Chinese PLA Modernisation: Perspectives and Issues

Lt Gen (Retd) JS Bajwa

“Build strong National Defence and powerful Armed Forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the need of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s modernisation drive.

-President Hu Jintao At the 18^th National Congress of CPC March 2013.

Armed forces of a nation constitute an element of National Power in synergy with diplomacy, economic development, education, technological base and Research and Development (R&D), industry and others. A distinguishing feature of China’s modernisation mission has been the national pursuit of “Comprehensive Power”. They wisely learnt that one key lesson from studying the experience of other previous powers - genuine global powers possess multidimensional strengths.

Chinese scholars and officials have used the term “Peaceful Rise” to describe China’s foreign policy to counter fears about its growing economic and political might. However, the ‘Rise’ has proved controversial as it has fuelled a perception that China is a threat to the existing established world order. Also, ‘Rise’ implies that others will decline in a relative sense. In the 2004 session of BFA (Boao Forum for Asia), President Hu Jintao used the phrase “Peaceful Development” which since has been the preferred term. ‘Development’ suggests that China’s advance can bring others along. The normative aspect of power being equally important as it is about projecting ‘soft power’ and relies primarily on resources of non-military nature. Recently Joseph Nye and Ernest Wilson developed the concept of ‘Smart Power’ which combines elements of soft and hard power to achieve foreign policy goals.

The past three decades of China’s economic rise has witnessed a similar and parallel rise of the Defence Budget translating into a phenomenal modernisation of the Armed Forces. The Defence Budget has risen at par and over a period at a higher rate than the economic growth rate. It has also remained steady at over five percent of total Central Government spending. The 2014 Government released data on Defence Budget indicates a 12.2 percent rise over the previous year (2014 - $131.6 billion; 2013 - $112.2 billion). There, thus, remains a concern of China’s potential for violent conflict with other states especially over territory.

In this context, it may be worthwhile to historically understand the circumstances when governments have exercised the option of war as an instrument of its foreign policy:-

(a) War is chosen even though no specific conflict of interest with another state or cacus belli may exist, only uncertainty about the future.

(b) Preventive Wars: Such a war is defined as ‘a war fought in order to avoid the risks of war under worsening circumstances later’.

(c) Territorial conflicts are dynamic contests. States actively compete to strengthen their claims in a dispute usually by improving their position in the local military balance.

(d) In territorial disputes, states will be able to match each other’s moves and maintain their relative balance and positions. Inaction could be more costly in the long run than using force in the short run.

The political, diplomatic and military moves initiated by China along India’s northern boundary reflect in substantive terms the possibility of China resorting to exercising the aforementioned options. China has used military force more often over territory than over any other type of foreign policy issue. A state may use military force in a territorial dispute not because of the importance of the land being contested but because of the need to invest in a general reputation for toughness. Such an option with respect to China should not be considered hypothetical or a mere figment of imagination.

However, it may appear contradictory that China’s historical record of dealing with territorial disputes has been of cooperation and compromise. From 1960-1964, out of eight disputes, China concluded boundary treaties with six of its neighbours. Similarly, from 1990-1999, nine additional boundary agreements were signed. Interestingly, the compromise periods correspond closely with the periods of ‘acute regime insecurity for China’s leadership. China is very sensitive to any eruption of ethnic revolt and this constitutes the first type of internal threat linked with compromise. Chinese military publications link the defence of its frontiers against external threats with internal political stability. The uncertainty of Tibet and the possibility of ethnic unrest will always be held against India by the Chinese government.

While China has not explicitly enunciated a grand strategic design, certain key elements of its national strategy are seminal. First, safeguard national security. Second, promote national development. Third, secure strategic objectives of China’s national rejuvenation and development. China undertook to build and cultivate power comprehensively across a variety of spheres: economic, science, technology, education, culture, values, military, governance, diplomacy and other sectors. The Chinese grasped the idea that power is comprehensive and integrative and not atomistic or indivisible.

Keeping this as the backdrop, China took on the modernisation of its armed forces in a phased manner. The stage was set by diplomatically creating an environment of peace and tranquillity along the borders thus freeing the Forces for modernisation. The first major downsizing was undertaken with the surplus manpower diverted to form the PAPF (People’s Armed Police Force) and Border Guards. The modernisation drive was planned and executed to lay a solid foundation by 2010, thereafter make major progress around 2020 and finally reach the goal of building armed forces capable of winning informationised wars by the mid-21^st Century – 2050. Herein, priority was accorded for the expansion and modernisation of the PLAN. The PLAAF, Second Artillery Corps, and Ground Forces came in subsequent order. An RMA with Chinese characteristics was conceptualised as follows:-

(a) Coordinated development of firepower, mobility and information capability.

(b) Strong military through science and technology.

(c) Strategic project for talented people.

(d) Improve levels of scientific management.

(e) Develop military theories in an innovative spirit.

(f) Downsize and restructure forces.

(g) Military exchange and cooperation in line with foreign policy.

The PLA Ground Forces are focused on speeding informationisation of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building ‘Pockets of Excellence’ (POE’s) by equipping and restructuring Rapid Reaction Forces/Units, Army Aviation, light mechanised units and information countermeasure units. The inclusion of conventional role capability with the Second Artillery corps has been a significant development in PLA modernisation. With the induction of agile and efficient launch systems, precision strike capability by conventional missiles and cruise missiles the potential of this force at the operational level is now significant. The concurrent technological trends which include terminal guidance for enhanced accuracy, payload variation viz. fragmentation, penetrating, thermo baric, EMP and sub-munitions enable target specific configuration. Along with the well developed infrastructure and its extensive network in Tibet, the reach of this force across India’s northern frontline has serious operational implications for India.

PLA’s doctrine has evolved along with its modernisation. It has been the principle ‘driver’ for force structure, personnel recruitment, military education, training regimes, hardware needs, research and development, weapon procurement and operational strategy. Doctrine, technology and threat have interacted in shaping PLA’s posture over time. The doctrinal thinking and planning enunciates operational principles which includes such concepts as mobility, attrition, annihilation, close or deep-depth defence, layered defence, pre-emptive strikes, asymmetrical warfare, trans-regional operations, offensive operations and other general concepts. The War Zone Concept (WZC) has emerged as an operational-based doctrine and involves all services of the PLA. WZC, simplified, is the doctrine for conducting a limited war under high-tech informationalised conditions. The major characteristic of WZC doctrine is what is referred to as Trans-Regional Support Operations (TRSO) which involves deployment and employment POE’s from other Military Area Commands (MAC) into a possible conflict zone. The mobile nature of the RRU’s and their effectiveness would constitute an indirect forward presence and thus contribute to creation of local and temporary superiority in psychological terms. This, in itself, is presumed, would deter provocation and hence prevent any situation from escalating into a conflict.

China has made no secret of its ambitious space goals. In 2003, it independently launched a man into orbit. In November 2011, it successfully docked two robotic spacecraft in Earth orbit. The quest for manned space station is planned to be put up and made running by 2020. Plans for landing man on the moon remains on its space programme agenda. Currently China has 10 Beidou (Big Dipper) satellites providing a home grown satellite navigation system. By 2020, it will have 35 satellites for the same. In January 2007, China stunned the strategic community when it shot to pieces its own weather satellite with a missile demonstrating an unexpected lethal capability acquired to dominate space. It is now developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. China’s ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies from China’s manned and lunar programmes as well as technologies and methods developed to detect and track space debris. A report dated May 3, 2014 stated that China had destroyed the ‘control chip’ of a Japanese spy satellite with a secret weapon (probably an EMP of several megawatts strength fired for one minute at the satellite). It was reported that this satellite was tracking the trial flight of a J-20 stealth fighter over mainland China. The space programme has enabled China to setup advanced space-based C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and Targeting capability. Presently, China has eight surveillance satellites in orbit besides earth resource satellites and remote sensing satellites.

The PLA is investing heavily in Computer Network Operations (CNO). China’s CNO concept includes computer network attack, computer network exploitation and computer network defence. In addition, PLA has established Information Warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks as well as devised tactics and defence measures to protect friendly computers systems and networks. Since 2002, PLA has been creating militia units comprising personnel from commercial Information Technology sector and academia.

Cyber operations are planned to be launched as psychological warfare tools. In 2005, PLA began to incorporate CNO into its military exercises primarily as first strikes against enemy networks. It recently established a new information support and safeguarding base in July 2010 indicating its emphasis on cyber operations. Its cyber espionage and warfare includes:-

(a) Denying and limiting use of space based assets by adversaries in times of crisis or conflict.

(b) Built capability of deploying direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon.

(c) Counter space measures including jamming, laser and microwave.

(d) Employing CNO as a tool to gain strategic intelligence.

As China’s rise continues and capabilities of its Armed Forces increases manifold, China is likely to be less tolerant to impediments or perceived hindrances of any sort in its single minded pursuit of its goals and in securing its national interests. China as a gargantuan economic and military power may continue to deny hegemony but it will inevitably employ some form of economic and diplomatic coercion against its smaller neighbours and military coercion in other cases when it perceives its interests threatened. Consequently its smaller neighbours will seek to hedge in order to maintain an element of independence and balance the power equation. Otherwise these countries will end “paying tribute” to the seat of power in Beijing as of yore. Does India need to bandwagon with likeminded nations? Making a choice will be a major strategic decision.

India needs to define its strategic goals it seeks to achieve along with clearly pronounced time lines. The ‘Financial Year’ syndrome is certainly not suited to long term strategic planning. Future wars will be more than just bullets and bombs – these can be said to be the ‘hard element’ of hard power. Surveillance, IW, CNO and space domination are the new and critical ‘soft elements’ of hard power which will have a decisive role in the outcome of any future conflict. While India makes progress in the accumulation of assets in the category of hard elements of hard power, it is woefully lacking in the research and development of critical soft elements of hard power, making India strategically vulnerable. Infrastructure along the Northern boundary of India is a serious deficiency. India has been extremely cautious in its approach to building roads in the border areas. Tunnelling, which would have been much more economical in the long run has not been undertaken in any sector.

In addition, there is a weakness in institutionalised future planning, both nationally and within the Armed Forces. The Perspective Planning in the Army needs to look at war fighting doctrine, future logistics, harnessing technology with equipment profile and organisational structures coordinated under one directorate. There is need to focus on comprehensive National Security Strategy which should be the main feeder to NSAB (National Security Advisory Board) / NSA (National Security Adviser). Once the National Defence University is set up, the institutions dealing with defence and strategic affairs, including those dealing with economy, foreign affairs and industry, should be incorporated. Intelligence, surveillance including electronic surveillance (National Intelligence Agency) are loosely related in their functioning. CERT-IN (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) presently under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is not a satisfactory arrangement as it functions like any other office while it requires being vigilant and responsive 24x7x365. Therefore, these elements have to be coordinated under one agency to report to NSCB/NSA.

India needs to plan as a future power and exit out of the slumbering mould of merely reacting to situations that seem to take the Government by surprise ever so often.

(The article is an updated version of the paper presented at the Seminar on Engaging China: Opportunity and Challenges, organised by the VIF on June 26, 2014)

(The authors is a Delhi-based Defence Analyst)

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Published Date: 7^th August 2014, Image source: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/

China's maritime 'Silk Road' Proposal: India must Tread Cautiously

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

China's proposition of a maritime Silk Route connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans is part of its propaganda drive to convince the world about its peaceful rise.

Its actions do not match its protestations, but that does not deter China from proclaiming that its rise will be free from clashes, unlike in the past when rising powers challenged existing hegemonies.

China uses the Silk Route memory to serve its interests, ambitions and image in several ways.

The historical Silk Route recalls China's role in world trade and the prize attached to its products by the rest of the world, in past generations.

The Silk Road represented China's economic superiority then, one that it seeks to regain in today's context when it has become the world's second-largest economy and its biggest exporter.

The Silk Road symbolised China's connectivity with the outside world. Connectivity, indeed, is the focus of China's current economic and trade strategy.

It is building east-west relationships, with oil and gas pipelines linking it to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. It is building north-south connections to South East Asia, Myanmar and Pakistan.

Through the latter, it is building connectivity to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, partially resolving its Malacca dilemma.

Yunnan and Sinkiang will draw the adjoining regions to which they are being connected into the Chinese economic orbit given their less developed state, China's economic dynamism, its tremendous export capacities and hunger for natural resources.

China is trying to rope India into its connectivity strategies through proposals such as the Bangadesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor linking Yunnan with our North-East.

India has been promoting east-west connections through Myanmar, Thailand and on to Vietnam, to balance China's north-south connections to South-East Asia.

We have had concerns about Chinese inroads into Myanmar. The BCIM corridor project counters our strategy and yet we are supporting it.

We are ignoring the danger of exposing our North-East to China, an area inadequately integrated with India, parts of which China claims as its own territory and where China has been involved in past insurgencies, not to mention the gun running from Yunnan to local insurgents that continues to a degree.

Even if, as part of our policy of furthering our engagement with China, we prefer not to be seen as opposing the project openly, the easy manner in which we accept such Chinese agendas is questionable.

Having seen the Silk Road idea working well politically on Asia's continental landmass - with the US touting the concept of a New Silk Road linking Central Asia to South Asia - China now proposes a maritime Silk Route linking it to Asia.

The memory of Admiral Zhang's sea-voyages in the early 15th century to South-East Asia, India, Hormuz and the Somalian littoral will no doubt be invoked by China to emphasise the historical basis of its peaceful forays to these distant Asian shores.

The concept of a maritime Silk Route seeks to present China's maritime strategy in a peaceful light, as being motivated purely by commercial considerations.

The word "silk" evokes softness and affluence. This is a belated counter to the misgiving - in India certainly - about the so-called "string of pearls" strategy being pursued by China to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean.

The port facilities China is obtaining or building in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, while justifiable from the Chinese point of view to buttress its huge external trade flowing in large part through the Indian Ocean, raise concerns about China encircling us physically and politically, changing our bilateral equation further to our disadvantage, thereby making it still more difficult for us to resolve our problems with it equitably.

China will, inevitably, follow up with its commercial footholds in the Indian Ocean with naval ones. The purpose of China's naval expansion is precisely to create strategic space for itself in western Pacific and then move into the Indian Ocean gradually, in preparation for which China is learning to operate far from its shores for quite some time now, in the Gulf of Aden, for instance.

The cynicism behind China's proposal is glaring in the light of its aggressive posture in the western Pacific.

The maritime Silk Route begins in tension ridden waters, with China contesting Japanese sovereignty over the Senkakus and undercutting it internationally by declaring an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea that covers these islands.

China has made illegal claims to large swathes of the South China Sea, embroiling it in strife with several South-East Asian countries.

It now threatens to declare an ADIZ over the South China Sea too, aggravating the situation for its neighbours and the international community at large.

China must first settle these issues amicably to ensure its maritime Silk Route proposal has political credibility.

India has been invited to join the Chinese proposal in what is clearly a bid to unsettle it diplomatically.

If India joins - we seem to have reportedly accepted the invitation - it will be endorsing China's maritime initiatives in the Indian Ocean, including its strategic objectives in developing Gwadar, not to mention its sizeable investments in Sri Lanka.

China is also skillfully trying to counter Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe's Indo-Pacific concept - which has pronounced security undertones - with a mollifying Silk Route concept linking the two oceans.

The American interest in India in the context of its re-balance towards Asia has a strong maritime content, reflected not only in frequent naval exercises between the Indian and US navies in the Indian Ocean, but also US exhortations to India to "act east".

China's maritime Silk Route proposal is too self-serving to receive our support. 

Shinzo Abe’s India Visit – Hits and Misses

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Much has been achieved during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s current visit to India and much has not. In reiterating a clear intention to strengthen bilateral ties, the visit has been a success, though in breaking new strategic ground concretely, the results could have been better.

Significant

Honouring Abe as chief guest at our Republic Day celebrations was politically significant. Such invitations are either intended to convey a desire to forge closer ties with a country or to indicate that relations had already reached a high level of entente. In other words, either an investment in the future or a celebration of success already achieved. Abe’s visit would fall in between these two categories.

The joint statement mentions the resolve of the two leaders to jointly contribute to peace and stability “taking into account changes in the strategic environment”- an indirect reference to the strategic issues raised by China’s rise and its increased assertiveness, as no other change in this environment has occurred that would disturb both India and Japan.

No doubt both countries are Asian democracies that share the values of freedom, democracy and rule of law, a feature of particular importance for Abe. But then, India and Japan have been liberal democracies since decades, without this providing a political glue all these years. If today there is a felt need to highlight this shared attachment to liberal values, it is to differentiate themselves from China’s authoritarianism. Uniting on the basis of universal values of democracy avoids the impression that the two are coming together on any explicit anti-China platform.

The issues thrown up by China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, the Senkaku imbroglio and the ADIZ announcement could not have been ignored in the joint statement. They find indirect mention- the most that could be done realistically- in a reference to freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes according to international law, as well as the importance of freedom of overflight and civil aviation safety.

Abe’s ambition to loosen some defence related constraints imposed on Japan after 1945 has found endorsement in our PM’s appreciation of his “Proactive Contribution to Peace” regionally and beyond. This boosts Abe as Japan manoeuvres against mounting Chinese pressure. In this broad context, the decision of India and Japan to institute a dialogue at the National Security Advisers level and their determination to “further strengthen bilateral defence cooperation” becomes significant. So does the satisfaction expressed with the regular trilateral India-Japan-US dialogue, the resolve to increase the frequency of bilateral naval exercises, and, most notably, given our reluctance on this score until now in deference to Chinese sensitivities and our aversion to be seen as drifting towards “alliance” configurations, to invite Japan to participate in the next multilateral “Malabar” maritime exercise. Japan’s offer to sell its US-2 amphibious aircraft- an important political step no doubt- is deficient from India’s viewpoint in that it is being offered as a civilian aircraft and not a military one because of Japan’s policy of not exporting military equipment.

Nuclear

The opportunity of Abe’s visit was missed for signing the civil nuclear agreement. The officials of the two sides have again been directed to “exert further efforts” towards an early conclusion. The Japanese demand that India yield more to it on the “nonproliferation” front that we have yielded to the US is both unreasonable and unrealistic. India yielded as much as it could politically to the US - the lynchpin of international nuclear sanctions on us- for a bilateral civilian nuclear deal as well as an NSG exemption for which the US lobbied with several recalcitrant countries, including China. Japan is not required to change the international nonproliferation paradigm for us; it has only to overcome some domestic resistance to the India deal. We have already reached an agreement with Canada on some issues raised by Japan, even though Canada has been particularly difficult with us on nuclear issues because of its grievance that it was its transfer of nuclear technology that enabled India to conduct a PNE in 1974. That solution is available. Abe’s commitment to support India’s full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement is, of course, to be welcomed.

Import

The joint statement omits any mention of space cooperation- a strategic lacuna. Both India and Japan have great strengths in space technology, as demonstrated in India’s moon and Mars missions and Japan’s participation in the International Space Station. India’s launch capabilities and Japanese robotics can be imaginatively married in some eye-catching space mission, without the MTCR impediment.

Investment, finance and technology, central to the bilateral relationship, form the hard core of the joint statement. Bilateral currency swap arrangements, generous Official Development Assistance, additional loans for the Delhi Metro, the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, IIT Hyderabad, the planned Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor, a joint feasibility study for a high speed Mumbai-Ahmedabad railway system, cooperation in energy-efficient and energy-saving technologies, an India-Japan ICT Comprehensive Cooperation Framework, a possible Japanese Electronic Industrial Township in India, Japanese investments in National Investment Manufacturing Zones, the rare earths project, cooperation in advanced technologies, all figure in the joint statement.

Some statements made during the visit stand out because of their great import. Our Prime Minister’s affirmation that “Japan is at the heart of India’s Look East Policy” gives a new geopolitical meaning to this policy, initiated when Japan was not a part of India’s calculus. Prime Minister Abe’s remarkable statement that “the relations between Japan and India have the greatest potential of any bilateral relationship anywhere in the world” speaks for itself.