Geopolitical Developments and India-China Relations

Jayadeva Ranade

The world is in a state of continuing flux. The economies of the major powers are still fragile and vulnerabilities exist in those of the bigger emerging powers in the Asia-Pacific like China and India. The balance of power is concurrently undergoing a shift with competing focal points of power surfacing in the East. The fragile nature has been accentuated in the past few years with Beijing’s accelerated push for recognition as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. This is resisted by the US, Japan and India and has made South East Asian countries nervous.

China’s sudden assertiveness since the end of 2007 was prompted by a combination of factors, but mainly by: the global economic downturn; China’s considerably enhanced economic and military strength; and Beijing’s perception that the US as a global power is on the decline and this is now the opportune moment for China to regain its self-perceived rightful position on the world stage and alter the status quo in Asia. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is divided on the issue of whether to write off the US as the sole world power. One view is that the US is a power irreparably on the decline while the other, which seems to be gaining ground, argues that the intrinsic strength and resilience of the US will ensure its return on to the world stage as a stronger, more effective power. There is consensus, however, that the US ability to project power simultaneously in different theatres is presently constrained, thus offering China a window of opportunity that would last at most between 5-10 years.

China’s impetuousness and decision to ‘take on’ the US anticipatedly triggered a response signalling quite clearly that the US is not about to cede either power or influence in the Asia-Pacific. The US encouraged particularly Japan and the Philippines, to react to China’s aggressiveness. It additionally unveiled the seemingly short-lived ‘Asian Pivot’ with its definite military content. The US has now shifted emphasis though, to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Rights (TPIP), which are economic equivalents of the ‘Asian Pivot’. China is now leaning towards joining the TPP/TPIP.

China, however, has not been deterred and continues to press ahead with achieving its global and regional ambitions. The continuing tense stand-off with US ally and East Asia’s strongest power, namely Japan, amidst steady escalation in tensions in the South China Sea, underlines Beijing’s willingness to push the envelope in the apparent confidence that the US will stop shy of confronting it and so will Japan and Vietnam. China reasserted the role it desires in the Asia-Pacific in a statement in Washington DC by its Ambassador to the US, Cui Tiankai, in February 2014. There is little doubt that US credibility as a reliable ally willing to back its partners in the region has been dented in the past 5-odd years.

In the South China Sea, after a series of confrontations with Vietnam and the Philippines where China seized some maritime territories, Beijing has begun to assert its claims over a larger area. It has revived its claims on St. James’ Shoal off Thailand and South Korea’s Ieodo Rock and recently began building airports on some islands and extending others. On May 24, 2014, China’s largest US $ 1 billion oil rig the ‘Haiyang Shi You 981’ sailed into Vietnamese-claimed waters escorted by 86 armed ships and Beijing has now sent four more rigs. Simultaneously, tension with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in Chinese) rose in recent weeks with the increased frequency of patrols by Chinese Navy ships and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) aircraft flying very close to Japanese Self Defence Force (SDF) aircraft and at times coming near collision range.

Meanwhile, modernisation of the 2.3 million-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which coincides with China’s continuing assertiveness that has unsettled its neighbours, has entered the final stage of its current phase. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Third Plenum, which was held in November 2013, provided it a substantive push. On January 18, 2014, the Party Secretary of Liaoning province disclosed that the second domestically-produced aircraft carrier being built at Dalian would be ready in six years. China also allocated US$ 1.6 billion for the first phase of indigenous design, development and production of jet engines.

The Third Plenum approved organisational reforms in the PLA’s command structure and the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLAAF and China’s strategic missile strike force, namely the Second Artillery, have been allotted enhanced operational roles and will receive priority in allocation of budgets and manpower. The PLA is to be downsized by 800,000 personnel including a large number of non-combatants. Reports filtering out of Beijing disclose that plans have been finalised to merge the seven military regions into five “combat zones”. This reorganisation will give the PLA a definite “outward orientation” and implies that “recovery” of territories claimed by Beijing will be a central feature of China’s strategic agenda and the PLA will reinforce diplomacy aimed at realising “China’s Dream”.

All this is relevant to India-China relations as is Beijing’s stance on ‘core national issues’ in bilateral relations. Beijing has made it explicitly clear in two despatches of China’s official news agency ‘Xinhua’ in August 2011, addressed to Japan and the Philippines, that ‘burgeoning economic ties do not mean good bilateral relations’ which depend entirely on the recognition and acceptance of China’s ‘core national interests’. The despatches are important because ‘Xinhua’ is China’s authoritative official news agency and even the CCP Central Committee (CC)’s powerful Propaganda Department instructs all Chinese journalists reporting on sensitive topics to adhere strictly to the text of ‘Xinhua’ reports.

To digress slightly, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 2-day visit (June 17-18, 2014) to UK is pertinent. Apart from the fact that Beijing was particular about the minutiae of protocol, the 30-Article Joint Statement issued after the visit revealed UK’s capitulation to China. Article 23 stated that Britain recognises Tibet as an integral part of China and does not recognise Tibetan independence. The English-language ‘Global Times’, a subsidiary of the CCP’s official newspaper ‘People’s Daily’, gloated that Britain was finding it difficult to accept that it was now a “poor power compared to China”. A major inducement were the over US$ 40 billion trade deals signed during the visit and establishment last year of a Yuan swap centre in London.

While assessing a country’s foreign and strategic policies, and particularly in the context of India- China relations where there are major stakes and we are directly affected, it is important to understand the nature of the State and its internal leadership dynamics.

There has been a major change in China’s politics and leadership style since 2011 and particularly with the ouster of former Politburo (PB) member Bo Xilai in 2012. That was a major event in China’s politics, perhaps the first major political upheaval since the Tiananmen Event of 1989, and has seen a visible ‘hardening’ of the Chinese State. Details revealed during the events leading to Bo Xilai’s ouster reinforced the conviction of the CCP’s nomenklatura that the US remains intent on its strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ -- China’s short-hand for US efforts to dismantle the CCP; deprive the CCP of its monopoly rule and introduce multi-Party democracy; and replace the ‘socialist economy’ with a ‘free-market capitalist economy’. Factional differences were subordinated to protecting the Party Centre and ensuring the CCP’s monopoly on power. All senior veteran cadres backed Xi Jinping and supported him as ‘leader’ of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). As a consequence, in addition to the three all important posts of CCP CC General Secretary, Chairman of the CMC and President of China, Xi Jinping now additionally heads seven of the Party’s Central Leading Small Groups, which are the most important and highest decision making bodies. The Party has, in effect, asserted itself and further tightened its grip over key levers of the State.

Doctrinaire policies have also gained ascendance in the Party in the past few years with renewed emphasis on Marxist and Maoist ideology and Party discipline. The Party’s guiding narrative is being enforced by the CCP CC’s powerful Propaganda Department which has been steadily tightening restrictions on the media, social media and journalists (including most recently last week), since Xi Jinping took over. The elevation of Liu Yunshan, former Director of the CCP CC Propaganda Department, as Member of the PBSC and the country’s Propaganda and Ideology Czar is demonstration that the ‘hardening’ of the State is the decision of the Party Centre.

Particularly relevant in this context is Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ which envisages: making the Chinese people wealthy; making China a strong nation; and the rejuvenation of China. This muscular aspiration for China spelt out by Xi Jinping at the 18th Party Congress has been adopted by the entire Party and has already entered the lexicon of the CCP. It is particularly pertinent to India-China relations as ‘rejuvenation’ implies the restoration of China to its self-perceived rightful international status and recovery of all its territories. The new passports published by China depict its claimed territories, as do its actions in the South China Sea and East China Sea and the increased assertiveness and expanding claims over Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.

The Party has concretised Xi Jinping’s status in the CCP hierarchy, thus legitimising his status in China. The Party theoretical fortnightly journal ‘Qiu Shi’ in its latest issue (June 2014) described Xi Jinping as “one of China’s greatest Communist leaders”. Xi Jinping is today China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong.

In India too, there has been a radical change with a new leader emerging after a resounding democratic electoral victory. New Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a reputation as a strong, decisive leader and the BJP as a ‘right wing’ Party and they have a majority in Parliament unprecedented for thirty years. Modi very quickly used his swearing-in ceremony as an opportunity to outline India’s view of its strategic neighbourhood and where Indian interest will focus. The visit to Bhutan and planned visit to Japan reinforces this. The current government can shape and implement medium to long-term policies. In other words, India and China both have strong leaders and this itself offers an opportunity for engagement on fresh and revised terms.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit was intended to show China’s eagerness in engaging with India’s new right-wing Government and is part of its strategy of ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’. It sought to project that China desires good relations with India and prevent India from moving close to Japan or towards a US-led anti-China grouping. A Chinese-language official ‘Xinhua’ despatch of May 29, 2014, is, however, pertinent. Its tone differed noticeably from that of other Chinese media reports which assessed that India’s policies towards China would not change and that economic relations would receive a boost. This Xinhua despatch asserted that Modi has no option other than economic cooperation with China as India perforce has to recognise China’s economic and military superiority in Asia. It stressed that Modi would have to accommodate China, not out of choice or inclination, but out of necessity. While this is arguable, but the Xinhua despatch exhibits China’s self-confidence and at the same time implies there is potential for cooperation.

China’s focus is on economic cooperation with India: Xi Jinping and PM Modi’s meeting on the sidelines of BRICS Summit also pointed towards the same though differences on some of the strategic issues remained. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s forthcoming visit to India has the economy as its focus and he is reportedly being accompanied by 350 Chinese Chief Executives (CEOs) amidst much talk of investing in India’s infrastructure, high-speed railways and the Bullet Train. Chinese diplomatic missions in India have already begun selecting locations for the ‘Special Industrial Parks’ and, at least in Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bengal, have identified middle-men for ‘benami’ purchases of land. China is anxious to find a new market for its huge reserves of surplus cash and as another avenue for investment, and India is an attractive vast market. Undoubtedly it will benefit if China invests in India’s infrastructure, but India will need to carefully decide the direction in which to steer Chinese business as otherwise, in a democratic set up such as India’s, China will soon acquire a powerful business lobby capable of adversely influencing national strategic decisions. Roads, flyovers, railways, hydro-electric projects, multi-storey office and residential buildings, are sectors that can benefit from Chinese investment. In order to ensure strategic flexibility and increased investment, however, these must be balanced by offering similar competitive opportunities to other countries like Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. India can particularly benefit in the hi-tech, advanced electronics and defence sectors by encouraging investments from Japan and Taiwan on very preferential terms.

Nevertheless, two events are worthy of note in this context. First is the protracted 20-day incursion by Chinese troops in Apr/May 2013 in the Depsang Plains of Ladakh that cast a cloud over the bilateral relationship and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit. The intrusion was apparently planned and deliberate. It was proposed by the PLA and approved by the Politburo which, after discussions, assessed that India would not cancel Li Keqiang’s visit for fear of offending China. It was certainly not, as sought to be made out, a local action by a local PLA Commander. On May 14, 2013, the influential, official ‘Zhongguo Qingnian Bao’ (China Youth Daily) published an article implicitly laying claim to Ladakh and describing it as part of Tibet.

Second is the visit (June 8 -9, 2014) of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi. In keeping with past practice, just two days before Wang Yi’s arrival China alluded to the outstanding border issue and the Dalai Lama’s presence by officially protesting the presence of Lobsang Sangay, head of the Central Tibetan Administration, at Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. Wang Yi too, at his press conference in New Delhi, asserted China’s territorial claims by brushing aside questions on border intrusions and made a carefully worded remark that the issue of stapled visas by China were a “unilateral” “flexible” “goodwill gesture” or, in other words, that the status of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir remain disputed.

On the vexed border issue, little progress can be anticipated unless both leaders and, especially Xi Jinping, decide to use their strength and push for a mutually acceptable settlement. China’s recent utterances on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, make this a distant possibility. China can, in fact, be expected to be insistent and expand its claims on Arunachal Pradesh and J&K and may test the resolve of the BJP government on the territorial issue. The status quo in negotiations will not change till India acquires the capability, through asymmetrical power, to impose unacceptable costs on China’s ‘Han heartland’, including Beijing and Shanghai. This will take a couple of years as the Agni V series of missiles become operational and are deployed.

China will continue to deepen relations with Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka and exert to establish a formal diplomatic presence in Thimpu, which is only a matter of time. A new and worrying feature is China’s focus on Lumbini in Nepal. Not only will construction of a modern airport in Lumbini built by the PLA pose a proximate military threat to India, but more insidious is Beijing’s effort to undermine the influence and the authority of the Dalai Lama amongst Tibetan Buddhist monks and lay the ground work for potentially triggering instability and secessionism across the vulnerable Indo-Tibetan Himalayan border belt. Plans of China’s so-called NGOs to build and operate a monastery-cum-seminary points to this.

Finally, it is pertinent to briefly mention China’s strategy of ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’ formulated in October last year. The ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’ strategy for the first time in the history of communist China designates neighbouring countries as ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ and promises huge benefits and economic largesse for countries that accept and assist China’s regional ambitions. These three initiatives aim at obtaining new sources of natural resources and new markets for China and will be secured by China’s expanding military might and strategic reach including in the Indian Ocean.

(The author is Member of the National Security Advisory Board and President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, New Delhi. He is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India)

(The article is a revised version of the paper presented by the author at the seminar on ‘Engaging China: Opportunities and Challenges’ organised by Vivekananda International Foundation on June 26, 2014)

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Published Date: 31^st July 2014, Image source: http://www.icec-council.org

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: A Preliminary Analysis

Shikha Aggrawal, 

Research Associate, VIF

In his seminal work, ‘The War Puzzle’ John Vaquez establishes that territorial issues constitute the fundamental cause of interstate wars in the modern global system since 1495. Elaborating further upon his thesis, Vasquez argues that territorial issues per se do not constitute a direct causal variable in leading to wars. However, the very presence of ‘territoriality’ as a contentious issue makes wars more probable.¹ As such, a thorough study of territorial disputes institutes a core dimension within the domain of international and security studies.

With international politics no longer governed along ideological fault lines, territorial equations today are often rooted in geopolitical contexts and are thus regarded as manifestations of perceived national interests (political, economic, and security) of the states. Due to this close association with these national concerns, territorial disputes frequently assume a nationalistic dimension. The sentiment of nationalism acts as a dualistic construct of cause and effect in determining the course of territorial conflicts, and their relative importance in a country’s political and strategic calculus.²

The Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands dispute in the East China Sea is a conflict that entails implications not only for the East-Asian regional dynamics, but has rather become the euphemism for Great Power Politics. This situation owes to the existence of a complex conflict structure involving ‘assertive’ positioning (attitudes and behaviour) by the parties (structures) involved in the dispute³: the People’s Republic of China regards the Islands as their ‘core national interests,’⁴ and hence is committed to recover the Islands through diplomatic or military means; Japan refutes the very existence of any sovereignty debate over the Islands and bought three of the disputed Islands from their private owners in 2012, thus, further intensifying the conflict; the United States of America, though claiming a neutral stance over the sovereignty debate, is committed to defend the Japanese interests under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan.

Though both China and Japan have, by far, refrained from resorting to direct armed confrontation for settling the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, any military resolution to the issue would render a precursor to the future of the power transition theory between China and the United States of America. This inference is rooted in the psychological underpinnings associated with the outcome of wars, and their effects upon the ‘power equations’ between states. In case of a Sino-US war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, a resolution in favour of China would undermine the confidence of the East Asian nations in America to preserve their interests in the region. This situation would destabilize the very existence of US pivot in Asia. Moreover, the military victory would consolidate China’s position as the ‘hegemonic power’ in East Asia. This would further narrow the ‘power gap’ between the PRC (revisionist state) and the United States of America (hegemonic state), and thereby satisfy the cardinal precept for the onset of “hegemonic war” as described in Organski’s thesis. ⁵,⁶

Furthermore, any solution to the issue would set a precedent, in both normative as well as symbolic terms, for the settlement of other sovereignty claims upheld by Japan and China vis-à-vis other countries. As such, the conflict presents a crucial study from the strategic point of view.

Most importantly, the Senkaku/Diaoyu problem in several ways highlights the fundamental inconsistency between the claims of sovereignty based in 14^th century Asia, and the norms of international dispute settlement developed in Europe centuries later. This divergence owes to the fact that the traditional East Asian international system that existed until the late 19^th century entailed extremely different connotations regarding the concepts of sovereignty and territorial boundaries than those enshrined in the modern Westphalian system. Unlike the Westphalian system that institutionalized norms regarding the notions of sovereignty, diplomacy, nationality, and commercial exchange, traditional East Asian international system operated within the dynamics of the Confucian world view. As such, the traditional East Asian regional order was patterned along a hierarchical construct, with China as the hegemonic power. Within this system, states derived their status and ranking from their cultural achievements, rather than military or economic prowess. Moreover, as David C. Kang has demonstrated, demarcation of uninhibited rocks in the middle of water bodies was not a practice in the East Asian region five hundred years ago. Therefore, Kang asserts that most of the current debates over different Islands in East Asian waters are political disputes and not historical issues per se.⁷ Therefore, it is imperative for IR analysts to explore the dynamics of the East Asia regional construct pertaining to this period, and argue the legitimacy and applicability of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ based upon this ancient regional order.

The Senkaku/ Diaoyu Dispute: Core Issues

The Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands refer to a tiny group of islands, comprising a land area of 6.3 Km2, in the East China Sea. The islands consists of eight tiny insular formations, of which only two are over 1 Km2 (the Diaoyu/Uotusri Island is the biggest one with a land area of 4.3 Km2), five are completely barren, and none are currently inhabited or have had any kind of reported human activity.

Table I: Islands appertaining to the Senkau/Diaoyu archipelago⁸

At the outset, the Islands dispute primarily involves two fundamental issues: the question of sovereignty over the disputed islands; and the issue of demarcation of the maritime boundary between Japan and China. These issues are further exacerbated due to a complex construct involving security, economic, and political concerns.

The “territorial” aspect of the conflict essentially emanates from a divergent reading of history by both China and Japan. It is within the context of historicity that the dispute assumes a symbolic significance. For the Chinese, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute represents yet another legacy of Japanese war-time aggression against China.⁹ As such, any resolution to the islands issue from the Chinese side would be conceived within the dynamics of convergence between pragmatic concerns of economics and security, and the politics of Chinese nationalism derived from a collective memory of past humiliation.

Similarly, Japan regards the developments of the late 19^th century pertaining to its annexation of Ryukyu Islands, Bonin Islands as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to be lawful territorial 

consolidations, and unrelated to its overseas military ventures or imperial expansion. ¹⁰ As such the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is associated with the idiom of national pride for the Japanese. This interplay between territorial disputes and popular nationalism serves to limit the policy choices for resolving the sovereignty debate by both countries.

The issue of demarcation of the maritime boundary is rooted in the specific geographic features of the East China Sea. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCOLOS), the territorial waters of states extend up to a limit of 12 nautical miles from their baseline. Further, the states can also claim a sea area of 200 nautical miles from the baseline as their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).¹¹ However, this delineation becomes complicated in the case of East China Sea as the coast-to-coast distance is less than 400 nautical miles (only 360 nautical miles). Ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would enable China to exert sovereign rights over the continental shelf along with the EEZ to the north and east of the disputed Islands. This would allow China exclusive economic rights to the entire southern portion of the East China Sea. Likewise, sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would entitle Japan to extend its EEZ to the north and west of Islands, beyond the Okinawa Trough.¹²

The maritime boundary aspect of the Islands dispute is further rendered difficult due to the differing interpretations of international laws pertaining to the seas by the claimant states. Whereas, Japan stresses on the ‘equidistance principle’ to demarcate the maritime boundary between China and Japan, the Chinese insist on the ‘principle of natural prolongation’ to solve the boundary question.¹³ As per Article 76 of the UNCLOS, a coastal state can claim an area up to 350 nautical miles from its baseline as its extended continental shelf under the principle of ‘natural prolongation’. The coastal state has the sovereign rights to explore mineral and non-living resources in the subsoil of the continental shelf. China argues that the Okinawa Trough in East China constitutes the natural maritime boundary between the PRC and Japan, and hence claims the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as falling within the 350 nautical miles area of its continental shelf that extends from its coast to the Okinawa trough. However, Japan insists that the Okinawa Trough is only an “incidental impression in an otherwise continuous continental shelf” and therefore, cannot constitute a natural maritime boundary. Accordingly, Japan favours an equitable division of the waters of the East China Sea by drawing a median line that is equidistant from the baseline of Chinese coast and the baseline of the Ryukyu Islands.¹⁴

For the feasibility of this study, the Paper will restrict itself to exploring the political, security and economic dimensions of the problem. In order to achieve this stated objective, the study shall explore and debate the historical documents cited by the both China and Japan to justify their claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets.

Various Dimensions of the Issue: Interplay between Political, Security, and Economic Concerns

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located approximately midway between Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, around 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles southwest of Okinawa, and 230 nautical miles east of China. This particular location of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands underscores the security dimension of the dispute. Sovereignty over the contested Islands would enable Japan or China to project its military prowess along a prolonged and enlarged frontier, thereby putting the other side into a disadvantageous position.

Furthermore, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute also entails geopolitical implications for both China and Japan. The sovereignty issue over the Islands involves a crucial relationship with PRC’s ‘One China’ policy. China regards the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of Taiwan, and validates its rights over the Islands on the basis of its claim over the ROC. As such, loss of sovereignty debate over the disputed Islands would jeopardise its concerns in Taiwan as well. It is in the context of Taiwan that the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute gets associated with the notion of regime stability in China. In the words of Chinese scholar, Zhongqi Pan, “If the Chinese government wavers in its position on the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, its legitimacy would be immediately challenged by the Chinese people in both the mainland and Taiwan.” ¹⁵

Moreover, as stated above, any solution to the Islands issue would set a precedent for the resolution of China’s claims in the South China Sea in particular, and its territorial disputes with other countries in general. Similarly, for Japan the issue holds consequences for its differences with Russia over the “Northern Territories” and with Korea over the Dokdo (Takeshima/Takdo) Island.

Notwithstanding the security and political significance of the Islands to the claimant states, the current dispute traces its origin to the 1968 report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE). The report by the ECAFE suggested the possibility of large hydrocarbon deposits in the waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. As such legal control over the Islands would confer upon the owner nation the “exclusive rights” to exploit the natural resources in the vicinity of the Islands. The economic value of the Islands should be of particular concern to China whose oil consumption is already the second largest in the world. According to some estimates, China’s oil consumption is expected to reach 590 million metric tonnes by 2020, nearly three-quarters of which will be imported by that time.

The Dispute: Legacy of Post-Second World War History

The recent history of the Senkaku/Dioyu dispute is located within the dynamics of international politics in the post-World War II period. This international political scenario is characterized by international treaties concerning the status and transfer of various territories, trans-regional alliances, and the changing contours of East-Asian politics and economy.

The current dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands began with the 1969 US-Japan joint statement¹⁶ that culminated in the Ryukyu Reversion Agreement of June, 1971. ¹⁷ As per this agreement, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were returned to Japan as part of the Okinawa. Previously, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had been placed under the US administration as part of the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands in accordance with Article III of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. Article III of the San Francisco Treaty stated¹⁸,

“Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)…. the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”

The US-Japan joint statement immediately triggered nation-wide protests by Chinese students in the United States.¹⁹ On June 1, 1971, the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal statement laying down Taiwan’s claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets on the basis of history, geography, and the principle of long usage of the Islands by the Taiwanese peoples. The ROC further adduced the provisions of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the1952 Treaty of peace between the ROC and Japan to legitimize its claims over the disputed Islands ²⁰ This aspect of the problematic involving the relationship between the Islands dispute and aforementioned treaties will be discussed in detail later in the Paper.

Meanwhile, in November 1970, the Japanese government had proposed the ROC and South Korea to carry out ‘joint development’ of the undersea resources in the East China Sea. This joint development exercise was to be conducted without any reference or prejudice to the sovereignty claims of the participant nations in the East China Sea.²¹ It was at this juncture that the PRC entered into the dispute through an article in the Peking Review in December 1970. The article accused the United States and Japan of setting up a “liaison committee” to plunder Chinese and Korean seabed resources in “collusion” with the “Chiang Kai-shek Gang and Pak Jung Hi puppet clique”. The article further stated that “...supported by US imperialism, the reactionary Sato government is also seeking various pretexts for incorporating the Tiaoyu, Huangwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, Peihsiao and others, as well as water areas which belong to China, into Japan’s territory.”²²

The PRC Foreign Ministry issued its formal statement with respect to the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue in December 1971. The statement for the first time stated China’s legal status on the dispute, and declared:²³

“…..the Tiaoyu and other Islands have been China’s territory since ancient times. Back in the Ming dynasty (A.D. 1368-1644), the Islands were already within China’s sea defence areas; they were islands appertaining to China’s Taiwan but not to Ryukyu….Like Taiwan, they have been an inalienable part of Chinese territory since ancient times….The Chinese people are determined to recover the Tiaoyu and other Islands appertaining to Taiwan.”

As can be inferred, the statement inextricably linked the Senkaku/Dioyu dispute to China’s claims over Taiwan, and thus rendered the issue a central significance within China’s political apparatus.

The year 1972 served as the watershed year for the Senkaku/Dioyu Islands dispute. In 1972, the US ended its trusteeship of the Islands and formally returned the Islands to Japan. Following U.S President Richard Nixon’s rapprochement towards China and the subsequent visit to Beijing in 1972, both China and Japan embarked on the negotiations that led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.²⁴ Pursuant to this development, Japan severed its relationship with the ROC in 1972. This political realignment thus changed the contours of the conflict from being a ROC-Japan issue to a dispute between the PRC and Japan.

It is within the ‘apparent peace’ build-up between China and Japan that yet another strand of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu dispute emerged. The Chinese claim that during the normalization talks in 1972, there was a ‘tacit agreement’ between Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and Chinese Premiere Zhou Enlai to shelve the Island issue. However, Japan argues that it never reached an agreement with China about "shelving" or "maintaining the status quo" regarding the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands.²⁵ As such, Japan does not recognize the existence of any issue regarding the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

On the Contrary, the Chinese version of the same conversation, made public only in 2012 through an article in the People’s Daily argues that both Zhou and Tanaka decided to stall the issue for future negotiations and deliberations.²⁶ Through this interpretation of the conversation, China attempts to showcase the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets as a ‘mutually recognized’ disputed territory.

Understanding the Claims: The Politics of History

Within the framework of the dispute both China and Japan agree on the fact that Japan exercised the de facto control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from1895 until the end of the Second World War. While Japan emphasizes this period of undisputed Japanese administration to assert its claims over the disputed Islands, the Chinese base their arguments on the pre-1895 period when they claim to have occupied the Islands. To support their claims, both countries take recourse to various international and bi-lateral treaties. This divergence in interpretation of history and legal documents pertaining to the issue necessitates a study of the arguments of both claimants.

In 1870s, Japan annexed the Ryukyu (present day Okinawa) Kingdom. However, it refrained from laying any claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands till 1895, when it finally annexed the Islands through a Cabinet decision (Appendix I). During the period between 1895 and the Second World War, Japan administered the disputed Islands as part of the Okinawa prefecture.

China argues that Japan took possession of the Islands after the defeat of the Qing court in the 1894 Sino-Japanese War. The PRC asserts that as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets appertained to Taiwan (formerly Formosa), the Islands were ceded to Japan as part of the Formosa Island under Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, concluded between Qing China and Japan in May 1895. Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki stated:²⁷

“China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon….2(b) The Island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa…..2(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude….”

Hence, China stresses that the Islands should be returned to it as per the provisions of the 1943 Cairo Declaration, and the Potsdam Conference of 1945. Signed in November 1943, The Cairo Declaration proposed,²⁸

“They [the Allies] covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.”

The Potsdam Declaration, signed in July 1945 further reinforces the terms of the Cairo Declaration. Article 8 of the Declaration reads:²⁹

“The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

However, Japan refutes the Chinese assertion that the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands were included as part of the Taiwan and Pescadores (Penghu) Islands annexed by it under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. As per the Japanese claims, the cabinet decision to occupy the Islands in 1895 was the result of a 10-year-long survey on the disputed Islets, which confirmed that the Islands showed no trace of having been under the control of China. Based upon this argument, Japan claims that the Islands were occupied by it under the principle of terra nullius (land without owners) as enshrined in the modern international law on territorial acquisition. As such, Japan maintains that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were never included in Article II of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, whereby Japan denounced its claims over ‘Formosa and the Pescadores Islands’ or the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan which reiterated Article II of the San Francisco Treaty, and further declared that “…all treaties, conventions, agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war.”³⁰

Japan further argues the PRC and Taiwan only began laying their claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands after the discovery of the prospective petroleum resources in the Senkaku/Diaoyu seabed. To consolidate this argument, Japan stresses the fact that neither Beijing nor Taipei ever raised any objections against the exclusion of the disputed Islands under Article II of the San Francisco Treaty. Also, both China and Taiwan never protested against Article III of the said Treaty, whereby the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets were transferred to the US as part of the Okinawa. However, this argument from the Japanese side is refuted by China on the grounds that the San Francisco Peace Treaty cannot exert finality on the dispute as neither the PRC nor Taiwan were signatories to the treaty.

To justify its claims, Japan cites historical documents which describe the disputed Islands as its territory. Two such documents pertain to the maps published in the Republic of China New Atlas, and the World Atlas, both published in China in 1933 and 1958 respectively. Both these maps depict the disputed Islands as the “Senkaku Islands” and not Diaoyutai Islands (See Appendix II, III).

Other documents put forth by Japan to reinforce its claims include a 1953 article that appeared in the People’s Daily and which describes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands (See Appendix IV). Another important article cited by Japan vis-à-vis their claims over the disputed Islands appertains to a 1920 ‘Letter of Appreciation’ by the Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki to the Japanese citizens to thank them for helping the Chinese fisherman in distress. The letter refers to the Senkaku Islands as part of the Okinawa Prefecture (Appendix V). However, it must be noted that China refutes the relevance of this evidence on the grounds that since the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, along with Taiwan were already under the Japanese control from 1885, the Consul referred to them as being Japan’s territory.

In addition to employing maps and official correspondences, Japan also takes recourse to historicity to justify its claim over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan posits that Formosa was not exactly under the control of the Fujian province during the Ming dynasty. It was only in 1683, under the Qing that Formosa was included in the Chinese territory.³¹ Through this interpretation of history, Japan seeks to nullify the Chinese claim that the Islands were China’s territory during the Ming rule.

As against the Japanese arguments, the Chinese claims to the Islands emanate from the historical narrative of the Ming (1368-1644) and the Qing (1644-1911) periods. Chinese historical records detail the discovery and geographic features of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as early as 1372. During this period, the Islands were used as navigational aid for the official Chinese missions to the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was in a tribute relationship with China at that time. As per the Chinese records, during the period from 1372-1879, the Chinese Emperors sent some 24 investiture missions to the Ryukyu Islands to confer the title of Zhongshan Wang (the Chung-shan King) on their new rulers.³² China also argues that the name “T’iaoyutai” first appeared in a Chinese book entitled Shun-feng Hsiang-sung (May Fair Winds Accompany You) published in the fifteenth century.³³

China insists that the Islands were incorporated into its maritime defence as early as 1556. Some of the documents cited to support this claim by the Chinese include the Illustrated Treatise on Coastal Defence. Compiled in 1562, the volume recorded all Chinese military deployments in the coastal areas on the mainland and offshore Islands. The disputed Islands were recorded in two maps labelled Fu7 and Fu8 in the first scroll of the volume whose title is “Atlas of the Islands and Shore of the Coastal Region.” (Appendix VI). Likewise, the Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province complied in 1871 indicates the presence of the “Diaoyutai” behind Taiwan, and their utility to anchor large ships 

(Appendix VII).

Interestingly, China employs studies by certain Japanese scholars to augment its claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets. Two prominent works in this regard are the 1785 map drawn by noted Japanese cartographer, Hayashi Shihei, titled the Illustrated Survey of Three Countries; and a study by Japanese historian Inoue Kiyoshi, “Senkaku” Islands: A Historical Explanation of the Diaoyu Island. The map by Hayshi Shihei uses the traditional four pigment colouring method, with Chinese territories, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands marked in red (Appendix VIII). This map was further translated into French and published in 1832 by a German scholar of Oriental studies, Heinrich Klaproth. The book by Inoue Kiyoshi cites several documents pertaining to the Ming period to establish Chinese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets.³⁴

In addition to this, China cites certain official Japanese documents which indicate that Japan was aware of the fact that the Islands were not terra nullius. One such document relates to an October 21, 1885 letter of response by the Foreign Minister of Japan to the Home Ministry (Appendix IX). The letter states that the Islands bear Chinese names and that a Chinese newspaper has already carried a report regarding Japan’s intentions to occupy the Islands near Taiwan. It further requests the government to wait till the “appropriate” time to establish its claim over the Islands.

China also argues that the ten years investigation by Japan to ascertain the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets was never completed. This assertion is supported through a letter written by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor 1892. In the letter, the Governor states that since the initial investigations of 1885, no subsequent field surveys have been conducted on the Islands (Appendix X).

The Chinese also refer to some usage of the disputed Islands as evidence of their claim. One such interesting record is that in 1893, just two years before Japan occupied the Islands, Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi of Qing issued an imperial edict through which the Islands were awarded to a Chinese alchemist who had gathered rare medical herbs on the Islands.³⁵

Analysis of the Claims:

In addition to establishing the authenticity of the documents produced by both China and Japan to assert their claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets, the dispute calls for an examination of the concept of ‘ownership’ over the Islands within the dynamics of the antiquated historical narratives of the countries. Within this context, a careful study of China’s claims reveals that the disputed Islands have been mentioned in the Ming historical records only for the purpose of navigational aid between the imperial court and the Ryukyu Kingdom. Moreover, China never established a permanent settlement of civilians nor of military personnel on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, it can be deduced that China never established any ‘direct’ ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. On the contrary, Japan exercised de facto control over the disputed Islets for a period of fifty years, beginning from 1895 to the end of the Second World War in 1945.

The second aspect of the problematic concerns the economic dimension of the dispute. In this respect, it is significant to question China’s failure to object to article II, and III of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. The Chinese argument that neither Taiwan nor the PRC were signatories to the Treaty fails to explain China’s silence on the matter for almost two decades. It is within these dynamics that China’s claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, originating only after the discovery of possible hydrocarbon deposits in the waters off the disputed Islets, indicate a classic case of economic opportunism.

APPENDIX I




Source: “Fact Sheet On the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

APPENDIX II





Source: “Fact Sheet On the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

APPENDIX III





Source: “Fact Sheet On the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

APPENDIX IV



Source: Fact Sheet On the Senkaku Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

APPENDIX V



Source: Fact Sheet On the Senkaku Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

APPENDIX VI



Cited here from Che-jung Yu, “A Historical Analysis of the Ownership of the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands: from the Chinese Perspetive,” Mater’s Thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuan University
APPENDIX VII





Cited here from Che-jung Yu, “A Historical Analysis of the Ownership of the Diaoyutai/ SenkakuIslands: from the Chinese Perspetive,” Mater’s Thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuan University
APPENDIX VIII



Cited here from Che-jung Yu, “A Historical Analysis of the Ownership of the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands: from the Chinese Perspetive,” Mater’s Thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuan University
APPENDIX IX





Cited here from Che-jung Yu, “A Historical Analysis of the Ownership of the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands: from the Chinese Perspetive,” Mater’s Thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuan University
APPENDIX X



Cited here from Che-jung Yu, “A Historical Analysis of the Ownership of the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands: from the Chinese Perspetive,” Mater’s Thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuan University
Endnotes

1. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
2. For a detailed study of Nationalism and its effects upon China’s territorial disputes refer to, Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” International Security, Vol. 23, No.3 (Winter, 1998-1999), pp. 114-146; Chih-Yu Shih, “Defining Japan: The Nationalist Assumption in China’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal, Vol.50, No.3 (Summer 1995), pp. 543-544; Erik Beukel, “ Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship,” Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report 2011:01.
3. This modeling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is based upon Johan Galtung’s Conflict Triangle. For details See, Johan Galtun, Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations ( Columbia University: 1958)
4. China first claimed the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as its Core National Interest through an opinion piece in the People’s daily in January 2012. The article can be accessed at http://english.people.com.cn/90780/7708939.html. The PRC officially declared the disputed Islands as its core national interests in April 2012, through a statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying. China uses the term to describe its sovereignty claims over Taiwan, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and Tibet.
5. A.F.K Organski, World Politics ( New York: Knopf, 1968)
6. The Paper employs Organski’s thesis only as an idea among various schools of IR theories to explain States’ behaviour. The author neither subscribes to, nor endorses the Realist perspective.
7. David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute ( New York: Columbia University Press, 2012)
8. Names and size details of the Islands taken from Che-jung Yu, “A Historical Analysis of the Ownership of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands: from the Chinese Perspetive,” Mater’s Thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuan University, 2013; Daniel Dzurek, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” Paper available at http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html
9. “Diaoyu Dao: An Inherent Territory of China,” State Council Information Office, PRC, September 2012. Full text available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm
10. “The Basic View on the Sovereignty of the Senkaky Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Full text available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html
11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
12. Pan Zhongqi, “Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 12, No.1, 2007
13. The Principle of Natural Prolongation proposes that a nation’s maritime boundaries should reflect the ‘natural prolongation’ of where its land territory reaches the coast. Whereas the Equidistance principle refers to a legal concept that states that a a nation's maritime boundaries should conform to a median line equidistant from the shores of neighboring nation-states.
14. For a detailed discussion on this aspect of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, See, Peter Dutton, “Craving Up the East China Sea,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp.45-68.
15. ibid
16. “Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon,” November 21, 1969, Washington, available at http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19691121.D1E...
17. “Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands,” June 17, 1971. Document is available at the Ryukyu-Okinawa History and Culture Website, http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/archive/rev71.html
18. “Treaty of Peace with Japan,” signed at San Francisco, September 08, 1951, United Nations Treaty Series 1952 (reg. no. 1832), vol. 136, pp. 45 - 164.
19. “An open letter to President Nixon and members of the Congress,” The New York Times, May 23, 1971.
20. The original statement was published in Chinese in Chung-yang Jih-pao ( Central Daily News), June 12, 1971. Cited here from Hungdah Chiu, “An analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto),” Occasional Paper Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, No. 1, 1999.
21. Ibid 17
22. “US and Japanese reactionaries out to Plunder Chinese and Korean Sea-Bed Resources,” Peking Review, Vol. 13, No. 450, December 11, 1970.
23. “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” (December 30, 1971). English translation available in Peking Review, Vol. 15, No.1, January 7, 1972.
24. “Joint Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Japan,” Peking Review, Vol. 15, No.40, October 6, 1972.
25. “The Senkaku Islands,” Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November, 2012, available at http://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/eg/contents/culture/SenkakuIslands.pdf
26. “Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory, based on abundant iron-clad evidence,” People’s Daily, October,
    12, 2012, available at (http://www.chinaembassy.org/chn//zt/DiaoYuDao/t978666.htm).
27. “Treaty Of Shimonoseki,” April 17, 1895, available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm
28. United States Department of State. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: 1941-1949, Basic Documents. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Department of State; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. G.P.O., 1950, p. 20.
29. ibid
30. “Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan,” April 28, 1952, Taipei, available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm
31. “The Senkaku Islands,” Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November, 2012, available at http://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/eg/contents/culture/SenkakuIslands.pdf
32. Tao Cheng, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol.14, No.2, 1974, pp.248-260.
33. The Year of publication of this book is not clear. According to Joseph Needham, it was published in 1430. For further details, see Science and Civilization in China, Vol.4, Part 1, Chapter 26, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971)
34. Kiyoshi Inoue, Japanese Militarism & Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Island–A Japanese Historian’s View: ‘The Tiaoyu Islands (Senkaku Island) are China’s Territory. Full text available at http://www.skycitygallery.com/japan/diaohist.html
35. Tao, “The Sino-Japanese Dispute,” 1974, pp. 248-60

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Published Date: 12^th June 2014, Image source: http://www.bloomberg.com

Time for Intense India-Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership

Maj Gen (Retd.) P K Chakravorty

Introduction

The 24^th ASEAN Summit was held for the first time in Naypyitaw, the capital of Myanmar. At the commencement of the summit on May 10, there were serious concerns raised by Vietnam on the recent drilling of an oil rig at the disputed Paracel Islands. ASEAN as a group deals primarily with political and economic issues. Despite the terms of reference, Vietnam brought out the issue and China responded by stating that it would be resolved bilaterally. The Vietnamese Prime Minister has stated that this affected Vietnamese sovereignty as the drilling was taking place 120 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast which as per the Law of Seas forms a part of the Exclusive Economic Zone of their country. The US State Department as per the Bangkok Post has called Beijing’s move to introduce an oil rig in the Paracel Islands as provocative. Further on 06 May, Philippines arrested 11 fishermen and seized a boat for poaching more than 500 endangered sea turtles at the disputed Half Moon South China Sea shoal. The Chinese call the shoal as Banuye Reef and claim it to be a part of the Nansha Islands. China has called for the release of the fishermen, but Philippines is currently proceeding legally with the case.

Analysis

Paracel Islands were occupied by Chinese from the erstwhile South Vietnamese in 1974. Ever since, China has been gradually spreading its influence over other islands in the South China Sea. It has built a small garrison town Sansha in the Woody Island of the Paracel Group. Sansha has an airport and a runway of 2700 metres which enable Chinese Air Force to operate in the area.

The China National Offshore Oil Company’s decision to move oil rig HD-981 was a pre meditated move which has hurt Vietnam and other claimants of islands in the South China Sea. The oil rig was escorted by about 80 ships of Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as also the Chinese Coast Guard and moved into its current location on 02 May 2014. The rig is going to remain in location for three months and drilling operations would continue during this period. The commencement of drilling was formally opposed by the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh who telephoned China’s State Councillor Yang Jiechi indicating violation of the Law of Seas. China listened to the Minister but continued the drilling process. Vietnam sent 35 ships out of which 29 were armed. On 04 May, Chinese ships rammed two Vietnamese Sea Guard vessels injuring seven Vietnamese. Chinese ships with air support were also used to intimidate six more Vietnamese ships. Further, water cannons were also used to threaten the Vietnamese. As of now not a single round has been fired.

The standoff has led to wide spread demonstrations in Vietnamese urban areas. There have been reports of Taiwanese factories being attacked who the Vietnamese are mistaking for Chinese. The situation remains tense and there is a need to sit at the negotiating table and resolve issues peacefully.

The moot point is why did China despatch rig HD-981 to the Paracel islands? The rig has been positioned immediately after the visit of US President Obama to Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Malaysia. The Chinese military posturing with their Navy and Air Force is possibly to test the US response to such an eventuality. Chinese feel that the US is currently tied down with Iran, Syria, Nigeria and Ukraine. They neither have their forces nor the inclination to get involved in issues pertaining to the South China Sea. Possibly Vietnam too would be seeking military partnerships to strategically balance China’s posturing.

Way Ahead

Despite assurances given by the US President, events of the last two weeks have clarified that the US would like the issue to be resolved diplomatically. There is no strong statement from the US State Department apart from maintaining that it is a provocation. Vietnam has responded with military precision by positioning 35 ships to counter 80 ships of the Chinese backed by Air Force. There is a need for negotiations to resolve the issue bilaterally. Vietnam is also considering legal options, which may not be undertaken. The Philippines issue of the Chinese fishermen too needs to be diplomatically resolved. Manila has also complained to China regarding construction on the Johnson Reef. The Chinese have stated that Johnson Reef belongs to them and they would continue with the construction. The Philippines have already submitted their case to UN tribunal for hearing their case on the South China Sea. In January 2014, the entire case was submitted with 40 maps and nearly 4000 pages of evidence. The case is not likely to be heard before 2015.

All these cases reflect Chinese hegemony in dealing with the situation and there is a need to strategically balance China. While the US is beset with numerous problems currently, it would be pertinent for Japan, Vietnam and India to strengthen their strategic partnership and respond to Chinese posturing. The start point would be to have joint naval exercises between these countries. These exercises should commence in non disputed territory and gradually move on to the South China Sea and East China Sea. This would create strategic problems for the Chinese resulting in discussions based on mutually accepted logic. China respects strength and needs to be tackled with ingenuity. Once the three strategic partners get their act together, China would have to play its cards cautiously and the US would also be a facilitator for these actions.

Conclusion

China is the dominant power in Asia. To balance this power, there is a need for intense strategic partnership between India, Vietnam and Japan. Strategy is a game played in the minds of strategic thinkers and practitioners. With strong leadership in these countries, intense strategic partnerships would become a reality. India’s own maritime interests in the South China Sea would be greatly affected if China does not adhere to UN Convention on Law of Sea. International community through its joint and combined efforts needs to impress upon China to follow the path of peaceful development rather than adopt muscular methods to assert its territorial claims.

(The author was India’s Defence Attache to Vietnam)

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Published Date: 27^th May 2014, Image source: http://static.tuoitre.vn

Recent Trends in Vietnam-Japan Ties and Implications for India

Maj Gen (Retd.) P K Chakravorty

Introduction

Japan has been an important trading partner of Vietnam from the 16th century. The port of Hoi An close to Danang in Central Vietnam was an important trading port and Japanese ships visited this location frequently to undertake trading activities. During the Second World War, Japan exercised control over this region and thereafter relations remained dormant up to 1972. Diplomatic ties were established on 21 September 1972, but active commercial activities between the two countries resumed only after the return of the Vietnamese Army from Cambodia in 1989.

Thereafter relations between the two countries strengthened with Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) resuming in full swing in the year 1992. Since then both the countries have left no stone unturned to enhance their relationship.

Recent Trends

As stated, the new chapter in Vietnamese Japanese relationship began in 1992. Vietnam became a member of the ASEAN in 1995. ASEAN and Japan established formal relations in 1973, which was formalised in March 1977.

Japan has consistently backed all the initiatives of ASEAN and in 1997 Japan became a part of ASEAN+3 along with China and South Korea. Further with the formation of the East Asia Summit in 2005, Japan and Vietnam became part of a larger organisation and currently both of them are active members. They also are official negotiating partners of the Trans Pacific Partnership which also includes the United States.

Japan has contributed immensely to Vietnam’s economic development. ODA contribution itself is more than $ 21 billion. Foreign Direct Investment by Japan in Vietnam translates into 2103 projects with a registered capital of $ 34.5 billion. More than 500,000 Japanese tourists visited Vietnam in the preceding year. The point to note is that both the countries are bonding very closely resulting in mutual benefit.

The current geo political situation presents us with a few hard realities regarding Asia Pacific. China has become the most dominant economic and military power of Asia. Great powers have great ambitions and China has stirred up issues regarding its claims on the islands of the East China Sea, South China Sea and along the Sino-Indian border. This has caused tensions between China on the one hand and Japan, Vietnam and India on the other. The United States with its pivot to Asia policy is attempting to rebalance her naval deployment by positioning six of her Carrier Battle Groups to be positioned in the Asia Pacific Region. Further the US is trying to form a tri lateral alliance between US, India and Japan. Meanwhile, Russia is also gradually entering this region, with arms supplies to China, Vietnam and India. In this situation, the US is looking for a more assertive Japan which could possibly handle security situations independently. This obviously calls for a stronger Japanese Self Defence Forces which can play an operational role in the Western Pacific. It is pertinent to note that due to economic reasons the US is reducing its Defence budget as also the manpower of her Army which would be below the strength that existed during the First World War. Accordingly it is obvious that Japan would have to a large extent resolve strategic issues in the Western Pacific using its Self Defence Forces with limited support from the US.

It is against this backdrop that one has to view Japan’s strategic relations with Vietnam. While Japan has issues with regard to Senkaku islands with China, Vietnam has disputes with regard to Paracel and Spratly islands with China. Militarily China is stronger than Japan and Vietnam. However, strengthened cooperation between Japan and Vietnam would enable them to strategically coordinate their activities resulting in a balanced approach from China. Vietnam and Japan have a strategic agreement since 2009 which is gradually being boosted by political leaders from both countries.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took over in December 2012 made his first overseas visit to Vietnam from 16 to 17 January 2013. As is well known, during his previous tenure in 2006, he had initiated a strategic dialogue with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung. He had clearly stated that the purpose of his visit was due to the common concerns of the two countries in the Asia Pacific region in the spheres of economics and strategy. On a lighter note, he also stated that people of both countries have common cultural traits like using chop sticks, eating rice as the main food and Buddhism. Currently the Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang is on a four day visit to Japan from March 16 to 19 at the invitation of Japanese Emperor Akihito. The visit is expected to further strengthen economic and strategic relations between the two countries resulting in greater synergy between these nations in the Asia Pacific.

Implications on India

Strategically the Asia Pacific region is extremely important for India. Japan and Vietnam are both strategic partners of India and play a critical role with regard to subsuming China’s assertiveness in the region. The growing strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan is resulting in both countries re crafting their military strategies and enhancing their defence postures.

India has strong economic relations and strategic partnerships with both Japan and Vietnam. China has disputes with regard to the land border along India and is also engaged in creating a string of pearls by developing port facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. There is a need for India to counter this move by intensifying strategic partnerships with Japan and Vietnam. This can be achieved by greater joint training at the individual and collective level between these countries. Joint trilateral exercises on land and sea would not only improve inter operability but also sensitise China on hard power capabilities of these countries. Further, economic cooperation can be enhanced to ensure greater Comprehensive National Power of the triumvirate.

To maintain strategic balance, the Asian continent must avoid an unchallenged economic as also strategic domination by China. The US is gradually rebalancing its assets to play a supportive role in the continent. To create stability there is a need for economic and strategic synergy between Japan, Vietnam and India. This would allow a stable Asia which can be free of Chinese assertiveness.

Conclusion

The current visit of the Vietnamese President to Japan is likely to strengthen economic and strategic relations between these countries. This is a step in the positive direction which must be utilised by India to strengthen the bond with these countries to stabilise the Asia Pacific. A strong trilateral relationship between the three nations would positively contribute to security in the region.

(The author was India’s Defence Attache to Vietnam)

Japan’s New Defence Guidelines and India

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

As part of ongoing efforts to further strengthen Indo-Japan relations, Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visited India in early January to discuss cementing of military ties. The visit comes close on the heels of China’s declaration of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over East China Sea which has implications on Japanese sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that are bone of contention between Tokyo and Beijing. India has also been at the receiving end of China’s assertive policies along the disputed Sino-Indian border. In fact, PLA made fresh transgression across the Indian border in Chumar area in the first week of January. Thus both nations have common goals in ensuring that China is restrained from aggressively pursuing its interests at the cost of other nations. While Japan has an alliance with the U.S. to address its security concerns, Tokyo has also been seeking stronger defence relationships with countries like India and others in the Asia-Pacific.

Japan is also in the process of shedding its pacific outlook and is revitalising its defence capabilities. In mid-December 2013, Japan came out with a new National Security Strategy (NSS), a National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and a much improved Five Year Midterm Defence Programme (2014-18) which indicated that Japan was firmly moving away from its pacifist constitution. In its documents, Japan has expressed concerns over the changing strategic and security environment. Tokyo is strengthening its alliance with the US and has supported America’s rebalance strategy. On the other hand, there is also thinking amongst America’s traditional allies like Japan as to how far the US would go to help them if there is hot conflict with China. Thus, there is a move to strengthen Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) as part of internal balancing. In effect, this would supplement the American capabilities to meet the challenges of Anti Access and Area Denial strategies. And therefore enhancing its defence and security relationship with countries like India and those part of ASEAN are designed to maintain a strategic equilibrium in the region.

Because of convergence of their interests, India, Japan and the U.S are also engaged in trilateral dialogue to work towards peace and stability in the region. In fact, well before the unveiling of the American rebalance strategy, there was a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue initiated between US, India, Japan and Australia in 2007 and a joint naval exercise was also carried out off the shore of Okinawa in that year. Viewed by Beijing as some sort of a concert of powers being formed against China, the level and scope of the joint exercise invited a diplomatic demarche from the PRC. Australia under pressure disassociated itself from the initiative. But later Australia has corrected its policy and seems to be aligning again with the U.S. and Japan. India had clarified its position that the exercises were not designed against any country and has been following some kind of a middle path since then.

Besides strengthening its alliance with the US, Japanese security strategy talks about ‘strengthening cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests such as Republic of Korea, Australia, the countries of ASEAN and India’. India is considered as being geo-politically very important especially by virtue of its location, its economy and demographic strengths. Strengthening bilateral relations with India in a broad range of areas including maritime security is one of the cornerstones of the Japanese new defence strategy. It also talks about strengthening trilateral frameworks like Japan-US-India grouping.

Japan’s new NSS indicates that in its efforts of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’, it is willing to participate in joint development and production of defence equipment and other related items. Clarifying some of its earlier reservations on the issue, the NDPG states “While giving due consideration to the roles that the three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment.” This in effect means that Japan would be ready to export weapons if it contributes to peace. Evidently, this new guideline is a major departure from the policies it pursued till now. This aspect is very important from the Indian point of view as relaxing of curbs on exports of defence technology and weapons and possibilities of joint development in defence industry would offer tremendous potential for Indo-Japanese defence cooperation which could be strategically and economically beneficial to both sides.

Japan’s midterm defence plan caters for over 240 billion US dollars to be spent over next five years which would largely add to its air and naval capabilities as also would go towards improving the cutting edge of its land forces. Enhancing its military capabilities is obviously being done as a response to the increasingly aggressive behaviour of China in recent times. The Japanese defence budget during its defence plan period is of course much more than India’s likely defence budget for the next five years but less than what China is expected to spend in the same period. Acquiring improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities besides a robust command, control and information networks would be essential elements of modernisation of JSDF.

Cyberspace and outer space have been considered as two vital areas where JSDF’s response and capabilities would be strengthened. China has been very active in cyber space wherein besides some other nations India and Japan have been at the receiving end of cyber attacks originating from China. However, mission definition of JSDF in case of a cyber attack is very limited and has not been well defined; for instance, the military is not charged with responding to cyber attacks on critical national infrastructures like in other countries. Further, PLA’s anti-satellite capabilities not only make US satellite networks vulnerable they also pose a challenge to Indian and Japanese space assets. Though India already has an ongoing cyber security dialogue with Japan as part of 2+2 framework which includes a Foreign Secretary level Dialogue and the Defence Policy Dialogue, there is a need for India to expand its engagement with Japan for exchange of cyber and space technologies to address mutual security concerns.

India has been looking forward to acquiring ShinMaywa US-2i amphibian aircraft for the Navy to strengthen its naval aviation arm. In fact, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in May 2013, a Joint Working Group to explore the modalities for cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft had been established. It needs to be remembered that Japan has a well-developed fighter aircraft production and technological base. The last F-2 aircraft was delivered to JSDF in 2011 but the capabilities available can be exploited for joint production development and export. Provided that possible Japanese reservations could be overcome based on the new NDPG, India should explore cooperation in this area. So far Japan has been keen to sell the aircraft to India but as indicated to Japan during a Joint Working Group Meeting in December 2013, New Delhi is keen to manufacture the aircraft jointly. Further, there is considerable scope for joint research development in high end technologies in both civil and military arena.

In addition, for the first time, a bilateral Joint Naval exercise between the Indian Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self Defence Force was carried out in June 2012 off the coast of Japan. And another joint naval exercise was carried out in Bay of Bengal in December 2013. Increasing frequency of joint naval and maritime exercises is part of the Japan’s NDPG and strategic outlook. Even the Coast Guards of the two countries have been carrying out joint exercises to improve interoperability and address security challenges to maritime security. These areas of defence cooperation were further discussed during Itsunori Onodera’s visit. India supports the principle of freedom of navigation though the seas and cannot but be in agreement with the principle espoused by Onodera that “no country should unilaterally change the status quo”.

Since 2008 when the joint declaration between Japan and India on defence and security cooperation was signed, the strategic relationship has grown multifold. In end November and beginning December 2013, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited India signifying the close relationship between India and Japan. Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visit is a precursor to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s coming visit to India as a Chief Guest for the Republic Day parade on January 26, 2014. Both India and Japan share the same democratic values and common political, economic and security concerns. Japan’s new thinking on defence issues provides a stronger platform for India and Japan to pursue their common strategic interests.