Urgent Need for Steps to Make Nathu La Route to Kailash Mansarovar Safe for Pilgrims

R. K. Bhandari

India and China had signed a bilateral agreement on September 18 this year providing for for conducting the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra through Nathu La in Sikkim Himalayas in addition to the existing Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand.

Addressing the media after the signing of the MoU in this regard, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the new route offers many benefits. “It makes Kailash Mansarovar accessible by a motorable road, which is especially beneficial for older pilgrims. It offers a safer alternative in the rainy season, makes the pilgrimage shorter in duration and will enable a much higher number of pilgrims to go there,” he said.

However, the bad news is that whereas China may be able to do its bit to take necessary steps to ensure the safety of the route before it opens, unprepared India may still be fighting with the systemic inertia to remove vulnerabilities for ensuring a hiccup free, smooth passage to the pilgrims, tourists and traders on its side of the border.

Of course, this bad news is somewhat obscured by another good news that by now we not only know the weak links in our chain of operation and what ails our disaster management systems, but additionally, we have also been repeatedly taught the do’s and don’ts of life by none other than the disasters themselves. Every now and then, we have passed through the tides of pain and suffering which are now so intense as to drive us to action. Nathu La, through which pilgrims will be able to reach Mansarovar next year, literally means a Pass with ears that listen. We too need listening ears without which the cries of those affected will continue to haunt us! It is therefore time to act.

Ordinarily hard core pilgrims are neither deterred by dangers that they might face when it comes to pilgrimage, nor do they fear the horror stories of disaster-inflicted death, destruction and sufferings, told to them by the previous generation. This is because they value faith, devotion, penance and salvation more than they fear death. It is the duty of the government, however, to protect the pilgrims from dangers of all shades and colors. According to a report in the News from China, September 2014 Issue, a total of nearly 70,000 Indian citizens have travelled to Tibet for pilgrimage in the past decade. The number of pilgrims has shot up from a mere 400 in 2003 to 14,084 in 2013, a whopping 35 fold increase!

Nathu La is already attracting tourists because of its fascinating altitude of 4310m, Tsomgo Lake, Baba Mandir and the fun of a handshake with the Chinese at the border fence. Once the route is opened for pilgrimage, the elderly and the sick will also not like to be left behind regardless of high altitude problems and dangers of which they may or may not be aware at this time. They will need acclimatisation, medicare and all kinds of support even in the normal times. In the event of border skirmishes and natural calamities, they will need much more than the so called preparedness. Even then a great majority of pilgrims may not get deterred by anticipated dangers, no matter how serious, because afterall, Nathu La had already been on the old Silk Road for trade between India and China, and it, even now continues to be one of the three open trading borders.¹ Moreover, if Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi could reach Bhutan via Nathu La more than half a century ago, then why not the pilgrims now? The Nathu La route may have remained closed for over four decades after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 but India’s armed forces have always been there and trade through Nathu La has already resumed as far back as 6 July 2006. Further, widening of the Gangtok- Nathu La highway is presently in progress and, en route, the tourists are already benefitting from modern amenities such as the high altitude internet cafe and ATM machines. Where is the danger to the pilgrims and why so much fuss, then?

The danger is in the environmental fragility of the terrain, the high seismicity of the area, neglect of slope management, alarming proneness to rockfalls and landsliding, poor infrastructure and inadequacy of disaster prevention and management capacity. The promised motorable road would doubtless attract pilgrims of all ages and in turn increased tourist population leading to demand for more civic amenities, hotels, human settlements, hospitals, roads and shops. Being a strategically sensitive area, border skirmishes cannot be ruled out. Increased vehicle population will also show up at all narrow roads and result in road blocks. Enhanced border trade through Nathu La would further add to the pressure on the civil and military administration. Real cheers on the faces of the pilgrims, tourists and traders will therefore come only when all these issues are sorted out in good time.

Pilgrims, tourists and traders will have to be prepared to face low temperatures, bumpy roads in difficult terrain, and landslides enroute. Imagine, what might happen if late in the evening, a portion of road in front of a vehicle is lost in a landslide or blocked by a pile of boulders, with no one around to help? In such a situation, it may take hours for help to arrive and days before the road could be restored.

For travel to Nathu La, pilgrims will have to travel to Gangtok first and then take the Jawaharlal Nehru highway to Nathu La. Both these roads are full of landslides of every shade and description which is why the hardships and danger will literarily travel with them as co-passengers right from the start. My first encounter with the landslide at mile post 9 on the Siliguri- Gangtok road was in 1964 and the very same landslide continues to be in the news even today. Similarly, Gangtok-Nathu La road too has a number of active landslide spots of which mile 15 has been known to be notorious for years. Nathu La is just 62 kilometres away from Gangtok with two and a half hours of travel time, but the time one might actually take is always decided not by us, but by the trinity of landslides, bumpy roads and bad weather.

The history of landslides on Siliguri- Gangtok and Gangtok- Nathu La roads are as old as the roads themselves. In fact, several landslides appeared on these routes even before the roads existed and many more were added during the road construction. Not to speak of the historic times, as recently as on 30 May 2012, nearly 4000 tourists got stranded because of a landslide between Gangtok and Tsomgo Lake. It started at about 3pm and continued until 8 pm hampering the relief operations. Again, the spot was 15th mile stone. A few months later, in September 2012, a major landslide killed 4 people. In an incident, on 23 July 2014, 130 people were evacuated by the army when about two dozen vehicles on the Nathula –Changu road got caught in the landslides between the 15th mile and the 17th mile. The area is prone to the added threat of earthquake induced landslide because of the high seismicity of the area. The Sikkim earthquake of 18 September 2011 of magnitude of 6.8 had its epicentre only 68 kilometres northeast of Gangtok, and it was felt in the region.

Once the new route to Kailash Mansarovar is operational, the pilgrims may either continue to patronize the traditional route or take the new one depending upon whichever is safer and more convenient. We have experienced the joys and sorrows of the traditional route for decades. For those not familiar with the route, the starting point for pilgrims on the map of Uttarakhand is Dharchula. The route runs along Tawaghat, Gosku, Mangti, Jibti, Malpa, Garbayang, Lamahari and Budhi eventually leading to the Indo-China border at Lipu Lekh Pass. One has to then cross Takla Kot and Parkha to arrive at the Mansarovar Lake. This route is highly vulnerable to landslides.

When the great Malpa rock avalanche tragedy occurred on this route on 17-18 August 2014, nearly 210 people were killed including 60 pilgrims. The village Malpa was traditionally inhabited by tribal people, engaged in trade with Tibet, for generations. With the patronage of pilgrims, the route began to bustle with human activity, as a base camp. Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam established their cottages for pilgrims to halt and rest here. Public Works Department, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and the local tribal people also put up their huts and buildings, on the bank of the river Kali. On the fateful night, a huge mass of rock got detached from the head region of the parent rock , broke into myriad of pieces, and eventually hurtled down the slope to bury the entire village under 5-15 thick pile of debris. The disaster management, apparatus broke into pieces as badly as the mountain itself.

If a particular route is troublesome, it is normal to look for an alternate route for safer pilgrimage. However, such projects demand definitive answers to the twin questions – Is abandoning of the troublesome route the only answer and how confident are we that new route is free from trouble and the remedy will not be worse than malady? After the Uttarakhand tragedy of June 2013, the old 14 Km long route to the Kedarnath shrine via Gaurikund and Rambara has been literally erased from our landscape forever by the joint action of men and nature. A recent media report suggests that several plans for the alternate route are on the drawing table. One possibility under consideration is of a 24 km long route from Sonprayag to Kedarnath at the higher elevations, skipping both Gaurikund and Rambara. The other possibility under consideration is to drive to Chaumasi on Kalimath-Kotma road from Guptakashi and trek 34 km via Kham Bugyal and Reka Bugyal. Yet another suggestion is to travel from Sonprayag to Gaurikund and thereafter trek 7km to Bhimbali, next 7km to Linchauli and take a helicopter or trek again a distance of 6km to Kedarnath. It is also reported that a task force has been constituted to ensure the completion of the project by April 2014 which is long gone.

The routes in difficult and fragile terrains are not decided by running a pencil over a map or by the known contours of convenience or by the Google map, or by setting unreasonable deadlines such as the above. It requires a well trained dedicated outfit with multi-disciplinary expertise, made accountable for the production of user-friendly, large scale multi-hazard maps. The mapping has to be done following a systematic process of spatial and ground surveys, investigation, and safety analysis with full awareness of the implications of climate change in the backdrop of the past history and future development programs. Currently, most of the hazard-mapping programmes are open-ended, more for testing latest GIS softwares and proving our own mapping skills rather than for projecting realistic hazard scenarios, making people aware of the hazards and forewarning them of impending dangers.

It is the obligation of the government to provide pilgrims user-friendly and reliable hazard maps and route-related information so that they can make informed choices. While we put our acts together to produce the first set of user-friendly hazard maps, the least we should do is produce user-friendly tourist maps showing all major old and new landslide trouble spots with clear statements on Do’s and Don’ts. The future lies in ruthlessly eliminating the sources of recurring hazard and zero tolerance towards mindless urbanization.

(The author is a Disaster Management Expert based in Delhi)

Endnotes

1. The other two being Shipkila in Himachal Pradesh and Lipulekh in Uttarakhand

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Published Date: 2^nd December 2014, Image source: http://www.thehindu.com

(Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Strike Corps for the Mountains: Upgrading India’s Military Strategy from Dissuasion to Deterrence

Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, 

Visiting Fellow, VIF

On July 17, 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finally approved the army’s proposal for raising a Strike Corps for the mountains. Though the approval came after considerable delay, it is a pragmatic move that will send an appropriate message across the Himalayas. It will help India to upgrade its military strategy against China from dissuasion to genuine deterrence as the Strike Corps, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force (IAF), will provide the capability to launch offensive operations across the Himalayas so as to take the next war into Chinese territory.

The new Strike Corps will comprise two infantry divisions and will be supported by three independent armoured brigades, three artillery brigades to provide potent firepower, an engineer and air defence brigade each, an aviation brigade and units providing logistics services. The Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore to raise and equip over a period of five to seven years. Approximately 90,000 new personnel will be added to the army’s manpower strength, including those in ancillary support and logistics units. The army has already raised 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and deployed them in Arunachal Pradesh to fill existing gaps in the defences. Some elements of these divisions will act as readily available reserves for the new Strike Corps to add weight along the axis of attack and exploit success. These divisions will also be employed to secure launch pads for offensive operations across the Himalayas. Hence, these must be seen as playing a significant supporting role for the Strike Corps.

Territorial Dispute

Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between India and China, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute that is the most disconcerting. Since well before the 1962 border war, China is in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 square kilometres (sq km) of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. China surreptitiously built its alternative route from Tibet to Xinjiang through this part of Aksai Chin. In addition, in March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in the Shaksgam Valley of the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (north of the Siachen Glacier and west of the Karakoram Pass) to China under a bilateral boundary agreement that India does not recognise. Through this area China built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan.

In India’s north-eastern region, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, even though physically the territory has always been under Indian control. In terms of area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, had publicly reiterated this claim just before President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006. The ambassador single-handedly ensured that his President received a cold shoulder in Delhi and the visit turned out to be inconsequential. Since then, Chinese interlocutors have claimed several times that the Tawang Tract is part of Tibet because one of the Dalai Lamas was born there. Chinese scholars visiting New Delhi always hint that the merger of the Tawang Tract with Tibet is non-negotiable. China’s often stated official position on such issues is that the reunification of Chinese territories is a sacred duty.

An inherently destabilising situation stems from the fact that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. The LAC is quite different from the disputed 4,056 km long boundary between India and Tibet. The un-delineated LAC is a major destabilising factor as patrol face-offs are common and could result in an armed clash between patrols. Also, incidents such as the Nathu La border clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung standoff of 1986 can recur. Such incidents have the potential to escalate into another border conflict similar to the war of 1962. Also, over the last decade, China has spent considerable time, effort and resources to upgrade the military infrastructure in Tibet. The PLA has stepped up the number of military training exercises that it has been conducting in Tibet every year. An airborne division, which is a dedicated rapid reaction force, has also practised induction and deployment in Tibet.

Joint Operations during War in the Mountains

Hence, despite the ongoing border talks between India and China to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute, often punctuated by ugly incidents like the PLA incursion in the Daulat Beg Oldie sector in April-May 2013 and repeated incursions into Chumar since then, a limited India-China border conflict cannot be completely ruled. As the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is also in the mountains, there is a very high probability that the next conventional conflict involving India will again break out in the mountains. Since the war will be fought under a nuclear overhang, particularly with Pakistan, there is a fair possibility that it will remain confined to the mountains so that it does not escalate out of control to nuclear exchanges. Hence, it was time for India to pivot to the mountains in its quest for building military capacities and it is creditable that the government has given the go ahead to raise a new Strike Corps.

In any future war that the armed forces are called upon to fight in the mountains, gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from Indian territory occupied by him will continue to remain important military aims. While these will be infantry predominant operations, no war plan will succeed without achieving massive asymmetries in the application of firepower to destroy the enemy’s combat potential and infrastructure. Therefore, army-IAF operational plans must be fully integrated. These must be jointly evolved, meticulously coordinated and flexible enough to be fine-tuned to exploit fleeting opportunities and to take advantage of the enemy’s reactions during execution. This is especially so in the mountains where the military aims and objectives are limited in scope because of the terrain. Both the Services must work together to create the capabilities that are necessary to take the battle into enemy territory during the next war in the mountains.

As artillery batteries and regiments cannot be moved and re-deployed easily, operations in the mountains place a premium on battlefield air support. Operational mastery over air-to-ground strikes can influence the outcome of tactical battles in the mountains extremely favourably. Firepower ratios can be enhanced to levels necessary for achieving overwhelming superiority only through a major upgradation in the availability of artillery guns, rocket launchers and missiles and offensive air support. A contract for the acquisition of 144 howitzers of 155 mm caliber has been hanging fire for long and needs to be expedited. The new artillery units that will be raised must be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) that can engage targets deep inside Tibet from deployment areas in the plains. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) need to be acquired in large numbers both by the artillery and the IAF to accurately destroy important targets such as communications centres. The government must also hasten the acquisition of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.

Ancillary Support

The peculiarities of terrain and the lack of sufficient road communications, particularly lateral roads that connect the road axes leading to the border, will place heavier demands on helicopter lift for the movement of reserves within divisional and brigade sectors. At the operational level, only an “air assault” formation can turn the tide through vertical envelopment and enable deep offensive operations to be carried out when employed in conjunction with Special Forces. An air assault brigade group inducted across the LoC or LAC by helicopters after the IAF has achieved a favourable air situation can seize an objective in depth. Ideally, each of the infantry divisions of the strike Corps must have one air assault brigade with the requisite air lift. Air-transported operations can also play a major role in influencing the course of the war. During Operation Parakram in 2001-02, almost a complete brigade group was airlifted to Kashmir Valley to enhance the reserves available in 15 Corps for offensive operations. In addition to attack helicopters, which will provide sustained firepower support, a large number of utility helicopters will be required to support offensive operations across the Himalayas, including medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.

The successful launching of Strike Corps operations will depend on the availability of good infrastructure, including double-lane roads with all-weather capability and suitably placed logistics nodes. India’s plans to upgrade the infrastructure in the states bordering China have not been progressing at an adequate pace. In fact, there have been inordinate delays due to the lack of environmental clearances and other reasons. While the new Strike Corps is being raised, equipped and trained, the government must make vigorous efforts to speed up the completion of infrastructure projects. Otherwise, the army will have a new Strike Corps and not be able to launch it effectively.

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The Evolving Threat from PLA along Indo-Tibetan Border: Implications

Vinod Anand

Senior Fellow, VIF

Early this month the Research and Analysis Wing in its threat assessment conveyed to the government that "there was a possibility of a skirmish or an incident triggered by China on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). ...Beijing was contemplating such an action to divert attention from its own domestic trouble."The above RAW report is not much different from its assessment of September 2009 when it ruled out any ‘major military adventure’ (but was silent on the possibility of a minor or limited conflict) by China against India in immediate future as this could derail its own economy. The report of 2009 also detailed the efforts being made by China in India’s neighbourhood aimed at isolating India. However, dwelling on PLA’s activity on Indo-Tibetan border R & AW’s assessment of 2009 had emphasized that China’s ‘recent incursions into India were part of the well-planned design to keep India on the tenterhooks and force it to divert attention from its primary development objectives’. “As such we feel that the pinpricks of incursion would continue”. And incursions or in some quarters ‘transgressions’ by PLA across the Line of Actual continue till today with impunity. Any of these incursions could become a prelude for limited conflict with India whether intended (by China) or unintended.

Whatever be the basis or inputs for coming to R&AW’s conclusions it cannot be denied that there would continue to be a near term threat from China as long as the border dispute remains unsolved.

In last three years the PLA has created capacities in Tibetan plateau which have distinctly enhanced the quality of threat being posed by China’s military posture in Tibet. With ever increasing defence budgets, increase in frequency of PLA training exercises in Tibet since 2010, improvements in military infrastructure as well as improvements in the weapons and equipment for high altitude and mountain warfare, the operational readiness of PLA to undertake agile and well-coordinated joint operations has been tremendously enhanced.

PLA Trains for India-Specific Operations

In 2010 an exercise to transport ‘strategic logistic equipment’ from Qinghai plateau to Tibet plateau by rail was carried out; this equipment was meant for the Air Force and missile units; therefore it was deduced that these were the ballistic missiles and some other missiles. There were also reports that this was being done for the first time. It is believed that the exercise was designed to test whether the missiles could withstand pressure differences during the transportation and as well as at the destination due to rarified atmosphere of Tibet. In another military exercise of October 2010 PLA conducted (said to be for the first time) a live-fire joint training drill involving Air Force, armour, artillery and Electronic Warfare units on the Tibetan plateau. The aim of exercise was to test the endurance of the soldiers at an altitude of 4700 meters with its harsh climate and lack of oxygen.

The momentum for training the PLA for India-specific operations was continued in the next year when two joint exercises in Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions were conducted. One was held at Army Group level to practice a division size force in joint and integrated operations including Special Forces and another was conducted in October, 2011 to practice a live-fire drill comprising air force and armour and artillery units.

Further, in March this year a ground attack training drill with the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) J-10 fighters was conducted. The J-10 used Laser Guided Bombs to hit the pre-designated targets. In May, an engineering unit of the PLAAF announced it had “modified” aircraft to make them more suited to the harsh environment of the Tibetan plateau and pledged that it would improve aircraft maintenance work. This year was also for the first time that PLAAF positioned their fighter aircraft in Gongga airfield near Lhasa for the first time during the winter months. Activation of new surveillance and tracking radars in the Lanzhou Military Region which is responsible for looking after border with India in the western and central sectors was also resorted to for monitoring Indian activity during the PLA exercise conducted last month. In addition an exercise was carried out to practice anti-tank units in live fire practice with the aim to “test their precision strike capability”.

In fact 2012 has already become a year when maximum amount of training activity has been carried out by the Chengdu Military Region and the military formations under it. In addition to training events mentioned above a war game described as ‘command and confrontation’ drill of command-and-staff organs based on information systems was organized by Chengdu MR in June. Over 100 high-ranking officers from the leading organs and troop units above regiment level of the Chengdu were said to have attended the exercise and studied the ways of command and confrontation training of the command-and-staff organs under information-based conditions. Apparently, this was the highest level war-game that involved both the 13^thand 14^th Group Armies with possibly representation from Lanzhou MR. The battlefield situation and awareness picture was depicted on a large screen where the moves of Red and Blue forces were plotted and discussions carried out. No prizes for guessing as to who could have been painted as the adversary in this war-game.

The above training efforts indicate the direction and focus of PLA’s manoeuvers therefore R&AW’s assessment on likelihood of China-initiated conflict cannot be easily discounted. Another factor which lends a certain degree of validity is the furious pace at which China has created infrastructure facilities, both military and civilian, on Tibetan plateau.

Synthesis of Civilian and Military Infrastructure

While the current politico-military leadership of China has paid great attention to develop military and civilian infrastructure as part of Western Area Development plans the President in waiting Mr. Xi Jinping is also a great proponent of Mao’s strategic concept of the 'unity between soldiers and civilians'. Sometime back Mr. Xi had remarked that both the army and regional civilian authorities should assiduously pool resources in the preparation for military struggle (against China's enemies). Thus the civilian infrastructure created in the frontier provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang has been also designed to strengthen national defence capabilities. And looking at Xi Jinping’s proclivities a larger share of national resources is likely to be allotted for PLA in the coming years.

It is also well known that the robust and extensive rail and road network built on Tibet plateau is meant for economic exploitation of natural resources and for speedy induction and deployment of military forces for both internal and external contingencies. In its current Five Year Plan (2011-2015) for Tibet China would be extending rail line from Lhasa to Shigatse (opposite Sikkim) and to Nyingchi town (closer to Arunachal Pradesh border). Extension of rail to Kathmandu is also on the anvil. Further, PLA is developing Bayi base of PLA next to Nyingchi. Bayi would be a key central base for launching operations across border with Arunachal Pradesh. While the infrastructure development activities in and around Bayi (including an airport nearby) are being done under the garb of developing tourism infrastructure they would also benefit PLA’s operational plans tremendously.

Upgrading of airports, especially the lengthening of the runways to more than 4500 meters at Nyingchi, Ngar Gunsi in Gar County in Western Tibet opposite Ladakh in addition to Gongga airfield near Lhasa and at Chamdo, are specifically designed to cater for both defence and civil requirements.

Further, over the years there have been reports based on the inputs provided by the local Tibetans that PLA has developed underground missile and weapons storage sights where the tunnels and other underground infrastructure has been developed in secrecy largely using the Chinese workers. Large trucks and missile shaped objects have been seen entering the underground storage complexes especially at Bayi town near Nyingchi. These missile sights are expected to house DF-21 intermediate range missile which could cover most of the cities in India and short range missiles with range varying between 200 to 600 kilometers to hit targets closer to the possible areas of operations.

Alarmed with the accelerated development of infrastructure in Tibet the Indian Army had made a presentation in May 2011 to the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary and the NSA that PLA could move 34 Divisions to Tibet in a maximum threat scenario. The military brass was particularly concerned with the widening asymmetry between our infrastructure in the border areas and that of the Chinese.

In another development this year the repaving work on the Xinjiang section of the Xinjiang-Tibet National Road, (which was a graveled road) would be completed by August this year. This would enable switching of forces between Xinjiang and Tibet thus giving more flexibility in deployment of PLA.

Improving the Quality of PLA

For over a decade the PLA has been concentrating on giving a practical shape to its doctrine of fighting ‘Local Wars under the Conditions of Informalisation’. Towards realizing the objectives of this concept it has improved its C4ISR capabilities in Tibet tremendously. It has laid out a vast network of underground fiber optic communication lines which provide redundancy and secure means of communications and enhance its information warfare capabilities. Placing of several types of military satellites in space has enabled the PLA to provide force multiplication to its ground assets. For instance 58 Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite stations are part of the robust command and control structure in Tibet whereas Indian forces have limited capacities in this field. There are reports that PLAAF units and sub-units have been linked through satellite links.

Further, there is abroad-band connectivity and secure means of communications between successive higher HQs including Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Region back to Beijing.

Recent reports suggest that PLA has constructed fifth generation barracks for the troops in the high altitude areas of Lanzhou and Chengdu Military regions. PLA has also constructed hyperbaric chambers which would enable accelerated acclimatization of troops being inducted from lower altitudes. All these preparations point towards acquiring the capacities for a quick mobilization and induction of forces for a surprise strike.

India’s Response

As a result of mounting threat from China India had gone in for raising of two mountain divisions in the North-East besides deployment of additional fighter squadrons along with a fresh push for development of rail, road and military infrastructure in the border areas. Last year in August, as part of upgrading its defensive posture from dissuasion to deterrence the government had accepted a proposal for raising of a Mountain Strike Corps at Pannagarh in West Bengal, positioning of two armoured regiments at Nathu La in Sikkim and Fukche in Ladakh respectively, and deployment of an additional infantry brigade in Barahoti plains of Uttarakhand. The proposal had been approved by the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Committee on Security. But this month, in a classical example of politico-bureaucratic red-tapism the proposal has been sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in order to bring the navy and air force on board and broad base military capability against China. Such a move would result in nothing but more delay as COSC is merely a talking shop where each service chief is supposed to defend its own turf. Evidently the government is not seized with urgency to mitigate the gap in military capabilities along the Indo-Tibetan borders that is becoming wider with the passage of time.

As far as border roads infrastructure is concerned elaborate plans in the shape of Long Term Perspective Plan I and II have been made. But as usual, the implementation of the plans has been very tardy. The slow pace of execution has been attributed to delay in obtaining clearances from multiple authorities, resistance shown by concerned state PWDs in handing over of roads and shortage of staff and restricted fund flows. The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence had carried out a detailed review of the BRO’s projects in March last year pointing out the inordinate delays and reasons for the same. However even after more than a year there has been hardly any reassessment of the BRO’s projects. Plans that should have been executed on war-footing lack suitable and robust oversight, monitoring and coordination mechanisms.

What Needs to be Done

While upgrading the dissuasive posture to a deterrence posture would take some time it is the filling in of gaps in our dissuasive forces that needs to be undertaken urgently. A number of measures to strengthen our defence preparedness have been suggested by the outgoing Army Chief and the current incumbent. Some of the priority actions that need to be taken are outlined below:-

The R & AW Report is a timely warning which needs to be taken seriously by our politico-bureaucratic combine otherwise we may be in for another Kargil like surprise. No opportunity should be given to China to teach us a lesson again. In fact we should be prepared to teach a lesson if any conflict is initiated by the PLA. And finally, one should remember the dictum that weakness invites aggression.

• The HUMINT cover along the borders needs to be augmented; the density of intelligence posts should also be increased.

• The quality of the ELINT and COMINT capabilities along the borders needs to be improved and the depth and breadth of such a cover should be enhanced.

• Similarly satellite cover for ISR and target acquisition needs to be supplemented on an urgent basis.

• Above all basic wherewithal like ammunition deficiencies and improvement of ammunition dumps as brought out by the current and outgoing Army Chiefs, need to be made up speedily. There are large scale voids which has also been described as ‘critical hollowness’ in the army that includes tanks running out of ammunition, obsolete air defence systems and lack of essential weaponry, and lack of critical surveillance and night-fighting capabilities for infantry and special forces.

• Acquisition of ground attack helicopters, speeding up the acquisition of artillery especially the ultra-light howitzers ex-USA that can be deployed in the mountains and are transportable by helicopters should be resorted to at the earliest. Acquisition of UAV’s and Drones would add to our surveillance, reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities.