.