Gurmeet Kanwal
Relations between India and China have been fairly stable at the
strategic level. Economic relations are much better now than these have
been in the past. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly even
though the balance of trade is skewed in China’s favour.
The two countries have been cooperating in international fora like
WTO talks and climate change negotiations. There has even been some
cooperation in energy security. However, at the tactical level, China
has been exhibiting a markedly assertive political, diplomatic and
military attitude. Instability in the security relationship, in
particular, has the potential to act as a spoiler; and, it is this
relationship that will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants
will clash or cooperate for mutual gains. The major cause for
instability in the China-India relationship is the half-century old
territorial and boundary dispute over which the two countries fought a
border war in 1962.
The pointers to the future are not particularly positive. China
continues to be in physical occupation of large areas of Indian
territory in Jammu and Kashmir. On the Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh in
J&K, China is in possession of approximately 38,000 square
kilometres of territory since the mid-1950s. In addition, Pakistan
illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory to China in 1963 in the
Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir under a bilateral boundary
agreement that India does not recognise. Close to this area, the Chinese
built the Karakoram highway that now provides a strategic land link
between Xinjiang, Tibet and Pakistan. China continues to stake its claim
to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory in the eastern state of
Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls Southern Tibet.
Chinese interlocutors have repeatedly claimed that the Tawang Tract,
in particular, is part of Tibet and that the merger of this area with
Tibet is non-negotiable. In 2005, India and China had agreed on “guiding
principles and parameters” for a political solution to the territorial
dispute. One important parameter was that “settled populations will not
be disturbed”. In the case of Tawang, the Chinese have gone back on
their commitment. If such errant behavior continues, India will find it
difficult to accept Chinese assurances of peaceful resolution of the
territorial dispute at face value.
The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China is yet to be
physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. In
fact, despite the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) signed
with the Chinese in 1993 and the agreement on Confidence Building
Measures in the Military Field signed in 1996, border guards of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have transgressed the LAC repeatedly to
intrude into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. They have even objected to
Indian road construction efforts and the presence of Indian graziers at
their traditional grazing grounds. To be fair to the Chinese, they too
claim similar transgressions by Indian patrols.
Patrol face-offs are commonplace and usually end with both the sides
warning each other to go back to their own territory. While no such
incident has resulted in a violent clash so far, the probability of such
an occurrence is high. Demarcation of the LAC without prejudice to each
other’s position on the territorial dispute would be an excellent
confidence building measure but little progress has been made in 15
rounds of talks between the two Special Representatives, including the
January 2012 meting at New Delhi. Under the circumstances, China’s
intransigence in exchanging maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the
western and the eastern sectors is difficult to understand.
The military gap between Indian and China is growing steadily as the
PLA is modernising at a rapid pace due to the double-digit annual growth
in the Chinese defence budget while India’s military modernisation
plans continue to remain mired in red tape. China’s negotiating strategy
is to stall resolution of the dispute till the Chinese are in a much
stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that
they can then dictate terms. The rapidly blossoming strategic
partnership between China and Pakistan is also a major cause for
concern. Chinese leaders have proclaimed that their friendship with
Pakistan is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.”
China has also guaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity.
During any future conflict with either China or Pakistan – even
though the probability is low, India will have to contend with a
two-front situation as each is likely to collude militarily with the
other – a situation for which the Indian armed forces are not prepared.
Hence, it is in India’s interest to strive for the early resolution of
the territorial dispute with China so that India has only one major
military adversary to contend with.
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