ISIS: Is Central Asia the Next Stop?

Alvite Singh Ningthoujam, 

Research Associate, VIF

There is a growing debate whether the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will advance into the heartland of Central Asia or not, although the figures of people from the region joining the outfit differ from source to source. But considering the prevailing situation in most of these countries, even a few hundreds could be a worrying number. The rise in radicalism gained momentum after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Reportedly, in the past three years, approximately 2,000 to 4,000¹ people started to seek a radical path as an alternative to the systems provided by their respective governments. This emerging trend fits well into that ambition of the ISIS to spread its tentacles globally.

The appearance of the black flag of the ISIS on a bridge in Tashkent on 28 August last year became one of the earliest incidents which marked the penetration of ISIS influence in this country. Thereafter, the outfit announced the appointment of an “emir” for Uzbekistan, whose identity has not been revealed,² and this was followed by another appointment of an emir for Raqqa, which is the headquarters of the group. Thereafter, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), under the leadership of Usman Gazi, extended support to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in mid-September 2014.³ This group is believed to have close relations with al-Qaeda and Taliban, but some of its cadres “had been thrown out over ideological differences or for insubordination.”⁴ However, IMU’s similar vision to establish a caliphate took it closer to ISIS without even declaring an outright allegiance to the latter. If both the groups merge someday, then the IMU will likely assist ISIS in staging more attacks in northern Afghanistan as well as in different parts of Central Asia.⁵

The resentment of the people with regard to political system in their respective countries can be attributed for the rise of religious extremism, which is tilting in favour of the ISIS. The power vacuum that was created after the fall of the Soviet Union led to the strengthening of radical elements in the region, and the mushrooming of several Islamists groups in the 1990s in Tajikistan is one such case. The governance of authoritarian rulers in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and equally corrupted political systems in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have driven many of the residents to call for “radical Islamism.”⁶ Similar is the situation in Kazakhstan, a country with vast oil and gas reserves, where there is an autocratic rule and rural population living in poverty. When these people feel they are economically or politically marginalised, they resort to violence, which, as a result, received crackdown form the state forces. This further estranged the relationship between them, and leads to the growth of radicalism.

Various sources have given different figures of Central Asians who have joined ISIS fighters. According to the International Centre for Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)⁷, there are at least 250 Kazakh fighters in the ISIS, 100 Kyrgyz citizens (while another source talks of as many as 600 fighters⁸), 360 from Turkmenistan, 500-odd Uzbek fighters (both citizens of Uzbekistan and ethnic Uzbeks from the neighbouring countries), and for Tajikistan, the figure ranges between 400 and 2,000.⁹ The movement of these people has become easier due to the 30-days visa-free regime with Turkey. In some cases, Afghanistan is an alternative but this is a less used route.

Factors

The radicalisation process which began in the early 1990s played an important role in making people move towards Syria, today. However, it is difficult to pick out any particular motive for Central Asians to join ISIS ranks, but “some are driven by the spirit of jihad, while others may be drawn to it due to ignorance and bigotry. The search for the employment and earnings remains one of the main factors”.¹⁰ Moreover, the belief of these people that ISIS can provide better prospects somehow facilitates the departure. A study conducted by the International Crisis Group (ICG) sums up that “All are inspired by the belief that an Islamic state is a meaningful alternative to post-Soviet life. Some wish to fight, others to facilitate.”¹¹

Wide-ranging socio-economic problems in most of the Central Asian countries have induced a strong sense of dissent against the state authorities. Such dissatisfaction which exists within a society, with a sizeable radicalised people, is a prime target for the group’s recruitment process. Therefore, those without employments or with a very insignificant salary become highly vulnerable to various terror outfits operating in the region, not only the ISIS. There were even reports of leaflets circulated by the ISIS in Tajikistan “offering Tajik fighters salaries of $5,000 a month, far more than the average salary” in the country.¹²

In the words of P. Stobdan, a former diplomat:

They [Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz] are often tricked into the jihadi net by unscrupulous recruiters who promise them jobs in Turkey and Europe. One reason why Central Asian fighters find lucrative to rush to Middle East than to Af-Pak region, is because they find ISIS more inspirational, prestigious, and rewarding than fighting in Af-Pak region. Moreover, Central Asians are never empathetic towards the Af-Pak Taliban for they pose direct threat to the region. They perhaps find other reasons like better living standards (permission to bring family, permission to marry local women) to go to Syria. It is also less hazardous to reach Syria than Af-Pak as Turkey provides easy gateway. All the Central Asian States have favorable visa regime with Turkey.¹³

The adherence to the extreme religious ideologies propagated by terror outfits such as ISIS is another strong reason for the flights of young men and women to Syria, in particular. The ambition to create an Islamic state wherever possible appears to have takers in this part of Asia. Under such circumstances, the contributions of the volunteers need only concentrate on battle fights but they are willing to provide humanitarian assistance. Therefore, their profiles are varied and they are mainly constituted of schools and university dropouts, businessmen, women abandoned by their husbands, 

etc.¹⁴ This comes in conjunction with that call on Muslims, by al-Baghdadi in July 2014, to travel to Iraq and Syria to lend helping hand in the establishment of an Islamic state. “Special calls” were made for “judges, doctors, engineers and people with military and administrative.”¹⁵ And, for the jihadists and religious ideologues, setting up of such a state, which is to be governed by strict Islamic laws, have become a commonly shared goal with that of ISIS.

Recruitment

Although social media remains as a pivotal instrument, it is not the most important recruiting strategy. The numbers of people having access to internet are low in many places in the region. While this tool acts as a communicating bridge between fighters in Iraq or Syria and those aspiring jihadist in Central Asia, the role of local institutions such as mosques and places of religious learning are equally gaining momentum. Influential religious leaders are believed to have assisted in radicalising the citizens who are susceptible to their preaching. For instance, radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which has strongholds in the region, particularly in Uzbekistan,¹⁶ and Tabligi Jamaat are reportedly playing a “peripheral role in so far as both men and women may be radicalised as they gravitate toward their teachings.”¹⁷ But the links to their direct involvement in recruiting Central Asians have remained limited, whereas some members of the IMU are believed to have done this job for ISIS in the Fergana Valley comprising of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The close proximity of Central Asian countries to Russia is also serving as a conduit for recruitment. This is due to the migration of workers towards Russian towns and cities in search of employment, particularly in the constructions sites. Several workers are said to have travelled to Syria after they were recruited by “Chechens in Moscow.”¹⁸ Tajik fighters constitute a majority of the migrant recruits. However, the identities of these “Chechens” recruiters are vague, but some of them are probably from the Pankisi George region in Georgia,¹⁹ the hometown of the "Omar the Chechen”, also known as Omar Ash-Shishani, the Islamic State military commander who was allegedly killed in November last year. ²⁰ The availability of online forums in Russian and other local languages make the recruitment endeavours easier. It is perhaps with this motive ISIS released first Russian-language publication called “Furat.Press” in May, and the second one, Istok (The Source) in June this year.²¹

The increasing activity of recruitment inside Russia takes place amidst the efforts to curb the issue of religious extremism. This phenomenon is prevalent in Moscow, which has perhaps the largest Muslim concentration in the country. While some of them get access to Mosques, which is limited in numbers, there are others who use temporary or “inappropriate” buildings for prayers. This, according to a source, “Prompts the police and the security services to regard them as sectarians and adherents to unofficial Islam, which automatically puts them in the category of potential terrorists.”²² As a result, dissatisfaction with the government and the role of law enforcement authorities has promoted the growth of radicalism. Finally, these disgruntled people have become the target for the recruiters.

Concerns and Countermeasures

The influence of ISIS inside Central Asia is taken to be dormant by many. There is an impression that the group is still far away from making inroads in the region. But these presumptions must not lead the countries to complacency. The developments in its immediate neighbourhoods, that is, inside Russia (as recruitment zone) and Afghanistan, where ISIS announced the establishment of its Khorasan wing (covering Pakistan as well) during late January 2015, are alarming. Moscow will not like to see an increase in the number of recruits on its soil (who then travel towards West Asian region) as there is always the possibility of those fighters returning home. These fighters can be source of strengths for other terror organisations inside the country as well. Moreover, the returnees can ignite unrest or influence like-minded people in their native countries. Equally worrying trend is developing in Afghanistan where limited group of fighters are spreading in the eastern part of the country. Although ISIS presence is still insignificant in Afghanistan, it is increasingly attracting new recruits, particularly, the dissatisfied or disillusioned former Taliban commanders.²³ Therefore, It is possible that the ISIS will carry forwards its fights towards Central Asia after establishing a sustainable presence in the Af-Pak region.

Since security measures alone cannot prevent the deepening of extremism in the region, there should be civilian approaches as well. The latter will require improving the overall socio-economic and political situation in every country. But for all these to materialise, a strong political will and resources are required. This is where the role of the affluent international powers will become appropriate, beyond providing military assistance. And, to prevent the upsurge of radical elements and that of the ISIS, the need of the hour is for the Central Asian countries to start engaging constantly amongst themselves. A robust regional cooperation framework in military-intelligence sharing should be established. 

Since Central Asia is India’s extended neighbourhood, New Delhi should step up its cooperation with the countries there. Owing to its strategic interests in this region with abundance of natural resources, the current visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the five states should give equal importance in discussing the long-term security implications, particularly, counter-terrorism, beyond oil and energy trade. This is an opportune moment for India in particular, keeping in mind the development of Chabahar port in Iran, a Persian Gulf country which it will use as a transit for Central Asia.

Finally, the efforts to prevent the ISIS from making Central Asia as its stop in the future will flounder if the countries in and around the region fail to understand the gravity of the situation. The vigour of this organisation should never be underestimated.

Endnotes

1. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, Policy Briefing, No. 72, Europe and Central Asia, International Crisis Group, 20 January 2015, p. 1.
2. “Islamic State Flag Hung from Tashkent Bridge”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 4 September 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-islamic-state-flag-tajikistan-sy...
3. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan declares support for ISIS”, alakhbar, 6 October 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/islamic-movement-uzbekistan-declare...
4. Joseph Goldstein, “In ISIS, the Taliban Face an Insurgent Threat of Their Own”, The New York Times, 4 June 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-face-in...
5. Damon A. Mehl, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 8, Issue. 6, pp. 11, 13-14.
6. Reid Standish. “Shadow Boxing with the Islamic State in Central Asia”, Foreign Policy, 6 February 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/06/shadow-boxing-with-the-islamic-state...
7. Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s”, International Centre for Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 26 January 2015, http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-200...
8. Anna Dyner, et al, “Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into Central Asia”, Policy Paper, No. 19 (121), The Polish Institute for International Affairs, June, p. 6.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. P. Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”, IDSA Issue Brief, 22 October 2014, http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/ISISinCentralAsia_pstobdan_221014.html, p. 4.
11. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 4.
12. Shawn Snow, “ISIS Looks for Foothold in Central Asia”, The Diplomat, 18 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/isis-looks-for-foothold-in-central-asia/
13. Stobdan, “ISIS in Central Asia”.
14. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 4.
15. “Isis leader calls on Muslims to ‘build Islamic state’, BBC, 1 July 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28116846
16. Samantha Brletich, “Central Asia: Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the Rise”, International Relations and Security Network, 8 August 2008, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=88668
17. “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia”, p. 6.
18. For a brief report, see Daniil Turovsky, “How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria”, The Guardian , 5 May 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-e...
19. Ibid.
20. “ISIS commander 'Omar the Chechen' allegedly killed”, RT, 13 November 2014, http://rt.com/news/205239-russia-chechen-isis-killed/
21. Umberto Bacchi, “Isis targets jihadists in former Soviet nations with Russian-language propaganda magazine Istok”, International Business Times, 3 June 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-targets-jihadists-former-soviet-nations-ru...
22. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Moscow Remains Fertile Recruiting Ground for Aspiring Jihadists”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 12, Issue. 41, 5 March 2015.
23. “Can the Islamic State Defeat the Taliban”, Stratfor, 25 June 2015. For further reading, see Lauren McNally, “Is the Islamic State Escalating in Afghanistan”, Institute for the Study of War, 27 April 2015.

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Published Date: 8^th July 2015, Image Source: http://www.theguardian.com (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Vivekananda International Foundation)

Delhi’s Craven Policy on Syria

Kanwal Sibal

Member Advisory Board, VIF

The position India is taking on the unfolding Syrian crisis does not do honour to our diplomacy. We supported last week the western resolution providing for sanctions on Syria under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter unless its government effectively ended its military operations against the insurgents who are backed by the West, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

UN

Russia and China vetoed this one-sided resolution which imposed specific and verifiable obligations on the government such as ceasing, within ten days, troop movements towards population centres and all use of heavy weapons there, a complete pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres and withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from these centres to their barracks etc. No obligation was imposed on the armed opposition groups, apart from a general exhortation to “all parties, including the opposition (to) cease all armed violence in all its forms”. The resolution took no cognizance of the role of the external backers of the armed groups and sought no end to outside interference.

In these circumstances, the provision to extend Kofi Annan’s UN mission to Syria for another 45 days- something that Russia and China(and India) favoured- became a casualty. The West has, in reality, little attachment to Annan’s mission as it serves to delay what they want- President Assad’s quick ouster- while Russia and China (and India) support it in the forlorn hope that some negotiated way out of the crisis can be found.

Kofi Annan’s mission has been subsequently salvaged, with the Security Council unanimously approving( July 20) a compromise western resolution extending the mandate of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria for 30 days, with the possibility of extension should there be a cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction of violence by all parties in Syria. The “all parties” referred to will not abjure violence as religious ideology and larger geopolitical objectives are involved. The regime will combat the armed opposition groups to protect itself and the country’s multi-ethnic secular foundations. The latest resolution is therefore an exercise in cynicism by those who remain bent on regime change and those who are willing to clutch at such diplomatic straws to uphold their position that the Syrians themselves and not external powers should decide on political change in Damascus.

If India’s conduct in the UN Security Council is questionable, it is because India is buffeted by contradictory considerations of principle and pragmatism in adopting a position. Conscious of its transformed relationship with the US, India is reluctant to oppose the latter on issues like Syria in the UNSC where its conduct is under scrutiny in the context of its permanent membership aspirations. India is exhorted by the West to assume its “international responsibilities” as a would-be global power on humanitarian and democracy-related issues, which means endorsing the policy of imposing sanctions on delinquent states as identified by them. India’s foreign investment and growth needs dispose its policy makers to bridge political gaps with the US as much as possible. India’s vast energy, trade, manpower and remittance linkages with the Gulf countries contrast with limited economic ties with Syria, placing a premium on pragmatism in defining our position.

Pragmatism

On the other hand, strategic autonomy means taking positions in conformity with our fundamental thinking about the conduct of international relations, even if our western partners find them disagreeable. The abhorrence for externally enforced regime change seems to have got dissipated in our political thinking. Syria may be different from Iraq and Libya in method but not in objective. Western leaders are insisting on Assad’s departure and warning that his days are numbered. They are supporting the armed opposition groups; their media has launched an information war against Syria; for ostensible humanitarian reasons they are creating conditions for a large scale human disaster there. Why should we implicitly support regime change in Syria?

In our longer term interest we should not be complicit in the destruction of secular authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and their replacement by authoritarian Islamist ones. The veneer of democracy being given to these developments is false. The US, which has managed fundamentalism in the Gulf for decades and even promoted it in our region till recently for geopolitical ends, may believe it retains enough levers to manage the developing Islamist trends in the Arab world in which allies like Saudi Arabia and Qatar are playing a catalysing role. But India is getting exposed to a longer term threat by the lurch of the Islamic world towards Salafism.

Principle

India’s explanation India for voting for the western resolution on Syria is disingenuous, as it refers only to India’s desire to preserve Kofi Annan’s mission and ignores completely the sanctions provision that Russia and China were objecting to. Not taking into consideration Russia’s cogent arguments against the western resolution reflects a departure from our oft-stated positions, along with Russia, on respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of countries, opposition to regime change and support for multilateralism and multi-polarity.

Our compliant attitude at New York contrasts with the position taken by South Africa which abstained and criticized the western resolution as one-sided. Pakistan too abstained, and opened up space for itself, unlike us, to jointly work with Russia to draft a joint resolution on extending the Kofi Annan mission as an alternative to the UK draft. This reflects poorly on our diplomcy with Russia on Syria.

A compromise between principle and pragmatism dictated abstention by India on the vote on Syria. If we should not oppose the West when they are right because of old prejudices, we should not support them when they are wrong out of new fears.