Afghanistan: Between Brinkmanship and Statesmanship

Lt General R K Sawhney, Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF

The worst fears about Afghanistan appear to be coming true. For more than a year now, there was a virtual consensus, not just in the international community but also within Afghanistan, that the future of the country was critically dependent on a credible presidential election in 2014. So much so that the prospects for relatively smooth security and economic transition was also contingent on an orderly political transition from President Karzai to his successor. But despite a fair, clean, transparent and untainted election which was accepted by all stakeholders being a sine qua non for a stable and secure future of Afghanistan, the election was subjected to what the front-runner Dr Abdullah Abdullah has called ‘fraud on an industrial scale’. This monumental folly has now put the entire future of Afghanistan at stake and while efforts are underway to resolve the dispute over the elections, the damage has been done.

All is, however, still not lost. If efforts at damage control go beyond merely papering over the deep differences between the leading candidates and their supporters, and are successful in bridging the widening chasm of suspicion and distrust between them, then Afghanistan still stands a good chance of pulling back from the brink. Despite the anger and resentment caused by the electoral fraud, the two main candidates have displayed remarkable sense of responsibility and maturity by not letting things spiral out of control. But whether they can rein in their supporters indefinitely is something that will depend on their political sagacity and skill. Afghans as a people can be amazingly pragmatic and some of this is manifest in the way both Dr Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah have agreed to back off from a headlong confrontation. The attitude of the leading Afghan politicians, when juxtaposed with the behaviour of Pakistani politicians where the opposition is virtually on the war path against the government and challenging an election that has been internationally recognised as credible, generates a lot more optimism about Afghanistan than it does about Afghanistan’s tormentor, Pakistan.

Frankly, Dr Abdullah’s rejection of the verdict that emerged after the run-off election is entirely understandable. Not only did he establish a clear lead over his nearest rival, Dr Ashraf Ghani, and came within sniffing distance of the 50%+1 vote in the first round, he also managed to get endorsements from most of the candidates who did not qualify for the run-off. Add the votes polled by losing candidates like former foreign minister Zalmai Rassoul, the religious leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf and the influential Pashtun leader Gul Agha Sherzai, all of whom endorsed Dr Abdullah in the run-off, and it was clear that he would romp home easily. His candidature received traction among not just the non-Pashtun Afghans but also among large sections of Pashtuns who saw in him a leader with not just potential to end the feckless governance under outgoing president Hamid Karzai, but also lead Afghanistan out of the impending crisis that loomed against the backdrop of the withdrawal of foreign forces.

According to Dr Abdullah’s supporters, there were other clear advantages that their candidate enjoyed over Dr Ghani. They point out that Dr Abdullah’s credentials of having fought against both the Soviet occupation and the Taliban tyranny were well established. Compared to him, they say, Dr Ghani was comfortably living in the USA when Afghanistan went through its worst period in recent history. They also feel that at a time when Afghanistan faces the real threat of another Taliban offensive, Afghanistan would probably be better off with Dr Abdullah at the helm. Politically, Dr Abdullah not only is seen as a charismatic leader but also as someone with the knack to build bridges across ethnic communities. Dr Ghani, on the other hand, was seen as stand-offish, less than even tempered and someone with an intellect that refused to suffer fools, a quality so critical for success in politics. For all his erudition, brilliance, administrative skill and, most of all honesty, Dr Ghani would probably have to make concerted efforts to take people along and build consensus across communities.

The most critical factor in favour of Dr Abdullah is his standing and credibility among the leadership of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Although the ANA has no Bonapartist tendencies of the kind displayed by the Pakistan Army, and the officer class still looks up to the civilian leadership, given the size of Tajik footprint in the ANA, it would not be prudent to leave Dr Abdullah out in the cold or to antagonise and humiliate him and his supporters. If ever a situation developed where Dr Abdullah and his supporters disassociated themselves from lending support to an Ashraf Ghani led dispensation, there was a good possibility that the ANA’s loyalties to the government could be severely tested. At a time when the ANA needed to be strengthened to confront the threat posed by the resurgent Taliban, any such division could well sound the death knell of the post Bonn accord system that prevails currently in Afghanistan. In other words, seen from the prism of security, Dr Abdullah emerged as a better bet over Dr Ghani. This is even more so in the light of the fact that while some Pashtuns might have voted for Dr Ghani, it is unlikely that the Pashtuns as a whole or even the anti-Taliban Pashtuns would rally around him against the Taliban in the same way as the non-Pashtuns and anti-Taliban Pashtuns would around Dr Abdullah. It is also important to factor in that Dr Abdullah’s supporters, both within the government i.e. ANA and outside of the government have the firepower and determination to resist the Taliban, something that cannot matched by those supporting Dr Ghani.

The security dimension of the political equation has acquired even more salience in light of the emerging Pakistani strategy. The much hyped Operation Zarb-e-Azb that the Pakistan Army has launched against the Jihadists of all persuasions based in North Waziristan is aimed more at pushing the war inside Afghanistan and securing Pakistani territory than against jihadist terror groups. By pushing into Afghanistan notorious terror groups like the Haqqani Network, TTP and pro-Taliban groups like the one led by Gul Bahadur, the Pakistanis are trying to fill the vacuum that is expected to result from the drawdown of foreign forces. Once the Taliban capture territory in parts of South and East Afghanistan, it will vastly improve their negotiating power, and perhaps even their prospects for extending their malevolence across the country. The massive spike in terror attacks coupled with Taliban offensive in some areas in South Afghanistan to capture territory from which they had been ousted a couple of years back, is a clear indication of what the Pakistanis are trying to do. Small wonder then that they are not particularly bothered about which of the two leading candidates gets to stay in the Arg.

All these things were known before the election process started. And it is precisely for all these reasons that an above board election was so important. A lot of the blame for the electoral fraud perpetrated during the run-off is being heaped on the outgoing President Hamid Karzai who wants to continue playing a role in the affairs of state. Karzai knew that he wouldn’t get much lift from Dr Abdullah. He was more hopeful about Dr Ghani and that’s why he used (or misused) his influence and contacts to ensure an outcome that favoured his favourite. The only problem was that the sheer scale of the fraud exposed the entire exercise. For Dr Abdullah, who had been cheated in the last presidential election, this was the second time an election was being stolen. Naturally, he refused to accept the result. Even more than him, his supporters were outraged and all set to push things over the edge, what with demands for declaring a parallel government and forcibly occupying the Presidential Palace.

In a remarkable display of restraint and statesmanship, Dr Abdullah did not let matters spiral out of control. This was a huge political risk he took because there was a good chance that his supporters might have abandoned him and taken matters in their own hands. Thankfully this did not happen. Meanwhile, the Americans, jumped into the act to put things back on the rails. Apart from Karzai, the Americans must also share their part of the blame for the election mess. There is talk that the Americans went along with the fraud partly because they considered Dr Ghani to be their man and partly because as a Pashtun, Dr Ghani would be more palatable for the Pashtun community and as such would serve as an effective counter to the predominantly Pashtun Taliban. It is of course another matter that the Americans should have understood that if a Pashtun Karzai failed to turn the Pashtuns against the Taliban, there was no reason or guarantee that Dr Ghani would succeed.

Be that as it may, the Americans managed to get both the leading candidates to agree to a formula for resolving the fracas over the elections. Here credit must be given to Dr Ghani for also displaying statesmanship in accepting the formula worked out by the Americans. It is easy to disparage the leading candidates by saying they had no choice but to agree. But anyone with even a modicum of understanding of Afghan character knows that just as they have an enormous capacity for being pragmatic, they also can be extremely bloody minded, obstinate and obdurate when they want to be regardless of the consequences.

As things stand, the situation remains fragile. Both sides have agreed to a complete audit of the votes polled and have agreed to whatever result emerges from this audit. But already there are serious disagreements on what constitutes a valid vote and how the invalid or fraud votes will be filtered out. Given the magnitude of fraudulent voting, it is unlikely that the result of the run-off will change. The problem is that whether the result remains the same or it changes in favour of Dr Abdullah, it will cause its own problems. Fortunately, this has been already gamed and a sort of power sharing formula has been worked out. Under this formula, the winner will become President and the losing candidate will become the chief of the executive council, a sort of de facto Prime Minister. The grapevine is that in the government of national unity that will be formed, important ministries like Interior, Foreign, Finance and Defence will be farmed out to the de facto PM who will appoint his people. A couple of years down the line, the constitutional reforms will be undertaken which will make the position of Prime Minister de jure. There are indications that Dr Abdullah has reconciled to heading the Executive council.

It is still not clear how this formula will play out. There are also questions about how the supporters of the rival candidates will take this formula. The enormous heartburn caused by the electoral fraud will need a lot of political sagacity to be put behind so that Afghanistan can move ahead. But apart from the statesmanship that the main political leaders are displaying, one important reason why things are not beyond retrieval is that the Afghans have no desire to see their country descend into political chaos. Nor for that matter do they have any intention of splitting their country along ethnic lines. They may mobilise politically along ethnic lines, but an ethnic division is a big no-no for every Afghan. But the new government will have to ensure that the kind of fraud that took place this time is never repeated. This means that the incoming government will have to undertake deep reforms in the election system so that the democratic urgings and aspirations of the Afghans are fulfilled in full measure.

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Published Date: 5^th August 2014, Image source: http://assets.nydailynews.com

National Interests should Guide India’s Afghan Policy

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

2014 will be a turning point in Afghanistan. Power will be handed over to a new President after elections. The US military will complete its withdrawal. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take over the security responsibility for the country.

The prospects for all these transitions do not look promising. The new President will have to be a Pashtun in order to ensure broad-based ethnic support. President Karzai was parachuted to the presidency without elections in post-war circumstances in which the US and the West could impose their will. His re-election was mired in controversy, created primarily by his western supporters. Despite many levers at their command, the US and the West have not been able to manage Karzai. This shows how difficult it has been for the US and others to oversee the political process in Afghanistan even under military occupation. With the impending withdrawal, their control over politics will become even less. The larger question is whether a new Pashtun leader can emerge who can assure cross ethnic support? Will he able to deliver political stability and a degree of economic development in the very difficult circumstances that his country will be facing?

The US has signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, but the follow-up agreement- the Bilateral Security Agreement- on the status of the residual US forces that will remain in military bases has not been finalized. The US has failed to secure a suitable agreement in Iraq. If it fails in Afghanistan, it is threatening a “zero option”. Whether this is pressure tactics or is a veritable option is not clear. In any case, the fact that this is being considered shows that the US has no clear answer for the future. “Zero option” has the air of a “zero answer”!

The ANSF may have numbers and reports that they are performing well does not guarantee they will be able to operate successfully in a post-US withdrawal environment, especially if the US leaves in a scenario that is politically unsatisfactory for all sides. The ANSF lacks heavy weaponry, air power and sophisticated intelligence capability. Will they be able to really cope as a cohesive force?

The economic prospects in Afghanistan are not very reassuring despite the pledges of assistance made at Tokyo and the announced longer-term commitments made by countries not to abandon Afghanistan. If the US exercises a zero military option, will that be compatible with a major economic commitment prolonged in time, especially in a tight economic situation in the US and the Eurozone? Plans by countries to invest in Afghanistan not only depend on internal stability but also will take some years to yield results, enough to make a difference on the ground.

Adding to the problem is the general instability around Afghanistan. The internal situation in Pakistan is fraught despite recent elections. Iran has a new President but the nuclear dossier remains problematic and sanctions on Iran have been further tightened. The Arab world is in turmoil, with the so-called Arab Spring having withered very rapidly. Religious extremism is spreading and this gives political oxygen to such forces battling in Afghanistan.

India has to cope with the situation as it develops. We have faced the worst when the Taliban took over Afghanistan in the mid-90s. We know of course what the dangers are ahead and have tried to play our limited role in preventing untoward conditions from developing through our political and economic engagement with Afghanistan.

India is pursuing a very responsible policy in Afghanistan. We want a sovereign, stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, one that is free from extremism and where human rights, especially those of women are respected. India is doing nothing contrary to the achievement of this objective in Afghanistan.

We are maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan based on equality and respect for sovereignty. We are not interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, arming any particular group or providing safe-havens for terrorists or anti-government political groups to carry on violent activities against the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

We have legitimate interests in Afghanistan as a neighbouring country and every right to be present there. The international community cannot accept the curtailment of Afghan sovereignty by endorsing the principle that the Afghan government should give precedence to the interests of any particular country over that of any other. It is for the Afghan government to take independent decisions in a responsible way. India has no intention to occupy the legitimate space that other neighbouring countries of Afghanistan seek there.

India has established a strategic relationship with Afghanistan. This is anchored in a longer-term bilateral and regional perspective. India has geo-political, strategic interests in this entire region that forms a part of our strategic neighbourhood. Afghanistan borders Central Asia and Iran, apart from China and Pakistan. India has had intimate age-old ties with Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran, with the history of our country linked to this region over centuries.

Central Asia is landlocked and so is Afghanistan. The development of this region faces a particularly difficult challenge because of this. This entire region needs the broadest possible choices for its development. It is natural for it to look for enhanced ties with India as the biggest economy in Southern Asia that can substantially contribute to this objective. We are wiling to respond.

Afghanistan has huge mineral resources that await exploitation. India is ready to invest large sums in this sector, beginning with iron ore extraction. Afghanistan is ready to offer to India a natural resources corridor for development. For realizing this objective, India needs better access to Afghanistan, as Pakistan is not as yet willing to provide transit facilities through its territory to Afghanistan.

India is looking at the Chabahar port in Iran as an access route to Afghanistan as well as Central Asia. We have recently committed $100 million to this project. US/EU sanctions on Iran are a complication for such efforts to give Afghanistan alternative options for its trade and facilitate foreign investment there. The US government should take a positive view of Indian investments in Iran that are specifically directed at easing Afghanistan’s difficult situation, which will be important for stimulating the Afghan economy, at present too dependent on foreign assistance and income derived from the presence of foreign troops on its soil.

In developing trade and energy ties between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, a project that the US favours as part of the New Silk Road project, Afghanistan is a critical hub. We support the TAPI pipeline project that will bring Turkmenistan gas to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. India can fruitfully participate in projects to increase electricity grids in the region to alleviate regional energy-related problems.

India is participating in several international efforts to contribute to development in Afghanistan, whether it is the Istanbul Process and the Heart of Asia conferences in Kabul in June 2012 and in Istanbul in April 2012, or the initiative we took ourselves to organize a Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan, also in June 2012, followed by the Tokyo Conference on aid to Afghanistan in July 2012.

India’s own bilateral aid to Afghanistan has reached $2 billion. Some see in this an effort by us to seek undue influence in Afghanistan. If India’s foreign assistance programme and the billions Indian companies are investing abroad are considered, this is not a very big sum. There is full participation of the Afghan authorities in selecting Indian assistance projects that are infrastructural as well as geared to meeting the basic requirements of people and localities spread over the country. A large number of our projects are in the Pashtun areas. India has earned great popularity because of the manner in which we have conducted ourselves.

Economic development in Afghanistan and the region is essential to check-mate the growth of extremist ideologies in the region and associated terrorist activity. These concerns are uppermost in India’s mind as we are most exposed as a country to terrorism and supporting ideologies. As a secular, multi-religious state, we are particularly sensitive to such threats. Any boost given to these extremist forces, even unwittingly, should be unacceptable as our security is threatened.

It is with concern therefore that we view the outreach by US, Britain and others to the Taliban. We are not against any genuine attempt at reconciliation if all sides want it on a basis that respects the red lines drawn by the international community for a dialogue with the Taliban. We find that these red lines are being blurred by NATO’s anxiety to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, whatever the ground situation.

Such a strategy gives the upper hand to the Taliban groups in Pakistan in negotiations as they know time is on their side.

The rhetoric remains that the reconciliation process should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, but the manner in which the dialogue is being structured does not suggest that it will be an independent intra- Afghan process. President Karzai has already distanced himself from the US initiative. We feel that nothing should be done behind the back of the Kabul government. Latest statements from persons close to President Karzai express the deep concern of the Kabul government about understandings that the US may have reached with Pakistan and the possibility of south and eastern Afghanistan being handed over to the Taliban, which could divide the country and trigger an all-out conflict.

The end-game in Afghanistan is being played out in an atmosphere of great suspicion and bickering amongst the principal parties involved. The manner in which the Doha office of the Taliban was opened has made matters worse. The conduct of the Taliban in declaring themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan made their own end-game clear.

The link between the Taliban and Pakistan is evident. One will have to wait and watch whether the declared US position that no single country will be allowed to dominate post-2014 Afghanistan can be sustained by it when its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan is so clear.

India has not been kept adequately in the picture about the dialogue with the Taliban, despite India’s vital concerns being involved. India suffered when the Taliban came to power in 1996. That was the only time India had no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and terrorists were being trained on its soil for attacks against India. If the Taliban were to be accommodated again, India has reason to be concerned.

We find that the policies of our western friends in Afghanistan are neither sufficiently steady nor transparent.

The argument that the Taliban has various currents in it and there are “moderate” Taliban has been exposed as hollow by what has transpired in Egypt where the same arguments distinguishing between various strands in the Muslim Brotherhood and welcoming their assumption of power have proved devoid of worth.

India does not want conditions of ethnic conflict to be created again in Afghanistan. The international community must safeguard against it. The post 2014 situation in Afghanistan remains very uncertain as the country will be faced with a political and military transition even when the external danger to the country has not been neutralized.

Establishing democracy in Afghanistan by integrating forces into the polity that are currently threatening the country will be a most difficult enterprise.

The root of the problem must be dealt with, which is external support for Afghan extremists and their instrumentalization for achieving the military ambitions of a third country. So long as there are safe havens for extremists outside Afghanistan, the problems will not go away. If the Taliban retain influence in eastern and southern Afghanistan, it is because their staging grounds are outside.

India’s traditional ties have been with the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. A large number of our development projects are in Pashtun areas, which have been very well received by the local people. We support ethnic harmony in Afghanistan, with the Pashtuns adequately represented in governance, but this has to emerge through a democratic process, without the shadow of externally supported violence.

Our strategic partnership with Afghanistan is not directed against any third country. The primary element in this strategic relationship is not military. India is willing to contribute to the capacity building of the Afghan national security forces through training and supply of non-lethal equipment so that they can better provide security to the people after the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. Our goals are primarily economically oriented. We do not want to supplant NATO.

In principle, however, India could provide a limited amount of combat equipment too, as sought by the Afghan government. The concerns of Pakistan should be irrelevant in this regard. Pakistan is having a military relationship with Sri Lanka unbothered by our sensitivities. China is arming Pakistan, providing it even strategic capabilities, without any one advising Pakistan to defer to Indian sensitivities about the security threat posed to us. The US is arming Pakistan too, disregarding our sensitivities.

For elements in the US to caution us against increasing our military engagement with Afghanistan because of Pakistani sensitivities is inconsistent with the policy choices they make in our region in their national interest. India could argue, as the US does, that our arms assistance to Afghanistan will not change the balance of power between it and Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear capable state with large and well-equipped armed forces, whereas Afghanistan has a fledgling, ill equipped force that is no match for the Pakistani military. Our decision on the question should be based on our judgment on how far we want to or can go in giving arms assistance to Afghanistan, not what Pakistan or the US thinks. In our own interest, we should be prudent.

It is a hugely perverse notion that the real problem in Afghanistan is India-Pakistan rivalry. Those who feel that their intervention in Afghanistan has not worked to stabilize the situation to the extent that they may have wanted and now want to cut costs at all costs, should not seek to transfer the responsibility for their failure on India’s shoulders.

India was not responsible for the rise of religious extremism in the region; it was not responsible for the civil war in Afghanistan after the Soviet departure; it did not put the Taliban in power in Kabul; it had no hand in the presence of Al Qaida and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan; it had no responsibility for US/NATO military intervention in Afghanistan; the Taliban groups or the Haqqani group are not in India; NATO soldiers have not been killed by groups operating from Indian soil. If the US has had to resort to drone attacks against terrorists in Pakistan, it is not because of India.

We seek a friendly relationship with Afghanistan. We seek no exclusive relationship. Afghanistan should have friendly relations with all its neighbours. We are willing to work with all of them. India and China are already talking to each other on Afghanistan. There should be no problem in discussing Afghanistan with Pakistan in a constructive way that opens up the doors for transit facilities eventually. The new government in Pakistan should think along those lines, rather than allowing Pakistan’s policies to be guided by the ambitions of its armed forces.

We have been very constructive in our dealings with the US on the Afghan issue. We have supported the international military intervention in Afghanistan and the ouster of the Taliban regime from power. We have been sensitive to US equities and concerns in Afghanistan despite serious provocations from Pakistan, including the terrorist attacks against the Indian Embassy in Kabul and India-related targets there. We continue to be willing to work with the US in a positive and mutually beneficial way in Afghanistan.

On June 27, US Special Envoy for Afghanistan Ambassador Dobbins, sent to India to re-assure us about the US initiative to negotiate with the Taliban, did not convey the impression that the US was playing a sure hand, was confident about its strategy and had alternative options in view.

He said the US hoped for presidential candidates in Afghanistan that have cross-ethnic appeal. The US was not entering the dialogue with the Taliban with any certainty that it will start, how it will develop, whether progress will be made and whether it will result in diminished violence and peace. The Taliban had to say whether they will accept the conditions and meet the US and the Afghan High Peace Council. The issue of terrorism had to be directly addressed and that a pre-condition for starting talks was a statement that the Taliban will begin to distance themselves from the Al Qaida, but reaching an agreement will require concretely severing all ties. Ending violence was not a pre-condition for talks, but an agreement had to include cessation of hostilities and respect for the Afghan Constitution. He concluded by stating that it was not certain that negotiations will end the war but that it was worth trying.

Such a tentative and uncertain reading of the situation, without a clear and confident road map, justifies our concerns about the wisdom of taking a step to politically accommodate such a retrograde and obscurantist force as the Taliban with the assistance of the Pakistani military whose disruptive strategic ambitions in Afghanistan are in fact at the root of the problem.

(Based on a talk recently delivered on the Capitol Hill, Washington)

India-US Ties: Need for Clarity, Balance

Kanwal Sibal, 

Dean, Centre for International Relations and Diplomacy, VIF

Doubts persist both in India and the United States on the substance of their strategic partnership. High-sounding declarations about the partnership being one of the defining ones of the 21st century, or one between “natural allies,” have not erased uncertainties in the two countries about the capacity and willingness of each side to meet the expectations of the other.

Growing India-U.S. convergence on several issues has not eliminated significant divergences emanating from huge disparity in power, different priorities, conflicting regional interests and differing views on structures of global governance. India has moved from distrust to positive engagement and greater acceptance of basic U.S. goodwill towards it. The U.S. is devoting higher attention to India than ever before in recognition of its growing international importance. But this improved atmosphere in bilateral relations is not sufficient for ironing out real differences.

Wide Gaps

While there is like-mindedness on issues of democracy, pluralism, human rights, economic liberalisation, terrorism, religious extremism, non-proliferation and the like, their treatment in concrete situations exposes wide gaps in the thinking of the two countries. India notes the selective manner in which “universal values” are promoted, sparing friends who spurn them and sanctioning adversaries for similar repudiation. Even in the case of terrorism, the conduct of some is condoned while that of others invokes steps to bring about regime change.

On Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Climate Change, the Doha Round, sovereignty issues, global governance, etc., India and the U.S. have different perspectives. While differences between the U.S. and some of its allies on important issues do not call into question the basic assumptions about their mutual relationship within an alliance system, in India’s case the “strategic relationship” gets stress-tested in public opinion each time the two countries are in discord.

Our strategic partnership with the U.S. cannot presume identity of views on contentious international issues or adjustment of Indian policies to suit American preferences alone. Yet, when India speaks of strategic autonomy, U.S. votaries and Indian champions of a strong India-U.S. friendship decry such thinking as mired in India’s defunct nonaligned credo. If the Indian Parliament passes a nuclear liability law imposing supplier liability on nuclear vendors, particularly after Fukushima, U.S. and Indian strategic affairs specialists become petulant. Similarly, if U.S. companies are excluded from defence contracts, there is interrogation about India’s commitment to a strategic partnership with the U.S. Elements in India characterise genuine policy differences as fence-sitting, reluctance to accept burden-sharing in upholding the international order and free-loading by India on the back of those powers who make hard choices, sometimes at the cost of their own immediate interest, to maintain peace and security.

Recurrent doubts in India about the quality of its U.S. relationship are fuelled by the inconsistency, lack of steadiness and even transparency of U.S. policies. The U.S. can change gears to suit its interests at a particular juncture, shaped by electoral considerations or lobbying. It is adept at giving varying spins to its policies as circumstances demand. The U.S. policy towards Pakistan, despite its terrorist affiliations and disruptive role in Afghanistan, exemplifies this. Washington’s military and economic aid to Islamabad continues despite Pakistan’s complicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s abetment of terrorism in India and the strategic headaches it causes to the U.S., the American tendency to equate India and Pakistan resurfaces from time to time.

On Afghanistan, the U.S. first questioned India’s role there, then supported it and is now disregarding India’s fundamental strategic doubts about politically rehabilitating the Taliban by dialoguing with it. The U.S. now seems open even to the Haqqani network’s participation in the political end-game in Afghanistan. On China, the signals waver, with the declaration of a pivot towards Asia with China’s rise in mind, which is then diluted to “re-balancing” detached from China-related fears and, finally, the wisdom of any beefed-up Asia-Pacific policy is questioned by the would-be U.S. Secretary of State.

US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit in June for the fourth round of the strategic dialogue illustrated these cross-currents moulding the India-U.S. strategic partnership. The joint statement issued on the occasion omits any mention of Pakistan, even in the context of the Mumbai attack. The references to terrorism and “violent extremism” and to dismantling of terrorist safe havens in the region are worded to avoid finger-pointing at Pakistan. There being no risk of any other political force being excluded by design or choice, the reference to “inclusive” Presidential and Provincial elections in Afghanistan in 2014 is puzzling, as it suggests that India too is advocating the “inclusion” of Taliban in these elections. The rhetoric about the reconciliation process being Afghan-led and Afghan-owned sounds hollower with the U.S. decision to talk directly to the Taliban at Doha, as Kabul will not dictate the negotiating script to Washington. The red lines drawn by the international community for any deal with the Taliban have been blurred in the joint statement which speaks in general terms about preserving “the historic political, economic and social progress made over the last decade,” though in Kerry’s speech at the Habitat Centre these red lines are reiterated. It is not clear how India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid could say in his joint press conference with Kerry that the U.S. “will ensure that none of the concerns of India is overlooked or undermined,” when the very act of talking to the Taliban under Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s benign oversight subverts India’s interests.

The joint statement omits any mention of China, the South China Sea or U.S. “re-balancing” towards Asia, though Kerry affirmed in his press statement that the U.S. leadership considered India a key part of such a re-balance. There is only a general reference — in the paragraph dealing with the Indian Ocean and the Arctic Council — to maritime security, unimpeded commerce and freedom of navigation! Iran and Syria are absent from the statement. The India-U.S. strategic dialogue thus ignores or obfuscates key strategic issues.

Arm-Twisting

Kerry pushed India unreasonably on the civilian nuclear front by unilaterally affirming in the joint press conference with Khurshid — beyond the joint statement’s non-committal language — that the two sides had agreed that a commercial agreement between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India should be reached by September this year. This is hardly possible when highly complex issues such as capital investment, financial mechanisms and the per-unit tariff rate have to be finalised, besides meeting other regulatory requirements. Is Kerry suggesting that the “full and timely implementation of the civil nuclear deal” requires India to hasten the finalisation of nuclear contracts with U.S. firms, irrespective of any consideration? Perhaps this arm-twisting is related to the Prime Minister’s expected visit to Washington in September.

The extraordinary emphasis on climate change issues by Kerry during his visit unnecessarily risks converting a complex global issue into a contentious bilateral one. Kerry waxed eloquent on the new energy market being the “biggest market ever seen on earth ... a $6 trillion market with 4 billion users,” suggesting powerful commercial considerations behind his push. The wisdom of creating a working group headed by Kerry and Khurshid to intensify bilateral efforts to address “forcefully” this “urgent” issue — which means increasing the weight of non-technical foreign policy considerations into bilateral discussions — is questionable.

Positive features were, of course, not missing from Kerry’s visit, given the much improved tenor of India-U.S. ties and the extraordinarily rich agenda of bilateral cooperation which in many unspectacular ways can be productive for India. The short point is that the cogs of the strategic partnership still grate with each other and the machine is not adequately lubricated yet by the diplomatic grease of coherence, clarity, balance of interests and a sense of true partnership.

Afghanistan: Is US on A Misplaced Exit Course?

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF 

With the 2014 deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan fast approaching and the ISAF military effort unable to break the back of the Taliban insurgency, the US appears to have concluded (one daresay wrongly) that it has run out of options for effecting a responsible and honourable exit from the Afghan quagmire. The desperate quest for any sort of a face-saving political solution which will also allow its troops to pull out safely from Afghanistan is, at least for the foreseeable future, the only real policy objective that the Americans are likely to pursue in the Afpak region. But imperial hubris and the embarrassment of a hyper-power losing to a rag-tag militia armed with nothing more than fanaticism, small arms, IEDs and suicide bombers, is forcing the Americans to proclaim certain principles, or if you will red-lines, that will determine the course of its dialogue with the Taliban. 

It is of course an entirely different matter that the manner in which the ‘political office’ of the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ in Doha was opened and which the US has touted as a major breakthrough, has blurred, if not entirely erased, some of the red-lines that the US had declared so solemnly time and time again. The new formulation is that the red-lines – breaking the alliance with Al Qaeda, respecting the Afghan constitution and taking part in elections and ensuring rights of women and minorities – will now be the outcome of, and not a pre-condition for, a dialogue. Worse, the US has effectively accorded the Taliban legitimacy and the status of a government-in-exile, thereby undermining the legitimate government of Afghanistan. 

Showing remarkable spine and spunk, President Hamid Karzai has raised the red flag over the US-Pakistan-Taliban-Qatari-Saudi-British (the last being the real villains as is their wont; as a sample, read William Dalrymple’s latest self-serving ‘pulp strategic fiction’ essay written for Brookings Institution painting the conflict in Afghanistan as being more an India-Pakistan proxy war rather than a part of the Global War on Terror) shenanigans against the Afghan people. By suspending talks with the US, not only has President Karzai refused to be a pushover, he has also let it be known that he has the ability to put a spoke in the wheel of any peace process that either keeps the Afghan government out of the loop or leaves it in the lurch.

No one in any case was really getting fooled by all the resolute American talk of inviolable red-lines, certainly not the Taliban or their patrons, Pakistan. Convinced that the US is all set to throw in the towel, the Taliban (with a nudge and push from their sponsors in Rawalpindi) have agreed to enter into a dialogue to pave the way for the US to cut and run from Afghanistan. The way the Pakistan-Taliban duo see it, even if the US spin is accepted that the Taliban have become amenable to a dialogue because they are exhausted by war and are uncertain of complete victory over their enemies after the withdrawal of the foreign troops, it makes eminent sense for the Taliban to enter into a dialogue that holds the promise of giving to them on a platter that which they will not be able get through force of arms. Leave aside the fact that the hate filled fanaticism that functions as the real force driving the Taliban/Al Qaeda fighters is far from exhausted and has only strengthened with the ever-weakening resolve of the effete European armies and flagging spirits of the US military, it suits Taliban to gain a modicum of international acceptability by entering into negotiations with the Americans, precisely the argument forwarded by the Pakistanis to their clients to bring them to the talks table. 

Unlike the Americans and other Western countries who seem to have bought into the nonsense about ‘reconcilable’ Taliban, the anti-Taliban forces suffer from no such false illusion. They know that the Taliban wouldn’t be Taliban if they were ‘reconcilable’. The world-view of the Taliban makes them incapable of living in peace with anyone who doesn’t accept or subscribe to their medieval and barbaric mindset. The Afghans know that any assurances or agreements that the Taliban enter into on the political future of their country will be observed only in their violation. After all, how can a self-declared Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful) agree to fight an election, especially one in which he may lose. The concept of Democracy is an anti-thesis of the concept of Amir-ul-Momineen, what with the former revelling in allowing dissent, which is anathema for the latter because his word is law. What is more, the Taliban have given absolutely no indication of any sort of a change in their attitude towards women, minorities (especially Shias) and on other social and political issues that made then Pariahs in the eyes of the international community when they were in power in the 1990s. 

Equally worrying, and galling, for the anti-Taliban forces is the virtual outsourcing of Afghanistan to Pakistan by the Americans. The Pakistanis have been working overtime on not just the Americans but also on wooing various players inside Afghanistan, including elements of the erstwhile Northern Alliance, to move back into the driving seat in Afghanistan. To an extent, the Pakistanis have been successful in their endeavours, what with the Americans now conceding them the pivotal position in deciding the future of Afghanistan. Apart from playing mediators between the Americans and the Taliban and terror groups like the Haqqani Network, the Pakistanis have also reportedly managed to reach out to important anti-Taliban leaders, thereby playing all sides of the Great Game in Afghanistan. One way of looking at the Pakistani game-plan is that they are making a genuine push for a national reconciliation inside Afghanistan and playing the honest broker. But past record, and even more importantly the inherent perversity that seems to guide Pakistani strategic policy in the region, suggests that the Pakistanis are building leverages inside Afghanistan so that if things go awry after the exit of US troops and the Taliban do not follow the Pakistani diktat, they will have the option of using non-Taliban groups to keep the Taliban off-balance and embroiled in conflicts inside Afghanistan. If this means that Afghanistan continue to burn, then so be it. 

As far as the Americans are concerned, they have absolutely no clear answer to give to the question on what their fallback position is going to be if the talks with the Taliban don’t really take off, or if the Taliban renege on the assurances and promises they make at the negotiation table. To put it simply, there is no Plan ‘B’. After all, once they exit, it is hardly likely that they will return to enforce the peace deal that they strike with the Taliban. There is some talk of a residual force staying back to support the Afghan government. But quite frankly, a small force of 8000-10000 men is going to be untenable and unsustainable for more than a year or two, certainly not beyond 2015-16. Quite asides the fact that such a small force would be more engaged in protecting itself (surrounded as it will be by hostiles) than in supporting the Afghan government, it will only serve as a red rag to the Taliban and their allies and affiliates. If anything then, this residual force is part of the American exit strategy because if the Americans were to announce today that all their forces will be pulled out on 31st December 2014, not a single Afghan would stand with the Americans tomorrow. It is precisely to avoid such a fate that the Americans are holding out the promise of not just a small force but also aid flows until 2025 to sustain the Afghan government. Of course, once it withdraws completely, whether these aid flows will continue and at what level and for how long remains an open question.

Try as they may, there is no way that the Americans can shake off the perception (based on facts on ground) that they have been defeated. While as an extra-regional superpower, the US might well be able to live with this setback, the impact of such a development on the region will be extremely destabilising. The reinforcing of the myth of Afghanistan being the Graveyard of Empires – the British in the 19th Century, the Soviets in the 20th and the Americans in the 21st – will in its wake unleash a new wave of instability, what with the Islamists of all hues emboldened by their triumph in Afghanistan running amok trying to export and impose their agenda on other countries in the region and beyond. It is of course another matter that Afghanistan’s reputation as an unconquerable country is utter nonsense and the result of faux historiography. 

The reality is that before the British, Alexander, Timur, the Mughals, Nadir Shah and Maharaja Ranjit Singh all subdued the turbulent Afghans and held sway over all or a part of the Afghan dominion for fairly long periods of time. The British did not lose a single war they fought in Afghanistan. Sure, they suffered setbacks, which is part and parcel of any expedition. But what is important is that the dominance established by the British and the settlement they imposed on Afghanistan survived for nearly 150 years and only started unravelling in the aftermath of the ‘jihad’ against Soviet occupation. 

In the case of the Russians, it wasn’t so much the Afghans who won but the Soviets who lost. Had the Americans not supported the Afghans with massive amounts of money and modern weaponry and training, the Russians might still have been sitting in Afghanistan. The game-changer was the shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. The Russians had bottled up the Afghan resistance and it was the Stinger Missiles turned the tide against the Russians as it prevented the Russians from using their attack helicopters and aircraft effectively. The other reason the Russians lost was the collapse of the Communist experiment. The short point is that without American assistance, the Afghan ‘mujahideen’ were nothing more than a nuisance for the Russians.

The only reason why the US is staring defeat in the face in Afghanistan is because of the critical mistakes it made. The first was of course the shifting of focus to Iraq in 2002-03. But the bigger mistake was the soft-peddling on the Pakistani double game on Taliban. The fact of the matter is that the Pakistanis never gave up supporting and sponsoring the Taliban – remember Musharraf’s advocacy of engaging the ‘moderate Taliban’ and the airlift of the ISI/Taliban leaders from Kunduz. It isn’t as though the Americans were not wise to Pakistan's game, only they did nothing except issue routine calls to ‘do more’ to force compliance on the Pakistanis. Without active Pakistani support, the Taliban would have been history. But having turned a blind eye to the Pakistani treachery, the Americans find themselves on the losing side of the war. 

Even now, the US has options that could prevent Afghanistan from sliding into the arms of the Taliban/Al Qaeda/ISI conglomerate. But these options come into play only if the US is willing to recognise the reality that by outsourcing Afghanistan to Pakistan and ignoring the fact that the ideology of radical Islam joins the Taliban and Al Qaeda at the hip, is only going to create a mess that will ultimately come back to haunt it. This is not to argue that the Americans should stay on in Afghanistan; they should leave (earlier than scheduled, if possible). But instead of throwing Afghans to the wolves, the Americans should put their money where their mouth is. Rather than undermining the lawful and legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Americans should continue, and even increase, their monetary, material and military (without putting boots on the ground) support for the Afghan government and leaders and leave it to them to meet the Taliban and Pakistani threat as they deem fit. 

More than anything else, this would be a truly Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-driven process. Not only would this call the Pakistani bluff, and leave it with no choice but to clean their act or else see the collapse of the Pakistani state, it would also take the wind out of the Taliban sails. At a fraction of the $ 100-120 billion that the US is currently spending annually in Afghanistan, it can ensure the defeat of the Taliban. Despite all the scepticism being expressed about the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police and notwithstanding the problems that afflict this force (not the least of which is the high rate of desertions and reports of infiltration by the Taliban), the ANA has performed quite creditably on a number of occasions. With continuing support and assistance, there is no reason why the ANA and ANP will not be able to keep the Taliban at bay, more so because for the Afghan soldiery not allowing the Taliban hold sway in their country is a matter of their very existence. At the very minimum, the prospect of prolonged fighting might puncture the zeal of the Taliban and make them more amenable to reason, something that is extremely unlikely under the Doha process. 

In India, there is a growing sense of disquiet over the US strategy on Afghanistan. Part of India’s problem is that its Afghan policy has been riding on the American shoulder since 9/11. Apart from the general policy paralysis that like in other cases has also affected the Afghan policy of the Indian government, there is the added problem of diffidence coupled with constantly looking askance towards the US for approval, if not permission, in forging a bolder security oriented strategy. While there are inherent limitations – geographical, financial and logistic – to how far India can go in supporting the anti-Taliban forces, there is a lot that India can still do at the political and diplomatic level to support the Afghan government. What India should however not do is to try and open a dialogue with the Taliban. This will be a disastrous policy because while on the one hand it will alienate India’s friends in Afghanistan, on the other hand, it will not help India win over its enemies who are not independent agents but proxies of Pakistan which has sponsored them precisely because they are implacably opposed to India. 

If, as India claims, Afghanistan is critical to its national security, then the current policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ on Afghanistan is just not an option. India must do everything possible to ensure the defeat of the Taliban. If this means going counter to the US strategy, then so be it. Since the strategic convergence of interests between India and the US on Afghanistan has all but broken down, India must do everything necessary to protect its interests, just as the US is doing. The simple reason for this is not just the impact that a Taliban victory will have on the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but more importantly the fillip it will give to the rising attraction of radical Islam among a growing section of Indian Muslim youth. This more than anything else is something that the Indian state needs to become alive to. Living in denial of this trend will be an invitation to catastrophe.