Showing posts with label C4ISR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label C4ISR. Show all posts

Thursday, October 10, 2013

PLA Rapidly Acquiring Precision Guided Munitions: Time for India to Enhance Capabilities

Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, 
Senior Fellow, VIF

Of late, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been adding to its precision capabilities in consonance with its doctrine of fighting a ‘local war under conditions of informationalisation’ which had evolved from its earlier doctrine of fighting ‘local war under hi-tech conditions’.

Learning from the world wide experience of other militaries, the PLA has imported and then indigenously developed technologies that have provided it an edge over not only the armed forces in the region but also helped in closing the technological gap between its precision capabilities and those of the U.S. defence forces. Though India is known for its information technology prowess, yet it is China that has made rapid strides in information age warfare capabilities.

PLA has been studying the use of precision munitions since ‘Operation Desert Storm’ of 1990-1991. In that Operation, only nine percent of overall ammunition was precision guided and its usage increased to 35 percent in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the circular error of probability (CEP) was only a few meters; or as claimed by the US forces it was around one ‘bomb length’. The use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) then had climbed to 68 percent versus 32 percent dumb bombs. Improving the accuracy of weapon systems has been the cherished ambition of military scientists. Looking back, in World War II, the CEP for an air-delivered bomb was 1000 meters; in the Korean War, this was improved to 300 meters and by the time of Vietnam War, it had progressed to slightly over 100 meters. Now, the CEP could be in a single digit only.

Combined with its acquisition of precision capabilities, PLA has also been paying significant attention on joint warfare concepts that in many ways would be able to exploit long range precision assets and provide the PLA forces flexibility, agility, economy of effort and concentration of effects. Such effects, at times, at the target end could be much more than a sub-kiloton nuclear weapon.

PLA conducted a "Joint Teaching 2012 Queshan" (Lian Jiao-2012 Queshan) exercise which tested the concepts of joint firepower strikes. Achieving long range precision has been one of the crucial elements of such strikes. The success of joint precision firepower strikes would depend upon many contextual factors like command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network which would involve seamless integration of both ground and space based assets. PLA in the last decade or so has made tremendous progress on C4ISR capabilities which would naturally give an edge to its evolving precision capabilities.

In addition to developing long range precision strike capabilities through improving the accuracy of a variety of its ballistic missiles (including the much talked about anti-ship ballistic missile DF-21D), cruise missiles, air to surface missiles and air to ground to precision munitions, the PLA has paid most attention to developing artillery delivered munitions which can undertake a wide variety of missions. For instance, it has developed smart munitions that are terminally guided or those which can sense the target through a variety of sensors fitted in the munitions. It has acquired capabilities equivalent to the western/American Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles that can carry out top attacks on enemy’s armour. Last year, the PLA daily had reported a break through ‘in its technology that senses a target and deploys a destructive projectile to break through armor, immediately followed by a cluster of sub-projectiles to wipe out whatever the armor was protecting’. Thus, with a single gun, the Chinese artillery could destroy a large number of tanks. This needs to be kept in mind especially when it comes to the tankable areas of Ladakh. Precision capabilities would also enable the PLA to destroy well fortified Indian bunkers with one or limited number of rounds.

China’s defence industry has also developed 120 mm mortar ammunition with a seeker that can provide a CEP of 7-9 meters. Though these munitions are not as precise as those of similar U.S. and Israeli munitions, yet these provide value for money as GPS guided precision munitions are more expensive. Chinese have also fitted these seekers to their 122mm, 152mm and 155mm howitzer munitions. Further, almost all the forward observers are provided with laser guidance units for achieving precision hits at the target end.

PLA’s Multiple Rocket Launching Systems (MRLS), which are part of its field artillery, have been fitted with precision guidance systems that have improved dramatically the artillery’s long range precision capabilities.

NORINCO (China’s North Industries Corporation) has developed PHL03 (Type 03, also known as AR2 in its export name) 300mm MRLS with a range over 100 kilometers for the PLA. The PHL03 copies the Russian 9K58 Smerch that had been supplied to the Chinese earlier. It incorporates GPS/GLONASS and instead of the rocket being guided, the sub-munitions are guided. However, it is the improved version AR-1 MRLS (dual caliber) with a range of 220 kilometers that has rocket guidance system which gives it precision capabilities. When deployed suitably on Sino-Indian border, it can really cause havoc all along the depth and breadth of a Corps Zone by attacking vital installations, communication HQs, logistic nodes and even air fields and aviation bases with its long range and precision capabilities. What is worse is that China has supplied Pakistan with MRLS A-100 which has a range of around 100 kilometers though it is not clear whether precision guidance capabilities are available with this version.

Precision weapons substitute mass for effects. The advent of sensors that provide accurate target intelligence coupled with precision guided munitions (PGMs) has led to “effect-based operations” gaining predominance for a speedy conflict resolution, with minimum collateral damage. The use of PGMs also satisfies one of the fundamental principles of war – an economy of effort. They enable concentration of effects from widely (geographically) dispersed forces. Since a lower number of ordnance or weapon platforms is required to achieve the same effects at the target end, they enable reduced signature of own forces for adversary’s sensors to detect.

Because less number of ordnance and munitions are required, they also contribute to reduced logistics tail thereby increasing the agility of a force. And since logistics have a great impact on strategic planning, it stands to reason that the PGMs would also have an important bearing on planning at strategic, operational and tactical levels. They can be quickly brought to the battlefield for generating force levels equal to or more than a force equipped with dumb bombs. PLA in its teachings about precision strikes (‘Precision Operations’ published by National Defence University, Beijing) emphasises on benefits of such operations as reduced collateral damage, improved combat effectiveness, efficiencies in force employment, restricting the scale of conflict and affecting the enemy psychologically.

India has limited number of PGMs in its armoury, especially so with the artillery. We need to increase our inventory of PGMs not only for the artillery but all across our navy’s and air force’s holdings. Some Krasnol PGMs were used by the Indian Artillery in Kargil operations; the IAF used laser guided bombs against the Pakistani positions during Kargil conflict with telling effect. The former Indian Army Chief General JJ Singh had stated in September 2007 thus: “My focus has also been in making full use of precision guided ammunition and firepower rather than manpower”.

In air-land operations or tri service operations, the benefits of PGMs can be jointly exploited to reinforce and complement the unique characteristics of each Service. Increasing inventory of precision weapons in IAF and surface forces would enhance the force multiplier effect of the existing weapon platforms. This would be very relevant in the short duration conflicts when speed, shock action and accurate long range fires become essential to achieve worthwhile objectives in a reasonable timeframe.

When force has to be used selectively, in the backdrop of possible international intervention, then it is imperative that force be wielded in a manner so as to achieve political aims through short, swift and precise military operations. This logic finds expression in PLA’s War Zone Concept and its doctrine of ‘Active Defence’ where pre-emption is considered as part of defensive operations. In the Indian context, a larger inventory of PGMs along with associated infrastructure becomes more relevant for the execution of our Joint Doctrine. Further, precision attacks from standoff distances would enable the air support to be provided in close vicinity of land forces as the chances of collateral damage would be much reduced and there would be inherent protection provided to one’s own attacking aircrafts.

Similarly, increased inventory with land forces of integrated battle groups would add additional punch to their arsenal and may reduce requirement of air support. Armed helicopters with fourth generation missiles, cannon launched guided projectiles and such other devices, including air defence missiles and even multi-barrel rocket launchers with PGMs, would enhance the joint and integrated effort required for attaining military goals in a short and intense conflict.

Therefore, the PGM inventory of the Indian armed forces needs to be augmented in a fast track mode. The employment of precision weapons also mandates that we have precise information. Thus, we need to develop a matching intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network dovetailed with shooters and decision makers’ grid with real time response capabilities.

Friday, July 6, 2012

PLA Sharpening its Claws in Tibet


Vinod Anand
Senior Fellow, VIF

In the second week of June PLA conducted an exercise with live fire practice for their anti-tank units in Tibet to test their precision strike capabilities. This training exercise was a sequel to a major live-fire air attack drill conducted in March, by a brigade under the Tibet Military District which in turn is part of the Chengdu Military Region.Evidently the training exercise was aimed at encouraging the PLA troops to have confidence in their weapon systems and their own skills. It also needs to be noted that in recent times the frequency of PLA’s training exercises in Tibet have increased. Further, there is an emphasis on jointness and integration among the PLA Air Force and various arms and services of the PLA.

Earlier in October 2011 two other joint exercises were carried out in Chengdu Military Region and Lanzhou Military Region. The Chengdu Military Region and PLAAF air bases in Tibet are earmarked for operations against Indian targets. The level of the joint exercises was at the Group Army level with the objective of practicing a Division sized force in an integrated and joint environment that involved armour, artillery and PLAAF units of Tibetan plateau. Network centric operations in intense electromagnetic environment i.e. in conditions of ‘informationalisation’ were practiced.
Later, in March this year PLAAF practiced ground attacks in conjunction with army and artillery units. It has also been revealed that PLAAF has modified its J-10 fighter aircrafts to operate in the higher altitudes of Tibet which severely restricts its performance in many operational parameters. Tibetan plateau in winters is freezing cold when it becomes difficult for the PLAAF jet fighters to fly therefore usually it had been exercising in favourable weather conditions of summer. This exercise was also aimed at testing out the new improvements and modifications made to their jet fighters and associated equipment to operate in sub-zero temperatures. The degree of advantage enjoyed by India because the PLA jets have to take off from 10,000 to 12,000 feet high airfield (thus with less payload) would be narrowed. Further, PLAAF is modernising rapidly and the air fleet size is almost triple of our Air Force fleet.

There are also reports that Second Artillery Corps has upgraded its missiles in the Western region by replacing old Dong Feng -3 missiles with intermediate range Dong Feng-21 ballistic missiles. Further with its centrally located missile base at Delingha it can target the Indian capital. And with its new improved logistics infrastructure, especially the railway network in place, the DF-21 missiles from Delingha and elsewhere can be inducted into the central and southern Tibet in a shorter span of time.

It has also been reported that underground missile silos/sites have been constructed in the Tibetan plateau that can strike targets further afield in India or for that matter even into the Indian Ocean. Reports suggest that a modified DF-21 has been converted into an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile and it has reached an advanced stage of operationalisation. The short range missiles of 200-600 Kms could also be easily moved by road and deployed near the Indian borders to target India’s military and civil installations and other vital areas and vital points.

Added to the above is PLA’s stress on its doctrine of fighting Local Wars under informationalised’ Conditions; this concept was first articulated in China’s National Defence White Paper of 2004. Thereafter, PLA has laid solid foundations for fighting information and cyber wars. Thus, before any physical operations take place it would be the information and cyber domains which would be used to cripple the adversary’s capabilities. PLA’s expanding capabilities in the use of space for military purposes provides it with the means to enhance its command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information and cyber warfare capabilities.

The PLA formations in Tibet have been provided with additional fire power, precision and long range capabilities. Their organisational structures have also been streamlined.

Further, the PLA has understood that their strategy of active defence depends largely upon achieving a high level of joint capabilities. Their concept of War Zone Campaign aims at the use of “elite and sharp arms” (special operations troops and their wherewithal) to be inserted behind enemy lines and seizing important ground to make a political statement (gaining initiative by striking first remains the essential lynchpin of its active defence strategy). If political objectives are achieved, then the forces are withdrawn, otherwise a quick battle is to be fought to force a quick resolution.

WZC is likely to be conducted at an intermediate level between the theatre and operational levels. It would be a joint and integrated campaign conducted under joint HQs with support from the Military Regions. At some level, WZC which involves the use of rapid reaction forces (RRF) can be compared with our “cold start doctrine” which aims at achieving allotted mission in a short span of time with Integrated Battle Groups. Both concepts are greatly dependent upon ushering in elements of the RMA and the practice of a high level of jointmanship.

What needs to be noticed is that PLA is sharpening its claws in Tibet in concert with increasing number of incursions or so called ‘transgressions’ of PLA across the Line of Actual Control. This stance of assertive PLA in Tibet has been made possible by the massive build up of logistic structure in Tibet to include extensive railway network and over 58,000 kilometres of roads. The roads have been built up to Indian borders and have also penetrated Nepal. This would ensure smooth induction of the PLA troops in any contingency. Not only that, China has initiated diplomatic talks with Bhutan to come understanding with the tiny kingdom on the border issue. If the influence of China on Bhutan increases then it would open another avenue of approach to India in certain contingencies.
PLA’s rising capabilities combined with enhanced levels of jointness and integration in the PLA need to be looked at seriously by India’s politico-military decision-makers.

No doubt India has recently embarked on activating its old airfields along Sino-Indian border and the MOD has chalked out a plan for building extensive road net work and other infrastructure facilities but our record in implementing plans and projects has so far been very tardy.

Further, standards of integration and jointness in our armed forces leave much to be desired. Even though Naresh Chandra’s Task Force in their recent report has recommended the institution of the post of a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, it nevertheless is a climb down from the Chief of Defence Staff recommended earlier by a Group of Ministers in 2001. HQ Integrated Defence Staff created for enhancing jointness and integration does not have adequate powers or wherewithal to enforce jointness or integration.

We also need to pay attention to increasing military assets in the space for enhancing our C4ISR capabilities. Surveillance and radar cover on our Northern borders is weak and needs augmentation at the earliest. And lastly, RMA in our armed forces has been proceeding at a glacial pace given the prevailing politico-bureaucratic environment. All this is leading to widening of the capability gap between the PLA and our armed forces. One thing which needs to be remembered is that weakness invites aggression.