Shinzo Abe’s India Visit – Hits and Misses

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Much has been achieved during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s current visit to India and much has not. In reiterating a clear intention to strengthen bilateral ties, the visit has been a success, though in breaking new strategic ground concretely, the results could have been better.

Significant

Honouring Abe as chief guest at our Republic Day celebrations was politically significant. Such invitations are either intended to convey a desire to forge closer ties with a country or to indicate that relations had already reached a high level of entente. In other words, either an investment in the future or a celebration of success already achieved. Abe’s visit would fall in between these two categories.

The joint statement mentions the resolve of the two leaders to jointly contribute to peace and stability “taking into account changes in the strategic environment”- an indirect reference to the strategic issues raised by China’s rise and its increased assertiveness, as no other change in this environment has occurred that would disturb both India and Japan.

No doubt both countries are Asian democracies that share the values of freedom, democracy and rule of law, a feature of particular importance for Abe. But then, India and Japan have been liberal democracies since decades, without this providing a political glue all these years. If today there is a felt need to highlight this shared attachment to liberal values, it is to differentiate themselves from China’s authoritarianism. Uniting on the basis of universal values of democracy avoids the impression that the two are coming together on any explicit anti-China platform.

The issues thrown up by China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, the Senkaku imbroglio and the ADIZ announcement could not have been ignored in the joint statement. They find indirect mention- the most that could be done realistically- in a reference to freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes according to international law, as well as the importance of freedom of overflight and civil aviation safety.

Abe’s ambition to loosen some defence related constraints imposed on Japan after 1945 has found endorsement in our PM’s appreciation of his “Proactive Contribution to Peace” regionally and beyond. This boosts Abe as Japan manoeuvres against mounting Chinese pressure. In this broad context, the decision of India and Japan to institute a dialogue at the National Security Advisers level and their determination to “further strengthen bilateral defence cooperation” becomes significant. So does the satisfaction expressed with the regular trilateral India-Japan-US dialogue, the resolve to increase the frequency of bilateral naval exercises, and, most notably, given our reluctance on this score until now in deference to Chinese sensitivities and our aversion to be seen as drifting towards “alliance” configurations, to invite Japan to participate in the next multilateral “Malabar” maritime exercise. Japan’s offer to sell its US-2 amphibious aircraft- an important political step no doubt- is deficient from India’s viewpoint in that it is being offered as a civilian aircraft and not a military one because of Japan’s policy of not exporting military equipment.

Nuclear

The opportunity of Abe’s visit was missed for signing the civil nuclear agreement. The officials of the two sides have again been directed to “exert further efforts” towards an early conclusion. The Japanese demand that India yield more to it on the “nonproliferation” front that we have yielded to the US is both unreasonable and unrealistic. India yielded as much as it could politically to the US - the lynchpin of international nuclear sanctions on us- for a bilateral civilian nuclear deal as well as an NSG exemption for which the US lobbied with several recalcitrant countries, including China. Japan is not required to change the international nonproliferation paradigm for us; it has only to overcome some domestic resistance to the India deal. We have already reached an agreement with Canada on some issues raised by Japan, even though Canada has been particularly difficult with us on nuclear issues because of its grievance that it was its transfer of nuclear technology that enabled India to conduct a PNE in 1974. That solution is available. Abe’s commitment to support India’s full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement is, of course, to be welcomed.

Import

The joint statement omits any mention of space cooperation- a strategic lacuna. Both India and Japan have great strengths in space technology, as demonstrated in India’s moon and Mars missions and Japan’s participation in the International Space Station. India’s launch capabilities and Japanese robotics can be imaginatively married in some eye-catching space mission, without the MTCR impediment.

Investment, finance and technology, central to the bilateral relationship, form the hard core of the joint statement. Bilateral currency swap arrangements, generous Official Development Assistance, additional loans for the Delhi Metro, the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, IIT Hyderabad, the planned Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor, a joint feasibility study for a high speed Mumbai-Ahmedabad railway system, cooperation in energy-efficient and energy-saving technologies, an India-Japan ICT Comprehensive Cooperation Framework, a possible Japanese Electronic Industrial Township in India, Japanese investments in National Investment Manufacturing Zones, the rare earths project, cooperation in advanced technologies, all figure in the joint statement.

Some statements made during the visit stand out because of their great import. Our Prime Minister’s affirmation that “Japan is at the heart of India’s Look East Policy” gives a new geopolitical meaning to this policy, initiated when Japan was not a part of India’s calculus. Prime Minister Abe’s remarkable statement that “the relations between Japan and India have the greatest potential of any bilateral relationship anywhere in the world” speaks for itself.

Japan’s New Defence Guidelines and India

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

As part of ongoing efforts to further strengthen Indo-Japan relations, Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visited India in early January to discuss cementing of military ties. The visit comes close on the heels of China’s declaration of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over East China Sea which has implications on Japanese sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that are bone of contention between Tokyo and Beijing. India has also been at the receiving end of China’s assertive policies along the disputed Sino-Indian border. In fact, PLA made fresh transgression across the Indian border in Chumar area in the first week of January. Thus both nations have common goals in ensuring that China is restrained from aggressively pursuing its interests at the cost of other nations. While Japan has an alliance with the U.S. to address its security concerns, Tokyo has also been seeking stronger defence relationships with countries like India and others in the Asia-Pacific.

Japan is also in the process of shedding its pacific outlook and is revitalising its defence capabilities. In mid-December 2013, Japan came out with a new National Security Strategy (NSS), a National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and a much improved Five Year Midterm Defence Programme (2014-18) which indicated that Japan was firmly moving away from its pacifist constitution. In its documents, Japan has expressed concerns over the changing strategic and security environment. Tokyo is strengthening its alliance with the US and has supported America’s rebalance strategy. On the other hand, there is also thinking amongst America’s traditional allies like Japan as to how far the US would go to help them if there is hot conflict with China. Thus, there is a move to strengthen Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) as part of internal balancing. In effect, this would supplement the American capabilities to meet the challenges of Anti Access and Area Denial strategies. And therefore enhancing its defence and security relationship with countries like India and those part of ASEAN are designed to maintain a strategic equilibrium in the region.

Because of convergence of their interests, India, Japan and the U.S are also engaged in trilateral dialogue to work towards peace and stability in the region. In fact, well before the unveiling of the American rebalance strategy, there was a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue initiated between US, India, Japan and Australia in 2007 and a joint naval exercise was also carried out off the shore of Okinawa in that year. Viewed by Beijing as some sort of a concert of powers being formed against China, the level and scope of the joint exercise invited a diplomatic demarche from the PRC. Australia under pressure disassociated itself from the initiative. But later Australia has corrected its policy and seems to be aligning again with the U.S. and Japan. India had clarified its position that the exercises were not designed against any country and has been following some kind of a middle path since then.

Besides strengthening its alliance with the US, Japanese security strategy talks about ‘strengthening cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests such as Republic of Korea, Australia, the countries of ASEAN and India’. India is considered as being geo-politically very important especially by virtue of its location, its economy and demographic strengths. Strengthening bilateral relations with India in a broad range of areas including maritime security is one of the cornerstones of the Japanese new defence strategy. It also talks about strengthening trilateral frameworks like Japan-US-India grouping.

Japan’s new NSS indicates that in its efforts of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’, it is willing to participate in joint development and production of defence equipment and other related items. Clarifying some of its earlier reservations on the issue, the NDPG states “While giving due consideration to the roles that the three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment.” This in effect means that Japan would be ready to export weapons if it contributes to peace. Evidently, this new guideline is a major departure from the policies it pursued till now. This aspect is very important from the Indian point of view as relaxing of curbs on exports of defence technology and weapons and possibilities of joint development in defence industry would offer tremendous potential for Indo-Japanese defence cooperation which could be strategically and economically beneficial to both sides.

Japan’s midterm defence plan caters for over 240 billion US dollars to be spent over next five years which would largely add to its air and naval capabilities as also would go towards improving the cutting edge of its land forces. Enhancing its military capabilities is obviously being done as a response to the increasingly aggressive behaviour of China in recent times. The Japanese defence budget during its defence plan period is of course much more than India’s likely defence budget for the next five years but less than what China is expected to spend in the same period. Acquiring improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities besides a robust command, control and information networks would be essential elements of modernisation of JSDF.

Cyberspace and outer space have been considered as two vital areas where JSDF’s response and capabilities would be strengthened. China has been very active in cyber space wherein besides some other nations India and Japan have been at the receiving end of cyber attacks originating from China. However, mission definition of JSDF in case of a cyber attack is very limited and has not been well defined; for instance, the military is not charged with responding to cyber attacks on critical national infrastructures like in other countries. Further, PLA’s anti-satellite capabilities not only make US satellite networks vulnerable they also pose a challenge to Indian and Japanese space assets. Though India already has an ongoing cyber security dialogue with Japan as part of 2+2 framework which includes a Foreign Secretary level Dialogue and the Defence Policy Dialogue, there is a need for India to expand its engagement with Japan for exchange of cyber and space technologies to address mutual security concerns.

India has been looking forward to acquiring ShinMaywa US-2i amphibian aircraft for the Navy to strengthen its naval aviation arm. In fact, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in May 2013, a Joint Working Group to explore the modalities for cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft had been established. It needs to be remembered that Japan has a well-developed fighter aircraft production and technological base. The last F-2 aircraft was delivered to JSDF in 2011 but the capabilities available can be exploited for joint production development and export. Provided that possible Japanese reservations could be overcome based on the new NDPG, India should explore cooperation in this area. So far Japan has been keen to sell the aircraft to India but as indicated to Japan during a Joint Working Group Meeting in December 2013, New Delhi is keen to manufacture the aircraft jointly. Further, there is considerable scope for joint research development in high end technologies in both civil and military arena.

In addition, for the first time, a bilateral Joint Naval exercise between the Indian Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self Defence Force was carried out in June 2012 off the coast of Japan. And another joint naval exercise was carried out in Bay of Bengal in December 2013. Increasing frequency of joint naval and maritime exercises is part of the Japan’s NDPG and strategic outlook. Even the Coast Guards of the two countries have been carrying out joint exercises to improve interoperability and address security challenges to maritime security. These areas of defence cooperation were further discussed during Itsunori Onodera’s visit. India supports the principle of freedom of navigation though the seas and cannot but be in agreement with the principle espoused by Onodera that “no country should unilaterally change the status quo”.

Since 2008 when the joint declaration between Japan and India on defence and security cooperation was signed, the strategic relationship has grown multifold. In end November and beginning December 2013, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited India signifying the close relationship between India and Japan. Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visit is a precursor to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s coming visit to India as a Chief Guest for the Republic Day parade on January 26, 2014. Both India and Japan share the same democratic values and common political, economic and security concerns. Japan’s new thinking on defence issues provides a stronger platform for India and Japan to pursue their common strategic interests.