Israel and India’s New Government: The Military-Security Dimension

Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, 

Research Associate, VIF

India-Israel Ties and the New Government:

The bilateral relations between India and Israel, today, are going in a direction as expected by many ever since the 2014 election results were declared. The thumping victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), by defeating the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) that governed the country for ten years, has ushered in a new level of engagements with Israel. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the military-security cooperation with Israel is witnessing a rapid enhancement. Simultaneously, cooperation in the fields of science and technology, water management and agriculture are also being given immense importance. On the economic front, both the countries are doing fairly well with the bilateral trade currently standing at US$6 billion.

Currently, Israel is the second largest arms suppliers of India with a bilateral arms trade over the last decade estimated at US$10 billion. Undoubtedly, defence cooperation has become one of the most important pillars of Indo-Israeli ties and it is likely to get further boost in the days to come. It has been almost six months since the BJP-led NDA government came into power and there have been visible improvements in this aspect of bilateral ties.

As in the past, the BJP-led government has already started initiatives to enhance defence ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Modi’s cabinet has a few ministers who are in favour of forging closer cooperation with Israel in all the sectors, and one of them is Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj who once called the Jewish state "a reliable partner."¹ Just before the 2014 election results were announced, Narendra Modi was even referred to as "Israel's best friend in South Asia".² This was mainly considering his long association with the Jewish state and its leaders. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had visited Israel in 2006. Gujarat has deep economic and trade links with Israel which has has invested billions of dollars for various projects in the state. In January 2013, Modi personally hosted the Israeli ambassador to India, Alon Ushpiz in his state, and discussed various avenues for cooperation. As a result, Modi has a fair knowledge and experience of dealing with Israel. The Israeli envoy expressed his full hope of realising the potential of India-Israel relations in various fields under the new government.³The overall impetus was given when the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Modi and congratulated the latter on his success in the national elections and pledged to deepen cooperation between the two countries.

Recent Developments:

A month after Modi came to power, India’s Defence Secretary R.K. Mathur paid a three-day visit to Israel from 1-3 July and discussed arms deals, including missile development programme, and also the procurement of two Israeli-made Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) for the Indian Air Force. Israel has endorsed its Iron Dome air defence system to India for protection against incoming long and short range missile threats. New Delhi, however, has not decided as yet on purchasing this anti missile system. During late 2012 and mid 2013, Indian armed forces had started discussing about this system and its suitability in the Indian context.

Further, both the countries have clinched two important arms deal, which had been delayed for several years due to various reasons.

The first breakthrough for the Modi-led government was the announcement to procure the much-needed Barak-1 missile, manufactured by the Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd (IAI). This is a significant step particularly considering the depleted defensive capabilities of Indian warships. With delivery scheduled for December 2015, fourteen ships that presently lack missile systems will be outfitted with the Barak-1. A little more than a decade ago, India and Israel defence cooperation had been plagued by allegations of bribery and allegations, pertaining to this missile system. India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) even conducted a probe into the deals with IAI and Rafael regarding the supply of these missiles. The deals were entered into by the then BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2000. Allegations of receiving kickbacks were levelled against several Indian officials, including the then Defence Minister, defence personnel and a few middlemen. It was only in December 2013 after a detailed probe that the investigation was closed by the CBI with the admission that there was no evidence against the accused.⁴

The final nod given by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in September 2014, under the chairmanship of Modi, for the acquisition of 262 missiles⁵ has come as a big relief to the Indian Navy, given its rapidly dwindling stock of anti-ballistic missiles for its frontline battleships. The Indian Navy has been voicing concerns over its deficiencies, with ships operating without missile defence systems. The announcement of the procurement at a whopping cost of US$144 million is thus a welcome move.⁶ The clearance given to this stalled missile deal itself is an indication of India’s preference for Israeli-made missile defence systems. It is, at the same time, to be acknowledged that Israel has faced a stiff competition from other mega foreign arms vendors such as the United States (US).

The US factor in Israeli arms sales is not a new topic; it has been there ever since the latter has emerged as an important arms exporter since the 1970s onwards. Due to fears of competition, the US even scuttled Israeli arms exports to a few countries in the past in Latin America, Europe and Asia as well. In the Indian context, too, the US was trying really hard to sell its Javelin missiles manufactured by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Since the last one year, there had been a fierce competition between Javelin and Israel’s Spike Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) produced by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The US has made several efforts to tap the lucrative Indian defence market with the Pentagon even demonstrating its willingness to offer “groundbreaking” defence technologies to India, including helicopters and UAVs.⁷ There have already been discussions between the two governments for joint development and production of items such as drones and missiles. But what have remained as the constraining factor in enhancing their defence cooperation are the entrenched issues on military technology transfer mechanisms. It is because of this reason that India opted for the Israel-made Spike ATGMs.

During late-October 2014, after a prolonged delay, at a meeting of its Defence Acquisition Council, India finally decided to buy 8,356 Israeli-made Spike ATGMs and 321 launchers at a cost of US$525 million.⁸ The deal for this missile remained stuck since 2010. The Indian Army had conducted several rounds of trial on this system. This major breakthrough in India-Israel defence ties under the Modi government has come at a juncture when border tension with China, and skirmishes along the India-Pakistan border were on a new high. In the words of India’s new Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar, “National security is the paramount concern of the government. All hurdles and bottlenecks in the procurement process should be addressed expeditiously so that the pace of acquisition is not stymied."⁹

The Spike missile deal should not be looked only from the prism of an arms trade between India and Israel. It has sent out a strong message to other potential arms suppliers who are eyeing the lucrative Indian defence market that India not only wants finished products but is also interested in getting technologies for its defence indigenisation programmes. New Delhi decided against Washington’s offer for its Javelin missiles because the exact extent of the Technology Transfer to the Indian defence firm Bharat Dynamics Ltd was not clearly defined; the cost of the Spike ATGM was cheaper than the Javelin, and “cancelling the Israeli deal at the last moment would have sent wrong signals to the international community.” ¹⁰ The issue on technology transfer also assumes significance as the present government under Modi is promoting its “Make in India” policy, and defence production is well within this initiative. Israel, unlike the US, has agreed to transfer technologies and this is an important step in India’s military modernisation drive. From now on, it appears that India’s arms purchase will come along with the clause of technology transfer from the suppliers, and Israel would not be spared from this emerging trend. Considering this, Israel cannot afford to remain complacent in its arms sales to India. The Israeli defence industries, rather, should capitalise on the new opportunities provided by India to manufacture in the country under Modi’s project.

During 2013, Israel witnessed a decline in its arms exports worldwide with a value of US$6.54 billion as compared to that of US$7.2 in 2012.¹¹ But with mega defence deals signed between Israel and a few Asian countries, the volume of the former’s arms exports could see a slight improvement during 2014. Moreover, in continuation to its military imports, India is considering to procure more Israeli-made Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) surveillance aircraft in a deal estimated to cost over US$1 billion. India had already purchased Phalcon AWACS in May 2009 and March 2010. Acquisition of this sophisticated system would further boost Indian Air Force’s (IAF) detecting capabilities of troop build-ups and movement of enemy aircraft along India’s frontiers. Now, if this deal gets clinched, then it is going to be a boom for Israel’s defence industries. The Asia-Pacific region was the main destination for Israeli arms during 2013, earning US$3.91 billion.

Apart from arms trade, India and Israel have also agreed to cooperate intensively on other military-security arenas. The seed for further enhancement of relations between the two countries was laid at the meeting between Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu and Modi on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York during late-September 2014. This was the first meeting between an Israeli Prime Minister and his Indian counterpart in the last 11 years. Despite robust relations in areas related to defence, intelligence and agriculture, the political ties between the two countries have remained somewhat low-profile. After the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003 to New Delhi, no other Israeli PM or any of their foreign ministers visited India in recent years. Likewise, from the Indian side, while no PM has ever visited Israel, the latest visit by a foreign minister to the West Asian nation was made by S.M. Krishna in January 2012.

Owing to various domestic pressures, particularly the presence of 175 million Muslim population in India, New Delhi is keeping its political ties with Israel a low-key affair. This reason was attributed for the delay in establishing diplomatic relations in 1992.¹² Nevertheless, in order to add more vigour to the already-thriving relations, attempts have to be made unrelentingly to forge stronger political relations, and this would require reciprocal visits by both Indian and Israeli PMs and other key ministers, sooner or later. It is to be seen if Modi would create history by becoming the first Indian PM to visit the Jewish state. Modi was invited by his Israeli counterpart during the New York-meeting. Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged the significance of the Indo-Israeli ties by saying “sky is the limit” for its growth. While such breakthrough would take the bilateral relations to further heights, one cannot rule out, at the same time, serious backlash within India from those corners which are vehemently opposed to New Delhi’s continuing ties with Israel.

During the Modi-Netanyahu meeting, a wide range of issues, which are of mutual interests, were discussed. Netanyahu raised the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme, and both the leaders acknowledged the threat of global terrorism in their respective countries. Along with these, the need for further cooperation in the fields of technology, defence, agriculture and water management were emphasised.

For quite some time, India and Israel have been developing an interest to cooperate in cyber security areas. This is in the wake of ever increasing cyber crimes in both the countries. Being surrounded by hostile neighbourhoods, the need for cyber security framework for both the countries has gained immense importance. It is in this direction, the Israeli PM invited Modi to be a part of his project of national cyber defence authority.¹³ The project’s main objective is to create a link between the civilian and military authorities in both the countries. For India, the invitation from Israel has come at a time when it is striving to establish a strong cyber security defence system. Several concerned Indian establishments have begun efforts on setting up a cyber security framework. This is a potential area of cooperation between the two countries, and more headway is expected soon.

Further impetus to Indo-Israeli ties was giving by the three-day visit of the Israeli National Security Advisor Joseph Cohen to New Delhi in October 2014. This was a follow-up visit to the Prime Ministers’ meeting a month earlier. In his interactions with the Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval, Home Minister Rajnath Singh and several other officials from the Indian External Affairs ministry, the visiting NSA expressed Israel’s willingness to cooperate with India in “all fields and at any level”. However, the agendas of the meetings concentrated on the situation in West Asia; terrorism and the threat it poses to both the countries; Israel’s view on Iranian nuclear programme as well as challenges that India and Israel share as two democracies in their respective regions, and solutions to those challenges.¹⁴

It is evident from the recent developments that both the countries are enhancing their cooperation on counterterrorism measures, apart from military trade. Given the emerging trend of terrorist activities both in West Asia and India, this dimension is definitely going to see significant cooperation between the two nations. India is likely to gain from Israeli expertise in counterterrorism measures along with surveillance skills at the borders (both land and sea). Israel is known for its excellent border protection technologies, and India has already used some of its equipments along the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir. India has been a victim of not only cross-border infiltration but also seaborne intrusion, the 2008 Mumbai carnage being one such dastardly attack. It is in this regard that India is showing a great interest in acquiring Israeli border management skills.¹⁵

Potential Challenges:

India-Israel ties is not devoid of challenges. Immediately after it came to power, the Modi government faced the first heat from the opposition parties when the External Affairs Minister refused to discuss a resolution in the Rajya Sabha during the Gaza crisis. Prior to this, during the initial stages of the crisis, while expressing concern over the Israeli air strikes resulting in the loss of lives and damages to property in Gaza, India was also worried over the cross-border provocations by targeting parts of Israel with rockets. However, this balancing act was not appreciated by both Israeli and Palestinian diplomats in New Delhi who expressed their disappointment over India’s statement.¹⁶ Nevertheless, in view of the cordial relations shared by India with both the parties, Sushma Swaraj said, “Any discourteous reference to any friendly country can impact our relations with them”, and further reiterated India’s Palestinian policy that remains unchanged. The minister also mentioned the need to condemn the violence indulged in by both sides. However, New Delhi ultimately condemned Israel’s “disproportionate use of force in Gaza” at the UN Human Rights Council.¹⁷ India’s vote at the UN against Israel evoked several reactions: both criticism and appreciation.

India’s stand on the aforementioned crisis once again brought back to limelight how increasingly difficult a diplomatic tightrope it has to walk while maintaining a delicate balance between friendship with Israel and support to the Palestinian cause. It also reflects how domestic politics still influences New Delhi’s Israel or Palestinian policies or foreign policy in general.

Another major challenge which the Modi government would have to face from time to time is criticism about the burgeoning military-security relations itself. The enhanced ties came up for wide condemnation during the debate on the Gaza crisis. As in the past, the CPI (M) once again called upon the government to immediately halt India’s purchase of arms from Israel.¹⁸ This issue, however, did not lead to any major debate as Sushma Swaraj countered it by pointing out at how this left party, being in the coalition under the UPA-1 government, failed to stop the robust military cooperation between India and Israel. Nevertheless, India-Israel arms trade remains an important target-point for various left wingers and social activists in the country.

In the circumstances, dealings on matters related to military-security affairs are likely to be carried out cautiously though they would not be shelved. Fears are also being expressed in some quarters that close ties with the Jewish state, or an intensive military cooperation, could lead to the strengthening of radical Islamist movements and its support base in India. For instance, several Kashmiri citizens staged violent protests against the recent Israeli offensive in Gaza Strip. Simultaneously, there is a visible influence of the Sunni militant organisation, Islamic State (IS), on India, and the recently established Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) has vowed to target the country.

Prospects Ahead:

Despite the challenges, the prospects for increased cooperation between the two countries are bright. The bilateral relationship between the two will continue to be driven by these close defence ties and shared national security challenges. At this juncture when both the countries are facing heightened terror threats, cooperation to combat this menace will continue to remain as one of the biggest incentives to expand their military-security ties. The visit of the Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh to Israel, fourteen years after that of L.K. Advani in 2000 when he was holding the same portfolio, has opened more opportunities to strengthen the bilateral relations. Cooperation in counterterrorism is, for sure, going to be given an impetus. His meetings with high-profile Israeli leaders, including PM Benjamin Netanyahu, emphasised on strengthening India’s “very warm” ties with Israel. The increasing radicalisation of few Israeli-Arabs and Indian Muslim youth under the influence of the Islamic State (IS) is a common challenge faced by both the countries and this will drive their cooperation to new levels. Additionally, Indian PM, during his meeting with the former Israeli president, Shimon Peres, in New Delhi, “reiterated the strong desire of India to further expand and strengthen its relations with Israel both in traditional areas as well as in new areas of cooperation.”¹⁹

Further, there is likely to be an enhanced cooperation between the defence industries of both the countries. But this would depend on how successfully India could convince the Israeli arms industries to manufacture in the country by taking advantage of the “Make in India” initiative. India’s quest for its own technological advancement in the defence industry is an important push factor for the expansion of ties with Israel. The Israeli premier has expressed his country’s willingness to “discuss transfer and development of technologies with India.” In his words, “"Israeli industries, including the defence industries, could 'make in India' and thereby reduce costs of manufacturing products and systems developed by Israel." ²⁰A few areas that are likely to see technology transfers are aviation security, border protection and water harvesting.

Amid these prospects, it should not be ignored that while India desires to have strong ties with Israel, there are several related political implications that the government needs to factor in along the journey. The sensitive nature of the domestic politics, particularly with the presence of a huge Muslim population which plays significant roles in India’s political set-up, will continue to cast its shadow on the government’s dealings with Israel. There would be inevitable opposition and pressures on the Modi government to scale down ties with Israel. It is, therefore, yet to be seen how successfully the present government would manoeuvre its policies towards Israel while tackling the challenges coming on its away. But a gradual process has been begun by the Modi government to engage very intensively both with the Muslim community in India and with the larger West Asian Arab countries. The recently-concluded India-Arab League meeting in New Delhi is one such important step.

Endnotes

1. Marissa Newman, “India’s new foreign minister a strong fan of Israel”, The Times of Israel, 27 May 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/indias-new-foreign-minister-a-strong-fan-of...
2. Palash Ghosh. “Narendra Modi, Israel’s Best Friend in South Asia”, International Business Times, 17 March 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/india-2014-elections-narendra-modi-israels-best-f...
3. “With Narendra Modi as the new PM, India-Israel ties will improve, feels Alon Usphiz”, The Economic Times, 30 May 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-30/news/50211150_1_...
4. Neeraj Chauhan, “CBI closes Barak scandal case for lack of evidence”, The Times of India, 11 December 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/CBI-closes-Barak-scandal-case-f...
5. Rajat Pandit, “Modi govt clears long-pending case for Israeli Barak missiles for warships”, The Times of India, 26 September 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi-govt-clears-long-pending-c...
6. For a relevant reading, see Alvite Ningthoujam, “India’s Promising Israel’s Defense Ties”, The Diplomat, 9 October 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/indias-promising-israel-defense-ties/
7. “US offers groundbreaking defence technologies to India”, The Times of India, 14 June 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-offers-groundbreaking-defenc...
8. “India chooses Israel's anti-tank guided missile 'Spike' over US' Javelin missiles”, DNA, 25 October 2014, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-chooses-israel-s-anti-tank-gu...
9. Nigam Prusty, “India picks Israel's Spike anti-tank missile over U.S. Javelin – source”, Reuters, 25 October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/25/india-missile-idUSL3N0SK088201...
10. “India to Buy 8,000 of These Anti-Tank Missiles From Israel”, NDTV, 27 October 2014, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-to-buy-8-000-of-these-anti-tank-...
11. Gili Cohen, “sraeli arms exports drop nearly $1 billion in 2013”, Haaretz, 7 October 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.619700
12. For a detailed analysis on India-Israel relations, see P.R. Kumaraswamy (2010), India’s Israel Policy, Columbia University Press: New York.
13. Jayanth Jacob, “Israel offers India to join new cyber security body”, Hindustan Times, 29 September 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/israel-offers-india-to-join-new...
14. “Israel-India to Enhance Cooperation in All Fields”, News, Israeli Embassy, New Delhi, http://embassies.gov.il/delhi/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Israel%20India%20to%20...
15. “India to seek Israeli expertise in managing borders”, DNA, 29 October 2014, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-to-seek-israeli-expertise-in-...
16. Suhasini Haidar, “India’s stand leaves West Asian rivals disappointed”, The Hindu, 16 July 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-stand-leaves-west-asian-riv...
17. “India Condemns Disproportionate Use of Force in Gaza: Full Statement”, NDTV, 24 July 2014, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-condemns-disproportionate-use-of...
18. Anita Joshua, “India must halt purchase of Israeli arms: CPI(M)”, The Hindu, 24 July 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-must-halt-purchase-of-israel...
19. “Prime Minister Receives Former Israeli President Shimon Peres” , News Updates,6 November 2014, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/prime-minister-receives-former-isr...
20. “Israel positive about 'Make in India' campaign: Benjamin Netanyahu”, The Economic Times, 7 November 2014, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/israel-positive-...

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Published Date: 1^st December 2014, Image source: http://i.ytimg.com

String of Pearls or A Garrotte

Kanwal Sibal

Member Advisory Board, VIF

While China Skilfully Plays With Wei Qi, India seems to be playing noughts and crosses

China’s relations with our neighbours have two dimensions. One, its policies towards them are derived from the state of its relations with India. Two, they are bilateral in scope, independent of China’s relations with us. Within these two broad parameters, there are several strands that together weave the tapestry of China’s ties with our neighbouring countries.

It should be kept in mind that some of India’s neighbours are China’s neighbours too by virtue of its occupation of Tibet. If India has geographical, political, economic and strategic reasons to fashion viable neighburhood policies, China cannot but seek to build bridges with countries that are its neighbours. Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, which are our direct neighbours are directly contiguous with Tibet. China will therefore have active policies of neighbourhhood with these countries and we have to accept it as an ineluctable fact.

It would not be abnormal for China to believe that Indian power has to be kept in check for having a trouble free periphery on its western borders. There are border differences between the two countries; the issues around Tibet and the Dalai Lama continue to distort ties. India alone in Asia has the potential to balance China. The geopolitical strategy of China towards India would therefore be to neutralize Indian power as much as possible by encouraging its neighbours to stand up to India, build their capacities to do so, and also establish its own presence in the sub-continent as a power with legitimate interests there. This is why China talks about India’s hegemonic ambitions in the sub-continent. It capitalizes on the fears that smaller countries in the subcontinent harbour against their giant neighbour with which they have their own bilateral differences.

China is pursuing a policy of shoring up our individual neighbours to the extent they have the capacity as well as depth of antagonism to challenge India. Its political, military and economic relationship with them is calibrated to its own strategic needs and an assessment how much load these countries can bear in the face of the possible scale of India’s reaction and countervailing policies.

Militarily, Pakistan has been the obvious choice for countering India because of its perennial hostility towards India and the size of its armed forces. Pakistan has therefore become China’s privileged partner in the sub-continent, with hyperbolic descriptions of the quality of their relationship. It is Pakistan’s biggest defence partner. The relationship is being shored up further by collaborating in developing the JF-17 fighter aircraft, the K-8 Karakoram advance training aircraft, AWACS systems, Al Khalid tanks etc. It has transferred nuclear and missile technologies to Pakistan to strategically neutralize India. This has been the biggest strategic blow delivered by China to India in which the West has also been complicit. It is now collaborating with Pakistan to develop the Babur cruise missile. To balance the India-US nuclear deal, China has agreed to supply two additional power reactors to Pakistan in violation of its NSG obligations. This demonstrates the depth of the strategic ties between the two countries and the length China is willing to go nurture them. China also does not fail to deflect western and Indian pressure on Pakistan on the issue of terrorism by praising its contribution to the combat against international terrorism and asking the international community to recognize this and show understanding Pakistan’s domestic compulsions.

China has developed military ties with our other neighbours. This is a critical area in bilateral relations between countries, but we are not able to match China because of our policies on arms sales and, even more importantly, the lack of a large enough domestic defence manufacturing base which severely limits our export potential. This vacuum in our neighbourhood has been filled up by China and others, with India making some limited and often token transfers. This has created a relationship of dependence between China and most of our neighbours in a vital area.

China has now established a military relationship with Nepal, limited in scope in terms of transfers but very significant politically. Chinese arms supplies to Nepal have been an extremely sensitive issue for India. Whereas Nepal’s provocation in this regard had created a crisis in the relationship during Rajiv Gandhi’s time, China supplied arms to Nepal in 2005 during Gyanendra’s time without an Indian riposte. They invited the Nepalese Defence Minister in September 2008 to observe a military exercise and announced a military aid package worth $1.3 million. In December 2008, a PLA General visiting Nepal pledged $2.6 million of non-lethal military aid. Two Chinese military teams visited Nepal in the course of 2008-2009. The political point has been made that the provisions of the relevant treaty with Nepal requiring it to first approach India for military supplies before approaching any other country can be disregarded, especially with regard to acquisitions from China. Nepal has been helped by China to recover its “sovereignty” through these defence dealings.

China is one of the top sources of arms supplies to Bangladesh. It has helped to revamp the country’s air force, supplied a short range defence air defence system, a squadron of F-7 fighter planes, three MI-171 helicopters worth about $600 to 800 million. Bangladesh has bought 44 tanks and 3 armoured recovery vehicles from China for $164 million. The Bangladesh navy is equipped with Chinese frigates and missile boats. In 2002, China and Bangladesh signed a “Defence Cooperation Agreement” which includes military training and defence production. In 2008 Bangladesh established an anti-ship missile launch pad near the Chittagong port with Chinese assistance.

China is Myanmar’s closest defence ally, supplying most of its military hardware: fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, naval vessels, surface to air missiles. It has assisted in constructing a naval base in Sittwe. Access to Myanmar’s ports and naval installations provide China with strategic influence in the Bay of Bengal. In 2009 Myanmar placed an order for 50 K-8 Karakorams, a joint venture between China and Pakistan. in August 2010 the Chinese and Myanmarese navies held a naval exercise; it was the first visit by Chinese naval warships to Myanmar.

Sri Lanka’s relations with China have always posed a difficult challenge for India. Sri Lanka has for decades tried to balance its relations with India by courting China. Since 2005, under the Rajapakse government, the already multi-dimensional and deep-rooted relationship has become even stronger. China has helped modernize and expand the Sri Lankan armed forces, providing it with tanks, jets, naval vessels, radars, communication equipment, night vision devices, deep penetration bombs, rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles etc, all the weapons Sri Lanka needed to crush the LTTE . In Sri Lanka we have to contend with Chinese and Pakistani military supplies. No doubt President Rajapakse assures us that Sri Lanka will remain vigilant about India’s security sensitivities, but that depends on how we define our security needs and how Sri Lanka understands them. India is not in a position to demand the curtailment of Chinese defence supplies to Sri Lanka, particularly as we cannot fill the breach.

The second leg of Chinese penetration of the sub-continent is the economic one. Since China’s objectives are essentially strategic the accent on the economic side is on infrastructure projects of strategic significance. China built the strategic Karakoram highway to establish a direct land-link between the two countries. China has agreed to rehabilitate and partially realign this crucial link that has been ruptured because of flooding and landslides. A railroad link has been mooted. China and Pakistan are discussing major development projects in POK with not only business as the objective but also the consolidation of Chinese presence in this area to better secure Sinkiang and add pressures on India, but also “legitimize” Pakistan’s illegal occupation of this territory which can become a hub of connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Gwadar deep-sea port, built with Chinese assistance, seems intended initially to be the receiving point for transporting hydrocarbons from the Gulf through Pakistan to Sinkiang, but it has also a military significance as it has the potential of becoming a lunch pad for Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Gwadar gives China access to the Arabian sea in the west just as corridors through Myanmar give it access to the Bay of Bengal in the east.

If in the west China has been able to pursue its strategic projects in Pakistan in a highly favourable political atmosphere, in the east it has had similar favourable conditions in Myanmar. China has helped build roads, railways, dams, bridges, airfields and seaports in Myanmar. It is building a crude oil port as part of a pipeline project to transport oil to its western provinces without having to go through the Malacca Straits. It is active in securing oil and gas reserves in Myanmar. It has built a strategic road along the Irrawady River linking Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal, besides a railroad through Kunming via Dali that links up with the Mandalay-Rangoon railway. Myanmar has officially commenced the construction of the main gas pipeline from the natural deep seaport of Kyaukpyu to Kunming in Yunnan. A railroad running adjacent to the pipelines is planned. If all goes as planned the route for the transport of Gulf oil and gas to China will change radically. This will enhance China’s energy security besides expanding the presence of Chinese ships in this part of Bay of Bengal to India’s strategic discomfort.

As part of a strategy to build connectivity that ties neighbouring countries to China, the latter is ready to participate commercially in developing the deep-sea port in Sonodia Island near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has sought China’s assistance to develop and use the Chittagong port. This along with the port at Sonadia Island will give China the connectivity it wants between Yunnan and the Bay of Bengal. China, Myanmar and Bangladesh have signed an agreement to establish a road and rail link.

China is giving special attention to infrastructure in Sri Lanka because of its strategic location in the Indian Ocean, very close to India’s southern coast. This fits into China’s plans to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean both to protect its trade and energy flows through these waters (80% of China’s oil goes through a sea lane a few nautical miles from Sri Lanka) but also to project its naval power there eventually, rather than remain vulnerable to US and Indian pressures in possible future scenarios. The massive $ 1.5 billion Hambantota Development project being built by China (it is financing more than 85% of the project which will take 10 years to complete) will include an international container port, an oil refinery, dry docks for ship repairs and construction, bunkering and refuelling facilities, an international airport etc. It will become a major transhipment hub. While at present there is no talk of a Chinese naval base on Hambantota, concerns about the future will remain. To keep an eye on developments India has opened a consulate in Hambantota in 2010.

In the case of Nepal, the strategic economic stakes are less important, but there is talk to extend the railway line built in Tibet till Lhasa to the Nepalese border and complete a connecting highway within Tibet to create greater connectivity in order to boost trade exchanges, with a dry port being planned at Tatopani near the Tibet border to create a “cross-border free trade zone”. The longer term scenario of connecting Tibet to the Bay of Bengal through Kolkata is not realizable until China settles its border issue with India. The connectivity being created with Tibet cannot alter fundamentally Nepal’s line of communication through India, though it provides Nepal with an option to temporarily relieve any Indian squeeze.

The nature of China’s economic priorities in our neighbourhood is demonstrated by its willingness to invest in strategic projects but unwillingness to be generous in doling out assistance in general. China’s direct investment in Pakistan until 2010 was relatively small at $1.83 billion according to Chinese figures. Pakistan has little to offer by way of strategic sectors like iron, copper, oil, gas and coal in which China invests abroad to meet domestic needs. China does not seem to have given any large loans to Pakistan. Its humanitarian aid is modest. When massive floods hit Pakistan in 2010, China’s initial contribution was a meagre $18 million, raised later to $250 million. China has been directing Pakistan’s aid requests to the IMF.

China has been involved in aid projects in Nepal since decades, in the highway sector, in particular. Other areas are health, education and hydropower. It annual assistance to Nepal is not too large at about $ 35 million. During his January 2012 visit to Nepal the Chinese Premier announced a grant aid of US $120 million to be spent on mutually defined projects.

Chinese investment in Bangladesh is modest at $200 million. Trade between the two countries has grown to $8.26 billion in 2011 with a huge imbalance in China’s favour (with Bangladesh’s exports at $449 million). Imports from China constitute 21% of the total Bangladesh imports, which is huge. While Bangladesh has traditionally complained vociferously about its trade imbalance with India, its tolerance levels towards China has been high. The two countries have agreed on introduction of 3G and 2.5G network and a fertilizer project. China has been more generous with Sri Lanka. Since 2006, it has provided $3.06 billion in financial assistance for various projects.

An important element conditioning China’s policies in our neighbourhood is the Tibetan question. China’s hold over Tibet remains politically insecure though its military position there cannot be shaken. The huge economic investments China has made in Tibet has not turned political opinion in its favour. This problem will continue till China’s political system changes, moving towards democracy and tolerance of dissent. There is no political, ethnic, cultural or linguistic glue that binds the Tibetans and Chinese. India can manage its diversity without the heavy stick of state authority because of democracy; China cannot at this stage. The uprising in Tibet in 2008 exposed the failure of China to win the hearts and minds of the Tibetans. The rash of current instances of self-immolations in the Greater Tibet area confirms that failure.

In this context Nepal is important. The Chinese put pressure on India on the issue of the Dalai Lama, which India both yield to and resists. Nepal cannot resist such pressure and cooperates with China in keeping an eye on the Tibetans in Nepal. The Chinese want to exclude any source of instability in Tibet fuelled through Nepal. For that they need to be active in Nepal itself rather than hunkering down defensively on their side of Tibet and warding off any threat. China has always had a policy of “balancing” Indian influence in Nepal, not the point of outright confrontation, but enough to prevent India from completely dominating Nepalese politics. Nepal is important for them, but they have been realistic enough to realize that that they cannot dominate the country or take the burden of sustaining it in case of an Indian squeeze as a result. It serves their interests adequately to nourish politically and economically influential anti-Indian lobbies in Nepal to a sufficient degree. Earlier it was the Palace whose insecurities and prejudices against India they exploited. The Palace nourished the Maoists to counter the democratic forces in Nepal. China did not have to actively back them. With the Maoists now in electoral politics and sharing power in the country, China has now a replacement tool in its hands to continue to wield influence in Nepal to further its own interests at India’s expense.

In recent years, encouraged by the Maoists and the general hardening of its position on the border issue with India, China is seeking more parity with India in its relations with Nepal. They are pressing for a bilateral treaty with Nepal similar to its treaty with India. China’s challenge to Indian interests in Nepal has grown substantially but not dramatically. China cannot manage the very turbulent politics of Nepal given its limited experience of handling political party politics of the highly convoluted and fractured type that operates in Nepal. China has opened several Confucian Institutes in the Terai, which poses a challenge in terms of Chinese activity close to our open border with Nepal. The China-Pakistan connection, even without the two countries working together in Nepal, facilitates Pakistani activity there as the pro-Chinese forces in Nepal would logically have a more tolerant view of Pakistan.

Bhutan has eschewed the kind of irrational attitudes that Nepal has adopted towards India. It has not played the China card against India for a variety of reasons. It has not had the kind of Palace versus democratic forces confrontation that Nepal has had, and so the Bhutanese monarch has not felt the need to cultivate an outside power against India. The Bhutan King’s conservative attitude towards opening the country to outsiders, his reluctance to allow any big power to open a resident mission in Thimphu in order to have a plausible reason to deny such a mission to China, his cooperation with India on water resources for generating revenues for the country for its development, Bhutan’s Buddhist identity that is separate from that of the Dalai Lama and which therefore excludes the Tibetan religious and refugee factor from the Bhutan-China relationship, all these factors cast the China-Bhutan relationship in terms of Indian interests very differently from that of China and Nepal.

The challenge for Bhutan is to settle the unresolved boundary issue with China, something that it would like to do if it did not have to contend with India’s concerns. India would not want China to succeed diplomatically in isolating India and making it look intransigent by settling the border issue with Bhutan and leaving the border with India unresolved. Apart from this, and, indeed, more importantly, it is most important for us that the delineation of the border between Bhutan and China in the Chumbi valley takes into account our vital security interests. We want therefore Bhutan to closely coordinate with us its border talks with China which have been going on since the 80s, with 19 rounds of talks till 2010. The Chinese tempt the Bhutanese with “concessions” in the pastoral lands in the north against acceptance of their claims in the Chumbi valley area. They also pressure Bhutan to open up diplomatic relations with China. So far the Bhutanese have cooperated, though elements there have the sentiment that Bhutan is paying a price because of India-China differences. In other words, they would be able to get a good deal from China but for the complicating Indian factor. The Chinese Prime Minister met the Bhutanese Foreign Minister at the Rio+20 conference in June where he raised the question of establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and this was publicized by the Chinese side. India has to be watchful about Chinese blandishments to Bhutan and ensure that Bhutan continues to be firm in its policy of not allowing any gap to develop in Indian and Bhutanese approaches to the sensitive border question, especially with a new and young monarch in power in Bhutan in a more democratic framework.

With the patchy and fluctuating nature of India-Bangladesh ties over the years, China has had ample opportunity to secure a deep footing in Bangladesh. All India’s neighbours, barring Bhutan, play the Chinese card against us in order to balance the overwhelming weight of India in the subcontinent. They have tried to exploit to their advantage the antagonistic ties between India and China and have deliberately created space for China to expand its presence in their countries. Bangladesh has been a thorn in India’s side under the military dictatorship and Begum Zia; it has blocked us from promoting connectivity not only with our own north-east but also Myanmar, with further linkages beyond with South-east Asia. It has sheltered anti-Indian insurgents on its soil, tying down Indian armed forces in the region and also retarding the development of this part of India. It suits the Chinese that Bangladesh should be a geopolitical problem for India in integrating its north-east and raising its profile in South-east Asia. To what extent China has given direct encouragement to Bangladesh when it has been under unfriendly rule to counter Indian interests is difficult to pin-point, but common sense suggests that they would play such a game subtly. It would be in their interest to prevent Bangladesh from moving into the Indian orbit decisively, and their presence and programmes ensure this. The two countries have agreed on a “Closer Comprehensive Partnership for Cooperation” with a strategic perspective. On Bangladesh’s invitation and Nepal’s support China was admitted as an observer in SAARC.

China steadily tightened its grip on Myanmar during the long period the West sought actively to isolate it through boycotts and sanctions. This policy has undergone a change with the easing of military rule in Myanmar, the introduction of limited democracy and US’s “re-balancing” strategy in Asia-Pacific that seeks to hedge against the unpredictable consequences of China’s rise. With the changed environment Myanmar has cancelled a $3.6 billion dam project at Myitsone because of strong public opposition to it. This might suggest that Myanmar will seek to loosen China’s embrace, but the logic of neighbourhood and benefits that Myanmar can derive from China’s economic strength will not necessarily mean any dramatic downgrading of the bilateral relationship.

With growing Chinese economic and military power the challenges for India to manage the inroads China will make into our region will become increasingly difficult to manage in a situation where China, now far ahead of India in its overall capacity to project power, continues its policy of effectively containing India but continuing to engage it in order to deflect attention away from this reality and creating economic opportunities for itself in the Indian market, which, in turn, will tie India’s hands even more in any push back policy directed at China. The foretaste of our domestic resistance to this is the bizarre statement recently by Ratan Tata that India should seek a way to become an ally of China and that he is not aware of anything adversarial done by China against us !!

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Need for An Indian Aerospace Command; Now and Here

Radhakrishna Rao

Deteriorating security environment in South Asia region along with a massive beef up in defence preparedness by the People’s Liberation Army(PLA) of China, have underpinned the need, as never before for India, to bolster its military might in all its manifestations to blunt the edge of the emerging multi-dimensional security threat.

Moreover, in the context of India’s declared national policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, the country should be extra vigilant in guarding against any threat to its territorial integrity. And looking beyond the possibility of the security threat, India in keeping with its status as an emerging technological power, should showcase its military muscle encasing the technological prowess that is immune to the threats of technology denial regime. Clearly and apparently, India cannot afford to lose the opportunity of positioning itself as a military power of global standing.

Indeed, in the context of the growing need to take care of Indian interests across the world, the need for a heightened situational awareness and quick mobility has become all the more pronounced. Only a well - equipped aerospace command supported by a range of advanced technology satellites could help India meet its emerging strategic challenges and security threats with courage and confidence. Of course, to begin with, India has the expertise, infrastructure and technology to create the nucleus for the proposed tri service aerospace command .But the only stumbling block is the green signal from the ruling dispensation in New Delhi. There is no denying the fact that an Indian tri service aerospace command would be a big morale booster for the Indian defence forces. As such, Government of India should seriously work towards giving a final go ahead for the proposed tri service aerospace command. For the creation of an aerospace command is a dynamic and continuously evolving process focussed on absorbing technological developments as it mainfests.

Indian Air Force (IAF), which has been vigorously advocating the need for an aerospace command for well over five years now, has already made a detailed study of the issues related to the structure and functions of aerospace commands in other countries. But then the type of the aerospace command India would need to set up—of course after getting clearance from the political leadership of the country—would reflect the needs specific to the Indian situation, extent of funds available as well as technology and expertise that could be pressed into service for the purpose. The objectives, however, of the proposed Indian tri service aerospace command, would be similar to aerospace commands in other countries: enhancing situational awareness in all its manifestations, a homogeneous platform for seamless integration of the capabilities of all the three wings of the services and ensuring free access to space while denying the adversary the opportunity to use space platforms in the event of a war. Other well identified objectives of the Indian aerospace command would include setting up a system to give out missile launch warnings and monitoring the launch of enemy satellites. The missile defence shield being put in place by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) could very well become an important component of the aerospace command. And so are the unmanned drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), AWACS(Advanced Warning and Control System) aircraft, a range of missiles meant for a variety of end uses and a constellation of satellites high up in space. Indeed, the whole exercise of creating a multi layered aerospace command should ultimately be aimed at ensuring that in a fast changing battlefield scenario, all the available tools should be harnessed to stay at the winning edge of the war.

Perhaps the biggest trump card in the endeavour to set up an Indian aerospace command lies in the expertise that ISRO has built up in the area of designing and developing state of the art satellites for wide ranging applications. Incidentally, ISRO has so far built and launched more than fifty satellites for uses such as scientific research, earth observation, weather watch as well as communications, broadcasting and navigation. As things stand now, India does not yet have a dedicated defence satellite even as all the three wings of services have been clamouring for exclusive satellite capability to boost their preparedness and fighting fitness. Not long back, DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat had pointed out to the well-conceived plan to build and launch a series of home grown defence spacecraft systems with surveillance, imaging and navigation capabilities that would not only help keep an eye on “hostile developments in the neighbourhood” but also help guide the cruise missiles and high precision weapons to hit targets with a high degree of accuracy.

“There will be a series of defence satellites. Each year, you will find one or two satellites going up. I cannot reveal you the numbers because they are classified,” noted Saraswat. However, he made it clear that each of these satellites would be equipped for a specific mission and would carry payloads for a variety of end uses including surveillance and reconnaissance, imaging, navigation and communications. Going ahead, Saraswat stated that “the army, the navy and IAF each have their own requirements and it would not be appropriate to say how many each of them would need.” According to Saraswat, with these satellites in orbit, Indian defence forces would be in a position to get a holistic picture of the movement of troops and such other things in the immediate neighbourhood. Saraswat also made a point that satellite systems hold the key to the successful operationalization of India’s ballistic missile defence shield.

Saraswat also revealed that the road map of the series of satellites required by the Indian defence forces has been handed over to the Indian Space Research Organisation(ISRO).But then with its current infrastructure and support level, ISRO is having tough time meeting its own requirements. With a single operational launch vehicle in the form of the four stage Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and a single launch complex spread across Sriharikota island on India’s eastern coast, ISRO is not in a position to accomplish more than 3-4 orbital missions a year. There is no denying the fact that India would need to build a second launch pad which is very critical to boosting the launch missions by a substantial extent. In the context of India’s plan to offer its launch services to international customers, ISRO would need to boost its launch frequencies to at least six a year. China, which has three landlocked launch complexes, is now building an ultra-modern costal orbital complex at Wenchang in Hainan Island which happens to be the epicentre of a massive Chinese naval build up.On its part, ISRO has hinted at a plan for a second launch complex. But whether it would assume a practical shape within a foreseeable future no one is sure as yet.

Similarly, the glaring failure of the Indian space agency to qualify the home grown cryogenic engine stage required to operationalize the three stage Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) well on time could jeopardise many of the high profile projects lined up by ISRO in the near future. To meet the growing needs of Indian defence forces, ISRO would need to not only build multiple launch centres and a variety of launch vehicles equipped for varying orbital missions but also involve the Indian industry in a big way in the task of building and delivering satellites and launch vehicles in a ready to use condition. Clearly and apparently, India lacks the “industrial culture “ fine-tuned for building spacecraft and space vehicles on a turnkey basis.

Perhaps a major hindrance in the way of setting up the Indian aerospace command is involving ISRO, a civilian space agency committed to the “peaceful use of space,” in the entire exercise. As such, the ruling dispensation in New Delhi should factor the possibility of such a step attracting international censure including the US technology embargo and trade sanction. In fact, in early 1990s, USA had prevented Russia from transferring the cryogenic engine technology to India, by citing the potential for the diversion of such a technology for military build up. In late 1990s, USA had pressurized India into dropping its Agni surface to surface missile programme with the observation that the Agni series of missiles developed under India’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme(IGMDP had drawn from the solid fuel technology developed for India’s first civilian basic launcher SLV-3 which had its successful debut flight in 1980.As it is,SLV-3 was developed under the leadership of the former Indian President Dr.A.P.J.Abdul Kalam during his stint with ISRO. Incidentally, Dr.Kalam who subsequently moved to DRDO, spearheaded the IGMDP which served as a launching pad for developing a range of Indian missiles.

Indeed, satellites serve as the “ears and eyes” of a well equipped aerospace command. The stunning success with which US led allied forces were able to pull off their intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq has highlighted the vital importance of the space based assets in realizing the strategic goals in a cost effective and timely manner. Meteorological satellites forecasting weather for facilitating bombing raids and missile launches, navigation satellites guiding lethal weapons to designated locations, reconnaissance satellites locating the exact geographic position of military targets, electronic ferret satellites gathering data on radar frequencies, communications satellites providing real time secure links between defence forces scattered over a vast geographical stretch for a coordinated strategy and ocean watch satellites snooping on the naval movement of adversaries which have all become a puppet in the string of the modern day warfare. Not surprisingly then, the massive intelligence failure suffered by the Indian army before and during the short lived Kargil skirmish of 1999 has been attributed to the lack of access to satellite resources.

On its part IAF is confident that a full fledged tri service aerospace command would go a long way towards ensuring the safety of Indian space assets and guarding the Indian air space with heightened vigil. The IAF’s defence “space vision 2020” outlines the need to evolve a strategy for the optimum utilization of space assets for sharpening its combat preparedness. By all means, for IAF uninterrupted access to dedicated constellation of military satellites is critically important to sustain its strategic superiority through the concept of “see, reach, hit and protect”. Satellites hold the key for the coordinated and synchronized functioning of the aerospace command by seamlessly integrating weapons systems, missiles, radars and sensor suites, unmanned aerial vehicles, weaponzied drones, electronics and communications network , fighter jets, transport aircraft, logistics and support systems, defence forces spread across a vast geographical swath for sustaining “strategic superiority” from the word go.

The clamour for setting up an Indian tri service aerospace command assumed strident dimensions following the early 2007 anti satellite test carried out by China. This exercise meant to refine Chinese space warfare techniques involved the destruction of an aging weather watch satellite positioned at an altitude of 537 kms above the earth by firing a ground based medium range ballistic missile. And while addressing the United Commanders Conference in New Delhi in mid-2008, Antony did not mince his words while underscoring Indian angst over the “emergence of anti satellite weaponry, a new class of heavy lift off boosters and improved array of military space devices in our neighbourhood.”

Of course, Saraswat has been stressing on the need to develop technological elements of anti satellite systems to prevent the rogue satellite systems from immobilizing the Indian space assets. He has also hinted at developing space laser sensor to monitor and track space based killer devices. To support the Indian aerospace command, DRDO has also a plan up its sleeve to develop and launch electronics intelligence and communications intelligence satellites as exclusive defence space platforms.

Space capability also constitutes a key element of the network centric system to integrate the resources of all the three wings of the services. Air Force Network (AFNET), inducted into IAF in 2010, on which an integrated air control and command is being built, will be allotted a slew of transponders on-board Indian satellites in INSAT constellation being operated by ISRO. The fibre optic technology based AFNET grid which will help link IAF’s command bases, radars, missiles, batteries and airborne fighters would ultimately pave the way for the complete situational awareness of the area that IAF wants to secure and dominate. In the ultimate analysis, the success of the aerospace command depends on the smartness with which the information super highways and communications channels are exploited for real time coordination of the “strategic moves” of the defence forces spread across a vast geographical swath.

Equally critical to the successful operation of an aerospace command is a versatile and well endowed C4ISR system. While the C 4 components of the system—computers, command , communications and control—constitute the backend, ISR(intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) make up for the front end. The ISR made up of orbital, airborne, maritime and fixed or mobile, ground based sensor systems help find, fix and track hostile targets and evaluate the damage to enemy targets. On the other hand, with an increasing number of smart weapons including missiles rapidly becoming autonomous, they would need to be controlled and manipulated through a network enabled command and control structure supported by a constellation of satellites.

Meanwhile, with the Indian Space Research Organisation(ISRO) preparing for the launch of India’s fully home-grown microwave earth observation satellite RISAT-1 sometime towards the end of April, Indian defence forces will have the reason to cheer. For they can look forward to fall back on a “smart eye in the sky” to enhance their situational awareness and surveillance capability along India’s borders with China and Pakistan.

Significantly, it is the all weather and day and night imaging capability of RISAT-1 that is particularly relevant to Indian defence forces from the point of view of strategic planning. For the high performance Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) payload of RISAT-1 is capable of functioning even under conditions of cloud, dust and haze. Right now, Indian defence forces have limited access to the IRS constellation of earth observation spacecraft being operated by ISRO. But then these satellites being passive systems can function only under the conditions of brightness.

In April 2009, India’s four stage PSLV had orbited RISAT-II microwave imaging spacecraft that ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) had realized in tie up with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) on a fast track mode. The launch of 300-kg.RISAT-II featuring an X-band SAR payload was widely perceived as a response to the insecurity complex generated by the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. The all weather RISAT-II has been described by strategic analysts as a high tech space platform meant to keep a tab on terrorist movements along India’s international borders with Pakistan.

Clearly and apparently, Indian defence forces can easily exploit the potentials of RISAT-II to boost the intelligence gathering capability of Indian armed forces in big way. For earth observation and surveillance are considered the two faces of the same coin. RISAT-II’s revisit capability of four to five days is considered advantageous factor in the dynamic monitoring of the developments of strategic importance. Added to that the highly agile RISAT-II can be manoeuvred to change its viewing angle as per the requirements of the users.

At the moment, Indian defence forces don’t have a dedicated satellite systems meant for surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering .Of course, the ISRO built GSAT-7 satellite which is expected to be launched during 2012-13 will serve as Indian navy’s exclusive space platform for reliable , robust and fool proof communications.

While India has a robust level of technological infrastructure and human expertise required to create a tri service aerospace command in a phased manner, the political leadership of the country should shed its “complacency and indifference” to give a go ahead to the setting up of the tri service aerospace command. For in the context of growing, multi-dimensional threat to India’s national security and taking into account the need to position India as a military power of global standing, the setting up of a tri service Indian aerospace command cannot be delayed under any circumstance. For the Indian defence forces, an aerospace command could very well be a force multiplier and game changer. And for India, it would be a hedge against the forces bent upon challenging the territorial integrity of the country.

Author is Research Fellow in Vivekananda International Foundation