Showing posts with label India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label India. Show all posts

Monday, January 15, 2018

India's Pakistan and China Policies must be Based on Realism not Hope

14 Jan, 2018 | Amb Satish Chandra, Dean, Centre for National Security and Strategic Studies, VIF

India's relations with Pakistan and China have been deeply troubled for several decades. With Pakistan, this has been the case since its inception, and with China since the 1960's. We have disputed borders with both countries and have been engaged in four hot wars with the former and one with the latter.
These troubled relationships are not of India's making. Indeed, India has left no stone unturned to establish peaceful and harmonious ties with both countries and towards this end has made many concessions.
Some of the notable concessions made to Pakistan by India may be listed as: payment of Rs. 55 crores in January 1948 on account of division of assets even while under attack by the former in Kashmir, non-pursuit of its claims vis-a-vis Pakistan for no- payment of the pre-partition debt of Rs. 300 crores, giving Pakistan 80 percent of the flows of the Indus basin rivers along with over 62 million pound sterling for building canal works under an overly generous Indus Waters Treaty, returning to Pakistan the 5386 square miles of its territory captured in the 1971 conflict without exacting a quid pro quo, obtaining concurrence of Bangladesh for the return of nearly 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India under the joint India-Bangladesh Command, facilitating Pakistan’s re-entry into the Non Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1979 and into the Commonwealth in 1989, unilaterally according Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to Pakistan, and most recently under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government, giving up its opposition to the European Union’s move to allow duty free entry to Pakistani textile manufactures at the cost of its own textile exports.
As with Pakistan, so too with China India's foreign policy has been excessively conciliatory. Some instances of such an approach that readily comes to mind are the adoption of the ‘One China’ policy and extreme caution exercised in developing ties with Taiwan, ardent promotion for the end of China’s isolation and expansion of its links with the third world, refusal to countenance the possibility of securing a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in the 1950's and insistence that the seat should instead first be given to China, renunciation of India's special rights in Tibet along with the recognition that Tibet is an autonomous part of China, the failure to expose China for its hegemonic tendencies and for its breach of innumerable understandings with us, and the timidity shown in expanding the role of the US, Japan, Australia and India ‘Quad’.
Given the extraordinary moves made by India to befriend Pakistan and China, it is prima facie perplexing that relations with both countries are at such a low ebb. While Pakistan seeks to bleed India though a ‘thousand cuts’ and openly uses terror as an instrument of foreign policy against it, China uses its leverages to undermine India's rise through a variety of means like opposition to our joining the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), pressure on our borders with Tibet by delaying its settlement and making unwarranted intrusions and claims, adoption of a ‘string of pearls’ strategy on our periphery to constrain us, disregarding our legitimate sovereignty concerns by pushing ahead with China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) etc. To make matters even worse, Pakistan and China have been colluding together against us for decades with the former being nothing short of the latter's proxy to keep India in check. In this context, it should not be forgotten that at the core of the Sino-Pak relationship are their military ties and at the core of their military ties is the support provided by China to Pakistan to enable it to emerge as a nuclear armed state.
In devising appropriate policies towards Pakistan and China, it is imperative to understand their respective motivations and why despite all our endeavours they continue to have an adversarial relationship with us.
In so far as Pakistan is concerned, anti-Indianism is a part of its DNA. Having failed to evolve a firmly rooted and unifying sense of identity, Pakistan has found value in anti-Indianism as a glue to hold the country together. This has metamorphosed into a search for parity with India leading it to become a security state with daunting democratic and development deficits. The Pakistani Establishment, with its strong military core, has consistently promoted the demonization of India as a means to perpetuate itself in power, to justify high levels of defence spending to maintain national unity. In these circumstances, no matter what concessions India makes Pakistan will persist with its machinations against it. Indeed, Parvez Musharraf in a speech in Karachi in April 1999 admitted that even if the Kashmir issue was resolved problems with India would persist.
China's approach to India is the product of its past mindset, whereby its norm is a natural dominion over everything under the heavens. Hence its quest for Super Power status. It has already become a regional hegemon unable to countenance multi-polarity in Asia. This, inevitably, places it on a collision course with India with its Pavlovian urge to undermine the latter's rise by all possible means. In these circumstances, China's antagonism to India, though not as deep rooted as that of Pakistan, is nevertheless fundamental and impossible to erase or even mitigate. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that it disputes our entire border with Tibet and has claims on Arunachal Pradesh. The latter constitutes a part of China's so called "lost territories" like Taiwan or the South China Sea islands which it is committed to recover. Brutally put, until and unless, India does not kowtow to China on all issues of import to it like the CPEC, give up its strategic autonomy, and meekly accept whatever crumbs it is offered in terms of a border settlement, amicable ties with it are not in the realm of possibility.
In view of the foregoing, India's ties with Pakistan and China have a bleak future. Placatory moves are uncalled for and could even be perceived as signs of weakness. India, instead, needs to pursue hard-headed and sustained policies aimed at undermining these countries to the extent possible and deter them from moving against us.
The Modi government is on the right track by pursuing firmer policies vis-a-vis Pakistan and China than those attempted in the past.
With Pakistan, the free hand given to the Army to respond to cross-border infiltration, the surgical strikes, non-resumption of the composite dialogue process, highlighting of human rights violations committed by Pakistan in Baluchistan and elsewhere as well as in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), the sustained and vigorous projection of Pakistan as a terrorist state, the endeavours to move towards full utilisation of Indus Waters in accordance with our Treaty rights etc. are steps in the right direction. The following additional measures could also be considered:-
1. The campaign to project Pakistan as a terrorist state may be intensified so that international sanctions are imposed on it, which inter alia, lead to suspension of military and economic assistance as well as targeted actions against the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and military officials by way of travel and financial restrictions.
2. Confidence Building Measures (CBM) like grant of MFN status to Pakistan must be terminated, not only to hurt Pakistan but to carry conviction with the international community about the depth of our concerns on its export of terrorism.
3. An Act of Parliament may be passed declaring Pakistan a terrorist state, and placing restrictions on our grant of any special facilities to it like the MFN, reducing the size and level of our diplomatic presence in that country etc.
4. While speeding up the maximisation of use in India of the Indus Waters Treaty, notice should be served on Pakistan for renegotiation of the Treaty under which we get only 20 percent of the waters while having 40 percent of the catchment area.
5. Pakistan’s fault lines must be ruthlessly exploited in Baluchistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Towards this end we should carry out a relentless campaign against the human rights violations perpetrated by Pakistan in these areas. We should also evolve a considered refugee policy in keeping with our traditions under which we should provide asylum to all who wish to flee from Pakistani tyranny.
6. We should highlight the atrocities being committed by Pakistan in the areas of Jammu & Kashmir under its illegal occupation and reach out to the Kashmiris residing there.
7. We should not hesitate to resort to covert strikes to take out terrorist elements and their supporters in Pakistan.
8. Contingency plans for surgical strikes should be developed expeditiously so that following another 26/11, which is always a possibility, these can be undertaken within a matter of hours.
The Modi government's firmness in dealing with China is reflected in its exemplary handling of the Doklam crisis and its principled and steadfast opposition to the CPEC. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done. The following are some specific moves that could be considered as a part of a get tough policy vis-a-vis China:-
1. Relentless pressure should be maintained for an early settlement of the boundary dispute, and in particular, on the need to evolve a common understanding on the alignment of the Line of Actual Control.
2. Appropriate counters to Chinese pinpricks such as border intrusions, stapled visas, arming of Pakistan, Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, opposition to India’s quest for membership of the NSG, and blockage in the UN of the listing of Masood Azhar as an international terrorist should be evolved and exercised.
3. The intensification of our ties with the US and military exercises with it on land, air and sea, as well as with other regional players like Japan, Australia etc. must not only be continued but strengthened as a hedging strategy. Additionally, we should encourage these countries to conduct air and land exercises with our forces in J & K and Arunachal Pradesh. The Quad should be invigorated with regular meetings held at a higher level for an all-encompassing dialogue on security, economics, environment and connectivity related issues. Ties with countries on China's periphery that feel similarly threatened by it, like Vietnam, South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia etc., should be assiduously invigorated, including by provision of military assistance.
4. Much as the PM did in his interaction with the Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) parliamentarians recently in Delhi, we need to expose the hegemonic and grasping nature of China in juxtaposition to India's cooperative and non-threatening outlook. This should become a regular feature in all our interactions in the region, and extend also to the other harsh truths about China, like its genocide in Tibet and Sinkiang, the environmental degradation that it has wrought and the plans it has on the use of waters to the detriment of the lower riparians.
5. We should also consider playing the Tibet and Sinkiang cards through the prism of human rights. Disaffected elements who seek asylum may be accorded the same. In order to play the Tibet card, it is imperative to maintain close links with the local Tibetan community, to make known our empathy for them, to gradually distance ourselves from our recognition of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as a part of China, to prepare for the post Dalai Lama situation, and to ensure that the Karmapa is critical of China's moves against Tibetans.
6. Expression of sympathy for the Uighurs who have been victimized by China in much the same manner as the Tibetans is not only a suitable riposte to its role in Kashmir and CPEC, but it would also immeasurably improve India’s standing in the Muslim community at home and abroad. It will also shatter Pakistan’s efforts to project itself as the champion of Islam the world over.
7. Finally, our economic and commercial links with China need to be reconfigured. These currently work in China's favour and are detrimental to our interests at multiple levels. At the most superficial level, our enormous $50 billion trade deficit with China is a drain on our balance of payments situation and is of major benefit to China. Indeed, in just one year it effectively finances the CPEC! The situation is, however, much more insidious. Cheap imports from China are destroying our industries in many areas ranging from active pharmaceutical ingredients to telecom. They are also resulting in an unhealthy dependency on China. In order to reverse this dangerous trend and wean ourselves away from the opiate of cheap Chinese imports, we need to ensure the success of the ‘Make in India’ campaign. This would most effectively be accomplished by the revival of our traditional pride in swadeshi together with a policy designed to speedily create a much more friendly industrial environment which enables our manufacturers to compete with the best in the world in terms of quality and price. Creation of such an environment will demand adoption of policies which promote innovation, technology transfer, lower input costs, and required infrastructural necessities. These remedial steps should be accompanied by the curbing of Chinese imports through a variety of measures where possible like countervailing duties, non-tariff barriers etc. China's investments and projects in sensitive sectors should also be eschewed.
The contention that such a tough approach towards Pakistan and China will provoke retaliation does not hold good as they are already doing their worst. Furthermore, there are limits on how far China would wish to engage in adventurism vis-a-vis India given the fact that this would set it back by decades in its quest for parity with the US which is its overriding long term objective.
In conclusion, it goes without saying that the proposed more muscular approach towards Pakistan and China must be accompanied by a series of measures designed to rapidly upgrade our comprehensive national power.
(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

Friday, January 12, 2018

क्या ‘वन बेल्ट वन रोड’ चीन में आर्थिक उथलपुथल ला सकता है?

12 Jan, 2018 | Prerna Gandhi, Research Associate, VIF

सन 2000 के बाद ही लगातार कई अर्थशास्त्रियों द्वारा चीनी अर्थव्यवस्था में गिरावट के कयास लगाये जा रहे थे. लेकिन इन सभी को गलत साबित करते हुए न केवल चीन की अर्थव्यस्था स्थिर रही बल्कि हाल ही में दस ट्रिलियन डॉलर की कीमत के सकल घरेलु उत्पाद (जीडीपी) वाले देशों के समूह में भी शामिल हो गयी है. हालाँकि उस समाजवादी देश में इस बात का अधिक श्रेय, निजी क्षेत्र को बढ़ावा देने वाली नीतियों को जाता है जिनके कारण बेहतर रूप से संसाधनों का बंटवारा कर पाना संभव हुआ. इसके पश्चात भी चीन के लिए आगे की राह आसान नही है.
छद्म बैंकिंग सेक्टर, जिसपर सरकार की कोई पकड़ नही है, की बढ़त के साथ-साथ यू. एस. फेड्रेअल रिज़र्व रेट में इसकी भेद्दता एवं बढ़ते हुए घरेलू कर्ज के चलते चीन की वित्तीय देनदारी बेहद जटिल होती जा रही है. ऐसे समय में ही चीनी-स्टाइल मार्शल प्लान का एक नमूना पेश करते हुए वन बेल्ट वन रोड (बीआरआई) जैसी महंगी परियोजना को फंड करना चीन के लिए एक व्यावहारिक नीति कतई नही है. इस परियोजना में चीन का निवेश अधिक है, जिसके तहत 2016 की अवधी तक अंतर्राष्ट्रीय एवं घरेलू स्तर पर परियोजनाओं की लागत लगभग पांच सौ बिलियन डॉलर1 है और पूरी तरह से बनने में इस परियोजना में लगभग 4 से 8 ट्रिलियन डॉलर की लागत आएगी. अमेरिका के मार्शल प्लान में केवल एक भू-भाग शामिल था जबकि चीन के बीआरआई में एशिया, अफ्रीका, यूरेशिया, ओशिनिया समेत सात भू-भागों में फैला हुआ है.
चीन की अत्यधिक क्षमताओं का उपयोग करना ही बीआरआई का असल आधार है जिसके साथ ही चीन की ऊर्जा एवं संसाधनों को भविष्य की आवश्यकताओं की पूर्ती हेतु संरक्षित किया जा सकेगा. लम्बे समय से लगातार बेहतर होती चीन की आर्थिक स्थिति ने मुद्रा का अवमूल्यन करते हुए, बड़ी मात्रा में औद्योगिक अति-क्षमता एवं बड़ी बचत और इसके साथ ही असंतोषजनक पूँजी आवंटन जैसी स्थतियों को जन्म दिया है जिससे नियमित निरिक्षण में गिरावट हुई है. हालाँकि चीन के बाह्य कर्जों की लागत सकल घरेलू उत्पाद का केवल 13 प्रतिशत है फिर भी चीन का यह आंकड़ा अनुमानित डेब्ट-टू-जीडीपी अनुपात का 270 प्रतिशत पहले से ही है. (2016 के आँकड़े).
राज्य के स्वामित्व में सकल घरेलू उत्पाद के लगभग 115 प्रतिशत बराबर उद्दम है जिनसे देश की वित्तीय स्थिरता कमजोर पड़ सकती है विशेषकर जब राजकोषीय घाटा2 अधिक हो रहा हो. पिछले दशक में चीन को लगभग छोटे-अवधी में किये जाने वाले निवेश एवं बड़े, घरेलू पूँजी निवेश से लगभग 3.8 ट्रिलियन डॉलर का नुकसान हुआ था3. धधकती हुई अर्थव्यवस्था को काबू करने के लिए चीन अब निवेश आधारित अर्थव्यवस्था से हटकर उत्पादकता एवं उपभोगता आधारित अर्थव्यवस्था कि ओर बढ़ रहा है. चीन यह समझता है कि मध्यस्थता पूँजी को रोकने के लिए चीन को आधुनिक तकनीक एवं अन्य उभरते हुए क्षेत्रों पर ध्यान केन्द्रित करना होगा, जैसा की अन्य यूरोपीय देश भी कर रहे है जिससे कि प्रतिद्वंदता में तुलनात्मक रूप से चीन को लागत की कमी हाँसिल हो सके. आज सेवा (50.2प्रतिशत) की चीन के सकल घरेलु उत्पाद में हिस्सेदारी उद्योग (40.2प्रतिशत) से अधिक है4
इस तरह से तकनीक, पूँजी एवं श्रम से परिपूर्ण उद्योग, बेहतरीन आधारभूत संरचना से चीन ने सभी को एक अच्छा मंच उपलब्ध करवाया है जिससे चीन को भी उभरती हुई चुनौतियों से लड़ने में मदद मिलेगी. हालाँकि चीन की अर्थव्यवस्था इतनी तेजी से बढ़ रही है कि तीन दशक से भी कम समय में वह ‘विश्व की दूसरी सबसे बड़ी अर्थव्यवस्था’ बनने के बेहद करीब ही है और यह अपनी दो सदी पुरानी ‘विश्व की सबसे बड़ी अर्थव्यस्व्था’ होने की ख्याति वापस पाना चाहता है. 2009 की प्रथम तिमाही से 2014 के तीसरे तिमाही तक चीन ने अपने सकल घरेलू उत्पाद के लगभग 139 प्रतिशत बराबर बचत की थी. इससे पूर्व अमेरिका एवं जापान ने भी इस तरह की भारी बचत की थी जिसके पश्चात् वे मंदी के बेहद बुरे दौर से गुज़रे थे.
अमेरिका ने 2002-07 में अपने सकल घरेलू उत्पाद का 58 प्रतिशत बचत किया था. उसके बाद वहां मंदी का बहुत बुरा दौर छाया था. जापान ने भी 1985-90 के बीच अपने जीडीपी के बराबर बचत की थी और उसके पश्चात 20 साल से अधिक समय तक अपस्फीती का दौर देखा था जो घटती हुई सांख्यिकी5 एवं महत्वपूर्ण परिवर्तनों की आवश्यकता की अनदेखी से दीर्घकालिक हो गयी थी. बैंक ऑफ़ इंटरनेशनल सेटलमेंट द्वारा जारी सितम्बर 2016 की रिपोर्ट के अनुसार चीन आने वाले तीन वर्ष में आर्थिक परेशानी से पीड़ित हो सकता है6. अतः चीन की तेजी से बढती हुई आर्थिक वृद्धि से अपरिहार्य वित्तीय विस्फोट टल भी सकता है या बेहद जल्दी भी आ सकता है क्यूंकि अत्यधिक बचत से निवेश की गुणवत्ता में कमी आएगी और इसके साथ ही बड़े मुआवजों के लिए जमानत की आवश्यकता भी पैदा हो जाएगी.
बेल्ट एवं रोड पोर्टल पर दर्ज बीआरआई की प्राथमिकताओं में नीति-सहयोग, सुविधाजनक जुडाव, बेरोकटोक व्यापार, वित्तीय समावेशन एवं व्यक्ति-से-व्यक्ति को जोड़ना शामिल है. मई 2017 में एशिया एवं प्रशांत क्षेत्र में आधारित संयुक्त राष्ट्र आर्थिक एवं सामाजिक आयोग ने अपनी एक स्टडी में दक्षिण-मध्य एशियाई देशों में वित्तीय समस्यायों की चिंता जताई, विशेषकर उन देशों में जहाँ बीआरआई के तहत चीन का कुल निवेश उस देश की अर्थव्यवस्था के लगभग बराबर है. रिपोर्ट कहती है कि,“एक बड़े पैमाने पर आसानी से दिए जाने वाली आधारभूत संरचना से सम्बंधित परियोजनाओं को ऋण अगर विशेष छूट के साथ भी दिए जायेंगे तो उनसे छोटी अर्थव्यवस्था वाले देश जिनमे वित्तीय बाज़ार अभी अविकसित है और जो ऋण-प्रबंधन7 में कुशल नही है, से उनकी व्यापक अर्थव्यवस्था (मैक्रोइकनोमिक) कमजोर हो सकती है. 2013 में चीन-उज्बेकिस्तान के बीच हुई 15 बिलियन डॉलर की निवेश डील उसके जीडीपी का एक चौथाई भी नही थी. इसी तरह चीन-कजाखस्तान सहयोग समझौता जो 2015 की शुरुआत में तय हुआ था और पाकिस्तान के साथ 46 बिलियन डॉलर का समझौता जो अप्रैल 2015 में तय हुआ था, इन देशों की जीडीपी का एक-पञ्च भाग है. संयुक्त राष्ट्र की एक स्टडी के अनुसार चीन-पाक के बीच प्रतिबद्धता अब 62 बिलियन डॉलर तक पहुँच गयी है. इसके साथ ही चीन और बांग्लादेश के बीच तय हुई 24 बिलियन डॉलर की डील भी बांग्लादेश की जीडीपी8 का लगभग 20 प्रतिशत है88. हो सकता है कि चीन की दिलचस्पी अपनी पूँजी को पुनःनिर्देशित करने तक सीमित हो, पर यदि ऐसा नही होता है और इस ऋण से चीन को उम्मेदानुसार लगान नही मिलता है, तो बीआरआई ऋण चीन के पहले से ही लदी हुई वित्तीय व्यवस्था पर एक और बोझ बनकर रह जायेंगे.
आधारभूत संरचना को ‘नेटवर्क इफ़ेक्ट’ की आवश्यकता है जिससे उन्हें पहले से ही मौजूद आधारभूत संरचना के साथ अधिक जुडाव मिले. इससे अधिकाधिक लोग इसका उपयोग कर सकेंगे और इससे अधिक मात्रा में लगान वसूला जा सकेगा. इससे वाजिब तौर पर नीति-सहयोग की आवश्यकता पैदा हो जाती है. हालाँकि बीआरआई के मसले पर चीन शायद असल भू-राजनीती को अनदेखा करते हुए प्रोत्साहन राशी पर अधिक ध्यान केन्द्रित कर रहा है. इस छूट से लोगों का व्यवहार इस बात से प्रभावित होगा कि उन्हें क्या दिया जा रहा है. प्रोत्साहन राशी आधारित पक्षपात से लोगो को यह समझाने का प्रयास किया जा रहा है की आखिर क्यों अपने निजी हितों से ग्रस्त लोग उस जगह के लोगों के हितों बेहतर करने के लिए अग्रसर है. चीन शायद यह सोचता है कि देश मौद्रिक प्रोत्साहन राशि व् सस्ते ऋणों से प्रभावित होंगे और स्वयं ही चीन की नीतियों का सहयोग करेंगे.
यह भी संभव है की एकल अथवा संस्थागत तौर पर इसका प्रभाव रहे. पर एक देश पर इन सबका प्रभाव इतनी आसानी से नही होता क्यूंकि वहाँ अन्य कारक भी मौजूद होते है. नीति-निर्धारण में शुरुआती स्तर पर भ्रम हमेशा ही बने रहते है और आम तौर पर प्रथम चरण की नीतियाँ अक्सर अधूरी ही होती है. इसलिए ऐसा संभव है की चीन अभी पक्षपाती पुष्टिकरण से ग्रस्त हो या फिर अपने काम की जानकारी को ग्रहण कर अन्य पर ध्यान न देने की आम मनुष्य प्रवर्ती से पीड़ित हो.
निष्कर्ष में, चीन का शीर्ष नेतृत्व आने वाले खतरे के बारे अधिक सतर्क है. हाल ही में, चीन को सभी प्रमुख अंतर्राष्ट्रीय आर्थिक एवं वित्तीय संस्थानों द्वारा चेतावनी मिल चुकी है. मूडी की रेटिंग में भी चीन पिछड़ गया है. इसी वर्ष अप्रैल में चीन के राष्ट्रपति शी जिनपिंग ने ‘राष्ट्रीय वित्तीय बाज़ार कि सुरक्षा’ के विषय पर बैठक बुलाई थी. अब तक के सबसे घाटेदार वर्षों में से एक होने की पुष्टि के एक दिन बाद ही इस बैठक का आयोजन किया गया था. इस बैठक में सेंट्रल बैंक के गवर्नर समेत अन्य महत्वपूर्ण गणमान्य हालाँकि उपस्थित तो थे, परन्तु कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी का मुख्य निर्धारक मंडल पोलितब्यूरो भी इसमें शामिल था और उन्होंने इन वित्तीय जोख़िमों पर उचित कदम उठाने की बात भी कही, यह इस बात को प्रमाणित करता है कि उनके बीच महत्वपूर्ण स्तर पर इस बात की स्वीकृति बन चुकी है9. 18 अगस्त 2017 को चीनी-स्टेट काउंसिल ने बीआरआई में नकली एवं तर्कहीन निवेश को रोकने के लिए एक नियमावली भी जारी की थी. अब क्यूंकि बीआरआई की चर्चा 2013 से ही जारी है इसलिए इस वर्ष में जून तक के लिए राज्य-अधिकृत चीनी निवेश कंपनी ‘सीनोंश्योर’ द्वारा कई उद्धमों एवं बैंकों को 1.73 बिलियन डॉलर का मुआवज़ा दिया गया है10. बताई गयी यह रकम कम भी हो सकती है क्यूंकि कई बीआरआई की मुख्य परियोजनाएं उम्मीद के अनुसार लगान नही वसूल कर सकीं. जिस नाटकीय ढंग से वेनेजुअला जैसे अमीर देश जिसपर चीन आर्थिक रूप से बेहद मेहेरबान था11, कि अर्थव्यवस्था ध्वस्त हो गयी और पाकिस्तान, जो चीन-पाकिस्तान कोरिडोर से बेहद फायदा लेने की बात सोच रहा है, भी सामानांतर स्थिति में है. इस तरह क्या चीनी नियामक बेल्ट एवं रोड में आने वाली वित्तीय समस्यायों को सुलझा पाएंगे ये तो अब निर्णायक द्वारा ही तय हो पायेगा.
सन्दर्भ:
1. Pricewater Coopers: China and Belt & Road Infrastructure, 2016 review and outlook, February 2017,https://www.pwchk.com/en/consulting/br-watch-infrastructure.pdf
2. Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2017: Governance and Fiscal Management, Chapter 2. Perspectives from Sub-regions, http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Chapter2-Survey2017.pdf
3. Forbes: Why China Lost About $3.8 Trillion To Capital Flight In The Last Decade, February 22, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2017/02/22/china-capital-flight-...
4. National Bureau of Statistics of China: Composition of GDP, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/html/0302EN.jpg
5. South China Morning Post: China’s credit excess is unlike anything the world has ever seen, April 21, 2017,http://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/2089577/can-worlds-l...
6. Reuters: BIS warns China banks risk crisis within three years, September 19, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banking/bis-warns-china-banks-r...
7. Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2017, Governance and Fiscal Management, Pg. 68,http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/publications/Survey%202017-Fi...
8. Economic Times: UN warns about financial risks in China’s One Belt One Road project, May 25, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/un-warns-about-financi...
9. Bloomberg: How China Is Tackling Dangers in Its Financial System, October 10, 2017 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-09/how-china-is-getting-...
10. China's insurance industry invests RMB700 bln for B&R construction, August 21, 2017, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/home/rolling/24203.htm
11. Bloomberg: Is Pakistan China's Venezuela?, November 27, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-11-27/is-pakistan-china-s...
(लेख में लेखक के निजी विचार हैं और वीआईएफ का उनसे सहमत होना आवश्यक नहीं है)

Thursday, January 11, 2018

Emerging India European Union Cooperation in Western Indian Ocean

11 Jan, 2018 | Commodore Somen Banerjee, Senior Fellow, VIF

Donald Trump’s exhortation for European Union (EU) to do more for their own security, coupled with ‘Brexit’ has spurred the EU to review its security framework. This has been further convoluted by an assertive Russia and rising influence of China. Whilst Russia might serve as a strong unifying factor, China’s economic muscle exposes the divisiveness and fragility of the EU. A combination of these elements provided the justification for consolidating a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in June 2016. Consequently, the European Community kick-started the process of formulating its EU Global Strategy (EUGS) which led to the adoption of a ‘defence package’. These nascent developments have been indeed transformational, but a wee bit ambitious. The greatest challenge for the EU probably is to keep its own flocks together and to exact equitable contribution of resources from each of its members, which might be hard to come by. These internal contradictions within the EU eventually manifest itself as capability deficit, as EU spreads itself thin around the globe. In this backdrop, India is perceived by EU as the most potent partner for maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), more specifically in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) theatre.
Challenges and Prospects in West Indian Ocean (WIO)
Littorals of the WIO have been beset with non-traditional threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, trafficking and weapon smuggling. Piracy off Somalia has been a unifying factor that has resulted in a near constant presence of combined task force led by the US, EU-Naval Forces (EU-NAVFOR), Japanese, Chinese and Indian navies. However, the cause has been made tenuous by China with the deployment of disproportionate forces in the Indian Ocean. China has seized it as an opportunity to burnish its skills on expeditionary operations for prospective use in future. The Maritime Silk Road has further dotted the Indian Ocean with permanent Chinese influence. Thus Indian Ocean is being upended irreversibly into volatile waters, akin to the South and East China Sea. Whilst official discourses on land often appear reassuring, they utterly belie the rising tensions at sea. The two prominent regional forums, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) have made significant contributions in raising awareness and coalescing the efforts of IOR nations. However, these initiatives have been largely ineffective in reducing maritime crimes and geopolitical tensions. Thus the Western Indian Ocean affords immense potentials for security cooperation amongst stakeholders, including the EU.
Ability to control the oceans does not translate naturally into regional stability. It requires sustainable and inclusive growth of the region through empowerment. Whilst, the spawning strategic rivalries would require a more nuanced approach and long term trust building, non-traditional threats can be tackled by effective international cooperation and inter-agency coordination. Capacity building of littoral states through multi-sectoral approach can generate considerable local goodwill for India against strategic threats and build confidence amongst littorals in the IOR. It needs transparent and comprehensive strategy that combines military coordination with civilian aspects on legal, public outreach policies, investigations of financial flows etc. These social enterprises promise better results when strengths of all stake holders are pooled in through partnership and tend to engender better regional cooperation.
EU’s Maritime Security Policy in WIO
EU’s Security and Defence Implementation Plan (SDIP) is premised on three core priorities, viz. response to external crisis, building capacities of partners and protecting its citizens through external actions. However, internal mechanisms within the EU, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on defence are still evolving. Often it is difficult to locate the exact nodal authority dealing with issues within the EU. Notwithstanding, these organizational infirmities, EU has made remarkable progress in dealing with maritime security of WIO which has enabled EU to create considerable footprints in East Africa. The multi-sectoral and comprehensive maritime security programs include the Maritime Security (MASE), EU Capability-building (EUCAP) Nestor in the Horn of Africa, EU Critical Maritime Routes Indian Ocean (EU CRIMARIO) and Djibouti Code. Few of these programs are on the verge of closing, but have left an indelible impression on East African littorals. The ongoing programs of EU in the WIO are as follows:
• The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) concerns repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the WIO and the Gulf of Aden. It was adopted on January 29, 2009 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa. DCOC has been amended by Jeddah Amendment in January, 2017 to include ‘blue economy’ for sustainable development. EU has played an active role in implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) as an ‘observer’ by facilitating the creation of the Information Sharing Centers (ISCs) in Yemen, Tanzania and Kenya as well as a Maritime Training Centre in Djibouti to enhance maritime security in the WIO.
• The EU program for promoting regional maritime security under the aegis of MASE ensures continuity and coordination between various civilian capacity building projects of the EU, including coordinated action on finance flows through Critical Maritime Routes Law Enforcement Agencies (CRIMLEA), inland economic development and governance projects. MASE provides a holistic approach to combating crime in East Africa.
• EU has been assisting the Indian Ocean Commission for operationalizing the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Madagascar and Regional Maritime Operational Coordination Centre (RMOCC) in Seychelles.
• EUCAP Nestor, headquartered at Mogadishu is a civilian mission that works exclusively for development and self sustenance of capacities in Somalia for maritime security. Community workshops, legal seminars and many more activities undertaken by the EU are helping in capacity building of the social community to combat security issues.
• EU CRIMARIO is a program launched by the EU for enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the WIO. Under this program EU would set up two IFCs, one each in the North and South Indian Ocean.
Indian Ocean Commission
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) was conceptualised in 1982 to harness the collective strengths of its member countries - Comoros, France / Reunion, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles and facilitate their integration into the global economy by pooling resources and sharing knowledge and technologies. The countries of Indian-oceanic region geographically stand at the crossroads of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) between Asia and Africa. Since its creation 30 years ago, IOC had primarily focused in the areas of diplomacy, trade, environment and human development. However, at the turn of the millennium, security and infrastructure development have also emerged as constituents of regional integration. In order to transform into a regional transshipment hub, IOC has adopted a comprehensive approach through port modernisation, security of sea lanes and setting up of an efficient regional maritime feeder system. Interestingly, these aspirations of IOC align well with China’s strategic aims in the IOR. China has demonstrated the nimbleness to snatch the initiative for developing ports, roads and digital connectivity in these island states. Seychelles has been the greatest beneficiary of Chinese endowments in terms of infrastructure and maritime patrol ship. Thus, China has not only succeeded in establishing a strategic bridgehead in the region, but also managed to drive a wedge in IOC’s regional cohesion, as it has done in EU and ASEAN. These are indeed ominous developments for France and India, being resident states of the IOR.
India – France Cooperation
France has the unique distinction of being a member of both the EU and the Indian Ocean. Thus it enjoys the plentitude of EU’s economic resources as also the strategic locale of the IOC. India’s relationship with France goes back many decades, especially in defence cooperation. Indian Armed Forces have benefitted from acquisition of front line equipment in the past and bilateral cooperation in Defence have congealed over the years. The ‘Varuna’ naval exercise forms the fulcrum of France–India strategic relationship along with other constituents of defence cooperation. The partnership has been consistent even in the past under the rubric of ‘India France Partnership for Future – 2010’. A first-ever bilateral dialogue on Maritime Security of the IOR was held in January 2016, which paved the way for enhanced cooperation on maintaining the safety of sea-lanes for trade and communications, countering the threat of piracy and maritime terrorism, maritime domain awareness and fostering trade and economic links in the IOR.
Partnership between India and France was further strengthened by the Government of India by hosting the French President as the Chief Guest at India's 67th Republic Day Celebrations in 2016. It was the fifth time that a French Head of State was invited as the Chief Guest on India's Republic Day celebrations, making France the country that has been extended this honour the highest number of times so far. Developing security infrastructure with France in WIO countries could enhance mutual support during peace, crisis and conflict.
India – EU Cooperation
The evolution of EU - India relationship from the 1960s to 2004 resided primarily in the realms of economic and commercial ties, taking into consideration the fact that the EU is a customs-union. Pursuant to the initiation of EU-India Strategic Partnership in 2004, these relationship moved beyond economics to encompass co-operation on security. A change in leadership in India in 2014 provided further fillip to security cooperation with the EU and led to the adoption of ‘Agenda for Action 2020’ during the Brussels Summit in 2016. This extended the security policy into the domain of maritime co-operation. Consequently, EU Naval Force and the Indian Naval ships engaged in joint manoeuvres (PASSEX) off the coast of Somalia in October 2017 after a long hiatus, thus rekindling the convergence and interoperability that already existed. Aspects of maritime security in the IOR have been further emphasised during the 14th Annual Summit between India and the EU held in New Delhi on October 06, 2017. Terrorism, freedom of navigation, over flight and security of the global commons – sea lanes, cyber space and outer space - were also reiterated during the summit. EU and India have resolved to comply by the norms of International Law, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 to address disputes at sea, contrary to insolent and hegemonic approach adopted by some nouveau regional powers.
As aforesaid, EU and France boast of substantial footprints in the WIO. Fortuitously, the complementarity of Indian and EU’s approach towards maritime security provides the perfect recipe for close cooperation between the two. By synthesising their capacities in the WIO, EU and India could emerge as the bellwether for net security in the IOR. However, India would also have to walk the talk and resort to a more nuanced approach in the region that is multi-sectoral, boosts regional cooperation, enhances regional institutions and aggregates civilian and military capabilities.
Proposed Approach for India in WIO
Due to her geographical location in the IOR, India enjoys significant flexibility in shaping the operations and calibrating its response, whilst retaining her strategic neutrality. India has been a benevolent force in the IOR with immense capacity to respond to the traditional and non-traditional crisis. This has been amply demonstrated during a multitude of occasions in the past, operations Cactus in Maldives (1988), intervention in Sri Lanka (1987), Tsunami (2004), Op Rahaat (2015) for evacuation from Yemen, to name a few. Whilst Indian Navy, shipping and airlines may be able to provide succor to its own nationals, other countries in the IOR have great expectations from India and look up to India for assistance, especially during a crisis. Hence, India’s response would have to be commensurate with its own percept as a net security provider. In this regard, collaboration with partners such as the EU can help plug the voids to deal with a large region such as the IOR.
On the matters of maritime security there are opportunities for cooperation between India and EU. At the tactical level the nuts and bolts of operational employment are compatible due to the existing interoperability and standard operating procedures (SOP) built over the past years. The difficulty though is in the incongruity of approach towards the governance on regional security. Under these conditions, a synergetic approach with the EU could assure greater promises for success. Hence it would be prudent for EU and India to aligning their organisations and SOPs to the extent feasible. The measures that could enhance India’s stature as a net security provider in the WIO are as follows: -
• Join the International Maritime Agreement (IMO) led Djibouti Code as an ‘observer’ and participate in capacity building of the Information Sharing Centers (ISCs) and training.
• Enhance the capacity of WIO counties for combating marine crimes (trafficking, illegal fishing, piracy etc.) in line with the EU CRIMLEA program under the aegis of MASE program.
• Engage with the Somalian society through civilian initiatives like the EUCAP Nestor program to empower them for sustainable maritime security. Community workshops, legal seminars can help capacity building of the social community to combat security issues. This will also help deeper linkages with the Somalian security and government organisation.
• Sign white shipping MoU with the CRIMARIO program launched by the EU for enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the WIO.
• Provide technical assistance to IOC led Information Fusion Center (IFC) in Madagascar and a Regional Maritime Operational Coordination Centre (RMOCC) in Seychelles.
• Develop joint infrastructure with France in WIO countries for mutual support during peace, crisis and conflict. Continuation of exercises Varuna by the Navies and Shakti by the Armies will facilitate review of SOPs and interoperability.
Conclusion
Although India and the EU have been strategic partners for over a decade, not much headway has been made, despite the existence of ample scope for cooperation. Ability to control the oceans does not translate naturally into regional stability. Therefore, India’s desire to become a net security provider in the IOR cannot be military centric. As a preeminent power in the Indian Ocean, India needs to involve proactively in civilian components of capacity building in East Africa, just as it has done in Afghanistan. A holistic and transparent approach will improve governance on regional security in the WIO and indeed ensure long-term stability in the IOR. Cooperation with EU could enable India to achieve speedy penetration into the African security system, instead of starting ab initio. In this respect, EU’s financial muscle and existing footprints in the IOR provide immense opportunities for India to emerge as a net security provider in the WIO.
(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

Wednesday, December 6, 2017

Updates on Nepalese Elections

Prof Hari Bansh Jha

6 Dec, 2017

In the process of implementing the most controversial constitution promulgated on September 20, 2015, Nepal government completed local level elections for the 753 Village Councils/municipalities between May and September this year in three phases. Recently, it completed the first phase of provincial and parliamentary elections on November 26 and the next phase of elections are due on December 7.
In the first phase of the parliamentary and provincial polls conducted in 32 districts on November 26, there were 37 seats for the federal parliament and 74 seats for provincial assemblies. The first phase of polling on November 26 was by and large peaceful though there were, according to media reports, nearly 100 minor incidents. According to the Election Commission, voter turnout was around 65 percent.
The second phase of the elections on December 7, will cover 45 districts in which there are 128 federal parliament seats and 256 provincial seats. Of the 90 political parties registered with the Election Commission (EC), 48 parties are contesting elections for the federal parliament seats; while 53 parties are contesting elections for the provincial assemblies.
In the 275-member House of Representatives, the Lower House of Parliament, 165 members will be elected on First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) basis; while 110 members will be elected on proportional representation (PR) basis. Similarly, in the Provincial assemblies, there are 550 seats in which 330 candidates will be elected on FPTP and 220 candidates on PR basis. Most importantly, women form 55 percent of the total federal and provincial PR candidates. 1 Political observers find this a welcome development in terms of enabling greater empowerment of women in the political process which no country in the region has been able to even aim for, much less achieve.
The elections for the 59 member-National Assembly, the Upper House of Parliament, will be held indirectly by the chairpersons/deputy chairpersons, mayors/deputy mayors, provincial assembly members and federal parliament members after the completion of provincial and federal parliament elections.
Among the contestants of federal election PR candidates, 30.93 percent candidates are from the Khas-Arya group followed by indigenous nationalities (28.82 percent), Tharus (6.64 percent), Dalits (13.86 percent), Madheshis (15.62 percent) and Muslims (4.14 percent). Similarly, among the candidates for provincial elections, 30.55 percent candidates are from Khas-Arya group followed by indigenous nationalities (27.88 percent), Tharus (7.1 percent), Dalits (13.46 percent), Madheshis (17.31 percent) and Muslims (3.7 percent). 2
Table No. 1 indicates that Province No. 3 has the largest number of Federal Parliament/Provincial Assembly seats (20 percent); while Province No. 6 has the smallest number of seats (7 percent). Next to Province No. 3, Province No. 2 that has predominantly Madheshi population has 19 percent seats, followed by Province No. 1 (17 percent) seats, Province No. 5 (16 percent) seats, and Province No. 7 (10 percent) seats.
Source: Al Jazeera - http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/11/nepal-elections-2017-explained-171126103009857.html
However, nearly half of the total electorate out of 14 million, was excluded from exercising their voting rights in the local elections.3 Around five million Nepalese working in the Gulf and other parts of the world were debarred from voting in the elections. Also, excluded from voting were the 700,000 government employees in the country. This has been adversely commented upon by political observers as a serious lacuna in the election process that, to an extent, makes the exercise less representative in character. EC will have to eventually find a way out of this in the future.
Significantly, a recent study shows that the elections in Nepal are eventually going to be the most costly affair in terms of money spent per elected candidate. During the local level polls, Rs. 5,000 was spent per voter in the country. This calculation is based on the figure that Rs. 69.42 billion was spent during the three phases of the elections in May, June and September 2017 in which the number of voters was 14.1 million.4 This includes all the expenditures made by the state, the candidates, the EC, the security agencies and different poll observer groups. Of the total expenditures made on the elections, 63 percent of the amount was spent by the candidates.
Violation of the election cost of conduct has become a common affair. Most of the candidates contesting the elections for the local units, provincial and federal parliament have been spending money far beyond the limit fixed by the EC. There are also reports that the government has also violated the code of conduct as appointments, transfers and promotions for key positions were rampant in the wake of the elections.
Amongst all the major political parties in the country, Madhesh-based Rashtriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) is only one that has raised the issue of rights for the deprived communities like the Madheshis, Tharus and Janajatis. All other political parties, including the main players like the Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) have confined themselves to developmental issues, ignoring the aspirations of the rights-related issues of the deprived groups.
On the issue of foreign relations, the ruling Nepali Congress Party leaders during their election campaign have been professing maintainance of balance in relations with India and China. However, leaders of the Left Alliance comprising the CPN-UML and the CPN-MC often projected anti-India and pro-China stand. 5 Both the CPN-UML and the CPN-MC want so-called unequal treaties with India such as the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship to be abolished. However, the Madhesh-based RJPN is not in favour of any change in maintaining special relations with India.
Not much attention has been given on educating the voters, particularly in the remote regions of the country.6 Even the 123 foreign election observers who are here in Nepal to assess the polls are interested more in extending their stay in the country till the formation of next government rather than focusing on such issue.7
Of late, some election observers from the European Union countries have courted controversy as they are perceived to be engaged in monitoring provincial and parliamentary polls acting beyond their jurisdiction/mandate. Therefore, the EC has called back two of its observers, including Lars-Goeran Plagmanand Eva Suhonen from Kanchanpur district. Immediately afterwards, the British organization, Department for International Development (DFID), has also come into controversy. Currently, four international organizations, including the Carter Centre, the European Union, Asian Network for Free Elections and Peru-based Ankawa International have been allowed to monitor polls.8
Anti-election activities by certain unidentified groups are being conducted on a large scale in the country. Cases of frequent clashes, particularly between the ‘left alliance’ and ‘democratic alliance’ forces during the political campaigns are common. 9 A number of senior leaders of both the left and democratic fronts have been targeted with bomb attacks both in the Terai and hill districts in which many people were injured. Because of such violent activities, many of the voters and also those involved in polls campaigns are scared. There had not been polls-related violence of such magnitude in the country in the past.10Therefore, the law enforcement agencies have been experiencing severe challenges to control the situation.
Despite the inbuilt challenges in carrying out electoral exercise at such a massive scale in a country with little or no experience in participative democracy, the elections are likely to be completed in Nepal in a peaceful manner and within the given time frame. As such, there will be no major hurdle in the formation of a new government as mandated by the new constitution except in the likely event of the voters throwing up a bitterly fractured mandate. If that were to happen, Nepal will once again witness the familiar game of alliances and realignments leading to continued political instability as has been the case right from the time the first CA was formed and which continued in the second CA as well.
However, a question of greater concern for the nascent democracy will be whether the election process will be able to sow seeds of strong and stable democracy in the country to make the process of people’s representation inclusive and equitable. Already a view prevails that the system chalked out does not adequately addresses the concerns of the deprived and marginalized sections of the population, including the Madheshis, Tharus and other Janajati groups, in regard to the formation of federals states, population-based elections, inclusivity and citizenship related issues are yet to be addressed in the constitution.
This will have to be taken up by the governments that are formed in the aftermath of the completion of the electoral process. The issues that had been raised by different sections of the population after the promulgation of the new constitution should not be forgotten, even though the task of nation building, economic management, developmental activities and above all completing the task of relief and rehabilitation to the victims of the devastating earthquake of 2014 will assume primacy.
(Dr. Jha is Executive Director of Centre for Economic and Technical Studies in Nepal)
Endnotes
1. Ibid.
2. Post Report, “Women account for 55pc of total PR candidates,” The Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu: November 20, 2017.
3. Ghimire, Yubraj, “Next Door Nepal: Much ado about nothing,” The Indian Express, November 27, 2017.
4. Shrestha, Prithvi and Ghimire, Binod, “Elections becoming ‘unnaturally expensive,” The Kathmandu Post, November 18, 2017.
5. Ghimire, no. 1.
6. Pradhan, Tika R, “EC helpless against poll code violators: Ovservers,” The Kathamndu Post, Kathmandu: November 25, 2017.
7. Ghimire, no. 1.
8. Himalayan News Service, “Two European Union observers barred from monitoring polls,” The Himalayan Times, Kathmandu: November 25, 2017.
9. Post Report, “Parties clash in different districts ahead of polls,” The Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu: November 25, 2017.
10. Sedhai, Roshan, “With more attacks, anxiety over poll security grows,” My Republica, Kathmandu: November 19, 2017.
(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

Image Source: http://www.forevernews.in/nepal-polls-vote-count-underway-75026

Thursday, November 23, 2017

"China's Internal Dynamics, Cyber Security and Relations with India"

The Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) organized a seminar titled "China's Internal Dynamics, Relations with India & Cyber Security", along with the Prospect Foundation from Taiwan on 01 November 2017. Dr. Arvind Gupta, Director VIF, and Dr. Tan-Sun Chen, Chairman, Prospect Foundation, delivered the opening remarks. Dr. I-Chung Lai, Dr. Yi-Bin Lu, and Mr. Fan Peng participated from the Prospect Foundations whereas Mr. Jayadeva Ranade, Amb. TCA Rangachari, Dr. Sujit Dutta and Lt Gen Davinder Kumar represented the Indian side. The Taiwanese Representative in India, Chung- Kwang Tien, Mr. Jason Huang, Mr. Chihlung Sheng, and Mr. Oliver Harn also participated. Many senior members of the strategic community, scholars from think tanks and universities attended the seminar.
The discussion was divided into three sessions: One, ‘Evaluation of 19th Party Congress; two, ‘China’s Rising Cyber Power’; and three, ‘A Case for India-Taiwan Strategic Cooperation’. Opinions expressed by the Taiwanese delegation in each Session are enumerated in the succeeding paragraphs.
Session 1 : The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, who holds fourteen formal positions (more than any other CCP leader so far) has emerged stronger from the 19th Party Congress. The biggest takeaway from the 19th Party Congress was that there are no apparent successors, leading to strong speculation that Xi could seek a third term after concentrating his power. The Party Congress emphasised that the People’s Liberation Army should focus on realising ‘Chinese Dream’ for which it should develop “a new military strategy under the new situation”. China will complete the modernisation of its armed forces by 2035 and achieve a world-class military by 2050 that can fight and win wars across all theatres.
Session 2: China has leveraged cyber-enable theft of intellectual property to create its critical mass. Its ‘Internet Plus’ strategy will further help in building its cyber space capacity. However, China is unlikely to be a dominant cyber power as it has inward looking focus. Democratic countries are more deliberate and hence they can build better cyber power in the long run.
Session 3: India and Taiwan have democratic governments and can identify cyber security as a strategic enabler of their unofficial relations. Both have the potential to pool together critical mass capability for strategic cooperation in cyber security.
Event Date: 
November 1, 2017

Saturday, November 4, 2017

Commentary - J&K: Special Representative’s Road Ahead will not be Easy


 
Arvind Gupta, Director - VIF

Appointment of Mr Dineshwar Sharma , former Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB), as special ‘Representative’(SR) by the government for Kashmir to interact with the wide cross section of society in Kashmir to understand their “legitimate aspirations” is a positive and bold step. While there have been many calls for a dialogue in Kashmir, most analysts had surmised that the government would continue to follow a hardline approach. Yet, the government has managed to surprise every one and taken the initiative in its hands. The appointment of Special Representative has the Prime Minister’s support.
It is also a timely step because over the last few months the government has been able to bring the law and order situation under control. PM spoke of a conciliatory approach on Kashmir,“…..Nagoli se, nagali se………”, from the Red Fort. The Home Minister has undertaken several visits to Kashmir. Some stability has returned to Kashmir. The Government waited for this moment. This is the right time for the Government to launch an initiative in Kashmir. By conducting operations against terrorists, the Government sent a signal that lawlessness and terrorism will be tackled with a firm hand.
The Government move also shows that it is ready to follow a multi-pronged strategy in Kashmir. A firm approach in dealing with terrorism is being complemented with a political approach. The move has been generally appreciated by the stake holders although some criticism has been made that the interlocutor should have been a ‘political’ personality rather than an ex-DIB. But the credentials of the new SR are impeccable and this has been accepted by all. Further, being a non-political personality, he is better placed to have an unbiased approach.
The important point to consider is how the process will move further. Only time will tell. In the past there have been several initiatives which did not succeed. The state of J&K has gone through a turbulent time in the last one year or so. So, it is natural that there would be heighted expectations as well as skepticism. The Hurriyat seems to be rejecting the dialogue with SR but one will have to wait and watch how the situation develops when the he begins his work.
The media will have a role to play in the success of the initiative. Hyper-ism should be avoided and no artificial deadlines should be imposed. The process should be allowed to take its own course. The political parties, one hopes, will keep national interest rather than narrow partisan interests uppermost while reacting to the initiative. Also, it would be better that expectations are tempered down and kept more realistic.
The previous initiatives did not succeed. Why? The issues involved are complex and carry the historical baggage of 70 years of history during which many mistakes were made by all sides. Also, the external sponsorship of terrorism and militancy has complicated the problem immensely.
Be that as it may, the special Representative should have an open mind. He should listen to all sides without preconceived notions. Now that the government has decided to appoint a Representative, he should be open to discussion with the entire political spectrum and all sections of the society.
However, one thing has to be kept in mind. Talks and violence cannot go hand-in-hand here. Talking cannot be a license for violence. Similarly, the security forces cannot afford to lower their guard against Pak sponsored infiltrators and tanzeems. Those who instigate violence should be dealt with in accordance with law. Further, lessons should be drawn from the previous experiences. A proper assessment of the earlier episodes should be made and factored in.
In an interview to The Hindu (31 Oct 2017), The Mr Dineshwar Sharma said that government’s focus is on bringing “permanent peace” in Kashmir. “Permanent solution and peace can only be brought about the dialogue”, he said. He stated that the government has given him “a free hand to speak to anyone” as he wanted. The people of Jammu and Ladakh would also be included in the dialogue. The final call, however, will be of the Government.
It is not difficult to guess what issues might be raised by different stakeholders. Some of these would be: Article 370, autonomy, self-rule, pellet guns, socio-economic development, Pakistan’s role, terrorism, Kashmiri Pundits, aspirations of the youth etc. Some questions are of political nature while others will be of socio-economic development, cultural character. The regional disparities – the aspirations of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Poonch etc. would also be raised. Some sections may even boycott the SR, just to make a point or gain publicity. The SR should take all this in his stride.
Different stakeholders would have varying agendas. This can be expected. Sometimes, these agendas are irreconcilable. But the government should be cautious. The agenda of the radical elements, jihadis and separatists should not be allowed to succeed. The initiative cannot be a road to disintegration of India.
The J&K Representative’s efforts deserve to be supported but the road ahead will not be easy.
(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF.)

Image Source: http://www.newindianexpress.com/topic/Dineshwar_Sharma