Key to Conflict Management in Kashmir is People, Politics and Perception

Brig Narender Kumar

Violence is a type of backwardness and it is enormously powerful tool to coerce the communally fractured population to revolt against the state. But sustaining the uprising would need psychological mentoring and shaping of the perception of the people against the state. Physical violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) commenced in early 90’s but passive aggression that targeted multi-cultural and multi-religious society started much earlier. In fact, Pakistan found a deadly mix of direct violence with cultural and structural violence to target secular and democratic institutions of the state.

Johan Galtung a Norwegian Peace Researcher said, “Structural violence is injustice and exploitation built into a social system that generates wealth for the few and poverty for the many, stunting everyone’s ability to develop their full humanity.” The political and administrative system created an environment where the administrative machinery is manipulated to benefit few with the result that the majority is deprived. He further says, “Cultural violence is the prevailing attitudes and beliefs that justify and legitimize the structural violence, making it seem natural.”¹ Cultural violence is acceptance of social, political and cultural ills as part of the system. When combined with the direct violence it denies the space for reconciliation. If the conflict in Kashmir is empirically examined, Pakistan has taken advantage of cultural and structural violence that existed in Kashmir to exploit the fracture and void created by political and administrative system. Pakistan just used the governance deficit to set in motion an asymmetric and hybrid war.

The state responded firmly against the direct violence but left the fast receding public and private space uncontested that was slowly acquired by radicals and proxies of Pakistan. It is an irony that neither political leadership nor other organs of the state could identify the multi-dimensional aspects of this war. The disaffection and perceptional change has not come suddenly but it is the result of a well-choreographed strategy by Pakistan through its proxies to shape the perceptions of the individuals and the society. Pakistan itself is surprised at the success of their hybrid war strategy in Kashmir and except for dealing with terrorism, India has found it hard to confront other dimensions of the hybrid war. It could be due to lack of understanding or lack of asymmetric and hybrid capabilities to respond back to Pakistan.

After three decades of conflict in Kashmir physical violence has done lesser harm to the Kashmiri society but cultural and structural violence has caused irreversible damage. Pakistan was aware that they cannot fight and win war on Kashmir militarily but will have to adopt a strategy of direct and passive aggression (passive aggression is difficult to detect till it has already achieved the operational objectives and is one of the most potent component of hybrid war). As part of the passive aggression Pakistan put into effect two strategies. The ‘inner front strategy’, by working against the state from within, focused on creating a perception that people of Kashmir are victim of Indian occupation and Kashmir is not an integral part of India. The strategy created a psychological hatred towards the symbol of India and a perception that political system is a puppet regime imposed on people of Kashmir. Thus eroded and discredited administrative and political system of J&K. Second, ‘misperception strategy’ by weaving seamless blend of facts and fictions at such a rapid pace, ultimately controls the perception of the people and fog their logic to decipher truth from lies. This was being done when India was largely focused on dealing with the terrorism and these two strategies almost went unnoticed. But what was going behind the fog of mistrust and misrepresentation was neither effectively contested nor disrupted.

What did Pakistan do to Destroy the Enlightened Values of Kashmiris?

Pakistan, through its proxies and modules, commenced obliteration of history and culture from collective memory of the people and society. Pakistan and its proxies targeted the very platform that bonded with other cultures, faith and societies by denouncing Sufism, Kashmir folk culture, music and Kashmiri poetry as un-Islamic practice and Hindu conspiracy against the Muslims of Kashmir. Pakistan found that biggest impediment in creating a space to fight from within Kashmir were Kashmiriyat, Shrine and Sufism. Pakistan proxies found it easy to indoctrinate youth and difficult to alter the faith of the older generation from Kashmiriyat, Shrines and Sufism. Simultaneously, it blocked and disrupted the intellectual discourse among the people of different faith and community. In order to kill memory and collective wisdom they chose to kill the sense of judgment of the people and social order by calibrated violence and targeting the institutions that were custodian of societal conscience. Pakistan through their proxies destroyed everything that belonged to the people so that they could write new narrative to create disaffection with India. The stone pelting, intolerance among people and youth against the symbol of India is the outcome of this passive aggression of Pakistan that went uncontested for over three decades now.

The characteristics of Pakistani propaganda is that it is generating very strong emotions, aggression, and has managed dramatic departure of society from the reality. ² The manufactured lie and web of misinformation by Pakistan has created societal amnesia that has managed to disorient and destroy the cultural heritage that had survived for more than 2500 years. Pakistan on one hand targeted cognitive domain of the Kashmiri Awam and on other side it targeted Indian state. In reality, Pakistan managed to pitch people against the state. This is one of the objectives of hybrid war which Pakistan has ably achieved.

The contours of asymmetric and hybrid war started emerging clearly sometime post 2005 when terrorism and violence was brought to a manageable limit by security forces. But the inability of the state in deliverance of governance gave a window of opportunity to Pakistan to shift gear and put in place more lethal hybrid war in practice. In fact, the dimensions of non-linear warfare are very wide and are very difficult to contain once it gets space to operate. India committed cardinal mistakes when it defined conflict in Kashmir as militancy, and later as proxy war. On the political front within Kashmir, successive governments termed it as separatist’s movement but probably they overlooked the contours of conflict that were indicative of more lethal hybrid war. But if the trend lines are examined carefully, it has all the ingredients of a potent hybrid war and response thereof should have been hybrid in nature. To consider that such a war can be handled by military was a miscalculation and the government continues to commit this cardinal mistake even today. One must realise that elimination of terrorists is insignificant if state is unable to win back the trust of the people.

Condition of Kashmir today is similar to Rome when Roman Empire fell and state plunged into chaos and unfolded an era that was characterized by barbarism, intolerance and regression. What happened in Rome was in complete contrast to the cultural richness of earlier society of Rome. Similarly, Kashmir is plunging into an irretrievable chaos in contrast to its culture that propagated peace, prosperity and co-existence of pluralistic society. In spite of the repeated invasion on Kashmir it maintained principle of co-existence of multiethnic and multi religious societies that were strengthened by enlightened values of the Kashmiri culture. The Kashmiriyat survived because the past invaders attacked the physical characters of the state but did not attack the enlightened values of Kashmiriyat. Whereas, Pakistan has been shrewd enough to identify this aspect and systematically dismantled the enlightened values of Kashmiriyat to change the course of the conflict. Herbert Schillar had said free and equal access to knowledge act as bulwark to meet the democratic aspirations of the people and nation. ³ Problem of Kashmir is that the access to knowledge has been blocked through a narrative propagated by radicals by converting the very temples of knowledge (Education Institutions) into radicalisation centers that denounced the Kashmiriyat and cultural heritage.

Has Pakistan Disabled Kashmir Politically and Psychologically?

Once the state is fractured on ethnic, religious and cultural lines, dysfunctional and corrupt administration provides an ideal target for psychological warfare and a strategic window of opportunity to a shrewd adversary.⁴ A peace and war scenario has been fatally blurred in Kashmir and unfortunately the security forces and intelligence agencies have completely overlooked and misjudged the potential of this dimension of hybrid war in Kashmir. This phenomenon is evident from the fact that tourism, education, health services, law and order, developmental activities and public grievances system has collapsed and stand completely eroded. Democratic institutions stand marginalised and discredited. Drug menace, black marketing of essential goods, smuggling of timber and fake currency have become backbone of a parallel conflict economy. A state without liberty and individuality has no future and that is what Pakistan has managed to do with the people of Kashmir. On the name of self-determination people have no voice of their own and the emotions are controlled and charged by proxies. People seems to be slaves of the dictates of the terrorists and separatists. People know the disastrous consequences of the harm Pakistan has done to the current and future generations of Kashmir but the anti-India sentiment is so strong that people refuse to see the logic. It is evident that Pakistan has effectively disabled Kashmir politically and psychologically.
The government should acknowledge that application of military force is not a solution to the complex problem of Kashmir. It is psychological, attitudinal, social, political and economic. Government should worry more about wining trust of the people back and let the terrorism be handled by the security forces.

It is a Different War that India Needs to Defeat

Is there something repeatedly irrational that India continues to choose to fight hybrid war by conventional means? General Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of Russian Armed Forces, wrote that “The very rules of war has changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals have grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness especially against hybrid threat.”⁵ Domination of informational battle has become essential components of modern warfare and it cannot be left uncontested. The information war has no relation to reality and is a provocation that is employed to disorient the population, security forces and to create a window of opportunity for non-state actors to exploit the exposed flanks. Whereas, counter measures should hit the enemy with strategies that appear noble and benign and operate completely outside the conventional domain. One of the principles of fighting a hybrid war is that there is no moral taint to fight it because hybrid war is fought in moral and immoral domain. Thus moral high ground in combating hybrid or unrestricted war is willful acceptance to fight with a handicap and it is a retrograde strategy.

Focus of the Government of India and J&K should be to win the trust of the people. No nation can achieve greatness by defeating its own people. Ultimately the people should emerge winner because state consists of its people. Thus rhetoric and media barbs needs to be moderated so that it does not give an impression that state is fighting against its own people. The perception in valley is that India is against people of Kashmir. This perception needs to be altered through continuous interaction and reconciliatory discourse. The Gerasimov doctrine on hybrid war calls for the fundamental blending and integration of the non-military means with the conventional and sub conventional military tools. What India should learn from the Gerasimov doctrine is the coordination between military and non-military actors with an objective to deal with direct, cultural and structural violence. Hybrid war requires people centric focus, the space that is acceded to non-state actors or proxies can be regained by deliverance of governance and a sustained psychological and information war by involving people of Kashmir.

It will be fatal to believe that India will be able to defeat the hybrid threat from Pakistan while fighting it in Kashmir. Kashmir war has to be fought in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), Baluchistan and even at global level. It is absence of strategic thinking if India choses to fight the Kashmir war within Kashmir; it is important to deny exposed flank to reverse the threat where it hurts the most. Government should handle Kashmir under the following verticals:-

• Fight Hybrid war with hybrid resources. Military and non-military resources should be applied in a synergized manner to address each aspect of nonlinear character of hybrid war in Kashmir. It will bear fruits if it is continuous and maintained at a sustained pace.
• Focused and concerted efforts to defeat strategy with a superior strategy. There is no moral taint to invoke ‘strategy of inner front’ and ‘misperception strategy’ against Pakistan. The loss to Pakistan should be unbearable. Julius Caesar had said, “No one is so brave that he is not disturbed by something unexpected”. ⁶ India must look at unexpected and beyond the conventional limits.
• If the centre of gravity is the people, in that case first and foremost is deliverance of governance. If political leadership fails to achieve this, it must be executed professionally by an executive council consisting of professionals, politicians, bureaucrats and law enforcing agencies of high integrity.

Conclusion

Application of a strategy must have continuity, consistency and surprise factor. Synergy and simultaneity is a must to deal with an adversary that has mastered the art of asymmetric and hybrid war. To defeat passive aggression, India must bridge the void and deny exposed flanks. Essence of fighting such a war is, ‘give no targets before you strike back’. Every strategy has an ideal counterstrategy,⁷ it is unlikely that all strategies will favour Pakistan, some strategies could be employed to reverse the threat and those strategies need to be identified and exploited. Policy makers must remember that at times killing and elimination of terrorists and insurgents unite their ranks and files in desperation. Undue highlighting of the success achieved by security forces could be counter-productive and may lead to alienation of the population further. There is a need to show humane side after the terrorists and insurgents are eliminated especially with the friends and family.

There may be a wisdom to follow what Machiavelli said, “assault a disunited city to seize it” and “unite a divided city so as to hold it”. ⁸ Wise of the city must sit down to bring back the memory of peace, tranquility and communal harmony that protected the Kashmiri culture for more than 2000 years, making efforts through reconciliation to reorder, reunite and restore sanity in Kashmir. Indian policy makers must remember what Edward Luttwak said, “Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counter-insurgency operations”.⁹

Endnotes

1. William T. Hathaway, Varieties of Violence: Structural, Cultural, and Direct, Transcend Media Service, October 21, 2013.
2. Armand Gosu and Octavian Manea, The Russian psychological warfare, Accessed from http://www.roec.biz/bsad/portfolio-item/the-russian-psychological-warfare/ on October 19,2017.
3. Rebecca Knuth, Libricide: The Regime-sponsored Destruction of Books and Libraries in the Twentieth century, Praeger Publications, P 34.
4. Armand Gosu and Octavian Manea, The Russian psychological warfare, Accessed from http://www.roec.biz/bsad/portfolio-item/the-russian-psychological-warfare/ on October 19,2017.
5. Mark Galeotti, “The Gerasimov Doctrine and Russian Non-linear War”, July, 2014. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine...
6. Robert Greene, The 36 Strategies of War, Viva Books Pvt Ltd, 2006, P 317.
7. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International Security, Accessed from https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001... on Oct 20,2017, P 104.
8. Patrick J. Coby, Machiavelli’s Romans: Liberty and Greatness in the Discourses on Livy, Lexington Books, 1999, P 127.
9. Raj Shukla, Review Article Counter-Insurgency Warfare as Military malpractice by Edward Luttwak published in CLAWS Journal Summer 2012.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF)

---

Image Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.in/yashwant-deshmukh/dear-rajdeep-i-am-not-com...

Commentary - J&K: Special Representative’s Road Ahead will not be Easy

 
Arvind Gupta, Director - VIF

Appointment of Mr Dineshwar Sharma , former Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB), as special ‘Representative’(SR) by the government for Kashmir to interact with the wide cross section of society in Kashmir to understand their “legitimate aspirations” is a positive and bold step. While there have been many calls for a dialogue in Kashmir, most analysts had surmised that the government would continue to follow a hardline approach. Yet, the government has managed to surprise every one and taken the initiative in its hands. The appointment of Special Representative has the Prime Minister’s support.

It is also a timely step because over the last few months the government has been able to bring the law and order situation under control. PM spoke of a conciliatory approach on Kashmir,“…..Nagoli se, nagali se………”, from the Red Fort. The Home Minister has undertaken several visits to Kashmir. Some stability has returned to Kashmir. The Government waited for this moment. This is the right time for the Government to launch an initiative in Kashmir. By conducting operations against terrorists, the Government sent a signal that lawlessness and terrorism will be tackled with a firm hand.

The Government move also shows that it is ready to follow a multi-pronged strategy in Kashmir. A firm approach in dealing with terrorism is being complemented with a political approach. The move has been generally appreciated by the stake holders although some criticism has been made that the interlocutor should have been a ‘political’ personality rather than an ex-DIB. But the credentials of the new SR are impeccable and this has been accepted by all. Further, being a non-political personality, he is better placed to have an unbiased approach.

The important point to consider is how the process will move further. Only time will tell. In the past there have been several initiatives which did not succeed. The state of J&K has gone through a turbulent time in the last one year or so. So, it is natural that there would be heighted expectations as well as skepticism. The Hurriyat seems to be rejecting the dialogue with SR but one will have to wait and watch how the situation develops when the he begins his work.

The media will have a role to play in the success of the initiative. Hyper-ism should be avoided and no artificial deadlines should be imposed. The process should be allowed to take its own course. The political parties, one hopes, will keep national interest rather than narrow partisan interests uppermost while reacting to the initiative. Also, it would be better that expectations are tempered down and kept more realistic.

The previous initiatives did not succeed. Why? The issues involved are complex and carry the historical baggage of 70 years of history during which many mistakes were made by all sides. Also, the external sponsorship of terrorism and militancy has complicated the problem immensely.

Be that as it may, the special Representative should have an open mind. He should listen to all sides without preconceived notions. Now that the government has decided to appoint a Representative, he should be open to discussion with the entire political spectrum and all sections of the society.

However, one thing has to be kept in mind. Talks and violence cannot go hand-in-hand here. Talking cannot be a license for violence. Similarly, the security forces cannot afford to lower their guard against Pak sponsored infiltrators and tanzeems. Those who instigate violence should be dealt with in accordance with law. Further, lessons should be drawn from the previous experiences. A proper assessment of the earlier episodes should be made and factored in.

In an interview to The Hindu (31 Oct 2017), The Mr Dineshwar Sharma said that government’s focus is on bringing “permanent peace” in Kashmir. “Permanent solution and peace can only be brought about the dialogue”, he said. He stated that the government has given him “a free hand to speak to anyone” as he wanted. The people of Jammu and Ladakh would also be included in the dialogue. The final call, however, will be of the Government.

It is not difficult to guess what issues might be raised by different stakeholders. Some of these would be: Article 370, autonomy, self-rule, pellet guns, socio-economic development, Pakistan’s role, terrorism, Kashmiri Pundits, aspirations of the youth etc. Some questions are of political nature while others will be of socio-economic development, cultural character. The regional disparities – the aspirations of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Poonch etc. would also be raised. Some sections may even boycott the SR, just to make a point or gain publicity. The SR should take all this in his stride.

Different stakeholders would have varying agendas. This can be expected. Sometimes, these agendas are irreconcilable. But the government should be cautious. The agenda of the radical elements, jihadis and separatists should not be allowed to succeed. The initiative cannot be a road to disintegration of India.

The J&K Representative’s efforts deserve to be supported but the road ahead will not be easy.

(Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VIF.)

---

Image Source: http://www.newindianexpress.com/topic/Dineshwar_Sharma

The J&K Flood Disaster : Overcoming Effects on The Security Paradigm

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

In 2005, one of the major considerations for the inauguration of the Karvan-e-Aman, the Srinagar- Muzaffarabad Bus Service, was the projection of a contrast which was expected to be perceived by the POK travellers between the standard of development on the Pakistan occupied side and that on the Indian side of Kashmir. That contrast has always existed. Yet, in one devastating night on 6/7 Sep 2014 the fury of the Jhelum has virtually equated the two sides of the LoC, laying bare vast stretches of human habitation, destroying livelihoods, habitat, much ancient architecture, and J&K’s famed products; papier-mâché, saffron, carpets, pashmina; just about everything one associates with the Valley’s great culture and tradition. Rightfully almost all the media coverage has concentrated so far on the human tragedy, involving displacement, health and sanitation, relief work, brave heart stories of courageous people, the deep and committed involvement of the Armed Forces, the youth’s energetic heroism and the negatives, involving governmental paralysis. Enough has been written on that, and a sensitive media has rightly ensured that no attempt was made to analyze the security paradigm of J&K and how that has undergone a change, post the flood.

But with 14 terrorists gunned down in Kashmir in September 2014, a reviving and brooding discontent in the flooded streets, much antipathy generated by the deliberate efforts of the separatists, and a vast vacuum created for recruitment of discontented people towards the gun, J&K has the potential of once again turning into a tinder box. This needs some analysis. It is not as if everything is going to happen overnight, but turbulent situations always have their seeds sown by uncontrollable events. The earlier these are recognized, the better it is for the security environment.

The prevailing complexities of a situation emerging from 25 years of terrorism and proxy war have been further complicated by the displacement of people and the trauma brought by the flood. Just prior to the disaster, alarm bells had already been sounded about the reemergence of militant activities, particularly in South Kashmir. In the current situation and its aftermath, the unpredictability factor increases exponentially thus adding trauma manifold. It is perhaps wishful thinking that the excellent rescue efforts by the Army will translate into openly displayed and fulltime goodwill; instead, it may remain a grudging goodwill unless a conscious effort is made to get into the groove of outreach as follow up. In fact, to assess the psyche of the distraught population of Srinagar is currently almost impossible.

Kashmir’s media, which influences opinion very largely, was itself paralyzed and has begun to emerge only now, tentatively. The media is not sure how to tackle the ambiguous situation; whether to play to the Separatist galleries, fringe elements, fence sitters, or the establishment. To be completely above all this is almost impossible, and survival instincts dictate a different course each day. To top it there is an uncertain political environment, a lame duck state government, and insufficient energy to retrieve Kashmir and some areas of Jammu from the disaster they have witnessed.

Traumatized people are considered the last ones to have any scope of change in mindsets; if anything, the failure of early return of livelihood and inability to get back their normal lives is going to keep the population even more vulnerable to negativity. The youth’s displayed dynamism is likely to give it greater self-assurance which while being positive on one hand can also be extremely negative if exploited by anti-national elements.

Is this therefore the time to look at national interests afresh and commence a new narrative? The disaster has witnessed a tremendous outflow of positive energy from the rest of India; aid is flowing in, and social media has seen greater focus on aid rather than the usual discussions on ideological and political differences. While people may be traumatized on the one hand, a large segment of the populace of Srinagar has recognized the efforts of the Army and other agencies (notwithstanding the media’s unintended neglect of the youth) in the rescue efforts. Traumatized people also speak the truth and do not turn their backs on their saviors. The Army has little role inside Srinagar city but it can energize other security forces and build on this relationship which is even more important than its relationship with the rural people. Symbolic acts of goodness must continue through the difficult winter months, including holding medical camps in conjunction with the local medical authorities, conducting small scale recreational events in the suburban areas, ensuring disciplined traffic movement of its convoys, and being available for various winter emergencies.

It is the time to unleash positive political activity, even as the people display their open dislike for political leaders for their collective failure. This is essential in an environment where political activity and outreach has been limited to non-existent. It does not necessarily mean that elections must be held on schedule, but the intervening period must not be occupied by anyone other than mainstream political parties of every hue. The critical psychological space cannot be handed over to separatists and their ilk.

All the above contributes to the security environment because J&K can ill afford bandhs, hartals or stone throwing any more. Whether separatist leaders will risk attempting to do this is unclear, but governance must now concentrate on ensuring that no triggers are provided, and this can be best done by being amply sensitive to the needs of winter for all segments of the population in all three divisions of J&K. The upper reaches of the Jammu division are as vulnerable as the Valley. Power, energy and food requirements must be thought through now; medical equipment and medicines must be stocked in plenty. The Army could be requested to enhance its medical resources this winter so that its assistance can be sought without hesitation. NGOs and volunteer organizations, if coordinated properly and with sensitivity, will be only too happy to have rotational presence through winter. Pediatric care in particular will be much in demand.

While winter tourism would be affected because of the absence of hotel rooms and lesser number of house boats in Srinagar, tour operators need to coordinate with the Department of Tourism to ensure that higher and unaffected areas of Pahalgam and Gulmarg continue to be patronized, as this will have a cascading effect on the economy of Srinagar, and the state will not be erased from the tourist map. The common perception will prevail that the Valley is out of bounds due to floods. Perhaps, this could be an opportunity to be exploited to permit more bed and breakfast facilities in the relatively affluent areas of Srinagar which have not been as badly affected by the Jhelum. For the next summer, we may once again revisit the dream mission of promoting rural tourism through facilities constructed in the villages of the upper ‘karewas’ near the Pir Panjal and the Kangan/Narayan Nag circuit.

Military security is being given the last priority here because the Army has amply demonstrated that it can multi-task itself with ease. Anyone who doubted its capabilities can see how it has simultaneously executed rescue in Srinagar and countered infiltration at the upper reaches of Kupwara, even as half its Headquarters was submerged in Badami Bagh. The Army’s multiple capabilities make it the only agency which can ensure not only full understanding of the challenges but also provide the lead in executing the revival through the difficult period of the first winter after the disaster. The critics of the Army’s presence and its outreach to civilian areas in the countryside will now have to take a back seat. In South Kashmir, which has been ravaged almost as much as Srinagar, and in the upper reaches of the Jammu division, the lead agency for reconstruction must be the Army, and there is nothing political about this; the humanitarian message must go starkly to the people of J&K.

There are enough detractors and exploiters of J&K’s disaster, chief being the ‘Nexus across the LoC and the Separatists’. They too may be sensing the opportunity which appears to be presenting itself. The threat is greater than may be realized now, and it is only coordinated and pro-active actions by India’s strategic thinkers, and execution by various agencies which could actually convert the Nexus’ opportunity into our gain. In all this, the people of J&K can emerge once again as the center of gravity just like they always have.

The underlying message in this piece is clear; there is a clear opportunity which has come the Nation’s way; we have the most dynamic political leadership in India in years; Pakistan has never been in the state of paralysis that it currently is; the separatists have also taken a psychological beating. We just need to set aside all other agenda and look at national interest afresh. Mainstreaming J&K more meaningfully may never happen as easily as it can now.

(The writer is a former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar based 15 Corps and the author of the Hearts Doctrine; he is a Visiting Fellow of the Vivekananda International Foundation besides being active on the India-Pakistan Track 2 circuit)

---

Published Date: 6^thOctober 2014, Image source: http://www.bbc.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

The Use of SWAT Units in Indian Homeland Security: Lessons from Mumbai 26/11

Dr Prem Mahadevan, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

The Indian security establishment was fiercely criticized both domestically and internationally for its tactical response to the 26/11 attacks. Some of this criticism was justified, while some was apparently motivated by a deliberate effort on the part of foreign powers to deflect attention from the Pakistani origins of the attack. As subsequent disclosures by Wikileaks have revealed, the United States and United Kingdom, together with their traditional intelligence partners in the ‘Anglosphere’ – Australia, New Zealand and Canada – formed a diplomatic cabal while the attacks were still ongoing, to devise a propaganda strategy that would protect Pakistan from India’s legitimate anger.¹

One aspect of this strategy seems to have been a concerted media campaign to debase the professional reputation and track record of Indian security and intelligence services. It was implied that India bore more responsibility for having allowed the attacks to occur on its soil, than Pakistan did for having allowed them to be planned, financed and rehearsed on its territory. Thus, the Indians were projected as having been more incompetent than the Pakistanis had been treacherous. To this day, perceptions of 26/11 are dominated by memories of police confusion and military slowness, with a degree of personal incompetence also attributed to national and state-level politicians.

In all this, clinical analyses of the attacks have been confined to a handful of experts within the Indian strategic community, and to Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units in the West. Those Western scholars who took the trouble to study the 26/11 attacks in depth, have offered valuable and valid criticism of the Indian security response. They have also had the humility to acknowledge that the tactical challenges posed by such attacks are of an unprecedented nature, and that Western SWAT capabilities have fallen behind the threat curve.² Mumbai 2008 was a wake-up call about the extent of their own vulnerability, and it triggered a frantic search for a new tactical concept.

This article will explain what was ‘new’ about the 26/11 attacks from a tactical incident response perspective. It shall suggest that the current SWAT model which India has copied from the West is unsuited to the task of combating suicidal or ‘fidayeen’ terrorism. This model is optimized for challenges set in the 1970s. It is meant to provide a ‘one-size-fits-all’ template for coping with a dual-faceted threat: accidental as well as deliberate hostage-taking, and its tenets are more inclined towards resolving the former than the latter. In the forty years since, terrorists have adapted to the challenge posed by SWAT units and developed a concept of suicidal operations. These operations are fast-moving and fluid, and need to be countered through systemic changes.

The Myth of a ‘Reverse Stockholm Syndrome’

Readers of this article would be familiar with the term ‘Stockholm Syndrome’. It connotes a situation wherein hostages gradually begin to empathize and identify with their captors, since both are subject to prolonged confinement: the hostages are unable to move within the limited space that they share with their captors, while the captors themselves cannot leave that space because of police encirclement. Over a period of time, both parties see themselves and each other as innocent victims, who must set aside their differences and pull together in order to survive their common ordeal. At least, that is what hostage rescue theorists have long believed to be the case.

The Stockholm Syndrome in its truest sense is assumed to be bi-directional. Hostages begin to rationalize the criminal actions of their tormentors, while the tormentors’ willingness to do the hostages harm is weakened as a result of prolonged association. Thus, the Stockholm Syndrome presages that hostages will try to shield their captors in the event of a SWAT assault, while hostage-takers will momentarily hesitate about harming their victims during that same assault. To a large extent, current SWAT doctrine has been built around the latter assumption in particular – that a reverse flow of empathy from captor to hostage will emerge from a lengthy siege.

This assumption may not be complete nonsense, but it is unsupported by the bulk of real-world counterterrorist experience. Certainly, in isolated cases, eyewitness reports state that terrorists hesitated to shoot hostages even though they knew that they were themselves about to be killed by SWAT assaulters. The 1976 Entebbe raid is an example: even as Israeli commandos charged into the building where hostages were held, one terrorist steeled himself to fire, but desperate pleading from the hostages weakened his resolve and he instead turned to face the commandos. Likewise, in 1997, left-wing terrorists occupying the Japanese embassy in Lima could not bring themselves to execute hostages although SWAT teams were seconds away from shooting them dead.³

Such cases of terrorists rising to a higher degree of morality are rare. Empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to the training concepts of SWAT teams and hostage negotiators, the Stockholm Syndrome seldom occurs in real life.⁴ This is largely due to the deliberate brutality that captors inflict on their hostages in order to gain psychological dominance and shatter the will to resist. Such brutality is especially likely in cases of politically-motivated hostage-taking, where terrorists initiate a hostage situation only after deliberate planning and intense psychological conditioning. In contrast, empathy towards hostages tends to be shown when a hostage situation is inadvertently created – for example, during a bungled robbery. It is worth remembering that the original hostage siege in Sweden which gave rise to the term ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ was actually a bank heist that went wrong.

The Origins of SWAT – Police and Military

Special Weapons and Tactics units were created in the 1970s to provide niche expertise in ending hostage situations and arresting well-armed criminals. There are two types of SWAT units: police and military. Police SWAT originated in the United States, where the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 had severely curtailed the government’s ability to deploy military personnel on US soil. Beginning in Los Angeles, the police SWAT concept was soon replicated across the country. It called for having a quick reaction team of marksmen, armed with military-grade weaponry, who could surround and neutralize dangerous criminals hiding in populated areas, where indiscriminate firing could not be resorted to. ⁵

Military SWAT was pioneered by the UK’s 22^nd Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, through an operation code named ‘Pagoda’. Consisting of two permanent ‘Special Projects’ teams, codenamed ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’, Op Pagoda aimed to provide the British government with a military option for ending hostage situations. The 1972 Munich Olympics massacre had proven that European policemen, unlike their American counterparts, were less trigger-happy and prone to hesitation when ordered to fire upon armed terrorists, even if this was necessary to ensure the safety of innocents. Policemen lacked battle inoculation of the kind that was intrinsic to military special forces units like the SAS.⁶

Both police and military SWAT drilled for scenarios where terrorists would seize a building or airliner, gather hostages, make a few bizarre political statements to publicize their ostensible ‘cause’ and then issue specific, time-bound demands. Throughout all this, it was assumed that the terrorists would want their hostages to remain alive, as insurance against a SWAT assault. This placed the burden of responsibility for a peaceful solution onto the government and led to an implicit deal in the interim: provided the terrorists were not provoked, they would not harm the hostages. Negotiators were instructed to exploit this dynamic and lull the terrorists into thinking that their demands would be eventually met, while SWAT teams gathered intelligence and rehearsed for a rescue mission.

Even at this early stage (the 1970s), there were tell-tale signs that SWAT rescue operations depended for their success on the terrorists’ own mindset. Certain famed interventions such as the 1977 assault on a hijacked airliner in Mogadishu came within a hair’s breadth of failure, due to the hijackers’ willingness to kill themselves along with their hostages. Other incidents such as the 1974 massacre of Israeli schoolchildren at Maa’lot were labelled as botched rescue operations, due to manifestly poor performance by the SWAT personnel deployed on-site. However, even in these botched operations, it was the terrorists’ readiness to slaughter their hostages that sharpened the difference between a partial failure and a completely mismanaged rescue mission with a high death toll.

SWAT in India

To date, India does not have a culture of armed policing, except in counterinsurgency. Even this took a long time to develop. During the 1980s, as Khalistani militants committed massacres in Punjab, bureaucrats dithered over the question of upgrading police firearms. It was felt that a civilian police force had no business carrying military-grade weaponry. Only the relentless death toll inflicted by Khalistani Kalashnikovs, obtained from Pakistan, broke this conservative stance and led to a partial militarization of policing.⁷ One of the innovations introduced was the formation of five commando battalions in the Punjab Armed Police. These battalions helped in turning the tide against the militants by attacking them in their own strongholds along the border, and storming their urban safe-houses.

On the military side, the Indian Army created a counterterrorist unit in the late 1970s, in the form of the ‘Special Group’ within the Cabinet Secretariat’s Establishment 22. The unit saw action alongside regular infantry and Para-Commando troops during Operation Bluestar in 1984, when it was tasked to assault the innermost defences of Khalistanis holed up in the Golden Temple. Despite their training and courage, the Special Group commandos were unable to make headway in the face of murderous small arms fire. Eventually tanks had to blast away the militant fortifications, causing extensive damage to the complex, and lending the entire operation a (false) image of brutality.

Criticism for having used excessive force against its own citizens led the government to create a new SWAT capability under the Union Home Ministry. Known as the National Security Guard (NSG), it was modelled on the German Grenzschutzgruppe 9. However, unlike GSG9 which had a distinct corporate identity, the NSG was a part-civilian and part-military organization. It drew half its manpower from the Indian Army and the remainder from various central paramilitary forces. This haphazard personnel policy led to differentiated operating philosophies, which as counterterrorist experience elsewhere has shown, tends to produce sub-optimal performance from the entire force overall.⁸ Coupled with the rapid turnover rate of officer-rank personnel, it prevented the NSG from growing into an independent entity that could proactively lobby for additional training resources and operational infrastructure.

For the first few years of its existence, the NSG was provided with state-of-the-art facilities for simulating hostage situations and practicing urban combat drills. Subsequently, a lack of maintenance funds led much of this equipment to waste away. The NSG continued to do excellent work in breaking up terrorist networks in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere, but its success was crucially dependent on the quality of intelligence provided by central agencies, as well as the ingenuity of its own personnel in improvising new tactics. In terms of systemic support from the policy establishment, the NSG got little by way of new authority and funding, partly due to economizing trends in government.

Lagging behind the threat

The biggest problem, however, was not resource shortfalls but the changing nature of terrorism itself. Even as the NSG grew into a force of 14,500 men, hostage-takers across the world were discovering that it did not pay to be ‘nice guys’. Whenever they agreed to be reasonable, the situation ended badly for them. For example, in 1994, Algerian terrorists planned to crash a hijacked airliner into the Eiffel Tower. Owing to a lack of operational focus, they allowed themselves instead to be talked into landing at Marseilles, and were killed by GIGN, the SWAT unit of the French gendarmerie. They had come close to accomplishing their mission, but sheer fatigue led them to be swayed. Years later, the 9/11 hijackers ensured that the timeframe of their action was too short for any intervening variables to come between themselves and their intended targets. Even as US authorities thought they were dealing with ‘regular’ hijackings, the World Trade Center and Pentagon were hit, kamikaze-style.

Eagerness on the part of terrorists to attain martyrdom totally changed the nature of hostage-taking. Previously, political hostage-takers were ready to die for their cause if necessary, but preferred to live. If offered a face-saving way out by government negotiators, they tended to accept it. In this, they were not so different from armed criminals in the West who, during the 1970s, would spontaneously seize bystanders as hostages whenever they found themselves in an unexpected shoot-out with policemen. Both accidental and deliberate hostage-takers of that era were open to dialogue, if given time to ponder the hopelessness of their situation and see the merits of surrendering peacefully.

The 1990s and the rise of millennial groups such as Al Qaeda brought a mindset shift into international terrorism. Now, terrorists knew that they could generate more publicity for their cause by killing a lot of people, rather than just taking them hostage and waiting for SWAT units to figure out how best to rescue them. If grabbing such media attention required sacrificing themselves, that was acceptable, since they were anyway assured of sweet benefits in the eternal hereafter. Once terrorist groups adopted a bureaucratic style of functioning, as Al Qaeda did, organizing cadres into specialized departments based on their aptitude, it was easy to create a sub-group of brainwashed suicide operatives with relatively low IQs who could be controlled by smooth-talking handlers.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT0 was at the forefront of this trend. Its military curriculum was managed by ex-soldiers from the Pakistan Army’s Special Services Group (SSG). In particular, members of Zarrar Company, the SSG’s counterterrorist team, played a crucial role in conceptualizing the ‘fidayeen’ model of operations. Having been trained in the same Western-derived template of mission planning as Indian SWAT units, they understood the weaknesses of existing hostage rescue capacity. ⁹ They knew that terrorists had a window of opportunity to inflict maximum damage without risk of serious opposition, in the minutes immediately following an armed assault. Thereafter, any prospect of a negotiated settlement was moot, since no government could offer safe passage to suicidal terrorists.

26/11 as a commando operation

Event timelines are crucial to understanding why the tactical response to the 26/11 attacks was so poor. From the opening shots at 2140 hours on 26 November, the clock had begun ticking for the NSG and Mumbai police to intervene swiftly, but they did not yet know it. Initially, the widely dispersed shootings were thought to be an outbreak of gang warfare. First responders were thus confused and overawed by the firepower that the attackers wielded. Once it became clear that a synchronized terrorist assault was underway, false sightings poured into the police control room, inflating the scale of the crisis to a point where the force leadership was psychologically overwhelmed. The bad luck of losing the Head of the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), Hemant Karkare, crippled the one unit which was capable of reacting to the crisis. The ATS had 60 AK-series assault rifles in its inventory, while none of Mumbai’s 86 regular police thanas had even one such weapon.¹⁰ This did not stop individual policemen from heroically trying to stop the attackers, but heroism is only the last refuge of those who have been failed by their own system, not those who are trained and equipped to do battle.

If viewed retrospectively, the Mumbai attacks inflicted so much damage because they adopted the textbook principles of a military-style commando raid. William McRaven, the mastermind of the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, has identified six such principles. He has observed that a small-sized attacking force must gain ‘relative superiority’ over a larger defending force by:

1. developing a simple plan,
2. ensuring that it remains secret until the moment of implementation,
3. carrying out detailed rehearsals of the implementation,
4. timing the implementation in such a manner that it achieves localized surprise,
5. ensuring that the speed of action is greater than the enemy’s ability to adapt, and
6. maintaining a sense of purpose, despite all distractions and ground-level confusion.¹¹

The attacks were simple to execute, because killing unarmed civilians is actually a simple affair. The only real complication was in transporting the attackers on-site, and once the LeT developed a sea-borne attack capability, that complication was resolved. Secrecy was preserved by tight personnel vetting – LeT compartmentalized the attack preparations, such that barring a few key personnel, nobody had access to the entire operational plan. Rehearsals were carried out based on topographical intelligence collected by penetration agents. The assault was timed to take place when the Pakistani foreign minister was on a goodwill mission, since that would delay recognition of the true nature of the attack ie., cross-border and state-sponsored. Speed was attained by ad hoc vehicular movement, in a context where first responders struggled to reach the affected areas. Finally, purpose was maintained by real-time encouragement from LeT handlers who were safely ensconced in Pakistan.

Once the attacks began, time was not on our side

The 1970s concept of SWAT deployment worked according to a lengthy timeline. It assumed that, since terrorists would not kill hostages unless provoked by police, a hasty assault should be avoided. Instead, pressure was to be built up gradually, like a psychological noose being tightened. First, police were to evacuate bystanders and cordon off the area, a process that could take up to 90 minutes. ¹² While this was going on, the SWAT command element would arrive in advance of the rest of the unit, and conduct a preliminary reconnaissance. The unit commander would contact leaders of the first responder units and agree to tactical communications procedures, while his second- and third-in command would identify potential locations for snipers and develop an Immediate Action Plan (IAP).

The IAP would be a rough-and-ready template for rapid intervention, in case the terrorists started killing hostages mid-way through negotiations. It was to be ready for implementation within 30 minutes of the rest of the SWAT unit arriving on-site, with all its heavy specialist equipment. ¹³ How long that would take depended on how far the target location was from the unit’s base. In 1980, the British SAS took over 16 hours to move a 25-man Special Projects team from Hereford to London, despite having begun the move even before civilian authorisation had been received.

Seen from this perspective, the NSG’s nine-hour deployment time to Mumbai during 26/11 was surprisingly good, considering the difficulties that the force had to overcome just to take off from Palam airport. The 200 men of the intervening unit, 51 SAG, were delayed by traffic congestion, particularly at the Manesar-Gurgaon toll gate. Had policymakers been willing to upgrade the unit’s capabilities for rapid response, they would have made themselves aware of the fact that chokepoints on National Highway 8 are clogged after nightfall, which increases NSG reaction time. During the 2002 Akshardham Temple attack, the force had been similarly delayed while racing to the airport. In the six intervening years, no effort was made to provide it with a dedicated tactical airlift capacity.

Even if the NSG had miraculously possessed the capability to become airborne within 20 minutes of the first shots being fired (ie., at 2200 hours on the night of 26 November), the flight time to Mumbai would have itself been too long to save those who had initially been targeted by the LeT fidayeen. From available accounts, an overwhelming majority of the 176 people who died in the attacks, were felled within the first three hours. As per the current model of SWAT deployment, it would have taken the local police half as long merely to isolate a single complex that had been attacked by terrorists. Coping with multiple simultaneous assaults, unfolding in a fluid pattern against fixed targets as well as targets of opportunity, would have been beyond the capacity of any police force, Indian or Western.

Lessons: Tactical and Psychological

There were several failures on 26/11. Leadership failure on the part of local police is the most obvious. Once the gravity of the situation set in, top police officials showed a lack of nerve, abdicating responsibility and waiting for the NSG to arrive from Delhi. Bureaucratic failure meant that the Navy’s marine commandos were not deployed until four hours after the attack began, because procedures for calling out the military were unfamiliar to the civil servants who were coordinating the initial response. Capacity failure on the part of emergency services meant that casualty evacuation was slow, with lives being lost from arson in the Taj Palace Hotel because fire engines ran out of water. Equipment failure due to poor maintenance caused police firearms to jam when first used. Worst of all, secrecy failure led state and national politicians to issue public statements without any regard for operational security. A central minister generously revealed the timeframe according to which the NSG would reach Mumbai and begin operations – information which LeT handlers in Pakistan put to immediate use. Another politician revealed his hiding place in the Taj Palace Hotel (and that of 200 other guests) in a cell phone interview. It is only thanks to the Navy’s MARCOS that indiscretion did not cost him his life. The terrorists were minutes away from locating the politician and his fellow-escapees when the MARCOS intervened, allowing the civilians to flee.

For the narrow purposes of this paper, three issues need to be especially highlighted for SWAT units:

1. Firepower: LeT fidayeen operate in a manner akin to special forces, moving swiftly in buddy pairs and carrying their combat loads on a man-pack basis. On average, each is kitted out with an assault rifle, roughly 300 rounds of ammunition, a sidearm, several grenades, communications gear, emergency rations and (perhaps) night vision goggles. Their main asset is initially the ability to open fire whilst in disguise, and thereafter to remain mobile. A static defence deprives them of the initiative and leads to a drop in their lethality, even if it increases the duration of an engagement. It is therefore vital that they should be aggressively engaged by first responders even before SWAT units arrive, with view towards restricting their freedom of movement. Regular policemen need to have basic proficiency in firearms usage and maintenance, as their initial reaction is crucial in deciding the outcome of a fidayeen attack. SWAT units can provide a mechanism for such training, through running marksmanship schools in high-risk cities. Rather than the specialized skills required for hostage rescue, first responders ‘only’ need to know is how to shoot moving targets whilst themselves being fired upon. Admittedly, this in itself is not easy, and weapon training is expensive. However, given the persistent threat of fidayeen attacks upon India, it is necessary to have a minimum standard which armed policemen in mega-cities cannot be permitted to fall below. For purposes of economy, priority for training should be given to those thanas that are located nearest to sites that have already been identified as likely fidayeen targets.
2. Real-time intelligence: the most important challenge facing a decision-maker during a crisis, is to recognize what kind of a crisis it is. After the international scrutiny that it attracted as a result of 26/11, LeT is chary about directly targeting Western nationals in India. This means that a hostage situation involving Westerners would probably feature non-Pakistani terrorists (perhaps even brainwashed Indians, although this is unlikely). Any other attack would probably once again take the nature of a coordinated fidayeen strike, where the goal is not to take hostages, but simply to inflict a high civilian death toll. There are three questions which need to be answered in this situation, for SWAT to form a tactical appreciation: how many sites have been attacked, are the attackers in contact with their Pakistani handlers, and are they mobile or static? The answers to these questions will not be held by any one agency; they need to be fused together in a crisis intelligence cell. It would perhaps be worth creating such a cell in the Intelligence Bureau, with a hotline to local police officials, NSG Headquarters and the relevant NSG regional hub. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is a logical choice for controlling such a cell, since it will be able to obtain information from local police about the unfolding ground-level situation while also exploiting national signal intelligence assets to ascertain the terrorists’ tactical objectives, in case these are dictated from Pakistan. Information needs to flow both upwards and downwards simultaneously, but with priority being given to the needs of immediate users.
3. Image management: LeT uses fidayeen attacks as a means of boosting its public image within Pakistan. It showcases both tactical innovation and military skill, using media coverage of an attack to reconnect with its mass constituency of rabid sympathizers in the Pakistani middle and lower classes. It is therefore vital that during a crisis, SWAT units should project themselves as far more competent than the fidayeen, even if this is not really the case. One relatively simple way of doing this would be to release pre-drafted press statements, claiming that the NSG has been extensively trained by American and British SWAT experts. This would make it difficult for commentators in the US and UK to then ridicule Indian counterterrorist performance, as they did after 26/11, smug in the knowledge that geography protected them from similar attacks. Between them, the US and UK shape global narratives on South Asian geopolitics, often to India’s detriment. To be muzzled, they should be embraced. At a more substantive level, intervention units also need to be perceived as genuinely proficient in conducting dynamic entry and precision shooting during a fast-moving engagement over unfamiliar urban terrain. This requires that they be provided with digitally-stored building plans (which would have been previously obtained through routine reconnaissance), high quality nightscopes, and hands-free tactical radios at the sub-section level. Since fidayeen are unlikely to operate in groups larger than four to six at a single location, they need to be relentlessly pursued by comparably-sized house intervention teams (HITs), each of which should be carrying enough hardware to allow it to fight until reinforced.

Unlike their Western counterparts, Indian security officials have a poor understanding of discourse-management. SWAT units in the West and Israel have long ago learned how to cover up their weaknesses and project an impression of omnipotence, seeing it as a psywar instrument that discourages terrorists from carrying out more hostage-takings. The British SAS is the best at this, ensuring that in-house scandals are not reported in the media and sometimes going to the extent of inflating its own contribution to counterterrorist successes in which it had only been a bit player. ¹⁴ In part, this is because the United Kingdom needs modern-day heroes to revitalize its fading memories of imperial glory, and this had made the political establishment keen to project the SAS as supermen.

Even American SWAT units have been caught wrongfooted when hostage-takers suddenly open fire, but they are treated more kindly by their media. For instance, in 2011 US Navy SEALs botched up a maritime rescue operation, when Somali pirates seized hostages and upon being cornered, panicked and began executing their captives. In the ensuing fire fight, all four hostages died. Since the action took place on the high seas, away from press coverage, the US Navy was able to disseminate a version of events that was charitable to itself, and labelled the hostage deaths as unavoidable.¹⁵ Calibrating media coverage through restricting journalistic access to the operational area is important, if unflattering images are to be prevented from going viral. This requires strict crowd control.

SWAT as a way of the future

Indian security forces are not used to their cities being turned into battlefields by armed gangsters, as happens in ghettoised neighbourhoods in the West. For their part, Western security forces do not have to cope with the challenge of a terrorist state that pushes mercenaries across its borders in order to externalize domestic militancy. This means that neither India nor the West as yet has a template for dealing with ‘swarm’ attacks launched on soft targets by international terrorists. The US and UK have sidestepped this problem by appeasement: they have tacitly signalled to Pakistan that it can continue to target Indian civilians, provided it cooperates in their own efforts to combat jihadist militancy. As Major General (Retd) G.D Bakshi has noted, India is the victim of a compact between the Anglophone West and Pakistan, founded on an implicitly racist logic that Indian lives are worth less than British or American ones. Having itself realized this, LeT is being emboldened to plan more fidayeen attacks.¹⁶

Preparation for meeting these attacks, in the form of capacity building for rapid intervention, should continue. ‘Active shooter’ protocols need to be drawn up at the police thana level, to speedily isolate each site that is known to be on the LeT target list. As soon as first reports arrive of a firearm assault at one of these sites, the protocol should be activated, along with the crisis intelligence cell in Delhi. The aim of ‘active shooter’ protocols should be to seal off exit routes and insert a small team of policemen (perhaps just 4-6 strong) who can move swiftly towards the sound of gunfire and engage anyone they see carrying a weapon. Meanwhile, assessments should be prepared of the terrorists’ motives, based on the nature of the still-unfolding attack. If only a single building has been hit, then the terrorists are probably seeking to establish a defensible perimeter and create a long-drawn standoff, similar to an old-style hostage situation (albeit with much greater readiness to kill). If multiple buildings have been hit, or a large complex has been attacked, then they are most likely seeking to carry out a straightforward suicidal strike that will continue until they are finally run to earth and gunned down. Identifying what kind of attack is underway will be crucial for optimising the level of force used by the intervening SWAT unit, whether it be provided by the police, NSG, or military. Should an attack fail to inflict the level of damage expected by its planners, it would count as a victory for Indian security forces, even if the attack itself cannot be prevented owing to lack of specific advance warning.

At a more strategic level, it should be recognized that ‘deterrence by denial’ is not enough to defeat a group like the LeT, which receives the fullest backing of the Pakistani army. A more aggressive approach has to be taken to neutralize attack planners on their own turf. Although this is not strictly speaking a SWAT mission, it is still an essential component of maintaining Indian homeland security. LeT cadres such as Sajid Majeed (who directly supervised the 26/11 attacks and ordered the execution of hostages in real-time) need to know that they might one day be found in a gutter with a bullet hole on one side of the head, and an exit wound on the other. The only outstanding questions are: how long would it take to happen, and will their family members be safe from accidents in the meantime? ¹⁷ The answers to these questions need to be formulated in Delhi, as part of ‘deterrence by punishment’.

Endnotes:

1. ‘WikiLeaks reveals how foreign diplomats charted response to 26/11’, Indian Express, accessed online at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/wikileaks-reveals-how-foreign-diplomat..., on 9 September 2013.
2. John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, ‘Preventing Another Mumbai: Building a Police Operational Art’, CTC Sentinel, accessed online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss6-Art2.pdf, on 9 September 2013.
3. Peter Harclerode, Secret Soldiers: Special Forces in the War Against Terrorism (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 517-524.
4. Kathryn Westcott, ‘What is Stockholm syndrome?’, BBC News Magazine, accessed online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22447726, 9 September 2013.
5. Hans Halberstadt, SWAT TEAM: Police Special Weapons and Tactics (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks, 1994), pp. 16-24.
6. Adrian Weale, Secret Warfare: Special Operations Forces from the Great Game to the SAS (London: Coronet, 1997), p. 205.
7. K.P.S Gill, ‘Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993’, Faultlines, Vol. 1, accessed online at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/Fault1-kpst..., on 10 September 2013.
8. The example of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, one of the most effective special forces units in the history of low intensity warfare, is illustrative. Initially drawing upon both police and army personnel for its manpower, it later shifted to being an all-army unit that operated under police guidance. R.F Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts (Welteverdenpark: Covos-Day, 2001), p. 122.
9. S. Hussain Zaidi with Rahul Bhatt, Headley and I (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2012), p. 80.
10. Adam Dolnik, ‘Fighting to the Death’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, No. 2 (2010), p. 63.
11. William H. McRaven, SPEC Ops – Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1996), pp. 8-23.
12. Wayman C. Mullins, ‘The Role of First Responder at a Hostage Situation’, Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2003), p. 33.
13. Andy McNab, Immediate Action (London: Corgi, 1995), p. 325.
14. Peter Popham, ‘The SAS confronts its enemy within’, The Independent, accessed online at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-sas-confronts-its-enemy-within-134..., on 10 September 2013. An example is the GSG9 hostage rescue operation at Mogadishu in 1977. A two-man SAS liaison team provided the German assaulters with stun grenades and were allowed to watch the rescue mission as it was underway. However, British spokesmen mischievously told the press thereafter that the SAS team had led the assault. See The Sunday Times Editorial Team’s book Siege! (London: Hamlyn, 1980), pp. 109-110.
15. Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2013), pp. 482-483.
16. G.D Bakshi, ‘Mumbai Redux: Debating India’s Strategic Response Options’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2009), p. 22. Also see Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban (London: Pluto Press, 2011), p. 94.
17. To get to the Hizballah master terrorist Imad Mughniyeh, Israel’s Mossad killed one of his brothers in 1994, in the hope of luring the man himself to come out of hiding and attend the funeral. Mughniyeh stayed away on that occasion, but was eventually killed in 2008. See Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (London: Oneworld, 2008) p. 242. Perhaps the only reason that people like Sajid Majeed, Abu Qahafa and Yusuf Muzammil have not yet met similar fates is because they do not appear to be worth killing, since they already live in a country where the value of human life is depreciating on a daily basis.