BCIM Economic Corridor: Prospects and Issues

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

Introduction

One of the cornerstones of India’s strategy has been to develop India economically and technologically. Another facet of India’s policy has been to seek partnerships on the strategic, economic and technological fronts to widen its policy and development options in order to safeguard its interests. The strategy adopted to meet these policy objectives is to restore our traditional links and integrate India with its immediate and extended neighborhood besides responding positively to the imperatives of globalization. This translates into an Indian vision of being well connected to Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian Region and beyond on the western flank and to Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and beyond on the eastern flank through a network of multi-modal transport corridors.

These networks would facilitate trade, exchange of energy through oil and gas pipelines, promotion of tourism and increase of communication links leading to what can be termed as a zone of co-prosperity. Towards this end, a number of regional and sub regional initiatives have been undertaken by India to improve connectivity, promote economic and technical cooperation, enhance people to people relations and usher in peace and prosperity.

Therefore, India is involved in a number of regional and sub-regional initiatives and frameworks. BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) framework is one such initiative which has recently been given a push both by India and China.

However, there are also other groupings like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) which is one such initiative for sub regional integration. Further, India also has a Trilateral Dialogue with Myanmar and Thailand addressing the same issues. There is also a Ganga –Mekong Initiative to link countries of Mekong Basin (Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) with India. All these are in addition to the major regional organisation in South East Asia i.e. ASEAN.

Similarly, China has also been involved in a number of regional groupings i.e Greater Mekong Sub-region initiative that was founded in Yunnan in 1992.

Even though there is an overlap in goals and objectives of a number of regional and sub regional groupings, there is a need to critically analyze whether multitude of such cooperative efforts are beneficial or otherwise.

BCIM Evolution

So far as the BCIM forum is concerned, it has been in works for over a decade now (since 1999). In fact, it was a Track II platform, known earlier as Kunming Initiative, which was formed for sub-regional cooperation revolving around trade, commerce and connectivity.

It was considered as a provincial initiative and did not have much resonance among at least the policy makers and the MEA officials. Some of the earlier meetings that were attended, for instance, by India’s Secretary (East), Mr. Rajiv Sikri in 2006 questioned its utility when several other similar initiatives existed in the region. On the other hand, later in 2011, a Kolkata-Kunming car Rally that was expected to encourage the concept of BCIM found official mention in the Joint Statement between China and India.

However, it was only last year that the BCIM grouping gained some traction when it was first mentioned in the Joint India-China communiqué during PM Li’s visit to India in May 2013 and it was again discussed between the two during PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing in October 2013. Thus, it became a Track I initiative with the prospects of the objectives of BCIM being realized.

As a follow up of Heads of State meetings, a Joint Study Group (JSG) of BCIM to chart out the modalities for achieving the goals of BCIM economic corridor was set up and it held its first meeting at Kunming in December, 2013. JSG has outlined a number of steps to be taken to convert the concept into a reality. A Joint Working Group was also proposed to be established for improving the working mechanism. The Final Report is expected to be submitted by end September and by end December 2014, it is expected to be adopted and signed for inter-governmental cooperation. Cooperative areas between the four members would include:-

(a) Physical Connectivity

(b) Trade in goods, services and investment including finance

(c) Environmentally sustainable development

(d) People to people contacts

Assessment

However, the question remains as to whether this sub regional grouping would make some headway in the coming years and what are Indian perceptions on the issue. What are its future prospects?

Even while the top leadership has come to an understanding that BCIM has plenty of potential and it needs to be encouraged, there are several difficulties and problems in imparting a degree of substance to achieving the objectives of the forum.

Security environment is one major negative factor inhibiting the successful realization of the forum.

For instance, in February, the influential English language Chinese daily, Global Times commenting on the BCIM Economic Corridor pointed out that even though it has been put on fast track, the border areas are characterized by poverty, ethnic division and collision and rampant transnational crimes. It talks about difficulties of security and development taking place simultaneously. (Construction of rail and road networks, logistics centres, industrial parks and development of scenic areas etc). ‘Thorny security challenges have to be resolved- ethnic conflicts, drug & human trafficking along Sino-Myanmar borders’. This situation is present on all the borders shared by the four countries. Security first or development first or both simultaneously is not an easy question to be answered.

Conflicts between the armed ethnic groups and Myanmar have negative impact on creating conducive climate for investment and development. Sino-Myanmar border has a number of ethnic conflicts and issues which are well known. Transnational crime gangs in the Golden Triangle create many obstacles for bringing peace and stability and law and order in the area.

Similarly, on the Indo-Myanmar border, there are ethnic people who reside on both sides of the borders and some elements continue to remain hostile to either India or Myanmar or both. While Indian and Myanmar security forces have coordinated their patrolling and operations against such groups, peace and stability continues to be at risk in these areas.

Sino-Indian tensions along the border are well known and despite the fact that a new Border Development Cooperation Agreement has been signed, the incursions and misperceptions along the borders continue to take place.

Bangladesh and Myanmar borders have with the problem of Rohingyas crossing over to Bangladesh and the Myanmar government refusing to grant them citizenship rights. Thus, conditions for trade and commerce are not conducive.

The prevailing security situation thwarts the successful outcome of BCIM forum and work against building trust and mutual confidence. China and India, both major countries in the group, could take the initiative to improve mutual trust and confidence between the members of this forum.

Indian Approach

Even though India has agreed in principle for a BCIM Economic Corridor, it also has some apprehensions.

Firstly, there are still several insurgent and rebel groups in North East India which are involved in a host of anti national activities like gun running, drug trafficking; they are also being used by foreign intelligence agencies (e.g. Anthony Shimray incident where Chinese intelligence agencies were alleged to have been involved in fuelling insurgency by sending a huge consignment of Chinese arms to NSCN(IM) in the NE; there have also been reports of some Chinese intelligence agents being active there; ISI has also been involved in sending arms).

Secondly, Sino-Indian border problems are well known and therefore Indian sensitivities concerning the claims and possible insecurities on that account. Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh is inhabited by Nagas and there is an insurgent activity there. Even though some funds for constructing Ledo/Stilwell Road have been earmarked, India is not in favour of reviving the old Burma/Stillwell Road linking India’s NE to Yunnan through Myanmar because of security reasons. This is despite the fact that enormous commercial benefits (especially with reduction of transportation costs) might accrue. There are apprehensions that this might give China advantage in case of a military conflict.

Thirdly, while there is a dire need to develop the North eastern states of India and China can provide the wherewithal for infrastructure development including the much needed funds, the Indian government remains reticent in involving China in ways that might be detrimental to Indian interests.

Further, during the visit of Japanese PM Shinzo Abe in January 2014, Japan has been invited to take part in the infrastructure development of NE States.

Fourthly, there is a growing trade imbalance between India and China and any free flow of trade and commerce through the envisioned economic corridor would only increase the trade imbalance against India as China has not been able to practically address India’s grievances on this issue in any meaningful way despite remonstrations by India to this effect during summits and other bilateral exchanges.

Additionally, India has several bilateral and multilateral initiatives with the regional countries to address precisely the same issues. For instance, India has Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Mekong Ganga Cooperation initiative and Trilateral between India, Myanmar and Thailand for improving connectivity; all such initiatives involve either cooperation with Bangladesh or Myanmar or both that have similar objectives to that of BICM.

There is an overlap in goals and objectives of a number of regional and sub regional groupings that remain an important sub set of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ set in motion in the mid 1990s. That is why India had not been very keen to add another sub-regional grouping to its kitty where, possibly, the central role of India in some of these platforms could be undermined. There have also been talks of merging or combining of BCIM and BIMSTEC but regional geo-political environment does not appear to be conducive for acceptance of such proposals.

Conclusion

Though, in the recent conversation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Premier Li Keqiang on 29^th May, the Chinese leader pushed for realization of BCIM yet it would not be easy to realize the objectives of BCIM Economic corridor or a Southern Silk Road in the short term to mid-term period. While it may be possible to address the security challenges along the borders and there are some signs of improvement along Indo-Myanmar and Indo-Bangladesh borders yet, for some progress to be made, there has to be a fundamental change in the nature of Sino-Indian relationship.

However, the way forward could be to start small joint projects in secure areas along the envisaged economic corridor which benefit the local population and which are not based purely on profit motive. Such joint projects could be initiated in Myanmar and Bangladesh by combined efforts of India and China. This would contribute to confidence building and possibly the goals of BCIM could be realized to some extent in the mid-term period.

Otherwise, except for hosting some Kolkata to Kunming car rallies and some other peripheral activities, it would be difficult to exploit the full potential of the grouping.

Substantive issues of BCIM would only receive attention when the geo-politics between both nations move towards a positive resonance. While specific programmes of BCIM Corridor may be discussed as part of keeping some positive atmospherics alive because of the confabulations at the top level yet implementation of the programmes would take their own time.

(The following is an updated version of the presentation made at Institute of South East Asia Studies during an international conference held at Yunnan University, Kunming, PRC).

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Published Date: 2^nd June 2014, Image source: http://voiceof.india.com

PLA’s Information Warfare Capabilities on an Upward Trajectory Printer-friendly version

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

In end February this year, Chinese President Xi Jinping formed a new working group at the apex level on cyber security and information security. While this was seen as the political leadership’s renewed efforts in underlining the threats and challenges to the national security in this arena, the military leadership has been paying particular attention to information warfare (IW) challenges since early 1990s. According to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concepts, the term information warfare encompasses cyber warfare, electronic warfare, deception warfare, psychological warfare, computer warfare, and transcends beyond the military realm.

The PLA has been adapting Western concepts to suit local conditions and considers it as a ‘driving force in PLA’s military combat readinesses. PLA has used the construct of People’s War and devised its own precepts of ‘Peoples War in IW domain’ where millions of Chinese, both civilians and soldiers armed with computers, could achieve the objectives of IW. That is what has been precisely happening since over the last one decade wherein a number of cyber/information attacks are known to have originated from China with India being one among many other countries being at the receiving end. In last few years, Indian government’s computers including those of National Security Council and some other important offices have been hacked with all evidence pointing towards China. PLA’s information warriors and hacker groups have been actively involved in virus warfare and hacking activities in countries of their interest.

PLA has intensified its efforts in IW field since it officially pronounced its military doctrine of ‘Local War under the conditions of informationalisation’ in its 2004 White Paper on Defence. The objective laid down was to build an informationalised force and to win an information war and push forward the revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics with ‘informationalisation’ at its core. Since the articulation of its current military doctrine, PLA has laid solid foundations for fighting information and cyber wars. According to PLA’s precepts, before any physical operations take place it would be the information and cyber domains that would be used to cripple the adversary’s capabilities.

PLA’s expanding capabilities in the use of space for military purposes provides it with the means to enhance its command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information and cyber warfare capabilities. Space is considered as a commanding height for enabling the battlefield information operations. PLA’s strategists have also stressed on the imperatives and necessity of ‘destroying, damaging and interfering’ with an enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellite systems. No country other than China has plans of launching almost 100 satellites till 2015. Compared to China, India’s plans for launching satellites are very modest; in fact in the last 37 years, India has launched 100 missions. Such endeavours when fully realized would add to China’s counter-space and IW capabilities.

PLA has also vastly expanded its optical fiber and other terrestrial networks giving it a tremendous IW capability. At the national level, China has a C3I system based on fiber optic cables, satellite communications, micro-wave links and automated command and control systems. The PLA has both secured and non-secured telecommunications and has an army wide data communication network and integrated field operations communication system which has been strengthened in the last decade. Many joint exercises carried out by PLA show that its WAN capabilities within Chinese borders have improved. PLA has been carrying out military exercises in Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions (which include the entire Sino-Indian border) where the PLA has practiced joint and integrated operations that include ‘information operations’.

According to Pentagon’s Annual Report to Congress on China’s Military and Security Developments of 2013, PLA’s Information Operations (IO) have matured and the top priority in peacetime is given to Computer Network Defence. As mentioned above, not only the IO/IW should be used even before the start of the campaign it would continue in all phases of war. Pre-emption also rhymes well with PLA’s doctrine of active defence where counter attack can be used to gain advantage even before the commencement of hostilities. Chinese military theorists also believe that if an information campaign is won then the need for military operations may not be necessary. Such a contingency may arise possibly with nations (like the U.S.) which are information dependent.

But that is no solace for India as both military and civil arena in our country is increasingly becoming dependent on information and information networks and systems. Our critical infrastructure dependent on a wide variety of information systems remains vulnerable to information attacks. Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facility did make India reflect on its vulnerabilities in the field of critical infrastructure. It has also been reported that even though the target of Stuxnet was Iran, Kaspersky Lab experts’ data indicates that in fact it was India that was the epicenter of Stuxnet activity thus raising questions about its implications and motives of the originator. Some analysts aver that the largest power outage in Indian history (of July 2012) which affected more than half of India was caused by the malicious ware of Stuxnet.

One also needs to take note of the theories and concepts articulated by two senior colonels of PLA in their book ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ where they opine that there would be no boundaries between military and non-military areas of warfare in future.

The levels of integration between the civilian and military efforts of PRC in all the fields of information and cyber warfare have been on the rise. The top political and military leadership of China is thoroughly seized with the significance of acquiring information and cyber warfare capabilities. The concept of Computer Network Operations (CNO) and Integrated Network Electronic Warfare is germane to their doctrine of IW. PLA’s Third and Fourth Departments of General Staff have been made responsible for executing CNO. While the Third Department has been tasked to collect intelligence and carry out defensive operations, the Fourth Department has the responsibility for network attacks and other offensive IW operations.

China’s defence budget (as also the internal security budget) has witnessed a double digit growth (in percentage terms) every year for over a decade. According to one study, the Chinese government actively funds IW related research in commercial IT companies and civil and military universities. The number of universities conducting such research is put around 50 which indicates the importance and priority given to security related aspects of information technologies. Further, China’s commercial IT companies involved in R & D actively seek collaboration with foreign firms to obtain cutting edge technologies which have dual use and therefore, in the end, benefit the PLA also. In certain cases, the civil use is only nominal and routing the research and development through the civil entities is undertaken as a matter of expediency. Such a subterfuge also helps in lowering the costs for the PLA. As is well known, China’s official defence budget is said to be much less than the actual one.

In fact, in January this year, Chinese telecom equipment companies Huwaei was accused of hacking into Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL)’s network and sabotaging its expansion plans in Rajahmundry in coastal Andhra Pradesh. A five-member team comprising senior officials from the National Security Council Secretariat, Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs and BSNL was formed to investigate the issue. Even a US Congressional report highlights the security threat posed by the Chinese companies like Huwaei and ZTE.

In conclusion, security threats and challenges to India in information warfare domain that includes cyberspace cannot be overemphasized. The Indian armed forces have promulgated a joint Information warfare doctrine and a tri-service Cyber Command is in the process of being established. Some efforts by the government have also been made in the shape of establishing a Computer Emergency Response Team and formulation of a National Cyber Security Policy-2013. However, what is needed of integrating the efforts of a number of ministries and stakeholders in this field. Allotment of additional funds for R & D and supporting such activities in educational institutions and universities is an imperative. Creating of space assets that support the information and cyber warfare efforts is also an imperative.

Information deterrence is equally important as a conventional military deterrence or even nuclear deterrence (which in turn is dependent upon a robust information capability). If critical infrastructure of a nation like banking, power industry, and railway or air communication networks are crippled, then there may be no need for a war. The nation would stand defeated as depicted by the Chinese military writers

Japan’s New Defence Guidelines and India

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

As part of ongoing efforts to further strengthen Indo-Japan relations, Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visited India in early January to discuss cementing of military ties. The visit comes close on the heels of China’s declaration of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over East China Sea which has implications on Japanese sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that are bone of contention between Tokyo and Beijing. India has also been at the receiving end of China’s assertive policies along the disputed Sino-Indian border. In fact, PLA made fresh transgression across the Indian border in Chumar area in the first week of January. Thus both nations have common goals in ensuring that China is restrained from aggressively pursuing its interests at the cost of other nations. While Japan has an alliance with the U.S. to address its security concerns, Tokyo has also been seeking stronger defence relationships with countries like India and others in the Asia-Pacific.

Japan is also in the process of shedding its pacific outlook and is revitalising its defence capabilities. In mid-December 2013, Japan came out with a new National Security Strategy (NSS), a National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) and a much improved Five Year Midterm Defence Programme (2014-18) which indicated that Japan was firmly moving away from its pacifist constitution. In its documents, Japan has expressed concerns over the changing strategic and security environment. Tokyo is strengthening its alliance with the US and has supported America’s rebalance strategy. On the other hand, there is also thinking amongst America’s traditional allies like Japan as to how far the US would go to help them if there is hot conflict with China. Thus, there is a move to strengthen Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF) as part of internal balancing. In effect, this would supplement the American capabilities to meet the challenges of Anti Access and Area Denial strategies. And therefore enhancing its defence and security relationship with countries like India and those part of ASEAN are designed to maintain a strategic equilibrium in the region.

Because of convergence of their interests, India, Japan and the U.S are also engaged in trilateral dialogue to work towards peace and stability in the region. In fact, well before the unveiling of the American rebalance strategy, there was a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue initiated between US, India, Japan and Australia in 2007 and a joint naval exercise was also carried out off the shore of Okinawa in that year. Viewed by Beijing as some sort of a concert of powers being formed against China, the level and scope of the joint exercise invited a diplomatic demarche from the PRC. Australia under pressure disassociated itself from the initiative. But later Australia has corrected its policy and seems to be aligning again with the U.S. and Japan. India had clarified its position that the exercises were not designed against any country and has been following some kind of a middle path since then.

Besides strengthening its alliance with the US, Japanese security strategy talks about ‘strengthening cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests such as Republic of Korea, Australia, the countries of ASEAN and India’. India is considered as being geo-politically very important especially by virtue of its location, its economy and demographic strengths. Strengthening bilateral relations with India in a broad range of areas including maritime security is one of the cornerstones of the Japanese new defence strategy. It also talks about strengthening trilateral frameworks like Japan-US-India grouping.

Japan’s new NSS indicates that in its efforts of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’, it is willing to participate in joint development and production of defence equipment and other related items. Clarifying some of its earlier reservations on the issue, the NDPG states “While giving due consideration to the roles that the three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment.” This in effect means that Japan would be ready to export weapons if it contributes to peace. Evidently, this new guideline is a major departure from the policies it pursued till now. This aspect is very important from the Indian point of view as relaxing of curbs on exports of defence technology and weapons and possibilities of joint development in defence industry would offer tremendous potential for Indo-Japanese defence cooperation which could be strategically and economically beneficial to both sides.

Japan’s midterm defence plan caters for over 240 billion US dollars to be spent over next five years which would largely add to its air and naval capabilities as also would go towards improving the cutting edge of its land forces. Enhancing its military capabilities is obviously being done as a response to the increasingly aggressive behaviour of China in recent times. The Japanese defence budget during its defence plan period is of course much more than India’s likely defence budget for the next five years but less than what China is expected to spend in the same period. Acquiring improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities besides a robust command, control and information networks would be essential elements of modernisation of JSDF.

Cyberspace and outer space have been considered as two vital areas where JSDF’s response and capabilities would be strengthened. China has been very active in cyber space wherein besides some other nations India and Japan have been at the receiving end of cyber attacks originating from China. However, mission definition of JSDF in case of a cyber attack is very limited and has not been well defined; for instance, the military is not charged with responding to cyber attacks on critical national infrastructures like in other countries. Further, PLA’s anti-satellite capabilities not only make US satellite networks vulnerable they also pose a challenge to Indian and Japanese space assets. Though India already has an ongoing cyber security dialogue with Japan as part of 2+2 framework which includes a Foreign Secretary level Dialogue and the Defence Policy Dialogue, there is a need for India to expand its engagement with Japan for exchange of cyber and space technologies to address mutual security concerns.

India has been looking forward to acquiring ShinMaywa US-2i amphibian aircraft for the Navy to strengthen its naval aviation arm. In fact, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in May 2013, a Joint Working Group to explore the modalities for cooperation on the US-2 amphibian aircraft had been established. It needs to be remembered that Japan has a well-developed fighter aircraft production and technological base. The last F-2 aircraft was delivered to JSDF in 2011 but the capabilities available can be exploited for joint production development and export. Provided that possible Japanese reservations could be overcome based on the new NDPG, India should explore cooperation in this area. So far Japan has been keen to sell the aircraft to India but as indicated to Japan during a Joint Working Group Meeting in December 2013, New Delhi is keen to manufacture the aircraft jointly. Further, there is considerable scope for joint research development in high end technologies in both civil and military arena.

In addition, for the first time, a bilateral Joint Naval exercise between the Indian Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self Defence Force was carried out in June 2012 off the coast of Japan. And another joint naval exercise was carried out in Bay of Bengal in December 2013. Increasing frequency of joint naval and maritime exercises is part of the Japan’s NDPG and strategic outlook. Even the Coast Guards of the two countries have been carrying out joint exercises to improve interoperability and address security challenges to maritime security. These areas of defence cooperation were further discussed during Itsunori Onodera’s visit. India supports the principle of freedom of navigation though the seas and cannot but be in agreement with the principle espoused by Onodera that “no country should unilaterally change the status quo”.

Since 2008 when the joint declaration between Japan and India on defence and security cooperation was signed, the strategic relationship has grown multifold. In end November and beginning December 2013, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited India signifying the close relationship between India and Japan. Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera visit is a precursor to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s coming visit to India as a Chief Guest for the Republic Day parade on January 26, 2014. Both India and Japan share the same democratic values and common political, economic and security concerns. Japan’s new thinking on defence issues provides a stronger platform for India and Japan to pursue their common strategic interests. 

PLA Rapidly Acquiring Precision Guided Munitions: Time for India to Enhance Capabilities

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

Of late, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been adding to its precision capabilities in consonance with its doctrine of fighting a ‘local war under conditions of informationalisation’ which had evolved from its earlier doctrine of fighting ‘local war under hi-tech conditions’.

Learning from the world wide experience of other militaries, the PLA has imported and then indigenously developed technologies that have provided it an edge over not only the armed forces in the region but also helped in closing the technological gap between its precision capabilities and those of the U.S. defence forces. Though India is known for its information technology prowess, yet it is China that has made rapid strides in information age warfare capabilities.

PLA has been studying the use of precision munitions since ‘Operation Desert Storm’ of 1990-1991. In that Operation, only nine percent of overall ammunition was precision guided and its usage increased to 35 percent in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the circular error of probability (CEP) was only a few meters; or as claimed by the US forces it was around one ‘bomb length’. The use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) then had climbed to 68 percent versus 32 percent dumb bombs. Improving the accuracy of weapon systems has been the cherished ambition of military scientists. Looking back, in World War II, the CEP for an air-delivered bomb was 1000 meters; in the Korean War, this was improved to 300 meters and by the time of Vietnam War, it had progressed to slightly over 100 meters. Now, the CEP could be in a single digit only.

Combined with its acquisition of precision capabilities, PLA has also been paying significant attention on joint warfare concepts that in many ways would be able to exploit long range precision assets and provide the PLA forces flexibility, agility, economy of effort and concentration of effects. Such effects, at times, at the target end could be much more than a sub-kiloton nuclear weapon.

PLA conducted a "Joint Teaching 2012 Queshan" (Lian Jiao-2012 Queshan) exercise which tested the concepts of joint firepower strikes. Achieving long range precision has been one of the crucial elements of such strikes. The success of joint precision firepower strikes would depend upon many contextual factors like command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network which would involve seamless integration of both ground and space based assets. PLA in the last decade or so has made tremendous progress on C4ISR capabilities which would naturally give an edge to its evolving precision capabilities.

In addition to developing long range precision strike capabilities through improving the accuracy of a variety of its ballistic missiles (including the much talked about anti-ship ballistic missile DF-21D), cruise missiles, air to surface missiles and air to ground to precision munitions, the PLA has paid most attention to developing artillery delivered munitions which can undertake a wide variety of missions. For instance, it has developed smart munitions that are terminally guided or those which can sense the target through a variety of sensors fitted in the munitions. It has acquired capabilities equivalent to the western/American Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles that can carry out top attacks on enemy’s armour. Last year, the PLA daily had reported a break through ‘in its technology that senses a target and deploys a destructive projectile to break through armor, immediately followed by a cluster of sub-projectiles to wipe out whatever the armor was protecting’. Thus, with a single gun, the Chinese artillery could destroy a large number of tanks. This needs to be kept in mind especially when it comes to the tankable areas of Ladakh. Precision capabilities would also enable the PLA to destroy well fortified Indian bunkers with one or limited number of rounds.

China’s defence industry has also developed 120 mm mortar ammunition with a seeker that can provide a CEP of 7-9 meters. Though these munitions are not as precise as those of similar U.S. and Israeli munitions, yet these provide value for money as GPS guided precision munitions are more expensive. Chinese have also fitted these seekers to their 122mm, 152mm and 155mm howitzer munitions. Further, almost all the forward observers are provided with laser guidance units for achieving precision hits at the target end.

PLA’s Multiple Rocket Launching Systems (MRLS), which are part of its field artillery, have been fitted with precision guidance systems that have improved dramatically the artillery’s long range precision capabilities.

NORINCO (China’s North Industries Corporation) has developed PHL03 (Type 03, also known as AR2 in its export name) 300mm MRLS with a range over 100 kilometers for the PLA. The PHL03 copies the Russian 9K58 Smerch that had been supplied to the Chinese earlier. It incorporates GPS/GLONASS and instead of the rocket being guided, the sub-munitions are guided. However, it is the improved version AR-1 MRLS (dual caliber) with a range of 220 kilometers that has rocket guidance system which gives it precision capabilities. When deployed suitably on Sino-Indian border, it can really cause havoc all along the depth and breadth of a Corps Zone by attacking vital installations, communication HQs, logistic nodes and even air fields and aviation bases with its long range and precision capabilities. What is worse is that China has supplied Pakistan with MRLS A-100 which has a range of around 100 kilometers though it is not clear whether precision guidance capabilities are available with this version.

Precision weapons substitute mass for effects. The advent of sensors that provide accurate target intelligence coupled with precision guided munitions (PGMs) has led to “effect-based operations” gaining predominance for a speedy conflict resolution, with minimum collateral damage. The use of PGMs also satisfies one of the fundamental principles of war – an economy of effort. They enable concentration of effects from widely (geographically) dispersed forces. Since a lower number of ordnance or weapon platforms is required to achieve the same effects at the target end, they enable reduced signature of own forces for adversary’s sensors to detect.

Because less number of ordnance and munitions are required, they also contribute to reduced logistics tail thereby increasing the agility of a force. And since logistics have a great impact on strategic planning, it stands to reason that the PGMs would also have an important bearing on planning at strategic, operational and tactical levels. They can be quickly brought to the battlefield for generating force levels equal to or more than a force equipped with dumb bombs. PLA in its teachings about precision strikes (‘Precision Operations’ published by National Defence University, Beijing) emphasises on benefits of such operations as reduced collateral damage, improved combat effectiveness, efficiencies in force employment, restricting the scale of conflict and affecting the enemy psychologically.

India has limited number of PGMs in its armoury, especially so with the artillery. We need to increase our inventory of PGMs not only for the artillery but all across our navy’s and air force’s holdings. Some Krasnol PGMs were used by the Indian Artillery in Kargil operations; the IAF used laser guided bombs against the Pakistani positions during Kargil conflict with telling effect. The former Indian Army Chief General JJ Singh had stated in September 2007 thus: “My focus has also been in making full use of precision guided ammunition and firepower rather than manpower”.

In air-land operations or tri service operations, the benefits of PGMs can be jointly exploited to reinforce and complement the unique characteristics of each Service. Increasing inventory of precision weapons in IAF and surface forces would enhance the force multiplier effect of the existing weapon platforms. This would be very relevant in the short duration conflicts when speed, shock action and accurate long range fires become essential to achieve worthwhile objectives in a reasonable timeframe.

When force has to be used selectively, in the backdrop of possible international intervention, then it is imperative that force be wielded in a manner so as to achieve political aims through short, swift and precise military operations. This logic finds expression in PLA’s War Zone Concept and its doctrine of ‘Active Defence’ where pre-emption is considered as part of defensive operations. In the Indian context, a larger inventory of PGMs along with associated infrastructure becomes more relevant for the execution of our Joint Doctrine. Further, precision attacks from standoff distances would enable the air support to be provided in close vicinity of land forces as the chances of collateral damage would be much reduced and there would be inherent protection provided to one’s own attacking aircrafts.

Similarly, increased inventory with land forces of integrated battle groups would add additional punch to their arsenal and may reduce requirement of air support. Armed helicopters with fourth generation missiles, cannon launched guided projectiles and such other devices, including air defence missiles and even multi-barrel rocket launchers with PGMs, would enhance the joint and integrated effort required for attaining military goals in a short and intense conflict.

Therefore, the PGM inventory of the Indian armed forces needs to be augmented in a fast track mode. The employment of precision weapons also mandates that we have precise information. Thus, we need to develop a matching intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network dovetailed with shooters and decision makers’ grid with real time response capabilities.

India’s Defence and Security Policies: Need to Learn Lessons from the Past

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

Have we learned any lessons from our experiences during the Nehru era and in subsequent years? Anyone looking dispassionately at our defence and security policies over the decades would respond only in the negative.

India frittered away its militarily advantageous position towards the end of Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 when we failed to exploit the operational situation in the Western Front that could have given us back our territory. This was much like towards the end of 1947-48 Indo-Pak conflict when Indian forces were ordered to stop operations. After the cessation of hostilities in 1971, we allowed Pakistan a victory on the negotiating table when India could have at least forced Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the Simla Agreement of 1972, to convert the cease fire line into a permanent border as we had over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in our custody.

Some specious response from Bhutto as to what face will he show to Pakistani public was accepted as a justified explanation. Our politico-bureaucratic psyche apparently is averse to following hard policy choices in pursuit of our well cherished and identifiable national interests. Leeway given to Bhutto then and his single minded pursuit of building an Islamic bomb that was successful has created more obstacles for settling the Kashmir issue favourably from the Indian point of view.

Like Nehru allowed Sheikh Abdullah and his cohorts to travel to Pakistan and exchange views with the Pakistani leadership, we continue to show irrational leniency to the separatist Hurriyat leadership and other hostile and anti-national elements to not only confer with officials of Pakistan’s High Commission in New Delhi but also to travel to Pakistan, obviously for purposes that would be contrary to India’s national interests.

It is a well known fact that such Kashmiri leaders have met those very leaders who sponsor terrorism both in Kashmir and all over India. It needs to be remembered that Sheikh Abdullah, in what is known as Kashmir Conspiracy case, was charged with treason for arranging to supply arms and explosives sourced from Pakistan as part of a conspiracy against the State. Despite the proof presented to Nehru about the involvement of Sheikh Abdullah in the conspiracy, he got him released and allowed him to Pakistan under the mistaken belief that something good might come out of the visit.

Currently, the present government is again inclined to follow soft policies towards Pakistan based on professions of peace by the newly elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif knowing very well that Pakistan’s India and Afghanistan policies are dictated by the military and security establishment. Plans by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to visit Pakistan based on the invitation extended by Nawaz Sharif have not been entirely discarded even as India has been waiting for Islamabad to deliver on the masterminds of 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks. It is quite evident that there has been no fundamental change in perceptions of Pakistani establishment that it is only cross-border terrorism that moves India to engage with Pakistan and possibly give some concessions to them especially on Kashmir.

While India has somehow managed to handle military and security threats from Pakistan, it is the ever expanding Pakistan-China nexus that presents an invidious and most dangerous threat to India’s security. It is only a few years back that the Indian Army started propagating a military doctrine to meet the threat of two front war. In a throwback to the Nehruvian policies, the government was more inclined to handle such threats diplomatically rather than spend additional defence funds for arising and equipping of requisite military formations and necessary air support.

The report ‘Non Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in Twenty First Century’ authored by a group of eminent experts, that included a member from National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon’s staff and where NSA also attended some of the deliberations of the group, while talking about military capabilities has opined that “we need to be clear about what kinds of offensive capabilities will be useful. The prevailing assumption that we should raise and deploy a 'mountain strike corps' against China is problematic. For it simply risks replicating all the problems with our existing strike corps under worse geographic and logistic conditions.” ¹ In short, it is not only the economic burden of raising such forces but the mindset about provoking China redolent of Nehru era persists. The report also talks of instigating an insurgency in our areas after they have been captured by the Chinese forces which conveys a defeatist attitude.

Further, what needs to be noticed is that since 2008 not only PLA has improved its posture in Tibet it has undertaken a number of incursions across the Line of Actual Control. This stance of assertive PLA in Tibet has been made possible by the massive build up of logistic structure in Tibet to include extensive railway network and over 58,000 kilometres of roads. The roads have been built up to Indian borders and have also penetrated Nepal. This would ensure smooth induction of the PLA troops in any contingency. This contrasts with our poor civil and military structure even after a lapse of over six decades. No doubt India has recently embarked on activating its old airfields along Sino-Indian border and the MOD has chalked out a plan for building extensive road net work and other infrastructure facilities but our record in implementing plans and projects has so far been very tardy. Thus the asymmetrical situation with China that existed in past during Nehruvian times and thereafter has not been rectified.

Recent incursions by the PLA in Depsang and Chumar areas of Ladakh sector also reveals the government’s disinclination to reveal such incidents along the border to the public which conforms to its past practice of withholding such information from the public lest it may embarrass the government in some manner or the other. Apparently, Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid and later Defence Minister Mr. AK Antony have visited Beijing subsequent to these incidents in April and June 2013 which seemed from all angles as conciliatory gestures to China’s aggressive policies in line with appeasement policies of Nehru.

The deficiencies in terms of both military capabilities and defence equipment continue to plague our forces. Shortage of basic wherewithal like ammunition deficiencies, need for improvement of ammunition dumps et al as brought out by the current and previous Army Chiefs, continue to persist. There are large scale voids which have also been described as ‘critical hollowness’ in the army that includes tanks running out of ammunition, obsolete air defence systems and lack of essential weaponry, and lack of critical surveillance and night-fighting capabilities for infantry and special forces. There is an inadequate HUMINT in the border areas and depth and breadth of ELINT, COMINT and satellite cover for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance needs to be enhanced.

There have been some improvements in defence organization, structures and processes but the civil-military relations leave lot to be desired. Similarly, there is a lack of integration and jointness in our armed forces. Even though Naresh Chandra’s Task Force in their report recommended the institution of the post of a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, the government has shot down that proposal which in any case was a climb down from the Chief of Defence Staff recommended earlier by a Group of Ministers in 2001. HQ Integrated Defence Staff created for enhancing jointness and integration does not have adequate powers or wherewithal to enforce it. Even NAM 2.0 report has recommended many relevant structural changes in the Ministry of Defence to improve civil-military relations but there seems to be lack of political will to implement such recommendations; the shibboleths of past that military might somehow establish ascendancy over the civil or political set up fail to go away.

There is a strong sense of déjà vu that is palpable in the current political approach to defence and security policies which leaves India vulnerable to China’s rising military capabilities and its assertive policies across the Line of Actual Control. While China has been single mindedly pursuing its long term objectives in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh sectors, Indian response to China’s strategy remains confused and subdued. Further, Pakistan would be too happy to join China in any adventure against India. While diplomatic approach would be of some help, the government needs to take an urgent action to mitigate the gap in military capabilities along the Indo-Tibetan borders that is becoming wider with the passage of time.

End Note

1. Para 173 of the report titled ”Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India of the Twenty First Century”,