Whether the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, should meet his
Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, in New York in September has become
a politically controversial issue. The government is being cautious in
not ruling in or out such a meeting at this stage, hoping that between
now and late September, the surrounding circumstances may change for the
better, making the meeting politically less risky in the background of
the public agitation over the killing of five Indian soldiers on the
Line of Control, and the government’s shaky handling of the Defence
Minister’s statement on the incident in the Lok Sabha.
Clearly, the minister’s first statement, casting doubts on whether the regular troops from Pakistan were involved in the killing, was intended to keep open the doors not only for the New York meeting but also the resumption of the composite dialogue prior to that, for which suitable dates were being considered. The second statement accusing Pakistan’s military of direct involvement, followed by giving the Indian military a free hand in responding to Pakistan’s cease-fire violations, has, naturally, complicated the political choreography of dialogue resumption, with the postponement of some envisaged secretary level-meetings as the first casualty.
It is apparent that Nawaz Sharif’s election raised hopes of better
relations with Pakistan, especially as improvement of ties with India
figured in his party’s election manifesto and his post-election
statements on expanding economic cooperation and expediting the trial of
those involved in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks struck the right
chords. These positive perspectives evidently prompted our Prime
Minister to send his special envoy to meet Nawaz Sharif even before he
formally took office, a gesture reciprocated by the latter through
sending his special envoy to Delhi with the message that all
stake-holders in Pakistan — meaning the military — were on board on
improving ties with India.
The positive momentum of these early moves has, however, been
reversed by subsequent developments. They have raised the question of
whether the early optimism on our side was justified in the light of our
frustrating experience of decades in dealing with Pakistan, the
structural impediments that exist there in normalizing ties, and the
long-standing links of Nawaz Sharif and his party with jihadi
organizations. To this must be added the region’s changing geo-political
scenario with American overtures to the Taliban and its renewed
recognition of the Pakistan military’s crucial role in facilitating an
orderly American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Already, under Nawaz Sharif’s very brief watch, many negative events
have occurred, raising questions of whether we can count on him to
control sufficiently the various elements in the body-politic of
Pakistan in disagreement with his perceived positive agenda towards
India: his political support base, extremist religious organisations,
the military and the bureaucracy. For over a decade, Pakistan has been
accusing our consulate in Jalalabad of supporting the insurgency in
Balochistan. The Pakistani foreign office’s reaction to the Ramban
incident in Kashmir was deliberately couched in religiously provocative
terms in demanding an Indian inquiry into reports of desecration of the
Quran.
Nawaz Sharif has been saying repeatedly that he intends to focus on
resolving the Kashmir problem, describing Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular
vein” in his first address to the nation and equating it with the
economy as the two priority issues. Such rhetoric cannot but fire up
popular anti-Indian sentiments and demands of “progress” on Kashmir to
Pakistan’s satisfaction. In June, the numbers for infiltration across
the LoC and of terrorists killed went up considerably. The political
atmosphere has been worsened by Pakistan’s parliament passing two
anti-Indian resolutions in the last few days on cease-fire violations,
countered by an Indian parliamentary resolution declaring that the whole
of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, with
Pakistan illegally occupying a part of it.
On top of it, Pakistan’s finance minister has announced that the
grant of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) status to India is not under
consideration. Pakistan was supposed to grant it last December, but
decided to delay formalizing the decision till after the elections.
Nawaz Sharif’s declared commitment to expand economic ties with India
would have gained credibility if he had quickly closed the MFN chapter.
That the Urdu translation of MFN makes the issue politically sensitive
is a dishonest excuse. The latest Pakistani strategem to gain time is to
leave business bodies on both sides to discuss the issue and allay the
concerns of sectors in Pakistan that fear competition from India,
following which the way would have been paved for the grant of MFN
status. The issue could well get tagged to the resumption of the
dialogue process, which means that it will get further complicated
politically.
To cap it all, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa has received sizable funding from
the Punjab government headed by Nawaz Sharif’s brother for charitable
works, even though it and its leader, Hafiz Saeed, are on the United
Nations list of terrorist organizations. Showing disdain for Indian
sensitivities about his persona, his anti-India tirades and his
involvement in the Mumbai attacks, Hafiz Saeed was allowed to lead the
Eid prayers in Lahore in the Gaddafi stadium. Nawaz Sharif has also
failed to initiate any new step to bring to justice those responsible
for the Mumbai attacks.
When these facts are mentioned by a group of experts to advise the
government not to show undue anxiety for a meeting at the
prime-ministerial level in New York and for resuming the composite
dialogue, as we would be playing into Nawaz Sharif’s hands and giving
him in advance what he wants without any positive action on his part to
set the stage for a renewed engagement, a former media adviser to the
Prime Minister, representing the most puerile position of professional
peaceniks in India, descends to a new low in making personal attacks
against what he calls the “Punish Pakistan” school, questioning their
professional integrity instead of refuting their arguments.
The fact is that Nawaz Sharif has presided over several negative
developments, which, if overlooked, would signal that India is once
again willing to tolerate Pakistan’s provocations without any dissuasive
diplomatic or other response. If such indulgence has not produced any
significant result so far, why persist in failed policies? When this is
said, the ideological peaceniks distort the debate with imaginary
accusations that those advocating a tougher approach to Pakistan are
advocating war and that the call for thrashing Pakistan as an errant
schoolboy will make India just like Pakistan — home to jingoism,
xenophobia and rough patriotism.
This kind of intellectual chicanery is deplorable, as postponing the
proposed meeting of the prime ministers at New York, delaying the
resumption of the composite dialogue, seeking an end to state-sponsored
terrorism and legal action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai
attacks, restoring the link between dialogue and terrorism, pressing for
curbs on Hafiz Saeed, insisting on MFN status as a gauge of Pakistan’s
readiness to normalize trade ties, retaliating locally against
Pakistan’s ceasefire violations are the many steps in our panoply that
can be taken. These are not acts of war against Pakistan, and only those
with no grounding in diplomacy can be so obtuse to think that they are.
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