Israel and India’s New Government: The Military-Security Dimension

Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, 

Research Associate, VIF

India-Israel Ties and the New Government:

The bilateral relations between India and Israel, today, are going in a direction as expected by many ever since the 2014 election results were declared. The thumping victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), by defeating the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) that governed the country for ten years, has ushered in a new level of engagements with Israel. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the military-security cooperation with Israel is witnessing a rapid enhancement. Simultaneously, cooperation in the fields of science and technology, water management and agriculture are also being given immense importance. On the economic front, both the countries are doing fairly well with the bilateral trade currently standing at US$6 billion.

Currently, Israel is the second largest arms suppliers of India with a bilateral arms trade over the last decade estimated at US$10 billion. Undoubtedly, defence cooperation has become one of the most important pillars of Indo-Israeli ties and it is likely to get further boost in the days to come. It has been almost six months since the BJP-led NDA government came into power and there have been visible improvements in this aspect of bilateral ties.

As in the past, the BJP-led government has already started initiatives to enhance defence ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Modi’s cabinet has a few ministers who are in favour of forging closer cooperation with Israel in all the sectors, and one of them is Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj who once called the Jewish state "a reliable partner."¹ Just before the 2014 election results were announced, Narendra Modi was even referred to as "Israel's best friend in South Asia".² This was mainly considering his long association with the Jewish state and its leaders. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had visited Israel in 2006. Gujarat has deep economic and trade links with Israel which has has invested billions of dollars for various projects in the state. In January 2013, Modi personally hosted the Israeli ambassador to India, Alon Ushpiz in his state, and discussed various avenues for cooperation. As a result, Modi has a fair knowledge and experience of dealing with Israel. The Israeli envoy expressed his full hope of realising the potential of India-Israel relations in various fields under the new government.³The overall impetus was given when the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Modi and congratulated the latter on his success in the national elections and pledged to deepen cooperation between the two countries.

Recent Developments:

A month after Modi came to power, India’s Defence Secretary R.K. Mathur paid a three-day visit to Israel from 1-3 July and discussed arms deals, including missile development programme, and also the procurement of two Israeli-made Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) for the Indian Air Force. Israel has endorsed its Iron Dome air defence system to India for protection against incoming long and short range missile threats. New Delhi, however, has not decided as yet on purchasing this anti missile system. During late 2012 and mid 2013, Indian armed forces had started discussing about this system and its suitability in the Indian context.

Further, both the countries have clinched two important arms deal, which had been delayed for several years due to various reasons.

The first breakthrough for the Modi-led government was the announcement to procure the much-needed Barak-1 missile, manufactured by the Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd (IAI). This is a significant step particularly considering the depleted defensive capabilities of Indian warships. With delivery scheduled for December 2015, fourteen ships that presently lack missile systems will be outfitted with the Barak-1. A little more than a decade ago, India and Israel defence cooperation had been plagued by allegations of bribery and allegations, pertaining to this missile system. India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) even conducted a probe into the deals with IAI and Rafael regarding the supply of these missiles. The deals were entered into by the then BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2000. Allegations of receiving kickbacks were levelled against several Indian officials, including the then Defence Minister, defence personnel and a few middlemen. It was only in December 2013 after a detailed probe that the investigation was closed by the CBI with the admission that there was no evidence against the accused.⁴

The final nod given by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in September 2014, under the chairmanship of Modi, for the acquisition of 262 missiles⁵ has come as a big relief to the Indian Navy, given its rapidly dwindling stock of anti-ballistic missiles for its frontline battleships. The Indian Navy has been voicing concerns over its deficiencies, with ships operating without missile defence systems. The announcement of the procurement at a whopping cost of US$144 million is thus a welcome move.⁶ The clearance given to this stalled missile deal itself is an indication of India’s preference for Israeli-made missile defence systems. It is, at the same time, to be acknowledged that Israel has faced a stiff competition from other mega foreign arms vendors such as the United States (US).

The US factor in Israeli arms sales is not a new topic; it has been there ever since the latter has emerged as an important arms exporter since the 1970s onwards. Due to fears of competition, the US even scuttled Israeli arms exports to a few countries in the past in Latin America, Europe and Asia as well. In the Indian context, too, the US was trying really hard to sell its Javelin missiles manufactured by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Since the last one year, there had been a fierce competition between Javelin and Israel’s Spike Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) produced by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The US has made several efforts to tap the lucrative Indian defence market with the Pentagon even demonstrating its willingness to offer “groundbreaking” defence technologies to India, including helicopters and UAVs.⁷ There have already been discussions between the two governments for joint development and production of items such as drones and missiles. But what have remained as the constraining factor in enhancing their defence cooperation are the entrenched issues on military technology transfer mechanisms. It is because of this reason that India opted for the Israel-made Spike ATGMs.

During late-October 2014, after a prolonged delay, at a meeting of its Defence Acquisition Council, India finally decided to buy 8,356 Israeli-made Spike ATGMs and 321 launchers at a cost of US$525 million.⁸ The deal for this missile remained stuck since 2010. The Indian Army had conducted several rounds of trial on this system. This major breakthrough in India-Israel defence ties under the Modi government has come at a juncture when border tension with China, and skirmishes along the India-Pakistan border were on a new high. In the words of India’s new Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar, “National security is the paramount concern of the government. All hurdles and bottlenecks in the procurement process should be addressed expeditiously so that the pace of acquisition is not stymied."⁹

The Spike missile deal should not be looked only from the prism of an arms trade between India and Israel. It has sent out a strong message to other potential arms suppliers who are eyeing the lucrative Indian defence market that India not only wants finished products but is also interested in getting technologies for its defence indigenisation programmes. New Delhi decided against Washington’s offer for its Javelin missiles because the exact extent of the Technology Transfer to the Indian defence firm Bharat Dynamics Ltd was not clearly defined; the cost of the Spike ATGM was cheaper than the Javelin, and “cancelling the Israeli deal at the last moment would have sent wrong signals to the international community.” ¹⁰ The issue on technology transfer also assumes significance as the present government under Modi is promoting its “Make in India” policy, and defence production is well within this initiative. Israel, unlike the US, has agreed to transfer technologies and this is an important step in India’s military modernisation drive. From now on, it appears that India’s arms purchase will come along with the clause of technology transfer from the suppliers, and Israel would not be spared from this emerging trend. Considering this, Israel cannot afford to remain complacent in its arms sales to India. The Israeli defence industries, rather, should capitalise on the new opportunities provided by India to manufacture in the country under Modi’s project.

During 2013, Israel witnessed a decline in its arms exports worldwide with a value of US$6.54 billion as compared to that of US$7.2 in 2012.¹¹ But with mega defence deals signed between Israel and a few Asian countries, the volume of the former’s arms exports could see a slight improvement during 2014. Moreover, in continuation to its military imports, India is considering to procure more Israeli-made Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) surveillance aircraft in a deal estimated to cost over US$1 billion. India had already purchased Phalcon AWACS in May 2009 and March 2010. Acquisition of this sophisticated system would further boost Indian Air Force’s (IAF) detecting capabilities of troop build-ups and movement of enemy aircraft along India’s frontiers. Now, if this deal gets clinched, then it is going to be a boom for Israel’s defence industries. The Asia-Pacific region was the main destination for Israeli arms during 2013, earning US$3.91 billion.

Apart from arms trade, India and Israel have also agreed to cooperate intensively on other military-security arenas. The seed for further enhancement of relations between the two countries was laid at the meeting between Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu and Modi on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York during late-September 2014. This was the first meeting between an Israeli Prime Minister and his Indian counterpart in the last 11 years. Despite robust relations in areas related to defence, intelligence and agriculture, the political ties between the two countries have remained somewhat low-profile. After the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003 to New Delhi, no other Israeli PM or any of their foreign ministers visited India in recent years. Likewise, from the Indian side, while no PM has ever visited Israel, the latest visit by a foreign minister to the West Asian nation was made by S.M. Krishna in January 2012.

Owing to various domestic pressures, particularly the presence of 175 million Muslim population in India, New Delhi is keeping its political ties with Israel a low-key affair. This reason was attributed for the delay in establishing diplomatic relations in 1992.¹² Nevertheless, in order to add more vigour to the already-thriving relations, attempts have to be made unrelentingly to forge stronger political relations, and this would require reciprocal visits by both Indian and Israeli PMs and other key ministers, sooner or later. It is to be seen if Modi would create history by becoming the first Indian PM to visit the Jewish state. Modi was invited by his Israeli counterpart during the New York-meeting. Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged the significance of the Indo-Israeli ties by saying “sky is the limit” for its growth. While such breakthrough would take the bilateral relations to further heights, one cannot rule out, at the same time, serious backlash within India from those corners which are vehemently opposed to New Delhi’s continuing ties with Israel.

During the Modi-Netanyahu meeting, a wide range of issues, which are of mutual interests, were discussed. Netanyahu raised the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme, and both the leaders acknowledged the threat of global terrorism in their respective countries. Along with these, the need for further cooperation in the fields of technology, defence, agriculture and water management were emphasised.

For quite some time, India and Israel have been developing an interest to cooperate in cyber security areas. This is in the wake of ever increasing cyber crimes in both the countries. Being surrounded by hostile neighbourhoods, the need for cyber security framework for both the countries has gained immense importance. It is in this direction, the Israeli PM invited Modi to be a part of his project of national cyber defence authority.¹³ The project’s main objective is to create a link between the civilian and military authorities in both the countries. For India, the invitation from Israel has come at a time when it is striving to establish a strong cyber security defence system. Several concerned Indian establishments have begun efforts on setting up a cyber security framework. This is a potential area of cooperation between the two countries, and more headway is expected soon.

Further impetus to Indo-Israeli ties was giving by the three-day visit of the Israeli National Security Advisor Joseph Cohen to New Delhi in October 2014. This was a follow-up visit to the Prime Ministers’ meeting a month earlier. In his interactions with the Indian counterpart, Ajit Doval, Home Minister Rajnath Singh and several other officials from the Indian External Affairs ministry, the visiting NSA expressed Israel’s willingness to cooperate with India in “all fields and at any level”. However, the agendas of the meetings concentrated on the situation in West Asia; terrorism and the threat it poses to both the countries; Israel’s view on Iranian nuclear programme as well as challenges that India and Israel share as two democracies in their respective regions, and solutions to those challenges.¹⁴

It is evident from the recent developments that both the countries are enhancing their cooperation on counterterrorism measures, apart from military trade. Given the emerging trend of terrorist activities both in West Asia and India, this dimension is definitely going to see significant cooperation between the two nations. India is likely to gain from Israeli expertise in counterterrorism measures along with surveillance skills at the borders (both land and sea). Israel is known for its excellent border protection technologies, and India has already used some of its equipments along the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir. India has been a victim of not only cross-border infiltration but also seaborne intrusion, the 2008 Mumbai carnage being one such dastardly attack. It is in this regard that India is showing a great interest in acquiring Israeli border management skills.¹⁵

Potential Challenges:

India-Israel ties is not devoid of challenges. Immediately after it came to power, the Modi government faced the first heat from the opposition parties when the External Affairs Minister refused to discuss a resolution in the Rajya Sabha during the Gaza crisis. Prior to this, during the initial stages of the crisis, while expressing concern over the Israeli air strikes resulting in the loss of lives and damages to property in Gaza, India was also worried over the cross-border provocations by targeting parts of Israel with rockets. However, this balancing act was not appreciated by both Israeli and Palestinian diplomats in New Delhi who expressed their disappointment over India’s statement.¹⁶ Nevertheless, in view of the cordial relations shared by India with both the parties, Sushma Swaraj said, “Any discourteous reference to any friendly country can impact our relations with them”, and further reiterated India’s Palestinian policy that remains unchanged. The minister also mentioned the need to condemn the violence indulged in by both sides. However, New Delhi ultimately condemned Israel’s “disproportionate use of force in Gaza” at the UN Human Rights Council.¹⁷ India’s vote at the UN against Israel evoked several reactions: both criticism and appreciation.

India’s stand on the aforementioned crisis once again brought back to limelight how increasingly difficult a diplomatic tightrope it has to walk while maintaining a delicate balance between friendship with Israel and support to the Palestinian cause. It also reflects how domestic politics still influences New Delhi’s Israel or Palestinian policies or foreign policy in general.

Another major challenge which the Modi government would have to face from time to time is criticism about the burgeoning military-security relations itself. The enhanced ties came up for wide condemnation during the debate on the Gaza crisis. As in the past, the CPI (M) once again called upon the government to immediately halt India’s purchase of arms from Israel.¹⁸ This issue, however, did not lead to any major debate as Sushma Swaraj countered it by pointing out at how this left party, being in the coalition under the UPA-1 government, failed to stop the robust military cooperation between India and Israel. Nevertheless, India-Israel arms trade remains an important target-point for various left wingers and social activists in the country.

In the circumstances, dealings on matters related to military-security affairs are likely to be carried out cautiously though they would not be shelved. Fears are also being expressed in some quarters that close ties with the Jewish state, or an intensive military cooperation, could lead to the strengthening of radical Islamist movements and its support base in India. For instance, several Kashmiri citizens staged violent protests against the recent Israeli offensive in Gaza Strip. Simultaneously, there is a visible influence of the Sunni militant organisation, Islamic State (IS), on India, and the recently established Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) has vowed to target the country.

Prospects Ahead:

Despite the challenges, the prospects for increased cooperation between the two countries are bright. The bilateral relationship between the two will continue to be driven by these close defence ties and shared national security challenges. At this juncture when both the countries are facing heightened terror threats, cooperation to combat this menace will continue to remain as one of the biggest incentives to expand their military-security ties. The visit of the Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh to Israel, fourteen years after that of L.K. Advani in 2000 when he was holding the same portfolio, has opened more opportunities to strengthen the bilateral relations. Cooperation in counterterrorism is, for sure, going to be given an impetus. His meetings with high-profile Israeli leaders, including PM Benjamin Netanyahu, emphasised on strengthening India’s “very warm” ties with Israel. The increasing radicalisation of few Israeli-Arabs and Indian Muslim youth under the influence of the Islamic State (IS) is a common challenge faced by both the countries and this will drive their cooperation to new levels. Additionally, Indian PM, during his meeting with the former Israeli president, Shimon Peres, in New Delhi, “reiterated the strong desire of India to further expand and strengthen its relations with Israel both in traditional areas as well as in new areas of cooperation.”¹⁹

Further, there is likely to be an enhanced cooperation between the defence industries of both the countries. But this would depend on how successfully India could convince the Israeli arms industries to manufacture in the country by taking advantage of the “Make in India” initiative. India’s quest for its own technological advancement in the defence industry is an important push factor for the expansion of ties with Israel. The Israeli premier has expressed his country’s willingness to “discuss transfer and development of technologies with India.” In his words, “"Israeli industries, including the defence industries, could 'make in India' and thereby reduce costs of manufacturing products and systems developed by Israel." ²⁰A few areas that are likely to see technology transfers are aviation security, border protection and water harvesting.

Amid these prospects, it should not be ignored that while India desires to have strong ties with Israel, there are several related political implications that the government needs to factor in along the journey. The sensitive nature of the domestic politics, particularly with the presence of a huge Muslim population which plays significant roles in India’s political set-up, will continue to cast its shadow on the government’s dealings with Israel. There would be inevitable opposition and pressures on the Modi government to scale down ties with Israel. It is, therefore, yet to be seen how successfully the present government would manoeuvre its policies towards Israel while tackling the challenges coming on its away. But a gradual process has been begun by the Modi government to engage very intensively both with the Muslim community in India and with the larger West Asian Arab countries. The recently-concluded India-Arab League meeting in New Delhi is one such important step.

Endnotes

1. Marissa Newman, “India’s new foreign minister a strong fan of Israel”, The Times of Israel, 27 May 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/indias-new-foreign-minister-a-strong-fan-of...
2. Palash Ghosh. “Narendra Modi, Israel’s Best Friend in South Asia”, International Business Times, 17 March 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/india-2014-elections-narendra-modi-israels-best-f...
3. “With Narendra Modi as the new PM, India-Israel ties will improve, feels Alon Usphiz”, The Economic Times, 30 May 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-30/news/50211150_1_...
4. Neeraj Chauhan, “CBI closes Barak scandal case for lack of evidence”, The Times of India, 11 December 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/CBI-closes-Barak-scandal-case-f...
5. Rajat Pandit, “Modi govt clears long-pending case for Israeli Barak missiles for warships”, The Times of India, 26 September 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi-govt-clears-long-pending-c...
6. For a relevant reading, see Alvite Ningthoujam, “India’s Promising Israel’s Defense Ties”, The Diplomat, 9 October 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/indias-promising-israel-defense-ties/
7. “US offers groundbreaking defence technologies to India”, The Times of India, 14 June 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-offers-groundbreaking-defenc...
8. “India chooses Israel's anti-tank guided missile 'Spike' over US' Javelin missiles”, DNA, 25 October 2014, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-chooses-israel-s-anti-tank-gu...
9. Nigam Prusty, “India picks Israel's Spike anti-tank missile over U.S. Javelin – source”, Reuters, 25 October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/25/india-missile-idUSL3N0SK088201...
10. “India to Buy 8,000 of These Anti-Tank Missiles From Israel”, NDTV, 27 October 2014, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-to-buy-8-000-of-these-anti-tank-...
11. Gili Cohen, “sraeli arms exports drop nearly $1 billion in 2013”, Haaretz, 7 October 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.619700
12. For a detailed analysis on India-Israel relations, see P.R. Kumaraswamy (2010), India’s Israel Policy, Columbia University Press: New York.
13. Jayanth Jacob, “Israel offers India to join new cyber security body”, Hindustan Times, 29 September 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/israel-offers-india-to-join-new...
14. “Israel-India to Enhance Cooperation in All Fields”, News, Israeli Embassy, New Delhi, http://embassies.gov.il/delhi/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Israel%20India%20to%20...
15. “India to seek Israeli expertise in managing borders”, DNA, 29 October 2014, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-to-seek-israeli-expertise-in-...
16. Suhasini Haidar, “India’s stand leaves West Asian rivals disappointed”, The Hindu, 16 July 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-stand-leaves-west-asian-riv...
17. “India Condemns Disproportionate Use of Force in Gaza: Full Statement”, NDTV, 24 July 2014, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-condemns-disproportionate-use-of...
18. Anita Joshua, “India must halt purchase of Israeli arms: CPI(M)”, The Hindu, 24 July 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-must-halt-purchase-of-israel...
19. “Prime Minister Receives Former Israeli President Shimon Peres” , News Updates,6 November 2014, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/prime-minister-receives-former-isr...
20. “Israel positive about 'Make in India' campaign: Benjamin Netanyahu”, The Economic Times, 7 November 2014, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/israel-positive-...

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Published Date: 1^st December 2014, Image source: http://i.ytimg.com

Afghanistan: Is US on A Misplaced Exit Course?

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF 

With the 2014 deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan fast approaching and the ISAF military effort unable to break the back of the Taliban insurgency, the US appears to have concluded (one daresay wrongly) that it has run out of options for effecting a responsible and honourable exit from the Afghan quagmire. The desperate quest for any sort of a face-saving political solution which will also allow its troops to pull out safely from Afghanistan is, at least for the foreseeable future, the only real policy objective that the Americans are likely to pursue in the Afpak region. But imperial hubris and the embarrassment of a hyper-power losing to a rag-tag militia armed with nothing more than fanaticism, small arms, IEDs and suicide bombers, is forcing the Americans to proclaim certain principles, or if you will red-lines, that will determine the course of its dialogue with the Taliban. 

It is of course an entirely different matter that the manner in which the ‘political office’ of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ in Doha was opened and which the US has touted as a major breakthrough, has blurred, if not entirely erased, some of the red-lines that the US had declared so solemnly time and time again. The new formulation is that the red-lines – breaking the alliance with Al Qaeda, respecting the Afghan constitution and taking part in elections and ensuring rights of women and minorities – will now be the outcome of, and not a pre-condition for, a dialogue. Worse, the US has effectively accorded the Taliban legitimacy and the status of a government-in-exile, thereby undermining the legitimate government of Afghanistan. 

Showing remarkable spine and spunk, President Hamid Karzai has raised the red flag over the US-Pakistan-Taliban-Qatari-Saudi-British (the last being the real villains as is their wont; as a sample, read William Dalrymple’s latest self-serving ‘pulp strategic fiction’ essay written for Brookings Institution painting the conflict in Afghanistan as being more an India-Pakistan proxy war rather than a part of the Global War on Terror) shenanigans against the Afghan people. By suspending talks with the US, not only has President Karzai refused to be a pushover, he has also let it be known that he has the ability to put a spoke in the wheel of any peace process that either keeps the Afghan government out of the loop or leaves it in the lurch.

No one in any case was really getting fooled by all the resolute American talk of inviolable red-lines, certainly not the Taliban or their patrons, Pakistan. Convinced that the US is all set to throw in the towel, the Taliban (with a nudge and push from their sponsors in Rawalpindi) have agreed to enter into a dialogue to pave the way for the US to cut and run from Afghanistan. The way the Pakistan-Taliban duo see it, even if the US spin is accepted that the Taliban have become amenable to a dialogue because they are exhausted by war and are uncertain of complete victory over their enemies after the withdrawal of the foreign troops, it makes eminent sense for the Taliban to enter into a dialogue that holds the promise of giving to them on a platter that which they will not be able get through force of arms. Leave aside the fact that the hate filled fanaticism that functions as the real force driving the Taliban/Al Qaeda fighters is far from exhausted and has only strengthened with the ever-weakening resolve of the effete European armies and flagging spirits of the US military, it suits Taliban to gain a modicum of international acceptability by entering into negotiations with the Americans, precisely the argument forwarded by the Pakistanis to their clients to bring them to the talks table. 

Unlike the Americans and other Western countries who seem to have bought into the nonsense about ‘reconcilable’ Taliban, the anti-Taliban forces suffer from no such false illusion. They know that the Taliban wouldn’t be Taliban if they were ‘reconcilable’. The world-view of the Taliban makes them incapable of living in peace with anyone who doesn’t accept or subscribe to their medieval and barbaric mindset. The Afghans know that any assurances or agreements that the Taliban enter into on the political future of their country will be observed only in their violation. After all, how can a self-declared Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful) agree to fight an election, especially one in which he may lose. The concept of Democracy is an anti-thesis of the concept of Amir-ul-Momineen, what with the former revelling in allowing dissent, which is anathema for the latter because his word is law. What is more, the Taliban have given absolutely no indication of any sort of a change in their attitude towards women, minorities (especially Shias) and on other social and political issues that made then Pariahs in the eyes of the international community when they were in power in the 1990s. 

Equally worrying, and galling, for the anti-Taliban forces is the virtual outsourcing of Afghanistan to Pakistan by the Americans. The Pakistanis have been working overtime on not just the Americans but also on wooing various players inside Afghanistan, including elements of the erstwhile Northern Alliance, to move back into the driving seat in Afghanistan. To an extent, the Pakistanis have been successful in their endeavours, what with the Americans now conceding them the pivotal position in deciding the future of Afghanistan. Apart from playing mediators between the Americans and the Taliban and terror groups like the Haqqani Network, the Pakistanis have also reportedly managed to reach out to important anti-Taliban leaders, thereby playing all sides of the Great Game in Afghanistan. One way of looking at the Pakistani game-plan is that they are making a genuine push for a national reconciliation inside Afghanistan and playing the honest broker. But past record, and even more importantly the inherent perversity that seems to guide Pakistani strategic policy in the region, suggests that the Pakistanis are building leverages inside Afghanistan so that if things go awry after the exit of US troops and the Taliban do not follow the Pakistani diktat, they will have the option of using non-Taliban groups to keep the Taliban off-balance and embroiled in conflicts inside Afghanistan. If this means that Afghanistan continue to burn, then so be it. 

As far as the Americans are concerned, they have absolutely no clear answer to give to the question on what their fallback position is going to be if the talks with the Taliban don’t really take off, or if the Taliban renege on the assurances and promises they make at the negotiation table. To put it simply, there is no Plan ‘B’. After all, once they exit, it is hardly likely that they will return to enforce the peace deal that they strike with the Taliban. There is some talk of a residual force staying back to support the Afghan government. But quite frankly, a small force of 8000-10000 men is going to be untenable and unsustainable for more than a year or two, certainly not beyond 2015-16. Quite asides the fact that such a small force would be more engaged in protecting itself (surrounded as it will be by hostiles) than in supporting the Afghan government, it will only serve as a red rag to the Taliban and their allies and affiliates. If anything then, this residual force is part of the American exit strategy because if the Americans were to announce today that all their forces will be pulled out on 31st December 2014, not a single Afghan would stand with the Americans tomorrow. It is precisely to avoid such a fate that the Americans are holding out the promise of not just a small force but also aid flows until 2025 to sustain the Afghan government. Of course, once it withdraws completely, whether these aid flows will continue and at what level and for how long remains an open question.

Try as they may, there is no way that the Americans can shake off the perception (based on facts on ground) that they have been defeated. While as an extra-regional superpower, the US might well be able to live with this setback, the impact of such a development on the region will be extremely destabilising. The reinforcing of the myth of Afghanistan being the Graveyard of Empires – the British in the 19th Century, the Soviets in the 20th and the Americans in the 21st – will in its wake unleash a new wave of instability, what with the Islamists of all hues emboldened by their triumph in Afghanistan running amok trying to export and impose their agenda on other countries in the region and beyond. It is of course another matter that Afghanistan’s reputation as an unconquerable country is utter nonsense and the result of faux historiography. 

The reality is that before the British, Alexander, Timur, the Mughals, Nadir Shah and Maharaja Ranjit Singh all subdued the turbulent Afghans and held sway over all or a part of the Afghan dominion for fairly long periods of time. The British did not lose a single war they fought in Afghanistan. Sure, they suffered setbacks, which is part and parcel of any expedition. But what is important is that the dominance established by the British and the settlement they imposed on Afghanistan survived for nearly 150 years and only started unravelling in the aftermath of the ‘jihad’ against Soviet occupation. 

In the case of the Russians, it wasn’t so much the Afghans who won but the Soviets who lost. Had the Americans not supported the Afghans with massive amounts of money and modern weaponry and training, the Russians might still have been sitting in Afghanistan. The game-changer was the shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. The Russians had bottled up the Afghan resistance and it was the Stinger Missiles turned the tide against the Russians as it prevented the Russians from using their attack helicopters and aircraft effectively. The other reason the Russians lost was the collapse of the Communist experiment. The short point is that without American assistance, the Afghan ‘mujahideen’ were nothing more than a nuisance for the Russians.

The only reason why the US is staring defeat in the face in Afghanistan is because of the critical mistakes it made. The first was of course the shifting of focus to Iraq in 2002-03. But the bigger mistake was the soft-peddling on the Pakistani double game on Taliban. The fact of the matter is that the Pakistanis never gave up supporting and sponsoring the Taliban – remember Musharraf’s advocacy of engaging the ‘moderate Taliban’ and the airlift of the ISI/Taliban leaders from Kunduz. It isn’t as though the Americans were not wise to Pakistan's game, only they did nothing except issue routine calls to ‘do more’ to force compliance on the Pakistanis. Without active Pakistani support, the Taliban would have been history. But having turned a blind eye to the Pakistani treachery, the Americans find themselves on the losing side of the war. 

Even now, the US has options that could prevent Afghanistan from sliding into the arms of the Taliban/Al Qaeda/ISI conglomerate. But these options come into play only if the US is willing to recognise the reality that by outsourcing Afghanistan to Pakistan and ignoring the fact that the ideology of radical Islam joins the Taliban and Al Qaeda at the hip, is only going to create a mess that will ultimately come back to haunt it. This is not to argue that the Americans should stay on in Afghanistan; they should leave (earlier than scheduled, if possible). But instead of throwing Afghans to the wolves, the Americans should put their money where their mouth is. Rather than undermining the lawful and legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Americans should continue, and even increase, their monetary, material and military (without putting boots on the ground) support for the Afghan government and leaders and leave it to them to meet the Taliban and Pakistani threat as they deem fit. 

More than anything else, this would be a truly Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-driven process. Not only would this call the Pakistani bluff, and leave it with no choice but to clean their act or else see the collapse of the Pakistani state, it would also take the wind out of the Taliban sails. At a fraction of the $ 100-120 billion that the US is currently spending annually in Afghanistan, it can ensure the defeat of the Taliban. Despite all the scepticism being expressed about the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police and notwithstanding the problems that afflict this force (not the least of which is the high rate of desertions and reports of infiltration by the Taliban), the ANA has performed quite creditably on a number of occasions. With continuing support and assistance, there is no reason why the ANA and ANP will not be able to keep the Taliban at bay, more so because for the Afghan soldiery not allowing the Taliban hold sway in their country is a matter of their very existence. At the very minimum, the prospect of prolonged fighting might puncture the zeal of the Taliban and make them more amenable to reason, something that is extremely unlikely under the Doha process. 

In India, there is a growing sense of disquiet over the US strategy on Afghanistan. Part of India’s problem is that its Afghan policy has been riding on the American shoulder since 9/11. Apart from the general policy paralysis that like in other cases has also affected the Afghan policy of the Indian government, there is the added problem of diffidence coupled with constantly looking askance towards the US for approval, if not permission, in forging a bolder security oriented strategy. While there are inherent limitations – geographical, financial and logistic – to how far India can go in supporting the anti-Taliban forces, there is a lot that India can still do at the political and diplomatic level to support the Afghan government. What India should however not do is to try and open a dialogue with the Taliban. This will be a disastrous policy because while on the one hand it will alienate India’s friends in Afghanistan, on the other hand, it will not help India win over its enemies who are not independent agents but proxies of Pakistan which has sponsored them precisely because they are implacably opposed to India. 

If, as India claims, Afghanistan is critical to its national security, then the current policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ on Afghanistan is just not an option. India must do everything possible to ensure the defeat of the Taliban. If this means going counter to the US strategy, then so be it. Since the strategic convergence of interests between India and the US on Afghanistan has all but broken down, India must do everything necessary to protect its interests, just as the US is doing. The simple reason for this is not just the impact that a Taliban victory will have on the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but more importantly the fillip it will give to the rising attraction of radical Islam among a growing section of Indian Muslim youth. This more than anything else is something that the Indian state needs to become alive to. Living in denial of this trend will be an invitation to catastrophe.