Why Mountain Strike Corps Along the India-China Border is Important?

Nitin Gokhale

Following the government’s recent in-principle clearance to raise a Mountain Strike Corps, a debate over the efficacy of the decision to spend over Rs 64,000 crores on the new accretion has begun. Noted Strategic Affairs expert, former Rear Admiral Raja Menon writing in The Hindu categorically asserted: "A geographically limited one axis offensive will not destabilise the PLA, but a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in the Indian Ocean can economically cripple mainland China." Others have also weighed in with their opinion essentially making the point that India should invest more in its Navy than sinking money in troops-intensive mountain strike corps.

The nub of this argument is: a powerful blue-water Indian Navy can choke the sea lines of communication (SLOC) so vital for China by strategic interdiction on the high seas and therefore the Indian Navy's capability to enforce a blockade must be strengthened. This theory assumes that India can unilaterally do so in case China assumes a belligerent posture across the Himalaya. If push comes to shove, India will certainly be forced to look at this option but the SLOCs are not an exclusive preserve of either India or China and the international community is therefore bound to intervene to keep the passage free to enable trade and commerce to function normally. A selective blockade of China-centric sea traffic is realistically difficult to implement even if on paper the prospect looks alluring.

However, if a conflict between India and China breaks out in the high mountains, the world is not going to be overly bothered for a while. India therefore needs to be prepared to meet this threat all along the 4,000 km long boundary with China. The likelihood of a limited skirmish in the mountains is much more than a confrontation at sea simply because the border remains un-demarcated and prone to frequent misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

The need to have more forces for the northern frontier cannot be overemphasised. This does not mean it should come at the cost of preventing the Indian Navy from expanding. Going by the information available in the open domain, the Indian Navy is in the middle of one of its most ambitious modernisation programmes. Apart from the planned—even if delayed—induction of INS Vikramaditya, the aircraft carrier built in Russia and currently under sea trials, 47 ships of different types and capability are on order in various Indian shipyards. India has activated the reactor on board the INS Arihant, the first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine. With Navy’s long-standing emphasis on acquiring indigenously-built platforms, Indian shipyards can cope only with these many numbers for at least another 10 years.

Coming back to the creation of a Mountain Strike Corps, according to available information, it is just the first step in what is needed urgently –the addition of 40,000 new troops to the Indian Army. The budget of Rs 64,000 crore for the new corps is to be spent over seven years –- which is just as well since raising new formations as large as a Corps is not an easy task. It is further difficult to make that formation capable of mountain warfare. For mountains gobble up troops; they take a heavy toll on man and machine.

The decision on the strike corps is somewhat reminiscent of a similar choice exercised by the UPA government almost four years ago.

The then outgoing UPA-I government's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) was meeting for the last time before the results of the 2009 general elections were to be announced. The sole item on the agenda: Enhancing India's military preparedness against China.

According to insiders present at that meeting, some of the members of the CCS wanted to leave the decision to the next government but better sense prevailed and days before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's first UPA government went ahead and sanctioned raising of two new Mountain Divisions for deployment in India's north eastern State of Arunachal Pradesh, an area claimed by China as South Tibet. In addition, the Indian Air Force was given the go ahead to reactivate half a dozen Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) spread all along the Arunachal-Tibet portion of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries and base additional squadrons of Sukhoi-30 combat jets in Assam.

The goal was to plug existing gaps in India’s preparedness along the Arunachal Pradesh-China frontier. The two new divisions were to include a squadron of India’s armoured spearhead—Soviet-built T-90 tanks--and a regiment of artillery.

Now four years later, the two mountain divisions have completed their recruitment, equipping and orbatting in the North-east. One of them--the 56 Mountain Division--after being raised in Nagaland's Zakhama area has been placed at Lekhabali, north of the Brahmaputra adding teeth to Indian Army's presence in East and Central Arunachal Pradesh. The other new Division--71--headquartered at Missamari in the plains of Assam, will enhance troop deployment beyond Tawang in West Arunachal Pradesh in addition to the 5 Mountain Division already stationed at Tenga.

However, one lacuna continues to persist. Road links to forward areas remain tenuous. The China Study Group (CSG), which controls India's policy on China had sanctioned 72 tactically important roads to be built in the tough, mountainous terrain along the China border in the Eastern and the Western sectors. The roads are being built by the quasi-military Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to enhance connectivity. But a combination of lethargic BRO, obstructionist state governments and ministry of environment and forests has meant that these roads are nowhere near completion. Similarly, the half a dozen ALGs in Arunachal Pradesh are also stuck in red tape.

The recent incursion by Chinese troops in Ladakh's Depsang area should serve as a timely reminder to the government that timelines for infrastructure development along the Chinese frontier and plans to boost military capability do not have the luxury of slippages.

Diplomacy and timing (cancellation of Chinese Premier's visit over the border standoff would have been a loss of face for Beijing) helped end the face off this time but New Delhi will do well to remember such incident is not going to be one off. The Chinese will continue to nibble at the un-demarcated border and test India's response as they have done for over 50 years.

What will be crucial for the new corps is cooperation and coordination between all stake-holders: The Defence, Finance and Environment Ministries, as well as the Army, Air Force and Border Roads Organization.

In the recent past, objections from the Environment Ministry have impeded upon the construction of crucial roads in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Ladakh and Uttarakhand. In the last case, the lack of connectivity was driven home brutally when torrential rains ripped open the state last month, leaving thousands stranded.

It is nobody's case that the environment should not be protected but a balance needs to be struck in caring for the environment and national security imperatives. The state governments will need to back the plan by facilitating the speedy allotment of land in remote areas.

The climate in most of these states means that the Border Roads Organization can leverage, at best, a four-month season to deliver new routes.

Similarly, establishing permanent infrastructure for troops, including hubs that supply ammunition and deciding strategically-placed artillery gun positions is a long -term and complicated process.

Finding the right contractors with the right skills and willingness to work on isolated, remote areas is another big challenge. The Indian Air Force, for instance, has been trying for three years to sign contracts that will lead the upgrading seven Advanced Landing Grounds or ALGS, crucial for the ability to quickly airlift troops to strategic parts along the China border. But the deals have not been closed because expert contractors find it difficult to work in these areas.

The new mountain corps will require light artillery which can be easily transported, even airlifted in the highest mountains. Given India's painfully-slow process of weapons acquisition, empowering the Mountain Strike Corps quickly will be a big challenge.

It is all the more necessary for the government to walk the talk in making the new formation a reality by adhering to timelines.

Simultaneously, India must re-look and re-tweak its China policy. For instance:

• Insist with Beijing the need for exchanging maps for all sectors immediately so that each side knows the other's claimed LAC and border negotiations can resume
• Instead of pushing for operational control of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Army should step up and assume responsibility to protect the disputed border.
• Ensure timely and effective information sharing mechanism with Indian media and through them the Indian people rather than let different stake holders speak in different and sometimes discordant voices during times of crisis.
• Educate and prepare the Indian people on the need for give and take on border negotiations in the future.

Policy makers in India must be mindful of the fact that military preparedness and trying to improve diplomatic relations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

(The author is a Delhi-based Security and Strategic Analyst)

The Evolving Threat from PLA along Indo-Tibetan Border: Implications

Vinod Anand

Senior Fellow, VIF

Early this month the Research and Analysis Wing in its threat assessment conveyed to the government that "there was a possibility of a skirmish or an incident triggered by China on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). ...Beijing was contemplating such an action to divert attention from its own domestic trouble."The above RAW report is not much different from its assessment of September 2009 when it ruled out any ‘major military adventure’ (but was silent on the possibility of a minor or limited conflict) by China against India in immediate future as this could derail its own economy. The report of 2009 also detailed the efforts being made by China in India’s neighbourhood aimed at isolating India. However, dwelling on PLA’s activity on Indo-Tibetan border R & AW’s assessment of 2009 had emphasized that China’s ‘recent incursions into India were part of the well-planned design to keep India on the tenterhooks and force it to divert attention from its primary development objectives’. “As such we feel that the pinpricks of incursion would continue”. And incursions or in some quarters ‘transgressions’ by PLA across the Line of Actual continue till today with impunity. Any of these incursions could become a prelude for limited conflict with India whether intended (by China) or unintended.

Whatever be the basis or inputs for coming to R&AW’s conclusions it cannot be denied that there would continue to be a near term threat from China as long as the border dispute remains unsolved.

In last three years the PLA has created capacities in Tibetan plateau which have distinctly enhanced the quality of threat being posed by China’s military posture in Tibet. With ever increasing defence budgets, increase in frequency of PLA training exercises in Tibet since 2010, improvements in military infrastructure as well as improvements in the weapons and equipment for high altitude and mountain warfare, the operational readiness of PLA to undertake agile and well-coordinated joint operations has been tremendously enhanced.

PLA Trains for India-Specific Operations

In 2010 an exercise to transport ‘strategic logistic equipment’ from Qinghai plateau to Tibet plateau by rail was carried out; this equipment was meant for the Air Force and missile units; therefore it was deduced that these were the ballistic missiles and some other missiles. There were also reports that this was being done for the first time. It is believed that the exercise was designed to test whether the missiles could withstand pressure differences during the transportation and as well as at the destination due to rarified atmosphere of Tibet. In another military exercise of October 2010 PLA conducted (said to be for the first time) a live-fire joint training drill involving Air Force, armour, artillery and Electronic Warfare units on the Tibetan plateau. The aim of exercise was to test the endurance of the soldiers at an altitude of 4700 meters with its harsh climate and lack of oxygen.

The momentum for training the PLA for India-specific operations was continued in the next year when two joint exercises in Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions were conducted. One was held at Army Group level to practice a division size force in joint and integrated operations including Special Forces and another was conducted in October, 2011 to practice a live-fire drill comprising air force and armour and artillery units.

Further, in March this year a ground attack training drill with the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) J-10 fighters was conducted. The J-10 used Laser Guided Bombs to hit the pre-designated targets. In May, an engineering unit of the PLAAF announced it had “modified” aircraft to make them more suited to the harsh environment of the Tibetan plateau and pledged that it would improve aircraft maintenance work. This year was also for the first time that PLAAF positioned their fighter aircraft in Gongga airfield near Lhasa for the first time during the winter months. Activation of new surveillance and tracking radars in the Lanzhou Military Region which is responsible for looking after border with India in the western and central sectors was also resorted to for monitoring Indian activity during the PLA exercise conducted last month. In addition an exercise was carried out to practice anti-tank units in live fire practice with the aim to “test their precision strike capability”.

In fact 2012 has already become a year when maximum amount of training activity has been carried out by the Chengdu Military Region and the military formations under it. In addition to training events mentioned above a war game described as ‘command and confrontation’ drill of command-and-staff organs based on information systems was organized by Chengdu MR in June. Over 100 high-ranking officers from the leading organs and troop units above regiment level of the Chengdu were said to have attended the exercise and studied the ways of command and confrontation training of the command-and-staff organs under information-based conditions. Apparently, this was the highest level war-game that involved both the 13^thand 14^th Group Armies with possibly representation from Lanzhou MR. The battlefield situation and awareness picture was depicted on a large screen where the moves of Red and Blue forces were plotted and discussions carried out. No prizes for guessing as to who could have been painted as the adversary in this war-game.

The above training efforts indicate the direction and focus of PLA’s manoeuvers therefore R&AW’s assessment on likelihood of China-initiated conflict cannot be easily discounted. Another factor which lends a certain degree of validity is the furious pace at which China has created infrastructure facilities, both military and civilian, on Tibetan plateau.

Synthesis of Civilian and Military Infrastructure

While the current politico-military leadership of China has paid great attention to develop military and civilian infrastructure as part of Western Area Development plans the President in waiting Mr. Xi Jinping is also a great proponent of Mao’s strategic concept of the 'unity between soldiers and civilians'. Sometime back Mr. Xi had remarked that both the army and regional civilian authorities should assiduously pool resources in the preparation for military struggle (against China's enemies). Thus the civilian infrastructure created in the frontier provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang has been also designed to strengthen national defence capabilities. And looking at Xi Jinping’s proclivities a larger share of national resources is likely to be allotted for PLA in the coming years.

It is also well known that the robust and extensive rail and road network built on Tibet plateau is meant for economic exploitation of natural resources and for speedy induction and deployment of military forces for both internal and external contingencies. In its current Five Year Plan (2011-2015) for Tibet China would be extending rail line from Lhasa to Shigatse (opposite Sikkim) and to Nyingchi town (closer to Arunachal Pradesh border). Extension of rail to Kathmandu is also on the anvil. Further, PLA is developing Bayi base of PLA next to Nyingchi. Bayi would be a key central base for launching operations across border with Arunachal Pradesh. While the infrastructure development activities in and around Bayi (including an airport nearby) are being done under the garb of developing tourism infrastructure they would also benefit PLA’s operational plans tremendously.

Upgrading of airports, especially the lengthening of the runways to more than 4500 meters at Nyingchi, Ngar Gunsi in Gar County in Western Tibet opposite Ladakh in addition to Gongga airfield near Lhasa and at Chamdo, are specifically designed to cater for both defence and civil requirements.

Further, over the years there have been reports based on the inputs provided by the local Tibetans that PLA has developed underground missile and weapons storage sights where the tunnels and other underground infrastructure has been developed in secrecy largely using the Chinese workers. Large trucks and missile shaped objects have been seen entering the underground storage complexes especially at Bayi town near Nyingchi. These missile sights are expected to house DF-21 intermediate range missile which could cover most of the cities in India and short range missiles with range varying between 200 to 600 kilometers to hit targets closer to the possible areas of operations.

Alarmed with the accelerated development of infrastructure in Tibet the Indian Army had made a presentation in May 2011 to the Defence Minister, Defence Secretary and the NSA that PLA could move 34 Divisions to Tibet in a maximum threat scenario. The military brass was particularly concerned with the widening asymmetry between our infrastructure in the border areas and that of the Chinese.

In another development this year the repaving work on the Xinjiang section of the Xinjiang-Tibet National Road, (which was a graveled road) would be completed by August this year. This would enable switching of forces between Xinjiang and Tibet thus giving more flexibility in deployment of PLA.

Improving the Quality of PLA

For over a decade the PLA has been concentrating on giving a practical shape to its doctrine of fighting ‘Local Wars under the Conditions of Informalisation’. Towards realizing the objectives of this concept it has improved its C4ISR capabilities in Tibet tremendously. It has laid out a vast network of underground fiber optic communication lines which provide redundancy and secure means of communications and enhance its information warfare capabilities. Placing of several types of military satellites in space has enabled the PLA to provide force multiplication to its ground assets. For instance 58 Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite stations are part of the robust command and control structure in Tibet whereas Indian forces have limited capacities in this field. There are reports that PLAAF units and sub-units have been linked through satellite links.

Further, there is abroad-band connectivity and secure means of communications between successive higher HQs including Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Region back to Beijing.

Recent reports suggest that PLA has constructed fifth generation barracks for the troops in the high altitude areas of Lanzhou and Chengdu Military regions. PLA has also constructed hyperbaric chambers which would enable accelerated acclimatization of troops being inducted from lower altitudes. All these preparations point towards acquiring the capacities for a quick mobilization and induction of forces for a surprise strike.

India’s Response

As a result of mounting threat from China India had gone in for raising of two mountain divisions in the North-East besides deployment of additional fighter squadrons along with a fresh push for development of rail, road and military infrastructure in the border areas. Last year in August, as part of upgrading its defensive posture from dissuasion to deterrence the government had accepted a proposal for raising of a Mountain Strike Corps at Pannagarh in West Bengal, positioning of two armoured regiments at Nathu La in Sikkim and Fukche in Ladakh respectively, and deployment of an additional infantry brigade in Barahoti plains of Uttarakhand. The proposal had been approved by the Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Committee on Security. But this month, in a classical example of politico-bureaucratic red-tapism the proposal has been sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in order to bring the navy and air force on board and broad base military capability against China. Such a move would result in nothing but more delay as COSC is merely a talking shop where each service chief is supposed to defend its own turf. Evidently the government is not seized with urgency to mitigate the gap in military capabilities along the Indo-Tibetan borders that is becoming wider with the passage of time.

As far as border roads infrastructure is concerned elaborate plans in the shape of Long Term Perspective Plan I and II have been made. But as usual, the implementation of the plans has been very tardy. The slow pace of execution has been attributed to delay in obtaining clearances from multiple authorities, resistance shown by concerned state PWDs in handing over of roads and shortage of staff and restricted fund flows. The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence had carried out a detailed review of the BRO’s projects in March last year pointing out the inordinate delays and reasons for the same. However even after more than a year there has been hardly any reassessment of the BRO’s projects. Plans that should have been executed on war-footing lack suitable and robust oversight, monitoring and coordination mechanisms.

What Needs to be Done

While upgrading the dissuasive posture to a deterrence posture would take some time it is the filling in of gaps in our dissuasive forces that needs to be undertaken urgently. A number of measures to strengthen our defence preparedness have been suggested by the outgoing Army Chief and the current incumbent. Some of the priority actions that need to be taken are outlined below:-

The R & AW Report is a timely warning which needs to be taken seriously by our politico-bureaucratic combine otherwise we may be in for another Kargil like surprise. No opportunity should be given to China to teach us a lesson again. In fact we should be prepared to teach a lesson if any conflict is initiated by the PLA. And finally, one should remember the dictum that weakness invites aggression.

• The HUMINT cover along the borders needs to be augmented; the density of intelligence posts should also be increased.

• The quality of the ELINT and COMINT capabilities along the borders needs to be improved and the depth and breadth of such a cover should be enhanced.

• Similarly satellite cover for ISR and target acquisition needs to be supplemented on an urgent basis.

• Above all basic wherewithal like ammunition deficiencies and improvement of ammunition dumps as brought out by the current and outgoing Army Chiefs, need to be made up speedily. There are large scale voids which has also been described as ‘critical hollowness’ in the army that includes tanks running out of ammunition, obsolete air defence systems and lack of essential weaponry, and lack of critical surveillance and night-fighting capabilities for infantry and special forces.

• Acquisition of ground attack helicopters, speeding up the acquisition of artillery especially the ultra-light howitzers ex-USA that can be deployed in the mountains and are transportable by helicopters should be resorted to at the earliest. Acquisition of UAV’s and Drones would add to our surveillance, reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities.