Creeping Coup Redux: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

A few months before the 1999 military coup, a monthly newsmagazine in Pakistan carried a cover story titled ‘Creeping Coup’. In his second stint as Prime Minister from 1996-99, Nawaz Sharif had started involving the military in all sorts of things that ideally should have been handled by the civilian government. From checking electricity meters to unearthing ghost schools to cleaning canals, the army was being deployed in the role of a sort of National Guard. The then Army Chief, Gen Pervez Musharraf was always ready to oblige, quite willingly it appeared. Nawaz Sharif, at that point in time, was unassailable. He had a 2/3^rd majority in the National Assembly, the opposition was in disarray, the nuclear tests had beefed up his position even move (even though in the aftermath of these tests, the economy had virtually collapsed), he had sacked a Navy chief and followed it up by forcing out an army chief, the ISI Chief was his man. In short, everything seemed to be going in Nawaz Sharif’s favor.

Then Kargil happened, and things started sliding very fast. So much so that even a statement from the US warning against any extra constitutional move against the elected government didn’t help. Nor for that matter did Nawaz Sharif’s efforts of going out of the way to placate Musharraf. When it came, all it took was what a former Prime Minister Ch. Shujaat Hussain calls ‘one jeep and two trucks’ to overthrow the civilian government. Therefore, the thumb rule number one about civil-military relations in Pakistan is to never imagine that the democratic process is irreversible.

A decade and a half after he was ousted in a military coup, Nawaz Sharif is once again occupying the Prime Minister’s chair. A lot of water has flowed down the Indus during this time and a lot of things appear to have changed. But as recent events have demonstrated, what hasn’t changed is the reality of the military establishment’s ability to destabilize a civilian government and box it into a corner. What also hasn’t changed is the tendency of the civil politicians, whether in government or out of it, to fall back on the military and seek its support to fix their opponents. What is more, with most state institutions steadily becoming dysfunctional, the military has become the default option when things need to be set right. If in 1999 the military was cleaning canals, unearthing ghost schools, reading electricity meters, in 2014 they have gone a step further and have been handed over the security of airports, railway stations, and other vital installations. Worse, not just is the army virtually in control of two major cities – Karachi and now Islamabad – it is practically calling the shots in two provinces – Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The democratic transition from one civilian government to another had led many to imagine that democracy had finally stuck firm roots in Pakistan. Much of the credit for that ‘historic’ transition is due to former President Asif Zardari’s remarkable skill at political gymnastics which ensured that his party’s government completed its term. But he was also aided by individuals and circumstances, without which he might have fallen well short of breasting the tape.

The first thing that helped Zardari was that the PPP was replacing a quasi-military regime and for the military to directly intervene in political affairs soon after restoration of democracy was neither politically feasible nor possible. This is a second thumb rule of Pakistani politics – it is a two party system with the civilians being one party and the military the second party; each side gets a 10 year ‘term’, give or take a couple of years. Viewed from this perspective, the current problems facing the Nawaz Sharif government could be explained as ‘mid-term blues’ of the civilian dispensation. Be that as it may, Asif Zardari got the benefit of this thumb rule. What also worked in his favor was that the main opposition leader was Nawaz Sharif who never really allowed political differences and competition reach the point of no return. Nawaz Sharif’s attitude was partly colored by his experience of the sordid politics of the 1990s when political parties conspired with the military against the government, something that allowed the Army to become the dominant political player in Pakistan. Equally important was the fact that Nawaz Sharif was not left out in the cold after the transition from quasi-military to civilian rule.

By virtue of his party coming into power in the province of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif had a stake in the system which also meant that he could afford to be patient and let the government complete its term. Apart from the role played by Nawaz Sharif in ensuring the survival of the Zardari-led PPP government, there was also a judiciary running amok under the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and a media which fancied itself as a guardian of democracy. Add to all this the international situation that wasn’t conducive to any direct military takeover, and it’s not difficult to figure out how and why Zardari managed to drag his party’s government across the finish line in spite of a terrible record of governance.

Nawaz Sharif started his 3^rd term with some advantages that Asif Zardari never enjoyed. Based on the strength that these advantages gave the Nawaz Sharif dispensation, many observers and analysts were convinced that democracy would only get strengthened. Nawaz Sharif had a comfortable majority in the centre and controlled two provinces –Punjab and Balochistan. The judiciary and media were not hostile to him. In fact, the judiciary was beholden to him because of the role he played in the restoration of judges. The PMLN’s legendary media management skills meant that he would not face the hostility that Asif Zardari had faced from a right-wing, illiberal and intellectually challenged media. Most of all, the army appeared to be a bit on the back foot. They were wary of Nawaz Sharif and weren’t quite sure whether he will adopt a vindictive and vengeful policy towards the military. There were fears in the army that Nawaz Sharif might actually take the rhetoric of civilian superiority seriously and try to implement it. This wasn’t a problem that the army faced with Asif Zardari or his nominated Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, who were more than willing to even grovel before the military to keep it in good humor. So much so, at one point Gilani is reported to have said that he had told the then army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani that he was at the service of the military.

While the army didn’t expect this level of obsequiousness from Nawaz Sharif, it also didn’t think it would be very smooth sailing with the new Prime Minister because of his reputation for never forgiving and his legendary aversion to being pushed around or being dictated to. Therefore, some amount of civil-military tension was inherent, more so because Nawaz Sharif was expected to not just push the envelope but also push back in order assert himself and show who is the boss and who will call the shots.

In the case of the PPP government, the civil-military tussle and tension came fairly early. Within weeks of the ouster of Musharraf from the Presidency, an attempt was made to bring the ISI under the control of the interior ministry. The army let the government know in no uncertain terms where it got off. After this first chastening, the PPP consistently yielded to the wishes and whims of the military. In Nawaz Sharif’s case, it took around six months for the latent tensions to surface. Until October 2013 when Gen Kayani was in office, and given how well-set and well-established he was, Nawaz Sharif bided his time. Another restraining factor on Nawaz Sharif during his first six months in office was the presence of the former chief justice, who retired only in December. It was after the exit of both these people that the transition was complete and Nawaz Sharif was in a position to be pretty much his own boss, or so be thought because almost immediately the problems started.

There were broadly four issues that became the bone of contention. The first was Musharraf and the treason case against him. The second was the government policy on TTP or the Islamist insurgency terrorism. The third was India and the fourth was the media war which broke out after the botched assassination attempt on the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir. All these issues prompted the political hyenas to jump into the fray, either because they thought they could exploit the growing gulf between the civilian government and military, or as many believe, they were put up to this in order to box the government into a corner.

The manner in which these issues became a wedge between the government and the military give rise to two or three more thumb rules of Pakistani politics. Thumb rule number three is what can be called the paradox of power. Briefly, this means that in Pakistan the more powerful and unassailable you appear to be, the weaker and more vulnerable you are because the anti- forces then have a compelling reason to bring you down regardless of the consequences. A corollary to this thumb rule is the ‘devil may cause attitude’ of Pakistan and Pakistanis wherein the culture of ‘bringing down the wall of the neighbor or enemy even if you come under it’ has been internalized. This corollary has implications for India because when Indians parrot the nonsense about ‘neighbors can’t be changed’ and ‘geography cannot be changed’, the perversity that guides Pakistani thinking is often ignored. In other words, the Pakistanis would go to any length to bring India’s wall down even if they perish in the process.

The fourth thumb rule is that civil-military relations are based on system of diarchy in which the civilians are allowed a free hand in taking charge of municipal functions, while all the serious strategic, defence and foreign policy matters are controlled by the military. The fifth thumb rule is that once you appoint an army chief you lose control over him. It is a unique country in which an elected Prime Minister appoints his own nemesis. At the very least, it is a unique system in which the appointing authority loses control of the appointee as soon as the appointment is made.

These thumb rules need to be kept in mind to understand why the predicament in which the Nawaz Sharif government finds itself in and despite enjoying a more than comfortable majority in the National Assembly, rumors of its pre-mature demise are starting to do the rounds.

The Musharraf case clearly caused lot of bad blood between the military and the civilian government. It is not that the army is in love with Musharraf but more that it’s an institutional response to a former chief being humiliated and being put on trial. An even bigger issue is that of senior military officials being held accountable by the ‘bloody civilians’. For Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf is both a personal and political issue. At a personal level, Nawaz Sharif and many members of his kitchen cabinet have suffered terrible indignities at the hands of Musharraf and would like to settle scores. Politically, while the hardliners realize that the Musharraf issue can backfire on them, they also don’t want to open themselves to the chance of having resiled from the tough talk they did on Musharraf both while in opposition and after coming into power. The pro-treason trial lobby in the ruling dispensation fears that they will have to pay a heavy political cost if they let Musharraf go scot free. Plus there is the entire argument that if Musharraf is left off the hook, then it will only serve as an encouragement to the next man on the horseback to usurp power. While these people are aware of the heartburn in the military, some of them argue that if they have to run the country they must have a free hand else what’s the point of being in government but without the power to do things they want to do.

To be sure, there is a split within the ruling party on the Musharraf issue with one faction advocating the hard line and another faction led by Shahbaz Sharif and the Interior Minister Ch. Nisar Ali Khan advocating caution and accommodation. What really spoiled matters was when an alleged understanding that Musharraf would be allowed to leave the country after a court allowed him to do so, was scotched by the hard line faction at the last minute. Many formal and informal advisors are now advising the Prime Minister that he should live to fight another day and not fritter away his government on as irrelevant a figure as Musharraf, more so when even the army would like to see his back. For now there is a stalemate on this issue. But increasingly it seems the army will eventually get its way.

The second issue was on how to handle the TTP and other Islamist groups. The army’s strategic calculation demanded that action be taken against the ‘bad’ Taliban and control be established over the ‘no-go’ areas like North Waziristan. The civilian government had its reasons for not being very enthusiastic about giving the army a go ahead to launch a military operation in this area. One reason was of course personal security of the members of the ruling family and party. But another reason was that an operation would mean giving a free hand to the army which would increase its political space, something the government wanted to avoid. There was also the whole issue of blowback or retaliation which would not only affect the political popularity of the government and alienate its conservative right wing vote bank but also ruin the economic and investment climate. But as things have turned out, the military finally got its way when it launched the operation. In a clear signal that it was the military and not the government that called the shots on the operation in North Waziristan, the announcement of the operation was made first by the military spokesman and the Prime Minister’s statement followed.

The third issue bedeviling relations between the civilian government and the Army was India. Nawaz Sharif was very keen and eager to do business with India. A trade deal heavily loaded in favor of the Pakistan was agreed by India in February 2014. But at the last moment the military put pressure and scuttled it. The army clearly is not ready to let the civilians take charge of the India policy and it increasingly appears that the government has given in to the army on this issue. What this means for India is that it should take anything that the civilian government in Pakistan says with a healthy dose of skepticism. In any case, India’s policy on Pakistan should not be predicated on what the Pakistanis say but on what they do and by all accounts what they are doing on ground doesn’t really inspire any confidence that there is any major shift in policy towards India.

The fourth issue which spoiled relations between the government and the military was the media war that broke out after the assassination attempt on the Pakistani journalist, Hamid Mir. After Mir’s TV channel accused the ISI chief of being behind the attempt on his life, a virtual storm was unleashed against the Jang/Geo group. Much of this was orchestrated by the ISI which mobilized other news channels against Geo and used all sorts of strong arm tactics to shut Geo down. This was a moment of truth for the Pakistan media and it exposed the lie of independence of media. The ISI-Geo tussle was in part a commercial fight. For some months now, there were reports that ISI was in the process of starting a news channel of its own. Seed money for this was allegedly being partly contributed by the international terrorist and criminal Dawood Ibrahim. Also allegedly involved was a dubious business group in Dubai which is infamous for gold smuggling and also runs a TV channel in Pakistan.

The big obstacle in the path of these plans was Geo, which not only dominated the news networks and print media but also poked the ISI in the eye by exposing its media plans. As long as Geo’s domination continued, the ISI’s news channel would remain a bit player. Shutting Geo down or blocking its transmission was therefore imperative if space had to be created for another channel in an already crowded media space. The other channels became wiling partners in this misadventure, behaving like typical hyenas to bring down an adversary against whom they couldn’t compete otherwise. A prominent role in this was played by ARY channel which for months had been conducting a campaign of slander and vilification against Geo and its owners. The civilian government was caught in the middle of this media war and tried to walk the tight rope, or if you will the knife’s edge. They couldn’t ignore the army but also could not allow it to ride rough shod over Geo because if today it was Geo, tomorrow it would be someone else, perhaps even the government itself.

The Geo episode exposed the armpit of Pakistan politics and media. It became clear who stood where and how independent or subservient the media was. It also exposed the helplessness of the judiciary vis-à-vis the army, and irrelevance of civil society. The limitations of the civilian government in reining in the military became apparent. But ironically, the episode also revealed the weakness of the Army which despite all its efforts could only go so far and no further in targeting Geo. The point is that while the Army remains the most powerful political force in Pakistan, it no longer enjoys the kind of domination that it did some years back. Over the years, it has been challenged politically and militarily and its monopoly over the national narrative has also been dented.

While the Army’s ability to destabilize the government remains quite intact as does its power to overthrow the government, it probably no longer enjoys the power to run the country as it did in the past, not that it ran the country well when it got the chance. In fact, most of the problems confronting Pakistan today can be traced back to the military regimes or the military’s control over national security and foreign policy. What, however, gives the military an advantage over the civilians is the bugling and inefficient and uninspiring performance of the civilian governments – not just in the political realm but also in the economic and administrative domain. The failure of civilians to give even a modicum of good governance and solve the problems of the people has created space for the military.

Today, the political situation is once again in a bit of flux. Just one year after winning a third term as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif’s government is finding itself under siege. Partly the situation is of the government’s own making and its bumbling and bungling ways. Apart from the fact that the government has failed to give even a little relief from the crippling energy shortages despite doubling the electricity tariffs, it is the almost amateurish political management which has created the spectre of instability despite the government having an almost 2/3rd majority in the National Assembly. For now a challenge is being mounted in the street by Imran Khan and a somewhat clownish cleric from Canada, Tahirul Qadri who is promising an instant revolution like it is some kind of instant coffee. Imran Khan, whose intellectual capacity and political thinking, is limited to drawing silly cricketing analogies wants the system to stay but at the same time is threatening to overthrow it by using street power and set the date of Aug 14 for forcing the government out of office. On the other hand, Tahirul Qadri, who was given a huge issue after the Punjab government fired on his supporters in Lahore and killed around a dozen people and injured around a 100, is making no bones about wanting to scrap the whole system.

Normally, a demonstration or even a massive anti-government protest shouldn’t be much cause for worry for a legitimate government, even less so when the demands being made by the protestors are illogical, extra-legal and even extra-constitutional. But Nawaz Sharif’s style of politics has come back to haunt him. Apart from the fact that many in the ruling party think that the agitation on streets is being orchestrated by the army to bring the government under pressure, perhaps even oust it, it is the steady isolation of Nawaz Sharif and his immediate circle from rest of the political mainstream and even his own party that is creating the impression of a government that is flailing rather helplessly. Not only has Nawaz Sharif ignored the very institution from which he derives his strength and legitimacy i.e. Parliament, he has also alienated members of his party by appointing cronies and family members to all plum positions in government. Even the decisions being taken are by a tiny group comprising the kitchen cabinet. The neglect of elected legislators has meant that they really don’t have any stake in the system. Worse, Nawaz Sharif has also ignored the main opposition party, PPP, which has suddenly woken up to the uncomfortable fact that by maintaining a posture of friendly opposition it is getting marginalized in the larger political game. The space that PPP has ceded has been filled by Imran Khan’s party, especially in the Punjab. Not surprisingly, PPP leaders from Punjab are restive and itching to take on the government. In order to keep the flock together, the PPP has now started making noises which have only added to the discomfiture of the ruling dispensation.

The nightmare for the government now is that if there are large scale street disturbances which go out of control, it could lead to a military intervention even if the military doesn’t want to intervene. The Army finds itself caught on many fronts and taking over the government will only stretch it further. Apart from confronting all the economic, political and other problems facing the government, the army will also have to face up to the diplomatic implications of ousting an elected government. Conversely, given that the army has already been involved in so many things, it might even consider taking over if things go out of control of civilian government. For its part, the civilian government has demonstrated its weakness by asking the military to intercede and convince Imran Khan to back off. It has also made a rather clumsy attempt by pitting the army against Imran Khan’s supporters by handing over security of Islamabad to the Army.

Under these circumstances, even if the current round of political confrontation passes off without incident, the government has already subordinated itself to the military and the only logical conclusion of this is that henceforth it will be left with only municipal functions while the military will call the shots on all issues of foreign and security policy including the mother of all issues which is India. What this means is that any engagement that India enters into with the civilian government will remain hostage to the Pakistan Army’s unreconstructed and unreformed view of India.

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Published Date: 20^th August 2014, Image source: http://images.thenews.com.pk

The Neighbour from Hell - India-Pakistan Summit – Yesterday Once More

Prabhat P Shukla, 

Joint Director, VIF

The run-up to the summit between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers had seen a serious debate on the wisdom or otherwise of such high-level contact. The way events have unfolded, it is clear that the sceptics had it right. But this is too serious a matter for any “I told you so” kind of gloating. Instead, it is time to take stock and see where developments are heading. This essay is one contribution to such an effort.

First, we need to be clear about what we are dealing with. For quite long now, we have accepted it as fact that Mian Nawaz wants peace with us – this is an image he has fostered with care, and has distanced himself from the hostile actions that have emanated from Pakistan. This applies principally to the Kargil adventure, where India gave him a free pass, even though the evidence did not warrant any such generosity. In point of fact, it is questionable whether he is indeed the man of peace he is portrayed as being.

Ever since Mian sahib came to power in June this year, we have seen a number of negative developments on the political and diplomatic side, which are directly traceable to him. The first is the National Assembly resolution on Kashmir. This was piloted by the PML-N, and not only called for a settlement on the basis of the UN Resolutions, but declared that Pakistan would continue to extend political, moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris. Nothing unusual for Pakistan, but this Prime Minister has repeatedly said that he wishes to pick up where he left off in 1999, when he was overthrown by Gen Musharraf. The 1999 Lahore Declaration that he signed did not mention the UN Resolutions – and that was one of the major breakthroughs of the Lahore meeting.

Secondly, it is Mian sahib’s Government that has finally put paid to all hopes that Pakistan will give MFN treatment to Indian exports. This, from a man who is sold to us as a business-minded leader – even the previous Government was more forthcoming on the issue. The issue has now been linked to the state of political relations between the two countries. In short, it is not on the agenda any longer. It is worth repeating that, in and of itself, this is not an issue that will affect our trade, piffling as it is. No, the issue is Pakistani refusal to honour its solemn international undertakings. Under WTO, it is obliged to extend MFN treatment to Indian exports – no conditions attach to this. But it is disregarding this obligation, secure in the knowledge that no Government till now has troubled itself on this account.

Third, at the UNGA session this year, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif again raked up the Kashmir issue, and once again linked it to the UN Resolutions, forcing the Indian Prime Minister to take a firm stand on the issue and emphasising the centrality of the Simla Agreement. It is worth stressing that Musharraf had ended the practice of referring to the UN Resolutions, and this had been continued by President Zardari in his initial years in power. However, he had re-started making reference to the UN Resolutions, so Nawaz Sharif genuinely had the choice of not raking up the Resolutions, but elected to do so.

All of this is to be seen against the backdrop of the continuing freedom of operation given to Hafiz Saeed to incite hatred and violence towards India. The PML-N Government in Punjab continues to provide funding for his tanzeem, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Our Prime Minister did raise this issue in the New York meeting, according to press reports, but was fobbed off with the usual – and unconvincing – response that the JuD was a charitable organisation. For good measure, Nawaz also raised the issues of Baluchistan and water-sharing – comparatively newer issues that will keep relations from improving even if, by some miracle, there is some forward movement on Kashmir.

All of this suggests that we need to re-assess the attitude and role of Nawaz Sharif. It has been almost axiomatic that he seeks friendly relations with India. True, there is evidence for this in the statements he has made, but the public pronouncements of former President Zardari were also of a similar tenor. The problem is not in saying that he, or some other leader, wants friendly relations; the challenge is to match their deeds with their words. And as we have seen, on issues like Kashmir, or even MFN, let alone curbing terrorism, there is no difference between the different leaders.

This is also the right time to address another mistake the Indian side frequently makes. This is the suggestion that the civilian leaders want good relations but the Army and the ISI block them. Historically, this is certainly false. We know that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was far more hawkish towards India than was Ayub. In the late 1980’s, and especially after the Kashmir troubles began in late 1989, Benazir was as hostile towards India as any military leader was. It is Mian Nawaz who has played Artful Dodger, and managed to insinuate that the Army in Pakistan was creating all the trouble – and we have eagerly seized upon this version. This is not meant to absolve the Pakistan Army – not at all; but the reality is that all segments of Pakistani society, the military and civil bureaucracy, the politicians and the tanzeems are committed in equal measure to two issues: Kashmir, and revenge for the humiliation of 1971.

The failure of the New York meeting has become apparent more quickly than one would have expected. It now turns out that even as the talks were taking place, armed intrusions by the special forces of the Pakistan Army were taking place across the Line of Control. This only provides confirmation, if any were needed, that talks are not the answer to the challenge we face from Pakistan. And certainly we do not need talks at the political level, until there is some reasonable ground for believing that there is a genuine change of policy on the part of Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

More important, we need to determine what the Pakistani strategy is for the coming months and years. The stepped-up pattern of military action comes alongside growing and open incitement from the likes of Hafiz Saeed. There are well-documented intelligence reports suggesting that there will be more active encouragement inside Kashmir of terror groups sponsored by Pakistan in the future. The aim is to keep Indian forces occupied in Kashmir, giving the Pakistanis and their Taliban proxies a free hand in Afghanistan as the western forces begin their draw-down. What is more, there is no longer any attempt on the part of the Pakistani establishment at concealing their intent; the terrorist groups are openly proclaiming their plans, presumably secure in the knowledge that the Government in Delhi will do nothing about the threats brewing in Kashmir and in the neighbourhood.

What we need therefore, even at this late stage, is to come to a common understanding that talks alone will never deliver the goods. Surely, by now, we may conclude definitively, that all the justifications given in advance of the New York meeting that talks were the only way to find a solution were wrong.

What is more, the country was kept in the dark about the military activity on the LoC and indeed across the border, so as not to raise questions once again about the unwisdom of the meeting itself. It raises the legitimate query – what is the Government thinking? It is quite remarkable that there is no explanation whatsoever from the Government for all the blunders it has committed, from the Joint Anti-terror Mechanism to the Sharm el-Sheikh statement to its own broken promises to the Indian people that talks and terror cannot go together. We never hear anything from the Government as to why it is behaving the way it does, what results we may expect from these policies, and when.

It is not yet too late to face the facts, abandon the current appeasement, and recognise that some hard decisions have to be taken. The security situation in the neighbourhood is worsening from our standpoint, and we need to be prepared for all contingencies.

Pak Charade on Terrorism Stands Exposed

Sushant Sareen, 

Senior Fellow, VIF

After weeks of delays and dithering, hemming and hawing, and some political bargaining, point scoring and grand-standing, the newly elected PMLN government in Pakistan finally managed to hold the much touted All Parties Conference to evolve a consensus on the counter-terrorism policy of the Pakistani state. The APC was never going to be the magic bullet that would find a lasting solution to Pakistan’s tryst with terrorism. But at the very least, it was expected to make a show of national resolve against terrorism even as it endorsed the government’s efforts and attempts to restore peace in the country through negotiations and dialogue. The resolution passed by the APC, however, is a document dripping with and reeking of irresoluteness. For all practical purposes, the only consensus that emerged after the confabulations of the civil and military leadership of Pakistan was to capitulate before the Taliban, and all that now remains to be decided are the modalities of going about this.¹

Not surprisingly, there has been trenchant criticism of the APC resolution by many Pakistani analysts and observers. For one, the very idea of holding an APC when there is a parliament in place to debate issues of vital national importance has been called into question, more so because ostensibly only parties with representation in parliament were invited for the APC.² Apart from procedural and protocol issues, there are other more substantial points on which the APC has been pilloried. For instance, despite all the verbiage in the resolution that was passed, there is no clear roadmap on how negotiations will be conducted, with whom, on what basis and under what framework, what will be the plan ‘B’ if the dialogue fails etc. In other words, none of the nuts and bolts of an anti-terror policy that are critical for determining the pace, direction, and terms and conditions of the negotiation process have been clearly specified. It is almost as though the authorities will decide things as they go along, or if you will, muddle along.

While the Pakistani politicians have been rather unrestrained in hitting out against the US, not just on the issue of drone attacks but also in making clear that in fighting the war Pakistan “will not be guided by the USA or any other country...”, when it comes to even mentioning the Taliban or the T-word (terrorism) all the determination displayed in standing up to the US (arguably Pakistan’s largest benefactor) seems to suddenly disappear. This of course is something that has been in the making for quite some months and, if anything, the pusillanimity of the Pakistani political class has only increased. Earlier this year, the the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam - Fazl-ur-Rehman Group (JUI-F) held an APC where the luminaries referred to the depredations of the Taliban as ‘lawlessness’ because use of the word ‘terrorism’ would offend the Taliban. The JUI-F APC also called for ‘engaging all concerned parties’, thereby conceding legitimacy to the Taliban by making them a concerned party instead of a combatant. The PMLN has gone a step further by using the term ‘stakeholders’ which is tantamount to placing the Taliban on an even higher pedestal.

The APC resolution quotes a two year old resolution by another APC to reiterate that ‘dialogue had to be initiated to negotiate peace with our own people (emphasis mine) in the Tribal Areas’. Quite asides the fact that this formulation is reflective of the twisted and confused mindset that pervades Pakistani thinking on the Taliban who are responsible for nearly 40000 murders, the talk about talking to ‘our own people’ is just so much hot air and not very different from the nonsense that used to be peddled during the Musharraf and Zardari period that negotiations or deals were not being made with the Taliban terrorists but with tribesmen and tribal elders. The spin that is now being given to this formulation is that it makes a distinction between foreign terrorists – Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighurs etc. and Pakistani jihadists and Taliban who are targeting the Pakistani people and state – and other groups which are involved in the insurgency because of some grievance or some ideological reasons and are not intrinsically opposed to the Pakistani state. If indeed such a distinction can be made, then the question arises as to what purpose will be served (in terms of restoring peace) by talking only to those combatants who are perhaps peripheral to the whole situation? In other words, the bulk of the people who are waging a war against the Pakistani state will not be part of the dialogue process and to tackle this lot force in any case will have to be used. If so, then this entire APC and the entire dialogue tack is an exercise in futility.

Worse, in what appears to be the Pakistani version of ‘one country, two systems’, the APC has virtually prepared the ground for conceding the formation of ‘Islamic Emirates’ in the areas where the Taliban hold sway. This has been done by the laying out the ‘guiding principles’ which talk of ‘respect for local customs and traditions, values and religious beliefs’. Clearly, such an ambiguously worded formulation allows the Taliban to impose their own version of Shariah and their medieval social norms in the areas they control under the pretext of respecting local customs and religious beliefs. What is more, if reports about Imran Khan’s boasts that the Pakistani authorities have accepted all that he has been demanding are true, then the Pakistan army is all set to effect a ‘phased withdrawal’ of troops from the troubled Tribal Areas, which means handing over complete control of these areas to the marauding Taliban, who will pretty much be free to run or ruin the place as they deem fit.³ Even now, the Pakistani state has effectively ceased to exist in many of the areas – notably North Waziristan and parts of South Waziristan – where it has entered into peace deals with Taliban warlords like Gul Bahadur and the now slain commander Mullah Nazir.

Perhaps the most problematic part of the APC deliberations and resolution is the extent that the civilian and military leadership has gone to appease the Taliban. The political class is apparently so terrified of riling and upsetting the Taliban that apart from use of obsequious phrases, they have also desisted from setting any ground rules that the Taliban would need to observe in order to prove their sincerity and seriousness about the dialogue. Forget about any clarity regarding what the dialogue is to achieve – according to one luminary of the PMLN who is rumoured to become the next governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the government will try to convince the Taliban to adhere to the constitution and accept the Shariah as currently exists in the country! – there are no pre-conditions of any sort that the Taliban will have to meet to come on the negotiation table.

But even though the Pakistani authorities seem reconciled to not insisting on any pre-conditions, there is at the same time an expectation (or at least a hope) that some sort of a ceasefire will be in place during the negotiations. The problem is that while from the side of the Pakistani state, there will be a single entity negotiating (which means that no operations from the side of the state against the insurgents), on the side of the insurgents there are dozens of groups which are operating, some reconcilable, others not so. This means that even though groups ready to negotiate with the government might adhere to a ceasefire, the groups that oppose any dialogue will be free to carry out attacks. Chances are that the Taliban (who are despite the multiplicity of groups constitute a confederation of sorts) follow the same twin track approach of talks and terror going hand in hand that Pakistan adopts with India. In other words, while the Taliban attacks will continue, there will be (and can be) no response from the side of the Pakistani state (because of the over-lapping of many Taliban groups in terms of both space and cadre), something that will only worsen the security situation and put the Taliban in a commanding position.

The TTP has already made it clear that any ceasefire would follow a dialogue and not precede it, as was being demanded by the earlier PPP-led government. To further rub the nose of the Pakistani authorities into the ground, the TTP had earlier this year nominated Adnan Rashid – the former Pakistan Air Force employee who had been given death sentence for his role in the assassination attempt on the former military dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf and who had been freed during the Bannu Jail break last year – as one of their negotiators. The other negotiators were Taliban leaders who were in custody of the Pakistani authorities. In addition, responding to earlier overtures for talks, the Taliban made it clear that they would neither lay down their arms nor sever their links with the Al Qaeda and other banned terror groups like the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other such groups. As far as this latest dialogue offer is concerned, even though the Taliban have welcomed it, there are reports that they will be insisting on some pre-conditions and confidence building measures before they accept the talks offer. Some of these conditions and CBMs appear to have been accepted, what with reports of half a dozen Taliban fighters and commanders being released as a goodwill gesture.

Quite clearly, the entire peace tack appears to be something of a non-starter and if it does start will in all likelihood backfire badly by reversing whatever little gains had been made by the Pakistani security forces in their half-hearted and unconvincing fight against the Islamist insurgents. Why then has the political class continued to insist on going through with this tack? One reason for this is that both Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan (the latter remains an unreconstructed Taliban advocate) had consistently called for a dialogue with the Taliban when they were not in power and for them to now turn turtle on this issue would not go down well with their conservative, Taliban-leaning constituency. Another reason is that Nawaz Sharif might actually be acting out of fear of the Taliban. In recent weeks there have been a number of plots that have been uncovered that were aimed at the First Family, including a plan to attack the Raiwind family estate, kidnapping Shahbaz Sharif and targeting members of the family. As far as other parties like the PPP, ANP and MQM are concerned, they have become willing partners to the APC resolution partly out of fear of the Taliban and partly because they didn’t want to stand out as spoilers and obstructionists in a peace process on which many people had laid their hopes.

Finally, there is the proverbial elephant in the room – the Pakistan Army – which reportedly was not in favour of an accommodation with the TTP and other affiliated groups but has now kowtowed to the desire of the civilian government to enter into a peace negotiation.⁴ There are two possible reasons for the army’s new position. The first is that the Army is perhaps giving a long rope to civilian government and the Taliban, fully convinced that the TTP will renege on any deal it enters into, which in turn will end the ambivalence of the political class and create the national mood for launching a comprehensive operation against the Islamist insurgents. Alternatively, the Army could be using this opportunity as part of its long term plan for the post 2014 situation in which it hopes to partner the Taliban in the pursuit of its grand strategic design for domination of the region. In either case, peace will continue to remain a casualty.

Endnotes

1. For text of resolution passed by the APC on September 9, 2013 see http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-201085-Text-of-the-APC-resolution
2. Apart from the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, the army and ISI chiefs, the participants of the APC included governor Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa‚ chief ministers of four provinces‚ PPP leaders Makhdoom Amin Fahim and Syed Khurshid Shah‚ PTI Chairman Imran Khan‚ JUI-F Chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman‚ PML-Q Chief Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain‚ PML-F leaders Pir Sibghatullah Rashdi and Imtiaz Sheikh‚ Jamaat-e-Islami leader Liaquat Baloch‚ Muttahida Qaumi Movement leaders Farooq Sattar and Haider Abbasi Rizvi‚ Awami National Party leader Haji Adeel‚ Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party Chief Mehmood Khan Achakzai‚ Balochistan National Party-M Chief Akhtar Mengal‚ National Party leader Mir Hasil Bizenjo‚ Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith Chief Allama Sajid Mir‚ Qaumi Watan Party Chief Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao‚ and Ghazi Gulab Jamal and Abbas Afridi from Fata.
   http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25325-All-parties-agree-on-talk...
3. http://tribune.com.pk/story/602219/imran-khan-convinced-kayani-on-phased...
4. For a report on the army’s position on the dialogue proposal please see the following:
   http://dawn.com/news/1041787/govt-wins-support-for-talks-with-taliban
   http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-25329-Army-to-enforce-govt-poli...

A Visit that can Wait

Kanwal SibalMember Advisory Board, VIF

The prime minister, Manmohan Singh, while publicly expressing his keenness to visit Pakistan, has also voiced his expectation several times that the outcome would be substantial. It was earlier speculated that by something “substantial” he had agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek in mind. While he still thinks Sir Creek is doable, the hope for an early resolution of the Siachen issue has receded. Although some progress was made in past talks, the issue has become complicated because of Kargil and the increased presence of China in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Now “substantial” means some credible progress by Pakistan in bringing to justice those responsible for the Mumbai terror attack. From the facts of the prime minister making his wishes known and Pakistan ignoring them even as it continues to press for his visit, one can infer that Singh is more keen on making the visit than Pakistan is in facilitating it by giving him a minimum face-saving reason to do so.

At one level, there is nothing exceptional in heads of State and government visiting one another. This is happening all the time in international diplomacy. So why so much fuss about the opportuneness of prime minister’s visit? In the case of India and Pakistan, though, the decision whether to make a visit or not has an exceptional context.

India has long suffered from terrorism at Pakistan’s hands, without this deterring it in the past to reach out to Pakistan at the prime minister’s level as Atal Bihari Vajpayee did in 1999. Kargil followed. In 2001, Vajpayee invited General Pervez Musharraf to Agra but the initiative failed because Pakistan did not offer a clear-cut commitment on terrorism. In 2004, Vajpayee went to Pakistan for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit and obtained a carefully worded commitment from Musharraf to prevent terrorism born on Pakistan’s soil from being directed against India. A spate of terrorist attacks nevertheless followed, but India did not interrupt the ongoing dialogue in the hope that Pakistan would at some stage abjure such acts in its own interest.

The dialogue collapsed, however, with the enormity of the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai orchestrated by the Inter-Services Intelligence-jihadi groups nexus. Again, after a gap, India persuaded itself that the no-dialogue option was not sustainable and that the compulsions of geography — which Pakistan disregards — dictated that India begin talking to Pakistan again.

Four years have elapsed since the Mumbai attacks and two rounds of dialogue have been held, but without any tangible move by Pakistan to try those guilty of the Mumbai attack. Pakistan has used the excuse of complex legal procedures and an independent judiciary to explain the inordinate delay in doing so. 

Meanwhile, to drive home to India the futility of its demand, it allows Hafiz Saeed, the purported mastermind of the Mumbai massacre, to engage freely in his anti-India jihadi tirades. That it is unwilling to be put on the defensive on Mumbai is indicated by its insistence on drawing a parallel between a meticulously planned terrorist action by Pakistani nationals on Indian soil with official Pakistani complicity and an isolated action by local Indian terrorists on Indian soil without any official connivance.

Worse, Pakistan’s foreign minister insults reality and decency by pretending that terrorism is no longer an issue between India and Pakistan and advising us to be realistic and not emotional about the Mumbai trial. Now, if the prime minister of India says that he will go to Pakistan only if Pakistan demonstrates its sincerity by trying those responsible for Mumbai and the foreign minister of Pakistan is “appalled” that we raise the terrorism “mantra of the past”, this “old time” stuff, as she calls it, where is the meeting ground between the ways in which he and the Pakistani leadership see the issue? Our concessions to Pakistan on terrorism, so that the bilateral dialogue can continue, have unfortunately led to these scornful remarks by its foreign minister. If the prime minister were still to go, Pakistan would have diplomatically humiliated India finally on the terrorism issue.

To put the matter of the visit in perspective, our prime minister has been meeting Pakistan’s president and prime minister quite regularly in India or in third countries during international meetings, whether at Ekaterinaberg, Sharm el-Sheikh, Thimphu, New York and, most recently, Tehran. So, contact at the highest political levels is being maintained. Our expectation has been that this willingness to engage with Pakistan would encourage it to bring the pernicious and dangerous issue of terrorism to a political closure bilaterally, as terrorism has the potential to wreck the dialogue process if a Mumbai-like attack is repeated. As it happens, Pakistan has succeeded in blunting India’s case on terrorism even as the United States of America, ironically, has increasingly exposed Pakistan’s duplicity on the issue. If the prime minister were to go to Pakistan under these circumstances, we would have allowed the latter to deny us the only deliverable we seek from it.

Apart from bilateral dimensions of the terrorism issue, there is the international dimension. With religious extremism spreading in the Arab world and organizations with a violent political past acceding to power in hitherto “moderate Islamic states”, not to mention the current street frenzy against the US unleashed by a film, India has to remain vigilant about the impact of such developments on the popular spirit in the region, linked transnationally through religion and ideology with happenings beyond.

As a sign of the maturing of democracy in Pakistan and its polity outgrowing its India obsession, Pakistani commentators had noted that India had not figured as an electoral issue in the last general elections there. If so, why should the prime minister’s visit at this juncture play electorally in favour of the civilian government, especially President Asif Ali Zardari’s, in any significant way? India, in fact, has never been in a position to influence internal developments in Pakistan to suit its interests. We should discard any illusions in this regard.

While Zardari, no doubt, has relatively congenial views on India, they do not get reflected sufficiently in policymaking. Pakistan’s president, highly embattled politically, is hardly in a position to deliver on substantive issues. In any case, the civilian government cannot escape responsibility for the lack of progress on various issues that bedevil our relations, apart from trade where different dynamics are at play. Let us also not forget that it is not the military that created Pakistan but civilian politicians. Civilian politicians were fully complicit in Pakistan’s Afghanistan adventure, the unleashing of terrorism in Kashmir, the country’s clandestine nuclear and missile exchanges with North Korea and the anti-Indian thrust of the China relationship. We should not entrap ourselves into the civilian good guys versus the military bad guys equation.

Elections are due in Pakistan latest by February 2013. Before that, a caretaker government will take over. For practical reasons, the timing of a prime ministerial visit at this juncture would therefore be ill-advised. For those who advocate that he visit Nankana Sahib on November 28 and his village at Gah should remember that Guru Nanak’s jayanti will be celebrated next year too and Gah will not be effaced from the map in the years to come. So, let’s wait for Pakistan to deliver on terrorism first.

India-Pakistan Relations: A Misplaced Euphoria

Satish Chandra

Distinguished Fellow,VIF

It is ironical that at a time when Pakistan’s standing in the international community is down in the dumps its relationship with India is on the mend. While the rationale for the former is clear there is no such simple explanation for the latter.

The downward spiral in Pakistan’s standing in the international community is due to numerous factors notably its having been exposed as a source of terrorism, its role as a spoiler in finding a satisfactory resolution to the Afghan problem, its unsavoury record as a proliferator, and finally its emergence as a nation whose democratic credentials are suspect and where the observance of the rule of law is more the exception than the norm.

In contrast, there is no such linear logic to explain the upward trend in Pakistan’s relations with India as would seem to be case from the near euphoric statements being made in this regard from many sections, official and non official, in the latter. Have the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks been brought to book by Pakistan? No. Instead terrorists like Hafiz Saeed are allowed to function freely and openly spew venom against India. Has Pakistan wound down the infrastructure of terror created by it for use against India? No. Indeed, after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 there have been at least three other major Pakistani inspired terrorist attacks against India. Has Pakistan handed over to India any of the 50 or so terrorists elements like Dawood Ibrahim whose extradition had been requested by the latter? No. Has Pakistan stopped trying to push infiltrators into Kashmir? No. Has Pakistan shown any indication of genuinely seeking reconciliation with India by giving up its opposition to India’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, by curbing the pumping in of fake currency into India or by desisting from pursuing an India centric nuclear policy? No. On the contrary it has encouraged the formation of the Defence of Pakistan Council led by extremists like Hafiz Saeed who revel in making aggressive anti Indian statements.

In the light of the foregoing it would be obvious to all objective analysts that there is no basic change of heart in Pakistan about India and that a new dawn in the relationship between the two countries is not on the cards in the foreseeable future. Indeed, given Pakistan’s continued involvement in terrorism directed against India another major terrorist incident in India is just waiting to happen.

Notwithstanding the foregoing many in India still insist on projecting a new found positivity in Pakistan’s attitude towards India on the basis of the very fact of Zardari’s April 8th visit to India, his call for “better relations”, Kayani’s subsequent assertion about the need for peaceful coexistence between the two countries and resolution of all issues, and Pakistan’s move towards according India MFN treatment. In this context, one may caution that it would be imprudent to be swayed by sweet nothings which is the sum and substance of Zardari’s India visit and the assertions made by Kayani and him. They by no means represent any tangible positivity on Pakistan’s stance vis a vis India and have merely been induced by the desire to ensure a peaceful eastern front at a time when Pakistan is under considerable pressure from the USA and has a troubled western front. It is, ofcourse, true that on trade Pakistan has made some forward movement by progressing from a positive list to a negative list though one should note that it is yet to accord MFN status to India. It must also be clearly understood that the halting moves taken by Pakistan in this regard are in part in response to our accord of MFN treatment to Pakistan way back in the 1990’s, and in part in response to our not having opposed the EU move to provide Pakistani textiles duty free access to the Eurozone even though this adversely affected our own textile exports. Finally, it should be kept in mind that by deciding to give India MFN treatment Pakistan is only doing itself a favour as its failure to do so all these years has denied it access to cheaper Indian goods---- something which is particularly painful at a time when its economy is in dire straits.

Clearly, projections of a change of heart in Pakistan vis a vis India are untenable. They are also unfortunate as they have created a totally misplaced euphoria about the possible upward trajectory of India-Pakistan relations and induced all manner of ill considered calls for further concessions by India to woo Pakistan even in disregard of all security implications. Such calls are gathering traction as our Prime Minister is all set to visit Pakistan within the next few months and a “successful” visit would demand the conclusion of some agreements.

Some of the agreements being touted are an easing of the visa regime, removal of existing restrictions on Pakistani investments in India, and settlement of the Sir Creek and Siachen issues. It is submitted that no such agreements should even be contemplated until and unless there is clear evidence that Pakistan is prepared to bring to book the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, shut down its India centric terrorist infrastructure and give up its inimical attitude towards India. Conclusion of such agreements in the absence of such evidence would not only amount to dishonouring the memories of the countless Indians who have been the victims of Pakistani inspired terror but would also embolden Pakistan to continue to involve itself in terrorist actions directed against India confident that the latter will never penalize it. Furthermore, it needs to borne in mind that even relatively innocuous measures like an easing of visa restrictions or removal of constraints on Pakistani investments in India will exponentially enhance Pakistan’s capabilities to destabilize India and should not, therefore, be considered as long as the former does not give up its inimical approach towards India. In this context, one need only refer to recent reports to the effect that Pakistan has been using the eased travel opportunities across the LOC for smuggling large amounts of fake currency into India.

Finally, as regards the proposed agreements on Sir Creek and Siachen the same will only be reached if India makes all the concessions. Historically, on no issue has Pakistan made any major concession and agreements between it and India have only been arrived at on when the latter has done all the running. Though the differences between the two countries on both issues are relatively small there is no reason for India to make any special gestures as long as Pakistan continues to give us no satisfaction on the issue of terrorism and retains its inimical mindset vis a vis India. This is all the more so as the special gestures made by India in the past as in the Indus Waters Treaty and in the Simla Agreement have earned it no gratitude or appreciation from Pakistan.

Both on Sir Creek and Siachen, though the differences between the two countries are relatively small they embody important issues of principle and there is no reason why India should make concessions and give in to the utterly unreasonable demands made by Pakistan.

Specifically, in respect of Sir Creek while India has taken the internationally accepted position that the boundary between the two counties should be the mid channel of the Creek, Pakistan demands that it should be the eastern shore line of the Creek. While acceptance by India of the Pakistani position would entail a marginal loss of territory on land it will have a much greater adverse impact in the determination of our maritime boundary and Extended Economic Zone. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate for us to give up our principled position on the issue. This is all the more so as the region is believed to be rich in hydrocarbons.

In respect of Siachen both sides have been calling for a demilitarization of the area and withdrawal of forces to specified points. It has, however, not been possible to arrive at an agreement as Pakistan has been unwilling to authenticate the existing location of the forces of the two sides. This is essential in order to be able to establish breach of faith by either side. Given Pakistan’s proclivity to violate such understandings with India, as most recently demonstrated by their breach of the LOC in 1999 which led to the Kargil conflict, it would be imprudent for us to give up our insistence on Pakistan’s authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line. Indeed, some may argue and rightly so that we should not pursue an agreement at all on this issue because when it was originally mooted in the 1980’s we were taking many casualties in the area which is not the case today due to vastly improved logistics. Furthermore, while we could, in the 1980’s and 1990’s, have addressed Pakistan’s stealthy occupation of the area, through a breach of faith, by bringing to bear our superiority in conventional arms this is much more difficult in the current nuclearised environment. Above all we should not lose sight of the fact that demilitarization of Siachen will enhance the possibility of Sino-Pak collusive activity in the area.

Much Ado About Little

Kanwal Sibal

The outcome of President Zardari’s unplanned private visit has been largely what any objective observer would have anticipated. It could not have broken new ground as it was not preceded by any intensive preparatory diplomacy. The India-Pakistan relationship is neither on the edge of a precipice as it was after the Indian parliament was attacked in 2001, nor blocked as it became after the November 2008 terrorist mayhem in Mumbai.

India and Pakistan have resumed their composite dialogue. An established mechanism for discussing differences now exists, and the state of relations is being reviewed at the highest political level periodically.

Prime Minister has met the top Pakistani leaders several times abroad and in India. Zardari’s visit was therefore needed neither to deblock a stalled dialogue nor give a missing political impetus to toughly negotiated structured discussions already taking place.

In any case, he is hardly in a position to cut through all the vexed issues bedevilling bilateral ties as his own leadership in Pakistan is being contested by powerful lobbies. The visit could not therefore have been but low key in substance.

Progress in normalizing ties between the two countries has been slow because the issues are burdened by the weight of entrenched positions and deep-seated distrust. Pakistan’s complicity with terrorism is now more exposed than ever. Increasing religious radicalism in Pakistan casts a worrying shadow on India’s own internal management of its religious diversity. Almost four and half years have elapsed after the Mumbai terrorist carnage but the Pakistani authorities have side-tracked through legal obfuscations Indian demands to bring the Pakistani perpetrators to justice.

The Kashmir issue continues to distort Pakistan’s attitude towards peace with India as it is linked to the management of the civilian-military relationship within Pakistan as well as the jihadi groups that are now deeply embedded in Pakistani society. Pakistan has now added the emotive water issue to its differences with India in a way that is feeding anti-Indian paranoia in the country.

The Pakistani establishment has developed the mentality of countering India’s complaints with matching ones of their own. The Pakistani mindset has to change before its policies can change. Zardari may have good intentions and on some issues his position may be relatively more forward-looking, but that hardly warranted any excitement over the prospect of his pilgrimage visit to India delivering concrete results that have escaped the negotiators toiling for them within the framework of the “comprehensive” dialogue.

The political calculation behind the invitation extended by President Zardari and earlier by Prime Minister Gilani to Prime Minister Singh to visit Pakistan has to be analysed in this context. The Pakistani leaders know that our Prime Minister is keen to visit Pakistan and sees normalization of relations with Pakistan as the crowning glory of his political career. Vocal lobbies in India supporting such a visit facilitate Pakistan’s task in pushing for it. No persuasive reasons have been offered by this lobby to justify such a visit except vague and pious hopes that such a gesture would yield good results.

The Prime Minister is tempted but is hesitant to commit himself unless he is assured of substantial, solid results as otherwise he will be accused of political failure in dealing with Pakistan with his soft approach. He was right in telling Prime Minister Gilani that he would be glad to visit Pakistan if there was something solid to celebrate. He has conveyed to President Zardari his willingness to visit Pakistan on a mutually convenient date. This is by no means a time-bound commitment as the later Indian briefing talks of “appropriate time” and “substantive preparations”; it leaves the possibility of a visit open but a “convenient date” should depend on delivery by Pakistan on key issues of concern to India.

Pakistan is pressing for Prime Minister’s visit as the implication would be that it has delivered on the terror issue, including the trial of those responsible for Mumbai, to India’s large satisfaction, and that relations between the two countries have been effectively normalised.

The reality, however, is that after four and a half years there is no forward movement on Mumbai and Hafiz Saeed cannot be curbed because he is politically too powerful, and after the announcement of a US bounty on his head has become a hero in Pakistan as some Pakistani commentators say. On Siachen Pakistan is not willing to formally authenticate the Actual Ground Position Line as that would endorse Indian “aggression” and close any room to undo it if circumstances permit. Pakistan will not cease poisoning domestic public opinion against India on the water issue. If after the Prime Minister’s visit all these issues remain on the table as before, with what conviction would we agitate them thereafter? A premature visit by the Prime Minster is a diplomatic trap. Yes, if the inconceivable happens and Pakistan delivers on some key issues, let the Prime Minister go and justifiably celebrate that solid achievement.

At the one-on-one meeting the Prime Minister asked for the umpteenth time that Pakistan prevent terror attacks against india, try the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack and curb Hafiz Saeed, eliciting a non-committal response from Zardari who, in turn, mentioned Kashmir, Sir Creek and Siachen. All this is well worn ground, which might explain the subdued and matter of fact statements by the two leaders after their meeting, with Prime Minister speaking laconically of finding practical and pragmatic solutions to outstanding issues. Even the breakthrough on trade was not played up. There was a clear attempt by both not to hype up the results of the visit.

All said and done, President Zardari’s visit was much ado about little.

Author is Member Advisory Board in Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary

Little Expected, Little Gained from Zardari Visit

Kanwal Sibal

It was a private visit, but it was unavoidably given an official colour as the Indian prime minister could not have ignored the Pakistani president's presence on Indian soil without creating a misunderstanding.

Observers would have conjectured that India considered the embattled Mr Zardari a spent force incapable of delivering on vital issues whatever his desire for improved relations with India.

The government would have been criticised for missing the opportunity to show India's backing for an elected civilian president at odds with the armed forces who, combined with the judiciary, wanted his ouster.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is, in any case, very keen to make a breakthrough with Pakistan and would have sought this unexpected opportunity to engage with Mr Zardari who was, therefore, invited to Delhi en route to Ajmer for a lunch and a private conversation.

Nothing much was expected from this meeting except a review of various issues and a general exchange of views on further steps needed to make progress.

This is so because India and Pakistan are already engaged in a structured bilateral dialogue covering the whole gamut of bilateral issues whose format and the agenda were agreed after tough negotiations.

One round of this dialogue has already been completed and the second has begun. During this period, the Indian prime minister has met Pakistan's leaders in India and in foreign capitals.

Unhappy History

What India expects from Pakistan is known to the latter; the answers Pakistan gives to India's demands are also known.

If progress in resolving outstanding issues is slow, it is because the issues are overlaid by unhappy history and deep mistrust.

Translating general expressions of friendship and goodwill into practical decisions is very difficult.

India wants satisfaction on the terrorism issue; Pakistan wants "justice" on the Kashmir issue and sees terrorism as a way to force India to yield ground.

This thinking has not been totally discarded even though Pakistan itself has become a prey to the very monster of terrorism it created.

The increasing radicalisation of Pakistan and the impunity with which Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, operates accounts for this.

Now Pakistan has raised the water issue in highly charged terms even though the only agreement that has worked between India and Pakistan is the Indus Waters Treaty.

In these circumstances, to have expected President Zardari's visit to have provided a breakthrough would have been unrealistic.

President Zardari at the Sufi shrine in Ajmer The visit did not live up to the media hype, says Kanwal Sibal

At about 40 minutes, the one-on-one meeting of the leaders was shorter than expected.

In this amount of time all outstanding bilateral as well as regional issues could not have been discussed in any detail.

Prime Minister Singh appears to have spoken, not for the first time to his Pakistani interlocutors, about the need to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice, prevent terror attacks against India from Pakistani soil and curb the activities of Hafiz Saeed.

Mr Zardari seems to have given a non-committal response.

Predictably, the president spoke of Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek - three areas where the two countries dispute control.

It was important for both leaders to assure their publics that "core" issues had been flagged. That both agreed to a step-by-step approach to resolve them only indicates the limited potential of this high-level conversation in Delhi to break new ground.

This step-by-step resolution of issues has lasted a few decades already and could well last a long time more now that there are question marks about Pakistan's future stability, the growing Islamisation of sections of its society and the uncertain consequences for itself and the region of its expected over-reach in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal.

Mr Singh expressed his appreciation of the steps taken by Pakistan on the trade front.

More could have been said about this positive development in bilateral ties in the statements by the two leaders and the later briefing on their talks by the Indian side.

Subdued Terms

Why this was not done is not clear. Perhaps Mr Zardari was reluctant because he does not want to be personally associated too much with this initiative which he undoubtedly favours, leaving its positive profiling to his government.

Somewhat surprisingly, the two leaders spoke after their meeting to the press in uncharacteristically subdued terms, with the Indian prime minister speaking laconically of finding practical and pragmatic solutions to the outstanding issues and the Pakistani president being even more bland.

Much has been made in the Indian media about the invitation to Mr Singh to visit Pakistan.

Pakistan is pressing for his visit as that would imply that it has delivered on the terror issue, including the trial of those responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack, and that relations between the two countries have been effectively normalised.

Mr Singh wants to go but he wants concrete results that would vindicate his policy of engaging Pakistan despite its recalcitrance on the issue of terrorism, an approach that has many critics in the country.

A premature visit by the prime minister could be highly counter-productive for him personally and for the country. Hence his caution.

In response to Mr Zardari's reiteration of an invitation to visit Pakistan "soon", Mr Singh has indicated his readiness to go on a "mutually convenient date", nuanced to an "appropriate time" in the briefing later by the Indian ministry of external affairs with the added caveat of "mutually acceptable dates" and "substantive preparations" beforehand.

All in all, the visit did not live up to the media hype, but it served its purpose of maintaining high-level engagement with Pakistan in the hope that incremental progress could be made in resolving the difficult issues that bedevil the bilateral relationship.

Author is Member Advisory Board in Vivekananda International Foundation and Former Foreign Secretary